[G.R. No. 159674. June 30, 2006.

]
SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR,
ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO
C. ESENCIA, EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA,
ANSELMO LOPEZ, TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA,
ANA PATIO, ROBERTO T. PATIO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN,
CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and JOEMARIE VIBO, petitioners, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
and HACIENDA MARIA, INC., respondents.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
review and reversal of the Resolutions 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28
August 2003, respectively.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs)
over parcels of land located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and EP numbers presented below:
Petitioners
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO
CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.

TCT/EP Nos.

TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675

TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
RONGIE D. AGUILAR
TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
TACIANA D. AGUILAR
TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN
TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
EDGAR DUENAS
TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658
MARIO P. ERIBAL
TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836
REYNALDO C. ESENCIA
TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844
RUBEN A. IBOJO
TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873
SAMUEL JAMANDRE
TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348
HILARION V. LANTIZA
TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
ANSELMO LOPEZ
TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840
TERESITA NACION
TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
CHARIE E. NASTOR
TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829
NELSON L. NULLAS
TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826
CARLITO S. OLIA
TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
ROBERTO T. PATIO
TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860
ANTONIO P. ROCHA
TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830
FERNANDO C. RUFINO
TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
PATERNO P. SAIN
TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and
TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880
JOEMARIE VIBO
TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827

Areas
(has.)
1.7833
2.0000
0.1565
3.1441
4.2405
3.3082
3.1437
4.0128
2.3087
2.0950
1.5737
2.2670
4.5526
0.4579
4.4939
2.2140
3.9291
2.7491
1.7954
6.4266
2.2143
4.5322
4.3223
3.7151
1.3185 2

he two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patio, are the surviving spouses of
deceased recipients of EPs over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa,
Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and EP numbers identified as follows:
(Deceased) Registered Owners
1.
2.
[iii]3

MANUEL S. GONZAGA
RAFAEL PATIO

TCT/EP Nos.
TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832
TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861

Areas
(has.)
4.1953
3.0078

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part
of a forested area which have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent
Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners, together with other persons, occupied and tilled these
areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never disturbed petitioners and the other
occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.
HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent
No. 2683 in 1956 by virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three
parcels of land with a total area of 527.8308 hectares, to wit:
Lot No.
Lot No. 1620, Pls 4
Lot No. 1621, Pls 4
Lot No. 1622, Pls 4
TOTAL

Area
(in hectares)
28.52
11.64
487.47
527.83 4

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 5 was issued mandating that tenanted rice
and corn lands be brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.
HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its
landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation
therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the
same may be covered under said law.
In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the
entire landholdings of 527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976,
the DAR approved the Parcellary Map Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire
landholdings.
HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including
the determination of the Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on
Land Production, and was a signatory of an undated Landowner and Tenant Production
Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was submitted to the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.
Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among
other persons, which was registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT
No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the
subject of the Deed of Assignment.
In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to
1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to
petitioners, among other persons.

In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of
CARAGA, Region XIII, 17 petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under
Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was
untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were later
consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares
which had been awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300
hectares under Presidential Decree No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were
untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.
On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD
rendered a Decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land
covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy
relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27 took effect on 21 October
1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda Maria
Action Team. Petitioners' TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.
After the DARAB denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the
Court of Appeals with their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the
following assailed Resolution:
A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
was executed by Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding
Special Power of Attorneys executed by the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their
behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED. 6
Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court
for the Admission of Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his
Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals denied the motion by issuing the following assailed
Resolution:
Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which
dismissed the petition for certiorari.
We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since
petitioners have failed to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can
be justified as against the unequivocal requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended.
While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the
relaxation of the rules on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in
the case at bar.
More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Court's ruling in Loquias
vs. Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a
matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on]
non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same.
Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper
authorization from all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist
thereby rendering the petition fatally defective.

Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice . . ."
It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be
dismissed forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed
could cure the petition's defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still
has not been met since some of the other petitioners failed to sign the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 7
Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that
the EPs are ordinary titles which become indefeasible one year after their registration.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Petitioners have sufficiently
complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
concerning the Certification
Against Forum shopping
Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No.
28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum
shopping to avoid the filing of multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals and agencies. Stated differently, the
rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and agencies would have to
resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:
Sec. 5.
Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending
therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt
as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed . . . to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is
to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible." 8 Technical rules of procedure should

be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. 9 The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting
what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum
Shopping, falls within the phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath
the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given
emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v. Cabantog 10 and Escorpizo v. University of
Baguio 11 that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of
the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 12 we likewise held that:
The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of
petitioner. For a certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the
principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do so. This
procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this action.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of
the Ombudsman, 13 where this Court ruled that:
At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one
of the petitioners in the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is
defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall
certify under oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court,
etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, signed the
certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the
latter and to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to
the best of his knowledge, whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims
filed or pending. We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict
observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show
reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules
cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)
Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the
Resolution of the Ombudsman charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the
above declaration "at the outset" was made together with a determination on the lack of
jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition. 14 There being only five petitioners in Loquias, the
unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.'s four co-accused is
immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege
that they are farmer-beneficiaries who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While
they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach
their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of transportation. Their houses are
located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is scarce and
difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are
members of a non-government organization engaged in development work) are based in Quezon
City who started assisting them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and
became their counsel of record only at the DARAB level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory
pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to travel to Manila at the time
of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers' organization, the
Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE).
When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners' counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried
earnestly to secure all the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA was being circulated for
their signatures, 24 of the named petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons some
could not be found within the area and were said to be temporarily residing in other towns, while

