Adonis Notes 2011

Alliance for Alternative Action
THE ADONIS CASES 2011

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES
SECTION 27, ARTICLE 18, 1987 CONSTITUTION
DE LEON VS. ESGUERRA
(G.R. NO. 78059. AUGUST 31, 1987)
MELENCIOHERRERA, !."
FACTS"
In the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections, petitioner Alfredo
M. De Leon was elected Barangay aptain and the other petitioners Angel
!. !ala"at, et al., as Barangay o#ncil"en of Barangay Dolores, $aytay,
%i&al.
'n (e)r#ary 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon recei*ed
a Me"orand#" antedated Dece")er 1, 198+ )#t signed )y respondent
'I ,o*ernor Ben-a"in .sg#erra on (e)r#ary 8, 1987 designating
respondent (lorentino ,. Magno as Barangay aptain of Barangay
Dolores, $aytay, %i&al. $he designation "ade )y the 'I ,o*ernor was
/)y a#thority of the Minister of Local ,o*ern"ent./
Also on (e)r#ary 8, 1987, .sg#erra signed a Me"orand#",
antedated Dece")er 1, 198+ designating respondents %e"igio M. $igas,
et al., as "e")ers of the Barangay o#ncil of the sa"e Barangay and
M#nicipality.
0etitioners "aintain that with the ratification of the 1987
onstit#tion, .sg#erra no longer has the a#thority to replace the" and to
designate their s#ccessors.
1owe*er, respondents rely on !ection 2, Article III of the
0ro*isional onstit#tion, which pro*ided2
!.$I'3 2. All electi*e and appointi*e officials and
e"ployees #nder the 1974 onstit#tion shall contin#e in office #ntil
otherwise pro*ided )y procla"ation or e5ec#ti*e order or #pon the
designation or appoint"ent and 6#alification of their s#ccessors, if s#ch
appoint"ent is "ade within a period of one year fro" (e)r#ary 27, 198+.
ISSUE" 8hether the designation of the respondents to replace petitioners
was *alidly "ade d#ring the one9year period which ended on (e)r#ary 27,
1987.
HELD"
3'. 8hile (e)r#ary 8, 1987 is ostensi)ly still within the one year
deadline #nder the 0ro*isional onstit#tion, the sa"e "#st )e dee"ed to
ha*e )een o*erta:en )y !ection 27, Article ;<III of the 1987 onstit#tion
reading2
=$his onstit#tion shall ta:e effect i""ediately
#pon its ratification )y a "a-ority of the *otes
cast in a ple)iscite held for the p#rpose and
shall s#persede all pre*io#s onstit#tions.>
$he 1987 onstit#tion was ratified in a ple)iscite on
(e)r#ary 2, 1987. By that date, the 0ro*isional onstit#tion "#st )e
dee"ed to ha*e )een s#perseded. 1a*ing )eco"e inoperati*e, !ection
2, Article III of the 0ro*isional onstit#tion co#ld not )e relied on )y the
respondent 'I ,o*ernor. $he "e"orand#" dated (e)r#ary 8, 1987 )y
the respondent 'I ,o*ernor co#ld no longer ha*e any legal force and
effect.
$he act of ratification is the act of *oting )y the people. $he
can*ass of the *otes thereafter is "erely the "athe"atical confir"ation of
what was done d#ring the date of the ple)iscite, and the procla"ation of
the 0resident is "erely the official confir"atory declaration of an act which
was act#ally done )y the (ilipino people in adopting the onstit#tion when
they cast their *otes on the date of the ple)iscite.
SECTIONS 1 # 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION
GON$ALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(GR. NO L2819%, NOVEM&ER 9, 19%7)
CONCEPCION, C.!."
FACTS"
$he ongress passed 4 resol#tions si"#ltaneo#sly. $he
first, proposing a"end"ents to the onstit#tion so as to increase the
"e")ership of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es fro" a "a5i"#" of 12?, as
pro*ided in the present onstit#tion, to a "a5i"#" of 18?. $he second,
calling a con*ention to propose a"end"ents to said onstit#tion, the
con*ention to )e co"posed of two @2A electi*e delegates fro" each
representati*e district, to )e elected in the general elections. And the third,
proposing that the sa"e onstit#tion )e a"ended so as to a#thori&e
!enators and "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es to )eco"e
delegates to the afore"entioned constit#tional con*ention, witho#t
forfeiting their respecti*e seats in ongress. !#)se6#ently, ongress
passed a )ill, which, #pon appro*al )y the 0resident, )eca"e %ep#)lic
Act 3o. B914 pro*iding that the a"end"ents to the onstit#tion proposed
in the afore"entioned resol#tions )e s#)"itted, for appro*al )y the
people, at the general elections. $he petitioner assails the constit#tionality
of the said law contending that the ongress cannot si"#ltaneo#sly
propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion and call for the holding of a
constit#tional con*ention.
ISSUES"
@1A Is %ep#)lic Act 3o. B914 constit#tionalC
@2A 8'3 ongress can si"#ltaneo#sly propose a"end"ents to the
onstit#tion and call for the holding of a constit#tional con*entionC
HELD"
D.! as to )oth iss#es. $he constit#ent power or the power
to a"end or re*ise the onstit#tion, is different fro" the law9"a:ing power
of ongress. ongress can directly propose a"end"ents to the
onstit#tion and at the sa"e ti"e call for a onstit#tional on*ention to
propose a"end"ents.
Indeed, the power to a"end the onstit#tion or to propose
a"end"ents thereto is not incl#ded in the general grant of legislati*e
powers to ongress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people E as
the repository of so*ereignty in a rep#)lican state, s#ch as o#rsE to
"a:e, and, hence, to a"end their own (#nda"ental Law. ongress "ay
propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion "erely )eca#se the sa"e
e5plicitly grants s#ch power. 1ence, when e5ercising the sa"e, it is said
that !enators and Me")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es act, not as
"e")ers of ongress, )#t as co"ponent ele"ents of a constit#ent
asse")ly. 8hen acting as s#ch, the "e")ers of ongress deri*e their
a#thority fro" the onstit#tion, #nli:e the people, when perfor"ing the
sa"e f#nction, for their a#thority does not e"anate fro" the onstit#tion
E they are the *ery so#rce of all powers of go*ern"ent, incl#ding the
onstit#tion itself .
!ince, when proposing, as a constit#ent asse")ly,
a"end"ents to the onstit#tion, the "e")ers of ongress deri*e their
a#thority fro" the (#nda"ental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do
not ha*e the final say on whether or not their acts are within or )eyond
constit#tional li"its. 'therwise, they co#ld )r#sh aside and set the sa"e
at na#ght, contrary to the )asic tenet that o#rs is a go*ern"ent of laws,
not of "en, and to the rigid nat#re of o#r onstit#tion. !#ch rigidity is
stressed )y the fact that, the onstit#tion e5pressly confers #pon the
!#pre"e o#rt, the power to declare a treaty #nconstit#tional, despite the
e"inently political character of treaty9"a:ing power.
IM&ONG VS. COMELEC
35 SCRA 28 (1970)
FACTS"
0etitioners Man#el I")ong and %a#l ,on&ales, )oth
interested in r#nning as candidates in the 1971 onstit#tional on*ention,
filed separate petitions for declaratory relief, i"p#gning the
constit#tionality of %A +142, clai"ing that it pre-#dices their rights as
candidates.
ongress, acting as a onstit#ent Asse")ly, passed
%esol#tion 3o.2 which called for the onstit#tional on*ention to propose
onstit#tional a"end"ents. After its adoption, ongress, acting as a
legislati*e )ody, enacted %.A. B91B i"ple"enting said resol#tion,
restating entirely the pro*isions of said resol#tion.
$hereafter, ongress, acting as a onstit#ent Asse")ly,
passed %esol#tion 3o. B a"ending the %esol#tion 3o. 2 )y pro*iding that
=555 any other details relating to the specific apportion"ent of delegates,
election of delegates to, and the holding of the onstit#tional on*ention
shall )e e")odied in an i"ple"enting legislation 555>
ongress, acting as a legislati*e )ody, enacted %.A. +142,
i"ple"enting %esol#tion 3os. 2 and B, and e5pressly repealing %.A.
B91B.
ISSUE" May ongress in acting as a legislati*e )ody enact %.A.+142 to
i"ple"ent the resol#tion passed )y it in its capacity as a onstit#ent
Asse")lyC
HELD"
D.!. $he o#rt declared that while the a#thority to call a
onstit#tional on*ention is *ested )y the onstit#tion solely and
e5cl#si*ely in ongress acting as a constit#tional asse")ly, the power to
enact the i"ple"enting details or specifics of the general law does not
e5cl#si*ely pertain to ongress, the ongress in e5ercising its
co"prehensi*e legislati*e power @not as a onstit#tional Asse")lyA "ay
pass the necessary i"ple"enting law pro*iding for the details of the
onstit#tional on*entions, s#ch as the n#")er, 6#alification, and
co"pensation of its "e")er.
$he reasons cited )y the o#rt in #pholding the
constit#tionality of the enact"ent of %.A. +142 are as follows2
1. ongress, acting as a onstit#ent Asse")ly
p#rs#ant to Article ;< of the onstit#tion, has a#thority to
propose constit#tional a"end"ents or call a con*ention for
the p#rpose )y F *otes of each ho#se in -oint session
asse")led )#t *oting separately.
2. !#ch grant incl#des all other powers essential
to the effecti*e e5ercise of the principal power )y necessary
i"plication.
4. I"ple"enting details are within the a#thority of
the ongress not only as a onstit#ent Asse")ly )#t also in
the e5ercise of its co"prehensi*e legislati*e power which
enco"passes all "atters not e5pressly or )y necessary
i"plication withdrawn or re"o*ed )y the onstit#tion fro"
San Beda College of Law
&'()* +, ATT-. ADONIS V. GA&RIEL .)/012)(
1
the a")it of legislati*e action so long as it does not
contra*ene any pro*ision of the onstit#tionG and
B. ongress as a legislati*e )ody "ay th#s enact
necessary i"ple"enting legislation to fill in the gaps which
ongress as a onstit#ent Asse")ly has o"itted.
ARTICLE 3VII, SECTION 15, 1973 CONSTITUTION
OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L5%350, APRIL 2, 1981
FERNANDO, C.!."
FACTS"
$he challenge in these two prohi)ition proceedings is
against the *alidity of three Batasang 0a")ansa %esol#tions proposing
constit#tional a"end"ents. 0etitioners #rged that the a"end"ents
proposed are so e5tensi*e in character that they go far )eyond the li"its
of the a#thority conferred on the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa as
s#ccessor of the Interi" 3ational Asse")ly. (or the", what was done
was to re*ise and not to a"end.
0etitioners !a"#el 'ccena and %a"on A. ,on&ales, )oth
"e")ers of the 0hilippine Bar and for"er delegates to the 1971
onstit#tional on*ention that fra"ed the present onstit#tion, are s#ing
as ta5payers. $he rather #northodo5 aspect of these petitions is the
assertion that the 1974 onstit#tion is not the f#nda"ental law.
$he s#its for prohi)ition were filed respecti*ely on March + and March 12,
1981.
ISSUES"
8hether or not the 1974 onstit#tion is already in effect.
8hether or not the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa has the power to
propose a"end"ents.
8hether or not the three resol#tions are *alid.
HELD"
1.Des. it is "#ch too late in the day to deny the force and applica)ility of
the 1974 onstit#tion. In the dispositi*e portion of Ha*ellana *. $he
.5ec#ti*e !ecretary, dis"issing petitions for prohi)ition and "anda"#s to
declare in*alid its ratification, this o#rt stated that it did so )y a *ote of si5
to fo#r. It then concl#ded2 /$his )eing the *ote of the "a-ority, there is no
f#rther -#dicial o)stacle to the new onstit#tion )eing considered in force
and effect./
8ith s#ch a prono#nce"ent )y the !#pre"e o#rt and with
the recognition of the cardinal post#late that what the !#pre"e o#rt says
is not only entitled to respect )#t "#st also )e o)eyed, a factor for
insta)ility was re"o*ed. $he !#pre"e o#rt can chec: as well as
legiti"ate. In declaring what the law is, it "ay not only n#llify the acts of
coordinate )ranches )#t "ay also s#stain their *alidity. In the latter case,
there is an affir"ation that what was done cannot )e stig"ati&ed as
constit#tionally deficient. $he "ere dis"issal of a s#it of this character
s#ffices. $hat is the "eaning of the concl#ding state"ent in Ha*ellana.
!ince then, this o#rt has in*aria)ly applied the present onstit#tion. $he
latest case in point is 0eople *. !ola, pro"#lgated )arely two wee:s ago.
D#ring the first year alone of the effecti*ity of the present onstit#tion, at
least ten cases "ay )e cited.
2. Des.$he e5istence of the power of the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa is
ind#)ita)le. $he applica)le pro*ision in the 197+ A"end"ents is 6#ite
e5plicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads th#s2 /$he Interi" Batasang
0a")ansa shall ha*e the sa"e powers and its Me")ers shall ha*e the
sa"e f#nctions, responsi)ilities, rights, pri*ileges, and dis6#alifications as
the interi" 3ational Asse")ly and the reg#lar 3ational Asse")ly and the
Me")ers thereof./ 'ne of s#ch powers is precisely that of proposing
a"end"ents. Article ;<II, !ection 17 of the 1974 onstit#tion in its
$ransitory 0ro*isions *ested the Interi" 3ational Asse")ly with the power
to propose a"end"ents #pon special call )y the 0ri"e Minister )y a *ote
of the "a-ority of its "e")ers to )e ratified in accordance with the Article
on A"end"ents. 8hen, therefore, the Interi" Batasang 0a")ansa, #pon
the call of the 0resident and 0ri"e Minister (erdinand .. Marcos, "et as
a constit#ent )ody it acted )y *irt#e 'f s#ch i"potence Its a#thority to do
so is clearly )eyond do#)t. It co#ld and did propose the a"end"ents
e")odied in the resol#tions now )eing assailed.
4. Des.$he 6#estion of whether the proposed resol#tions constit#te
a"end"ents or re*ision is of no rele*ance. It s#ffices to 6#ote fro" the
opinion of H#stice Ma:asiar, spea:ing for the o#rt, in Del %osario *.
o""ission on .lections to dispose of this contention. 8hether the
onstit#tional on*ention will only propose a"end"ents to the
onstit#tion or entirely o*erha#l the present onstit#tion and propose an
entirely new onstit#tion )ased on an Ideology foreign to the de"ocratic
syste", is of no "o"entG )eca#se the sa"e will )e s#)"itted to the
people for ratification. 'nce ratified )y the so*ereign people, there can )e
no de)ate a)o#t the *alidity of the new onstit#tion. $he fact that the
present onstit#tion "ay )e re*ised and replaced with a new one ... is no
arg#"ent against the *alidity of the law )eca#se Ia"end"entI incl#des the
Ire*isionI or total o*erha#l of the entire onstit#tion. At any rate, whether
the onstit#tion is "erely a"ended in part or re*ised or totally changed
wo#ld )eco"e i""aterial the "o"ent the sa"e is ratified )y the
so*ereign people./
81.%.('%., the petitions are dis"issed for lac: of "erit.
SECTIONS 1 # 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987 CONSTITUTION
TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(GR. NO. L34150, OCTO&ER 1%, 1971)
&ARREDO, !."
FACTS"
A onstit#tional on*ention was called #pon to propose
a"end"ents to the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, in which, the delegates
to the said on*ention were all elected #nder and )y *irt#e of resol#tions
and the i"ple"enting legislation thereof, %ep#)lic Act +142. $he
on*ention appro*ed 'rganic %esol#tion 3o. 1, a"ending section one of
article 7 of the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines so as to lower the *oting age
to 18. !aid resol#tion also pro*ided in its !ection 4 that the partial
a"end"ent, which refers only to the age 6#alification for the e5ercise of
s#ffrage shall )e witho#t pre-#dice to other a"end"ents that will )e
proposed in the f#t#re )y the 1971 onstit#tional on*ention on other
portions of the a"ended !ection or on other portions of the entire
onstit#tion.
$he "ain thr#st of the petition is that 'rganic %esol#tion 3o.
1 and the other i"ple"enting resol#tions thereof s#)se6#ently appro*ed
)y the on*ention ha*e no force and effect as laws in so far as they are in
contra*ention to !ection 1 Article ;< of the onstit#tion. Jnder the said
pro*ision, the proposed a"end"ent in 6#estion cannot )e presented to
the people for ratification separately fro" each and all of the other
a"end"ents to )e drafted and proposed )y the on*ention.
ISSUE"
Is the %esol#tion appro*ed )y the 1971 onstit#tional
on*ention constit#tionalC
HELD"
3'. 'rganic %esol#tion 3o. 1 of the onstit#tional
on*ention of 1971 and the i"ple"enting acts and resol#tions of the
on*ention, insofar as they pro*ide for the holding of a ple)iscite, as well
as the resol#tion of the respondent o"elec co"plying therewith are n#ll
and *oid.
$he o#rt is of the opinion that in pro*iding for the
6#estioned ple)iscite )efore it has finished, and separately fro", the
whole draft of the constit#tion it has )een called to for"#late, the
on*entionIs 'rganic %esol#tion 3o. 1 and all s#)se6#ent acts of the
on*ention i"ple"enting the sa"e *iolate the condition in !ection 1,
Article ;< that there sho#ld only )e one /election/ or ple)iscite for the
ratification of all the a"end"ents the on*ention "ay propose. 8e are
not denying any right of the people to *ote on the proposed a"end"entG
8e are only holding that #nder !ection 1, Article ;< of the onstit#tion,
the sa"e sho#ld )e s#)"itted to the" not separately fro" )#t together
with all the other a"end"ents to )e proposed )y this present on*ention.
0rescinding already fro" the fact that #nder !ection 4 of the
6#estioned resol#tion, it is e*ident that no fi5ed fra"e of reference is
pro*ided the *oter, as to what finally will )e conco"itant 6#alifications that
will )e re6#ired )y the final draft of the constit#tion to )e for"#lated )y the
on*ention of a *oter to )e a)le to en-oy the right of s#ffrage, there are
other considerations which "a:e it i"possi)le to *ote intelligently on the
proposed a"end"ent. 3o one :nows what changes in the f#nda"ental
principles of the constit#tion the on*ention will )e "inded to appro*e. $o
)e "ore specific, we do not ha*e any "eans of foreseeing whether the
right to *ote wo#ld )e of any significant *al#e at all. 8ho can say whether
or not later on the on*ention "ay decide to pro*ide for *arying types of
*oters for each le*el of the political #nits it "ay di*ide the co#ntry into. $he
root of the diffic#lty in other words, lies in that the on*ention is precisely
on the *erge of introd#cing s#)stantial changes, if not radical ones, in
al"ost e*ery part and aspect of the e5isting social and political order
enshrined in the present onstit#tion. 1ow can a *oter in the proposed
ple)iscite intelligently deter"ine the effect of the red#ction of the *oting
age #pon the different instit#tions which the on*ention "ay esta)lish and
of which presently he is not gi*en any ideaC learly, there is i"proper
s#)"ission.
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 (197%)
FACTS"
0resident Marcos iss#ed 0.D. 991 calling for a national referend#"
on 'cto)er 1+, 197+ for the iti&ens Asse")lies @=Barangay>A to resol*e,
a"ong other things, the iss#es of "artial law, the interi" asse")ly, its
replace"ent, the powers of s#ch replace"ent, the period of its e5istence,
the length of the period for the e5ercise )y the 0resident of his present
powers.
$hereafter, 0.D.1?41 was iss#ed, a"ending 0.D. 991 )y
declaring the pro*isions of 0.D. 229 applica)le as to the "anner of *oting
and can*assing of *otes in )arangays for the national referend#"9
ple)iscite of 'cto)er 1+, 197+. 0.D. 1?44 was also iss#ed, declaring
therein that the 6#estion of the contin#ance of "artial law will )e
s#)"itted for referend#" at the sa"e ti"e as the s#)"ission of his
@0residentA proposed a"end"ents to the onstit#tion thro#gh a ple)iscite
on 'cto)er 1+, 197+.
0etitioner !anidad filed s#it for 0rohi)ition and 0reli"inary
In-#nction, see:ing to en-oin the 'M.L. fro" holding and cond#cting
said %eferend#"90le)iscite on the )asis that #nder the 1947 and 1974
onstit#tion, there is no grant to the inc#")ent 0resident to e5ercise the
2
constit#ent power to propose a"end"ents to the new onstit#tion, hence,
the %eferend#"90le)iscite on 'cto)er 1+ has no legal )asis.
0etitioner ,#&"an filed another action asserting that the
power to propose a"end"ents to or re*ision of the onstit#tion d#ring the
transition period is e5pressly conferred to the interi" 3ational Asse")ly
#nder sec.1+, Art. ;<II of the onstit#tion.
A si"ilar action was instit#ted )y petitioners ,on&ales and
!alapantan arg#ing that2
1. .*en granting hi" legislati*e powers #nder the "artial law,
the inc#")ent 0resident cannot act as a constit#ent asse")ly to
propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion,
2. A referend#"9ple)iscite is #ntena)le #nder the onstit#tions
of 1947 and 1974,
4. $he s#)"ission of the proposed a"end"ents in s#ch a
short period of ti"e for deli)eration renders the ple)iscite a n#llity,
B. $o lift "artial law, the 0resident need not cons#lt the people
*ia referend#", and
7. Allowing 179year9olds to *ote wo#ld a"o#nt to an
a"end"ent of the onstit#tion, which confines the right of s#ffrage
to those citi&ens of the 0hilippines 18 years of age and a)o*e.
$he !olicitor ,eneral, in his co""ent for respondent
'M.L., "aintains that2
1. 0etitioners ha*e no standing to s#e
2. $he iss#e raised is political in nat#re, )eyond -#dicial
cogni&ance of the co#rt
4. At this state of the transition period, only the inc#")ent
0resident has the a#thority to e5ercise constit#ent power
B. $he referend#"9ple)iscite is a step towards nor"ali&ation.
ISSUES"
Do the petitioners ha*e the standing to s#eC
1. Is the 6#estion of the constit#tionality of the 0residential
Decrees 991, 1?41, and 1?44 political or -#dicialC
2. Does the 0resident possess the power to propose
a"end"ents to the onstit#tion as well as set #p the re6#ired
"achinery and prescri)e the proced#re for the ratification of his
proposal, in the a)sence of an interi" 3ational Asse")lyC
4. Is the s#)"ission to the people of the proposed
a"end"ents within the ti"e fra"e allowed therefore a s#fficient
and proper s#)"issionC

HELD"
1. D.!. At the instance of ta5payers, laws pro*iding for the
dis)#rse"ent of p#)lic f#nds "ay )e en-oined #pon the theory that
the e5pendit#re of p#)lic f#nds )y the !tate for the p#rpose of
e5ec#ting an #nconstit#tional act constit#tes a "isapplication of
s#ch f#nds.
2. It is a -#dicial 6#estion.
4. D.!. If the 0resident has )een legiti"ately discharging the
legislati*e f#nctions of the Interi" Asse")ly, there is no reason
why he cannot *alidly discharge the f#nction of that asse")ly to
propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion, which is )#t ad-#nct,
altho#gh pec#liar, to its gross legislati*e power. $his is not to say
that the 0resident has con*erted his office into a constit#ent
asse")ly of that nat#re nor"ally constit#ted )y the legislat#re.
%ather, with the Interi" Asse")ly not con*ened and only the
0residency and !#pre"e o#rt in operation, the #rges of a)sol#te
necessity render it i"perati*e #pon the 0resident to act as agent for
and in )ehalf of the people to propose a"end"ents to the
onstit#tion. 0arenthetically, )y its *ery constit#tion, the !#pre"e
o#rt possesses no capacity to propose a"end"ents witho#t
constit#tional infractions. (or the 0resident to shy away fro" that
act#ality and decline to #nderta:e the a"ending process wo#ld
lea*e the go*ern"ental "achinery at a stale"ate or create in the
powers of the !tate a destr#cti*e *ac##". After all, the constit#ent
asse")lies or constit#tional con*entions, li:e the 0resident now,
are "ere agents of the people.
B. D.!. Art. ;<I of the onstit#tion "a:es no pro*ision as to
the specific date when the ple)iscite shall )e held, )#t si"ply states
that =it shall )e held not later than 4 "onths after the appro*al of
s#ch a"end"ent or re*ision.> $he period fro" !epte")er 21 to
'cto)er 1+, or a period of three wee:s is not too short for free
de)ates or disc#ssions on the referend#"9ple)iscite iss#es. $he
iss#es are not new. $hey are the iss#es of the day, and the people
ha*e )een li*ing with
7. the" since the procla"ation of "artial law fo#r years ago.
$he referend#"s of 1974 and 1977 carried the sa"e iss#e of
"artial law. $hat notwithstanding, the contested )rief period for
disc#ssion is not witho#t co#nterparts in pre*io#s ple)iscites for
constit#tional a"end"ents.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
270 SCRA 10%, MARCH 19, 1997
FACTS"
0ri*ate respondent Delfin filed with the 'M.L. a
=0etition to A"end the onstit#tion, to Lift $er" Li"its of .lecti*e 'fficials,
)y 0eopleKs a"end"ents to the onstit#tion granted #nder !ection 2, Art.
;<II of the 1987 onstit#tion. %.A. +747 and 'M.L. %esol#tion 3o.
24??. $he proposed a"end"ents consist of the s#)"ission of this
proposition to the peopleE=Do yo# appro*e the lifting of the ter" li"its of
all electi*e officials, a"ending for the p#rpose section B and 7 of Art.<I,
!ection B of Art.<II, and !ection 8 of Art. ; of the 0hilippine onstit#tionC>
$he 'M.L. iss#ed an order directing the p#)lication of
the petition and the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for
hearing. At the hearing, !enator %a#l %oco, the IB0, De"o:rasya9
Ipagtanggol ang Lonstit#syon @DILA, 0#)lic Interest Law enter, and
La)an ng De"o:rati:ong 0ilipino @LABA3A appeared as inter*enors9
oppositors. !enator %oco "o*ed to dis"iss the Delfin 0etition on the
gro#nd that it is not the initiatory party cogni&a)le )y the 'M.L..
0etitioners filed a special ci*il action directing respondents
'M.L. and DelfinKs 0etition to directly propose a"end"ents to the
onstit#tion thro#gh the syste" of initiati*e #nder sec.2 of Art. ;<II of the
1987 onstit#tion. 0etitioners raise the following arg#"ents2
1. $he constit#tional pro*ision on peopleKs initiati*e to a"end
the onstit#tion can only )e i"ple"ented )y law to )e passed )y
ongress. 3o s#ch law has )een passed.
2. %.A. +747 failed to pro*ide s#)title initiati*e on the
onstit#tion, #nli:e in the other "odes of initiati*e. It only pro*ides
for the effecti*ity of the law after the p#)lication in print "edia
indicating that the Act co*ers only laws and not constit#tional
a"end"ents )eca#se the latter ta:es effect only #pon ratification
and not after p#)lication.
4. 'M.L. %esol#tion 3o.24??, adopted on Han#ary 1+,
1991 to go*ern the =cond#ct of initiati*e on the onstit#tion and
initiati*e and referend#" on national and local laws>, is #ltra *ires
insofar as initiati*e or a"end"ents to the onstit#tion are
concerned, since the 'M.L. has no power to pro*ide r#les and
reg#lation for the e5ercise of the right of initiati*e to a"end the
onstit#tion. 'nly the ongress is a#thori&ed )y the onstit#tion
to pass the i"ple"enting law.
B. $he peopleKs initiati*e is li"ited to a"end"ents to the
onstit#tion, to the re*ision thereof. .5tending or lifting of the ter"
li"its constit#tes a re*ision and is therefore o#tside the power of
the peopleKs initiati*e.
7. (inally, ongress has not yet appropriated f#nds for peopleKs
initiati*e, neither the 'M.L. nor any other depart"ent, agency
or office of the go*ern"ent has realigned f#nds for the p#rpose.
$he !#pre"e o#rt ga*e d#e co#rse to this petition and
granted the Motions for Inter*ention filed )y 0etitioners9Inter*enors DIL,
MABI3I, IB0, LABA3, and !enator %oco.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether !ec. 2, Art. ;<II of the 1987 onstit#tion is a
self9e5ec#ting pro*isionC
2. 8hether %.A.+747 is a s#fficient stat#tory
i"ple"entation of the said constit#tional pro*isionC
4. 8hether the 'M.L. resol#tion is *alidC
B. 8hether the lifting of ter" li"its of electi*e national
and local officials as proposed wo#ld constit#te a re*ision, or an
a"end"ent to the onstit#tionC
HELD"
3'. Altho#gh the "ode of a"end"ent which )ypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on
congressional action. 8hile the onstit#tion has recogni&ed or granted
that right, the people cannot e5ercise it if the ongress for whate*er
reason, does not pro*ide for its i"ple"entation.
1. 3'. %.A. +747 is ins#fficient and inco"plete to f#lly co"ply
with the power and d#ty of the ongress to enact the stat#tory
i"ple"entation of sec.2, Art.;<II of the onstit#tion. Altho#gh said
Act intended to incl#de the syste" of initiati*e on a"end"ents to
the onstit#tion, it is dee"ed inade6#ate to co*er that syste" and
accordingly pro*ide for a local initiati*e re6#ired for proposing
onstit#tional changes.
2. 3'. $he 'M.L. %esol#tion insofar as it prescri)es
r#les and reg#lations on the cond#ct of initiati*e on a"end"ents to
the onstit#tion is *oid, as e5pressed
in the Latin "a5i" =0otestas delegate non delegari potest. In e*ery
case of per"issi)le delegation, it "#st )e shown that the
delegation itself is *alid.
4. $he resol#tion of this iss#e is held to )e #nnecessary, if not
acade"ic, as the proposal to lift the ter" li"its of electi*e local and
national officials is an a"end"ent to the onstit#tion and not a
re*ision. $h#s, the petition was granted, and the 'M.L. is
per"anently en-oined fro" ta:ing cogni&ance of any petition for
initiati*e on a"end"ents to the onstit#tion #ntil a s#fficiently law
shall ha*e )een *alidly enacted to pro*ide for the i"ple"entation of
the syste".
LAM&INO VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 174153, OCTO&ER 25, 200%
FACTS"
'n 17 (e)r#ary 2??+, petitioners in ,.%. 3o. 17B174,
na"ely %a#l L. La")ino and .rico B. A#"entado @/La")ino ,ro#p/A, with
other gro#ps and indi*id#als, co""enced gathering signat#res for an
initiati*e petition to change the 1987 onstit#tion. 'n 27 A#g#st 2??+, the
La")ino ,ro#p filed a petition with the 'M.L. to hold a ple)iscite that
will ratify their initiati*e petition #nder !ection 7@)A and @cA and !ection 7 of
%ep#)lic Act 3o. +747 or the Initiati*e and %eferend#" Act @/%A +747/A.
$he La")ino ,ro#p alleged that their petition had the
s#pport of +,427,972 indi*id#als constit#ting at least twel*e per centum
3
@12MA of all registered *oters, with each legislati*e district represented )y
at least three per centum @4MA of its registered *oters. $he La")ino
,ro#p also clai"ed that 'M.L. election registrars had *erified the
signat#res of the +.4 "illion indi*id#als.
$he La")ino ,ro#pIs initiati*e petition changes the 1987
onstit#tion )y "odifying !ections 197 of Article <I @Legislati*e
Depart"entA and !ections 19B of Article <II @.5ec#ti*e Depart"entA and
)y adding Article ;<III entitled /$ransitory 0ro*isions./ $hese proposed
changes will shift the present Bica"eral90residential syste" to a
Jnica"eral90arlia"entary for" of go*ern"ent. $he La")ino ,ro#p
prayed that after d#e p#)lication of their petition, the 'M.L. sho#ld
s#)"it the following proposition in a ple)iscite for the *otersI ratification.
'n 4? A#g#st 2??+, the La")ino ,ro#p filed an A"ended
0etition with the 'M.L. indicating "odifications in the proposed
Article ;<III @$ransitory 0ro*isionsA of their initiati*e.
ISSUE"
8hether the La")ino ,ro#pIs initiati*e petition co"plies with
!ection 2, Article ;<II of the onstit#tion on a"end"ents to the
onstit#tion thro#gh a peopleIs initiati*e.
HELD"
3'. $he co#rt declared that La")ino ,ro#pIs initiati*e is
*oid and #nconstit#tional )eca#se it dis"ally fails to co"ply with the
re6#ire"ent of !ection 2, Article ;<II of the onstit#tion that the initiati*e
"#st )e /directly proposed )y the people thro#gh initiati*e #pon a
petition./
$he essence of a"end"ents /directly proposed )y the
people thro#gh initiati*e #pon a petition/ is that the entire proposal on its
face is a petition )y the people. $his "eans two essential ele"ents "#st
)e present. (irst, the people "#st a#thor and th#s sign the entire
proposal. 3o agent or representati*e can sign on their )ehalf. !econd, as
an initiati*e #pon a petition, the proposal "#st )e e")odied in a petition.
$hese essential ele"ents are present only if the f#ll te5t of
the proposed a"end"ents is first shown to the people who e5press their
assent )y signing s#ch co"plete proposal in a petition. $h#s, an
a"end"ent is /directly proposed )y the people thro#gh initiati*e #pon a
petition/ only if the people sign on a petition that contains the f#ll te5t of
the proposed a"end"ents.
$he f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents "ay )e either
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition "#st state the fact of s#ch attach"ent. $his is an ass#rance that
e*ery one of the se*eral "illions of signatories to the petition had seen the
f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ents )efore signing. 'therwise, it is
physically i"possi)le, gi*en the ti"e constraint, to pro*e that e*ery one of
the "illions of signatories had seen the f#ll te5t of the proposed
a"end"ents )efore signing.
!ection 2, Article ;<II of the onstit#tion does not e5pressly
state that the petition "#st set forth the f#ll te5t of the proposed
a"end"ents. 1owe*er, the deli)erations of the fra"ers of o#r
onstit#tion clearly show that the fra"ers intended to adopt the rele*ant
A"erican -#rispr#dence on peopleIs initiati*e. In partic#lar, the
deli)erations of the onstit#tional o""ission e5plicitly re*eal that the
fra"ers intended that the people "#st first see the f#ll te5t of the proposed
a"end"ents )efore they sign, and that the people "#st sign on a petition
containing s#ch f#ll te5t. Indeed, !ection 7@)A of %ep#)lic Act 3o. +747,
the Initiati*e and %eferend#" Act that the La")ino ,ro#p in*o:es as
*alid, re6#ires that the people "#st sign the /petition 5 5 5 as signatories./
$he proponents of the initiati*e sec#re the signat#res fro"
the people. $he proponents sec#re the signat#res in their pri*ate capacity
and not as p#)lic officials. $he proponents are not disinterested parties
who can i"partially e5plain the ad*antages and disad*antages of the
proposed a"end"ents to the people. $he proponents present fa*ora)ly
their proposal to the people and do not present the arg#"ents against
their proposal. $he proponents, or their s#pporters, often pay those who
gather the signat#res.
$h#s, there is no pres#"ption that the proponents o)ser*ed
the constit#tional re6#ire"ents in gathering the signat#res. $he
proponents )ear the )#rden of pro*ing that they co"plied with the
constit#tional re6#ire"ents in gathering the signat#res 9 that the petition
contained, or incorporated )y attach"ent, the f#ll te5t of the proposed
a"end"ents.
(or s#re, the great "a-ority of the +.4 "illion people who
signed the signat#re sheets did not see the f#ll te5t of the proposed
changes )efore signing. $hey co#ld not ha*e :nown the nat#re and effect
of the proposed changes, a"ong which are2
1. $he ter" li"its on "e")ers of
the legislat#re will )e lifted and th#s "e")ers
of 0arlia"ent can )e re9elected
indefinitelyG
2. $he interi" 0arlia"ent can
contin#e to f#nction indefinitely #ntil its
"e")ers, who are al"ost all the
present "e")ers of ongress, decide to call
for new parlia"entary elections. $h#s, the
"e")ers of the interi" 0arlia"ent will
deter"ine the e5piration of their
own ter" of officeG
4. 8ithin B7 days fro" the
ratification of the proposed changes, the
interi" 0arlia"ent shall con*ene to
propose f#rther a"end"ents or re*isions to
the onstit#tion.
$hese three specific a"end"ents are not stated or e*en
indicated in the La")ino ,ro#pIs signat#re sheets. $he people who
signed the signat#re sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
a"end"ents. $hese three proposed changes are highly contro*ersial.
$he people co#ld not ha*e inferred or di*ined these proposed changes
"erely fro" a reading or rereading of the contents of the signat#re sheets.
$he onstit#tion entr#sts to the people the power to directly
propose a"end"ents to the onstit#tion. $his o#rt tr#sts the wisdo" of
the people e*en if the "e")ers of this o#rt do not personally :now the
people who sign the petition. 1owe*er, this tr#st e"anates fro" a
f#nda"ental ass#"ption2 the f#ll te5t of the proposed a"end"ent is first
shown to the people )efore they sign the petition, not after they ha*e
signed the petition.
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. CAMPOS RUEDA
(G.R. N+. L13250, O/0. 29, 1971)
FACTS"
$his is an appeal interposed )y petitioner Antonio a"pos %#eda,
ad"inistrator of the estate of the deceased DoNa Maria de la .strella
!oriano <da. de erdeira, fro" the decision of the respondent ollector of
Internal %e*en#e, assessing against and de"anding fro" the for"er the
s#" 01+1,87B.97 as deficiency state and inheritance ta5es, incl#ding
interests and penalties, on the transfer of intangi)le personal properties
sit#ated in the 0hilippines and )elonging to said Maria de la .strella
!oriano <da. de erdeira. Maria de la .strella !oriano <da. de erdeira
@Maria erdeira for shortA is a !panish national, )y reason of her "arriage
to a !panish citi&en and was a resident of $angier, Morocco fro" 1941 #p
to her death on Han#ary 2, 1977. At the ti"e of her de"ise she left, a"ong
others, intangi)le personal properties in the 0hilippines./ $hen ca"e this
portion2 /'n !epte")er 29, 1977, petitioner filed a pro*isional estate and
inheritance ta5 ret#rn on all the properties of the late Maria erdeira. 'n
the sa"e date, respondent, pending in*estigation, iss#ed an assess"ent
for estate and inheritance ta5es which ta5 lia)ilities were paid )y
petitioner.
