WWW.IPPR.

ORG

StatesofConflict
Acasestudyonstate-buildingin
Afghanistan
WilliamMaley

November2009
©ippr2009

InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch
Challengingideas– Changingpolicy
2 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Contents
Aboutippr ............................................................................................................................. 3
Abouttheauthor.................................................................................................................. 3
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 3
‘StatesofConflict’................................................................................................................. 3
Introduction........................................................................................................................... 4
Historicalbackground............................................................................................................ 5
Thenatureofinternationalinvolvement............................................................................... 8
Assessmentofinternationalinvolvementandlessonslearned........................................... 11
SomepolicyimplicationsforAfghanistan ........................................................................... 13
References ........................................................................................................................... 16
3 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Aboutippr
TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(ippr)istheUK’sleadingprogressivethinktank,
producingcutting-edgeresearchandinnovativepolicyideasforajust,democraticand
sustainableworld.
Since1988,wehavebeenattheforefrontofprogressivedebateandpolicymakinginthe
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ThispaperwasfirstpublishedinNovember2009.©ippr2009

Abouttheauthor
WilliamMaleyisProfessorandDirectoroftheAsia-PacificCollegeofDiplomacyatThe
AustralianNationalUniversity,Australia.

Acknowledgements
ipprisgratefultotheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentandtheSwedish
ForeignMinistryfortheirgenerousfundingofthispieceofwork.

‘StatesofConflict’
Thispaperisoneofaseries.TheotherpaperscoverMacedonia,Kosovo,BosniaandHaiti.
DueforpublicationinAutumn2009,theywillbeavailablefrom
www.ippr.org/publicationsandreports