some already died because of old age. 15 Be that as it may, those who did not sign the SPA did
not participate, and are not parties to this petition.
The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court
that justify the relaxation of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present
in the case at bar, 16 without discussing the circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their
Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of argument that the actuation of
petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would
justify the suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against
forum shopping, such as those which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.
In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 17 the appeal to the
Court of Appeals had a certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not
contain a board resolution authorizing the signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein
attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, as in
this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:
[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a
board resolution or a secretary's certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by
petitioner to represent it in the case. It would appear that the signatory of the certification was,
in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board resolution attached to petitioner's motion for
reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that there was at least
substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural
requirements.
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and
while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be
met at the expense of substantial justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help
secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules
may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core
reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs. Court of Appeals; BA
Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].
In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 18 the authority of petitioner's resident
manager to sign the certification against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals
only after the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that
he already had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition. We ratiocinated therein
that:
On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by
the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that
should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that
said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.
In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification. In Loyola v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the
filing of the certification one day after the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance
with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]),
the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal of the petition. In Uy
v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy's petition for lack of verification and certification
against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted
a motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there

were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule
requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping.
In the instant case, the merits of petitioner's case should be considered special circumstances or
compelling reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of nonforum shopping. Moreover, in Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with
the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow
the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on non-forum shopping,
failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner
subsequently submitted a secretary's certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an
action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.
It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping
is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat
the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of
procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. While the swift unclogging of court
dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent ideal.
In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 19 we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the
substantive aspect of the case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the
reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to suspend our rules to serve the ends of
justice. Thus:
The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not
unprecedented. In those cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements,
there were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case
should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of
the petition. . . .
There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the
rule on certification against forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the
merits. In De Guia v. De Guia, 20 petitioners raised in their Petition for Review the allowance of
respondents' Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against forum shopping. We held
therein that:
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves
us to agree with the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of
respondents' counsel, but we simply cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been
held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to suspend its own rules in a particular
case in order to do justice."
In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission, 21 the non-compliance was
disregarded because of the principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at
bar:
We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum
shopping. The certifications in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is
not correct. The certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party
and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioners could have warranted the
outright dismissal of their actions.
But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of
social justice involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in
the way of equitably and completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties.

Moreover, we must stress that technical rules of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly
applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.
The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was
violation of Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would
be justified for two compelling reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of
the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.
Certificates of Title issued pursuant
to Emancipation Patents are as
indefeasible as TCTs issued in
registration proceedings.
Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year
from the date of its issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through
the agrarian reform program of the government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is
governed by the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a Torrens title."
The DARAB is grossly mistaken.
Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 22 provides that certificates of title issued in
administrative proceedings are as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial
proceedings:
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding
pursuant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title
issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a
disposable public land within the contemplation of the Public Land Law.
There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land
Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public
land patent is open to review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a public land patent certificate of title
with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited cases clearly
reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by
implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the
Secretary of Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in
accordance with law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of
the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree finally awards the
land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the Director of
Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This,
to our mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation
of a family home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement
of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favor of the homesteader would
be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been given by the Government through
the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would arise
uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government's system of distributing public
agricultural lands pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired
lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject
to contest, just because his certificate of title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The
silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is
the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:

Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted
thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who
come into the possession of his homestead after complying with the requirements thereof.
Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be interpreted to apply by implication to the
patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of Natural Resources,
under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law. 23
After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue
the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied
with Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire
the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the
issuance of the patent, . . . . Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of
a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person." 25
As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr. 26 :
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of
title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a
private individual, the corresponding patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is
issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically brought within the operation of the
Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards
provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its
issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued
in a registration proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act
No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system
of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX 27 on the subject of
EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates
of title issued in registration proceedings.
The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the
first time on appeal with the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised
before the RARAD. 28
The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the
lots covered under the Republic Act No. 6657, 29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being
issued with CLOAs, would only delay the application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed
277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and resources of the government.
The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after
the alleged wrongful annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more
than ten years after the issuance of the TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire
to receive a substantially higher valuation and just compensation should the disputed 277.5008
hectares be covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of Presidential Decree No. 27. 30 This
is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:
(i)
HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm
they were cultivating;
(ii)
HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never
protested petitioners' act of declaring the same for realty taxation;

(iii)
HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire
landholdings or the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn
lands;
(iv)
HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights
in 1977.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or
to their successors-in-interest are hereby declared VALID and SUBSISTING:
Original Grantees
1.
2.