'n 3o*e")er 17, 1977, an a"ended ret#rn was filed . . .
where intangi)le personal properties with were clai"ed as e5e"pted fro"
ta5es. 'n 3o*e")er 24, 1977, respondent, pending in*estigation, iss#ed
another assess"ent for estate and inheritance ta5es. In a letter dated
Han#ary 11, 197+, respondent denied the re6#est for e5e"ption on the
gro#nd that the law of $angier is not reciprocal to !ection 122 of the
3ational Internal %e*en#e ode. 1ence, respondent de"anded the
pay"ent '( deficiency estate and inheritance ta5es incl#ding ad *alore"
penalties, s#rcharges, interests and co"pro"ise penalties . . . . In a letter
dated (e)r#ary 8, 197+, and recei*ed )y respondent on the following day,
petitioner re6#ested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the
clai" for ta5 e5e"ption of the intangi)le personal properties and the
i"position of the 27M and 7M ad *alore" penalties. 1owe*er, respondent
denied this re6#est, in his letter dated May 7, 197+ . . . and recei*ed )y
petitioner on May 21, 197+. %espondent pre"ised the denial on the
gro#nds that there was no reciprocity Owith $angier, which was "oreo*erP
a "ere principality, not a foreign co#ntry. onse6#ently, respondent
de"anded the pay"ent of deficiency estate and inheritance ta5es
incl#ding s#rcharges, interests and co"pro"ise penalties
ISSUE"
Is $angier a foreign co#ntryC
HELD"
Des. It does not ad"it of do#)t that if a foreign co#ntry is to )e identified
with a state, it is re6#ired in line with 0o#ndIs for"#lation that it )e a
politically organi&ed so*ereign co""#nity independent of o#tside control
)o#nd )y ties of nationhood, legally s#pre"e within its territory, acting
thro#gh a go*ern"ent f#nctioning #nder a regi"e of law. 9 It is th#s a
so*ereign person with the people co"posing it *iewed as an organi&ed
corporate society #nder a go*ern"ent with the legal co"petence to e5act
o)edience its co""ands. It has )een referred to as a )ody9politic
organi&ed )y co""on consent for "#t#al defense and "#t#al safety and
to pro"ote the general welfare. orrectly has it )een descri)ed )y .s"ein
as /the -#ridical personification of the nation./ $his is to *iew it in the light
its historical de*elop"ent. $he stress is on its )eing a nation, its people
occ#pying a definite territory, politically organi&ed, e5ercising )y "eans of
its go*ern"ent its so*ereign will o*er the indi*id#als within it and
"aintaining its separate international personality. Las:i co#ld spea: of it
then as a territorial society di*ided into go*ern"ent and s#)-ects, clai"ing
within its allotted area a s#pre"acy o*er all other instit#tions. McI*er
si"ilarly wo#ld point to the power entr#sted to its go*ern"ent to "aintain
within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
international relations. With the latter requisites satisfied,
international law does not exact independence as a condition of
statehood. So Hyde did opine.
.*en on the ass#"ption then that $angier is )ereft of international
personality petitioner has not s#ccessf#lly "ade o#t a case. It )ears
repeating that fo#r days after the filing of this petition on Han#ary +, 1978
in ollector of Internal %e*en#e *. De Lara, it was specifically held )y #s2
/onsidering the !tate of alifornia as a foreign co#ntry in relation to
section 122 of o#r $a5 ode we )elie*e and hold, as did the $a5 o#rt,
that the Ancilliary Ad"inistrator is entitled to e5e"ption fro" the
4
inheritance ta5 on the intangi)le personal property fo#nd in the
0hilippines./ $here can )e no do#)t that alifornia as a state in the
A"erican Jnion was lac:ing in the alleged re6#isite of international
personality. 3onetheless, it was held to )e a foreign co#ntry within the
"eaning of !ection 122 of the 3ational Internal %e*en#e ode.
&ACANI V. NACOCO
5GRN L9%57 NOVEM&ER 29, 195%6
&AUTISTA ANGELO, !."
FACTS"
$he plaintiffs are co#rt stenographers assigned in Branch <I
of the o#rt of (irst Instance of Manila. D#ring the pendency of i*il ase
3o. 2294 of said co#rt, entitled (rancisco !ycip *s. 3ational ocon#t
orporation, Assistant orporate o#nsel (ederico Ali:pala, co#nsel for
defendant, re6#ested said stenographers for copies, of the transcript of
the stenographic notes ta:en )y the" d#ring the hearing. 0laintiffs
co"plied with the re6#est )y deli*ering to o#nsel Ali:pala the needed
transcript containing 71B pages and thereafter s#)"itted to hi" their )ills
for the pay"ent of their fees. $he 3ational ocon#t orporation paid the
a"o#nt of 07+B to Leopoldo $. Bacani and 017? to Mateo A. Matoto for
said transcript at the rate of 01 per page.
Jpon inspecting the )oo:s of this corporation, the A#ditor
,eneral disallowed the pay"ent of these fees and so#ght the reco*ery of
the a"o#nts paid. $he respondents arg#e that 3ational ocon#t
orporation "ay )e considered as incl#ded in the ter" /,o*ern"ent of
the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines/ for the p#rposes of the e5e"ption of the
legal fees pro*ided for in %#le 194? of the %#les of o#rt.
ISSUE" 8hether or not 3A'' is a part of the ,o*ern"ent of the
0hilippines )y *irt#e of its perfor"ance of go*ern"ent f#nctions.
HELD"
3o, 3A'' does not ac6#ire that stat#s for the si"ple
reason that it does not co"e #nder the classification of "#nicipal or p#)lic
corporation. $o resol*e the iss#e in this case re6#ires a little digression on
the nat#re and f#nctions of o#r go*ern"ent as instit#ted in o#r
onstit#tion. $o )egin with, we state that the ter" /,o*ern"ent/ "ay )e
defined as /that instit#tion or aggregate of instit#tions )y which an
independent society "a:es and carries o#t those r#les of action which are
necessary to ena)le "en to li*e in a social state, or which are i"posed
#pon the people for"ing that society )y those who possess the power or
a#thority of prescri)ing the"/ @J.!. *s. Dorr, 2 0hil., 442A. $his instit#tion,
when referring to the national go*ern"ent, has reference to what o#r
onstit#tion has esta)lished co"posed of three great depart"ents, the
legislati*e, e5ec#ti*e, and the -#dicial, thro#gh which the powers and
f#nctions of go*ern"ent are e5ercised. $hese f#nctions are twofold2
constit#te and "inistrant. $he for"er are those which constit#te the *ery
)onds of society and are co"p#lsory in nat#reG the latter are those that
are #nderta:en only )y way of ad*ancing the general interests of society,
and are "erely optional.
$o this latter class )elongs the organi&ation of those
corporations owned or controlled )y the go*ern"ent to pro"ote certain
aspects of the econo"ic life of o#r people s#ch as the 3ational ocon#t
orporation. $hese are what we call go*ern"ent9owned or controlled
corporations which "ay ta:e on the for" of a pri*ate enterprise or one
organi&ed with powers and for"al characteristics of a pri*ate corporation
#nder the orporation Law.
B#t while 3A'' was organi&ed for the "inistrant f#nction
of pro"oting the cocon#t ind#stry, howe*er, it was gi*en a corporate
power separate and distinct fro" o#r go*ern"ent, for it was "ade s#)-ect
to the pro*isions of o#r orporation Law in so far as its corporate
e5istence and the powers that it "ay e5ercise are concerned @sections 2
and B, o""onwealth Act 3o. 718A.
=,o*ern"ent of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines/ #sed in
section 2 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode refers only to that
go*ern"ent. entity thro#gh which the f#nctions of the go*ern"ent are
e5ercised as an attri)#te of so*ereignty, and in this are incl#ded those
ar"s thro#gh which political a#thority is "ade effecti*e whether they )e
pro*incial, "#nicipal or other for" of local go*ern"ent. $hese are what
we call "#nicipal corporations. $hey do not incl#de go*ern"ent entities
which are gi*en a corporate personality. separate and distinct fro" the
go*ern"ent and Iwhich are go*erned )y the orporation Law. $heir
powers, d#ties and lia)ilities ha*e to )e deter"ined in the light of that law
and of their corporate charters.
As this o#rt has aptly said, /$he "ere fact that the
,o*ern"ent happens to )e a "a-ority stoc:holder does not "a:e it a
p#)lic corporation/ @3ational oal o. *s. ollector of Internal %e*en#e,
B+ 0hil., 78+9797A. /By )eco"ing a stoc:holder in the 3ational oal
o"pany, the ,o*ern"ent di*ested itself of its so*ereign character so far
as respects the transactions of the corporation. Jnli:e the ,o*ern"ent,
the corporation "ay )e s#ed witho#t its consent, and is s#)-ect to
ta5ation. Det the 3ational oal o"pany re"ains an agency or
instr#"entality of go*ern"ent./ @,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippine Islands *s.
!pringer, 7? 0hil., 288.A
PVTA VS.CIR
5GRN L32052 !UL- 25, 19756
FACTS"
0ri*ate respondents filed with the I% a petition, alleging
their e"ploy"ent relationship, the o*erti"e ser*ices in e5cess of the
reg#lar eight ho#rs a day rendered )y the", and the fail#re to pay the"
o*erti"e co"pensation in accordance with o""onwealth Act 3o. BBB.
$heir prayer was for the differential )etween the a"o#nt act#ally paid to
the" and the a"o#nt allegedly d#e the". 0etitioner 0hilippine <irginia
$o)acco Ad"inistration denied the allegations. $he then 0residing H#dge
Arsenio $. Martine& of respondent o#rt s#stained the clai"s of pri*ate
respondents for o*erti"e ser*ices fro" Dece")er 24, 19+4 #p to the date
the decision was rendered on March 21, 197?, and directing petitioner to
pay the sa"e, "in#s what it had already paid. 0etitioner clai"s that the
"atter is )eyond the -#risdiction of the I% as it is e5ercising
go*ern"ental f#nctions and that it is e5e"pt fro" the operation of .A.
BBB, in*o:ing the doctrine anno#nced in the leading Agric#lt#ral redit
and ooperati*e (inancing Ad"inistration decision, and the distinction
)etween constit#ent and "inistrant f#nctions of go*ern"ents as set forth
in Bacani *. 3ational ocon#t orporation.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the traditional classification of f#nction of
go*ern"ent as "inistrant and constit#ent applica)le in the case at )ar.
HELD"
3o. $he irrele*ance of s#ch a distinction considering the
needs of the ti"es was clearly pointed o#t )y the present hief H#stice.
Jnder this traditional classification, s#ch constit#ent f#nctions are
e5ercised )y the !tate as attri)#tes of so*ereignty, and not "erely to
pro"ote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people 9 these latter
f#nctions )eing "inistrant, the e5ercise of which is optional on the part of
the go*ern"ent./
3onetheless, as he e5plained so pers#asi*ely2 /$he growing
co"ple5ities of "odern society, howe*er, ha*e rendered this traditional
classification of the f#nctions of go*ern"ent 6#ite #nrealistic, not to say
o)solete. $he areas which #sed to )e left to pri*ate enterprise and
initiati*e and which the go*ern"ent was called #pon to enter optionally,
and only I)eca#se it was )etter e6#ipped to ad"inister for the p#)lic
welfare than is any pri*ate indi*id#al or gro#p of indi*id#als,I contin#e to
lose their well9defined )o#ndaries and to )e a)sor)ed within acti*ities that
the go*ern"ent "#st #nderta:e in its so*ereign capacity if it is to "eet the
increasing social challenges of the ti"es. 1ere as al"ost e*erywhere else
the tendency is #ndo#)tedly towards a greater sociali&ation of econo"ic
forces. 1ere of co#rse this de*elop"ent was en*isioned, indeed adopted
as a national policy, )y the onstit#tion itself in its declaration of principle
concerning the pro"otion of social -#stice./
$h#s was laid to rest the doctrine in Bacani *. 3ational
ocon#t orporation, )ased on the 8ilsonian classification of the tas:s
inc#")ent on go*ern"ent into constit#ent and "inistrant in accordance
with the laisse& faire principle.
81.%.('%., the appealed 'rder of March 21, 197? and
the %esol#tion of respondent o#rt, denying a "otion for reconsideration
are here)y affir"ed.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD
(G.R. NO. L9959, DECEM&ER 13, 191%)
TRENT, !."
FACTS"
A)o#t QB??,???, were s#)scri)ed and paid into the treas#ry
of the 0hilippine Islands )y the inha)itants of the !panish Do"inions of
the relief of those da"aged )y the earth6#a:e which too: place in the
0hilippine Islands on H#ne 4, 18+4. !#)se6#ent thereto a central relief
)oard was appointed to distri)#te the "oneys th#s *ol#ntarily contri)#ted
and allotted Q4+7,7?4.7? to the *ario#s s#fferers na"ed in its resol#tion.
By order of the ,o*ernor9,eneral of the 0hilippine Islands, a list of these
allot"ents, together with the na"es of those entitled thereto, was
p#)lished in the 'fficial ,a&ette of Manila. $hese were later distri)#ted #p
to the s#" of Q4?,299.+7, lea*ing a )alance of Q4+7,B?4.87.
Jpon the petition of the go*erning )ody of the Monte de
0iedad, the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent, )y order, directed its treas#rer to t#rn
o*er to the for"er the s#" of Q8?,??? of the relief f#nd in install"ents of
Q2?,??? each and were recei*ed on the following dates2 (e)r#ary 17,
March 12, April 1B, and H#ne 2, 1884, and are still in the possession of the
Monte de 0iedad. 'n acco#nt of *ario#s petitions of the persons, and
heirs of others to who" the a)o*e9"entioned allot"ents were "ade, the
0hilippine Islands filed a s#it against the Monte de 0iedad a reco*er,
/thro#gh the Attorney9,eneral and in representation of the ,o*ern"ent of
the 0hilippine Islands,/ the Q8?.???, together with interest. After d#e trial,
-#dg"ent was entered in fa*or of the plaintiff. Defendant appealed and
"ade the following contentions2
that the Q8?,???, gi*en to the Monte de 0iedad y a-a de Ahorros,
were so gi*en as a donation, and that said donation had
)een clearedG
that the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippine Islands has not s#)rogated
the !panish ,o*ern"ent in its rights, as regards an
i"portant s#" of "oney a)o*e"entionedG
that the only persons who co#ld clai" to )e da"aged )y this
pay"ent to the Monte, if it was #nlawf#l, are the donors or
5
the cest#is 6#e tr#stent, th#s, the plaintiff is not the proper
party to )ring the actionG
that the co#rt erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for
the prescription of this s#it )ro#ght )y the Ins#lar
,o*ern"ent against the defendant appellant.
ISSUES"
8hether or not the Q8?,??? recei*ed )y Monte de 0iedad was in for" of
donation.
8hether or not the o)ligation on the part of the Monte de 0iedad to ret#rn
the Q8?,??? to the ,o*ern"ent, e*en considering it a loan, was
wiped o#t on the change of so*ereignty.
8hether or not the ,o*ern"ent is a proper party to the case #nder the
doctrine of parens patriae.
8hether or not the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent is )o#nd )y the stat#te of
li"itations.
HELD"
1.3o.Doc#"entary e*idence shows that Monte de 0iedad, after setting
forth in its petition to the ,o*ernor9,eneral its financial condition and its
a)sol#te necessity for "ore wor:ing capital, as:ed that o#t of the s#" of
Q1??,??? held in the $reas#ry of the 0hilippine Islands, there )e
transferred to it the s#" of Q8?,???. $he Monte de 0iedad agreed that if
the transfer of these f#nds sho#ld not )e appro*ed )y the ,o*ern"ent of
!pain, the sa"e wo#ld )e ret#rned forthwith. It did not as: that the
Q8?,??? )e gi*en to it as a donation.
$he Depart"ent of (inance, acting #nder the orders of the
,o*ernor9,eneral, #nderstood that the Q8?,??? was transferred to the
Monte de 0iedad well :new that it recei*ed this s#" as a loan interest./
(#rther"ore, the Monte de 0iedad recogni&ed and considered as late as
March 41, 19?2, that it recei*ed the Q8?,??? /as a ret#rna)le loan, and
witho#t interest./ $h#s, there cannot )e the slightest do#)t the fact that
the Monte de 0iedad recei*ed the Q8?,??? as a "ere loan or deposit and
not as a donation.
2.3o. o#rt r#led that if legal pro*isions are in conflict with the political
character, constit#tion or instit#tions of the new so*ereign, they )eca"e
inoperati*e or lost their force #pon the cession of the 0hilippine Islands to
the Jnited !tates, )#t if they are a"ong /that great )ody of "#nicipal law
which reg#lates pri*ate and do"estic rights,/ they contin#ed in force and
are still in force #nless they ha*e )een repealed )y the present
,o*ern"ent.
(ro" the nat#re and class of the s#)-ect "atter, it is clear
that it falls within the latter class. $hey are laws which are not political in
any sense of the word. $hey conferred #pon the !panish ,o*ern"ent the
right and d#ty to s#per*ise, reg#late, and to so"e e5tent control charities
and charita)le instit#tions. $he present so*ereign, in e5e"pting /pro*ident
instit#tions, sa*ings )an:s, etc.,/ all of which are in the nat#re of charita)le
instit#tions, fro" ta5ation, placed s#ch instit#tions, in so far as the
in*est"ent in sec#rities are concerned, #nder the general s#per*ision of
the Ins#lar $reas#rer.
4.Des.$he gro#nd #pon which the right of the ,o*ern"ent to "aintain the
action rests on the fact that the "oney, )eing gi*en to a charity )eca"e a
p#)lic property, only applica)le to the specific p#rposes to which it was
intended to )e de*oted. It is )#t within those li"its consecrated to the
p#)lic #se, and )eca"e part of the p#)lic reso#rces for pro"oting the
happiness and welfare of the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent. $o deny the
,o*ern"entIs right to "aintain this action wo#ld )e contrary to so#nd
p#)lic policy.
$he !#pre"e o#rt of the Jnited !tates in !ohier *s. Mass.
,eneral 1ospital, r#led that2 =insane persons and person not :nown, or
not in )eing, apply to the )eneficiaries of charities, who are often in
capa)le of *indicating their rights, and -#stly loo: for protection to the
so*ereign a#thority, acting as parens patriae. $hey show that this
)eneficient f#nctions has not ceased to e5ist #nder the change of
go*ern"ent fro" a "onarchy to a rep#)licG )#t that it now resides in the
legislati*e depart"ent, ready to )e called into e5ercise whene*er re6#ired
for the p#rposes of -#stice and right, and is a clearly capa)le of )eing
e5ercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whate*er.>
hancelor Lent says2 In this co#ntry, the legislat#re or go*ern"ent of the
!tate, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of p#)lic
nat#re, )y *irt#e of its general s#perintending a#thority o*er the p#)lic
interests, where no other person is entr#sted with it. @B Lent o"., 7?8,
note.A
B.3o. In 27 yc., 1??+, the r#le, s#pported )y n#"ero#s a#thorities, is
stated as follows2
In the a)sence of e5press stat#tory pro*ision to the contrary, stat#te of
li"itations do not as a general r#le r#n against the so*ereign or
go*ern"ent, whether state or federal. B#t the r#le is otherwise where the
"ischief to )e re"edied are of s#ch a nat#re that the state "#st
necessarily )e incl#ded, where the state goes into )#siness in concert or
in co"petition with her citi&ens, or where a party see:s to enforces his
pri*ate rights )y s#it in the na"e of the state or go*ern"ent, so that the
latter is only a no"inal party.
In the instant case the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent is not a "ere
no"inal party )eca#se it, in )ringing and prosec#ting this action, is
e5ercising its so*ereign f#nctions or powers and is see:ing to carry o#t a
tr#st de*eloped #pon it when the 0hilippine Islands were ceded to the
Jnited !tates.
(or the foregoing reasons the -#dg"ent appealed fro" is
affir"ed.
CO 7IM CHAN V. VALDE$ TAN 7EH
75 PHIL 113, SEPTEM&ER 17, 1945
FERIA, !"
FACTS"
0etitioner filed a "otion for "anda"#s praying that the
respondent -#dge )e ordered to contin#e the proceedings in ci*il case no.
4?12 which was initiated #nder the regi"e of the so9called %ep#)lic of the
0hilippines esta)lished d#ring the Hapanese "ilitary occ#pation of the
islands.
$he respondent -#dge ref#sed to ta:e cogni&ance of and
contin#e the proceedings on the following gro#nds2 @1A the procla"ation
iss#ed on 'cto)er 24, 19BB )y ,en. Mac Arth#r had the effect of
in*alidating and n#llifying all -#dicial proceedings and -#dg"ents of the
co#rts of the 0hilippines #nder the 0hilippine .5ec#ti*e o""ission and
the %ep#)lic esta)lished d#ring the Hapanese occ#pationG@2A the lower
co#rts ha*e no -#risdiction to ta:e cogni&ance of and contin#e -#dicial
proceedings pending in the co#rts of the def#nct %ep#)lic in the a)sence
of ena)ling law granting s#ch a#thorityG @4A the go*ern"ent esta)lished in
the 0hilippines d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation was not a de facto
go*ern"ent.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether the go*ern"ent esta)lished d#ring the Hapanese
occ#pation was a de facto go*ern"ent.
2. 8hether the -#dicial acts and proceedings of the co#rts
e5isting in the 0hilippines #nder the 0hil. .5ec#ti*e o""ission
and the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines were good and *alid and
re"ained so e*en after the li)eration or reocc#pation of the
0hilippines )y the J! and (ilipino forces.
4. 8hether the procla"ation iss#ed )y ,en. Mac Arth#r
declaring =all laws, reg#lations and processes of any other
go*ern"ent in the 0hilippines than that of the o""onwealth are
n#ll and *oid and witho#t legal effect in areas of the 0hilippines free
of ene"y occ#pation and control> has in*alidated al -#dg"ents and
-#dicial acts and proceedings of the said co#rts.
B. 8hether the co#rts of o""onwealth, which were the sa"e
co#rts e5isting prior to and contin#e d#ring the Hapanese "ilitary
occ#pation of the 0hilippines "ay contin#e those proceedings in
said co#rts at the ti"e the 0hilippines were reocc#pied and
li)erated )y the J! and (ilipino forces and the o""onwealth of
the 0hilippines were reesta)lished.
HELD"
1. D.!. $he go*ern"ent esta)lished #nder the na"es of
0hilippine .5ec#ti*e o""ission and %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines
d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation was a ci*il go*ern"ent and a de facto
go*ern"ent of the second :ind2 that which is esta)lished and
"aintained )y "ilitary forces who in*ade and occ#py a territory of the
ene"y in the co#rse of war. $he disting#ishing characteristics of this
:ind of de facto go*ern"ent areG @1A that its e5istence is "aintained )y
acti*e "ilitary power within the territories, and against the rightf#l
a#thority of an esta)lished and lawf#l go*ern"entG and @2A that while it
e5ists it "#st necessarily )e o)eyed in ci*il "atters )y pri*ate citi&ens
who, )y acts of o)edience rendered in s#)"ission to s#ch force, do
not )eco"e responsi)le, as wrongdoers, for those acts, tho#gh not
warranted )y the laws of the rightf#l go*ern"ent.
2. D.!. Being a de facto go*ern"ent, it necessarily follows that
the -#dicial acts and proceedings of the co#rts of -#stice of those
go*ern"ents, which are not of a political co"ple5ion, were good and
*alid, and, )y *irt#e of the well :nown principle of postli"iny in
international law, re"ained good and *alid after the li)eration or
reocc#pation of the 0hilippines )y the A"erican and (ilipino forces.
4. 3'. $he phrase =processes of any other go*ern"ent> is
)road and "ay refer not only to -#dicial processes, )#t also to
ad"inistrati*e or legislati*e, as well as constit#tional processes of the
%ep#)lic of the 0hilippines or other go*ern"ental agencies esta)lished
in the Islands d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation. $a:ing into
consideration the fact that, according to the well9:nown principles of
international law, all -#dg"ents and -#dicial proceedings, which are not
of a political co"ple5ion, of the de facto go*ern"ent d#ring the
Hapanese occ#pation were good and *alid )efore and re"ained so
after the occ#pied territory had co"e again into the power of the tit#lar
so*ereign, it sho#ld )e pres#"ed that it was not, and co#ld not ha*e
)een, the intention of the ,en. Mac Arth#r, in #sing the phrase
=processes of any go*ern"ent> to refer to -#dicial processes, in
*iolation of said principles of international law. $he only reasona)le
constr#ction of the said phrase is that it refers to go*ern"ental
processes other than -#dicial processes, or co#rt proceedings, for
according to a well9:nown stat#tory constr#ction, stat#te o#ght ne*er
to )e constr#ed to *iolate the law of nations if any other possi)le
constr#ction re"ains.
B. D.!. Altho#gh in theory, the a#thority of the local ci*il and
-#dicial ad"inistration is s#spended as a "atter of co#rse as soon as
"ilitary occ#pation ta:es place, in practice, the in*ader does not
#s#ally ta:e the ad"inistration of -#stice into his own hands, )#t
6
contin#es the ordinary co#rts or tri)#nals to ad"inister the laws of the
co#ntry to which he is en-oined, #nless a)sol#tely pre*ented. If the
proceedings pending in the different co#rts of the Islands prior to the
Hapanese "ilitary occ#pation had )een contin#ed d#ring the Hapanese
"ilitary ad"inistration, the 0hilippine .5ec#ti*e o""ission and the
so9called %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, it stands to reason the sa"e
co#rts, which )eco"e reesta)lished and concei*ed of as ha*ing )een
in contin#ed e5istence #pon the reocc#pation and li)eration of the
0hilippines )y *irt#e of the principle of postli"iny, "ay contin#e the
proceedings in cases then pending in said co#rts, witho#t necessity of
enacting laws conferring -#risdiction #pon the" to contin#e said
proceedings.
CONCEPT OF THE STATE
PEOPLE V. GO$O
53 SCRA 47%, OCTO&ER 2%, 1973
FERNANDO, !"
FACTS"
Loreta ,o&o )o#ght a ho#se and lot located inside the J!
3a*al %eser*ation within the territorial -#risdiction of 'langapo ity. !he
de"olished the ho#se and )#ilt another one in its place witho#t sec#ring a
)#ilding per"it fro" the ity Mayor of 'langapo ity. $he ity o#rt of
'langapo fo#nd her g#ilty of *iolating a "#nicipal ordinance that re6#ires
per"it fro" the "#nicipal "ayor for constr#ction of )#ilding as well as any
"odification, repairs or de"olition thereof.
'n appeal with the o#rt of Appeals, ,o&o p#t in iss#e the
*alidity of s#ch ordinance )y in*o:ing d#e process. !he li:ewise
6#estioned the applica)ility of the ordinance to her in *iew of the location
of her dwelling within the na*al )ase leased to the A"erican Ar"ed
(orcesG she contended that the "#nicipal go*ern"ent cannot e5ercise
therein ad"inistrati*e -#risdiction.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether "#nicipal ordinance is *alidC
2. 8hether the "#nicipal corporation retains its ad"inistrati*e
-#risdiction o*er the area where ,o&oKs ho#se was locatedC
HELD"
1. D.!, the "#nicipal ordinance is *alid. $he a#thority to
re6#ire )#ilding per"its is predicated #pon the general welfare cla#se.
Its scope is wide, well9nigh all e")racing, co*ering e*ery aspect of
p#)lic health, p#)lic "orals, p#)lic safety, and the well )eing and good
order of the co""#nity.
2. D.!, the "#nicipal corporation retains its ad"inistrati*e
-#risdiction o*er the said area. By the agree"ent, the 0hilippine
,o*ern"ent "erely consents that the Jnited !tates e5ercise
-#risdiction in certain cases. $his consent was gi*en p#rely as a "atter
of co"ity, co#rtesy or e5pediency. $he 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent has not
a)dicated its so*ereignty o*er the )ases as part of the 0hilippine
territory or di*ested itself co"pletely of -#risdiction o*er offenses
co""itted therein. Jnder the ter"s of the treaty, the Jnited !tates
,o*ern"ent has prior or preferential )#t not e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of
s#ch offenses. $he 0hilippine -#risdiction retains not only -#risdictional
rights not granted, )#t also s#ch ceded rights as the Jnited !tates
Military a#thorities for reasons of their own decline to "a:e #se of.
Moreo*er, the concept of so*ereignty as a#to9li"itation,
is the property of a state9force d#e to which it has the e5cl#si*e
capacity of legal self9deter"ination and self9restriction. 5 5 5 A state is
not precl#ded fro" allowing another power to participate in the
e5ercise of -#risdictional right o*er certain portions of its territory. If it
does so, it )y no "eans follows that s#ch areas )eco"e i"pressed
with an alien character. $hey retain their stat#s as nati*e soil. $hey are
still s#)-ect to its a#thority. Its -#risdiction "ay )e di"ished, )#t it does
not disappear. !o it is with the )ases #nder lease to the A"erican
ar"ed forces )y *irt#e of the "ilitary )ases agree"ent of 19B7. they
are not and cannot )e foreign territory.
LAUREL V. MISA
77 PHIL 85%, !ANUAR- 30, 1947
PER CURIAM"
FACTS"
!o"eti"e in May 19B7, Anastacio La#rel, herein petitioner,
a (ilipino citi&en, was arrested )y the J! Ar"y and was interned, #nder a
co""it"ent order =for his acti*e colla)oration with the Hapanese d#ring
the Hapanese occ#pation>. 1e was charged with treason as defined and
penali&ed )y Art. 11B of the 0enal ode. B#t in !epte")er 19B7, he was
t#rned o*er to the o""onwealth go*ern"ent and since then he has
)een #nder the c#stody of the Director of 0risons.
0etitioner then filed a petition for ha)eas corp#s "ainly
asserting that he cannot )e prosec#ted for the cri"e of treason for the
reason @1A that the so*ereignty of the legiti"ate go*ern"ent in the
0hilippines and, conse6#ently, the correlati*e allegiance of (ilipino
citi&ens thereto was then s#spendedG and @2A that there was a change of
so*ereignty o*er these Islands #pon the procla"ation of the 0hilippine
%ep#)lic.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether the so*ereignty of the legiti"ate go*ern"ent in the
0hilippines and, conse6#ently, the correlati*e allegiance of (ilipino
citi&ens were s#spended d#ring the Hapanese occ#pation.
2. 8hether the petitioner can )e prosec#ted for the cri"e of
treason )y gi*ing aid and s#pport to the ene"y d#ring the
Hapanese occ#pation.
HELD"
1. 3'. $he a)sol#te and per"anent allegiance of the
inha)itants of a territory occ#pied )y the ene"y to their legiti"ate
go*ern"ent or so*ereign is not a)rogated or se*ered )y the
ene"yKs occ#pation, )eca#se the so*ereignty of the go*ern"ent or
so*ereign de -#re is not transferred there)y to the occ#pier and if its
is not transferred to the occ#pant it "#st necessarily re"ain *ested
in the legiti"ate go*ern"entG that the so*ereignty *ested in the
tit#lar go*ern"ent "#st )e disting#ished fro" the e5ercise of the
rights inherent thereto, and "ay )e destroyed, or se*ered and
transferred to another, )#t it cannot )e s#spended )eca#se the
e5istence of so*ereignty cannot )e s#spended witho#t p#tting it o#t
of e5istence or di*esting the possessor thereof at least d#ring the
so9called period of s#spensionG that what "ay )e s#spended is the
e5ercise of the rights of so*ereignty with the control and
go*ern"ent of the territory occ#pied )y the ene"y passes
te"porarily to the occ#pantG 5 5 5 and that as a corollary of the
concl#sion that the so*ereignty itself is not s#spended and s#)sists
d#ring the ene"y occ#pation, the allegiance of the inha)itants to
their legiti"ate go*ern"ent or so*ereign s#)sists, and therefore
there is no s#ch thing as s#spended allegiance.
2. D.!. Article 11B of the %e*ised 0enal ode was applica)le
to treason co""itted against the national sec#rity of the legiti"ate
go*ern"ent )eca#se the inha)itants of the occ#pied territory were
still )o#nd )y their allegiance to the latter d#ring the ene"yKs
occ#pation.
H#st as a citi&en or s#)-ect of a go*ern"ent or
so*ereign "ay )e prosec#ted for and con*icted of treason
co""itted in a foreign co#ntry, in the sa"e way a inha)itant of a
territory occ#pied )y the "ilitary forces of the ene"y "ay co""it
treason against his own legiti"ate or so*ereign if he adheres to the
ene"ies of the latter )y gi*ing the" aid and co"fort.
RUFF- VS. CHIEF OF STAFF
75 PHIL 875, AUGUST 20, 194%
TUASON, !"
FACTS"
D#ring the Hapanese occ#pation, herein petitioner, %a"on
%#ffy, a 0ro*incial o""ander of the 0hilippine onsta)#lary, retreated
in the "o#ntains instead of s#rrendering to the ene"y. 1e organi&ed and
led a g#errilla o#tfit :nown as Bolo o")at $ea" or Bolo Area. $he said
Bolo Area was a contingent of the +
th
Military District, which has )een
recogni&ed and placed #nder the operational control of the J! Ar"y in the
!o#th 0acific.
!o"eti"e later, ol. H#rado effected a change of co""and
in the Bolo Area. Ma-or %#ffy who was then acting as o""anding 'fficer
for the Bolo Area was relie*ed of his position. Later on or on 'cto)er 19,
19BB, Lie#t. ol H#rado was slain allegedly )y the petitioners. It was this
"#rder which ga*e rise to petitionerKs trial.
$he trial co#rt con*icted petitioner and he now filed this
instant petition with the contention that he was not s#)-ect to "ilitary law
at the ti"e the offense for which he had )een placed on trial was
co""itted. 0etitioners contended that )y the ene"y occ#pation of the
0hilippines, the 3ational Defense Act and all laws and reg#lations creating
and go*erning the e5istence of the 0hilippine Ar"y incl#ding the Articles
of 8ar, were s#spended and in a)eyance d#ring s#ch )elligerent
occ#pation. 1e also assailed the constit#tionality of 94d Article of 8ar
which pro*ides that =any person s#)-ect to "ilitary law who co""its
"#rder in the ti"e of war sho#ld s#ffer death or i"prison"ent for life, as
the co#rt "artial "ay direct.> 0etitioner arg#ed that the said law was in
*iolation of Article <II, section 2 of the onstit#tion since 94d of Article of
8ar fails to allow a re*iew )y the !#pre"e o#rt of -#dg"ents of co#rts
"artial i"posing death or life i"prison"ent.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether petitioner was s#)-ect to "ilitary law at the ti"e the
alleged offense was co""itted.
2. 8hether 94d of Articles of 8ar was constit#tional.
HELD"
1. D.!, petitioner was s#)-ect to "ilitary law at the ti"e the
alleged offense was co""itted. $he r#le that laws of political nat#re or
affecting political relations are considered s#perseded or in a)eyance
d#ring the "ilitary occ#pation, is intended for the go*erning of the ci*il
inha)itants of the occ#pied territory. It is not intended for and does not
)ind the ene"ies in ar"s.
By the occ#pation of the 0hilippines )y Hapanese forces, the
officers and "en of the 0hilippine ar"y did not cease to )e f#lly in the
7
ser*ice, tho#gh, in a "eas#re, only in "eas#re, they were not s#)-ect
to the "ilitary -#risdiction, if they were not in acti*e d#ty. In the latter
case, li:e officers and soldiers on lea*e of a)sence or held as
prisoners of war, they co#ld not )e held g#ilty of )reach of the
discipline of the co""and or of a neglect of d#ty 5 5 5G )#t for an act
#n)eco"ing of a gentle"an or an act which constit#tes an offense of
the class specified in the 97
th
Article of 8ar, they "ay in general )e
legally held s#)-ect to "ilitary -#risdiction and trial.
Moreo*er, petitioners, )y their acceptance of appoint"ents as
officers in the Bolo Area fro" the ,eneral 1ead6#arters of the +
th
Military District, they )eca"e "e")ers of the 0hilippine Ar"y
a"ena)le to the Articles of 8ar. 5 5 5 As officers in the Bolo Area and
the +
th
Military District, the petitioners operated #nder the orders of a
d#ly esta)lished and d#ly appointed co""anders of the Jnited !tates
Ar"y and th#s co*ered )y Article 2 of the Articles of 8ar which
pro*ides for persons s#)-ect to "ilitary law.
2. D.!, 94d of the Articles of 8ar was constit#tional. It does
not *iolate Article <II, section 2 of the onstit#tion which pro*ides that
=the 3ational Asse")ly "ay not depri*e the !#pre"e o#rt of its
original -#risdiction o*er all cri"inal cases in which the penalty i"posed
is death or life i"prison"ent>. o#rt Martial are agencies of e5ec#ti*e
character, and one of the a#thorities =for ordering of co#rts "artial has
)een held to )e attached to the constit#tional f#nctions of the 0resident
as o""ander in hief, independently of legislation>. Jnli:e co#rts of
law, they are not a portion of the -#diciary.