ipprCommissiononNationalSecurityinthe21stCentury
From2007to2009ipprhostedanindependentall-partyCommissiononNational
Securityinthe21stCentury,co-chairedbyLordGeorgeRobertsonandLordPaddy
Ashdown.ReadaboutthefindingsoftheCommissionandviewtheinterimandfinal
reportsatwww.ippr.org.uk/security
4 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Introduction
Afghanistanpresentsoneofthemostcomplicatedandtroublingchallengestoconfrontthe
internationalcommunityintheearlyyearsofthetwenty-firstcentury.Thedriftofattention
fromAfghanistantoIraqin2002–03ledtoadisastrouslossofmomentuminthetransition
inauguratedbytheoverthrowoftheTalibanregimeinNovember2001,andtheinstallation
justoveramonthlaterofaninterimAdministrationheadedbyHamedKarzai.Sincethen,
thecountry’sproblemshavebeencompoundedbythedevelopmentofadysfunctional
constitutionalframework,byaidprogrammesthattoooftenfuelledcorruption,andby
violentattacksinthesouthandeastofthecountrycarriedoutbyTalibangroupssustained
bysanctuariesinneighbouringPakistan.
AllthesefactorshaveledtoaseriousfallinconfidenceonthepartofordinaryAfghans.The
proportionbelievingthattheircountryismovingintherightdirectionhasfallenfrom64per
centin2004to42percentin2009(AsiaFoundation2004,2009).Thesefactorshavealso
contributedtoagrowingmalaiseamongthecountry’sinternationalsupporters,someof
whomarenowrecommendingnegotiationswiththeTalibanasthebestwayoutofthe
quagmire.
Focusingsimplyonthesefactors,however,canleadtoanunderestimationofthedepthof
Afghanistan’sproblems.Manyofwhatareseenas‘governance’problemsunderPresident
Karzaihavemuchdeeperroots,andcanbeattributedtothecollapseoftheAfghanstate
andtheseriousproblemsofreconstitutingandre-legitimisingthestatewhenlevelsoftrust
betweenpoliticalactorsarelowandexpectationsofwhatthestatecandeliverare
unrealisticallyhigh.Suchproblemscannotbeovercomeeasilyorquickly,anditisabsurdto
expectanyAfghanpoliticalleadertobeabletodelivermagicsolutions,althoughdifferent
leadersmayapproachtheirtasksindifferentways.Afghanistanhasnowexperiencedmore
than30yearsofturmoil,andawholegenerationofyoungAfghanshasknownnothing
different.ItisnaivetoexpectthatAfghanistancanbeextractedfromitsdifficultiesathigh
speed,andmanagingthisburdenconstitutesanimmensechallengeforanyAfghan
leadership.
TheeffortstostabiliseAfghanistansincetheoverthrowoftheTalibanregimehave
involvedcomplexendeavoursonthepartofdiverseactorsintheinternationalcommunity,
andcomponentsofAfghansocietyatbothmassandelitelevels.Althoughtheinternal
Afghancontributions,bothpositiveandnegative,shouldnotbeunderestimated(see
Maley2006),thefocusofthiscasestudyisprimarilyontheactivitiesofthewiderworld.
Thestoryisnotahappyone,withdedicationonthepartofsomeglobalactors
underminedbyincompetenceandlimitedattentionspanonthepartofothers.Ifthereisa
broaderlessonfromthiscase,itisthattherecanbenointernational‘quickfixes’for
severelydisruptedstates.Thislessonalsoappliesasgovernmentscontemplatehowbestto
proceedinAfghanistanfromthispoint.
5 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Historicalbackground
Afghanistanisnotableforthecomplexityofitssociety,politicsandgeopoliticalenvironment,
andthesecomplexitieshelpexplainthetangledcourseofitshistory(Saikal2004).Islamis
thereligionoftheoverwhelmingmajorityofthepopulation,dividedintoasignificantShiite
MuslimminorityandaSunniMuslimmajority.Morethan50ethnicgroupshavebeen
identifiedinAfghanistan(Schetter2003),withethnicPushtunsmakingupthelargestsingle
group(althoughprobablylessthanhalfoftheoverallpopulation).Arangeoflanguagesare
alsospokenwithinAfghanistan’sborders,andthepopulationisoccupationallydifferentiated
incomplexways,withurbanlifequitedifferentfromrural,andsharpdistinctionsinsocial
rolesaccordingtogenderaswell.
Afghanistan’spoliticallifehasbeensimilarlyfragmented.Inthe1960s,studentsgraduating
fromKabulUniversitywereexposedtoMarxismatoneendofthepoliticalspectrumandto
IslamistideasofMiddleEasternoriginattheother.Thisledtoincreasingdivisionwithinthe
Kabul-basedpoliticalclasswhichflaredspectacularlyintoviewwiththecommunistcoupof
April1978andtheSovietinvasionofAfghanistaninDecember1979.Thestrugglebetween
Soviet-backedcommunistsandforcesoftheAfghanresistance(the Mujahideen)reinforced
ideologicaldifferencesthatwerealreadythere.
ButafterthecollapseofthecommunistregimeinApril1992,newsortsofforcesemerged.
Pakistan,wantingtoblockanyre-emergenceoftheAfghannationalismthathadpoisoned
thetwocountries’bilateralrelationsinearliertimes,threwitsweightbehindtheradical
Hezb-eIslami(PartyofIslam)ofGulbuddinHekmatyar.WhentheHezb-eIslamiproved
incapableofseizingKabulorholdingotherterritories,itthenshifteditssupporttothenew
Taliban(seeRashid2000),whoweresomewhatinjudiciouslydescribedbyPakistan’sInterior
Ministeras‘ourboys’(Murshed2006:45).
ThisPakistaniinvolvementledtofiercestrugglesforcontroloftheAfghancapitalbetween
1992and1996,whentheTalibanmovementmanagedtooccupyit.TheTaliban,however,
provedtobeananti-modernistforcewithnoreconstructionagendaandverylittle
understandingofthewiderworld(Maley2000).Theyfailedtosecuresignificant
internationalrecognitionandtheirgrowingpatronageofextremistssuchasOsamaBin
Ladenmeantthatwhenthe11Septemberattackstookplacein2001,theTalibanhadfew
friendsleft.
FollowingtheinvasionledbytheUnitedStatesin2001,thetestfortheinternational
communityhasnotsimplybeenthere-establishmentofanAfghangovernment.Adeeper
andmoreprofoundchallengehasbeenthereconstitutionoftheAfghanstate,ataskthat
involvesthedevelopmentofbothcapacityandlegitimacy.TheAfghanstatewasfragile
evenbeforethedestabilisationcausedbythecommunistcoup(seeRubin2002),andwith
theSovietinvasionofAfghanistan,theabilityofAfghanrulerstoraisesignificantlocal
revenueswaslostasthebulkofthepopulationlivedinareasoutsidethestate’scontrol.
Thus,thecessationofaidfromtheSovietUnion,whichtriggeredthedisintegrationofthe
AfghancommunistregimeinApril1992,didnotsomuchcausethecollapseofthestate
asexposeit.
Furthermore,itisamistaketoassumethatthereconstitutionofthestateisanobjective
thatwouldnecessarilyenjoynear-universalsupport.Indeed,anumberofunsavouryactors,
suchascriminalnetworks,standtobenefitfromtheabsenceorweaknessofthestate.Anda
muchwiderrangeofordinarypeople,whilewelcomingtheideaofaneffectivestate,may
nonethelessbereluctanttoshifttheirloyaltiesfromlocalsourcesofprotectionthathave
provedofvalueintroubledtimes(suchastribesorevenwarlords)infavourofanuntried,
untestedandremotenewadministrationthatisnotwellplacedtoassistthemiftheyrun
intodifficulties(Mukhopadhyay2009).
6 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Thisproblemhasbeencompoundedbythatofelitefragmentation.Therearegoodreasons
tobelievethataconsensually-unifiedelite,oneinwhichtherearesharedunderstandingsof
thenormsofbehaviourthatmakeapoliticalsystemwork,isaprerequisiteforthe
establishmentofastablepoliticalorderinwhichordinarypeoplecanusemechanismsof
popularchoicetochangetheirrulerswithoutbloodshed.Yettheturbulencethathas
afflictedAfghanistanforthelastthreedecadeshasprovidedanythingbutpropitious
conditionsfortheemergenceofcooperativeformsofbehaviourinwhichdifferentpolitical
actorsarepreparedtotrusteachother.
ThescaleofAfghanistan’ssufferingsince1978–79isoftennotfullyappreciated.Ofapre-
warsettledpopulationestimatedatjustover13millionpeople,morethan6.2millionhad
beendisplacedtoneighbouringcountriesasrefugeesby1990,withcountlessothers
displacedinternally(SchmeidlandMaley2008).Inaddition,vastinfrastructuredamagehad
occurred,andthehumantollofwarwasenormous,withoneconservativecalculation
suggestingthatinthedecadefollowingthecommunistcoup,onaveragemorethan240
Afghansperishedeverydayfor10yearsstraight(Khalidi1991).