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO
CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

RONGIE D. AGUILAR
TACIANA D. AGUILAR
ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN,
ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR.
EDGAR DUENAS
MARIO P. ERIBAL
REYNALDO C. ESENCIA
RUBEN A. IBOJO
SAMUEL JAMANDRE
HILARION V. LANTIZA

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

ANSELMO LOPEZ
TERESITA NACION
CHARIE E. NASTOR
NELSON L. NULLAS
CARLITO S. OLIA
ROBERTO T. PATIO
ANTONIO P. ROCHA
FERNANDO C. RUFINO
PATERNO P. SAIN
CLAUSIO S. SAYSON
JOEMARIE VIBO
MANUEL S. GONZAGA
RAFAEL PATIO

TCT/EP Nos.
TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675
TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814
TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293
TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295
TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296
TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809
TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676
TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658
TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836
TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844
TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873
TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348
TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674
TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825
TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840
TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849
TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829
TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826
TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673
TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860
TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830
TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848
TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813
TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880
TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827
TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832
TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861

Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 78214. December 5, 1988.]
YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON, respondents.

REFORM,

HON.

DECISION
SARMIENTO, J p:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public
respondent Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR), now the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
through its then Minister, the Hon. Heherson Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the herein petitioner and the private respondent and certifying the criminal

case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent as not proper
for trial.
The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:
The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters
(20 meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter
being the petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by
Andrea Alicaba Millenes. This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-C, which has a total area of
about 500 square meters, situated at Lawa-an, Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C
was subsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the
Millenes family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in
favor of the petitioner.
In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido
Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of
P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion
of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a fifty-fifty basis. From
1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting
corn but continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00
rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.
Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda
Caballes, told Abajon that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and
pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding.
Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but his offer was
not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying that they
needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation before the
Barangay Captain of Lawa-an in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts
exerted by the landowners to oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply
refused to budge. LLphil
On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that
immediately after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the
property without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana
plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was filed
against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all the planting on
the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On September 30,
1982, upon motion of the defense in open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the
referral of the case to the Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary determination
of the relationship between the parties. As a result, the Regional Director of MAR Regional VII,
issued a certification 1 dated January 24, 1983, stating that said Criminal Case No. 4003 was not
proper for hearing on the bases of the following findings:
That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness, which is
devoted to bananas;
That this case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding, which act
is prohibited b law; and
That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.
From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the respondent
DAR. Acting on said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then Minister Conrado Estrella,
reversed the previous certification in its Order 2 of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No.
4003 as proper for trial as "the land involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square
meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the
town as evinced from the Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu."
Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR, through its new
Minister, herein respondent Heherson Alvarez, issued an Order 3 dated November 15, 1986,
setting aside the previous Order dated February 3, 1986, and certifying said criminal case as not
proper for trial, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties, and that the
case was designed to harass the accused into vacating his tillage.
In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea
Millenes, testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land

under his cultivation. The grandson of Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the
testimony of the former, stating that he received said share from Abajon. Roger Millenes further
testified that the present owners received in his presence a bunch of bananas from the accused
representing 1/2 or 50% of the two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes had acquired the
property. 4
From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea
Millenes, the former owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land with
Abajon as tiller thereof. 5 Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which provides that
"[T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates
or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR
ruled that "the new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim
that the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and
twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square meters." 6
Hence, its petition for certiorari alleging that:
I.
Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an
agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a 60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a
commercial lot of the petitioner.
II.
Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003 is not proper for
trial and hearing by the court. 7
We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as
amended. To invest him with the status of a tenant is preposterous.
Section 2 of said law provides:
It is the policy of the State:
(1)
To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as
tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial
development;
xxx
xxx
xxx
RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that
permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income
sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing,
shelter, and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land,
and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." 8
The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by
any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting
camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income
sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs. The
private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land because
it was too small, and that he took on carpentry jobs on the side. 9 Thus, the order sought to be
reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of the law stated above.
The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the former
owner, Andrea Millenes. This led, or misled, the public respondents to conclude that a tenancy
relationship existed between the petitioner and the private respondent because, the public
respondents continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R. A. 3844, as amended, the petitioner new
owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the supposed agricultural
lessor (the former owner).
We disagree.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
1.
The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2.
The subject is agricultural land;
3.
There is consent;

4.
5.
6.

The purpose is agricultural production;

There is personal cultivation; and
There is sharing of harvests.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established
his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. 10
Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship.
Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from
someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of
sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does
not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60,
or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or
commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this
case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the
owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some
sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.
Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear
that the private respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes.
Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private
respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.
Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an
agricultural tenant, the criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared
as proper for trial so that proceedings in the lower court can resume.
Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the petitioner, we
hold that the remand of the case to the lower court for the resumption of the criminal
proceedings is not in the interest of justice. Remand to the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu,
would not serve the ends of justice at all, nor is it necessary, because this High Tribunal is in a
position to resolve with finality the dispute before it. This Court, in the public interest, and
towards the expeditious administration of justice, has decided to act on the merits and dispose of
the case with finality. 11
The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private
respondent for allegedly cutting down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take up much of
the time and attention of the municipal court to the prejudice of other more pressing cases
pending therein. Furthermore, the private respondent will have to incur unnecessary expenses to
finance his legal battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below were to resume.
Court litigants have decried the long and unnecessary delay in the resolution of their cases and
the consequent costs of such litigations. The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial
dawdle. Impoverished that they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which they
can only interpret as harassment or intimidation brought about by their poverty, deprivation, and
despair. It must be the mission of the Court to remove the misperceptions aggrieved people have
of the nature of the dispensation of justice. If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to
drop gently from heaven? Thus, considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle, the Court
finds it proper and compelling to decide it here and now, instead of further deferring its final
termination.
As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the petitioner's
affidavit stating that after she reprimanded private respondent Abajon for harvesting bananas
and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana
trees on the property worth about P50.00.
This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner, who likewise
executed an affidavit to the effect that she saw the private respondent indiscriminately cutting
the banana trees. 12