5 5 5 co#rt "artial are in fact si"ply instr#"entalities of the e5ec#ti*e
power, pro*ided )y ongress for the 0resident as o""ander in
hief, to aid hi" in properly co""anding the ar"y and na*y and
enforcing discipline therein, and #tili&ed #nder his orders or those of
his a#thori&ed "ilitary representati*es.
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE
IMMUNITY
THE DOCTRINE OF STATE IMMUNIT-
SANDERS VS. VERIDIANO II
1%2 SCRA 88 (1988)
FACTS"
0ri*ate respondents Anthony %ossi and %alph 8yers
@deceasedA were )oth e"ployed as ga"e roo" attendants in the special
ser*ices depart"ent of the J! 3a*al !tation @3A<!$AA. $hey were
ad*ised that their e"ploy"ent had )een con*erted fro" per"anent f#ll9
ti"e to per"anent part9ti"e. $heir reaction was to protect the con*ersion
and to instit#te grie*ance proceedings. $he hearing officer reco""ended
the reinstate"ent of pri*ate respondents to per"anent f#ll9ti"e stat#s pl#s
)ac: wages.
In a letter addressed to petitioner Morea#, o""anding
'fficer of !#)ic 3a*al Base, petitioner !anders, !pecial !er*ices Director
of 3A<!$A, disagreed with the reco""endation and as:ed for its
re-ection.
Morea#, e*en )efore the start of the grie*ance hearings,
sent a letter to the hief of 3a*al 0ersonnel e5plaining the change of the
pri*ate respondentKs stat#s and re6#ested conc#rrence therewith.
0ri*ate respondents filed s#it for da"ages clai"ing that the
letters contained li)elo#s i"p#tations that had e5posed the" to ridic#le
and had ca#sed the" "ental ang#ish, and pre-#dg"ent of the grie*ance
proceedings was an in*asion of their personal and proprietary rights. $hey
"a:e it clear that petitioners were )eing s#ed in their personal capacity. A
"otion to dis"iss on the gro#nd of lac: of -#risdiction was filed )y the
petitioner and was denied.
ISSUE" 8ere the petitioners perfor"ing their official d#ties when they did
the acts for which they are )eing s#ed for da"agesC
HELD"
D.!. It is clear in the present case that the acts for which
the petitioners are )eing called to acco#nt were perfor"ed )y the" in the
discharge of their official d#ties. !anders as director of the special
ser*ices depart"ent of 3A<!$A, #ndo#)tedly had s#per*ision o*er its
personnel incl#ding the pri*ate respondents and had a hand in their
e"ploy"ent, wor:, assign"ents, discipline, dis"issal and other related
"atters. $he act of Morea# is deadly official in nat#re, perfor"ed )y hi"
as the i""ediate s#perior of !anders and directly answera)le to 3a*al
0ersonnel in "atters in*ol*ing the special depart"ent of 3A<!$A.
REPU&LIC VS. SANDOVAL
220 SCRA 124 (1993)
FACTS"
By reason of the Mendiola "assacre, wherein 12 rallyists
died in their 6#est for =gen#ine agrarian refor">, 0resident A6#ino iss#ed
Ad"inistrati*e 'rder 3o.11 which created the iti&enKs Mendiola
o""ission for the p#rpose of cond#cting an in*estigation for the
disorders, death and cas#alties that too: place.
$he "ost significant reco""endation of the o""ission
was for the deceased and other *icti"s of Mendiola incident to )e
co"pensated )y the go*ern"ent.
D#e to the reco""endation, petitioners filed a for"al letter
of de"and for co"pensation fro" the go*ern"ent to which the latter did
not ta:e heed. $he gro#p then instit#ted an action for da"ages against
the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines together with "ilitary officers and
personnel in*ol*ed in Mendiola incident.
%espondent H#dge !ando*al dis"issed the co"plaint as
against the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines on the )asis that there was no
wa*er )y the state. 1ence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE"
8hether the !tate )y *irt#e of the ad"inistrati*e order wai*ed its i""#nity
fro" s#itC
HELD"
3'. (irstly, reco""endation "ade )y the co""ission does
not in any way "ean that lia)ility a#to"atically attaches to the state. In
effect, the sa"e shall only ser*e as a ca#se of action on the e*ent that
any party decides to litigate his or her clai". $he co""ission is "erely a
preli"inary *en#e.
!econdly, whate*er acts or #tterances that then 0resident
A6#ino "ay ha*e said or done, the sa"e are not tanta"o#nt to the state
ha*ing wai*ed its i""#nity fro" s#it.
$he principle of state i""#nity fro" s#it does not apply in
this case, as when the relief de"anded )y the s#it re6#ires no affir"ati*e
official action on the part of the state nor the affir"ati*e discharge of any
o)ligation which )elongs to the state in its political capacity, e*en tho#gh
the officers or agents who are "ade defendants clai" to hold or act only
)y *irt#e of a title of the state and as its agents and ser*ants.
FESTE!O VS. FERNANDO
94 PHIL 504 (1954)
FACTS"
0laintiff ar"en (este-o filed an action against defendant
Isaias (ernando, Director of B#rea# of 0#)lic 8or:s for #nlawf#lly ta:ing
possession of portions of her three parcels of land and ca#sing the
constr#ction of irrigation canal witho#t o)taining right of way and witho#t
her consent or :nowledge.
$he lower co#rt r#led in fa*or of plaintiff (este-o. 'n appeal,
defendant (ernando in*o:ed his )eing a p#)lic officer of the go*ern"ent
of the 0hilippines and th#s, en-oys i""#nity fro" s#it and sho#ld )e
a)sol*ed fro" lia)ility for da"ages.
ISSUE" May defendant in*o:e i""#nity fro" s#itC
HELD"
3'. 'rdinarily, the officer or e"ployee co""itting the tort is
personally lia)le and "ay )e s#ed as any other citi&en and held
answera)le for whate*er in-#ry.
SECTION 3, ARTICLE 3VI, 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
U.S.A VS. GUINTO
(G.R. NO. 7%%07 FE&RUAR- 2%, 1990)
CRU$, !.
FACTS"
In the first case, the pri*ate respondents are s#ing se*eral
officers of the J.!. Air (orce stationed in lar: Air Base in connection with
the )idding cond#cted )y the" for contracts for )ar)er ser*ices in the
)ase.
In the second case, pri*ate respondents filed a co"plaint for
da"ages against pri*ate petitioners for his dis"issal as coo: in the J.!.
Air (orce %ecreation enter at the Hohn 1ay Air !tation.
In the third case, pri*ate respondent, who was e"ployed as
a )arrac:s )oy in a J.!. Base, was arrested following a )#y9)#st
operation cond#cted )y the indi*id#al petitioners, officers of the J.!. Air
(orce and special agents of the Air (orce 'ffice of !pecial In*estigators.
1e then filed a co"plaint for da"ages against the indi*id#al petitioners
clai"ing that it was )eca#se of their acts that he was re"o*ed.
In the fo#rth case, a co"plaint for da"ages was filed )y the
pri*ate respondents against the pri*ate petitioners, for in-#ries allegedly
s#stained )y the plaintiffs as a res#lt of the acts of the defendants.
According to the plaintiffs, the defendants )eat the" #p, handc#ffed the"
and #nleashed dogs on the" which )it the" in se*eral parts of their
)odies and ca#sed e5tensi*e in-#ries to the".
$hese cases ha*e )een consolidated )eca#se they all
in*ol*e the doctrine of state i""#nity. $he Jnited !tates of A"erica was
not i"pleaded in the co"plaints )elow )#t has "o*ed to dis"iss on the
gro#nd that they are in effect s#its against it to which it has not consented.
It is now contesting the denial of its "otions )y the respondent -#dges.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the Doctrine of !tate I""#nity is not applica)le
there)y "a:ing the !tate lia)le
HELD"
8
3'. 8hile s#a)le, the petitioners are ne*ertheless not
lia)le. It is o)*io#s that the clai" for da"ages cannot )e allowed on the
strength of the e*idence, which ha*e )een caref#lly e5a"ined.
$he traditional r#le of i""#nity e5e"pts a !tate fro" )eing
s#ed in the co#rts of another !tate witho#t its consent or wai*er. $his r#le
is a necessary conse6#ence of the principles of independence and
e6#ality of !tates. 1owe*er, the r#les of International Law are not
petrifiedG they are constantly de*eloping and e*ol*ing. And )eca#se the
acti*ities of states ha*e "#ltiplied, it has )een necessary to disting#ish
the" 9 )etween so*ereign and go*ern"ental acts @-#re i"periiA and
pri*ate, co""ercial and proprietary acts @-#re gestionisA. $he res#lt is that
!tate i""#nity now e5tends only to acts -#re i"perii. $he restricti*e
application of !tate i""#nity is now the r#le in the Jnited !tates, the
Jnited Lingdo" and other states in 8estern .#rope.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
!tated differently, a !tate "ay )e said to ha*e descended to the le*el of
an indi*id#al and can th#s )e dee"ed to ha*e tacitly gi*en its consent to
)e s#ed only when it enters into )#siness contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the e5ercise of its so*ereign f#nctions. In this
case the pro-ects are an integral part of the na*al )ase which is de*oted to
the defense of )oth the Jnited !tates and the 0hilippines, indisp#ta)ly a
f#nction of the go*ern"ent of the highest orderG they are not #tili&ed for
nor dedicated to co""ercial or )#siness p#rposes.
$here is no 6#estion that the Jnited !tates of A"erica, li:e
any other state, will )e dee"ed to ha*e i"pliedly wai*ed its non9s#a)ility if
it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or pri*ate capacity, as in the
cases at )ar. It is only when the contract in*ol*es its so*ereign or
go*ern"ental capacity that no s#ch wai*er "ay )e i"plied. A !tate "ay
)e said to ha*e descended to the le*el of an indi*id#al and can th#s )e
dee"ed to ha*e tacitly gi*en its consent to )e s#ed only when it enters
into )#siness contracts.
The private respondents invokes Article 2180 of the Civil
Code which holds the government liable if it acts through a special agent.
The argument, it would seem, is premised on the ground that since the
officers are designated special agents, the !nited "tates government
should be liable for their torts.
$here see"s to )e a fail#re to disting#ish )etween (1'89.90:
and .9'89.90: and a "isconception that the two ter"s are synony"o#s.
!#a)ility depends on the consent of the state to )e s#ed, lia)ility on the
applica)le law and the esta)lished facts. $he circ#"stance that a state is
s#a)le does not necessarily "ean that it is lia)leG on the other hand, it can
ne*er )e held lia)le if it does not first consent to )e s#ed. Lia)ility is not
conceded )y the "ere fact that the state has allowed itself to )e s#ed.
8hen the state does wai*e its so*ereign i""#nity, it is only gi*ing the
plaintiff the chance to pro*e, if it can, that the defendant is lia)le.
T;) ('9* '209/.) )(0'8.9(;)( ' 21.) +< .9'89.90: , ,+0
(1'89.90:. $he go*ern"ent "ay )e held lia)le #nder this r#le only if it first
allows itself to )e s#ed thro#gh any of the accepted for"s of consent.
Moreo*er, the agent perfor"ing his reg#lar f#nctions is not a special agent
e*en if he is so deno"inated, as in the case at )ar. 3o less i"portant, the
said pro*ision appears to reg#late only the relations of the local state with
its inha)itants and, hence, applies only to the 0hilippine go*ern"ent and
not to foreign go*ern"ents i"pleaded in o#r co#rts.
$he co"plaints against the petitioners in the co#rt )elow
were aptly dis"issed.
VETERANS MANPO=ER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICE, INC. VS CA
(G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEM&ER 25, 1992)
FACTS"
A s#it was filed against the 0 hief for fail#re to act on the
re6#est )y petitioner see:ing to set aside the findings of 0AD0A'
e5pelling it fro" 0AD0A' and considering its application for renewal of its
license e*en witho#t a certificate of "e")ership fro" 0AD0A'. A Motion
to Dis"iss was filed in*o:ing that it is a s#it against the !tate which had
not gi*en its consent.
ISSUES"
8hether or not the action ta:en )y the petitioners is a s#it against
the !tate.
8hether of not the 0 hief and 09!J!IA are lia)le in their
pri*ate capacities.
8hether or not the Me"orand#" of Agree"ent constit#te as an
i"plied consent of the !tate to )e s#ed
HELD"
Des, it is a s#it against the !tate, the 0 hief and 09!J!IA )eing
instr#"entalities of the !tate e5ercising the go*ern"ental f#nction of
reg#lating the organi&ation and operation of pri*ate detecti*e
watch"en or sec#rity g#ard agencies. .*en if its action prospers, the
pay"ent of its "onetary clai"s "ay not )e enforced )eca#se the
!tate did not consent to appropriate the necessary f#nds for the
p#rpose.
3o, since the acts for which the 0 hief and 09!J!IA are )eing called
to acco#nt in this case, were perfor"ed )y the" as part of their official
d#ties, witho#t "alice, gross negligence or )ad faith, no reco*ery "ay
)e held against the" in their pri*ate capacities.
3o, the Me"orand#" of Agree"ent did not constit#te an i"plied consent
)y the !tate to )e s#ed )eca#se it was intended to professionali&e the
ind#stry and to standardi&ed the salaries of the sec#rity g#ards. It is
"erely incidental to the p#rpose of %A 3o. 7B87 which is to reg#late
the organi&ation and operation of pri*ate sec#rity agencies.
$he !tate is dee"ed to ha*e gi*en tacitly its consent to )e
s#ed when it enters into a contract. 1owe*er, it does not apply where
the contact relates to the e5ercise of its so*ereign f#nctions.
MERRITT >(. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. L11154, MARCH 21, 191%)
TRENT, !.
FACTS"
Merritt, while riding his "otorcycle was hit )y an a")#lance
owned )y the 0hilippine ,eneral 1ospital. A dri*er e"ployed )y the
hospital dro*e it. In order for Merritt to s#e the 0hilippine go*ern"ent, Act
3o. 2B77 was enacted )y the 0hilippine Legislat#re a#thori&ing Merritt to
)ring s#it against the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippine Islands and a#thori&ing
the Attorney9,eneral of said Islands to appear in said s#it. A s#it was
then filed )efore the (I of Manila, which fi5ed the responsi)ility for the
collision solely on the a")#lance dri*er and deter"ined the a"o#nt of
da"ages to )e awarded to Merritt. Both parties appealed fro" the
decision, plaintiff Merritt as to the a"o#nt of da"ages and defendant in
rendering the a"o#nt against the go*ern"ent.

ISSUE" 8hether or not defendant, ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines, wai*ed
its i""#nity fro" s#it as well as conceded its lia)ility to the plaintiff when it
enacted Act 3o. 2B77
HELD"
3'. By consenting to )e s#ed, a state si"ply wai*es its
i""#nity fro" s#it. It does not there)y concede its lia)ility to the plaintiff,
or create any ca#se of action in his fa*or, or e5tend its lia)ility to any
ca#se not pre*io#sly recogni&ed. It "erely gi*es a re"edy to enforce a
pre9e5isting lia)ility and s#)"it itself to the -#risdiction of the co#rt, s#)-ect
to its right to interpose any lawf#l defense.
$he ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines Islands is only lia)le, for
the acts of its agents, officers and e"ployees when they act as special
agents. A special agent is one who recei*es a definite and fi5ed order or
co""ission, foreign to the e5ercise of the d#ties of his office if he is a
special official. $he special agent acts in representation of the state and
)eing )o#nd to act as an agent thereof, he e5ec#tes the tr#st confided to
hi". $his concept does not apply to any e5ec#ti*e agent who is an
e"ployee of the acting ad"inistration and who on his own responsi)ility
perfor"s the f#nctions which are inherent in and nat#rally pertain to his
office and which are reg#lated )y law and the reg#lations. $he
responsi)ility of the state is li"ited to that which it contracts thro#gh a
special agent, d#ly e"powered )y a definite order or co""ission to
perfor" so"e act or charged with so"e definite p#rpose which gi*es rise
to the clai", and not where the clai" is )ased on acts or o"issions
i"p#ta)le to a p#)lic official charged with so"e ad"inistrati*e or technical
office who can )e held to the proper responsi)ility in the "anner laid down
)y the law of ci*il responsi)ility. $he cha#ffe#r of the a")#lance of the
,eneral 1ospital was not s#ch an agent.
AMIGA&LE VS. CUENCA
(G.R. NO. L2%400 FE&RUAR- 29, 1972)
MA7ALINTAL, !.
FACTS"
A"iga)le is the registered owner of a lot co*ered )y a
$ransfer ertificate of $itle, where no annotation in fa*or of the
go*ern"ent of any right or interest in the property appears at the )ac: of
the certificate. 8itho#t prior e5propriation or negotiated sale, the
go*ern"ent #sed a portion of said lot for the constr#ction of the Mango
and ,orordo A*en#es.
It appears that said a*en#es already e5isted since 1921. In
1978, A"iga)leIs co#nsel wrote the 0resident of the 0hilippines,
re6#esting pay"ent of the portion of her lot which had )een appropriated
)y the go*ern"ent. $he clai" was indorsed to the A#ditor ,eneral, who
disallowed it. A"iga)le then filed in the co#rt a 6#o a co"plaint against
the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and 3icolas #enca, in his capacity as
o""issioner of 0#)lic 1ighways for the reco*ery of ownership and
possession of the land tra*ersed )y the Mango and ,orordo A*en#es.
!he also so#ght the pay"ent of co"pensatory da"ages for the illegal
occ#pation of her land, "oral da"ages, attorneyIs fees and the costs of
the s#it. $he ,o*ern"ent had not gi*en its consent to )e s#ed.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the appellant "ay properly s#e the go*ern"ent
#nder the facts of the case

HELD"
D.!. 8here the go*ern"ent ta:es away property fro" a
pri*ate landowner for p#)lic #se witho#t going thro#gh the legal process of
e5propriation or negotiated sale, the aggrie*ed party "ay properly
"aintain a s#it against the go*ern"ent witho#t there)y *iolating the
9
doctrine of go*ern"ental i""#nity fro" s#it witho#t its consent. $he
doctrine of go*ern"ental i""#nity fro" s#it cannot ser*e as an
instr#"ent for perpetrating an in-#stice on a citi&en. 1ad the go*ern"ent
followed the proced#re indicated )y the go*erning law at the ti"e, a
co"plaint wo#ld ha*e )een filed )y it, and only #pon pay"ent of the
co"pensation fi5ed )y the -#dg"ent, or after tender to the party entitled to
s#ch pay"ent of the a"o#nt fi5ed, "ay it /ha*e the right to enter in and
#pon the land so conde"ned, to appropriate the sa"e to the p#)lic #se
defined in the -#dg"ent./ If there were an o)ser*ance of proced#ral
reg#larity, petitioners wo#ld not )e in the sad plaint they are now. It is
#nthin:a)le then that precisely )eca#se there was a fail#re to a)ide )y
what the law re6#ires, the go*ern"ent wo#ld stand to )enefit. It is not too
"#ch to say that when the go*ern"ent ta:es any property for p#)lic #se,
which is conditioned #pon the pay"ent of -#st co"pensation, to )e
-#dicially ascertained, it "a:es "anifest that it s#)"its to the -#risdiction of
a co#rt. $here is no tho#ght then that the doctrine of i""#nity fro" s#it
co#ld still )e appropriately in*o:ed.
REPU&LIC VS. SANDIGAN&A-AN
204 SCRA 212 (1991)
FACTS"
$he 0,, filed with the !andigan)ayan a co"plaint for
recon*eyance, re*ersion, acco#nting, restit#tion, and da"ages against
pri*ate respondents Bien*enido $antoco and Do"inador !antiago, et al.
0ri*ate respondents -ointly "o*ed =to stri:e o#t so"e
portions of the co"plaint and for )ill of partic#lars of other portions>, which
"otion was opposed )y the 0,,. $he !andigan)ayan ga*e the 0,,
B7 days to e5pand its co"plaint to "a:e "ore specific certain allegations.
0ri*ate respondents then presented a =Motion to lea*e to file
interrogatories #nder %#le 27 of the %#les of o#rt>.
$he !andigan)ayan denied pri*ate respondentsK "otions.
0ri*ate respondents filed an Answer to with o"p#lsory
o#nterclai". In response, the 0,, presented a =%eply to
o#nterclai" with Motion to Dis"iss co"p#lsory co#nterclai".>
0ri*ate respondents filed a pleading deno"inated
=Interrogatories to 0laintiff>, and =A"ended Interrogatories to 0laintiff> as
well as a "otion for prod#ction and inspection of doc#"ents.
$he !andigan)ayan ad"itted the A"ended Interrogatories
and granted the "otion for prod#ction and inspection of doc#"ents
respecti*ely.
$he 0,, "o*ed for reconsideration, arg#ing that the
doc#"ents are pri*ileged in character since they are intended to )e #sed
against the 0,, andRor its o""ission in *iolation of !ec.B of .' 3o.
1, <122
aA 3o ci*il action shall lie
against the
o""ission or any
"e")er thereof for
anything done or
o"itted in the
discharge of the tas:
conte"plated )y this
'rder.
)A 3o "e")er or staff )y
the o""ission shall
)e re6#ired to testify or
prod#ce e*idence in
any -#dicial, legislati*e
or ad"inistrati*e
proceedings
concerning "atter
within its official
cogni&ance.
$he !andigan)ayan pro"#lgated two %esol#tions. $he first,
denying reconsideration of the %esol#tion allowing prod#ction of the
doc#"ents, and the second, reiterating, )y i"plication the per"ission to
ser*e the a"ended interrogatories on the plaintiff.
ISSUE" Is the 0,, i""#ne fro" s#itC
HELD"
3'. $he state is of co#rse i""#ne fro" s#it in the sense
that it cannot, as a r#le, )e s#ed witho#t its consent. B#t it is a5io"atic
that in filing an action, it di*ests itself of its so*ereign character and sheds
its i""#nity fro" s#it, descending to the le*el of an ordinary litigant. $he
0,, cannot clai" a s#perior or preferred stat#s to the !tate, e*en while
ass#"ing of an act for the !tate. $he s#ggestion that the !tate "a:es no
i"plied wai*er of i""#nity )y filing a s#it e5cept when in doing so it acts
in, or in "atters concerning, its proprietary or non9go*ern"ental capacity,
is #naccepta)le. It atte"pts a distinction witho#t s#pport in principle or
precedent. 'n the contrary, =the consent of the !tate to )e s#ed "ay )e
gi*en e5pressly or i"pliedly.> .5press consent "ay )e "anifested either
thro#gh a general law or a special law. I"plied consent is gi*en when the
!tate itself co""ences litigation or when it enters into a contract.
REPU&LIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PA&LO FELICIANO
AND INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. NO. 70853? MARCH 12, 1987
FACTS"
0etitioner see:s the re*iew of the decision of the
Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt dated April 4?, 1987, which dis"issed the
co"plaint of respondent 0a)lo (eliciano for reco*ery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land on the gro#nd of non9s#a)ility of the !tate.
'n Han#ary 22, 197?, (eliciano filed a co"plaint with then o#rt of (irst
Instance of a"arines !#r against the %0, represented )y the Land
A#thority, for the reco*ery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land, consisting of fo#r @BA
lots with an aggregate area of 1,4+B.B177 hectares, sit#ated in the Barrio
of !al*acion, M#nicipality of $ina")ac, a"arines !#r. (eliciano alleged
that he )o#ght the property in 6#estion fro" <ictor ,ardiola )y *irt#e of a
ontract of !ale dated May 41, 1972, followed )y a Deed of A)sol#te !ale
on 'cto)er 4?, 197BG that ,ardiola had ac6#ired the property )y p#rchase
fro" the heirs of (rancisco A)ra&ado whose title to the said property was
e*idenced )y an informacion posesoria that #pon his p#rchase of the
property, he too: act#al possession of the sa"e, introd#ced *ario#s
i"pro*e"ents therein and ca#sed it to )e s#r*eyed in H#ly 1972, which
s#r*ey was appro*ed )y the Director of Lands on 'cto)er 2B,197B.
'n 3o*e")er 1, 197B, 0resident %a"on Magsaysay iss#ed
0rocla"ation 3o. 9? reser*ing for settle"ent p#rposes, #nder the
ad"inistration of the 3ational %esettle"ent and %eha)ilitation
Ad"inistration @3A%%AA, a tract of land sit#ated in the M#nicipalities of
$ina")ac and !ir#"a, a"arines !#r, after which the 3A%%A and its
s#ccessor agency, the Land A#thority, started s#)9di*iding and distri)#ting
the land to the settlersG that the property in 6#estion, while located within
the reser*ation esta)lished #nder 0rocla"ation 3o. 9?, was the pri*ate
property of (eliciano and sho#ld therefore )e e5cl#ded therefro".
(eliciano prayed that he )e declared the rightf#l and tr#e owner of the
property in 6#estion consisting of 1,4+B.B177 hectaresG that his title of
ownership )ased on informacion posesoria of his predecessor9in9interest
)e declared legally *alid and s#)sisting and that defendant )e ordered to
cancel and n#llify all awards to the settlers.
ISSUE"
8hether or not the !tate can )e s#ed for reco*ery and
possession of a parcel of land
HELD"
A s#it against the !tate, #nder settled -#rispr#dence is not
per"itted, e5cept #pon a showing that the !tate hasconsented to )e s#ed,
either e5pressly or )y i"plication thro#gh the #se of stat#tory lang#age
too plain to )e "isinterpreted. It "ay )e in*o:ed )y the co#rts sua
sponte at any stage of the proceedings. 8ai*er of i""#nity, )eing a
derogation of so*ereignty, will not )e inferred lightly, )#t "#st )e
constr#ed instrictissimi #uris @of strictest rightA. Moreo*er, the 0rocla"ation
is not a legislati*e act. $he consent of the !tate to )e s#ed "#st e"anate
fro" stat#tory a#thority. 8ai*er of !tate i""#nity can only )e "ade )y an
act of the legislati*e )ody. Also, it is noteworthy, that as pointed o#t )y the
!olicitor ,eneral, that the informacion posesoria registered in the 'ffice of
the %egister of Deed of a"arines !#r on !epte")er 24, 1972 was a
/reconstit#ted/ possessory infor"ationG it was /reconstit#ted fro" the
d#plicate presented to this office @%egister of DeedsA )y Dr. 0a)lo
(eliciano,/ witho#t the s#)"ission of proof that the alleged d#plicate was
a#thentic or that the original thereof was lost. %econstit#tion can )e
*alidly "ade only in case of loss of the original. $hese circ#"stances
raise gra*e do#)ts as to the a#thenticity and *alidity of the informacion
posesoria relied #pon )y respondent (eliciano. Adding to the
d#)io#sness of said doc#"ent is the fact that /possessory infor"ation
calls for an area of only 1?? hectares,/ whereas the land clai"ed )y
respondent (eliciano co"prises 1,4+B.B177 hectares, later red#ced to
7?199?+B hectares.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUI$
13% SCRA 487 (1985)
FACTS"
0etitioner in*ited the s#)"ission of )ids for repair of its
whar*es and shoreline in the !#)ic Bay Area. .ligion and o. responded
to the in*itation and s#)"itted )ids. !aid co"pany was re6#ested )y
telegra" to confir" its price proposals and for the na"e of its )onding
co"pany, and fro" which it co"plied.
Later, the Jnited !tates, thro#gh its agents, infor"ed said
co"pany that it was not 6#alified to recei*e an award at the pro-ect for the
poorly co"pleted pro-ects it awarded to third parties. $he co"pany s#ed
petitioner for specific perfor"ance and if no longer possi)le, for da"ages.
It also as:ed for a writ of preli"inary in-#nction to restrain the defendants
fro" entering into contracts with others.
$he Jnited !tates entered a special appearance for the
p#rpose only of 6#estioning the -#risdiction of the co#rt o*er the s#)-ect
"atter of the co"plaint and the persons of the defendants, the s#)-ect
"atter of the co"plaint )eing acts and o"issions of the indi*id#al
defendants as agents of the defendant Jnited !tates of A"erica, a foreign
so*ereign which has not gi*en its consent to this s#it or any other s#it for
the ca#se of action asserted in the co"plaint.
J! filed a "otion to dis"iss and opposed the writ. $he trial
co#rt denied the "otion and iss#ed a writ.
ISSUE" 8hether the J! "ay )e s#edC
HELD"
3o. The traditional rule of "tate immunit$ e%empts a "tate
from being sued in the courts of another "tate without its consent or
10
waiver. $his r#le is a necessary conse6#ence of the principles of
independence and e6#ality of !tates. &owever, the rules of 'nternational
(aw are not petrified) the$ are constantl$ developing and evolving. And
because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessar$ to
distinguish them * between sovereign and governmental acts +#ure
imperii, and private, commercial and proprietar$ acts +#ure gestionis,. The
result is that "tate immunit$ now e%tends onl$ to acts #ure imperii. $he
restricti*e application of !tate i""#nity is now the r#le in the Jnited
!tates, the Jnited Lingdo" and other states in western .#rope. @!ee
o6#ia and Defensor9!antiago, 0#)lic International Law, pp. 2?792?9
O198BP.A
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
!tated differently, a state "ay )e said to ha*e descended to the le*el of
an indi*id#al and can )e th#s dee"ed to ha*e tacitly gi*en its consent to
)e s#ed only when the contract relates to the e5ercise of its so*ereign
f#nctions. In this case, the pro-ects are an integral part of the na*al )ase
which is de*oted to the defense of )oth the J! and the 0hilippines,
#ndisp#ted a f#nction of the go*ern"ent of the highest order, they are not
#tili&ed for nor dedicated to co""ercial or )#siness p#rposes. The
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is
shown in Syquia vs. Lope, !" #hil. $%& '%("(). In that case the
plaintiffs leased three apart"ent )#ildings to the Jnited !tates of A"erica
for the #se of its "ilitary officials. $he plaintiffs s#ed to reco*er possession
of the pre"ises on the gro#nd that the ter" of the leases had e5pired,
$hey also as:ed for increased rentals #ntil the apart"ents shall ha*e )een
*acated.
THE HOL- SEE VS. DEL ROSARIO !R
238 SCRA 524 (1994)
FACTS"
Lot 79A is registered #nder the na"e of the petitioner $he
1oly !ee. $his lot is contig#o#s to lots 79B and 79D registered in the
na"e of 0hilippine %ealty orporation @0%A. $hese three lots were sold
thro#gh an agent Msgr. Do"ingo irilos Hr. to %a"on Lic#p. Lic#p
assigned his rights to pri*ate respondent !tar)right !ales .nt. Inc. @!!.IA.
D#e to ref#sal of the s6#atters to *acate the lots, a disp#te
arose as to who of the parties has the responsi)ility of e*iction and
clearing the land. !!.I insists that petitioner sho#ld clear the property of
the s6#atters. 0etitioner ref#sed and proposed that either !!.I #nderta:e
the e*iction or that the earnest "oney )e ret#rned. Msgr. irilos ret#rned
the 01??,???.?? earnest "oney, and the property was sold to $ropicana
0roperties and De*elop"ent orporation @$ropicanaA.
!!.I filed s#it for ann#l"ent of sale, specific perfor"ance
and da"ages against Msgr. irilos, 0%, and $ropicana.
$he petitioner and Msgr. irilos "o*ed to dis"iss for lac: of
-#risdiction )ased on so*ereign i""#nity fro" s#it. It was denied on the
gro#nd that petitioner =shed off its so*ereign i""#nity )y entering into the
)#siness contract> in 6#estion.
A "otion for reconsideration was also denied. 1ence, this
special ci*il action for certiorari.
ISSUE" Did the 1oly !ee properly in*o:e so*ereign i""#nity for its non9
s#a)ilityC
HELD"
D.!. In the case at )ar, lot 79A was ac6#ired as a donation
fro" the archdiocese of Manila for the site of its "ission or the Apostolic
3#niciat#re in the 0hilippines. $he s#)se6#ent disposal was "ade
)eca#se the s6#atters li*ing thereon "ade it i"possi)le for petitioner to
#se it for the p#rpose of the donation. 0etitioner did not sell lot 79A for
profit or gain.
$here are two conflicting concepts of so*ereign i""#nity,
each widely held and fir"ly esta)lished. According to the /.'((9/'. +2
'8(+.10) 0;)+2:, a so*ereign cannot, witho#t its consent, )e "ade a
respondent in the co#rts of another so*ereign. According to the ,)@)2 +2
2)(029/09>) 0;)+2:, the i""#nity of the so*ereign is recogni&ed only with
regard to p#)lic acts or acts -#re i"perii of a state, )#t not with regard to
pri*ate acts or acts -#re gestionis @Jnited !tates of A"erica *. %#i&, 14+
!%A B87 O1987PG o6#ia and Defensor9!antiago, 0#)lic International
Law 19B O198BPA.
$he 2)(029/09>) 0;)+2:, which is intended to )e a sol#tion to
the host of pro)le"s in*ol*ing the iss#e of so*ereign i""#nity, has
created pro)le"s of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in co#ntries
which follow the restricti*e theory ha*e diffic#lty in characteri&ing whether
a contract of a so*ereign state with a pri*ate party is an act -#re gestionis
or an act -#re i"perii.
$he restricti*e theory ca"e a)o#t )eca#se of the entry of
so*ereign states into p#rely co""ercial acti*ities re"otely connected with
the discharge of go*ern"ental f#nctions. $his is partic#larly tr#e with
respect to the o""#nist states which too: control of nationali&ed
)#siness acti*ities and international trading.
$his o#rt has considered the following transactions )y a
foreign state with pri*ate parties as acts *ure imperii2 @1A the lease )y a
foreign go*ern"ent of apart"ent )#ildings for #se of its "ilitary officers
@!y6#ia *. Lope&, 8B 0hil. 412 O19B9PG @2A the cond#ct of p#)lic )idding for
the repair of a wharf at a Jnited !tates 3a*al !tation @Jnited !tates of
A"erica *. %#i&, s#pra.AG and @4A the change of e"ploy"ent stat#s of )ase
e"ployees @!anders *. <eridiano, 1+2 !%A 88 O1988PA.
'n the other hand, this o#rt has considered the following
transactions )y a foreign state with pri*ate parties as acts *ure gestionis+
@1A the hiring of a coo: in the recreation center, consisting of three
resta#rants, a cafeteria, a )a:ery, a store, and a coffee and pastry shop at
the Hohn 1ay Air !tation in Bag#io ity, to cater to A"erican ser*ice"en
and the general p#)lic @Jnited !tates of A"erica *. %odrigo, 182 !%A
+BB O199?PAG and @2A the )idding for the operation of )ar)er shops in lar:
Air Base in Angeles ity @Jnited !tates of A"erica *. ,#into, 182 !%A
+BB O199?PA. $he operation of the resta#rants and other facilities open to
the general p#)lic is #ndo#)tedly for profit as a co""ercial and not a
go*ern"ental acti*ity. By entering into the e"ploy"ent contract with the
coo: in the discharge of its proprietary f#nction, the Jnited !tates
go*ern"ent i"pliedly di*ested itself of its so*ereign i""#nity fro" s#it.
In the a)sence of legislation defining what acti*ities and
transactions shall )e considered /co""ercial/ and as constit#ting acts
-#re gestionis, we ha*e to co"e o#t with o#r own g#idelines, tentati*e they
"ay )e.
ertainly, the "ere entering into a contract )y a foreign state
with a pri*ate party cannot )e the #lti"ate test. !#ch an act can only )e
the start of the in6#iry. $he logical 6#estion is whether the foreign state is
engaged in the acti*ity in the reg#lar co#rse of )#siness. If the foreign
state is not engaged reg#larly in a )#siness or trade, the partic#lar act or
transaction "#st then )e tested )y its nat#re. If the act is in p#rs#it of a
so*ereign acti*ity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act -#re i"perii,
especially when it is not #nderta:en for gain or profit.
As held in Jnited !tates of A"erica *. ,#into, @s#praA2
/$here is no 6#estion that the Jnited !tates of A"erica, li:e
any other state, will )e dee"ed to ha*e i"pliedly wai*ed its non9s#a)ility if
it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or pri*ate capacity. It is only
when the contract in*ol*es its so*ereign or go*ern"ental capacity that no
s#ch wai*er "ay )e i"plied./
In the case at )ench, if petitioner has )o#ght and sold lands
in the ordinary co#rse of a real estate )#siness, s#rely the said transaction
can )e categori&ed as an act -#re gestionis. 1owe*er, petitioner has
denied that the ac6#isition and s#)se6#ent disposal of Lot 79A were "ade
for profit )#t clai"ed that it ac6#ired said property for the site of its "ission
or the Apostolic 3#nciat#re in the 0hilippines. 0ri*ate respondent failed to
disp#te said clai".
Jnder Art.41@AA of the 19+1 <ienna on*ention on
Diplo"atic %elations, a diplo"atic en*oy is granted i""#nity fro" the ci*il
and ad"inistrati*e -#risdiction of the recei*ing state o*er any real action
relating to pri*ate i""o*a)le property sit#ated in the territory of the
recei*ing state which the en*oy holds on )ehalf of the sending state for
the p#rposes of the "ission. If this i""#nity is pro*ided for a diplo"atic
en*oy with all the "ore reason sho#ld i""#nity )e recogni&ed as regards
the so*ereign itself, which in this case is the 1oly !ee.
Moreo*er the Depart"ent of the (oreign Affairs has for"ally
inter*ened and officially certified that the .")assy of the 1oly !ee is a
d#ly accredited diplo"atic "issionary to the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines
and as s#ch is e5e"pt fro" local -#risdiction and entitled to all the rights,
pri*ileges and i""#nities of a diplo"atic "ission or e")assy in this co#rt.
$he deter"ination of the e5ec#ti*e ar" of the go*ern"ent
that a state or instr#"entality is entitled to so*ereign or diplo"atic
i""#nity is a political 6#estion that is concl#si*e #pon the co#rts. 8here
the plea of i""#nity is reac6#ired and affir"ed )y the e5ec#ti*e )ranch, it
is the d#ty of the co#rts to accept this clai" so as not to e")arrass the
e5ec#ti*e ar" of the go*ern"ent in cond#cting the co#ntryKs foreign
relations.
