ACTUS ME INVITO FACTUS NON EST MEUS ACTUS

AN ACT DONE BY ME AGAINST MY WILL IS NOT MY ACT

UNITED STATES v. AH CHONG
G.R. No. L-5272
March 19, 1910
FACTS:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook in one of the Officers quarters at Fort
McKinley, Rizal Province. Together living with him in the said quarters was the deceased,
Pascual Gualberto, who was employed as a houseboy. There had been several robberies in
Fort McKinley prior to the incident thus prompting the defendant and his roommate to
reinforce the flimsy hook used to lock the door of their room by placing a chair against it.
The defendant and the deceased had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock on the door and say his name. On the night of Aug. 14, 1908, Ah Chong,
who was alone in his room, was awakened by someone trying to force open the door of the
room. The defendant called out twice, asking the identity of the person but heard no
answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, the defendant called out that he
would kill the intruder if he tried to enter. At that moment, the door was forced open and
the defendant was struck first above the knee by the edge of the chair. Because of the
darkness of the room, the defendant thought he was being hit by the intruder and tried to
defend himself by striking wildly at the intruder using a common kitchen knife which he kept
under his pillow. It turned out that the said intruder was actually the defendants roommate,
Pascual Gualberto. The roommate was brought to the military hospital where he died from
the effects of the wound the following day.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant was criminally liable for committing a felony
HELD:
Defendant was not criminally liable and exonerated.
In order for mistake of fact to be held as a valid defense, there has to be several requisites.
One, that the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed
them to be. Two, that the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful,
and lastly, that the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the
accused.
In the case at bar, had the intruder been a robber as the defendant believed him to be, then
Ah Chong acted in good faith, without malice or criminal intent (an act done by me against
my will is not my act), and would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability and that
he cannot be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness.











CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS, CESSAT ET IPSA LEX
WHEN THE REASON OF THE LAW CEASES, THE LAW ITSELF CEASES

COMENDADOR v. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 93177
August 2, 1991

FACTS:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties
and related issues arising from the same incident.
1. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for
their alleged participation in the failed coup d etat that took place on December 1 to 9,
1989.
2. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation
to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
3. Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial were formed. During their trial, petitioners
invoked their right to peremptory Challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on
the ground that the right was discontinued when martial law was declared under a
Presidential Decree. The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory
challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings
and defer his deserved Punishment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners were denied of their right of due process due to the investigation was
resolved against them in failure to submit a counter affidavit?
2. Whether GCM No. 14 has a legal ground denying the petitioners their right of peremptory
challenge?
3. Whether denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection?
HELD:
1. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena sent them that failure to submit the
aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
(their) right to submit controverting evidence. They chose not to heed the warning. As
their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to
GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense. Due process is
satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it
is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
2. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the
law itself ceases (cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex). This principle is also expressed
in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul. Applying these rules, we
hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 became
ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of
Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408
was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
3. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and do
not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The
accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are
not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are not allowed
the same right that is extended to civilians.

























EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS
A THING NOT BEING EXCEPTED MUST BE REGARDED AS COMING WITHIN THE PURVIEW
OF THE GENERAL RULE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MAPA
G.R. No. L-22301
August 30, 1967
FACTS:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in an
information dated 14 August 1962 in violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative
Code in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4 (home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without
serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the
necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities)
Accused admits to possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor
Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. On 27 November 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and
one day to two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a secret agent falls among those authorized to possess firearms.
HELD:
No. The court held that the law cannot be any clearer. The law does not contain any
exception for secret agent therefore holding this position would not constitute a sufficient
defense to a prosecution for a crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions.
Wherefore the conviction of the accused must stand. The Courts ruling overturned that of
People v. Macarandang, a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the
appointment of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently put him within the category of a peace
officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section
879, thus, in the present case, therefore, the conviction must stand.