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall deliberately
cause to the property of another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding
chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief." 13
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:
1.
The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
2.
The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destructions.
3.
The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.
After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the aforesaid
criminal case against the private respondent be dismissed.
The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the
banana trees because, as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the
banana trees, he owns said crops including the fruits thereof. The private respondent's
possession of the land is not illegal or in bad faith because he was allowed by the previous
owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the private respondent worked the
land in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners. Consequently, whatever the
private respondent planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to
the landowner. Thus, an essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is "damage
deliberately caused to the property of another," is absent because the private respondent merely
cut down his own plantings. prcd
WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case No. 4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Municipal
Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for appropriate action. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 86186. May 8, 1992.]
RAFAEL GELOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO
ALZONA, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.
REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; FACTUAL ISSUES NOT PROPER.
The basic question the petitioner now raises before the Court is essentially factual and therefore
not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Only questions of law may
be raised in this kind of proceeding.
2.
ID.; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, CONCLUSIVE ON APPEAL. The settled rule is that the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on even this Court as long as they are supported by
substantial evidence. The petitioner has not shown such findings may be validly reversed by this
Court.
3.
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; TENANCY; A LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BROUGHT ABOUT BY
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES. As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not
a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also
a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and
as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary
to law, are even more important."
4.
ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF IRRIGATION FEES, NOT EVIDENCE OF TENANCY. The petitioner's
payment of irrigation fees from 1980 to 1985 to the National Irrigation Administration on the said
landholding is explained by the fact that during the pendency of the CAR case, the Agrarian
Reform Office fixed a provisional leasehold rental after a preliminary finding that Gelos was the
tenant of the private respondent. As such, it was he who had to pay the irrigation fees.
5.
ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION BY THE SECRETARY OF EXISTENCE OF TENANCY RELATIONSHIP,
NOT CONCLUSIVE. Section 12, subpar. (r) of PD 946 provides that the Secretary's
determination of the tenancy relationship is only preliminary and cannot be conclusive on the
lower court.

6.
ID.; ID.; TENANT, DEFINED. A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No.
1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or
both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
7.
ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties
are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the
purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of
harvest or payment of rental. In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel
of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant.
8.
ID.; LABOR LAWS; EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; REQUISITES. On the other
hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection and
engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the
power to control the employee's conduct although the latter is the most important element.
9.
ID.; TENANCY; DISTINGUISHED FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER RELATIONSHIP.
According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished from
farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the
lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm
employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and
the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer
and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit.
On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest."
10.
CIVIL LAW; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS; ACTION BASED ON A WRITTEN CONTRACT
PRESCRIBES IN TEN (10) YEARS; CASE AT BAR. The other issue raised by the petitioner, which
is decidedly legal, is easily resolved. There being no tenancy relationship, the contention that the
private respondent's complaint has prescribed under Section 38 of R.A. 3844 must also fail. That
section is not applicable. It must be noted that at the very outset, Alzona rejected the petitioner's
claim of agricultural tenancy and immediately instituted his action for unlawful detainer in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. As it happened, the said case was held
not proper for trial by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. He then resorted to other remedies just so
he could recover possession of his land and, finally, in 1979, he yielded to the jurisdiction of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations by filing there an action for declaration of non-tenancy. The
action, which was commenced in 1979, was within the ten-year prescriptive period provided
under Article 1144 of the Civil Code for actions based on a written contract.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The Court is asked to determine the real status of the petitioner, who claims to be a tenant
of the private respondent and entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws. The private respondent
objects, contending that the petitioner is only a hired laborer whose right to occupy the subject
land ended with the termination of their contract of employment.
The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao, Laguna, and
belonging originally to private respondent Ernesto Alzona and his parents in equal shares. On July
5, 1970, they entered into a written contract with petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as their
laborer on the land at the stipulated daily wage of P5.00. 1 On September 4, 1973, after Alzona
had bought his parents' share and acquired full ownership of the land, he wrote Gelos to inform
him of the termination of his services and to demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused
and continued working on the land.
On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and asked for the fixing
of the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later withdrew the case and went to the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which granted his petition. For his part, Alzona filed a complaint for
illegal detainer against Gelos in the Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but this action was declared
"not proper for trial" by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform because of the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. Alzona was rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the