Thiscontext–aseverelyweakenedstate,afragmentedeliteandmassivesocialdamage–
decisivelyshapedtheagendaofpolitical,economicandsocialreconstructioninthepost-
2001period.Theformalframeworkfortheseactivitieswassuppliedbytheso-called‘Bonn
process’,whichoriginatedwithaconferenceinBonn,Germany,inNovemberandDecember
2001.Themeetingbroughttogetheranumberofkeynon-TalibanAfghanpoliticalactors,
undertheauspicesoftheUnitedNationsandinparticulartheUNSecretary-General’s
SpecialRepresentative,AmbassadorLakhdarBrahimi,tonegotiateapathwayforward(see
Dobbins2008).
TheagreementstruckatBonnwasasophisticatedone.Itrecognisedthatnosingle
mechanismtobuildthelegitimacyofnewarrangementswouldbestrongenoughtoattract
thesupportofallkeyelementsofAfghansociety.Thus,itcombinedamixtureof
legitimationstrategies:theestablishmentofanInterimAdministrationheadedbya
charismaticChair,HamidKarzai;theholdingoftwoLoyaJirgas,ortraditionaltribal
assemblies,thefirsttoelevatetheInterimAdministrationtothehigherlevelofaTransitional
Administration,andthesecondtodraftanewconstitution;thereturntoaceremonial
positionofformerKingZahir,whohadoccupiedthethronefornearlyfourdecadesbefore
beingoverthrowninapalacecoupinJuly1973;and,ultimately,theholdingoffreeandfair
electionsinaccordancewiththerequirementsoftheconstitution.
Thesebenchmarkswereallmet,toconsiderableinternationalapplause.The‘Emergency Loya
Jirga’washeldfrom11–19June2002,andaffirmedKarzai’sposition,althoughitwas
perhapsmorenotableforthedeterminedeffortsofPresidentGeorgeW.Bush’senvoy,the
Afghan-bornDrZalmayKhalilzad,toheadoffmovesbysupportersofZahirShahtogivethe
formermonarchanenhancedrole,andforarm-twistingbehindthescenesbytheDefence
Minister,MohammadQasimFahim.
AttheconstitutionalLoyaJirga,heldfrom14December2003to4January2004,therewas
againalotofattemptedarm-twistingbyFahim.However,onthatoccasion,itwasagood
deallesssuccessful,pointingtoawidererosionofthepositionoftheso-called‘Northern
Alliance’groupsthathadplayedacentralroleinopposingtheTalibanmilitarilyin
Afghanistan.Theresultingconstitutioncreated,onpaperatleast,astrongexecutive
presidency,withamuchweakerbicameralParliamentwithanelectedLowerHouse(Wolesi
Jirga).Apresidentialelectionwasheldon9October2004,andKarzaiwoncomfortablywith
55.4percentofthevote(althoughheonlynarrowlyavoidedarunoffelection,whichthe
French-stylesystemofelectingthepresidentwouldhaverequired,hadnocandidate
obtainedmorethan50percentofthevoteinthefirstroundofpolling).Finally,on18
September2005,electionswereheldfortheWolesiJirga,anditmetforthefirsttimein
Decemberofthatyear.
7 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Whilethesemeasurestorebuildthepoliticalsystemwerebeingpursued,agreatdealof
activitywasoccurringineconomicandsocialspherestoo.Majorinternationalconferences
wereheldinTokyo(inJanuary2002),inBerlin(inMarchtoApril2004)andinLondon(in
2006)toelicitsupportforAfghanreconstructionandtoendorsestrategicplansforthe
specificsofreconstructionactivity.Theseculminatedintheapprovalin2006ofanupdated
AfghanistanNationalDevelopmentStrategy(ANDS),theimplementationofwhichwastobe
overseenbyaJointCoordinationandMonitoringBoard(JCMB),co-chairedbyasenior
AfghanofficalandtheSpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretary-General.
SomereconstructionactivitieswereundertakenbyAfghanministries,fundedpartlyby
locally-raisedrevenueandpartlyfromfundscontributedbydonorgovernmentstoan
AfghanReconstructionTrustFund.Otherswereundertakenbyinternationalorganisations,
privatecommercialcontractorsorsub-contractors,ornon-governmentalorganisations
(NGOs),forthemostpartdrawingondirectfundingstreamsthatbypassedtheAfghan
governmentaltogether.Toevenacasualvisitor,Kabulseemsanotherworldentirelyfrom
whatitwasduringtheTalibanera,andmanyofthechangesareindubitablyforthebetter.
YetthesenseofcrisiscurrentlysurroundingAfghanistanisdeepandpervasive.Thereisfar
moretoAfghanistanthantheKabulbubble,andevenKabulisnotassafeasitmayappear.
InthewordsoftheeminentjournalistandcommentatorAhmedRashid,iftheUSandNATO
wereto‘starttopulloutofAfghanistanduringthenexttwelvemonths…[t]hatwould
almostcertainlyresultintheTalibanwalkingintoKabul’(Rashid2009).
Threeparticularfactorshavecontributedtothissituation.Thefirstisthere-emergenceof
insurgencyinAfghanistan,withPakistan-basedTalibanfightersmountingattackswith
improvisedexplosivedevices(IEDs)andotherweaponsonbothAfghanciviliansand
internationalforces,especiallyinthesouthbutincreasinglyintheeastandevenpartsofthe
north.ThesehavebeencomplementedbyattackscarriedoutbyHekmatyar’sHezb,andby
anetworkofcombatantslinkedtotheformerMujahideen commanderJalaluddinHaqqani,a
networkthatPakistan’sArmychiefinMay2008reportedlydescribedasa‘strategicasset’
(Sanger2009:248).
ThesecondistheweaklegitimacyoftheAfghanstateanditsfailuretosecurethenormative
supportoftheAfghanpeople.Intransitionalphasesindisruptedstateslegitimacyisstrongly
relatedtotheperformanceofthegovernment,andinAfghanistanthereisgreat
disappointmentathowthegovernmenthasperformed(Maley2008).FormanyAfghansthe
shamelessfraudthattaintedthe20August2009electionsmayhavebeennearlythelast
straw.Ofcourse,theAfghangovernmenthasbeenseverelyconstrainedbyresourcescarcity,
bythedesireofsomedonorstodeterminehowfundstheydonatewillbespent,andby
problemsofinsecurityarisingfromtheTaliban’sresurgence,butthatmakeslittledifference
toAfghansconfrontedbyproblemsofcorruption,abuseofpowerandinjusticeonadaily
basis.
ThethirdfactoristhepervasiveinfluenceofcriminalityinAfghanistan–mostvisibleinthe
abilityofmanygangsandsyndicatestoactwithimpunity–andintheriseofopium
productionfrom185tonnesin2001to6,900tonnesin2009.Someoftheprofitsfrom
theseillicitactivitieshavefoundtheirwaytotheTaliban(Peters2009).Criminalitycanbe
justasgreatablightonthedailylivesofordinarypeopleasinsurgency,andagovernment
thatcannotconfrontcriminalsislikelytobeseenaslittlebetterthanthecriminals
themselves.
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Thenatureofinternationalinvolvement
Inallthesedevelopments,thewiderworldhasbeenheavilyinvolved.Afghanistanisno
longertheexotic,isolatedlandofnineteenthcenturyOrientalistimagery:rather,itisdeeply
entangledinthecomplexpoliticsofitsregion,inprocessesofglobalisationthathave
transformedtheworldaroundit,andinthepoliciesofmajorpowersandofmultilateral
agenciesandinstitutions.TounderstandAfghanistan’schallenges,itisessentialtoseenot
onlyhowitsdomesticcomplexitiesshapeitsprospects,butalsohowitmirrorsthe
complexitiesoftheworld.Thisinvolvesinturnanunderstandingofthespecificformsof
internationalengagementthathaveoccurredinAfghanistansince2001.
Attheoutset,itisimportanttograspjusthowmanyinternationalactorshavebeeninvolved
inAfghanistan.Adominantplayer,ofcourse,hasbeentheUnitedStates,butmanyother
stateactorshavebeeninvolvedaswell:theUnitedStates’NATOallies,includingtheUnited
Kingdom,non-NATOalliessuchasAustralia,andotherstatesthathavebeeninvolvedas
financialcontributors,suchasJapan,orascontributorsoflargenumbersofpersonnelasaid
workersorcontractors,suchasIndia.Thisdiversityisreflectedinthenumberofembassies
thathavebeenopenedinKabul,andintheactivitiesofgovernment-basedaidbureaucracies
suchastheUK’sDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DfID)andtheUnitedStates
AgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID).
ThereisalsoasubstantialmultilateralpresenceinKabulandbeyond.TheUnitedNations
AssistanceMissioninAfghanistan(UNAMA),establishedbyUNSecurityCouncilResolution
1401of28March2002,nominallysitsattheapexoftheUnitedNationsorganisational
‘family’,butmanyothermembersofthat‘family’–notablytheUNDevelopment
Programme(UNDP),OfficeoftheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees
(UNHCR)andChildren’sFund(UNICEF),theWorldFoodProgrammeandtheWorldBank–
haveentrenchedpresences,andtendtoadopttheirownapproachestoproblem-solving.
BeyondtheUNandBrettonWoodssystemsareanumberofothermultilateralagencies,
suchastheAsianDevelopmentBank,andaplethoraofinternationalandlocalNGOs,some
ofthemveryexperiencedinworkingintheAfghanenvironment(suchastheSwedish
CommitteeforAfghanistan),butothersmuchlessso.Andincreasinglythereareprivate
commercialcontractorsplayingsignificantrolesasimplementingagencies.
TheUNactorshaveplayeddiverserolesinoneparticularlyimportantsphere,namely
assistanceintheprocessofinstitutionaldevelopment.TheBonnAgreementdeliberatelyleft
manyquestionsabouttheshapeoftheAfghanpoliticalsystemforAfghansthemselvesto
resolve,aspartofwhatwasexplicitlylabelleda‘lightfootprint’approachtoinvolvementin
Afghanistan(incontrasttotheapproachtakeninotherrecentUNmissions,suchasthatof
theUNTransitionalAdministrationinEastTimor).However,infacilitatinginstitutional
development,theUNplayedanumberofroles.ItoversawtheprocessofselectionofLoya
Jirga delegatestodraftthenewconstitution,andwhiletheselectionprocessesclearlydid
notmeetthestandardsoffreedomandfairnessrequiredforacredibleelection,theywere
moreinclusivethanwouldhavebeenthecasehadexistingpowerholderssimplydemanded
placesintheLoyaJirga fortheirclientsandsupporters(Rubin2004).
TheUNwasalsoheavilyinvolvedintherunningofthe2004election,throughaJoint
ElectoralManagementBody(JEMB)inwhichtwoeminentinternationalelections
administrators,ReginaldAustinofZimbabweandDavidAveryofAustralia,playedcritical
roles.(In2005,adifferentapproachwastaken,withtheUNDPplayingtheleadroleforthe
UNinelectoralassistance.)Butbeyondformalities,theshapingofapoliticalenvironment
hasmuchtodowithpromotingtrustbetweendifferentlocalactors,andhere,Ambassador
Brahimi,whorepresentedtheSecretary-Generaluntilearly2004,playedacriticalandlargely
successfulrole.
9 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Internationalactorshavealsobeendeeplyinvolvedineconomicandsocialreconstruction,
notjustascontributorsofresources,butalsoasagentsofmanagementandcoordination.It
isimportanttonotethattheissueofhowreconstructionshouldbepursued,ordevelopment
promoted,isnotanarrowlytechnicalquestion,butonethatraisesdeepquestionsaboutthe
appropriaterolesofthestateandofmarketsindeterminingresourceallocationsandincome
distribution.Furthermore,effectivemarketsdonotexistintheabsenceofaframeworkof
rulesandnorms:a‘civileconomy’,asRichardRosehaspointedout,‘isamarketeconomy
operatingwithinaclearlegalframework’(Rose1992:14).Theimplicationisthateconomic
developmentwillnecessarilybeshapedbyprogressinsuchareasasthereconstitutionofthe
ruleoflawandofjudicial,policingandpenalsystems.Yetthishasprovedoneofthemost
frustratingaspectsofinternationalinvolvementinAfghanistan.
Responsibilityforsupportingreconstructioneffortsinrelatedsphereshasinanumberofkey
casesbeendividedbetweendifferentactorsaccordingtoa‘leadnation’model.Thus,
supportingthere-establishmentofafunctioningcourtsystemwasassumedasa
responsibilitybythegovernmentofItaly,whileGermanytookresponsibilityforpolicereform.
Aswellascomplexitiessurroundingthedivisionofresponsibilitiesbetweendifferentforeign
actors,therehavealsobeendifficultiesrelatingtotherelativeauthorityofthedonor
communityandtheAfghangovernment.Hereonewitnessestheentanglementofdifferent
politicalsystemsandpressures.Donorcountriesareresponsibletotheirownpublics,andthe
desiretodemonstraterapidprogresscandrivereconstructioninthedirectionof‘quick
impactprojects’.TheAfghanGovernment,bycontrast,haseveryreasontowishtoassertits
ownsovereignty,andtoencourageprojectsthatreflectitsprioritiesratherthanthoseofthe
donors.This,ofcourse,isanissueinmanydifferentcontexts(JenkinsandPlowden2006).
Itisinthesphereofsecuritythattheinvolvementofthewiderworldhasbeenmost
extensive.TheinternationalmilitarypresenceinAfghanistanhasnotonlybecomeamatter
ofdomesticcontroversyinmanyWesterncountries,buthasalsobeenusedbytheTalibanin
theirpropaganda,whichseekstodepicttheiractivitiesasastruggleofMuslimsagainstnon-
Muslimforeigners(InternationalCrisisGroup2008).Someseeaforeignpresenceasthe
factorfuellinginsurgencyinAfghanistan(LodhiandLieven2009),butthisclaimismore
oftenmadethansubstantiated,andresearchcarriedoutfortheBBCandreleasedin
February2009showedconsiderablepopularsupportforacontinuedNATO/International
SecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)(59percent)andUSmilitarypresence(63percent).
AcertainlevelofinternationalmilitarypresencewasunavoidableinAfghanistanafter2001.
TheUSwaskeentouseitsforcestopursuealQaeda,andtheBonnparticipantshad
themselvesformallyrequestedthedeploymentofanInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce
tobridgethesecuritygapthathadarisenintheaftermathoftheTalibanregime’scollapse.
ThedeploymentofISAFthroughoutAfghanistandidnotcomeaboutimmediately,butfrom
October2003,ISAFpersonnelspreadbeyondKabul,andon9August2003NATOformally
assumedresponsibilityforISAFCommand.
Theorganisationalframeworkwithinwhichmanymilitarypersonnelcametobedeployed
wastheso-called‘ProvincialReconstructionTeam’(PRT),aforcewithmixedmilitaryand
reconstructionresponsibilities–althoughitrapidlybecameclearthattherewasnosingle
PRT‘model’,butratherarangeofapproachesthatreflectedthestructures,culturesand
wealthofthecontributingmilitaries(YaqubandMaley2008).However,withthegrowthof
insurgency,manymilitariesthatoriginallysawtheAfghanistanmissionasatworstan
exercisein‘conflictualpeacebuilding’(SuhrkeandStrand2005)havefoundthemselves
caughtupinfiercecombatwhichhascostmanylives–withtheUKandCanadasuffering
particularlyfromviolentattacksinHelmandandKandaharrespectively.Theroutetoeventual
exithasseemedtomanytobethereformoftheAfghansecuritysector,throughthe
establishmentofanewAfghanNationalArmy(ANA)andtherecruitmentofanAfghan
NationalPolice.However,thepolice-buildingexperiencehasbeenwidelyviewedasacostly
failure(Wilder2007),anditisunclearwhethereventheANA,whichhasamuchbetter
reputation,wouldhangtogetherordisintegrateifitfacedrealpressure(Maley2009b).
10 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Thereisoneotherareaofinternationalinvolvementthathasbeenofimportanceinshaping
Afghanistan’srecentdestiny,andthathasbeeninthetheatreofregionalrelationsinSouth
andSouthwestAsia.Throughmuchofthe1990s,Afghanistanwasneglectedbythemajor
powers,butitbecameabattlegroundforinfluencebetweenregionalactors(seeColl2005
andGutman2008).AfghansoftencriticisethebehaviouroftheWesternforcesintheir
countrybutthisdoesnotmeanthattheywanttoseethemleave,sincethatwouldlikely
turnAfghanistanintosuchabattlegroundonceagain.Pakistaninparticularhashadalong
historyofdisruptivemeddlinginAfghanistan(Hussain2005),bothtolimitIndianinfluence
andtopreventtheresurfacingofthe‘Pushtunistan’territorialdisputethatpoisoned
Pakistan–Afghanistanrelationsfromthelate1940stothelate1970s.
However,untilveryrecently,Pakistan’sactivitiesattractedlittlepubliccommentfrom
WashingtonorLondon,inpartbecausePresidentBushregardedPakistaniPresident
Musharrafasanally,andinpartbecausesecuritycooperationfromPakistanwasvery
importantfortheUKaftertheLondonbombingsof7July2005.Nordidmajorpower
diplomacygivemuchattentiontotheneedtoviewAfghanistan’sproblemsinawider
regionalcontext(seeRubinetal 2001).Thereluctanceofthewiderworldtoaddressthe
issueofperfidiousbehaviourbyPakistanwassomethingthattheKarzaigovernment
understandablyfoundextremelyfrustrating,anditisonlysinceBarackObamaassumedthe
USpresidencythattheproblemofPakistanhasbeguntoreceivetheattentionitdeserves.
11 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