FALSA DEMONSTRATIO NON NOCET, CUM DE CORPORE CONSTAT
FALSE DESCRIPTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONSTRUCTION NOR VITIATE THE MEANING
OF THE STATUTE

LOPEZ & SONS, INC. v. COURT OF TAX APPEALS
G.R. No. L-9274
February 1, 1957

FACTS:
Petitioner imported wire nettings from Germany. The Manila Customs Collector assessed the
customs duties on the basis of the suppliers invoice. The duties were paid and the shipment
released. Thereafter, the Manila Customs Collector reassessed the duties due on the basis of
the dollar value of the importation and imposed additional duties.
Petitioner appealed directly to Respondent Court but they dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction
citing Sec. 7 of RA 1125 creating said Tax Court. Provision says that the Court has
jurisdiction to review decisions of Commissioner of Customs. However, under Sec. 11 of
same Act, the Court has jurisdiction to review rulings of the Collector of Customs when
brought by persons affected thereby.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent court has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the collector of
customs
HELD:
Yes, there is indeed a disparity between Sec. 7 and 11 of same RA. The Supreme Court
concurred with the positions of the Solicitor General that a clerical error was committed in
Sec. 11 and the word Collector should read Commissioner. To support this, the Supreme
Court cited that under the Customs Law as found under Sec. 1137 to 1410 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Collectors of Customs are mere Subordinates of the Commissioner
of Customs over whom he has supervision and control.
In this ruling, the court did not engage in judicial legislation. It merely rectified an apparent
clerical error in the wordings of the statute to carry out the conspicuous intention of the
Legislature. Under the rule of statutory construction, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the
law and the intent of the legislature that is important.









HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST
IT IS EXCEEDINGLY HARD BUT SO THE LAW IS WRITTEN

PAMIL v. TELERON
G.R. No. L-34854
November 20, 1978

FACTS:
Respondent Fr. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of Albuquerque,
Bohol. The petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed for Gonzagas disqualification
based on Sec. 2175 of the Administrative Code which stated that in no case can
ecclesiastics be elected to a municipal office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ecclesiastic is eligible to be elected
HELD:
The vote was indecisive. Seven believed Sec. 2175 was no longer operative. Five believed
that the prohibition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. Though the five were a
minority, the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective, hence
it was presumed valid. Gonzaga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty.
Dissenting Seven: The challenged provision was superseded by the 1935 Constitution, the
supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of
political rights. Sec. 2175 was also repealed by the Election Code for ecclesiastics are no
longer included in the enumeration of ineligible persons. Also, legislation that intends to
repeal all former laws upon the subject shows the legislative intent to repeal the former
statutory law.
Minor Five: For a later provision to repeal a prior one there must be such absolute
repugnance between the two. No such repugnance is discernible. Sec. 2175 has neither
been repealed nor superseded. The section also admitted no exception, therefore there can
be none. The Court cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation.










INTERPOTARE ET CONCORDARE LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPOTANDI MODUS
EVERY STATUTE MUST BE SO CONSTRUED AND HARMONIZED WITH OTHER STATUTES AS
TO FORM UNIFORM SYSTEM OF LAW

AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066
March 26, 2001
FACTS:
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the
extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration
has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21
be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the
petition. AKBAYAN-Youth sued the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for
denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were
not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic
Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular
election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the
COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-
election acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the
extension of the voters registration
HELD:
No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of
Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120
days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by
measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in
the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the
act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly
manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the
day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA
8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act
that cannot be reset.
Every new statute should be construed in connection with those already existing in relation
to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if they
can be done by any fair and reasonable interpretation. Interpretare et concordare legibus
est optimus interpretandi, which means that the best method of interpretation is that which
makes laws consistent with other laws. Accordingly, courts of justice, when confronted with
apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile them instead of declaring
outright the invalidity of one against the other. Courts should harmonize them, if this is
possible, because they are equally the handiwork of the same legislature.
In light of the foregoing doctrine, we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present
case, for the purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election.




