assistance of the Ministry of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations for a declaration of non-tenancy and damages against Gelos. On appeal to the Office of
the President, however, the complaint was declared proper for trial and so de-archived and
reinstated.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City (which had taken over the Court of
Agrarian Relations under BP 129) rendered a decision dated April 21, 1987, dismissing the
complaint. 2 It found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject property and entitled to remain thereon
as such. The plaintiff was also held liable in attorney's fees and costs.
The decision was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. In its judgment
promulgated on November 25, 1988, 3 it held that Gelos was not a tenant of the land in question
and ordered him to surrender it to Alzona. He was also held liable for the payment of P10,000.00
as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
The basic question the petitioner now raises before the Court is essentially factual and
therefore not proper in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Only questions
of law may be raised in this kind of proceeding. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on even this Court as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. The petitioner has not shown that his case comes under any of those rare exceptions
when such findings may be validly reversed by this Court.
It is true that in Talavera v. Court of Appeals, 4 we held that a factual conclusion made by the
trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum evidence
demanded by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the appellate tribunals
except for compelling reasons. In the case at bar, however, we find with the respondent court
that there was such a compelling reason. A careful examination of the record reveals that,
indeed, the trial court misappreciated the facts when it ruled that the petitioner was a tenant of
the private respondent.
The circumstance that the findings of the respondent court do not concur with those of the
trial court does not, of course, call for automatic reversal of the appellate court. Precisely, the
function of the appellate court is to review and, if warranted, reverse the findings of the trial
court. Disagreement between the two courts merely calls on us to make a specially careful study
of their respective decisions to determine which of them should be preferred as more
conformable to the facts at hand.
The Court has made this careful study and will sustain the decision of the respondent court.
The contract of employment dated July 5, 1970, written in Tagalog and entitled "Kasunduan
ng Upahang Araw," reads pertinently as follows:
1.
Ang Unang Panig ay siyang may-ari at nagtatangkilik ng isang lagay na lupa, sinasaka, na
tumatayo sa Nayon ng Baclaran, Cabuyao, Laguna, na siyang gagawa at sasaka sa lupa,
samantalang ang Ikalawang Panig ay magiging upahan at katulong sa paggawa ng lupa.
2.
Ang Unang Panig ay gustong ipagpatuloy ang pagbubungkal at paggawa ng bukid na
binabanggit sa itaas at ang Ikalawang Panig ay may ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang
P5.00 sa bawat araw, walong oras na trabaho gaya ng mga sumusunod: Patubigan ng linang;
pagpapahalabas ng mga pilapil; pagpapaaldabis sa unang araw ng pag-aararo; pagpapalinis ng
damo sa ibabaw ng pilapil; pagpapakamot (unang pagpapasuyod), pagpapahalang at
pagpapabalasaw (ikalawa't ikatlong pagpapasuyod); isang tao sa pagsasabog ng abono una sa
pagpapantay ng linang; bago magtanim; isang tao sa pagaalaga ng dapog; upa sa isang tao ng
magbobomba ng gamot laban sa pagkapit ng mga kulisap (mayroon at wala); sa nag-we-weeder;
upa sa mga tao na maggagamas at magpapatubig ng palay; magsasapaw ng mga pilapil at iba
pa.
3.
Ang Unang Panig at ang Ikalawang Panig ay nagkasundo na ang huli ay gagawa sa bukid
ayon sa nabanggit sa itaas bilang katulong at upahan lamang. Ang Unang Panig bukod sa sila
ang gagawa at magsasaka ay maaaring umupa ng iba pang tao manggagawa sa upahang
umiiral sang-ayon sa batas katulad ng pag-aararo, pagpapahulip, pagpapagamas, pagbobomba,
pagweweeder, pagsasabog ng abono, pagbobomba ng gamot, pagpapatubig at iba pang mga
gawain. Maaaring alisin ang Ikalawang Panig sa pagpapatrabaho sa ano mang oras ng Unang
Panig.
4.
Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na
binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.