REPU&LIC VS. VILLASOR
54 SCRA 84 (1973)
FACTS"
A decision was rendered in a !pecial 0roceeding against the
%ep#)lic of the 0hilippines there)y confir"ing the ar)itration award of
01,712,49+.B? in fa*or of respondent corporation. After the decision
)eca"e final and e5ec#tory, respondent -#dge iss#ed an order directing
the sheriff to e5ec#te the said decision, and the corresponding alias writ of
e5ec#tion was th#s iss#ed.
1ence the sheriff ser*ed notices of garnish"ent with se*eral
)an:s especially the "onies d#e to the A(0 in the for" of deposits
s#fficient to co*er the a"o#nt "entioned in the writ. 03B and 0hilippine
<eterans Ban: recei*ed s#ch notice. As certified )y the A(0 o"ptroller,
these f#nds of the A(0 with the said )an:s are p#)lic f#nds for the
pensions, pay, and allowances of its "ilitary and ci*ilian personnel.
$he petitioner, in this certiorari and prohi)ition proceedings,
challenges the *alidity of the 'rder iss#ed )y H#dge <illasor declaring the
decision final and e5ec#tory and s#)se6#ently iss#ing an alias writ of
e5ec#tion directed against the f#nds of the A(0 in p#rs#ance thereof.
ISSUE"
May the writs of e5ec#tion and notices of garnish"ent )e s#ed against
p#)lic f#ndsC
HELD"
3'. Altho#gh the !tate "ay gi*e its consent to )e s#ed )y
pri*ate parties, there is corollary that p#)lic f#nds cannot )e the o)-ect of
garnish"ent proceedings e*en if the consent to )e s#ed has )een
pre*io#sly granted and the stateKs lia)ility has )een ad-#dged.
11
$h#s in the case of o""ission of 0#)lic 1ighways *s. !an
Diego, s#ch a well9settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of H#stice
$eehan:ee. $he #ni*ersal r#le that where the state gi*es its consent to
)e s#ed )y pri*ate parties either )y general or special law, it "ay li"it
clai"antKs action only #p to the co"pletion of proceedings anterior to the
stage of e5ec#tion and that the power of the co#rts ends when the
-#dg"ent is rendered, since the go*ern"ent f#nds and properties "ay not
)e sei&ed #nder writs of e5ec#tion or garnish"ent to satisfy s#ch
-#dg"ent, is )ased on o)*io#s considerations of p#)lic policy.
Dis)#rse"ent of p#)lic f#nds "#st )e co*ered )y the corresponding
appropriations as re6#ired )y law. $he f#nctions and p#)lic ser*ices
rendered )y the !tate cannot )e allowed to )e paraly&ed or disr#pted )y
di*ersion of p#)lic f#nds fro" their legiti"ate and specific o)-ect is
appropriated )y law.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS. NLRC
227 SCRA %93 (1993)
FACTS"
$he DA% and !#ltan !ec#rity Agency entered into a contract
for sec#rity ser*ices to )e pro*ided )y the latter to the said go*ern"ental
entity. !e*eral g#ards of the agency assigned to the petitionerKs pre"ises
filed a co"plaint for #nderpay"ent of wages, non9pay"ent of 14
th
"onth
pay, #nifor" allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and
o*erti"e pay as well as for da"ages, )efore the %egional Ar)itration,
against the petitioner and the agency. $he .5ec#ti*e La)or ar)iter
rendered a decision finding the petitioner and the agency -ointly and
se*erally lia)le for the pay"ent of the "oney clai"s. $he decision
)eca"e final and e5ec#tory. $he La)or Ar)iter then iss#ed a writ of
e5ec#tion which res#lted in the property of the petitioner )eing le*ied. $he
petitioner asserts the r#le of non9s#a)ility of the !tate.
ISSUE"
an the Depart"ent of Agric#lt#re )e s#ed #nder the contract entered
with the agencyC
HELD"
D.!. $he )asic post#late #nder Art. ; section 4 of the
onstit#tion that =the !tate "ay not )e s#ed witho#t its consent> is not
a)sol#te for it does not say that the !tate "ay not )e s#ed #nder any
circ#"stances. 'n the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only
con*eys =that the !tate "ay not )e s#ed witho#t its consent.> Its i"port
then is that the !tate "ay at ti"es )e s#ed. $he !tateKs consent "ay )e
gi*en either e5pressly or i"pliedly. .5press consent "ay )e "ade
thro#gh a general law wai*ing the i""#nity of the !tate fro" s#it which is
fo#nd in Act 4?84, where the 0hilippine go*ern"ent =consents and
s#)"its to )e s#ed #pon any "oney clai" in*ol*ing lia)ility arising fro"
contract, e5press or i"plied, which co#ld ser*e as )asis of ci*il action
)etween pri*ate parties.> I"plied consent on the other hand, is conceded
when the !tate itself co""ences litigation, th#s opening itself to
co#nterclai" or when it enters into a contract.
In this sit#ation, the go*ern"ent is dee"ed to ha*e
descended to the le*el of the other contracting party and to ha*e di*ested
itself of its so*ereign i""#nity. $he r#le relied #pon )y the 3L% is not,
howe*er, witho#t 6#alification. 3ot all contracts entered into )y the
go*ern"ent operate as a wai*er of its non9s#a)ility. Distinction "#st still
)e "ade )etween one which was e5ec#ted in the e5ercise of its so*ereign
f#nction and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the
instant case, the petitioner has not pretended to ha*e ass#"ed a capacity
apart fro" its )eing a go*ern"ental entity when it entered into the
6#estioned contract, not that it co#ld ha*e in fact perfor"ed any act
proprietary in character, )#t )e that as it "ay, the clai"s of pri*ate
respondents arising fro" the contract for sec#rity ser*ices clearly
constit#te "oney clai"s for which Act 4?84 gi*es the consent of the state
to )e s#ed.
1owe*er, when the !tate gi*es its consent to )e s#ed, it
does not there)y necessarily consent to an #nrestricted e5ec#tion against
it. 8hen the !tate wai*es i""#nity, all it does, in effect, is to gi*e the
other party an opport#nity to pro*e, if it can, that the state has any lia)ility.
PN& VS. PA&ALAN
83 SCRA 595 (1978)
FACTS"
A -#dg"ent was rendered against 0hilippine <irginia
$o)acco Ad"inistration @0<$AA. H#dge Ha*ier 0a)alan iss#ed a writ of
e5ec#tion followed thereafter )y a notice of garnish"ent of the f#nds of
respondent 0<$A which were deposited with the 0hilippine 3ational Ban:
@03BA. 03B o)-ected on the constit#tional law doctrine of non9s#a)ility of
a state. It alleged that s#ch f#nds are p#)lic in character.
ISSUE" 8as the contention of 03B correctC
HELD"
3'. It is to )e ad"itted that #nder the present onstit#tion,
what was for"erly i"plicit as a f#nda"ental doctrine in constit#tional law
has )een set forth in e5press ter"s2 =$he !tate "ay not )e s#ed witho#t
its consent.> If the f#nds appertained to one of the reg#lar depart"ents or
offices in the go*ern"ent, then, certainly s#ch a pro*ision wo#ld lie a )ar
to garnish"ent. !#ch is not the case here. ,arnish"ent wo#ld lie. $he
!#pre"e o#rt, in a case )ro#ght )y the sa"e petitioner precisely
in*o:ing s#ch doctrine, left no do#)t that the f#nds of a p#)lic corporation
co#ld properly )e "ade the o)-ect of a notice of garnish"ent.
It is well settled that when the go*ern"ent enters into
co""ercial )#siness, its a)andons its so*ereign capacity and is to )e
treated li:e any other corporation. @Manila 1otel ."ployees Association
*s. Manila 1otel o"panyA
RA-O VS. CFI OF &ULACAN
110 SCRA 4%0 (1981)
FACTS"
D#ring the height of the infa"o#s typhoon Lading, the 30,
acting thro#gh its plant s#perintendent, Ben-a"in ha*e&, opened or
ca#sed to )e opened si"#ltaneo#sly all the three floodgates of the Angat
Da". $he "any #nfort#nate *icti"s of the "an9ca#sed flood filed with the
respondent co#rt ele*en co"plaints for da"ages against the 30 and
Ben-a"in ha*e&. 30 filed separate answers to each of the ele*en
co"plaints and in*o:ed in each answer a special and affir"ati*e defense
that in the operation of the Angat Da", it is perfor"ing a p#rely
go*ern"ental f#nction. 1ence, it cannot )e s#ed witho#t the e5press
consent of the !tate. $he respondent co#rt dis"issed the case on the
gro#nds that said defendant perfor"s a p#rely go*ern"ental f#nction in
the operation of the Angat Da" and cannot therefore )e s#ed for
da"ages in the instant cases in connection therewith.
ISSUE" 8as the 30 perfor"ing a go*ern"ental f#nction with respect to
the "anage"ent and operation of the Angat Da"C
HELD"
D.!. 1owe*er, it is not necessary to deter"ine whether
30 perfor"s a go*ern"ental f#nction with respect to the "anage"ent
and operation of the Angat Da". It is s#fficient to say that the go*ern"ent
has organi&ed a pri*ate corporation, p#t "oney in it and has allowed itself
to s#e and )e s#ed in any co#rt #nder its charter. As a go*ern"ent owned
and controlled corporation, it has personality of its own, distinct and
separate fro" that of the go*ern"ent. Moreo*er, the charter pro*ision that
the 30 can s#e and )e s#ed in any co#rt is witho#t 6#alification on the
ca#se of action as the one instit#ted )y the petitioners.
&UREAU OF PRINTING VS. &UREAU OF PRINTING EMPLO-EES
ASSOCIATION
1 SCRA 340 (19%1)
FACTS"
B#rea# of 0rinting ."ployees Association filed a case
against herein petitioners B#rea# of 0rinting, !erafin !al*ador, and
Mariano Ledes"a. $he co"plaint alleged that !al*ador and Ledes"a
ha*e )een engaging in #nfair la)or practices )y interfering with, or
coercing the e"ployees of the B#rea# of 0rinting, partic#larly the
"e")ers of the co"plaining association, in the e5ercise of their right to
self9organi&ation, and )y discri"inating in regard to hiring and ten#re of
their e"ploy"ent in order to disco#rage the" fro" p#rs#ing their #nion
acti*ities. Answering the co"plaint, !al*ador and Ledes"a denied the
charges, and contended that the B#rea# of 0rinting has no -#ridical
personality to s#e and )e s#ed.
ISSUE" an the B#rea# of 0rinting )e s#edC
HELD"
3'. As a go*ern"ent office, witho#t any -#ridical capacity, it
cannot )e s#ed.
$he B#rea# of 0rinting is an instr#"entality of the
go*ern"entG it operates #nder the direct s#per*ision of the .5ec#ti*e
!ecretary. It is designed to "eet the printing needs of the go*ern"ent. It
is pri"arily a ser*ice )#rea#. It is o)*io#sly not engaged in )#siness or
occ#pation for pec#niary profit. It has no corporate e5istence. Its
appropriations are pro*ided for in the )#dget. It is not s#)-ect to the
-#risdiction of the o#rt of Ind#strial %elations.
Any s#it, action or proceeding against the B#rea# of 0rinting
wo#ld act#ally )e a s#it, action or proceeding against the go*ern"ent
itself. $he go*ern"ent cannot )e s#ed witho#t its consent, "#ch less o*er
its o)-ection.
MO&IL PHILS. E3PLORATION, INC. VS. CUSTOMS ARRASTRE
SERVICE
18 SCRA 1120 (19%%)
FACTS"
(o#r cases of rotary drill parts were shipped fro" a)road
consigned to Mo)il 0hilippines. $he #sto"s Arrastre later deli*ered to
12
the )ro:er of the consignee three cases only of the ship"ent. Mo)il
0hilippines .5ploration Inc.
filed s#it in the (I against the #sto"s Arrastre !er*ice and the B#rea#
of #sto"s to reco*er the *al#e of the #ndeli*ered cases pl#s other
da"ages.
$he defendants filed a "otion to dis"iss the co"plaint on
the gro#nd that not )eing a person #nder the law, defendants cannot )e
s#ed.
After the plaintiff opposed the "otion, the co#rt dis"issed
the co"plaint on the gro#nd that neither the #sto"s Arrastre !er*ice nor
the B#rea# of #sto"s is s#a)le.
ISSUE" an the #sto"s Arrastre !er*ice or the B#rea# of #sto"s )e
s#edC
HELD"
3'. $he B#rea# of #sto"s, acting as part of the "achinery
of the national go*ern"ent in the operations of arrastre ser*ice, p#rs#ant
to e5press legislati*e "andate and a necessary incident of its pri"e
go*ern"ental f#nction, is i""#ne fro" s#it, there )eing no stat#te to the
contrary.
$he B#rea# of #sto"s has no personality of its own apart
fro" that of the go*ern"ent. Its pri"ary f#nction is go*ern"ental, that of
assessing and collecting lawf#l re*en#es fro" i"ported articles and all
other tariff and c#sto"s d#ties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. $o this
f#nction, arrastre is a necessary incident. Altho#gh said arrastre f#nction
is dee"ed proprietary, it is necessarily an incident of the pri"ary and
go*ern"ental f#nction of the B#rea# of #sto"s, so that engaging in the
sa"e does not necessarily render said B#rea# lia)le to s#it. (or
otherwise, it co#ld not perfor" its go*ern"ental f#nction witho#t
necessarily e5posing itself to s#it. !o*ereign i""#nity granted as to the
end sho#ld not )e denied as to the necessary "eans to that end.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
1%7 SCRA 28 (1988)
FACTS"
.rnest !i":e went to Manila International Airport to "eet his
f#t#re son9in9law. 8hile wal:ing towards the *iewing dec: or the terrace
to get a )etter *iew of the inco"ing passengers, he slipped o*er an
ele*ation a)o#t fo#r inches high, and he fell on his )ac: and )ro:e his
thigh )one.
1e filed an action for da"ages )ased on 6#asi9delict with
the (I of %i&al against the i*il Aerona#tics Ad"inistration or AA as the
entity e"powered to ad"inister, operate, "anage, control, "aintain, and
de*elop the MIA. H#dg"ent was rendered in his fa*or, and on appeal to
the o#rt of Appeals, -#dg"ent was affir"ed.
ISSUE" 8hether the AA, )eing an agency of the go*ern"ent, can )e
"ade a party defendantC
HELD"
D.!. 3ot all go*ern"ent entities whether corporate or not
are i""#ne fro" s#its. I""#nity fro" s#its is deter"ined )y the
character of the o)-ects for which the entity was organi&ed. $he AA is
not i""#ne fro" s#it it )eing engaged in f#nctions pertaining to a pri*ate
entity. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far fro" )eing the e5cl#si*e
prerogati*e of the state, "ay "ore than the constr#ction of p#)lic roads,
)e #nderta:en )y pri*ate concerns. $he AA was created not to "aintain
a necessity of the go*ern"ent, )#t to r#n what is essentially a )#siness
e*en if the re*en#es )e not its pri"e o)-ecti*e )#t rather the pro"otion of
tra*el and the con*enience of the tra*eling p#)lic.
MUN. OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS. !UDGE FIRME
195 SCRA %92 (1991)
FACTS"
0etitioner M#nicipality of !an (ernando, La Jnion, is a
"#nicipality corporation. %espondent H#dge %o"eo 3. (ir"e is
i"pleaded in his official capacity as the presiding -#dge, while pri*ate
respondents are heirs of the deceased La#reano Banina, !r.
'n Dece")er 1+, 19+7, a collision occ#rred in*ol*ing a
passenger -eep, a gra*el and sand tr#c:, and a d#"p tr#c: of the
M#nicipality of !an (ernando, La Jnion which was dri*en )y Alfredo
Bislig. D#e to the i"pact, se*eral passengers of the -eep incl#ding
Banina, !r. died.
$he heir of Banina, !r. instit#ted a co"plaint for da"ages
against the owner and dri*er of the passenger -eep. 1owe*er, the
aforesaid defendant filed a third party co"plaint against the petitioner and
the dri*er of the d#"p tr#c: of the petitioner.
$hereafter, the pri*ate respondents a"ended the co"plaint
wherein the petitioner and its reg#lar e"ployee Alfredo Bislig were
i"pleaded for the first ti"e as defendants. 0etitioner filed its answer and
raised affir"ati*e defenses s#ch as lac: of ca#se of action, non9s#a)ility
of the state, prescription of ca#se of action, and the negligence of the
owner and dri*er of the passenger -eep as the pro5i"ate ca#se of the
collision.
'n 'cto)er 1?, 1979, the trial co#rt rendered a decision for
the plaintiffs, and defendants M#nicipality of san (ernando, La Jnion and
Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay -ointly and se*erally the plaintiffs. $he
co"plaint against the dri*er and the owner of the passenger -eep was
dis"issed.
0etitioner filed a "otion for reconsideration and for a new
trial. 1owe*er, respondent -#dge iss#ed another order denying the "otion
for reconsideration of the order for ha*ing )een filed o#t of ti"e. 1ence,
this petition.
ISSUE" 8hether the "#nicipality is lia)le for the tort co""itted )y its
e"ployeeC
HELD"
3'. $he test of lia)ility of the "#nicipality depends on
whether or not the dri*er acting in )ehalf of the "#nicipality is perfor"ing
go*ern"ental or proprietary f#nctions. It has already )een re"ar:ed that
"#nicipal corporations are s#a)le )eca#se their charters grant the" the
co"petence to s#e and )e s#ed. 3e*ertheless, they are generally not
lia)le for torts co""itted )y the" in the discharge of go*ern"ental
f#nctions and can )e held answera)le only if it can )e shown that they
were acting in a proprietary capacity. In per"itting s#ch entities to )e
s#ed, the state "erely gi*es the clai"ants the right to show the defendant
was not acting in its go*ern"ental capacity when the in-#ry was inflicted or
that the case co"es #nder the e5ceptions recogni&ed )y law. (ailing this,
the clai"ants cannot reco*er.
In the case at )ar, the dri*er of the d#"p tr#c: of the
"#nicipality insists that he was on his way to 3ag#ilan %i*er to get a load
of sand and gra*el for the repair of the !an (ernando "#nicipal street.
In the a)sence of any e*idence to the contrary, the reg#larity
of the perfor"ance of official d#ty is pres#"ed. 1ence, the dri*er of the
d#"p tr#c: was perfor"ing d#ties or tas:s pertaining to his office.
After caref#l e5a"ination of e5isting laws and -#rispr#dence,
we arri*e at the concl#sion that the "#nicipality cannot )e held lia)le for
the torts co""itted )y its reg#lar e"ployee, who was then engaged in the
discharge of go*ern"ental f#nctions. 1ence, the death of the passenger,
tragic and deplora)le tho#gh, it "ay )e i"posed on the "#nicipality no
d#ty to pay the "onetary co"pensation.
MUNICIPALIT- OF SAN MIGUEL, &ULACAN VS. FERNANDE$
130 SCRA 5% (1984)
FACTS"
In i*il ase 3o. +?B9B, the then (I of B#lacan rendered
-#dg"ent holding herein petitioner "#nicipality lia)le to respondents
I"perio, et al. 8hen the -#dg"ent )eca"e final, respondent -#dge iss#ed
a writ of e5ec#tion to satisfy the sa"e. 0etitioner "#nicipality filed a
"otion to 6#ash the writ on the gro#nd that the "#nicipalityKs property or
f#nds are p#)lic e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion. $he "otion was denied. $he
respondent -#dge iss#ed another order re6#iring )oth the "#nicipal and
pro*incial treas#rer to co"ply with the "oney -#dg"ent. 8hen the
treas#rers failed to do so, respondent -#dge iss#ed an order for their arrest
and that they will )e released #pon co"pliance, hence the present
petition.
ISSUE" 8hether the f#nds of the "#nicipality in the hands of the
0ro*incial and M#nicipal $reas#rers of B#lacan and !an Mig#el,
respecti*ely are p#)lic f#nds which are e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tionC
HELD"
D.!. M#nicipal f#nds in possession of "#nicipal and
pro*incial treas#rers are p#)lic f#nds e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion. $he reason
for those was e5plained in the case of M#nicipality of 0aoay *s. Manaois
Sthat are held in tr#st for the people intended and #sed for the acco"plices
of the p#rposes for which "#nicipal corporations are created and that to
s#)-ect said properties and p#)lic f#nds to e5ec#tion wo#ld "aterially
i"pede, e*en defeat and in so"e instance destroy said p#rpose.> $h#s it
is clear that all the f#nds of petitioner "#nicipality in the possession of the
M#nicipal $reas#rer of !an Mig#el as well as those in the possession of
the 0ro*incial $reas#rer of B#lacan are also p#)lic f#nds and as s#ch they
are e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion.
Besides 0D BB7, :nown as the Decree on Local (iscal
Ad"inistration, pro*ides in section 4 @aA that =no "oney shall )e paid o#t
of the treas#ry e5cept in p#rs#ance of a lawf#l appropriation or other
specific stat#tory a#thority.> 'therwise stated, there "#st )e a
corresponding appropriation in the for" of an ordinance d#ly passed )y
the !angg#niang Bayan )efore any "oney of the "#nicipality "ay )e paid
o#t. In the case at )ar, it has not )een shown that the !angg#niang
Bayan has passed any ordinance to this effect.
MUNICIPALIT- OF MA7ATI VS. COURT OF APPEALS
190 SCRA 20% (1990)
FACTS"
An e5propriation proceeding was initiated )y petitioner
M#nicipality of Ma:ati against pri*ate respondent Ad"iral (inance
reditors onsorti#" Inc., 1o"e B#ilding !yste" and %eality orp., and
Arceli 0. Ho in*ol*ing a parcel of land and i"pro*e"ents thereon located
at !an Antonio <illage, Ma:ati.
13
An action for e"inent do"ain was filed. Attached to the
petitionerKs co"plaint was a certification that a )an: acco#nt had )een
opened with the 03B. After the decision has )eco"e final and e5ec#tory,
a writ of e5ec#tion was iss#ed and a notice of garnish"ent was ser*ed
#pon the "anager of 03B where the petitioner had )an: acco#nts.
1owe*er, the sheriff was infor"ed that a hold code was placed on the
acco#nt of the petitioner.
$he petitioner contended that its f#nds at the 03B coc:ed
neither )e garnished nor le*ied #pon e5ec#tion for to do so wo#ld res#lt in
the dis)#rse"ent of p#)lic f#nds witho#t the proper appropriation re6#ired
#nder the law.
In a petition with the o#rt of Appeals, petitioner alleges for
the first ti"e that it has act#ally two acco#nts with the 03B, one
e5cl#si*ely for the e5propriation of the s#)-ect property with the
o#tstanding )alance of 099, 7B4. 9B. $he other acco#nt was for the
o)ligations and other p#rposes of the "#nicipal go*ern"ent with a
)alance of 017?,?98,B21.72.
ISSUE" 8hether the )an: acco#nt of a "#nicipality "ay )e le*ied on
e5ec#tion to satisfy a "oney -#dg"ent against it a)sent showing that the
"#nicipal co#ncil has passed an ordinance appropriating fro" its p#)lic
f#nds an a"o#nt corresponding to the )alance d#e to the %$ decisionC
HELD"
D.!. !ince the first 03B acco#nt was specifically opened
for e5propriation proceedings it has initiated o*er the s#)-ect property,
there is no o)-ection to the garnish"ent or le*y #nder e5ec#tion of f#nds
therein a"o#nting to 0B,9+7,7?+.B?, the f#nds garnished in e5cess of
099,7B4.9B, which are p#)lic f#nds ear"ar:ed for the "#nicipal
go*ern"ent. 'ther stat#tory o)ligations are e5e"pted fro" e5ec#tion
witho#t the proper appropriation re6#ired #nder the law.
$he f#nds deposited in the 2
nd
03B acco#nt are p#)lic f#nds
of the "#nicipal go*ern"ent. $he r#le is well9settled that p#)lic f#nds are
not s#)-ect to le*y and e5ec#tion, #nless otherwise pro*ided )y the
stat#te. More partic#larly, the properties of a "#nicipality, whether real or
personal, which are necessary for p#)lic #se cannot )e attached and sold
on e5ec#tion sale to satisfy a "oney -#dg"ent against the "#nicipality.
M#nicipal re*en#es deri*ed fro" ta5es, licenses and "ar:et fees, and
which are intended pri"arily and e5cl#si*ely for the p#rpose of financing
go*ern"ental acti*ities and f#nctions of the "#nicipality are e5e"pt fro"
e5ec#tion. $he foregoing r#le finds application in the case at )ar.
$his is not to say that pri*ate respondents are left with no
legal reco#rse. 8hen a "#nicipality fails or ref#ses witho#t -#stifia)le
reason to effect pay"ent of a final "oney -#dg"ent rendered against it,
the clai"ant "ay a*ail of the re"edy of "anda"#s in order to co"pel the
enact"ent and appro*al of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the
corresponding dis)#rse"ent of "#nicipal f#nds. $he co#rt will not
condone petitionerKs )latant ref#sal to settle its o)ligation arising fro" an
e5propriation proceeding it has in fact initiated. 8ithin the conte5t of the
stateKs inherent power of e"inent do"ain, -#st co"pensation "eans not
only the correct deter"ination of the a"o#nt to )e paid to the owner of the
land )#t also the pay"ent of the land within a reasona)le ti"e fro" its
ta:ing. $he stateKs power of e"inent do"ain sho#ld )e e5ercised within
the )o#nds of fair play and -#stice. In the case at )ar, considering that
*al#a)le property has )een ta:en, the co"pensation to )e paid is fi5ed,
and the "#nicipal has had "ore than reasona)le ti"e to pay f#ll
co"pensation.
CIT- OF CALOOCAN VS. ALLARDE
G.R. NO. 107271? SEPTEM&ER 10, 2003
FACTS"
In 1972, Mayor Marcial !a"son of aloocan a)olished the
position of Assistant ity Ad"inistrator and 17 other positions *ia
'rdinance 3o. 17B9. $he affected e"ployees assailed the legality of the
a)olition. $he (I in 1974 declared a)olition illegal and ordered the
reinstate"ent of all the dis"issed e"ployees and the pay"ent of their
)ac:9wages and other e"ol#"ents. $he ity ,o*ern"ent appealed the
decision )#t s#ch was dis"issed. In 198+ the ity paid !antiago
077,?84.47 as partial pay"ent of her )ac:9wages. $he others were paid
in f#ll. In 1987 the ity appropriated f#nds for her #npaid )ac: salaries
@s#pple"ental )#dget T4A )#t the ity ref#sed to release the "oney to
!antiago. $he ity of aloocan arg#ed that !antiago was not entitled to
)ac: wages. 'n H#ly 27, 1992 !heriff astillo le*ied and sold at p#)lic
a#ction one of the "otor *ehicles of the ity ,o*ern"ent for 01??,???.
$he a"o#nt was gi*en to !antiago. $he ity ,o*ern"ent 6#estioned the
*alidity of the sale of "otor *ehicleG properties of the "#nicipality were
e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tion. H#dge Allarde denied the "otion and directed the
sheriff to le*y and sched#le at p#)lic a#ction 4 "ore *ehicles. 'n 'cto)er
7, 1994 the ity o#ncil of aloocan passed 'rdinance 3o. ?14B which
incl#ded the a"o#nt of 0B49,477.1B clai"ed )y !antiago as )ac:9wages,
pl#s interest. H#dge Allarde iss#ed an order to the ity $reas#rer to
release the chec: )#t the ity $reas#rer canKt do so )eca#se the Mayor
ref#ses to sign the chec:. 'n May 7, 1994. H#dge Allarde ordered the
!heriff to i""ediately garnish the f#nds of the ity ,o*ern"ent of
aloocan corresponding to the clai" of !antiago. 3otice of garnish"ent
was forwarded to the 03B )#t the ity $reas#rer sent an ad*ice letter to
03B that the garnish"ent was illegal and that it wo#ld hold 03B lia)le for
any da"ages which "ay )e ca#sed )y the withholding the f#nds of the
city.
ISSUE"
8hether or not the f#nds of ity of aloocan, in 03B, "ay
)e garnished @i.e. e5e"pt fro" e5ec#tionA, to satisfy !antiagoKs clai".
HELD"
,arnish"ent is considered a specie of attach"ent )y "eans
of which the plaintiff see:s to s#)-ect to his clai" property of the defendant
in the hands of a third person, or "oney owed )y s#ch third person or
garnishee to the defendant. $he r#le is and has always )een that all
go*ern"ent f#nds deposited in the 03B or any other official depositary of
the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent )y any of its agencies or instr#"entalities,
whether )y general or special deposit, re"ain go*ern"ent f#nds and "ay
not )e s#)-ect to garnish"ent or le*y, in the a)sence of a corresponding
appropriation as re6#ired )y law. .*en tho#gh the r#le as to i""#nity of a
state fro" s#it is rela5ed, the power of the co#rts ends when the -#dg"ent
is rendered. Altho#gh the lia)ility of the state has )een -#dicially
ascertained, the state is at li)erty to deter"ine for itself whether to pay the
-#dg"ent or not, and e5ec#tion cannot iss#e on a -#dg"ent against the
state. !#ch stat#tes do not a#thori&e a sei&#re of state property to satisfy
-#dg"ents reco*ered, and only con*ey an i"plication that the legislat#re
will recogni&e s#ch -#dg"ent as final and "a:e pro*ision for the
satisfaction thereof. 1owe*er, the r#le is not a)sol#te and ad"its of a well9
defined e5ception, that is, when there is a corresponding appropriation as
re6#ired )y law. In s#ch a case, the "onetary -#dg"ent "ay )e legally
enforced )y -#dicial processes. 1erein, the ity o#ncil of aloocan
already appro*ed and passed 'rdinance 3o. ?14B, !eries of 1992,
allocating the a"o#nt of 0B49,477.1B for !antiagoKs )ac:9wages pl#s
interest. $his case, th#s, fell s6#arely within the e5ception. $he -#dg"ent
of the trial co#rt co#ld then )e *alidly enforced against s#ch f#nds.
ARTICLE II - FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES
ARTICLE II FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
VILLAVICENCIO VS. LU7&AN
(39 PHIL 778)
FACTS"
%espondent H#sto L#:)an, Mayor of the city of Manila, for
the )est of all reasons, to e5ter"inate *ise, ordered the segregated district
for wo"en of ill rep#te, which had )een per"itted for a n#")er of years in
the ity of Manila, closed. $he wo"en were :ept confined to their ho#ses
in the district )y the police. At a)o#t "idnight of 'cto)er 27, the police,
acting p#rs#ant to the orders fro" the chief of the police and H#sto
L#:)an, descended #pon the ho#ses, h#stled so"e 17? in"ates into
patrol wagons, and placed the" a)oard the stea"ers =orregidor> and
=3egros>. $hey had no :nowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao. $he two stea"ers with their #nwilling passengers sailed for
Da*ao d#ring the night of 'cto)er 27, 1918.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the act of the Mayor of the ity of Manila is
constit#tional.
HELD"
$he !#pre"e o#rt conde"ned the "ayorKs act.
%espondentKs intention to s#ppress the social e*il was co""#ta)le. B#t
his "ethods were #nlawf#ll.
Alien prostit#tes can )e e5pelled fro" the 0hilippines in
confor"ity with an act of ongress. $he ,o*ernor9,eneral can order the
e*iction of #ndesira)le aliens after a hearing fro" the Islands. 'ne can
search in *ain for any law, order, or reg#lation, which e*en hints at the
right of the Mayor of the ity of Manila or the hief of 0olice of that ity to
force citi&ens of the 0hilippine Islands, and these wo"en despite their
)eing in a sense, lepers of society are ne*ertheless not chattels )#t
0hilippine citi&ens protected )y the sa"e constit#tional g#arantees as
other citi&ens.
Law defines power. $he law is the only s#pre"e power in
o#r syste" of go*ern"ent, and e*ery "an who )y accepting office
participates in its f#nctions is only the "ore strongly )o#nd to s#)"it to
that s#pre"acy, and to o)ser*e the li"itations which gi*es itself and
i"poses #pon the e5ercise of the a#thority which it gi*es.
$he f#nda"ental rights of life, li)erty and the p#rs#it of
happiness, considered as indi*id#al possessions, are sec#red )y those
"a5i"s of constit#tional law which are the "on#"ents showing the
*ictorio#s progress of the race in sec#ring to "en the )lessings of
ci*ili&ation #nder the reign of -#st and e6#al laws, so that, in the fa"o#s
lang#age of the Massach#setts Bill of %ights, the go*ern"ent of the
co""onwealth "ay )e =go*ern"ent of laws and not of "en>.

7URODA VS. !ALANDONI
83 PHIL. 171
FACTS"
!higenori L#roda, for"erly a Lie#tenant9,eneral of the
Hapanese I"perial Ar"y and o""anding ,eneral of the Hapanese
I"perial (orces in the 0hilippines d#ring a period co*ering 19B4 and 19BB,
14
who is now charged )efore a Military o""ission with ha*ing #nlawf#lly
disregarded and failed /to discharge his d#ties as s#ch co""ander to
control the operations of "e")ers of his co""and, per"itting the" to
co""it )r#tal atrocities and other high cri"es against nonco")atant
ci*ilians and prisoners of the I"perial Hapanese (orces, in *iolation of the
laws and c#sto"s of war/ E co"es )efore this o#rt see:ing to esta)lish
the illegality of .' 3o. +8, which esta)lished a 3ational 8ar ri"es
'ffices and pro*ides that persons acc#sed as war cri"inals shall )e tried
)y "ilitary co""issionG and to per"anently prohi)it respondents fro"
proceeding with the case of petitioner.
L#roda arg#es that .' 3o. +8 is illegal on the gro#nd that it
*iolates not only the pro*isions of o#r constit#tional law )#t also o#r local
laws, to say nothing of the fact @thatA the 0hilippines is not a signatory nor
an adherent to the 1ag#e on*ention on %#les and %eg#lations co*ering
Land 8arfare and, therefore, petitioner is charged of Ucri"esI not )ased
on law, national and international. 1ence, petitioner arg#es E /$hat in
*iew of the fact that this co""ission has )een e"panelled )y *irt#e of an
#nconstit#tional law and an illegal order, this co""ission is witho#t
-#risdiction to try herein petitioner./
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 0hilippines can adopt the r#les and reg#lations
laid down on $he 1ag#e and ,ene*a on*entions notwithstanding that it
is not a signatory thereto and whether it can create a Military o""ission
to try *iolations of the 1ag#e on*entionC
HELD"
Des. .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +8, esta)lishing a 3ational 8ar ri"es 'ffice
and prescri)ing r#les and reg#lations go*erning the trial of acc#sed war
cri"inals, was iss#ed )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines on the 29th day
of H#ly, 19B7. $his o#rt holds that this order is *alid and constit#tional.
Article 2 of o#r onstit#tion pro*ides in its section 4, that

/$he 0hilippines reno#nces war as an instr#"ent of national policy, and
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the nation./
In accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law of
the present day, incl#ding the 1ag#e on*ention, the ,ene*a on*ention
and significant precedents of international -#rispr#dence esta)lished )y
the Jnited 3ations, all those persons, "ilitary or ci*ilian, who ha*e )een
g#ilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
co""ission of cri"es and offenses conse6#ential and incidental thereto,
in *iolation of the laws and c#sto"s of war, of h#"anity and ci*ili&ation,
are held acco#nta)le therefor. onse6#ently, in the pro"#lgation and
enforce"ent of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +8, the 0resident of the 0hilippines
has acted in confor"ity with the generally accepted principles and policies
of international law which are part of o#r onstit#tion.
$he pro"#lgation of said e5ec#ti*e order is an e5ercise )y the 0resident
of his powers as o""ander in hief of all o#r ar"ed forces, as #pheld
)y this o#rt in the case of Da"ashita *s. !tyer L9129, B2 'ff. ,a&., +7BA
1 when we said
/8ar is not ended si"ply )eca#se hostilities ha*e ceased. After cessation
of ar"ed hostilities, incidents of war "ay re"ain pending which sho#ld )e
disposed of as in ti"e of war. UAn i"portant incident to a cond#ct of war is
the adoption of "eas#res )y the "ilitary co""and not only to repel and
defeat the ene"ies )#t to sei&e and s#)-ect to disciplinary "eas#res
those ene"ies who in their atte"pt to thwart or i"pede o#r "ilitary effort
ha*e *iolated the law of war.I @.5 parte V#irin, 417 J. !., 1G +4 !#p. t.,
2.A Indeed, the power to create a "ilitary co""ission for the trial and
p#nish"ent of war cri"inals is an aspect of waging war. And, in the
lang#age of a writer, a "ilitary co""ission Uhas -#risdiction so long as a
technical state of war contin#es. $his incl#des the period of an ar"istice,
or "ilitary occ#pation, #p to the effecti*e date of a treaty of peace, and
"ay e5tend )eyond, )y treaty agree"ent.I @owls, $rial of 8ar ri"inals
)y Military $ri)#nals, A"erican Bar Association Ho#rnal, H#ne, 19BB.A/
onse6#ently, the 0resident as o""ander in hief is f#lly e"powered
to cons#""ate this #nfinished aspect of war, na"ely, the trial and
p#nish"ent of war cri"inals, thro#gh the iss#ance and enforce"ent of
.5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +8.