LEX DE FUTURO, JUDEZ DE PRATERITO
THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE FUTURE, THE JUDGE FOR THE PAST

BALATBAT v. COURT OF APPEALS AND PASSION
G.R. No. L-36378
January 27, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner has an agricultural land in Sta. Ana, Pampanga containing 18,490 square meters
of land owned by Garcia. Garcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared
it for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 126. Private respondent Pasion claims
that he will cultivate the land pursuant to Sec. 36(1) of RA 3844. However, petitioner
maintains that the case should have been decided in light of Sec. 7 of RA 6389 since, in
view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to acquire the land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7 of RA 6389 should be given retroactive effect
HELD:
No. Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that there should be no retroactive effect unless
otherwise provided by law. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a
provision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should be understood which is not
embodied in the law. Furthermore the law is a rule established to guide our action with no
binding effect until it is enacted, thus laws have no effect in past times but laws look
forward in the future.















PARI MATERIA
RELATING TO SAME MATTER

WIL WILHEMSEN, INC v. BALUYUT
G.R. Nos. L-27350-51
May 11, 1978
FACTS:
Empty cargo vans were used by Plaintiffs to facilitate the carriage and sale storage of
merchandise loaded on their vessels for delivery from foreign ports of Manila among others.
After the merchandise had arrived at the port and the cargo vans had been emptied of their
contents, they were left along Muelle de San Francisco Stalag. The Defendant applied to the
Surveyor of Port for the transfer of these empty sea vans. The request was based on the
Memorandum Order No. 19 and the Memorandum Order dated April 20, 1964. The trial
court held that the transfer of Appellants empty cargo vans to the warehouse of Appellee
was done by authority of Customs Memorandum of April 20, 1964 and Customs
Administrative Order No. 22-64, and that the said objects were lawfully detained by
Appellee in his warehouse pending the payment of storage charges.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the trial court is legally valid
HELD:
Yes. As plainly worded in the administrative order, it becomes necessary for all empty sea
vans to be removed from the pier premises by their owners or shipping agents within ten
days after the vans have been completely emptied of all their contents. This is in order to
make available at all times adequate space in all ports for the loading and unloading of
cargoes. In addition, the administrative order has no requirement similar to that found in
Memorandum Order No. 130-63 whereby the owners of the impounded vans should be
notified in writing. The two customs regulations under consideration are in pari materia so
far as both operate under the flexible cargo system.












RATIO LEGIS
INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO SPIRIT

COMENDADOR v. DE VILLA
G.R. No. 93177
August 2, 1991
FACTS:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related
issues arising from the same incident.
1. The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and
97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged
participation in the failed coup d etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
2. The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (Murder).
3. Pre-Investigation Panel and a Court Martial were formed. During their trial, petitioners invoked their
right to peremptory Challenge. The same was denied by the Court Martial on the ground that the right
was discontinued when martial law was declared under a Presidential Decree. The Court realizes that
the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respondent in a court-
martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied of their right of due process due to the investigation was
resolved against them in failure to submit a counter affidavit
2. Whether or not GCM No. 14 has a legal ground denying the petitioners their right of peremptory
challenge
3. Whether or not denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
HELD:
1. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena sent them that failure to submit the
aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right
to submit controverting evidence. They chose not to heed the warning. As their motions appeared to
be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the
petitioners to submit their defense. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an
opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the
Bill of Rights.
2. It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39
became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation
No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived
and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.
3. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and do not apply
where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can
complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they
have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to
civilians.

























STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE
FOLLOW PAST PRECEDENTS AND DO NOT DISTURB WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED

NEGROS NAVIGATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 110398
November 7, 1997
FACTS:
Sometime in April 1980, Ramon Miranda, one of the private respondents in this case
purchased four special tickets (Numbers 74411, 74412, 74413 and 74414) from the
petitioner for his wife, children and niece who were then bound to leave for Bacolod City to
attend a family reunion.
On 22 April 1980, private respondents aforementioned relatives boarded M/V Don Juan of
Negros Navigation Co., Inc., that was leaving Manila at 1:00 PM. As expected, said vessel
sailed on time. However, on the evening of 22 April, petitioners vessel collided with the M/T
Tacloban City- an oil tanker owned by the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) and
the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC). Obviously, several passengers
perished in the sea tragedy. Some bodies were found, and some, including the relatives of
private respondents were never found.
Knowing the ill-fate of the M/V Don Juan, private respondents, namely Garcia and Sps de la
Victoria filed a complaint against the Negros Navigation, the PNOC, and the PNOC/STC.
Private respondents sought for damages for the death of their relatives namely Ardita de la
Miranda, Rosario V. Miranda, Ramon Miranda Jr., and Elfreda de la Victoria.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents, and asked petitioners,
including PNOC and PNOC/STC to pay the moral damages sought by Garcia and Sps. de la
Victoria. And upon review by the Court Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the RTCs
decision with several modifications.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the ruling in the Mecenas v. CA, finding the crew members of petitioners to
be grossly negligent in the performance of their duty, is binding in this case
HELD:
Yes. The courts adherence to the Mecenas Case is dictated by the principle of stare decisis
et non quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled).
The petitioners assail the lower courts reliance on the Mecenas Case, arguing that although
the same case arose out of the same incident as that involved in the Mecenas, the parties
are different and trials were conducted separately. Furthermore they contend that the
decision in this case must be based on the allegations, the defenses pleaded and evidence
adduced stated on the records of the case.
The Supreme Court ruled otherwise. The Supreme Court stated that although the merits of
the individual claims against the petitioner are different in both cases, there remains a
similarity which is material in the decision of the court vis--vis the case at hand, i.e. the
cause of the sinking of its ship on 22 April 1980 and the liabilities (of petitioner) for such
accident.

The doctrine of stare decisis applies in this case. It is a rule that a ruling of the court as to
the construction of a law should be followed in subsequent cases involving similar questions.
Although the personal circumstances and claims of Mecenas, and Miranda and de la Victoria
are different as contended by the petitioner, the two cases raised similar question/issue, i.e.
on the damages for which the petitioner was liable due to the sinking of its ship.

























VERBA ACCIPIENDA SUNT SECUNDUM SUBJECTAM MATERIAM
A WORD IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT IS USED

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC. v. GIMENEZ and MATHAY
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963
FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues
used primarily in the production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are
"urea and formaldehyde" which are both being imported abroad.
Pursuant to R.A. 2609 Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, The Central Bank issued Circulars
fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The bank also issued
memorandum establishing the procedure for the applications for exemption from the
payment of said fee as provided by R.A. 2609.
Petitioners paid the required margin fee with their 2 import transactions. In both of their
transactions through R.A. 2609 they wanted to avail the exemption from the payment of
said fee as provided by RA. 2609. Petitioners filed a refund request to the Central Bank and
the Central Bank issued the vouchers but was not accepted by the Auditor of the Bank. The
refusal was also affirmed by the Auditor General. The refusal was based on the fact that the
separate importation of "urea and formaldehyde" is not in accord with the provisions of R.A.
2609. Becuase section 2 of R.A. 2609 clearly provides Urea formaldehyde and not urea
and formaldehyde
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should
be construed as "urea and formaldehyde". Petitioner contends that the bill approved in
Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and
"formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners contentions that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde"
RULING:
No, because what is allowed in RA. 2809 is urea formaldehyde, not urea
and formaldehyde, both are different from each other.
The National Institute of Science and Technology defines urea formaldehyde is the synthetic
resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and
formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of
reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers
constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Urea
formaldehyde is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea and formaldehyde.
What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. It is well settled
that the enrolled bill which uses the term urea formaldehyde instead of urea and
formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress and approved by
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers
of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones
of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by
judicial decree.