It is noted that the agreement provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (meaning Gelos) ay may
ibig na magpaupa sa paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawa't araw, walong oras na trabaho" (The
Second Party desires to lease his services at the rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and
that 'Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid kundi upahan lamang na
binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit." (The Second Party
makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid for every day of
work on the said farm.)
These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a tendency agreement
but only a contract of employment. The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in
dispute. This intention is quite consistent with the undisputed fact that three days before that
agreement was concluded, the former tenant of the land, Laocadio Punongbayan, had executed
an instrument in which he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights to the private
respondent. 5 It also clearly demonstrates that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, Alzona
intended to cultivate the land himself instead of placing it again under tenancy.
The petitioner would now disavow the agreement, but his protestations are less than
convincing. His wife's testimony that he is illiterate is belied by his own testimony to the contrary
in another proceeding. 6 Her claim that they were tricked into signing the agreement does not
stand up against the testimony of Atty. Santos Pampolina, who declared under his oath as a
witness (and as an attorney and officer of the court) that he explained the meaning of the
document to Gelos, who even read it himself before signing it. 7 Atty. Pampolina said the
agreement was not notarized because his commission as notary public was good only for Manila
and did not cover Laguna, where the document was executed. 8 At any rate, the lack of
notarization did not adversely affect the veracity and effectiveness of the agreement, which,
significantly, Gelos and his wife do not deny having signed.
Gelos points to the specific tasks mentioned in the agreement and suggests that they are
the work of a tenant and not of a mere hired laborer. Not so. The work specified is not peculiar to
tenancy. What a tenant may do may also be done by a hired laborer working under the direction
of the landowner, as in the case at bar. It is not the nature of the work involved but the intention
of the parties that determines the relationship between them.
As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, 9 "tenancy is not a purely factual
relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal
relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in
this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to
law, are even more important."
Gelos presented receipts 10 for fertilizer and pesticides he allegedly bought and applied to
the land of the private respondent, but the latter insists that it was his brother who bought them,
being an agriculturist and in charge of the technical aspect of the farm. Moreover, the receipts do
not indicate to which particular landholding the fertilizers would be applied and, as pointed out
by the private respondent, could refer to the other parcels of land which Gelos was tenanting.
The petitioner's payment of irrigation fees from 1980 to 1985 to the National Irrigation
Administration on the said landholding is explained by the fact that during the pendency of the
CAR case, the Agrarian Reform Office fixed a provisional leasehold rental after a preliminary
finding that Gelos was the tenant of the private respondent. As such, it was he who had to pay
the irrigation fees. Incidentally, Section 12, subpar. (r) of PD 946 provides that the Secretary's
determination of the tenancy relationship is only preliminary and cannot be conclusive on the
lower court.
It is noteworthy that, except for the self-serving testimony of the petitioner's wife, the
records of this case are bereft of evidence regarding the sharing of harvest between Gelos and
Alzona. No less importantly, as the Court of Appeals observed, the petitioner has not shown that
he paid rentals on the subject property from 1970 to 1973, before their dispute arose.
A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to
or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system. (Emphasis supplied)

For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural
production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of
rental. In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator
thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. 11
On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4)
the power to control the employee's conduct - although the latter is the most important
element. 12
According to a well-known authority on the subject, 13 tenancy relationship is distinguished
from farm employer-farm worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship,
the lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm
employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and
the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm employer
and for his labor he receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit.
On the other hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest."
The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the produce of
the land, paid the petitioner lump sums for specific kinds of work on the subject lot or gave
himvales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer thereon. The petitioner's wife claims that
Alzona made her husband sign the invoices all at one time because he allegedly needed them to
reduce his income taxes. Even assuming this to be true, we do not think that made the said
payments fictitious, especially so since the petitioner never denied having received them.
The other issue raised by the petitioner, which is decidedly legal, is easily resolved. There
being no tenancy relationship, the contention that the private respondent's complaint has
prescribed under Section 38 of R.A. 3844 must also fail. That section is not applicable. It must be
noted that at the very outset, Alzona rejected the petitioner's claim of agricultural tenancy and
immediately instituted his action for unlawful detainer in accordance with Section 1, Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. As it happened, the said case was held not proper for trial by the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform. He then resorted to other remedies just so he could recover possession of his
land and, finally, in 1979, he yielded to the jurisdiction of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations
by filing there an action for declaration of non-tenancy. The action, which was commenced in
1979. was within the ten-year prescriptive period provided under Article 1144 of the Civil Code
for actions based on a written contract. **
The Court quotes with approval the following acute observations made by Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy:
It might not be amiss to state at this juncture that in deciding this case in favor of defendant, the
lower court might have been greatly influenced by the fact that defendant is a mere farmer who
is almost illiterate while plaintiff is an educated landlord, such that it had felt that it was its duty
to be vigilant for the protection of defendant's interests. But the duty of the court to protect the
weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to
the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side. Besides, defendant's
economic position vis a vis the plaintiff does not necessarily make him the underprivileged party
in this case, for as testified by plaintiff which defendant never denied, the small land in question
was the only landholding of plaintiff when he and his father bought the same, at which time he
was just a lowly employee who did not even have a house of his own and his father, a mere
farmer, while defendant was the agricultural tenant of another piece of land and also owns his
own house, a sari sari store, and a caritela. Plaintiff also surmised that it was only after
defendant had been taken into its wings by the Federation of Free Farmers that he started
claiming to be plaintiff's agricultural tenant, presumably upon the Federation's instigation and
advice. And we cannot discount this possibility indeed, considering that during the early stages
of the proceedings in this case, defendant even counter-proposed to plaintiff that he would
surrender the land in question to the latter if plaintiff would convey to him another piece of land
adjacent to the land in question, almost one ha. in area, that plaintiff had also acquired after
buying the land in question, showing that defendant was not as ignorant as he would want the
Court to believe and had the advice of people knowledgeable on agrarian matters.