Assessmentofinternationalinvolvementandlessonslearned
Thesectionsaboveofferacondensedaccountofsomeoftheareasinwhichinternational
involvementinAfghanistanafter2001hasproducedlessthansterlingresults.These
experiencesintheareasofpolitics,state-building,aidandthemanagementoftransitionina
worldcrowdedwithissuesoffersomesoberinglessonsaboutwhatmightberequiredto
makethingsworkbetterinthefuture,bothinAfghanistanandinothercountriesemerging
fromsevereinternalstrife.
Thinkthroughthemeaningof‘state-building’
Afirstlessonisthatmuchmorethoughtneedstobegiventothemeaningof‘state-
building’.TheBonnagreement,forallitsmerits,hadonehugeflaw:itembodiednoserious
reflectiononwhatkindofstateAfghanistanmightrequireforthefuture.AsFukuyamahas
pointedout,thestatecanvaryinbothitsscopeanditsstrength(Fukuyama2004),inthe
rangeofmattersthataretreatedasbeingwithinitspurview,andinthecapacitiesthatithas
todealwithsuchmatters.Astatethatattemptstoomuchwilllikelyendupdoingnothing
reallywell,anditsstandingintheeyesofthepublicislikelytosufferaccordingly.Therisks
thatcouldbeposedbyastrongcentralisedstatehavebeennotedinthepast(Shahrani
1998)andwerehighlightedinastarkcritiquepublishedshortlyaftertheBonnagreement
wasfinalised(OttawayandLieven2002).
InAfghanistan,therewasastrongcaseforidentifyingcertaincoretasksonwhichtofocus–
basicsecurity,governmentfinancereform,thepromotionofprimaryhealthcare,
improvementsineducation,androadbuilding–withasmallnumberofministriestomatch.
Instead,theBonnagreementenvisagedmorethan20departmentsofgovernment,which
weredistributedamongthedifferentpartiesthattookpartinthemeeting.Thishad
disastrousconsequences.These‘parties’werenotpoliticalpartiesintheWesternsenseof
theterm,butpatronagenetworks,andpositionsinthenewstatestructurewerealltoooften
distributedonthebasisofloyaltyratherthancompetence.Thedistributionofdepartments
topoliticalrivalsalsosetthesceneforferociousrivalrybetweendifferentbureaucracies,the
precisedutiesofwhichwerenotoftenclearlydelineated.
TheresultovertimewasagrowingsenseamongAfghansthatthestatewascorruptand
dysfunctional,andadevelopingWesternliteratureemphasisingtheinappropriatenessof
whathadbeenattemptedinAfghanistan(Suhrke2006,2007).State-buildingisnotasimple
‘technical’task.Itrequires,onthecontrary,themostcarefulreflectiononwhatislikelytobe
attainableandacceptableinagivenculturalandpoliticalcontext.
Relyoninstitutions,notindividuals
Asecondlessonisthatitisdangeroustorelyonindividualsratherthaninstitutionsto
sustainatransitionalprocess.ThesadcaseofPresidentKarzaishowsthisalltooclearly.A
minorbutrespectedfigurefromoneofthesmallerMujahideen parties,andamemberofa
distinguishedPushtunfamily,heprovedacceptabletothedifferentparticipantsintheBonn
meetingtochairtheInterimAdministration,andrapidlywonsupportforhisgrace,
inclusivenessandcommitmenttotheideaofamodernAfghanistan.
Astimewenton,however,thesequalitiesprovedlessrelevanttothedailychallengesthat
Afghanistanfaced.AfterhewaselectedPresidentinOctober2004,peoplelookedtoKarzai
totaketheleadinpolicydevelopmentandimplementation.Yetthesewereneverhisareasof
notableskill:hehadgrownup,politically,inthe‘state-free’environmentofMujahideen
politicsinthePakistanicityofPeshawarinthe1980s,anditwastacticaldeal-makingand
alliance-buildingatwhichheexcelled.Thusfrom2004,moreandmoreobserverswere
remarkingonthesluggishperformanceofthestate,anditsinabilitytomeettheaspirations
ofordinaryAfghans.
Karzaiwasbynomeanstoblameforalltheseproblems;hehadnotbeenaparticipantatthe
Bonnmeeting,andhadinheritedsomeofthedefectivepoliticalarrangementsthathadbeen
12 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