0etitioner arg#es that respondent Military o""ission has no -#risdiction
to try petitioner for acts co""itted in *iolation of the 1ag#e on*ention
and the ,ene*a on*ention )eca#se the 0hilippines is not a signatory to
the first and signed the second only in 19B7. It cannot )e denied that the
r#les and reg#lations of the 1ag#e and ,ene*a con*entions for" part of
and are wholly )ased on the generally accepted principles of international
law. In fact, these r#les and principles were accepted )y the two
)elligerent nations, the Jnited !tates and Hapan, who were signatories to
the two on*entions. Such rules and principles, therefore, form part of
the law of our nation even if the #hilippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them, for our ,onstitution has been
deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to
the recognition of rules and principles of international law as
contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
(#rther"ore, when the cri"es charged against petitioner were allegedly
co""itted, the 0hilippines was #nder the so*ereignty of the Jnited !tates,
and th#s we were e6#ally )o#nd together with the Jnited !tates and with
Hapan, to the rights and o)ligations contained in the treaties )etween the
)elligerent co#ntries. $hese rights and o)ligations were not erased )y o#r
ass#"ption of f#ll so*ereignty. If at all, o#r e"ergence as a free state
entitles #s to enforce the right, on o#r own, of trying and p#nishing those
who co""itted cri"es against o#r people.
AGUSTIN VS. EDU
88 SCRA 195
FACTS"
A presidential letter of instr#ction @L'IA prescri)ing the #se of
triang#lar reflectori&ed early warning de*ices to pre*ent *ehic#lar
accidents was assailed for the lac: of a legislati*e enact"ent that wo#ld
a#thori&e the iss#ance of said L'I. $he petition 6#oted two whereas
cla#ses of the assailed L'I2 O8hereasP, the ha&ards posed )y s#ch
o)str#ctions to traffic ha*e )een recogni&ed )y international )odies
concerned with traffic safety, the 19+8 <ienna on*ention on %oad !igns
and !ignals and the Jnited 3ations 'rgani&ation @J.3.AG O8hereasP, the
said <ienna on*ention which was ratified )y the 0hilippine ,o*ern"ent
#nder 0.D. 3o. 2?7, reco""ended the enact"ent of local legislation for
the installation of road safety signs and de*ices.
ISSUE" 8hether or not a legislati*e enact"ent is necessary in order to
a#thori&e the iss#ance of said L'I )ased on the 19+8 <ienna on*ention
on %oad !igns and !ignals and the Jnited 3ations 'rgani&ation @J.3.A.
HELD"
3ot any"ore. $he petition "#st )e dis"issed for lac: of "erit. It cannot )e
disp#ted that this Declaration of 0rinciple fo#nd in the onstit#tion
possesses rele*ance2 /$he 0hilippines W W W adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, W W W./ $he
19+8 <ienna on*ention on %oad !igns and !ignals is i"pressed with
s#ch a character. It is not for this co#ntry to rep#diate a co""it"ent to
which it had pledged its word. $he concept of 0acta s#nt ser*anda stands
in the way of s#ch an attit#de, which is, "oreo*er, at war with the principle
of international "orality.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDE$
101 PHIL. 1155
FACTS"
0etitioner filed a s#it to in*alidate the %etail $rade
3ationali&ation Law, on the pre"ise that it *iolated se*eral treaties which
#nder the r#le of pacta s#nt ser*anda, a generally accepted principle of
international law, sho#ld )e o)ser*ed )y the o#rt in good faith.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the %etail $rade 3ationali&ation Law is
#nconstit#tional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally
accepted principles of international law.
HELD"
$he !#pre"e o#rt said it saw no conflict. $he reason
gi*en )y the o#rt was that the %etail $rade 3ational Law was passed in
the e5ercise of the police power which cannot )e )argained away thro#gh
the "edi#" of a treaty or a contract.
$he law in 6#estion was enacted to re"edy a real act#al
threat and danger to national econo"y posed )y alien do"inance and
control of the retail )#siness and free citi&ens and co#ntry fro" s#ch
do"inance and controlG that the enact"ent clearly falls within the scope of
the police power of the !tate, thr# which and )y which it protects its own
personality and ins#res its sec#rity and f#t#re.
%es#"ing what we ha*e set forth a)o*e we hold that the
disp#ted law was enacted to re"edy a real act#al threat and danger to
national econo"y posed )y alien do"inance and control of the retail
)#siness and free citi&ens and co#ntry fro" s#ch do"inance and controlG
that the enact"ent clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
state, thro#gh which and )y which it protects its own personality and
ins#res its sec#rity and f#t#reG that the law does not *iolate the e6#al
protection cla#se of the onstit#tion )eca#se s#fficient gro#nds e5ist for
the distinction )etween alien and citi&en in the e5ercise of occ#pation
reg#lated, nor the d#e process of the law cla#seG )eca#se the law is
prospecti*e in operation and recogni&es the pri*ilege of aliens already
engaged in the occ#pation and reasona)ly protects their pri*ilegeG that the
wisdo" and efficacy of the law to carry o#t its o)-ecti*es appear to #s to
)e plainly e*ident 9 as a "atter of fact it see"s not only appropriate )#t
act#ally necessary 9 and that in any case s#ch "atter falls within the
prerogati*e of the legislat#re, with whose power and discretion the -#dicial
depart"ent of the ,o*ern"ent "ay not interfereG that the pro*isions of the
law are clearly e")raced in the title, and this s#ffers fro" no d#plicity and
has not "isled the legislat#re of the seg"ent of the pop#lation affectedG
and that it cannot )e said to )e *oid for s#pposed conflict with treaty
o)ligations )eca#se no treaty has act#ally )een entered into on the
s#)-ect and the police power "ay not )e c#rtailed or s#rrendered )y any
treaty or any other con*entional agree"ent.
GON$ALES VS. HECHANOVA
9 SCRA 230
FACTS"
15
%espondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary a#thori&ed the i"portation
of tons of foreign rice to )e p#rchased fro" pri*ate so#rces. 0etitioner
,on&ales 9 a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo 0alay and orn
0lanters Association filed this petition, a*erring that, in "a:ing or
atte"pting to "a:e said i"portation of foreign rice, the afore"entioned
respondents /are, '/09,A @90;+10 B129(*9/09+, +2 9, )C/)(( +<
B129(*9/09+,/, )eca#se %A 3o. 4B72 which allegedly repeals or a"ends
%A 3o. 22?7 9 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn by
-the .ice and ,orn /dministration or any other government
agency.0
%espondent contended a"ong others that the ,o*ern"ent
of the 0hilippines has already entered into two contracts for the p#rchase
of rice, one with the %ep#)lic of <ietna", and another with the
,o*ern"ent of B#r"aG that these contracts constit#te *alid e5ec#ti*e
agree"ents #nder international lawG that s#ch agree"ents )eca"e
)inding and effecti*e #pon signing thereof )y representati*es of the
parties theretoG that in case of conflict )etween %ep#)lic Act 3os. 22?7
and 4B72 on the one hand, and the afore"entioned contracts, on the
other, the latter sho#ld pre*ail, )eca#se, if a treaty and a stat#te are
inconsistent with each other, the conflict "#st )e resol*ed 9 #nder the
A"erican -#rispr#dence 9 in fa*or of the one which is latest in point of ti"e.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the respondents, in atte"pting to i"port foreign
rice, are acting witho#t -#risdiction or in e5cess of -#risdiction.
HELD"
Des. $he respondents acted witho#t -#risdiction or in e5cess
of -#risdiction. It is respondents contend that the ,o*ern"ent of the
0hilippines has already entered into two @2A contracts for the p#rchase of
rice, one with the %ep#)lic of <iet 3a", and another with the ,o*ern"ent
of B#r"aG that these contracts constit#te *alid e5ec#ti*e agree"ents
#nder international lawG that s#ch agree"ents )eca"e )inding and
effecti*e #pon signing thereof )y representati*es of the parties theretoG
that in case of conflict )etween %ep#)lic Act 3os. 22?7 and 4B72 on the
one hand, and the afore"entioned contracts, on the other, the latter
sho#ld pre*ail, )eca#se, if a treaty and a stat#te are inconsistent with
each other, the conflict "#st )e resol*ed E #nder the A"erican
-#rispr#dence E in fa*or of the one which is latest in point of ti"eG that
petitioner herein assails the *alidity of acts of the e5ec#ti*e relati*e to
foreign relations in the cond#ct of which the !#pre"e o#rt cannot
interfereG and that the afore"entioned contracts ha*e already )een
cons#""ated, the ,o*ern"ent of the 0hilippines ha*ing already paid the
price of the rice in*ol*ed therein thro#gh irre*oca)le letters of credit in
fa*or of the sellers of said co""odity. 8e find no "erit in this pretense.
$he o#rt is not satisfied that the stat#s of said contracts as
alleged e5ec#ti*e agree"ents has )een s#fficiently esta)lished. $he
parties to said contracts do not appear to ha*e regarded the sa"e as
e5ec#ti*e agree"ents. 1ut, even assuming that said contracts may
properly be considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint,
said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of .epublic
/cts 2os. &&34 and $"5&. /lthough the #resident may, under the
/merican constitutional system, enter into executive agreements
without previous legislative authority, he may not, by executive
agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto. Jnder the onstit#tion, the "ain f#nction of the
.5ec#ti*e is to enforce laws enacted )y ongress. The former may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter,
except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat
legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement
providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws.
$he A"erican theory to the effect that, in the e*ent of conflict
)etween a treaty and a stat#te, the one which is latest in point of ti"e shall
pre*ail, is not applica)le to the case at )ar, for respondents not only ad"it,
)#t, also, insist that the contracts ad*erted to are not treaties. !aid theory
"ay )e -#stified #pon the gro#nd that treaties to which the Jnited !tates is
signatory re6#ire the ad*ice and consent of its !enate, and, hence, of a
)ranch of the legislati*e depart"ent. 3o s#ch -#stification can )e gi*en as
regards e5ec#ti*e agree"ents not a#thori&ed )y pre*io#s legislation,
witho#t co"pletely #psetting the principle of separation of powers and the
syste" of chec:s and )alances which are f#nda"ental in o#r
constit#tional set #p and that of the Jnited !tates.
IN RE" GARCIA
2 SCRA 984, 19%1
FACTS"
Jnder the $reaty on Acade"ic Degrees and the .5ercise of
0rofessions )etween the 0hilippines and !pain, nationals of each of the
two co#ntries who ha*e o)tained the re6#ired degrees can practice their
professions within the territory of the other. .fren ,arcia, a (ilipino,
finished law in the Jni*ersity of Madrid, !pain and was allowed to practice
the law profession therein. 1e in*o:es the treaty in order for hi" to )e
allowed to practice in the 0hilippines witho#t ta:ing the )ar e5a"inations.
ISSUE"
8hether or not the $reaty can "odify reg#lations go*erning ad"ission to
0hilippine Bar.
HELD"
3o. It is clear, #nder Article 1 of the $reaty, that the
pri*ileges pro*ided therein are "ade e5pressly s#)-ect to the laws and,
reg#lations of the contracting !tate in whose territory it is desired to
e5ercise the legal professionG and !ection 1 of %#le 127, in connection
with !ections 2, 9, and 1+ thereof, which ha*e the force of law, re6#ire
that )efore anyone can practice the legal profession in the 0hilippines he
"#st first s#ccessf#lly pass the re6#ired )ar e5a"inations.
Moreo*er, the $reaty was intended to go*ern (ilipino citi&ens
desiring to practice their profession in !pain, and the citi&ens of !pain
desiring to practice their profession in the 0hilippines. Applicant is a
(ilipino iti&en desiring to practice the legal profession in the 0hilippines.
1e is therefore s#)-ect to the laws of his own co#ntry and is not entitled to
the pri*ileges e5tended to !panish nationals desiring to practice in the
0hilippines.
$he afore"entioned $reaty, concl#ded )etween the
%ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and the !panish !tate co#ld not ha*e )een
intended to "odify the laws and reg#lations go*erning ad"ission to the
practice of law in the 0hilippines, for the reason that the 6xecutive
7epartment may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of
the Supreme ,ourt to promulgate rules for admission to the practice
of law in the #hilippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement
such rules being reserved only to the ,ongress of the #hilippines .
PEOPLE VS. LAGMAN AND $OSA
%% PHIL 13, 1938
FACTS"
$ran6#ilino Lag"an and 0ri"iti*o de !osa are charged with
and con*icted of ref#sal to register for "ilitary training as re6#ired )y the
a)o*e9"entioned stat#te. 'n appeal, Xosa arg#ed that he was fatherless
and had a "other and eight )rothers to s#pport, while Lag"an alleged
that he had a father to s#pport, had no "ilitary leanings, and did not wish
to :ill or )e :illedG and )oth clai"ed that the stat#te was #nconstit#tional.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the the 3ational Defense Law is *alid, #nder which
the acc#sed were sentenced.
HELD"
Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt affir"ed their con*iction, holding
that the law in 6#estion was )ased on the afore9cited constit#tional
principle.
$he 3ational Defense Law, in so far as it esta)lishes
co"p#lsory "ilitary ser*ice, does not go against this constit#tional
pro*ision )#t is, on the contrary, in faithf#l co"pliance therewith. $he d#ty
of the ,o*ern"ent to defend the !tate cannot )e perfor"ed e5cept
thro#gh an ar"y. $o lea*e the organi&ation of an ar"y to the will of the
citi&ens wo#ld )e to "a:e this d#ty of the ,o*ern"ent e5c#sa)le sho#ld
there )e no s#fficient "en who *ol#nteer to enlist therein.
$he right of the ,o*ern"ent to re6#ire co"p#lsory "ilitary
ser*ice is a conse6#ence of its d#ty to defend the !tate and is reciprocal
with its d#ty to defend the life, li)erty, and property of the citi&en
AGLIPA- VS. RUI$
%4 PHIL 201
FACTS"
$he petitioner, Mons. ,regorio Aglipay, !#pre"e 1ead of
the 0hilippine Independent h#rch, see:s the iss#ance fro" this co#rt of a
writ of prohi)ition to pre*ent the respondent Director of 0osts fro" iss#ing
and selling postage sta"ps co""e"orati*e of the $hirty9third
International .#charistic ongress.
In May, 194+, the Director of 0osts anno#nced in the dailies
of Manila that he wo#ld order the iss#ance of postage sta"ps
co""e"orating the cele)ration in the ity of Manila of the $hirty9 third
International .#charistic ongress, organi&ed )y the %o"an atholic
h#rch. In spite of the protest of the petitionerIs attorney, the respondent
p#)licly anno#nced ha*ing sent to the Jnited !tates the designs of the
postage for printing
ISSUE" Is there a *iolation of principle of separation of ch#rch and stateC
HELD"
In the case at )ar, it appears that the respondent Director of
0osts iss#ed the postage sta"ps in 6#estion #nder the pro*isions of Act.
3o. B?72 of the 0hilippine Legislat#re.
Act 3o. B?72 conte"plates no religio#s p#rpose in *iew.
8hat it gi*es the Director of 0osts is the discretionary power to deter"ine
when the iss#ance of special postage sta"ps wo#ld )e /ad*antageo#s to
the ,o*ern"ent./ 'f co#rse, the phrase /ad*antageo#s to the
,o*ern"ent/ does not a#thori&e the *iolation of the onstit#tion. It does
not a#thori&e the appropriation, #se or application of p#)lic "oney or
property for the #se, )enefit or s#pport of a partic#lar sect or ch#rch. In the
present case, howe*er, the iss#ance of the postage sta"ps in 6#estion )y
the Director of 0osts and the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and
o""#nications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not
16
issued and sold for the benefit of the .oman ,atholic ,hurch. 2or
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. 'n the contrary, it appears fro" the letter of the Director of 0osts
of H#ne 7, 194+, incorporated on page 2 of the petitionerIs co"plaint, that
the only p#rpose in iss#ing and selling the sta"ps was /to ad*ertise the
0hilippines and attract "ore to#rists to this co#ntry./ $he officials
concerned "erely too: ad*antage of an e*ent considered of international
i"portance /to gi*e p#)licity to the 0hilippines and its people/. It is
significant to note that the sta"ps as act#ally designed and printed,
instead of showing a atholic h#rch chalice as originally planned,
contains a "ap of the 0hilippines and the location of the ity of Manila,
and an inscription as follows2 /!eat ;;;III International .#charistic
ongress, (e). 497, 1947./ 8hat is e"phasi&ed is not the .#charistic
ongress itself )#t Manila, the capital of the 0hilippines, as the seat of
that congress. It is o)*io#s that while the iss#ance and sale of the sta"ps
in 6#estion "ay )e said to )e insepara)ly lin:ed with an e*ent of a
religio#s character, the res#lting propaganda, if any, recei*ed )y the
%o"an atholic h#rch, was not the ai" and p#rpose of the ,o*ern"ent.
8e are of the opinion that the ,o*ern"ent sho#ld not )e e")arrassed in
its acti*ities si"ply )eca#se of incidental res#lts, "ore or less religio#s in
character, if the p#rpose had in *iew is one which co#ld legiti"ately )e
#nderta:en )y appropriate legislation. $he "ain p#rpose sho#ld not )e
fr#strated )y its s#)ordination to "ere incidental res#lts not conte"plated.
$here is no *iolation of the principle of separation of ch#rch
and state. $he iss#ance and sale of the sta"ps in 6#estion "ay)e said to
)e separa)ly lin:ed with an e*ent of a religio#s character, the res#lting
propaganda, if any, recei*ed )y the atholic h#rch, was not the ai" and
p#rpose of the go*ern"ent @to pro"ote to#ris"A.
TARUC VS. DE LA CRU$
G.R. NO. 144801? MARCH 10, 2005
CORONA, 8."
FACTS"
0etitioners were lay "e")ers of the 0hilippine Independent
h#rch @0IA. 'n H#ne 28, 1994, D#e to petitionersK ada"ant dri*e to
create dissension within the diocese )y cele)rating their own open "ass
witho#t participation fro" the parish priest, Bishop de la r#& declared
petitioners e5pelledRe5co""#nicated fro" the 0hilippine Independent
h#rch. $he good Bishop did so as a last resort, as he first pleaded to the
petitionersK to cease fro" riling #p the co""#nity against the diocese.
Beca#se of the order of e5p#lsionRe5co""#nication, petitioners filed a
co"plaint for da"ages with preli"inary in-#nction against Bishop de la
r#& )efore the %egional $rial o#rt. $hey contended that their e5p#lsion
was illegal )eca#se it was done witho#t trial th#s *iolating their right to d#e
process of law.
ISSUE"
8hether or not the co#rts ha*e -#risdiction to hear a case
in*ol*ing the e5p#lsionRe5co""#nication of "e")ers of a religio#s
instit#tionC
HELD"
$he o#rt r#les that they do not ha*e s#ch -#risdiction. $he
e5p#lsionRe5co""#nication of "e")ers of a religio#s
instit#tionRorgani&ation is a "atter )est left to the discretion of the officials,
and the laws and canons, of said instit#tionRorgani&ation. It is not for the
co#rts to e5ercise control o*er ch#rch a#thorities in the perfor"ance of
their discretionary and official f#nctions. %ather, it is for the "e")ers of
religio#s instit#tionsRorgani&ations to confor" to -#st ch#rch reg#lations.
=i*il o#rts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a
religio#s organi&ation e5cept for the protection of ci*il or property rights.
$hose rights "ay )e the s#)-ect of litigation in a ci*il co#rt, and the co#rts
ha*e -#risdiction to deter"ine contro*erted clai"s to the title, #se, or
possession of ch#rch property.>
')*io#sly, there was no *iolation of a ci*il rights in the
present case.
CALALANG VS. =ILLIAMS
70 P;9.. 72%, 1940
FACTS"
$he 3ational $raffic o""ission, in its resol#tion of H#ly 17,
19B?, resol*ed to reco""end to the Director of 0#)lic 8or:s and to the
!ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications that ani"al9drawn
*ehicles )e prohi)ited fro" passing along %osario !treet e5tending fro"
0la&a alderon de la Barca to Das"ariNas !treet, fro" 724? a.". to 1224?
p.". and fro" 124? p.". to 724? p.".G and along %i&al A*en#e e5tending
fro" the railroad crossing at Antipolo !treet to .chag#e !treet, fro" 7
a.". to 11 p."., fro" a period of one year fro" the date of the opening of
the olgante Bridge to trafficG that the hair"an of the 3ational $raffic
o""ission, on H#ly 18, 19B? reco""ended to the Director of 0#)lic
8or:s the adoption of the "eas#re proposed in the resol#tion
afore"entioned, in p#rs#ance of the pro*isions of o""onwealth Act 3o.
7B8 which a#thori&es said Director of 0#)lic 8or:s, with the appro*al of
the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications, to pro"#lgate r#les
and reg#lations to reg#late and control the #se of and traffic on national
roadsG that on A#g#st 2, 19B?, the Director of 0#)lic 8or:s, in his first
indorse"ent to the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications,
reco""ended to the latter the appro*al of the reco""endation "ade )y
the hair"an of the 3ational $raffic o""ission as aforesaid, with the
"odification that the closing of %i&al A*en#e to traffic to ani"al9drawn
*ehicles )e li"ited to the portion thereof e5tending fro" the railroad
crossing at Antipolo !treet to A&carraga !treetG that on A#g#st 1?, 19B?,
the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and o""#nications, in his second
indorse"ent addressed to the Director of 0#)lic 8or:s, appro*ed the
reco""endation of the latter that %osario !treet and %i&al A*en#e )e
closed to traffic of ani"al9drawn *ehicles, )etween the points and d#ring
the ho#rs as a)o*e indicated, for a period of one year fro" the date of the
opening of the olgante Bridge to trafficG that the Mayor of Manila and the
Acting hief of 0olice of Manila ha*e enforced and ca#sed to )e enforced
the r#les and reg#lations th#s adoptedG that as a conse6#ence of s#ch
enforce"ent, all ani"al9drawn *ehicles are not allowed to pass and pic:
#p passengers in the places a)o*e9"entioned to the detri"ent not only of
their owners )#t of the riding p#)lic as well.
$he petitioner f#rther contends that the r#les and reg#lations
pro"#lgated )y the respondents p#rs#ant to the pro*isions of
o""onwealth Act 3o. 7B8 constit#te an #nlawf#l interference with
legiti"ate )#siness or trade and a)ridge the right to personal li)erty and
freedo" of loco"otion. o""onwealth Act 3o. 7B8 was passed )y the
3ational Asse")ly in the e5ercise of the para"o#nt police power of the
state.
ISSUE" 8hether the r#les Y reg#lations pro"#lgated p#rs#ant to the
pro*isions of o""onwealth Act 3o. 7B8 considered as constit#tionalC
HELD" Des. !aid Act, )y *irt#e of which the r#les and reg#lations
co"plained of were pro"#lgated, ai"s to pro"ote safe transit #pon and
a*oid o)str#ctions on national roads, in the interest and con*enience of
the p#)lic. In enacting said law, therefore, the 3ational Asse")ly was
pro"pted )y considerations of p#)lic con*enience and welfare. It was
inspired )y a desire to relie*e congestion of traffic. which is, to say the
least, a "enace to p#)lic safety. 0#)lic welfare, then, lies at the )otto" of
the enact"ent of said law, and the state in order to pro"ote the general
welfare "ay interfere with personal li)erty, with property, and with
)#siness and occ#pations. 0ersons and property "ay )e s#)-ected to all
:inds of restraints and )#rdens, in order to sec#re the general co"fort,
health, and prosperity of the state @J.!. *s. ,o"e& Hes#s, 41 0hil., 218A.
$o this f#nda"ental ai" of o#r ,o*ern"ent the rights of the indi*id#al are
s#)ordinated. Li)erty is a )lessing witho#t which life is a "isery, )#t li)erty
sho#ld not )e "ade to pre*ail o*er a#thority )eca#se then society will fall
into anarchy. 3either sho#ld a#thority )e "ade to pre*ail o*er li)erty
)eca#se then the indi*id#al will fall into sla*ery. $he citi&en sho#ld
achie*e the re6#ired )alance of li)erty and a#thority in his "ind thro#gh
ed#cation and personal discipline, so that there "ay )e esta)lished the
res#ltant e6#ili)ri#", which "eans peace and order and happiness for all.
$he "o"ent greater a#thority is conferred #pon the go*ern"ent, logically
so "#ch is withdrawn fro" the resid##" of li)erty which resides in the
people. $he parado5 lies in the fact that the apparent c#rtail"ent of li)erty
is precisely the *ery "eans of ins#ring its preser*ation.
0etitioner finally a*ers that the r#les and reg#lations
co"plained of infringe #pon the constit#tional precept regarding the
pro"otion of social -#stice to ins#re the well9)eing and econo"ic sec#rity
of all the people. $he pro"otion of social -#stice, howe*er, is to )e
achie*ed not thro#gh a "ista:en sy"pathy towards any gi*en gro#p.
Social *ustice is -neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy,- but the humaniation of laws and the equaliation of
social and economic forces by the State so that *ustice in its rational
and ob*ectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social *ustice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
the adoption by the 9overnment of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through
the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally *ustifiable, or extra:
constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time:honored principle of salus
populi est suprema lex.
ALMEDA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
78 SCRA 194, 1977
FACTS"
%espondent ,on&ales is a share tenant of Angeles et al., on
land de*oted to s#gar cane and cocon#ts. $he landowners sold the
property to petitioners Al"eda witho#t notifying respondent in writing of
the sale. $he sale was registered with the %egister of Deeds. %espondent
th#s s#ed for rede"ption )efore the A%.
0etitioners co#nter that long )efore the e5ec#tion of the
deed of sale, ,licerio Angeles and his nephew esar Angeles first offered
the sale of the land to respondent )#t the latter said that he had no
"oneyG that respondent, instead, went personally to the ho#se of
petitioners and i"plored the" to )#y the land for fear that if so"eone else
wo#ld )#y the land, he "ay not )e ta:en in as tenantG that respondent is a
"ere d#""y of so"eone deeply interested in )#ying the landG that
respondent "ade to tender of pay"ent or any *alid consignation in co#rt
at the ti"e he filed the co"plaint for rede"ption.
$he Agrarian o#rt rendered -#dg"ent a#thori&ing
respondent to redee" the land for 02B,???.??, the said a"o#nt to )e
17
deposited )y hi" with the ler: of o#rt within 17 days fro" receipt of the
decision.
'n appeal, the A affir"ed the assailed decision. $heir
"otion for reconsideration was denied. 1ence, the present petition for
re*iew.
ISSUE" Is there a tenantIs right of rede"ption in s#gar and cocon#t landsC
HELD"
Des. A"ong those e5e"pted fro" the a#to"atic con*ersion
to agric#lt#ral leasehold #pon the effecti*ity of the Agric#lt#ral Land
%efor" ode in 19+4 or e*en after its a"end"ents @ode of Agrarian
%efor"sA are s#gar lands. !ection B thereof states2 //gricultural share
tenancy thro#gho#t the co#ntry, as herein defined, is here)y declared
contrary to p#)lic policy and shall )e a#to"atically con*erted to
agricultural leasehold #pon the effecti*ity of this section. . . . 0ro*ided,
$hat in order not to -eopardi&e international co""it"ents, lands de*oted
to crops co*ered )y "ar:eting allot"ents shall )e "ade the s#)-ect of a
separate procla"ation )y the 0resident #pon reco""endation of the
depart"ent head that ade6#ate pro*isions, s#ch as the organi&ation of
cooperati*es "ar:eting agree"ent, or si"ilar other wor:a)le
arrange"ents, ha*e )een "ade to ins#re efficient "anage"ent on all
"atters re6#iring synchroni&ation of the agric#lt#ral with the processing
phases of s#ch crops . . ./
!#gar is, of co#rse, one crop co*ered )y "ar:eting
allot"ents. In other words, this section recogni&es share tenancy in s#gar
lands #ntil after a special procla"ation is "ade, which procla"ation shall
ha*e the sa"e effect of an e5ec#ti*e procla"ation of the operation of the
Depart"ent of Agrarian %efor" in any region or localityG the share tenants
in the lands affected will )eco"e agric#lt#ral lessees at the )eginning of
the agric#lt#ral year ne5t s#cceeding the year in which the procla"ation is
"ade. B#t, there is nothing reada)le or e*en discerni)le in the law
denying to tenants in s#gar lands the right of pre9e"ption and rede"ption
#nder the ode.
$he e5e"ption is p#rely li"ited to the tenancy syste"G it
does not e5cl#de the other rights conferred )y the ode, s#ch as the right
of pre9e"ption and rede"ption. In the sa"e "anner, cocon#t lands are
e5e"pted fro" the ode only with respect to the consideration and
tenancy syste" pre*ailing, i"plying that in other "atters the right of pre9
e"ption and rede"ption which does not refer to the consideration of the
tenancy the pro*isions of the ode apply. $h#s, !ection 47 states2
/3otwithstanding the pro*isions of the preceding !ections, in the case of
fishponds, salt)eds and lands principally planted to citr#s, cocon#ts,
cacao, coffee, d#rian, and other si"ilar per"anent trees at the ti"e of the
appro*al of this ode, the consideration, as well as the tenancy syste"
pre*ailing, shall )e go*erned )y the pro*isions of %ep#)lic Act 3#")ered
.le*en 1#ndred and 3inety93ine, as a"ended./
;t is to be noted that under the new ,onstitution,
property ownership is impressed with social function. #roperty use
must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well.
The State, in the promotion of social *ustice, may -regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, en*oyment and disposition of private
property, and equitably diffuse property . . . ownership and profits.-
'ne go*ern"ental policy of recent date pro-ects the e"ancipation of
tenants fro" the )ondage of the soil and the transfer to the" of the
ownership of the land they till. $his is 0residential Decree 3o. 27 of
'cto)er 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant far"ers /of pri*ate agric#lt#ral
lands de*oted to rice and corn #nder a syste" of sharecrop or lease9
tenancy, whether classified as landed estates or not/ shall )e dee"ed
/owner of a portion constit#ting a fa"ily9si&e far" of fi*e @7A hectares if not
irrigated and there @4A hectares if irrigated./
ONDO- VS. IGNACIO
97 SCRA %11, 1980
FACTS"
0etitioner .strella 'ndoy filed a clai" for co"pensation for
the death of her son, Hose 'ndoy, who drowned while in the e"ploy of
respondent <irgilio Ignacio. %espondent "o*ed to dis"iss on the gro#nd
of lac: of e"ployer9e"ployee relationship. 1owe*er, d#ring the hearing of
the case, respondent s#)"itted affida*its e5ec#ted )y the chief engineer
and oiler of the fishing *essel that the deceased, a fisher"an, was in that
ship, #ndenia)ly a "e")er of the wor:ing force, )#t after )eing in*ited )y
friends to a drin:ing spree, left the *essel, and thereafter was fo#nd dead.
$he referee s#""arily ignored the affida*it of the chief9"ate of
respondent e"ployer to the effect /that so"eti"e in 'cto)er, 19+8, while
Hose 'ndoy, "y co9wor:er, was in the act#al perfor"ance of his wor: with
said fishing enterprises, he was drowned and died on 'cto)er 22, 19+8.
$hat the deceased died in line of D#ty./ $he hearing officer or referee
dis"issed the clai" for lac: of "erit. A "otion for reconsideration was
d#ly filed, )#t the then !ecretary of La)or, denied s#ch "otion for
reconsideration for lac: of "erit. 1ence this petition for re*iew.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the clai" for co"pensation was *alidly dis"issed.
HELD"
$here is e*idence, direct and categorical, to the effect that
the deceased was drowned while /in the act#al perfor"ance of his wor:/
with the shipping enterprise of pri*ate respondent. .*en witho#t s#ch
e*idence, the petitioner co#ld ha*e relied on the presumption of
compensability #nder the Act once it is shown that the death or disa)ility
arose in the co#rse of e"ploy"ent, with the )#rden of o*erthrowing it
)eing cast on the person or entity resisting the clai".
$his o#rt, in recogni&ing the right of petitioner to the award,
merely adheres to the interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this
,ourt resolving all doubts in favor of the claimant. 8hat was said in
<ictorias Milling o., Inc. *. 8or:"enIs o"pensation o""ission is not
a"iss2 /$here is need, it see"s, e*en at this late date, for Opri*ate
respondentP and other e"ployers to )e re"inded of the high estate
accorded the 8or:"enIs o"pensation Act in the constit#tional sche"e
of social -#stice and protection to la)or./ 3o other -#dicial attit#de "ay )e
e5pected in the face of a clearly e5pressed legislati*e deter"ination which
antedated the constit#tionally a*owed concern for social -#stice and
protection to la)or. It is easily #nderstanda)le why the -#diciary frowns on
resort to doctrines, which e*en if decepti*ely pla#si)le, wo#ld res#lt in
fr#strating s#ch a national policy./ $o )e "ore specific, the principle of
social -#stice is in this sphere strengthened and *itali&ed. /s between a
laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the employer, who has
resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand
from the latter stricter compliance. Social *ustice in these cases is
not equality but protection.0
SALONGA VS. FARRALES
105 SCRA 359, 1981
FACTS"
Defendant (arrales is the titled owner of a parcel of
residential land. .*en prior to the ac6#isition )y defendant (arrales of the
land aforesaid, plaintiff !alonga was already in possession as lessee of
so"e 17+ s6#are "eters thereof, on which she had erected a ho#se,
paying rentals thereon first to the original owners and later to defendant
(arrales.
(arrales filed an e-ect"ent case for non9pay"ent of rentals
against plaintiff. H#dg"ent was later rendered in fa*or of defendant
(arrales and ordering the therein defendants, incl#ding plaintiff herein and
her h#s)and, to *acate the portion occ#pied )y the" and to pay rentals in
arrears.
.*idence showed that plaintiff offered to p#rchase fro" said
defendant the land in disp#te, )#t, defendant, despite the fact that said
plaintiffIs order to p#rchase was -#st, fair and reasona)le persistently
ref#sed s#ch offer, and instead, insisted to e5ec#te the -#dg"ent rendered
in the e-ect"ent case.
0laintiff then filed a co"plaint against defendant (arrales
praying the latter )e ordered to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land in
6#estion.
ISSUE" Is the plaintiff entitled for specific perfor"anceC
HELD"
3o. If plaintiffIs offer to p#rchase was, as aforesaid
persistently ref#sed )y defendant, it is o)*io#s that no "eeting of the
"inds too: place and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of sale,
was e*er perfected )etween the".
!ince contracts are enforcea)le only fro" the "o"ent of
perfection, and there is here no perfected contract at all, it goes witho#t
saying that plaintiff has a)sol#tely nothing to enforce against defendant
(arrales, and the fact that defendant (arrales pre*io#sly sold portions of
the land to other lessees si"ilarly sit#ated as plaintiff herein, does not
change the sit#ation )eca#se, as to said other lessees, a perfected
contract e5isted which is not the case with plaintiff.
;t must be remembered that social *ustice cannot be
invo<ed to trample on the rights of property owners who under our
,onstitution and laws are also entitled to protection. $he social -#stice
consecrated in o#r constit#tion was not intended to ta:e away rights fro"
a person and gi*e the" to another who is not entitled thereto. 6vidently,
the plea for social *ustice cannot nullify the law on obligations and
contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the power of the ,ourt to grant.
SECRETAR- OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS. MANALO
G.R. N+. L47841, O/0+8)2 7, 2008
FACTS"
$he case at )ar in*ol*es the rights to life, li)erty and sec#rity
in the first petition for a writ of a"paro filed )efore this o#rt.
$his case was originally a 0etition for 0rohi)ition, In-#nction,
and $e"porary %estraining 'rder to stop herein petitioners andRor their
officers and agents fro" depri*ing the" of their right to li)erty and other
)asic rights and en-oined the" fro" ca#sing the arrest of therein
petitioners, or otherwise restricting, c#rtailing, a)ridging, or depri*ing the"
of their right to life, li)erty, and other )asic rights as g#aranteed #nder
Article III, !ection 1 of the 1987 onstit#tion.
8hile the A#g#st 24, 2??7 0etition was pending, the %#le on
the 8rit of A"paro too: effect on 'cto)er 2B, 2??7. (orthwith, therein
petitioners filed a Manifestation and '"ni)#s Motion to $reat .5isting
0etition as A"paro 0etition.
'n 'cto)er 27, 2??7, the o#rt resol*ed to treat the A#g#st
24, 2??7 0etition as a petition #nder the A"paro %#le
18
'n Dece")er 2+, 2??7, the o#rt of Appeals rendered a
decision in fa*or of herein respondents. 1ence, this appeal.
$his pertains to the a)d#ction of %ADM'3D MA3AL' and
%.D3ALD' MA3AL' who were forci)ly ta:en fro" their respecti*e
ho"es in Brgy. B#hol na Mangga, !an Ildefonso, B#lacan on 1B (e)r#ary
2??+ )y #nidentified ar"ed "en and thereafter were forci)ly disappeared.
After the said incident, relati*es of the *icti"s filed a case for A)d#ction in
the ci*il co#rt against the herein s#spects2 Michael dela r#&, Madning
dela r#&, 0#ti Dela r#&, 0#la Dela r#&, %andy Mendo&a and %#dy
Mendo&a as alleged "e")ers of the iti&en Ar"ed (orces ,eographical
Jnit @A(,JA.
$he a)d#ction was perpetrated )y ar"ed "en who were
s#fficiently identified )y the petitioners @herein respondentsA to )e "ilitary
personnel and A(,J a#5iliaries. %ay"ond recalled that the si5 ar"ed
"en who )arged into his ho#se thro#gh the rear door were "ilitary "en
)ased on their attire of fatig#e pants and ar"y )oots, and the A(,J
a#5iliaries, na"ely2 Michael de la r#&, Madning de la r#&, 0#ti de la
r#& and 0#la de la r#&, all "e")ers of the A(,J and residents of
M#&on, !an Ildefonso, B#lacan, and the )rothers %andy Mendo&a and
%#dy Mendo&a, also A(,J "e")ers, ser*ed as loo:o#ts d#ring the
a)d#ction. %ay"ond was s#re that three of the si5 "ilitary "en were
,anata, who headed the a)d#cting tea", 1ilario, who dro*e the *an, and
,eorge. !#)se6#ent incidents of their long capti*ity, as narrated )y the
petitioners, *alidated their assertion of the participation of the ele"ents of
the 7th Infantry Di*ision, 0hilippine Ar"y, and their A(,J a#5iliaries.