This Court has stressed more than once that social justice or any justice for that matter
is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is
true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor,
to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified
to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are
rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the
law.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the petition
is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, C .J ., Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-27797. August 26, 1974.]
TRINIDAD GABRIEL, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN, defendant-appellant.
DECISION
ZALDIVAR, J p:
This appeal from the decision, dated December 26, 1963, of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for the
reason that the jurisdiction of an inferior court is involved.
During the pendency of this case before this Court, under date of April 29, 1972, Atty.
Virgilio M. Pablo, counsel for the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, gave notice to this Court that said
appellant died on April 3, 1964, and was survived by his children, who are his legal heirs, namely:
Salvador Pangilinan, Santos Pangilinan, Mariano Pangilinan, Carlos Pangilinan and Pilar Pangilinan
de Avante. For the purposes of this case the appellant Eusebio Pangilinan, therefore, is
substituted by his heirs herein named.
Under date of November 20, 1973, Atty. Amando M. Laki filed a motion with this Court
advising that appellee Trinidad Gabriel died on June 14, 1967, and was survived by her heirs and
successors-in-interest, namely: Corazon O. Gabriel, married to Lamberto Ignacio; Ernesto O.
Gabriel; Ester O. Gabriel, married to Emmanuel Padua; Generoso O. Gabriel, Marciano O. Gabriel
and Pablo O. Gabriel, and prayed that appellee Trinidad Gabriel be substituted by her heirs herein
named. By order of this Court of December 4, 1973 the prayer for substitution was granted.
In its resolution dated April 19, 1967 certifying the case to this Court, the Court of Appeals
made the following findings, which We adopt:
"On June 18, 1960 Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
against Eusebio Pangilinan alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond situated in barrio Sta.
Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and measuring about 169,507 square meters; that sometime during the
last war she entered into an oral contract of lease thereof with the defendant on a year to year
basis, i.e., from January 1 to December 31, at a rental of P1,200, plus the amount of real estate
taxes, payable in advance in the month of January; that desiring to develop and cultivate the
fishpond by herself, she notified the defendant in a letter dated June 26, 1957 that she was
terminating the contract as of December 31, 1957; that upon request of the defendant, she
extended the lease for another year that on November 19, 1958 she again wrote the defendant
that he should surrender possession of the fishpond on January 1, 1959, which demand he
however ignored. Plaintiff accordingly prayed that the defendant be ordered to restore the
possession of the fishpond to her and to pay her P1,200, plus the amount of real estate taxes, a
year from 1959, attorney's fees and costs.
"The defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there
being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by the
plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant thereafter filed his answer with counterclaim
alleging, inter alia, that the land in question was originally leased to him, also verbally, by the
plaintiff's father, Potenciano Gabriel, in 1923 for as long as the defendant wanted subject to the
condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and the part which was already
a fishpond be improved at his expense which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his

heirs at the termination of the lease for whatever cause: that when the plaintiff became the
owner of the property through inheritance, she told the defendant that she would honor her
father's contract with the defendant, and likewise assured him that he could continue leasing the
property, whose original rental of P400.00 a year had been progressively increased to P1,200.00,
for as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally. As a special
defense, the defendant reiterated the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to take
cognizance of the case.
"On February 12, 1962 the trial court issued an order herein below quoted in full:
'The plaintiff seeks to eject the defendant from the fishpond described in the complaint which is
under lease to the said defendant, who, however, refuses to vacate. Instead, he has impugned
the jurisdiction of this Court contending that the action should have been filed with the Court of
Agrarian Relations, which has original and exclusive jurisdiction, as their relationship is one of
leasehold tenancy.
'After the motion to dismiss was denied on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, the
parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take
cognizance of the case.
'It appears that the fishpond is presently in the possession of the defendant, who originally
leased it from the father of the plaintiff. Upon the death of the said father, the fishpond was
inherited by the plaintiff. It is now covered by T.C.T. No. 1634 and is registered in her name. It
contains an area of 169,507.00 square meters. The rental is on a yearly basis.
'It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the
aforecited fishpond since 1956 he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan,
took over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying
his instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano Maninang. The
names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who were paid for the
repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the watcher. He has
lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing near the
fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a
priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been seen working on the fishpond.
'The above are the material and pertinent facts upon which we enter this order.
'After a study of the facts and in the light of the provisions of the Tenancy Law, Republic Act No.
1199, particularly Sections 4 and 9, as amended, it seems clear that his case does not fall within
the purview of said Act. The lease contract is manifestly a civil lease governed by the New Civil
Code. Considering the area of the fishpond, 16 hectares, more or less, the fact that neither the
defendant, who is physically incapacitated, or his daughter is personally cultivating the fishpond
or through the employment of mechanical farm implements, and the further fact that the
persons named above are not members of the immediate farm household of the defendant, the
conclusion is that no tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as
defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended.
'We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold that this Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and
decide this case. After this order has become final, the plaintiff may request for the settling of
the initial trial.'
The defendant does not contest the findings of facts therein made by the trial court.
"After the parties adduced their respective evidence on the merits, decision was rendered
wherein the trial court, pursuant to Article 1197 of the Civil Code, fixed the period of the lease up
to June 30, 1964, the defendant on said date to surrender possession of the fishpond to the
plaintiff and to pay the rentals due the latter. The plaintiff, on her part, was required upon
surrender of possession to her, to pay the defendant the sum of P1,000.00 as reimbursement of
the expenses he incurred in improving the fishpond, and upon failure by either party to pay the
amount due the other, the same would bear interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
"A reconsideration by the defendant having been denied, he appealed to this Court and assigned
the following errors:
1.
The lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a
civil lease, in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines and not a leasehold tenancy under
Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.