createdthere.However,hedidnothaveaclearstrategytoaddressthesedeepstructural
problems.Instead,asthestandingofthegovernmentslipped,hisrelianceontacticsrather
thanstrategyaccelerated,anditculminatedinthedisastrouselectionof20August2009.This
electionwitnessedwhatonecommentatorcalled‘epiclevelsoffraudandvotestealing’(Filkins
2009),withtheindependentElectionComplaintsCommission,onwhichinternationalofficials
wereinamajority,strikingoutover1.2millionvotes,or22.3percentofthe5.66million
allegedlycast(seealsoAfghanistanAnalystsNetwork2009,Boone2009,Ruttig2009).
TheexposureofthefrauddidKarzaianinordinateamountofreputationaldamage,even
thoughevidencedidnotsurfacethatlinkedhimdirectlytoit.Hadtherebeenmore
attentiongivensince2001tonurturinginstitutionalmechanismstoallowordinarypeopleto
rulewell,thecrisiscreatedbythediscoverythatafavouredindividualhadfeetofclaywould
nothavebeenanywherenearasworrisome.
Aidisabluntinstrument
Athirdlessonisthatreconstructionanddevelopmentaidisarelativelybluntinstrumentfor
achievingpoliticalgoalsorbetteringpeople’slives.Vastsumshavebeenpouredinto
Afghanistansince2001,butthereislittletosuggestthatmany‘heartsandminds’have
beenwonintheprocess(Wilder2009).Fartoomuchaidhasbeen‘churned’throughthe
paymentofverylargesalariestoconsultantswhenitwouldhavemadefarmoresenseto
spendmoneytoboostlocalcapacity.Furthermore,monieshavebeensquanderedthrough
multiplesub-contractingthatdoeslittlemorethanfillbankaccountsinDubai.Adisturbing
numberofprojectshavebeenpoorlydesigned,shoddilyimplemented,andinadequately
monitored(StephensandOttaway2005,Nawa2005),andtheseeasilyattractmore
attentionthanprojectsthatproceedwell.
Here,thefragmentationofinternationalactionhashadextremelydeleteriouseffects.While
itiseasytorecognisethetheoreticalbenefitsofimprovedcoordination,thisdoesnot
translateintoawillingnesstobecoordinated.Beyondthis,politicalconsiderationscandrive
evenwell-consideredprojectsoffcourse.Road-building,forinstance,canhavepositive
effects(Kilcullen2009),butonlyifitrespondstolocalneedsandplaysintegrativeroles.An
unhappycontrastistheshowcaseKabul-Kandaharhighway,whichwasrushedtocompletion
in2003tocoincidewithavisittoAfghanistanbytheAmericanFirstLady,buthasbeen
decayingalmostfromthemomentitwasopenedtotraffic,andisnowsoinsecurethatmany
travellersavoiditaltogether.Afurtherproblemisthatwhenareasarepeaceful,theyhave
oftenreceivedlessaidthandisturbedareas,creatingaclassicproblemofmoralhazard.
Afghanistanisbynomeansuniqueinconfrontingthesesortsofproblems,butincomplex
transitionsthereisoftenonlyonechancetogetthingsright,sincedefectiveapproaches
oftenbenefitatleastsomeactorswhothenhaveanincentivetoresistreform.Puttingaid
deliverybackontrackisunlikelytobeeasy.
Internationaldevelopmentsmayunderminetransition
Afourthlessonisthatinternationaldevelopmentsmayseriouslyorfatallyunderminea
processoftransitionwithinagivenstate.Twointernationalfactorsaboveallcompromised
Afghanistan’stransition.OnewastheUSpreoccupationwithIraq.ThisledtheBush
AdministrationinMarch2002toblocktheexpansionofISAFbeyondKabuloutoffearthat
ISAFwouldrequireairliftassetsthatwerealreadybeingearmarkedforafutureoperationto
overthrowSaddamHussein.Thissentadisturbingsignalabouttheseriousnessof
Washington’scommitmenttoAfghanistan,andbythetimethatthedecisionwasreversedin
October2003,vitalmomentumhadbeenlost.Thiswasparalleledbyaprofoundlymisguided
approachtoPakistan,whichatthefirstsignofUSwaveringadoptedwhathasbeen
describedasa‘two-trackforeignpolicytowardAfghanistan’(WeinbaumandHarder2008:
27),withthesecondtrackinvolvingongoingsupportforradicalgroups.Theconsequences
ofWashington’salmostwilfulblindnesstothisdevelopmenthauntAfghanistantothisday
(SchmittandSanger2009).
13 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