8e are con*inced, too, that the reason for the a)d#ction was
the s#spicion that the petitioners were either "e")ers or sy"pathi&ers of
the 30A, considering that the a)d#ctors were loo:ing for La Bestre, who
t#rned o#t to )e %olando, the )rother of petitioners.
$he efforts e5erted )y the Military o""and to loo: into the
a)d#ction were, at )est, "erely s#perficial. $he in*estigation of the
0ro*ost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Di*ision foc#sed on the one9sided
*ersion of the A(,J a#5iliaries in*ol*ed. $his one9sidedness "ight )e
d#e to the fact that the 0ro*ost Marshall co#ld del*e only into the
participation of "ilitary personnel, )#t e*en then the 0ro*ost Marshall
sho#ld ha*e refrained fro" o#trightly e5c#lpating the A(,J a#5iliaries
he perf#nctorily in*estigate.
,en. 0alparanKs participation in the a)d#ction was also
esta)lished. At the *ery least, he was aware of the petitionersK capti*ity at
the hands of "en in #nifor" assigned to his co""and. In fact, he or any
other officer tendered no contro*ersion to the fir" clai" of %ay"ond that
he @,en. 0alparanA "et the" in person in a safeho#se in B#lacan and told
the" what he wanted the" and their parents to do or not to )e doing.
,en. 0alparanKs direct and personal role in the a)d#ction "ight not ha*e
)een shown )#t his :nowledge of the dire sit#ation of the petitioners
d#ring their long capti*ity at the hands of "ilitary personnel #nder his
co""and )espo:e of his ind#)ita)le co""and policy that #na*oida)ly
enco#raged and not "erely tolerated the a)d#ction of ci*ilians witho#t d#e
process of law and witho#t pro)a)le ca#se.
-e now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege
of the writ of amparo. There is no .uarrel that the enforced disappearance
of both respondents /a$mond and /e$naldo 0analo has now passed as
the$ have escaped from captivit$ and surfaced. 1ut while respondents
admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free,
they assert that they are not =free in every sense of the word0 as
their =movements continue to be restricted for fear that people they
have named in their 8udicial /ffidavits and testified against 'in the
case of .aymond) are still at large and have not been held
accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the
/rmed >orces of the #hilippines and are, thus, in a position to
threaten respondents? rights to life, liberty and security.0
.espondents claim that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, <ept captive or even <illed, which constitute a direct
violation of their right to security of person.
1laborating on the 2right to securit$, in general,3 respondents
point out that this right is 2often associated with libert$)3 it is also seen as
an 2e%pansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel
and unusual punishment.3 Conceding that there is no right to securit$
e%pressl$ mentioned in Article ''' of the 1485 Constitution, the$ submit that
their rights 2to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado
detention and solitar$ detention places fall under the general coverage of
the right to securit$ of person under the writ of Amparo.3 The$ submit that
the Court ought to give an e%pansive recognition of the right to securit$ of
person in view of the "tate 6olic$ under Article '' of the 1485 Constitution
which enunciates that, 2The "tate values the dignit$ of ever$ human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.3
'n sum, respondents assert that their cause of action
consists in the threat to their right to life and libert$, and a violation of their
right to securit$.
ISSUE" 8hether the 0etition for iss#ance of 8rit A"paro sho#ld )e
grantedC
HELD" Des. 8hile the right to life #nder Article III, !ection 1O12?P
g#arantees essentially the right to )e ali*e9 #pon which the en-oy"ent of
all other rights is preconditioned 9 the right to sec#rity of person is a
g#arantee of the sec#re 6#ality of this life, *i&2 =$he life to which each
person has a right is not a life li*ed in fear that his person and property
"ay )e #nreasona)ly *iolated )y a powerf#l r#ler. %ather, it is a life li*ed
with the ass#rance that the go*ern"ent he esta)lished and consented to,
will protect the sec#rity of his person and property. $he ideal of sec#rity in
life and propertyZ per*ades the whole history of "an. It to#ches e*ery
aspect of "anKs e5istence.> In a )road sense, the right to sec#rity of
person =e"anates in a personKs legal and #ninterr#pted en-oy"ent of his
life, his li")s, his )ody, his health, and his rep#tation. It incl#des the right
to e5ist, and the right to en-oy"ent of life while e5isting, and it is in*aded
not only )y a depri*ation of life )#t also of
those things which are necessary to the en-oy"ent of life according to the
nat#re, te"pera"ent, and lawf#l desires of the indi*id#al.>
A closer loo: at the right to sec#rity of person wo#ld yield *ario#s
per"#tations of the e5ercise of this right.
>irst, the right to sec#rity of person is =freedo" fro" fear.> In its =whereas>
cla#ses, the Jni*ersal Declaration of 1#"an %ights @JD1%A en#nciates
that =a world in which h#"an )eings shall en-oy freedo" of speech and
)elief and freedo" fro" fear and want has )een proclai"ed as the highest
aspiration of the co""on people.> e"phasis s#ppliedA !o"e scholars
post#late that =freedo" fro" fear> is not only an aspirational principle, )#t
essentially an indi*id#al international h#"an right.O12BP It is the =right to
sec#rity of person> as the word =sec#rity> itself "eans =freedo" fro" fear.>
Article 4 of the JD1% pro*ides, *i&2
.*eryone has the right to life, li)erty and sec#rity of person.O12+P
e"phasis s#ppliedA
In f#rtherance of this right declared in the JD1%, Article 9@1A of the
International o*enant on i*il and 0olitical %ights @I0%A also pro*ides
for the right to sec#rity of person, *i&2
1. .*eryone has the right to li)erty and sec#rity of person. 3o one shall )e
s#)-ected to ar)itrary arrest or detention. 3o one shall )e depri*ed of his
li)erty e5cept on s#ch gro#nds and in accordance with s#ch proced#re as
are esta)lished )y law. e"phasis s#ppliedA
$he 0hilippines is a signatory to )oth the JD1% and the I0%.
In the conte5t of !ection 1 of the A"paro %#le, =freedo" fro" fear> is the
right and any threat to the rights to life, li)erty or sec#rity is the actiona)le
wrong. (ear is a state of "ind, a reactionG threat is a sti"#l#s, a ca#se of
action. (ear ca#sed )y the sa"e sti"#l#s can range fro" )eing )aseless
to well9fo#nded as people react differently. $he degree of fear can *ary
fro" one person to another with the *ariation of the prolificacy of their
i"agination, strength of character or past e5perience with the sti"#l#s.
$h#s, in the a"paro conte5t, it is "ore correct to say that the =right to
sec#rity> is act#ally the =freedo" fro" threat.> <iewed in this light, the
=threatened with *iolation> la#se in the latter part of !ection 1 of the
A"paro %#le is a for" of *iolation of the right to sec#rity "entioned in the
earlier part of the pro*ision.
Second, the right to sec#rity of person is a g#arantee of )odily and
psychological integrity or sec#rity. Article III, !ection II of the 1987
onstit#tion g#arantees that, as a general r#le, oneKs )ody cannot )e
searched or in*aded witho#t a search warrant. 0hysical in-#ries inflicted in
the conte5t of e5tralegal :illings and enforced disappearances constit#te
"ore than a search or in*asion of the )ody. It "ay constit#te
dis"e")er"ent, physical disa)ilities, and painf#l physical intr#sion. As
the degree of physical in-#ry increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
3ota)ly, in cri"inal law, physical in-#ries constit#te a cri"e against
persons )eca#se they are an affront to the )odily integrity or sec#rity of a
person.
0hysical tort#re, force, and *iolence are a se*ere in*asion of )odily
integrity. 8hen e"ployed to *itiate the free will s#ch as to force the *icti"
to ad"it, re*eal or fa)ricate incri"inating infor"ation, it constit#tes an
in*asion of )oth )odily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the
h#"an person incl#des the e5ercise of free will. Article III, !ection 12 of
the 1987 onstit#tion "ore specifically proscri)es )odily and
psychological in*asion, *i&2
@2A 3o tort#re, force, *iolence, threat or inti"idation, or any other "eans
which *itiate the free will shall )e #sed against hi" @any person #nder
in*estigation for the co""ission of an offenseA. !ecret detention places,
solitary, inco""#nicado or other si"ilar for"s of detention are prohi)ited.
0arenthetically, #nder this pro*ision, threat and intimidation that *itiate
the free will 9 altho#gh not in*ol*ing in*asion of )odily integrity 9
ne*ertheless constit#te a *iolation of the right to sec#rity in the sense of
=freedo" fro" threat> as afore9disc#ssed.
Article III, !ection 12 g#arantees freedo" fro" deh#"ani&ing a)#ses of
persons #nder in*estigation for the co""ission of an offense. <icti"s of
enforced disappearances who are not e*en #nder s#ch in*estigation
sho#ld all the "ore )e protected fro" these degradations.
An o*ert#re to an interpretation of the right to sec#rity of person as a right
against tort#re was "ade )y the .#ropean o#rt of 1#"an %ights
@.1%A in the recent case of 0opo* *. %#ssia.O14?P In this case, the
clai"ant, who was lawf#lly detained, alleged that the state a#thorities had
physically a)#sed hi" in prison, there)y *iolating his right to sec#rity of
person. Article 7@1A of the .#ropean on*ention on 1#"an %ights
pro*ides, *i&2 =.*eryone has the right to li)erty and sec#rity of person. 3o
one shall )e depri*ed of his li)erty sa*e in the following cases and in
accordance with a proced#re prescri)ed )y law ...> @e"phases s#ppliedA
Article 4, on the other hand, pro*ides that =@nAo one shall )e s#)-ected to
tort#re or to inh#"an or degrading treat"ent or p#nish"ent.> Altho#gh
19
the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill9treat"ent was fo#nd
)aseless, the .1% relied hea*ily on the concept of sec#rity in holding,
*i&2
...the applicant did not )ring his allegations to the attention of do"estic
a#thorities at the ti"e when they co#ld reasona)ly ha*e )een e5pected to
ta:e "eas#res in order to ens#re his sec#rity and to in*estigate the
circ#"stances in 6#estion.
555 555 555
... the a#thorities failed to ens#re his sec#rity in c#stody or to co"ply with
the proced#ral o)ligation #nder Art.4 to cond#ct an effecti*e in*estigation
into his allegations.O141P @e"phasis s#ppliedA
$he J.3. o""ittee on the .li"ination of Discri"ination against 8o"en
has also "ade a state"ent that the protection of the )odily integrity of
wo"en "ay also )e related to the right to sec#rity and li)erty, *i&2
Zgender9)ased *iolence which i"pairs or n#llifies the en-oy"ent )y
wo"en of h#"an rights and f#nda"ental freedo"s #nder general
international law or #nder specific h#"an rights con*entions is
discri"ination within the "eaning of article 1 of the on*ention @on the
.li"ination of All (or"s of Discri"ination Against 8o"enA. $hese rights
and freedo"s incl#de . . . the right to li)erty and sec#rity of person.

Third, the right to sec#rity of person is a g#arantee of protection of oneKs
rights )y the go*ern"ent. In the conte5t of the writ of a"paro, this right is
)#ilt into the g#arantees of the right to life and li)erty #nder Article III,
!ection 1 of the 1987 onstit#tion and the right to sec#rity of person @as
freedo" fro" threat and g#arantee of )odily and psychological integrityA
#nder Article III, !ection 2. The right to security of person in this third
sense is a corollary of the policy that the State =guarantees full
respect for human rights0 under /rticle ;;, Section %% of the %(!4
,onstitution. A( 0;) A+>)2,D),0 9( 0;) /;9)< A1'2',0+2 +< +2*)2 ',*
()/1290:, 0;) C+,(090109+,'. A1'2',0)) +< 0;) 29A;0( 0+ .9<), .98)20: ',*
()/1290: +< E)2(+, 9( 2),*)2)* 9,)<<)/09>) 9< A+>)2,D),0 *+)( ,+0
'<<+2* E2+0)/09+, 0+ 0;)() 29A;0( )(E)/9'..: @;), 0;): '2) 1,*)2
0;2)'0. P2+0)/09+, 9,/.1*)( /+,*1/09,A )<<)/09>) 9,>)(09A'09+,(,
+2A',9F'09+, +< 0;) A+>)2,D),0 'EE'2'01( 0+ )C0),* E2+0)/09+, 0+
>9/09D( +< )C02'.)A'. G9..9,A( +2 ),<+2/)* *9('EE)'2',/)( (+2 0;2)'0(
0;)2)+<) ',*H+2 0;)92 <'D9.9)(, ',* 829,A9,A +<<),*)2( 0+ 0;) 8'2 +<
B1(09/).
ME-ER VS. NE&RAS7A
2%2 US 390 519226
FACTS"
%o)ert Meyer, while an instr#ctor in Xion 0arochial !chool,
was tried and con*icted in the district of 1a"ilton, 3e)ras:a #nder an
infor"ation which charged hi" for #nlawf#lly teaching reading ,er"an
lang#age to %ay"ond 0artpar, a ten year old child who had not
s#ccessf#lly reached the eight grade. $he infor"ation was )ased #pon
=An Act %elating to the $eaching of (oreign Lang#age in the !tate of
3e)ras:a,> which prohi)ited any s#)-ect in any lang#age other than
.nglish to any person who has not s#ccessf#lly passed the eight grade.
ISSUE" May the !tate prohi)it the teaching of foreign lang#age to children
who has not reach a certain grade le*elC
HELD"
It was held that it is inco"petent for the go*ern"ent to
prohi)it the teaching of the ,er"an lang#age to st#dents )etween certain
age le*els since there is nothing inherently har"f#l in the lang#age that
will i"pair the #p)ringing of the childG and in fact s#ch a s#)-ect co#ld
i"pro*e his acade"ic )ac:gro#nd.
PIERCE VS. SOCIET- OF SISTERS
2%2 US 390
FACTS"
$he !tate of 'regon passed a law re6#iring
parentsRg#ardians of children ages 891+ to send their child to p#)lic
school. $he "anifest p#rpose is to co"pel general attendance at p#)lic
schools )y children 891+ who ha*e not co"pleted their 8
th
grade.
!ociety of !isters operates a pri*ate school. It owns *al#a)le
)#ilding, especially constr#cted and e6#ipped for the school p#rposes.
$he law has already ca#sed the withdrawal fro" its school of children,
who wo#ld other wise contin#e attending the sa"e school. !ociety then
filed a s#it to en-oin the enforce"ent of the law contending that the sa"e
#nconstit#tional.
ISSUE" May the !tate re6#ire children to attend only p#)lic schools )efore
they reach a certain ageC
HELD"
$he f#nda"ental theory of li)erty #pon which the
go*ern"ent #nder the onstit#tion reposes e5cl#des any general power
of the !tate to standardi&e its children )y enforcing the" to accept
instr#ction fro" p#)lic teachers only. $he child is not the "ere creat#re of
the !tateG those who n#rt#re hi" and direct his destiny ha*e the right
co#pled with the high d#ty, to recogni&e and prepare hi" for additional
o)ligations.
VIRTUOSO VS. MUNICIPAL !UDGE
82 SCRA 191, 1978
FACTS"
0etitioner (rancisco <irto#so, Hr. filed an application for the
writ of ha)eas corp#s on the gro#nd that the preli"inary e5a"ination
which led to the iss#ance of a warrant of arrest against hi" was a #seless
for"ality as respondent M#nicipal H#dge failed to "eet the strict standard
re6#ired )y the onstit#tion to ascertain whether there was a pro)a)le
ca#se. 1e li:ewise alleged that aside fro" the constit#tional infir"ity that
tainted the proced#re followed in the preli"inary e5a"ination, the )ail
i"posed was clearly e5cessi*e. It was in the a"o#nt of 01+,???.??, the
alleged ro))ery of a $< set )eing i"p#ted to petitioner
It was later ascertained that the petitioner is a se*enteen
year old "inor entitled to the protection and )enefits of the child and Do#th
8elfare ode.
ISSUE" 8hether or not petitionerKs application for release sho#ld )e
granted.
HELD"
Des. As a "inor, he co#ld )e pro*isionally released on
recogni&ance in the discretion of a co#rt. This ,ourt should, whenever
appropriate, give vitality and force to the @outh and Welfare ,ode,
which is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate.
-The State recognies the vital role of the youth in nation:building
and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well:being.-
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792, 1993
FACTS"
$he petitioner, all "inors and alleges that the plaintiffs /are
all citi&ens of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, ta5payers, and entitled to the
f#ll )enefit, #se and en-oy"ent of the nat#ral reso#rce treas#re that is the
co#ntryIs *irgin tropical rainforests, d#ly -oined and represented )y their
parents instit#ted a co"plained as a ta5payersK class s#it and prayed for
the rendering of -#dg"ent ordering defendant (actoran, then !ecretary of
the D.3%, his agents, representati*es and other persons acting in his
)ehalf to cancel all e5isting ti")er license agree"ents in the co#ntry and
to cease and desist for" recei*ing, accepting, processing, renewing or
appro*ing new ti")er license agree"ents.
$he defendant "o*ed for the dis"issal of the co"plaint on
two gro#nds2 1A lac: of ca#se of action against hi" and 2A the iss#e raised
was a political 6#estion which properly pertains to the legislati*e or
e5ec#ti*e )ranches. $he trial co#rt dis"issed the co"plaint )ased on the
afore"entioned gro#nds. $h#s, the petitioners filed a special ci*il action
for certiorari see:ing to rescind and set aside.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the said petitioners ha*e a cause of action to
pre*ent the "isappropriation or i"pair"ent of the 0hilippine rainforests
and ha*e the defendant stop for" recei*ing, processing and appro*ing
ti")er license agree"ents.
HELD"
Des. $he petitioners ha*e a ca#se of action. The complaint
focuses on one specific fundamental legal right7the right to a balanced
and healthful ecolog$ which, for the first time in our constitutional histor$,
is solemnl$ incorporated in the fundamental law. !ection 1+, Article II of
the 1987 onstit#tion e5plicitly pro*ides that the !tate shall protect and
ad*ance the right of the people to a )alanced and healthf#l ecology in
accord with the rhyth" and har"ony of nat#re.$his right #nites with the
right to health which is pro*ided for in !.. 17 of Article 2.
-hile the right to a balanced and healthful ecolog$ is to be
found under the 8eclaration of 6rinciples and "tate 6olicies and not under
the 9ill of /ights, it does not follow that it is less important than an$ of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. "uch a right belongs to a
different categor$ of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self7
preservation and self7perpetuation 77 aptl$ and fittingl$ stressed b$ the
petitioners 77 the advancement of which ma$ even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights
need not even be written in the Constitution for the$ are assumed to e%ist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now e5plicitly "entioned in
the f#nda"ental charter, it is )eca#se of the well9fo#nded fear of its
fra"ers that #nless the rights to a )alanced and healthf#l ecology and to
health are "andated as state policies )y the onstit#tion itself, thereb$
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the da$ would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come :: generations
20
which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
$he right to a )alanced and healthf#l ecology carries with it
the correlati*e d#ty to refrain fro" i"pairing the en*iron"ent. $he said
right i"plies, a"ong "any other things, the -#dicio#s "anage"ent and
conser*ation of the co#ntryIs forests.
..'. 3o.192 and the Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987 ha*e set
the o)-ecti*es which ser*e as the )ases for policy for"#lation and ha*e
defined the powers and f#nctions of the D.3%, the pri"ary go*ern"ent
agency for the proper #se and de*elop"ent of the co#ntries nat#ral
reso#rces. $he right of the petitioners and all they represent to a )alanced
and healthf#l ecology is as clear as the D.3%Ks d#ty to protect and
ad*ance the said right.
A denial or *iolation of that right )y the owner who has the
correlati*e d#ty or o)ligation to respect or protect the sa"e gi*es rise to a
ca#se of action.
LLDA VS. CA
231 SCRA 292, 1994
FACTS"
$he $as: (orce a"arin D#"psite of '#r Lady of Lo#rdes
0arish, Barangay a"arin, aloocan ity, filed a letter9co"plaint with the
petitioner, see:ing to stop the operation of the open gar)age d#"psite in
$ala .state, Barangay a"arin, aloocan ity d#e to its har"f#l effects
on the health of the residents and the possi)ility of poll#tion of the water
content of the s#rro#nding area. $he LLDA cond#cted an on9site
in*estigation, "onitoring and test sa"pling of the leachate that seeps fro"
said d#"psite to the near)y cree: which is a tri)#tary of the Marilao %i*er.
$he LLDA Legal and $echnical personnel fo#nd that the ity ,o*ern"ent
of aloocan was "aintaining an open d#"psite at the a"arin area
witho#t first sec#ring an .n*iron"ental o"pliance ertificate @.A fro"
the .n*iron"ental Manage"ent B#rea# @.MBA of the Depart"ent of
.n*iron"ent and 3at#ral %eso#rces, and clearance fro" LLDA as
re6#ired #nder %ep#)lic Act 3o. B87?, 7 as a"ended )y 0residential
Decree 3o. 814 and .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 927
$he LLDA iss#ed a ease and Desist 'rder ordering the
ity ,o*ern"ent of aloocan, Metropolitan Manila A#thority, their
contractors, and other entities, to co"pletely halt, stop and desist fro"
d#"ping any for" or :ind of gar)age and other waste "atter at the
a"arin d#"psite. 1owe*er, the ity ,o*ern"ent of aloocan filed with
the %$ an action for the declaration of n#llity of the cease and desist
order with prayer for the iss#ance of a writ of in-#nction. LLDA then filed a
"otion of Dis"iss on the gro#nd that their order was "erely s#)-ect to
re*iew of the A and not the %$.
ISSUE"
8hether or not the LLDA ha*e the power and a#thority to iss#e a cease
and desist order
HELD"
Des. $he LLDA, as a speciali&ed ad"inistrati*e agency, is
specifically "andated #nder %ep#)lic Act 3o. B87? and its a"endatory
laws to carry o#t and "a:e effecti*e the declared national policy of
pro"oting and accelerating the de*elop"ent and )alanced growth of the
Lag#na La:e incl#ding aloocan ity with d#e regard and ade6#ate
pro*isions for en*iron"ental "anage"ent and control, preser*ation of the
6#ality of h#"an life and ecological syste"s, and the pre*ention of #nd#e
ecological dist#r)ances, deterioration and poll#tion. Jnder %A B87? it
a#thori&es LLDA to 2make, alter or modif$ orders re.uiring the
discontinuance of pollution.3
/ssuming arguendo that the authority to issue a -cease
and desist order- were not expressly conferred by law, there is
*urisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such
authority need not necessarily be express. While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is li<ewise a settled rule that an
administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its express powers. In the e5ercise,
therefore, of its e5press powers #nder its charter as a reg#latory and
6#asi9-#dicial )ody with respect to poll#tion cases in the Lag#na La:e
region, the authority of the LL7/ to issue a -cease and desist order-
is, perforce, implied. Atherwise, it may well be reduced to a
-toothless- paper agency.
In this connection, it "#st )e noted that in 0oll#tion
Ad-#dication Board *. o#rt of Appeals, et al., 27 the o#rt r#led that the
0oll#tion Ad-#dication Board @0ABA has the power to iss#e an e59parte
cease and desist order when there is pri"a facie e*idence of an
esta)lish"ent e5ceeding the allowa)le standards set )y the anti9poll#tion
laws of the co#ntry. $he ponente, Associate H#stice (lorentino 0.
(eliciano, declared2
/.5 parte cease and desist orders are per"itted )y law and reg#lations in
sit#ations li:e that here presented precisely )eca#se stopping the
contin#o#s discharge of poll#ti*e and #ntreated effl#ents into the ri*ers
and other inland waters of the 0hilippines cannot )e "ade to wait #ntil
protracted litigation o*er the #lti"ate correctness or propriety of s#ch
orders has r#n its f#ll co#rse, incl#ding "#ltiple and se6#ential appeals
s#ch as those which !olar has ta:en, which of co#rse "ay ta:e se*eral
years. $he rele*ant poll#tion control stat#te and i"ple"enting reg#lations
were enacted and pro"#lgated in the e5ercise of that per*asi*e,
so*ereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and
co"fort of the p#)lic, as well as the protection of plant and ani"al life,
co""only designated as the police power. It is a constit#tional
co""onplace that the ordinary re6#ire"ents of proced#ral d#e process
yield to the necessities of protecting *ital p#)lic interests li:e those here
in*ol*ed, thro#gh the e5ercise of police power. . . ./
The immediate response to the demands of -the necessities of
protecting vital public interests- gives vitality to the statement on
ecology embodied in the 7eclaration of #rinciples and State #olicies
or the %(!4 ,onstitution. /rticle ;;, Section %B which provides+
-The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.-
/s a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the
correlative duty of non:impairment. This is but in consonance with
the declared policy of the state -to protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.-
&! ;t is to be borne in mind that the #hilippines is party to the
Cniversal 7eclaration of Human .ights and the /lma ,onference
7eclaration of %(4! which recognie health as a fundamental human
right. &(
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LL7/,
as a practical matter of procedure under the circumstances of the
case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter
and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued by
the LL7/ been complied with by the ,ity 9overnment of ,aloocan
as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary.
$he charter of LLDA, %ep#)lic Act 3o. B87?, as a"ended, instead of
conferring #pon the LLDA the "eans of directly enforcing s#ch orders, has
pro*ided #nder its !ection B @dA the power to instit#te /necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall co""ence to i"ple"ent or
contin#e i"ple"entation of any pro-ect, plan or progra" within the Lag#na
de Bay region witho#t pre*io#s clearance fro" the LLDA./
learly, said pro*ision was designed to in*est the LLDA with
s#fficiently )road powers in the reg#lation of all pro-ects initiated in the
Lag#na La:e region, whether )y the go*ern"ent or the pri*ate sector,
insofar as the i"ple"entation of these pro-ects is concerned. It was "eant
to deal with cases which "ight possi)ly arise where decisions or orders
iss#ed p#rs#ant to the e5ercise of s#ch )road powers "ay not )e o)eyed,
res#lting in the thwarting of its la#da)le o)-ecti*e. $o "eet s#ch
contingencies, then the writs of "anda"#s and in-#nction which are
)eyond the power of the LLDA to iss#e, "ay )e so#ght fro" the proper
co#rts.
GARCIA VS. &OARD OF INVESTMENTS
191 SCRA 288, 1990
FACTS"
$his is a petition to ann#l and set aside the decision of the Board of
In*est"ents @B'IARDepart"ent of $rade and Ind#stry @D$IA appro*ing the
transfer of the site of the proposed petroche"ical plant fro" Bataan to
Batangas and the shift of feedstoc: for that plant fro" naphtha only to
naphtha andRor li6#efied petrole#" gas @L0,A.
Jnder 0.D. 3o. 18?4 dated Han#ary 1+, 1981, 77+ hectares of the p#)lic
do"ain located in La"ao, Li"ay, Bataan were reser*ed for the
0etroche"ical Ind#strial Xone #nder the ad"inistration, "anage"ent, and
ownership of the 0hilippine 3ational 'il o"pany @03'A.
$he Bataan %efining orporation @B%A is a wholly go*ern"ent owned
corporation, located at Bataan. It prod#ces +?M of the national o#tp#t of
naphtha.
$aiwanese in*estors in a petroche"ical pro-ect for"ed the Bataan
0etroche"ical orporation @B0A and applied with B'I for registration as
a new do"estic prod#cer of petroche"icals. Its application specified
Bataan as the plant site. 'ne of the ter"s and conditions for registration of
the pro-ect was the #se of /naphtha crac:er/ and /naphtha/ as feedstoc:
or f#el for its petroche"ical plant. $he petroche"ical plant was to )e a
-oint *ent#re with 03'. B0 was iss#ed a certificate of registration on
(e)r#ary 2B, 1988 )y B'I.
B0 was gi*en pioneer stat#s and accorded fiscal and other incenti*es )y
B'I, li:e, @1A e5e"ption fro" ta5es on raw "aterials, @2A repatriation of the
entire proceeds of li6#idation in*est"ents in c#rrency originally "ade and
at the e5change rate o)taining at the ti"e of repatriationG and @4A
re"ittance of earnings on in*est"ents. As additional incenti*e, the 1o#se
of %epresentati*es appro*ed a )ill introd#ced )y the petitioner eli"inating
the B8M ad *alore" ta5 on naphtha if and when it is #sed as raw "aterials
in the petroche"ical plant.
1owe*er, in (e)r#ary, 1989, A.$. hong, chair"an of J!I (ar .ast
orporation, the "a-or in*estor in B0, personally deli*ered to $rade
21
!ecretary Hose oncepcion a letter dated Han#ary 27, 1989 ad*ising hi"
of B0Is desire to a"end the original registration certification of its pro-ect
)y changing the -o) site fro" Li"ay, Bataan, to Batangas. $he reason
add#ced for the transfer was the ins#rgency and #nsta)le la)or sit#ation,
and the presence in Batangas of a h#ge li6#efied petrole#" gas @L0,A
depot owned )y the 0hilippine !hell orporation.
$he petitioner *igoro#sly opposed the proposal and no less than 0resident
A6#ino e5pressed her preference that the plant )e esta)lished in Bataan
in a conference with the $aiwanese in*estors, the !ecretary of 3ational
Defense and $he hief of !taff of the Ar"ed (orces.
Despite speeches in the !enate and 1o#se opposing the transfer of the
pro-ect to Batangas, B0 filed its re6#est for appro*al of the a"end"ents.
Its application is as follows2 /@1A increasing the in*est"ent a"o#nt fro"
J!Q22? "illion to J!Q42? "illionG @2A increasing the prod#ction capacity
of its naphtha crac:er, polythylene plant and polypropylene plantG @4A
changing the feedstoc: fro" naphtha only to /naphtha andRor li6#efied
petrole#" gasG/ and @BA transferring the -o) site fro" Li"ay, Bataan, to
Batangas. B'I states that it has ta:en a p#)lic position preferring Bataan
o*er Batangas as the site of the petroche"ical co"ple5, as this wo#ld
pro*ide a )etter distri)#tion of ind#stries aro#nd the Metro Manila area. In
ad*ocating the choice of Bataan as the pro-ect site for the petroche"ical
co"ple5, the B'I, howe*er, "ade it clear in its *iew that the B'I or the
go*ern"ent for that "atter co#ld only reco""end as to where the pro-ect
sho#ld )e located. $he B'I recogni&es and respects the principle that the
final choice is still with the proponent who wo#ld in the final analysis
pro*ide the f#nding or ris: capital for the pro-ect.
ISSUE"
8hether or not there was a)#se of discretion on the part of the Board of
In*est"ents for yielding to the wishes of the in*estor, the national interest
notwithstandingC
HELD"
D.!. #nder !ection 1?, Article ;II of the 1987 onstit#tion, it is the d#ty of
the !tate to /reg#late and e5ercise a#thority o*er foreign in*est"ents
within its national -#risdiction and in accordance with its national goals and
priorities./ $he de*elop"ent of a self9reliant and independent national
econo"y effecti*ely controlled )y (ilipinos is "andated in !ection 19,
Article II of the onstit#tion.
A petroche"ical ind#stry is not an ordinary in*est"ent opport#nity. It
sho#ld not )e treated li:e a gar"ent or e")roidery fir", a shoe9"a:ing
*ent#re, or e*en an asse")ler of cars or "an#fact#rer of co"p#ter chips,
where the B'I reasoning "ay )e accorded f#ller faith and credit. $he
petroche"ical ind#stry is essential to the national interest.
;n this particular 1#, venture, not only has the 9overnment given
unprecedented favors, but through its regulatory agency, the 1A;, it
surrenders even the power to ma<e a company abide by its initial
choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous
machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best
interests of the >ilipino people.
$he o#rt, therefore, holds and finds that the B'I co""itted a gra*e
a)#se of discretion in appro*ing the transfer of the petroche"ical plant
fro" Bataan to Batangas and a#thori&ing the change of feedstoc: fro"
naphtha only to naphtha andRor L0, for the "ain reason that the final say
is in the in*estor all other circ#"stances to the contrary notwithstanding.
3o cogent ad*antage to the go*ern"ent has )een shown )y this transfer.
$his is a rep#diation of the independent policy of the go*ern"ent
e5pressed in n#"ero#s laws and the onstit#tion to r#n its own affairs the
way it dee"s )est for the national interest.U
Ane can but remember the words of a great >ilipino leader who in
part said he would not mind having a government run li<e hell by
>ilipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation. In this case, it is
not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the
1A; allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage.
ASSO. OF SMALL LANDO=NERS VS. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
175 SCRA 343, 1989
FACTS"
In ancient "ythology, Antae#s was a terri)le giant who )loc:ed and
challenged 1erc#les for his life on his way to Mycenae after perfor"ing his
ele*enth la)or. $he two wrestled "ightily and 1erc#les fl#ng his ad*ersary
to the gro#nd thin:ing hi" dead, )#t Antae#s rose e*en stronger to
res#"e their str#ggle. $his happened se*eral ti"es to 1erc#lesI
increasing a"a&e"ent. (inally, as they contin#ed grappling, it dawned on
1erc#les that Antae#s was the son of ,aea and co#ld ne*er die as long
as any part of his )ody was to#ching his Mother .arth. $h#s forewarned,
1erc#les then held Antae#s #p in the air, )eyond the reach of the
s#staining soil, and cr#shed hi" to death.
Mother .arth. $he s#staining soil. $he gi*er of life, witho#t whose
in*igorating to#ch e*en the powerf#l Antae#s wea:ened and died.
$he cases )efore #s are not as fancif#l as the foregoing tale. B#t they also
tell of the ele"ental forces of life and death, of "en and wo"en who, li:e
Antae#s, need the s#staining strength of the precio#s earth to stay ali*e.
/Land for the Landless/ is a slogan that #nderscores the ac#te i")alance
in the distri)#tion of this precio#s reso#rce a"ong o#r people. B#t it is
"ore than a slogan. $hro#gh the )rooding cent#ries, it has )eco"e a
)attlecry dra"ati&ing the increasingly #rgent de"and of the dispossessed
a"ong #s for a plot of earth as their place in the s#n.
%ecogni&ing this need, the onstit#tion in 1947 "andated the policy of
social -#stice to /ins#re the well9)eing and econo"ic sec#rity of all the
people,/ especially the less pri*ileged. In 1974, the new onstit#tion
affir"ed this goal, adding specifically that /the !tate shall reg#late the
ac6#isition, ownership, #se, en-oy"ent and disposition of pri*ate property
and e6#ita)ly diff#se property ownership and profits.I !ignificantly, there
was also the specific in-#nction to /for"#late and i"ple"ent an agrarian
refor" progra" ai"ed at e"ancipating the tenant fro" the )ondage of the
soil./
$he onstit#tion of 1987 was not to )e o#tdone. Besides echoing these
senti"ents, it also adopted one whole and separate Article ;III on !ocial
H#stice and 1#"an %ights, containing grandiose )#t #ndo#)tedly sincere
pro*isions for the #plift of the co""on people. $hese incl#de a call in the
following words for the adoption )y the !tate of an agrarian refor"
progra".
$he cases in*ol*ed ha*e )een consolidated )eca#se they concern
co""on legal 6#estions, incl#ding serio#s challenges to the
constit#tionality of %A ++77 otherwise :nown as the o"prehensi*e
Agrarian %efor" Law of 1988 and other s#pple"entary to %A ++77 s#ch
as 0D 27 @pro*iding for the co"p#lsory ac6#isition of pri*ate lands for
distri)#tion a"ong tenant9far"ers and to specify "a5i"#" land
ownership in fa*or of the )eneficiaries of 0D 27A 0res. 0roc. 141
@instit#ting A%0A and .' 229 @pro*iding the "echanics of
i"ple"entation of A%0A %A ++77 is the "ost recent legislation, signed
into law )y 0res. A6#ino on H#ne 1?, 1988.
ISSUE" 8'3 %A ++77, 0D 77, 0roc. 41 Y .os 228 Y 229 considered as
*alid and constit#tionalC
HELD"
D.!. $he assailed laws are considered as a *alid e5ercise of )oth police
power and of e"inent do"ain. $he e5tent that it sets retention li"its is an
e5ercise of police power. It "#st )e noted that li:e ta5ation, the power of
e"inent do"ain co#ld )e #sed as an i"ple"ent of police power of the
state. $he e5pressed o)-ecti*e of the law was the pro"otion of the welfare
of the farners, which ca"e clearly #nder the police power of the state. $o
achie*e this p#rpose, the law pro*ided for the e5propriation of agric#lt#ral
lands @s#)-ect to "ini"#" retention li"its for the landownerA to )e
distri)#ted a"ong the peasantry. As the ponencia o)ser*ed2
$he cases )efore #s present no :notty co"plication insofar as the
6#estion of co"pensa)le ta:ing is concerned. To the extent that the
measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with the ,onstitution.
1ut where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of
the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a ta<ing under the
power of eminent domain for which payment of *ust compensation is
imperative. The ta<ing contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. 8hat is re6#ired is the s#rrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said e5cess and all )eneficial rights accr#ing to
the owner in fa*or of the far"er9)eneficiary. $his is definitely an e5ercise
not of the police power )#t of the power of e"inent do"ain.
;t bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions
contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use of private lands
under the police power. We deal here with an actual ta<ing of private
agricultural lands that has dispossessed the owners of their property
and deprived them of all its beneficial use and en*oyment, to entitle
them to the *ust compensation mandated by the ,onstitution.