2.
The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction,
the case being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep. Act. No. 1199 as amended.
3.
The lower court erred in appreciating the evidence of the appellant particularly the basis for
the expenditure for the development of the fishpond in question.
4.
The lower court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the appellant in the measely
amount of one thousand pesos for reimbursement and for seven hundred pesos for the cost of
the floodgate.
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, it is an admitted fact that plaintiff leased the fishpond to the
defendant in 1943 without a fixed term, the annual rental payable at the end of the year (Exhibit
C, Deposition of plaintiff, Dec. 13, 1962, pp. 2 and 3). It is likewise undisputed that the work in
the fishpond consisted in letting out the water so algae (lumut) would grow or if algae would not
grow, getting some from the river and putting them in the fishpond, changing the dirty water
with fresh water, repairing leaks in the dikes, and planting of fingerlings and attending to them;
that these were done by defendant, with some help; that he personally attended to the fishpond
until 1956 when he became ill; that thereafter his nephew Bernardo Cayanan, who was living
with him, helped in the work to be done in the fishpond and his daughter Pilar Pangilinan helped
in the management, conveying his instructions to the workers (t.s.n., pp. 4-8, Magat).
"Upon the foregoing facts, the defendant insists that the relationship between the parties is an
agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to
section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is therefore within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. Plaintiff, on the other hand, maintains in
effect that since defendant has ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the
members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy
relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease
and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.
"It does appear that the controversy on the issue of jurisdiction calls for the interpretation of
cultivating or working the land by the tenant personally or with the aid of the members of his
immediate farm household." 1
Those are the findings and conclusions of facts made by the Court of Appeals which, as a
general rule, bind this Court. 2
1.
Let Us now discuss the issues raised in this appeal. First, was the relationship between
the appellee and appellant a leasehold tenancy or a civil law lease?
There are important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The
subject matter of leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be
either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold
tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee
need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in
leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for
any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil
Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws. 3
In order that leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the following
requisites must concur:
1.
That the land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2.
That the land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of
his immediate farm household;
3.
That the land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor
available from members of his immediate farm household;
4.
That the land belongs to another; and
5.
That the use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money
or in produce or in both. 4
Were the foregoing requisites present in the instant case?
There is no doubt that the land in question is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and
prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. Thus Section 46 (c) of said Act provides that "the
consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the raising
of livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties". This Court has already ruled

that "land in which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land." 5 The mere fact, however,
that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within
the purview of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the
other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.
Regarding the second requisite, it is to be noted that the land in question has an area of
169,507 square meters, or roughly 17 hectares of fishpond. The question of whether such a big
parcel of land is susceptible of being worked by the appellant's family or not has not been raised,
and We see no need of tarrying on this point. So, We pass to the third requisite, to wit, whether
the tenant himself personally or with the aid of his immediate family worked the land.
Assuming that appellant had previously entered in 1923 into an agreement of leasehold
tenancy with Potenciano Gabriel, appellee's father, such tenancy agreement was severed in 1956
when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not
even did the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land in question. Only
the members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant
or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm
enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household" 6 The record shows who helped
work the land in question, and We quote:
"It also appears that the defendant has ceased to work personally with the aid of helpers the
aforecited fishpond since 1956 when he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar
Pangilinan took over. She testified that she helps her father in administering the leased property,
conveying his instructions to the workers, Urbano Maninang, Isidro Bernal and Marciano
Maninang. The names of Ire, Juan and Aguedo Viada have been mentioned as the laborers who
were paid for the repair of the dikes. Bernardo Cayanan, a nephew of the defendant, acts as the
watcher. He has lived separately since he got married. Excepting Pilar Pangilinan, who is residing
near the fishpond, the other children of the defendant are all professionals: a lawyer, an
engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these persons has been seen working on
the fishpond." 7
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. This
Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant" as a person who, himself
and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land
belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's consent for purposes of production
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Section 8 of the same Act limits the relation of landholder and tenant to the person who furnishes
the land and to the person who actually works the land himself with the aid of labor available
from within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4 of the same Act requires for the
existence of leasehold tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm household work the land.
It provides that leasehold tenancy exists when a person, who either personally or with the aid of
labor available from members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a piece
of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his
immediate farm household, belonging to, or legally possessed by, another in consideration of a
fixed amount in money or in produce or in both.
A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from
his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work
the land cannot be considered tenants; 8 and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the
cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant
within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status,
rights, and privileges of one.
We are, therefore, construed to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the
appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under
Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Agrarian Relations. 9
2.
Regarding the second assignment of error. We accordingly rule that the Court of First
Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case at bar, this being a case of civil law lease.
3.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the third and fourth assigned errors as these are
issues involving findings of facts which have been settled by the lower court, and unless there is

grave abuse of discretion, which we do not find in the record of the case, We shall not venture to
discuss the merits of the factual findings of the court a quo.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
This decision should apply to the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original parties, as
named in this decision. In consonance with the decision of the lower court, the heirs and
successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should deliver the possession of the
fishpond in question to the heirs and successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel; and said
heirs and successors-in-interest of appellant Eusebio Pangilinan should pay the heirs and
successors-in-interest of appellee Trinidad Gabriel the accrued rentals from January 1, 1960, at
the rate of P1,200.00 a year, until the actual delivery of the possession of the fishpond as herein
ordered, with interest at the legal rate until full payment is made.
IT IS SO ORDERED.