SomepolicyimplicationsforAfghanistan
AlthoughtherearenosilverbulletsofferingimmediatesolutionstoAfghanistan’scomplex
problems,therearestepsthatcanbetakentoholdontowhathasbeenachievedsince
2001,andtobegintoreversethelossofmomentumthathasunderminedtheeffortsofthe
Afghangovernment,theUnitedStates,anditsNATOandnon-NATOallies.IfWestern
leaderspursuethesestepsseriously,theprospectsforAfghanistanmayprovesomewhat
betterthanmuchofthereportinginthepopularpresswouldsuggest.

1.ItisvitaltoimprovethequalityofmessagingtoAfghanistan.
WesternleadersoftenspeakasifthereisnomassAfghanaudienceforwhattheyhaveto
say.Nothingcouldbefurtherfromthetruth.ThebulkoftheAfghanpopulationlistento
internationalshort-waveradiobroadcastsonadailybasis(fromoutletssuchasthePashto
andPersianservicesoftheBBCandVoiceofAmerica),andtheseinformationsourcesare
increasinglycomplementedbyAfghanradioandtelevisionstations(suchasFMRadioArman
andToloTelevision).PublicagonisinginWesterncapitalsaboutthesituationinAfghanistan
directlyaffectsthatsituation:Afghans,forverygoodreasons,arealwayswatchingforsigns
ofhowthewindisblowing.Thekeytowinningheartsandmindsisnottobefoundinthe
deliveryofaidtolocalcommunities,butincrediblysignallingthattheAfghangovernment
anditssupportersarelikelytocomeoutontop.Thisisnotthemessagethatordinary
Afghansarecurrentlyreceiving.
2.AnuancedapproachtodealingwithdifferentcomponentsoftheAfghan
communityisimportant.
TherearesignificantblocsofdisaffectedtribalelementswithinAfghanistan,andseekingto
drawthembacktothesideofthegovernmentissensible,throughenhancedengagement
withlocalcommunitiesinthesouthandeast(Semple2009).Thisisdifferent,however,from
attemptingto‘deal’,‘engage’,or‘negotiate’withtheTaliban.
ThereisverylittletosuggestthatfruitfuldiscussionswiththeTalibanareatalllikelyto
occur,orthatanyTalibanleadersareremotelyinterestedintalking(Maley2007,Tellis2009),
butthemerediscussionofthepossibilityhasnegativeeffectsthatareusuallyoverlooked.
EverytimethisideaismootedinWesterncircles–asitwas,forexample,bytheUK’s
ForeignSecretaryDavidMilibandinJuly2009(Weaver2009)–itsendsshiversdownthe
spinesofsignificantelementsintheAfghanpopulation,startingwithAfghanwomenand
membersofethnicandsectarianminorities.Indeed,therecentincreasedoutflowofHazara
refugeesfromAfghanistanmaywellderivefromfearofa‘Yalta’-styledealinwhichpartsof
thecountrywouldeffectivelyfallunderTalibancontrol,somethingthatwouldbelikelyto
resultfrompolicyproposalsalreadybeingcanvassedinWesternacademiccircles(seeLodhi
andLieven2009).
Buttheproblemisnotsimplyoneofperceptionsorexpectations.AcceptingaTalibansphere
ofinfluenceinsouthernAfghanistanwouldbearecipeforarapidandcatastrophiclossof
anyremainingmomentuminAfghanistan’stransition,forattemptsatrearmamentbyanti-
Talibangroupsthathadearlierrelinquishedtheirweaponry,andfortheestablishmentofan
AfghansanctuaryforthePakistanTaliban.Itisespeciallydangeroustothinkthatasolution
liesinbuyingofftheTaliban.Suchapproachesproduceconditionalcomplianceratherthan
stablepeace,apointillustratedbytheunhappyexperienceoftheFrenchinthevicinityof
Sarobi,wheretheirfailuretocontinuemakingpaymentswhichapparentlyhadbeenmadeby
theirItalianpredecessorsinthedistrictsawthemcomeunderunexpectedandlethalfirein
August2008(seeGallandRahimi2008,Coghlan2009).
3.TheAfghanTalibanarevulnerable.
WhiletheAfghanTalibanaremuchmoreorganisationallycoherentthanisoftenrecognised
(seeSinno2008,Dorronsoro2009),theyarealsovulnerablebecauseoftheirdependenceon
sanctuariesinPakistan.
14 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