$he e5propriation )efore #s affects all pri*ate agric#lt#ral lands whene*er
fo#nd and of whate*er :ind as long as they are in e5cess of the "a5i"#"
retention li"its allowed their owners. $his :ind of e5propriation is intended
for the )enefit not only of a partic#lar co""#nity or of a s"all seg"ent of
the pop#lation )#t of the entire (ilipino nation, fro" all le*els of o#r
society, fro" the i"po*erished far"er to the land9gl#tted owner. Its
p#rpose does not co*er only the whole territory of this co#ntry )#t goes
)eyond in ti"e to the foreseea)le f#t#re, which it hopes to sec#re and
edify with the *ision and the sacrifice of the present generation of (ilipinos.
,enerations yet to co"e are as in*ol*ed in this progra" as we are today,
altho#gh hopef#lly only as )eneficiaries of a richer and "ore f#lfilling life
we will g#arantee to the" to"orrow thro#gh o#r tho#ghtf#lness today.
And, finally, let it not )e forgotten that it is no less than the onstit#tion
itself that has ordained this re*ol#tion in the far"s, calling for /a -#st
distri)#tion/ a"ong the far"ers of lands that ha*e heretofore )een the
prison of their drea"s )#t can now )eco"e the :ey at least to their
deli*erance.
22
!#ch a progra" will in*ol*e not "ere "illions of pesos. $he cost will )e
tre"endo#s. onsidering the *ast areas of land s#)-ect to e5propriation
#nder the laws )efore #s, we esti"ate that h#ndreds of )illions of pesos
will )e needed, far "ore indeed than the a"o#nt of 07? )illion initially
appropriated, which is already staggering as it is )y o#r present standards.
!#ch a"o#nt is in fact not e*en f#lly a*aila)le at this ti"e.
8e ass#"e that the fra"ers of the onstit#tion were aware of this
diffic#lty when they called for agrarian refor" as a top priority pro-ect of
the go*ern"ent. It is a part of this ass#"ption that when they en*isioned
the e5propriation that wo#ld )e needed, they also intended that the -#st
co"pensation wo#ld ha*e to )e paid not in the orthodo5 way )#t a less
con*entional if "ore practical "ethod. $here can )e no do#)t that they
were aware of the financial li"itations of the go*ern"ent and had no
ill#sions that there wo#ld )e eno#gh "oney to pay in cash and in f#ll for
the lands they wanted to )e distri)#ted a"ong the far"ers. 8e "ay
therefore ass#"e that their intention was to allow s#ch "anner of
pay"ent as is now pro*ided for )y the A%0 Law, partic#larly the
pay"ent of the )alance @if the owner cannot )e paid f#lly with "oneyA, or
indeed of the entire a"o#nt of the -#st co"pensation, with other things of
*al#e. 8e "ay also s#ppose that what they had in "ind was a si"ilar
sche"e of pay"ent as that prescri)ed in 0.D. 3o. 27, which was the law
in force at the ti"e they deli)erated on the new harter and with which
they pres#"a)ly agreed in principle.
In relation thereto, the -#st co"pensation to )e "ade )y the ,o*ern"ent
in the for" of financial instr#"ents and not "oney is -#stified )y the
re*ol#tionary character of of the sche"e and the need to allow the
go*ern"ent ti"e to raise the f#nds needed.
&ASCO VS. PAGCOR
197 SCRA 52, 1991
FACTS"
0etitioners see: to ann#l the 0hilippine A"#se"ent and
,a"ing orporation @0A,'%A harter 9 0D 18+9, )eca#se it is
allegedly contrary to "orals, p#)lic policy and order. 0etitioners also clai"
that said 0D has a /ga")ling o)-ecti*e/ and that !ection 14 par 2 of the
sa"e 0D which e5e"pts 0A,'% fro" paying any ta5, any :ind of ter"
inco"e or otherwise as well as fees, charges as le*ies of whate*er nat#re
whether national or local is *iolati*e of the principles of local a#tono"y for
it is a wai*er of the right of the ity of Manila to i"pose ta5es and legal
fees.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the local a#tono"y cla#se is *iolated )y 0D 18+9
HELD"
$he petitionerKs contentions are witho#t "erit for the
following reasons2
1. $he ity of Manila, )eing a "ere M#nicipal corporation hits no
inherent right to i"pose ta5es
2. $he harter of the ity of Manila is s#)-ect to control )y ongress.
It sho#ld )e stressed that -municipal corporations are mere
creatures of ,ongress- which has the power to -create and
abolish municipal corporations- due to its -general legislative
powers-. ,ongress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments. /nd if ,ongress can grant the ,ity of
Danila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even ta<e bac< the power.
4. $he ity of ManilaIs power to i"pose license fees on ga")ling, has
long )een re*o:ed. 'nly the 3ational ,o*ern"ent has the power to
iss#e /licenses or per"its/ for the operation of ga")ling.
3ecessarily, the power to de"and or collect license fees which is a
conse6#ence of the iss#ance of /licensesor per"its/ is no longer
*ested in the ity of Manila.
". Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of
the 2ational 9overnment. #/9,A. is a government owned or
controlled corporation with an original charter.
5. The power of local government to -impose taxes and fees- is
always sub*ect to -limitations- which ,ongress may provide
by law. !ince 0D 18+9 re"ains an /operati*eII law, its /e5e"ption
cla#se/ re"ains as an e5ception to the e5ercise of the power of
local go*ern"ents to i"pose ta5es and fees. It cannot therefore )e
*iolati*e )#t rather is consistent with the principle of local
a#tono"y. Besides, the principle of local a#tono"y #nder the 1987
onstit#tion si"ply "eans /decentrali&ation/. It does not "a:e local
go*ern"ents so*ereign within the slate or an 9 i"peri#rn in i"perio.
LIM&ONA VS. MANGELIN
170 SCRA 78%, 1989
FACTS"
0etitioner is the elected spea:er of the Batangas, pa"poo:
of entral Mindanao @Asse")ly for )refityA. %espondents are "e")ers of
said Asse")ly.
ongress"an Matala", hair"an of the o""ittee on
M#sli" Affairs of the 1o#se of %epresentati*e in*ited the petitioner in his
capacity as spea:er of the Asse")ly to participate in cons#ltation and
dialog#e regarding the charting of the a#tono"o#s go*ern"ent of M#sli"
Mindanao to )e held in Manila.
0etitioner sent a telegra" thro#gh the !ecretary of the
Asse")ly to all the "e")ers thereof infor"ing that =there will )e no
session this 3o*e")er> in *iew of the in*itation of ong. Matala".
1owe*er, on 3o*e")er 2, 1987, the Asse")ly held session and declared
the seat of the !pea:er *acant. $his was reiterated in another session on
3o*e")er 7 of sa"e year.
%espondents allege that )eca#se the !angg#niang
0a"poo:@sA are /a#tono"o#s,/ the co#rts "ay not rightf#lly inter*ene in
their affairs, "#ch less stri:e down their acts.

ISSUE"
Are the so9called a#tono"o#s go*ern"ents of Mindanao, as they are now
constit#ted, s#)-ect to the -#risdiction of the national co#rtsC In other
words, what is the e5tent of self9go*ern"ent gi*en to the two a#tono"o#s
go*ern"ents of %egion I; and ;IIC
HELD"
Des, it "ay ass#"e -#risdiction. In resol*ing this case the !
"ade a differentiation )etween decentrali&ation of ad"inistration and
decentrali&ation of power.
$here is D)/),02'.9F'09+, +< '*D9,9(02'09+, when the
central go*ern"ent delegates ad"inistrati*e powers to political
s#)di*isions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments more responsive and accountable,/
and ensure their fullest development as self7reliant communities and
make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress. At the sa"e ti"e, it relieves the central government
of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. $he 0resident e5ercises IA),)2'. (1E)2>9(9+,I o*er
the", )#t only to /ens#re that local affairs are ad"inistered according to
law./ &e has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute
their #udgments with his own. D)/),02'.9F'09+, +< E+@)2, on the other
hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the
a#tono"o#s go*ern"ent is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
f#t#re with "ini"#" inter*ention fro" central a#thorities.
An e5a"ination of the *ery 0residential Decree creating the
a#tono"o#s go*ern"ents of Mindanao pers#ades #s that they were ne*er
"eant to e5ercise a#tono"y in the second sense, that is, in which the
central go*ern"ent co""its an act of self9i""olation. 0residential Decree
3o. 1+18, in the first place, "andates that /the 0resident shall ha*e the
power of general s#per*ision and control o*er A#tono"o#s %egions./ In
the second place, the !angg#niang 0a"poo:, their legislati*e ar", is
"ade to discharge chiefly ad"inistrati*e ser*ices.
PAMATONG VS. COMELEC
G.R. N+. 1%1872, AE29. 13, 2004
FACTS"
0etitioner %e*. .lly <ele& 0a"atong filed his ertificate of
andidacy for 0resident. %espondent o""ission on .lections
@'M.L.A ref#sed to gi*e d#e co#rse to petitionerKs ertificate of
andidacy in its %esol#tion 3o. +778 dated Han#ary 17, 2??B. $he
decision, howe*er, was not #nani"o#s since o""issioners L#&*i"inda
,. $ancangco and Mehol L. !adain *oted to incl#de petitioner as they
)elie*ed he had parties or "o*e"ents to )ac: #p his candidacy.
'n Han#ary 17, 2??B, petitioner "o*ed for reconsideration of
%esol#tion 3o. +778. 0etitionerKs Motion for %econsideration was
doc:eted as !00 @M0A 3o. ?B9??1. $he 'M.L., acting on petitionerKs
Motion for %econsideration and on si"ilar "otions filed )y other aspirants
for national electi*e positions, denied the sa"e #nder the aegis of
'"ni)#s %esol#tion 3o. ++?B dated (e)r#ary 11, 2??B. $he 'M.L.
declared petitioner and thirty9fi*e @47A others n#isance candidates who
co#ld not wage a nationwide ca"paign andRor are not no"inated )y a
political party or are not s#pported )y a registered political party with a
national constit#ency. o""issioner !adain "aintained his *ote for
petitioner. By then, o""issioner $ancangco had retired.
In this 0etition (or 8rit of ertiorari, petitioner see:s to
re*erse the resol#tions which were allegedly rendered in *iolation of his
right to =e6#al access to opport#nities for p#)lic ser*ice> #nder !ection 2+,
Article II of the 1987 onstit#tion,O)y li"iting the n#")er of 6#alified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide ca"paign
andRor are no"inated )y political parties. In so doing, petitioner arg#es
that the 'M.L. indirectly a"ended the constit#tional pro*isions on the
electoral process and li"ited the power of the so*ereign people to choose
their leaders. $he 'M.L. s#pposedly erred in dis6#alifying hi" since
he is the "ost 6#alified a"ong all the presidential candidates, i.e., he
possesses all the constit#tional and legal 6#alifications for the office of the
president, he is capa)le of waging a national ca"paign since he has
n#"ero#s national organi&ations #nder his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international ca"paign since he has practiced law in
other co#ntries, and he has a platfor" of go*ern"ent. 0etitioner li:ewise
attac:s the *alidity of the for" for the ertificate of andidacy prepared )y
the 'M.L.. 0etitioner clai"s that the for" does not pro*ide clear and
reasona)le g#idelines for deter"ining the 6#alifications of candidates
since it does not as: for the candidateKs )io9data and his progra" of
23
go*ern"ent.
ISSUE"
8hether the constit#tional pro*ision ens#ring =e6#al access to
opport#nities for p#)lic office> creates a constit#tional right to r#n for or
hold p#)lic office and, partic#larly in his case, to see: the presidencyC
HELD"
3'.I"plicit in the petitionerKs in*ocation of the constit#tional
pro*ision ens#ring =e6#al access to opport#nities for p#)lic office> is the
clai" that there is a constit#tional right to r#n for or hold p#)lic office and,
partic#larly in his case, to see: the presidency. There is none. What is
recognied is merely a privilege sub*ect to limitations imposed by
law. Section &B, /rticle ;; of the ,onstitution neither bestows such a
right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
$here is nothing in the plain lang#age of the pro*ision which s#ggests
s#ch a thr#st or -#stifies an interpretation of the sort.
$he =equal access0 pro*ision is a s#)s#"ed part of Article
II of the onstit#tion, entitled =Declaration of 0rinciples and !tate 0olicies.>
The provisions under the Article are generall$ considered not self7
e%ecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the 2e.ual access3 provision. (ike the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article '', the provision does not contain an$ #udiciall$
enforceable constitutional right but merel$ specifies a guideline for
legislative or e%ecutive action.:;< The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to an$ cause of action before the courts.
An in.uir$ into the intent of the framers produces the same
determination that the provision is not self7e%ecutor$. The original
wording of the present "ection 2=, Article '' had read, =The State shall
broaden opportunities to public office and prohibit public
dynasties.0 Commissioner +now Chief >ustice, &ilario 8avide, >r.
successfull$ brought forth an amendment that changed the word
2broaden3 to the phrase 2ensure e.ual access,3 and the substitution of the
word 2office3 to 2service.3 &e e%plained his proposal in this wise?
' changed the word 2 broaden0 to =62SC.6
6EC/L /,,6SS TA0 because what is important would
be e.ual access to the opportunit$. 'f $ou broaden, it
would necessaril$ mean that the government would be
mandated to create as man$ offices as are possible to
accommodate as man$ people as are also possible.
That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to
public service. "o, in order that we should not mandate
the "tate to make the government the number one
emplo$er and to limit offices onl$ to what ma$ be
necessar$ and e%pedient $et offering e.ual
opportunities to access to it, ' change the word
2broaden.3 :5< mphasis supplied,
Abviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to
enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people
as possible into public office. The approval of the =7avide
amendment0 indicates the design of the framers to cast the
provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy ob*ective and not
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
0oreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to
be regarded as the source of positive rights. 't is difficult to interpret the
clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means
and reach are not properl$ defined. 9roadl$ written, the m$riad of claims
that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirel$ open7ended.
:8< -ords and phrases such as 2e.ual access,3 2opportunities,3 and
2public service3 are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainl$, it was not the intention of the framers
to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which
innatel$ unenforceable rights ma$ be sourced.
As earlier noted, the pri*ilege of e6#al access to
opport#nities to p#)lic office "ay )e s#)-ected to li"itations. !o"e *alid
li"itations specifically on the pri*ilege to see: electi*e office are fo#nd in
the pro*isionsO9P of the '"ni)#s .lection ode on =3#isance andidates>
and 'M.L. %esol#tion 3o. +B72O1?P dated Dece")er 1?, 2??2
o#tlining the instances wherein the 'M.L. "ay "ot# proprio ref#se to
gi*e d#e co#rse to or cancel a ertificate of andidacy.
As long as the li"itations apply to e*ery)ody e6#ally witho#t
discri"ination, howe*er, the e6#al access cla#se is not *iolated. .6#ality
is not sacrificed as long as the )#rdens engendered )y the li"itations are
"eant to )e )orne )y any one who is "inded to file a certificate of
candidacy. In the case at )ar, there is no showing that any person is
e5e"pt fro" the li"itations or the )#rdens which they create.
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION
150 SCRA 530, 1987
FACTS"
$he f#nda"ental right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic
concern is in*o:ed in this special ci*il action for Manda"#s instit#ted )y
petitioner <alentin L. Legaspi against the i*il !er*ice o""ission. $he
respondent had earlier denied LegaspiIs re6#est for infor"ation on the
ci*il ser*ice eligi)ilities of certain persons e"ployed as sanitarians in the
1ealth Depart"ent of e)# ity. $hese go*ern"ent e"ployees had
allegedly represented the"sel*es as ci*il ser*ice eligi)les who passed the
ci*il ser*ice e5a"inations for sanitarians.
ISSUE" 8hether or not Legaspi sho#ld )e allowed s#ch right
HELD"
$he constit#tional right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic
concern is recogni&ed in the Bill of %ights. These constitutional
provisions are self:executing. $hey s#pply the r#les )y "eans of which
the right to infor"ation "ay )e en-oyed )y g#aranteeing the right and
"andating the d#ty to afford access to so#rces of infor"ation. 1ence, the
f#nda"ental right therein recogni&ed "ay )e asserted )y the people #pon
the ratification of the constit#tion witho#t need for any ancillary act of the
Legislat#re. 8hat "ay )e pro*ided for )y the Legislat#re are reasona)le
conditions and li"itations #pon the access to )e afforded which "#st, of
necessity, )e consistent with the declared !tate policy of f#ll p#)lic
disclos#re of all transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest.
>or every right of the people recognied as
fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
who govern, to respect and protect that right. $hat is the *ery essence
of the Bill of %ights in a constit#tional regi"e. 'nly go*ern"ents operating
#nder f#nda"ental r#les defining the li"its of their power so as to shield
indi*id#al rights against its ar)itrary e5ercise can properly clai" to )e
constit#tional. 8itho#t a go*ern"entIs acceptance of the li"itations
i"posed #pon it )y the onstit#tion in order to #phold indi*id#al li)erties,
witho#t an ac:nowledg"ent on its part of those d#ties e5acted )y the
rights pertaining to the citi&ens, the Bill of %ights )eco"es a sophistry, and
li)erty, the #lti"ate ill#sion.
;n recogniing the peopleFs right to be informed, both
the %(4$ ,onstitution and the 2ew ,harter expressly mandate the
duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
documents, papers and in addition, government research data used
as basis for policy development, sub*ect to such limitations as may
be provided by law. $he g#arantee has )een f#rther enhanced in the
3ew onstit#tion with the adoption of a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re, this
ti"e /s#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law,/ in Article II,
!ection 28 thereof, to wit2
!#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law, the !tate adopts and
i"ple"ents a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing
p#)lic interest. @Art. II, !ec. 28A.
In the $anada case, s#pra, the constit#tional g#arantee was )olstered )y
what this o#rt declared as an i"perati*e d#ty of the go*ern"ent officials
concerned to p#)lish all i"portant legislati*e acts and resol#tions of a
p#)lic nat#re as well as all e5ec#ti*e orders and procla"ations of general
applica)ility. 8e granted Manda"#s in said case, and in the process, 8e
fo#nd occasion to e5po#nd )riefly on the nat#re of said d#ty2
. . . $hat d#ty "#st )e enforced if the onstit#tional right of the people to
)e infor"ed on "atters of p#)lic concern is to )e gi*en s#)stance and
reality. $he law itself "a:es a list of what sho#ld )e p#)lished in the
'fficial ,a&ette. !#ch listing, to o#r "ind, lea*es respondents with no
discretion whatsoe*er as to what "#st )e incl#ded or e5cl#ded fro" s#ch
p#)lication. @$anada *. $#*era, s#pra, at 49A
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in
allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records
in the Affice of the .egister of 7eeds, is emphasied in Subido vs.
Aaeta, s#pra2
6xcept, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination
is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty
under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the
motives, reasons, and ob*ects of the person see<ing access to the
records. ;t is not their prerogative to see that the information which
the records contain is not flaunted before public gae, or that
scandal is not made of it. ;f it be wrong to publish the contents of the
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody
thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. . . . @!#)ido *.
'&aeta, s#pra at 488A.
;t is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this ,ourt that
government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure
of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the
right to information may be exercised by the public. In the !#)ido
case, 8e recogni&ed the a#thority of the %egister of Deeds to reg#late the
"anner in which persons desiring to do so, "ay inspect, e5a"ine or copy
records relating to registered lands. 1owe*er, the reg#lations which the
%egister of Deeds "ay pro"#lgate are confined to2
. . . prescri)ing the "anner and ho#rs of e5a"ination to the end that
da"age to or loss of, the records "ay )e a*oided, that #nd#e interference
with the d#ties of the c#stodian of the )oo:s and doc#"ents and other
e"ployees "ay )e pre*ented, that the right of other persons entitled to
"a:e inspection "ay )e ins#red . . . @!#)ido *s. '&aeta, 8? 0hil. 484,
487A.
24
Applying the !#)ido r#ling )y analogy, 8e recogni&ed a si"ilar a#thority
in a "#nicipal -#dge, to reg#late the "anner of inspection )y the p#)lic of
cri"inal doc:et records in the case of Baldo&a *s. Di"aano @Ad". Matter
3o. 112?9MH, May 7, 197+, 71 !%A 1BA. !aid ad"inistrati*e case was
filed against the respondent -#dge for his alleged ref#sal to allow
e5a"ination of the cri"inal doc:et records in his sala. Jpon a finding )y
the In*estigating H#dge that the respondent had allowed the co"plainant
to open and *iew the s#)-ect records, 8e a)sol*ed the respondent. In
effect, 8e ha*e also held that the r#les and conditions i"posed )y hi"
#pon the "anner of e5a"ining the p#)lic records were reasona)le.
In )oth the !#)ido and the Baldo&a cases, 8e were e"phatic in '#r
state"ent that the a#thority to reg#late the "anner of e5a"ining p#)lic
records does not carry with it the power to prohi)it. A distinction has to )e
"ade )etween the discretion to ref#se o#tright the disclos#re of or access
to a partic#lar infor"ation and the a#thority to reg#late the "anner in
which the access is to )e afforded. $he first is a li"itation #pon the
a*aila)ility of access to the infor"ation so#ght, which only the Legislat#re
"ay i"pose @Art. III, !ec. +, 1987 onstit#tionA. $he second pertains to
the go*ern"ent agency charged with the c#stody of p#)lic records. Its
a#thority to reg#late access is to )e e5ercised solely to the end that
da"age to, or loss of, p#)lic records "ay )e a*oided, #nd#e interference
with the d#ties of said agencies "ay )e pre*ented, and "ore i"portantly,
that the e5ercise of the sa"e constit#tional right )y other persons shall )e
ass#red @!#)ido *s. '&aeta, s#praA.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be sub*ect
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the
part of said agencies. ,ertainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Atherwise, the
en*oyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty,
not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ
of Dandamus in a proper case.
B#t what is a proper case for Manda"#s to iss#eC In the case )efore Js,
the p#)lic right to )e enforced and the conco"itant d#ty of the !tate are
#ne6#i*oca)ly set forth in the onstit#tion. $he decisi*e 6#estion on the
propriety of the iss#ance of the writ of Manda"#s in this case is, whether
the infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner is within the a")it of the
constit#tional g#arantee.
$he incorporation in the onstit#tion of a g#arantee of
access to infor"ation of p#)lic concern is a recognition of the essentiality
of the free flow of ideas and infor"ation in a de"ocracy @Baldo&a *.
Di"aano, Ad". Matter 3o. 112?9MH, May 7, 197+, 17 !%A 1BA. In the
sa"e way that free disc#ssion ena)les "e")ers of society to cope with
the e5igencies of their ti"e @$hornhill *s. Ala)a"a, 41? J.!. 88, 1?2
O1949PA, access to infor"ation of general interest aids the people in
de"ocratic decision9"a:ing @87 1ar*ard Law %e*iew 17?7 O197BP )y
gi*ing the" a )etter perspecti*e of the *ital iss#es confronting the nation.
1ut the constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. ;t does not open every
door to any and all information. Cnder the ,onstitution, access to
official records, papers, etc., are -sub*ect to limitations as may be
provided by law- '/rt. ;;;, Sec. 4, second sentence). $he law "ay
therefore e5e"pt certain types of infor"ation fro" p#)lic scr#tiny, s#ch as
those affecting national sec#rity. It follows that, in e*ery case, the
a*aila)ility of access to a partic#lar p#)lic record "#st )e circ#"scri)ed
)y the nat#re of the infor"ation so#ght, i.e., @aA )eing of p#)lic concern or
one that in*ol*es p#)lic interest, and, @)A not )eing e5e"pted )y law fro"
the operation of the constit#tional g#arantee. The threshold .uestion is,
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
public concern.
$his 6#estion is first addressed to the go*ern"ent agency
ha*ing c#stody of the desired infor"ation. 1owe*er, as already disc#ssed,
this does not gi*e the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
access. In case of denial of access, the go*ern"ent agency has the
)#rden of showing that the infor"ation re6#ested is not of p#)lic concern,
or, if it is of p#)lic concern, that the sa"e has )een e5e"pted )y law fro"
the operation of the g#arantee. $o hold otherwise will ser*e to dil#te the
constit#tional right. As aptly o)ser*ed, /. . . the go*ern"ent is in an
ad*antageo#s position to "arshall and interpret arg#"ents against
release . . ./ $o safeg#ard the constit#tional right, e*ery denial of access
)y the go*ern"ent agency concerned is s#)-ect to re*iew )y the co#rts,
and in the proper case, access "ay )e co"pelled )y a writ of Manda"#s.
'n determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. #ublic
concern- like -public interest- is a term that eludes e%act definition.
9oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of sub#ects which the public ma$
want to know , either
%
because these directly affect their lives, or
&
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citien. ;n the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
$he p#)lic concern in*o:ed in the case of $aNada *. $#*era, s#pra, was
the need for ade6#ate notice to the p#)lic of the *ario#s laws which are to
reg#late the actions and cond#ct of citi&ens. In !#)ido *s. '&aeta, s#pra,
the p#)lic concern dee"ed co*ered )y the stat#tory right was the
:nowledge of those real estate transactions which so"e )elie*ed to ha*e
)een registered in *iolation of the onstit#tion.
$he infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner in this case is the tr#th of the
clai" of certain go*ern"ent e"ployees that they are ci*il ser*ice eligi)les
for the positions to which they were appointed. $he onstit#tion e5pressly
declares as a !tate policy that2
Appoint"ents in the ci*il ser*ice shall )e "ade only according to "erit
and fitness to )e deter"ined, as far as practica)le, and e5cept as to
positions which are policy deter"ining, pri"arily confidential or highly
technical, )y co"petiti*e e5a"ination. @Art. I;, B, !ec. 2. O2PA.
#ublic office being a public trust, G,onst., /rt. H;, Sec+ %I it is the
legitimate concern of citiens to ensure that government positions
requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
are eligibles. #ublic officers are at all times accountable to the
people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
1ut then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
interest. >or Dandamus to lie in a given case, the information must
not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while ref#sing to confir" or deny the clai"s of
eligi)ility, the respondent has failed to cite any pro*ision in the i*il
!er*ice Law which wo#ld li"it the petitionerIs right to :now who are, and
who are not, ci*il ser*ice eligi)les. 8e ta:e -#dicial notice of the fact that
the na"es of those who pass the ci*il ser*ice e5a"inations, as in )ar
e5a"inations and licens#re e5a"inations for *ario#s professions, are
released to the p#)lic. &ence, there is nothing secret about one@s civil
service eligibilit$, if actuall$ possessed. 0etitionerIs re6#est is, therefore,
neither #n#s#al nor #nreasona)le. And when, as in this case, the
go*ern"ent e"ployees concerned clai" to )e ci*il ser*ice eligi)les, the
p#)lic, thro#gh any citi&en, has a right to *erify their professed eligi)ilities
fro" the i*il !er*ice o""ission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access
to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
the respondent ,ommission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
Dandamus, therefore lies.
VALMONTE VS. &ELMONTE
170 SCRA 25%, 1989
FACTS"
0etitioner <al"onte wrote a letter to respondent Bel"onte,
,eneral Manager of ,!I!, re6#esting the latter to f#rnish hi" the list of
the na"es of the Batasang 0a")ansa "e")ers )elonging to the J3ID'
and 0D09La)an who were a)le to sec#re clean loans i""ediately )efore
the (e)r#ary 7 election thr# the intercessionR"arginal note of the then
(irst Lady I"elda Marcos.
$he Dep#ty ,eneral co#nsel of the ,!I! wrote )ac: the
petitioner t#rning down his re6#est on the gro#nd that there e5ists a
confidential relationship )etween the ,!I! and all those who )orrow fro"
it, which confidence it is the ,!I! is d#ty )o#nd to preser*e.
ISSUE" 8hether or not "anda"#s lies to co"pel respondent to perfor"
the acts so#ght )y petitioner to )e done, in p#rs#ance of their right to
infor"ation
HELD"
Des. $he peopleKs right to infor"ation is li"ited to "atters of
p#)lic concern and is f#rther s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e
pro*ided )y law. $he ,!I! is a tr#stee of contri)#tions fro" the
go*ern"ent and its e"ployees and ad"inistration of *ario#s ins#rance
progra"s for the )enefit of the latter. Cndeniably, its funds assume a
public character. ;t is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure
that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximiing the benefits to insured government employees.
$he p#)lic nat#re of the loana)le f#nds of the ,!I! and the
p#)lic office held )y the alleged )orrowers "a:e the infor"ation so#ght
clearly a "atter of p#)lic interest and concern.
(#rther"ore, the /constit#ent9"inistrant/ dichoto"y
characteri&ing go*ern"ent f#nction has long )een rep#diated. $hat the
,!I!, in granting the loans, was e5ercising a proprietary f#nction wo#ld
not -#stify the e5cl#sion of the transactions fro" the co*erage and scope
of the right to infor"ation.
/espondent ne%t asserts that the documents evidencing the
loan transactions of the A"'" are private in nature and hence, are not
covered b$ the Constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern which guarantees +a,ccess to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions onl$.
't is argued that the records of the A"'", a government
corporation performing proprietar$ functions, are outside the coverage of
25
the people@s right of access to official records. 't is further contended that
since the loan function of the A"'" is merel$ incidental to its insurance
function, then its loan transactions are not covered b$ the constitutional
polic$ of full public disclosure and the right to information which is
applicable onl$ to official transactions.
(irst of all, the /constit#ent 9999"inistrant/ dichoto"y
characteri&ing go*ern"ent f#nction has long )een rep#diated. In A(A
*. onfederation of Jnions and ,o*ern"ent orporations and 'ffices
O,.%. 3os. L921B8B and L924+?7, 3o*e")er 29, 19+9, 4? !%A +BBP, the
o#rt said that the go*ern"ent, whether carrying o#t its so*ereign
attri)#tes or r#nning so"e )#siness, discharges the sa"e f#nction of
ser*ice to the people.
Conse.uentl$, that the A"'", in granting the loans, was
e%ercising a proprietar$ function would not #ustif$ the e%clusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
Doreover, the intent of the members of the
,onstitutional ,ommission of %(!B, to include government:owned
and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them
within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is
manifest from the records of the proceedings
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive,
and considering further that government7owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietar$ or governmental functions
are accountable to the people, the ,ourt is convinced that transactions
entered into by the 9S;S, a government:controlled corporation
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the peopleFs
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
'n fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted b$ the A"'", sub#ect to reasonable regulations
that the latter ma$ promulgate relating to the manner and hours of
e%amination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records ma$ be
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records ma$ be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to
inspect the records ma$ be insured
However, although citiens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to -access to official
records,- the ,onstitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the li<e in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.
AJUINOSARMIENTO VS. MORATO
203 SCRA 515, 1991
FACTS"
0etitioner, a "e")er of respondent M$%B, wrote its
records officer re6#esting that she )e allowed to e5a"ine the )oardIs
records pertaining to the *oting slips acco"plished )y the indi*id#al )oard
"e")ers after a re*iew of the "o*ies and tele*ision prod#ctions. It is on
the )asis of said slips that fil"s are either )anned, c#t or classified
accordingly. 0etitionerIs re6#est was denied )y respondent Morato on the
gro#nd that whene*er the "e")ers of the )oard sit in -#dg"ent o*er a
fil", their decisions as reflected in the indi*id#al *oting slips parta:e the
nat#re of conscience *otes and as s#ch, are p#rely and co"pletely pri*ate
and personal.
0etitioner co#nters that the records she wishes to e5a"ine
are p#)lic in character and other than pro*iding for reasona)le conditions
reg#lating the "anner and ho#rs of e5a"ination, respondents ha*e no
a#thority to deny any citi&en see:ing e5a"ination of the )oardIs records.
ISSUE" 8as the respondentsK denial of petitionerKs re6#est properC
HELD"
8e find respondentsI ref#sal to allow petitioner to e5a"ine
the records of respondent M$%B, pertaining to the decisions of the
re*iew co""ittee as well as the indi*id#al *oting slips of its "e")ers, as
*iolati*e of petitionerIs constit#tional right of access to p#)lic records.
May the decisions of respondent Board and the indi*id#al
"e")ers concerned, arri*ed at in an official capacity, )e considered
pri*ateC ertainly not. As "ay )e gleaned fro" the decree @0D 198+A
creating the respondent classification )oard, there is no do#)t that its *ery
e5istence is p#)lic in characterG it is an office created to ser*e p#)lic
interest. it )eing the case, respondents can Hay no *alid clai" to pri*acy.
$he right to pri*acy )elongs to the indi*id#al acting in his pri*ate capacity
and not to a go*ern"ental agency or officers tas:ed with, and acting in,
the discharge of p#)lic d#ties.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTO&ATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL
GR N+. 183591, O/0+8)2 14, 2008
FACTS"
8hen 0resident ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo ass#"ed office, the
"ilitary offensi*e against the MIL( was s#spended and the go*ern"ent
so#ght a res#"ption of the peace tal:s. $he MIL(, according to a leading
MIL( "e")er, initially responded with deep reser*ation, )#t when
0resident Arroyo as:ed the ,o*ern"ent of Malaysia thro#gh 0ri"e
Minister Mahathir Moha""ad to help con*ince the MIL( to ret#rn to the
negotiating ta)le, the MIL( con*ened its entral o""ittee to serio#sly
disc#ss the "atter and, e*ent#ally, decided to "eet with the ,%0.
$he parties "et in L#ala L#"p#r on March 2B, 2??1, with the tal:s
)eing facilitated )y the Malaysian go*ern"ent, the parties signing on the
sa"e date the Agree"ent on the ,eneral (ra"ewor: for the %es#"ption
of 0eace $al:s Between the ,%0 and the MIL(. $he MIL( thereafter
s#spended all its "ilitary actions.
(or"al peace tal:s )etween the parties were held in $ripoli, Li)ya
fro" H#ne 2?922, 2??1, the o#tco"e of which was the ,%09MIL( $ripoli
Agree"ent on 0eace @$ripoli Agree"ent 2??1A containing the )asic
principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation2 !ec#rity
Aspect, %eha)ilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Do"ain Aspect. 8ith regard
to the Ancestral Do"ain Aspect, the parties in $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1
si"ply agreed =that the sa"e )e disc#ssed f#rther )y the 0arties in their
ne5t "eeting.>
A second ro#nd of peace tal:s was held in y)er-aya, Malaysia on
A#g#st 797, 2??1 which ended with the signing of the I"ple"enting
,#idelines on the !ec#rity Aspect of the $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1 leading
to a ceasefire stat#s )etween the parties. $his was followed )y the
I"ple"enting ,#idelines on the 1#"anitarian %eha)ilitation and
De*elop"ent Aspects of the $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1, which was signed on
May 7, 2??2 at 0#tra-aya, Malaysia. 3onetheless, there were "any
incidence of *iolence )etween go*ern"ent forces and the MIL( fro" 2??2
to 2??4. Meanwhile, then MIL( hair"an !ala"at 1ashi" passed away
on H#ly 14, 2??4 and he was replaced )y Al 1a- M#rad, who was then the
chief peace negotiator of the MIL(. M#radKs position as chief peace
negotiator was ta:en o*er )y Mohagher I6)al.
In 2??7, se*eral e5ploratory tal:s were held )etween the parties in
L#ala L#"p#r, e*ent#ally leading to the crafting of the draft M'A9AD in its
final for", which, as "entioned, was set to )e signed last A#g#st 7, 2??8.
Before the o#rt is what is perhaps the "ost contentio#s =consens#s>
e*er e")odied in an instr#"ent [ the M'A9AD which is assailed
principally )y the present petitions )earing doc:et n#")ers 184791,
184772, 184894, 184971 and 1849+2. o""only i"pleaded as
respondents are the ,%0 0eace 0anel on Ancestral Do"ain and the
0residential Ad*iser on the 0eace 0rocess @0A00A 1er"ogenes .speron,
Hr. 'n H#ly 24, 2??8, the 0ro*ince of 3orth ota)atoOand <ice9,o*ernor
.""an#el 0iNol filed a petition, doc:eted as ,.%. 3o. 184791, for
Manda"#s and 0rohi)ition with 0rayer for the Iss#ance of 8rit of
0reli"inary In-#nction and $e"porary %estraining 'rder. In*o:ing the right
to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern, petitioners see: to co"pel
respondents to disclose and f#rnish the" the co"plete and official copies
of the M'A9AD incl#ding its attach"ents, and to prohi)it the slated signing
of the M'A9AD, pending the disclos#re of the contents of the M'A9AD
and the holding of a p#)lic cons#ltation thereon. !#pple"entarily,
petitioners pray that the M'A9AD )e declared #nconstit#tional. $his initial
petition was followed )y se*eral other petitions )y other parties. $he o#rt
ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
ISSUE"
8hether there is a *iolation of the peopleKs right to infor"ation on "atters
of p#)lic concern @1987 onstit#tion, Article III, !ec. 7A #nder a state
policy of f#ll disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest @1987
onstit#tion, Article II, !ec. 28A incl#ding p#)lic cons#ltation #nder
%ep#)lic Act 3o. 71+? @L'AL ,'<.%3M.3$ 'D. '( 1991C
HELD"
D.!. $he right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern
shall )e recogni&ed. Access to official records, and to doc#"ents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
go*ern"ent research data #sed as )asis for policy de*elop"ent, shall )e
afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law.
As early as 19B8, in !#)ido *. '&aeta, the o#rt has recogni&ed the
stat#tory right to e5a"ine and inspect p#)lic records, a right which was
e*ent#ally accorded constit#tional stat#s.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both
the %(4$ ,onstitution and the %(!4 ,onstitution, has been
recognied as a self:executory constitutional right.