ItistheclosingofthesesanctuariesandthearrestofthetopAfghanTalibanleadershipthat
shouldbethecentrepieceofWesterndiplomacyandthesearchforapoliticalratherthan
purelymilitarysolutiontotheAfghanistanproblem.
Withoutattentiontothismatter,thedespatchoffurtherforcestoAfghanistanislittlebetter
thanaband-aidmeasure,offeringashort-termpalliativeratherthananylong-termcure.In
August2007,PresidentMusharrafstatedduringavisittoKabulthat,‘Thereisnodoubt
AfghanmilitantsaresupportedfromPakistanisoil.Theproblemthatyouhaveinyourregion
isbecausesupportisprovidedfromourside’(ShahandGall2007).Thissimplyconfirmed
whatamountainofevidencehadlongshown(seeJohnsonandMason2007,Rashid2008,
Jones2008,Jones2009,Maley2009b).
ThethreattostabilityinPakistanposedbyTalibanisationhasbeenlonginthemaking
(Maley2001),buthasnowreachedacriticalpoint.Soonerorlatertherealisationislikelyto
dawneveninhighmilitarycirclesthatitisimpossibletoaddressthechallengefromPakistani
TalibanwithoutalsomovingagainsttheAfghanTaliban,whoprovidedtheinspirationthat
allowedthePakistaniversiontotakeshape.TheclosingoftheAfghanTaliban’ssanctuaries
wouldlikelyhaveadramaticandpositiveimpactonthesituationinAfghanistan,andcould
eventriggeracascadesimilartothatwhichsawtheTalibanregimecollapseveryquicklyin
late2001.Westerngovernmentsthatdeclinetoaddressthesanctuariesissuenotonly
undermineanymeaningfulcounterinsurgencystrategy,butalsocompromisethesafetyof
theirowntroopsinthefield.
4.Theinternationalcommunityneedstotakeamuchstrongerstandthanithas
adoptedthusfarontheissueofgoodgovernanceandtheruleoflaw.
Theinternationalcommunitycouldeasilystartbyimprovingitsownbehaviour.When
WesternleadersendorsedtheideaofprolongingPresidentKarzai’stermuntilanelectionin
August2009–eventhoughitwasabsolutelyclearfromArticle61ofthe2004Constitution
thatthePresident’stermexpiredon22May2009–theysentthemessagethateventhe
mostfundamentallawcouldbetwistedforadministrativeconvenience.Itishardlysurprising
thatthe20Augustelectionwitnessedmoretwisting,butthistimeonthepartofelectoral
fraudsters.Equally,whenWesternactorsmakeuseoftheservicesofhighly-suspectprivate
securitycompaniesthatoftenbehaveasiftheyareabovethelaw(BrookingandSchmeidl
2008),theattempttopromotegoodgovernanceandtheruleoflawinevitablysuffers.
Attheveryleastwhatisrequiredisamuchtoughersetofconditionsattachedtotheuseof
fundsthataresuppliedfrominternationalsources,andamoreresoluteapproachto
monitoringandaccountability. Thisdoesnot,ofcourse,meanthatgovernanceislikelyto
improverapidlyorthattheruleoflawwillblossomanytimesoon,butitwillatleastsignalto
ordinaryAfghansthattheirconcernsaboutjusticeandgovernancearebeginningtobetaken
seriously.Improvementsinthisspherearecrucialifthereistobeanyhopeofrebuildingthe
governmentallegitimacythatwaslostthroughthefraudthatcontaminatedthevotingon20
August2009(Maley2009a).ExcessivedeferencetoAfghan‘sovereignty’notonlymissesthe
complexityoftheideaofsovereigntyitself,butalsoburdenstheAfghanstatewith
unrealisticresponsibilitiesthatitisunlikelytobeabletodischarge.
Agoodplacetostartwouldbetodemand,immediately,thereplacementoftheChairofthe
IndependentElectionCommission,whonotonlyboreformalresponsibilityfortherunningof
theAugust2009elections,butalsoroutinelydisplayedpartisanshiponascaleamountingto
seriousimpropriety(HumanRightsWatch2009).TheChairannouncedevenbefore the
runoffelectionthatwasscheduledfor7November(andlatercancelled)that‘Karzaiisgoing
towin’(Filkins2009).
Suchademandshouldbematchedbythedemandthatindependentinternationalofficials
continuetomakeupamajorityofthemembershipoftheElectionComplaintsCommission.
Unlessthesestepsaretaken,the2010legislativeelectionsarelikelytobejustasfarcicalas
the20Augustpollprovedtobe.
15 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

5.ItisvitaltorecognisetheneedforconstitutionalreforminAfghanistan.
Onpaper,Afghanistanhasastrongpresidentialsystem.Thishasnotservedthecountryatall
well.Presidentialsystems,bycreatingonewinnerandmanylosers,readilycontributeto
divisionratherthancooperationincountriesthatarealreadyfragmented.Inaddition,the
Afghanpresidencyisseriouslyoverloaded,withonepersonsimultaneouslycalleduponto
providesymbolicleadership,drivepolicydevelopmentandimplementationandreconcile
conflictingministriesandagencies.
Finally,apresidentialsystemempowersunelectedassociatesofthepresidentattheexpense
ofthosewhocanclaimsomelegitimacy,eitheraselectedmembersoftheAfghan
parliament,orastraditionalleadersofsignificanttribes.Thissystemfostersanapproachto
politicsthatnurturescronyismandnetworking,butdoeslittletoensureeffectivepolicy
formulationandimplementation.Atsomepointitwillneedtobeseriouslyaddressedifitis
nottodofatalharmtoAfghanistan’spoliticalfuture.
16 ippr|StatesofConflict:Acasestudyonstate-buildinginAfghanistan

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