In the 197+ case of Baldo&a *. 1on. H#dge Di"aano,the o#rt r#led
that access to p#)lic records is predicated on the right of the people to
ac6#ire infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern since, #ndo#)tedly, in a
de"ocracy, the p#)ic has a legiti"ate interest in "atters of social and
political significance. $he incorporation of this right in the onstit#tion is a
recognition of the f#nda"ental role of free e5change of infor"ation in a
de"ocracy. $here can )e no realistic perception )y the p#)lic of the
nationKs pro)le"s, nor a "eaningf#l de"ocratic decision9"a:ing if they
are denied access to infor"ation of general interest. Infor"ation is
needed to ena)le the "e")ers of society to cope with the e5igencies of
the ti"es. As has )een aptly o)ser*ed2 =Maintaining the flow of s#ch
infor"ation depends on protection for )oth its ac6#isition and its
disse"ination since, if either process is interr#pted, the flow ine*ita)ly
ceases.>
In the sa"e way that free disc#ssion ena)les "e")ers of society to
cope with the e5igencies of their ti"e, access to infor"ation of general
interest aids the people in de"ocratic decision9"a:ing )y gi*ing the" a
)etter perspecti*e of the *ital iss#es confronting the nation, so that they
"ay )e a)le to critici&e and participate in the affairs of the go*ern"ent in a
responsi)le, reasona)le and effecti*e "anner. It is )y ens#ring an
#nfettered and #ninhi)ited e5change of ideas a"ong a well9infor"ed
26
p#)lic that a go*ern"ent re"ains responsi*e to the changes desired )y
the people.
$he M'A9AD is a "atter of p#)lic concern

That the sub*ect of the information sought in the present
cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. ;n
fact, respondents admit that the DA/:/7 is indeed of public
concern. ;n previous cases, the ,ourt found that the regularity of
real estate transactions entered in the .egister of 7eeds, the need
for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service
eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of 9S;S
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery
of the Darcoses? alleged ill:gotten wealth,G%&3I and the identity of
party:list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern.
Cndoubtedly, the DA/:/7 sub*ect of the present cases is of public
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Datters of public concern covered by the right to information
include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract. In not disting#ishing as to the e5ec#tory nat#re or co""ercial
character of agree"ents, the o#rt has categorically r#led that the right to
infor"ation =conte"plates incl#sion of negotiations leading to the
cons#""ation of the transaction.> ertainly, a cons#""ated contract is
not a re6#ire"ent for the e5ercise of the right to infor"ation. 'therwise,
the people can ne*er e5ercise the right if no contract is cons#""ated,
and if one is cons#""ated, it "ay )e too late for the p#)lic to e5pose its
defects.

.equiring a consummated contract will <eep the public in the
dar< until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the ,onstitution could not have
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citienry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the 1ill of .ights.
8e can allow neither an e"asc#lation of a constit#tional right, nor a
retreat )y the !tate of its a*owed =policy of f#ll disclos#re of all its
transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest.>
Intended as a =splendid sy""etry> to the right to infor"ation #nder
the Bill of %ights is the policy of p#)lic disclos#re #nder !ection 28, Article
II of the onstit#tion. $he policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re en#nciated in
a)o*e96#oted !ection 28 co"ple"ents the right of access to infor"ation
on "atters of p#)lic concern fo#nd in the Bill of %ights. $he right to
infor"ation g#arantees the right of the people to de"and infor"ation,
while !ection 28 recogni&es the d#ty of officialdo" to gi*e infor"ation
e*en if no)ody de"ands.
$he policy of p#)lic disclos#re esta)lishes a concrete ethical
principle for the cond#ct of p#)lic affairs in a gen#inely open de"ocracy,
with the peopleKs right to :now as the centerpiece. It is a "andate of the
!tate to )e acco#nta)le )y following s#ch policy. $hese pro*isions are
*ital to the e5ercise of the freedo" of e5pression and essential to hold
p#)lic officials at all ti"es acco#nta)le to the people.
8hether !ection 28 is self9e5ec#tory, the records of the
deli)erations of the onstit#tional o""ission so disclose.
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE
STATE
POLICE POWER
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE E3PORTERS, INC >(. HON.
DRILON
G.R. N+. 81958, !1,) 30, 1988, SARMIENTO, !.
F'/0("
$he petitioner, 0hilippine Association of !er*ice .5porters,
Inc. @0A!.I, for shortA, a fir" /engaged principally in the recr#it"ent of
(ilipino wor:ers, "ale and fe"ale, for o*erseas place"ent,/ challenges
the onstit#tional *alidity of Depart"ent 'rder 3o. 1, !eries of 1988, of
the Depart"ent of La)or and ."ploy"ent, in the character of
/,JID.LI3.! ,'<.%3I3, $1. $.M0'%A%D !J!0.3!I'3 '(
D.0L'DM.3$ '( (ILI0I3' D'M.!$I A3D 1'J!.1'LD
8'%L.%!,/ in this petition for certiorari and prohi)ition. !pecifically, the
"eas#re is assailed for /discri"ination against "ales or fe"alesG/ that it
/does not apply to all (ilipino wor:ers )#t only to do"estic helpers and
fe"ales with si"ilar s:illsG/ and that it is *iolati*e of the right to tra*el. It is
held li:ewise to )e an in*alid e5ercise of the law"a:ing power, police
power )eing legislati*e, and not e5ec#ti*e, in character.
In this petition for certiorari and prohi)ition, 0A!.I,
challenges the *alidity of Depart"ent 'rder 3o. 1 @deploy"ent )anA of the
D'L. on the following gro#nds2 1A it is discri"inatory as it only applies to
fe"ale wor:ersG 2A it is an in*alid e5ercise of the law"a:ing power. $he
respondents in*o:e the police power of the 0hilippine !tate.
I((1)" 8hether or not the enact"ent of D' 3o. 1 is a *alid e5ercise of
police power.
H).*" Des, it is a *alid e5ercise of police power. 0olice power has )een
defined as the /state a#thority to enact legislation that "ay interfere with
personal li)erty or property in order to pro"ote the general welfare./ It
finds no specific onstit#tional grant for the plain reason that it does not
owe its origin to the harter. It is a f#nda"ental attri)#te of go*ern"ent
that has ena)led it to perfor" the "ost *ital f#nctions of go*ernance. It
constit#tes an i"plied li"itation on the Bill of %ights. 1owe*er, police
power is not witho#t its own li"itations. It "ay not )e e5ercised ar)itrarily
or #nreasona)ly.
It is ad"itted that Depart"ent 'rder 3o. 1 is in the nat#re of
a police power "eas#re. $he only 6#estion is whether or not it is *alid
#nder the onstit#tion.
The concept of police power is well:established in this
*urisdiction. ;t has been defined as the -state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare.- /s defined, it consists of '%)
an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, '&) in order to
foster the common good. ;t is not capable of an exact definition but
has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all:
comprehensive embrace.
/Its scope, e*er9e5panding to "eet the e5igencies of the
ti"es, e*en to anticipate the f#t#re where it co#ld )e done, pro*ides
eno#gh roo" for an efficient and fle5i)le response to conditions and
circ#"stances th#s ass#ring the greatest )enefits./
;t finds no specific ,onstitutional grant for the plain
reason that it does not owe its origin to the ,harter. /long with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of
statehood and sovereignty. It is a f#nda"ental attri)#te of go*ern"ent
that has ena)led it to perfor" the "ost *ital f#nctions of go*ernance.
Marshall, to who" the e5pression has )een credited, refers to it s#ccinctly
as the plenary power of the State -to govern its citiens.-
/$he police power of the !tate . . . is a power coe5tensi*e
with self9protection, and it is not inaptly ter"ed the Ilaw of o*erwhel"ing
necessity.I It "ay )e said to )e that inherent and plenary power in the
!tate which ena)les it to prohi)it all things h#rtf#l to the co"fort, safety,
and welfare of society./
;t constitutes an implied limitation on the 1ill of .ights.
/ccording to >ernando, it is -rooted in the conception that men in
organiing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citien or a group of citiens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare./ !ignificantly, the
Bill of %ights itself does not p#rport to )e an a)sol#te g#aranty of
indi*id#al rights and li)erties -6ven liberty itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to oneFs will.- It is
s#)-ect to the far "ore o*erriding de"ands and re6#ire"ents of the
greater n#")er.
2otwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is
not without its own limitations. >or all its awesome consequences, it
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Atherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further
private interests at the expense of the citienry, there is a clear
misuse of the power.
D' 3o. 1 applies only to /fe"ale contract wor:ers,/ )#t it
does not there)y "a:e an #nd#e discri"ination )etween the se5es.
=.6#ality )efore the law/ ad"its of classifications, pro*ided that @1A s#ch
classifications rest on s#)stantial distinctionsG @2A they are ger"ane to the
p#rposes of the lawG @4A they are not confined to e5isting conditionsG and
@BA they apply e6#ally to all "e")ers of the sa"e class. It is the a*owed
o)-ecti*e of D' 3o. 1 to /enhance the protection for (ilipino fe"ale
o*erseas wor:ers. Discri"ination in this case is -#stified.
0olice power is the do"ain of the legislat#re, )#t it does not
"ean that s#ch an a#thority "ay not )e lawf#lly delegated. $he La)or
ode itself *ests the D'L. with r#le"a:ing powers in the enforce"ent
whereof. 1ence it is a *alid e5ercise of police power.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDE$
101 PHIL. 1155
FACTS"
%ep#)lic Act 118? or co""only :nown as =An Act to
%eg#late the %etail B#siness> was passed. $he said law pro*ides for a
prohi)ition against foreigners as well as corporations owned )y foreigners
fro" engaging fro" retail trade in o#r co#ntry.
0etitioner filed a s#it to in*alidate the %etail $rade
3ationali&ation Law, on the pre"ise that it *iolated se*eral treaties which
#nder the r#le of pacta s#nt ser*anda, a generally accepted principle of
international law, sho#ld )e o)ser*ed )y the o#rt in good faith.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the %etail $rade 3ationali&ation Law is
#nconstit#tional for it is in conflict with treaties which are generally
accepted principles of international law.
HELD"
$he !#pre"e o#rt said it saw no conflict. $he reason
gi*en )y the o#rt was that the %etail $rade 3ational Law was passed in
27
the e5ercise of the police power which cannot )e )argained away thro#gh
the "edi#" of a treaty or a contract.
$he law in 6#estion was enacted to remedy a real actual
threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free the citiens and country
from such dominance and controlJ that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and
future.
%es#"ing what we ha*e set forth a)o*e we hold that the
disp#ted law was enacted to re"edy a real act#al threat and danger to
national econo"y posed )y alien do"inance and control of the retail
)#siness and free citi&ens and co#ntry fro" s#ch do"inance and controlG
that the enact"ent clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
state, thro#gh which and )y which it protects its own personality and
ins#res its sec#rity and f#t#reG that the law does not *iolate the e6#al
the distinction )etween alien and citi&en in the e5ercise of occ#pation
reg#lated, nor the d#e process of the law cla#seG )eca#se the law is
engaged in the occ#pation and reasona)ly protects their pri*ilegeG that the
wisdo" and efficacy of the law to carry o#t its o)-ecti*es appear to #s to
)e plainly e*ident 9 as a "atter of fact it see"s not only appropriate )#t
act#ally necessary 9 and that in any case s#ch "atter falls within the
prerogati*e of the legislat#re, with whose power and discretion the -#dicial
depart"ent of the ,o*ern"ent "ay not interfereG that the pro*isions of the
law are clearly e")raced in the title, and this s#ffers fro" no d#plicity and
has not "isled the legislat#re of the seg"ent of the pop#lation affectedG
and that it cannot )e said to )e *oid for s#pposed conflict with treaty
o)ligations )eca#se no treaty has act#ally )een entered into on the
s#)-ect and the police power "ay not )e c#rtailed or s#rrendered )y any
treaty or any other con*entional agree"ent.
=ALTER LUT$, )0. '. >(. ANTONIO ARANETA,
G.R. N+. L7859, D)/)D8)2 22, 1955, RE-ES, !.& L., !.
F'/0(" 0laintiffs see: to reco*er ta5 fro" the respondent alleging that s#ch
is #nconstit#tional and *oid, )eing le*ied for the aid and s#pport of the
s#gar ind#stry e5cl#si*ely, which in plaintiffIs opinion is not a p#)lic
p#rpose for which a ta5 "ay )e constit#tionally le*ied. $he action ha*ing
)een dis"issed )y the o#rt of (irst Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the
case directly to the !#pre"e o#rt.
I((1)" 8hether or not the i"position of ta5 #nder the A 3o. 7+7 is a
*alid e5ercise of police power.
H).*" Des. $he ta5 is le*ied with a reg#latory p#rpose, to provide means
for the rehabilitation and stabiliation of the threatened sugar
industry. ;n other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the police
power. $he protection of a large ind#stry constit#ting one of the great
so#rces of the stateIs wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting
the welfare of so great a portion of the pop#lation of the !tate is affected
to s#ch an e5tent )y p#)lic interests as to )e within the police power of the
so*ereign.$he decision appealed fro" is affir"ed.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDO=NERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
)0. '.
>(. HONORA&LE SECRETAR- OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. N+. 78742, !1.: 14, 1989, CRU$, !.
F'/0(" In these consolidated cases, petitioners pri"arily assail the
constit#tionality of %.A. 3o. ++77, 0.D. 3o. 27, 0roc. 3o. 141, and ..'.
3os. 228 and 229 arg#ing that no pri*ate property shall )e ta:en for p#)lic
#se witho#t -#st co"pensation. $he respondent in*o:es the police power
of the !tate.
I((1)" 8hether or not the ta:ing of property #nder the said laws is a *alid
e5ercise of police power or of the power of e"inent do"ain.
H).*" It is an e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain. $he cases present
no :notty co"plication insofar as the 6#estion of co"pensa)le ta:ing is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the
police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the ,onstitution. 1ut where, to carry out such regulation, it
becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they
may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
ta<ing under the power of eminent domain for which payment of *ust
compensation is imperative. The ta<ing contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer:
beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but
of the power of eminent domain. 8herefore, the o#rt holds the
constit#tionality of %.A. 3o. ++77, 0.D. 3o. 27, 0roc. 3o. 141, and ..'.
3os. 228 and 229. 1owe*er, the title to all e5propriated properties shall )e
transferred to the !tate only #pon f#ll pay"ent of co"pensation to their
respecti*e owners.
FLORENTINA A. LO$ANO >(. HONORA&LE ANTONIO M. MARTINE$,
)0.'.
G.R. N+. L%3419 D)/)D8)2 18, 198%, -AP, !.
F'/0(" Batas 0a")ansa Bilang 22 @B0 22 for shortA, pop#larly :nown as
the Bo#ncing hec: Law p#nishes a person /who "a:es or draws and
iss#es any chec: on acco#nt or for *al#e, :nowing at the ti"e of iss#e that
he does not ha*e s#fficient f#nds in or credit with the drawee )an: for the
pay"ent of said chec: in f#ll #pon present"ent, which chec: is
s#)se6#ently dishonored )y the drawee )an: for ins#fficiency of f#nds or
credit or wo#ld ha*e )een dishonored for the sa"e reason had not the
drawer, witho#t any *alid reason, ordered the )an: to stop pay"ent./
$hose who 6#estion the constit#tionality of B0 22 insist that it offends the
constit#tional pro*ision for)idding i"prison"ent for de)t and it
contra*enes the e6#al protection cla#se.
I((1)" 8hether or not the enact"ent of B0 22 is a *alid e5ercise of police
power.
H).*" Des. The enactment of 1# && is a valid exercise of the police
power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. ;t may be constitutionally impermissible for
the legislature to penalie a person for non:payment of a debt ex
contractu. 1ut certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawma<ing
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. /cts mala in se are not the only acts which the law
can punish. /n act may not be considered by society as inherently
wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally
punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise
of its police power. $here is no s#)stance in the clai" that the stat#te in
6#estion denies e6#al protection of the laws or is discri"inatory, since it
penali&es the drawer of the chec:, )#t not the payee. 8herefore, the
decision rendered )y the respondent -#dge is here)y set aside.
%ecent statistics of the entral Ban: show that one9third of
the entire "oney s#pply of the co#ntry, ro#ghly totalling 042.4 )illion,
consists of peso de"and depositsG the re"aining two9thirds consists of
c#rrency in circ#lation. $hese de"and deposits in the )an:s constit#te the
f#nds against which, a"ong others, co""ercial papers li:e chec:s, are
drawn. $he "agnit#de of the a"o#nt in*ol*ed a"ply -#stifies the
legiti"ate concern of the state in preser*ing the integrity of the )an:ing
syste". (looding the syste" with worthless chec:s is li:e po#ring gar)age
into the )loodstrea" of the nationIs econo"y.
$he effects of the iss#ance of a worthless chec: transcends
the pri*ate interests of the parties directly in*ol*ed in the transaction and
to#ches the interests of the co""#nity at large. $he "ischief it creates is
not only a wrong to the payee or holder, )#t also an in-#ry to the p#)lic.
The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, in*ure the ban<ing system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
In s#", we find the enact"ent of B0 22 a *alid e5ercise of
the police power and is not rep#gnant to the constit#tional inhi)ition
against i"prison"ent for de)t.
DECS > S', D9)A+
180 SCRA 233, C21F, !.
F'/0(" $he petitioner dis6#alified the pri*ate respondent who had act#ally
ta:en and failed fo#r ti"es the 3ational Medical Ad"ission $est fro"
ta:ing it again #nder its reg#lation. B#t the pri*ate respondent contends
that he is still entitled and hence, applied to ta:e a fifth e5a"ination )ased
on constit#tional gro#nds2 right to acade"ic freedo" and 6#ality
ed#cation, d#e process and e6#al protection. 1e filed a petition for
"anda"#s. $he respondent -#dge declared the said r#le in*alid and
granted the petition.
I((1)" 8hether or not the three fl#n: r#le is a *alid e5ercise of police
power.
H).*" Des. $he police power is *alidly e5ercised if @aA the interests of the
p#)lic generally, as disting#ished fro" those of a partic#lar class, re6#ire
the interference of the !tate, and @)A the "eans e"ployed are reasona)ly
necessary to the attain"ent of the o)-ect so#ght to )e acco"plished and
not #nd#ly oppressi*e #pon indi*id#als. $h#s, the sub*ect of the
challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. ;t is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents
to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. 8hile
e*ery person is entitled to aspire to )e a doctor, he does not ha*e a
constit#tional right to )e a doctor. $he pri*ate respondent has failed the
3MA$ fi*e ti"es and this is s#fficed to say that he "#st yield to the
challenged r#le and gi*e way to those )etter prepared. $he o#rt #pheld
the constit#tionality of the 3MA$ as a "eas#re intended to li"it the
ad"ission to "edical schools only to those who ha*e initially pro*ed their
co"petence and preparation for a "edical ed#cation. $he decision of the
respondent -#dge is re*ersed.
-,+0 > IAC
148 SCRA %59, C21F, !.
F'/0(" 0resident Marcos iss#ed ..'. +2+9A a"ending ..'. +2+, which
prohibits the transport of carabaos or carabeefs fro" one pro*ince to
28
another for the purpose of preventing indiscriminate slaughter of
these animals. $he petitioner had transported si5 cara)aos fro" Mas)ate
to Iloilo where they were confiscated for *iolation of the said order. 1e
s#ed for reco*ery and challenges the constit#tionality of the said order.
$he lower co#rt s#stained the confiscation of the cara)aos. 1e appealed
the decision to the Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt which #pheld the lower
co#rt. 1ence this petition for re*iew on certiorari.
I((1)" 8hether or not the p#rpose of ..'. +2+9A is a *alid e5ercise of
police power.
H).*" 3o. We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be <illed anywhere, with no less difficulty
in one province than in another. Abviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than
moving them to another province will ma<e it easier to <ill them
there. /s for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented
by simply <illing the animal. 0erhaps so. 1owe*er, if the "o*e"ent of
the li*e ani"als for the p#rpose of pre*enting their sla#ghter cannot )e
prohi)ited, it sho#ld follow that there is no reason either to prohi)it their
transfer as, not to )e flippant, dead "eat.
1ven if a reasonable relation between the means and the
end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction
that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalt$ is
outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be
meted out b$ the e%ecutive authorities, usuall$ the police onl$. In the
$ori)io ase, the stat#te was s#stained )eca#se the penalty prescri)ed
was fine and i"prison"ent, to )e i"posed )y the co#rt after trial and
con*iction of the acc#sed. Jnder the challenged "eas#re, significantly, no
s#ch trial is prescri)ed, and the property )eing transported is i""ediately
i"po#nded )y the police and declared, )y the "eas#re itself, as forfeited
to the go*ern"ent.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitraril$ confiscated
b$ the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner onl$ after
he had filed a complaint for recover$ and given a supersedeas bond of
612,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
the carabaos when ordered b$ the trial court. The e%ecutive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediatel$ imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once
and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus den$ing him the centuries7old guarant$ of elementar$ fair pla$.
In the instant case, the challenged "eas#re is an in*alid
e5ercise of the police power )eca#se the "ethod e"ployed to conser*e
the cara)aos is not reasona)ly necessary to the p#rpose of the law and,
worse, is #nd#ly oppressi*e. Moreo*er, there was no s#ch press#re of
ti"e or action calling for the petitionerIs pere"ptory treat"ent. $he
properties in*ol*ed were not e*en ini"ical per se as to re6#ire their instant
destr#ction. $h#s, the o#rt cannot say with e6#al certainty that it
co"plies with the second re6#ire"ent, that there )e a lawf#l "ethod. $he
reasona)le connection )etween the "eans e"ployed and the p#rpose
so#ght to )e achie*ed )y the 6#estioned "eas#re is "issing. .5ec#ti*e
'rder 3o. +2+9A is here)y declared #nconstit#tional.
C90: G+>K0 +< J1)F+, C90: > E29/0'
122 SCRA 759, G109)22)F, !2., !
F'/0(" %espondent 1i"layang 0ilipino filed a petition see:ing to ann#l
!ection 9 of 'rdinance 3o. +118, !9+B, re6#iring pri*ate ce"eteries to
reser*e +M of its total area for the )#rial of pa#pers, on the gro#nd that it
is contrary to the onstit#tion. $he petitioner contends that the said order
was a *alid e5ercise of police power #nder the general welfare cla#se.
$he respondent co#rt declared the said order n#ll and *oid. 1ence, this
instant petition.
I((1)" 8hether or not !ection 9 of the ordinance in 6#estion is a *alid
e5ercise of police power.
H).*" 3o. !ection 9 cannot )e -#stified #nder the power granted to
V#e&on ity to ta5, fi5 the license fee, and reg#late s#ch other )#siness,
trades, and occ#pation as "ay )e esta)lished or practice in the ity.I
@!#)sections II, !ec. 12, %.A. 747). The ordinance in question not
only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial par<
cemetery. /s defined, police power is Fthe power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
propertyF. ;n the instant case, Section ( of Ardinance 2o. B%%!,
Series of %(B" of Eueon ,ity is not a mere police regulation but an
outright confiscation. It depri*es a person of his pri*ate property witho#t
d#e process of law, nay, e*en witho#t co"pensation. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six 'B)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The
ordinance is actually a ta<ing without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of )#ilding or "aintaining a p#)lic
ce"etery for this p#rpose, the city passes the )#rden to pri*ate
ce"eteries. As a "atter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general
welfare cla#se or on i"plied powers of the "#nicipal corporation, not on
any e5press pro*ision of law as stat#tory )asis of their e5ercise of power.
$he petition for re*iew is here)y dis"issed
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
C90: +< M',9.' > C;9,)() C+DD1,90:
40 P;9. 349, !+;,(+,, !.
F'/0(" $he plaintiff prayed that certain lands )e e5propriated for the
p#rpose of constr#cting a p#)lic i"pro*e"ent into an e5tension of %i&al
A*en#e, Manila which is necessary for the plaintiff to e5ercise in fee
si"ple of certain parcels of land. $he defendant on the other hand,
contends that the e5propriation was not necessary as a p#)lic
i"pro*e"ent and that the plaintiff has no right to e5propriate the said
ce"etery or any part or portion thereof for street p#rposes. $he lower
co#rt declared that there was no necessity for the said e5propriation.
1ence, this appeal.
I((1)" 8hether or not the o#rts can in6#ire into the necessity of
e5propriation of delegate, s#ch as the ity of ManilaC
H).*" The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a
municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law
must exist conferring the power upon it.
$he general power to e5ercise the right of e"inent do"ain
"#st not )e conf#sed with the right to e5ercise it in a partic#lar case. The
power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal corporations and
other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right
of eminent domain cannot be questioned by courts, but the general
authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the
right to exercise it in particular instances. $he "o"ent the "#nicipal
corporation or entity atte"pts to e5ercise the a#thority conferred, it "#st
co"ply with the conditions acco"panying the a#thority. $he necessity for
conferring the a#thority #pon a "#nicipal corporation to e5ercise the right
of e"inent do"ain is ad"ittedly within the power of the legislat#re. 1ut
whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the
right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.
8hen the co#rts co"e to deter"ine the 6#estion, they "#st
only find @aA that a law or a#thority e5ists for the e5ercise of the right of
e"inent do"ain, )#t @)A also that the right or a#thority is )eing e5ercised
in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions
i"posed #pon the a#thority conceded to the ity of Manila2 (irst, the land
"#st )e pri*ateG and, second, the p#rpose "#st )e p#)lic. $he a#thority of
the city of Manila to e5propriate pri*ate lands for p#)lic p#rposes, is not
denied as pro*ided in its harter. 1owe*er, if the co#rt, #pon trial, finds
that neither of these conditions e5ists or that either one of the" fails,
certainly it cannot )e contended that the right is )eing e5ercised in
accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does not show
concl#si*ely that the plaintiff has definitely decided that there e5ists a
necessity for e5propriation. $he decision of the lower co#rt is affir"ed.
R)E18.9/ > PLDT
2% SCRA %20, R):)(, !.&.L., !.
F'/0(" $he petitioner, %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, is a political entity
e5ercising go*ern"ental powers thro#gh its )ranches and
instr#"entalities, one of which is the B#rea# of $eleco""#nications.
8hile the respondent, 0hilippine Long Distance $elephone has the power
to install, operate and "aintain a telephone syste" thro#gho#t the
0hilippines and to carry on the )#siness of electrical trans"ission of
"essages within the 0hilippines and )etween the 0hilippines and the
telephone syste"s of other co#ntries. !o"eti"e in 1944, the defendant
and the %A o""#nications, Inc., entered into an agree"ent where)y
telephone "essages, co#ld a#to"atically )e transferred to the lines of
0LD$G and *ice9*ersa. The 1ureau of Telecommunications set up its
own 9overnment Telephone System by utiliing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting trun< lines of the #L7T
to enable government offices to call private parties. $he respondent
said that the )#rea# was *iolating the conditions #nder which their 0ri*ate
Branch .5change @0B;A is inter9connected with the 0LD$Is facilities. $he
petitioner prayed co""anding the 0LD$ to e5ec#te a contract with it,
thro#gh the B#rea#, for the #se of the facilities of defendantIs telephone
syste". $he lower co#rt rendered -#dg"ent that it co#ld not co"pel the
0LD$ to enter into an agree"ent with the B#rea# )eca#se the parties
were not in agree"ent. Both parties appealed.
I((1)" 8hether or not the B#rea# of $eleco""#nications has the right to
de"and interconnection )etween the ,o*ern"ent $elephone !yste" and
the 0LD$.
H).*" Des. It is tr#e that parties cannot )e coerced to enter into a contract
where no agree"ent was "ade )etween the". (reedo" to stip#late s#ch
ter"s and conditions is of the essence of o#r contract#al syste", and )y
e5press pro*ision of the stat#te, a contract "ay )e ann#lled if tainted )y
*iolence, inti"idation or #nd#e infl#ence @Articles 14?+, 144+, 1447, i*il
ode of the 0hilippinesA. B#t the co#rt a 6#o has apparentl$ overlooked
that while the /epublic ma$ not compel the 6(8T to celebrate a contract
with it, the .epublic, in the exercise of the sovereign of eminent
domain, may require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the 9overnment Telephone System and that of
#L7T, as the needs of the government service may require, sub*ect
29
to the payment of *ust compensation. Jlti"ately, the )eneficiary of the
interconnecting ser*ice wo#ld )e the #sers of )oth telephone syste"s, so
that conde"nation wo#ld )e for p#)lic #se.
P)+E.) >. F'B'2*+
GR 12172, A1A. 29 1958
F'/0(" $he "#nicipal co#ncil of Baao, a"arines !#r stating a"ong
others that constr#ction of a )#ilding, which will destroy the *iew of the
pla&a, shall not )e allowed and therefore )e destroyed at the e5pense of
the owner, enacted an ordinance. 1erein appellant filed a written re6#est
with the inc#")ent "#nicipal "ayor for a per"it to constr#ct a )#ilding
ad-acent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in (a-ardoIs
na"e, located along the national highway and separated fro" the p#)lic
pla&a )y a cree:. $he re6#est was denied, for the reason a"ong others
that the proposed )#ilding wo#ld destroy the *iew or )ea#ty of the p#)lic
pla&a. Defendants reiterated their re6#est for a )#ilding per"it, )#t again
the "ayor t#rned down the re6#est. 8here#pon, appellants proceeded
with the constr#ction of the )#ilding witho#t a per"it, )eca#se they
needed a place of residence *ery )adly, their for"er ho#se ha*ing )een
destroyed )y a typhoon and hitherto they had )een li*ing on leased
property. $hereafter, defendants were charged in *iolation of the
ordinance and s#)se6#ently con*icted. 1ence this appeal.
I((1)" 8hether or not the ordinance is a *alid e5ercise of police power.
H).*" 3o. It is not a *alid e5ercise of police power. The ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanentl$ deprive
appellants of the right to use their own propert$) hence, it oversteps the
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellantBs propert$
without #ust compensation. 8e do not o*erloo: that the "odern tendency
is to regard the )ea#tification of neigh)orhoods as cond#ci*e to the
co"fort and happiness of residents.
As the case now stands, e*ery str#ct#re that "ay )e erected
on appellantsI land, regardless of its own )ea#ty, stands conde"ned
#nder the ordinance in 6#estion, )eca#se it wo#ld interfere with the *iew
of the p#)lic pla&a fro" the highway. $he appellants wo#ld, in effect, )e
constrained to let their land re"ain idle and #n#sed for the o)*io#s
p#rpose for which it is )est s#ited, )eing #r)an in character. To legall$
achieve that result, the municipalit$ must give appellants *ust
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
R)E18.9/ >. V*'. D) C'(0)..>9
GR N+. 20%20, A1A.15, 1974
F'/0(" $he %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines occupied the land of ,armen D.
vda. de ,astellvi from % 8uly %("4, by virtue of a contract of lease, on
a year to year )asis @fro" H#ly 1 of each year to H#ne 4? of the
s#cceeding yearA. $he %ep#)lic so#ght to renew the sa"e )#t astell*i
ref#sed. $he A(0 ref#sed to *acate the leased pre"ises after the
ter"ination of the contract )eca#se it wo#ld diffic#lt for the ar"y to *acate
the pre"ises in *iew of the per"anent installations and other facilities
worth al"ost 07??,???.?? that were erected and already esta)lished on
the property. ,astellvi then brought suit to e*ect the #hilippine /ir
>orce from the land. While this e*ectment case was pending, the
.epublic filed on &B 8une %(5( complaints for eminent domain
against the respondents over the $ parcels of land. In its co"plaint,
the %ep#)lic alleged, a"ong other things, that the fair "ar:et *al#e of the
a)o*e9"entioned lands, according to the o""ittee on Appraisal for the
0ro*ince of 0a"panga, was not "ore than 02,??? per hectare.$he co#rt
a#thori&es the %ep#)lic to ta:e i""ediate possession of the lands #pon
deposit of that a"o#nt with the 0ro*incial $reas#rer of 0a"panga.In 19+1,
the trial co#rt, rendered its decision in the e-ect"ent case, finding that the
#nani"o#s reco""endation of the co""issioners of 01?.?? per s6#are
"eter for the 4 lots s#)-ect of the action is fair and -#stG and re6#ired the
%ep#)lic to pay interests.
I((1)" 8hether the ta:ing of astell*iKs property occ#rred in 19B7 or in
1979.
H).*" $he %ep#)lic #rges that the /ta:ing / of astell*iIs property sho#ld
)e dee"ed as of the year 19B7 )y *irt#e of afore96#oted lease agree"ent.
In A"erican H#rispr#dence, <ol. 2+, 2nd edition, !ection 177, on the
s#)-ect of /."inent Do"ain, we read the definition of /ta:ing/ @in e"inent
do"ainA as follows2
-Ta<ing0#nder the power of e"inent do"ain "ay )e defined generally as
entering #pon pri*ate property for "ore than a "o"entary period, and,
#nder the warrant or color of legal a#thority, de*oting it to a p#)lic #se, or
otherwise infor"ally appropriating or in-#rio#sly affecting it in s#ch a way
as s#)stantially to o#st the owner and depri*e hi" of all )eneficial
en-oy"ent thereof./
0#rs#ant to the aforecited a#thority, a n#")er of circ#"stances "#st )e
present in the /ta:ing/ of property for p#rposes of e"inent do"ain.
F92(0, the e5propriator "#st enter a pri*ate property. $his circ#"stance is
present in the instant case, when )y *irt#e of the lease agree"ent the
%ep#)lic, thro#gh the A(0, too: possession of the property of astell*i.
S)/+,*, the entrance into pri*ate property "#st )e for "ore than a
"o"entary period. /Mo"entary/ "eans, /lasting )#t a "o"entG of )#t a
"o"entIs d#ration/ @$he '5ford .nglish Dictionary, <ol#"e <I, page 79+AG
/lasting a *ery short ti"eG transitoryG ha*ing a *ery )rief lifeG operati*e or
rec#rring at e*ery "o"ent/ @8e)sterIs $hird International Dictionary, 19+4
edition.A $he word /"o"entary/ when applied to possession or occ#pancy
of @realA property sho#ld )e constr#ed to "ean /a li"ited period/ not
indefinite or per"anent. $he aforecited lease contract was for a period of
one year, renewa)le fro" year to year. T;) ),02: +, 0;) E2+E)20:, 1,*)2
0;) .)'(), 9( 0)DE+2'2:, ',* /+,(9*)2)* 02',(90+2:. T;) <'/0 0;'0 0;)
R)E18.9/, 0;2+1A; 0;) AFP, /+,(021/0)* (+D) 9,(0'..'09+,( +< '
E)2D',),0 ,'012) *+)( ,+0 '.0)2 0;) <'/0 0;'0 0;) ),02: 9,0+ 0;) .',*
@'( 02',(90+2:, +2 9,0),*)* 0+ .'(0 ' :)'2, '.0;+1A; 2),)@'8.) <2+D
:)'2 0+ :)'2 8: /+,(),0 +< 0;) +@,)2 +< 0;) .',*. 1y express
provision of the lease agreement the .epublic, as lessee, undertoo<
to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the
time the property was first occupied by the /># . ;t is claimed that the
=;2T62T;A20 of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as
may be inferred from the construction of permanent improvements.
1ut this -;2T62T;A2- cannot prevail over the clear and express
terms of the lease contract. ;ntent is to be deduced from the
language employed by the parties, and the terms of the contract,
when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the
absence of averment and proof of mista<e or fraud the question
being not what the intention wag, but what is expressed in the
language used. Moreo*er, in order to -#dge the intention of the
contracting parties, their conte"poraneo#s and s#)se6#ent acts shall )e
principally considered @Art. 1471, i*il odeA. 'f the intention of the lessee
+/epublic, in 14C5 was reall$ to occup$ permanentl$ Castellvi@s propert$,
wh$ was the contract of lease entered into on $ear to $ear basisD -h$
was the lease agreement renewed from $ear to $earD -h$ did not the
/epublic e%propriate this land of Castellvi in 14C4 when, according to the
/epublic itself, it e%propriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at
the same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them
into a #et air baseD It "ight really ha*e )een the intention of the %ep#)lic
to e5propriate the lands in 6#estion at so"e f#t#re ti"e, )#t certainly "ere
notice "#ch less an i"plied notice of s#ch intention on the part of the
%ep#)lic to e5propriate the lands in the f#t#re did not, and co#ld not, )ind
the landowner, nor )ind the land itself. $he e5propriation "#st )e act#ally
co""enced in co#rt.
T;92*, the entry into the property sho#ld )e #nder warrant or color of legal
a#thority. $his circ#"stance in the /ta:ing/ "ay )e considered as present
in the instant case, )eca#se the %ep#)lic entered the astell*i property as
lessee.
F+120;, the property "#st )e de*oted to a p#)lic #se or otherwise
infor"ally appropriated or in-#rio#sly affected. It "ay )e conceded that the
circ#"stance of the property )eing de*oted to p#)lic #se is present
)eca#se the property was #sed )y the air force of the A(0.
F9<0;, the #tili&ation of the property for p#)lic #se "#st )e in s#ch a way as
to o#st the owner and depri*e hi" of all )eneficial en-oy"ent of the
property. In the instant case, the entry of the %ep#)lic into the property
and its #tili&ation of the sa"e for p#)lic #se did not o#st astell*i and
depri*e her of all )eneficial en-oy"ent of the property. astell*i re"ained
as owner, and was contin#o#sly recogni&ed as owner )y the %ep#)lic, as
shown )y the renewal of the lease contract fro" year to year, and )y the
pro*ision in the lease contract where)y the %ep#)lic #ndertoo: to ret#rn
the property to astell*i when the lease was ter"inated. 3either was
astell*i depri*ed of all the )eneficial en-oy"ent of the property, )eca#se
the %ep#)lic was )o#nd to pay, and had )een paying, astell*i the agreed
"onthly rentals #ntil the ti"e when it filed the co"plaint for e"inent
do"ain on H#ne 2+, 1979.
It is clear, therefore, that the /ta:ing/ of astell*iIs property for p#rposes of
e"inent do"ain cannot )e considered to ha*e ta:en place in 19B7 when
the %ep#)lic co""enced to occ#py the property as lessee thereof. 8e
find "erit in the contention of astell*i that two essential ele"ents in the
/ta:ing/ of property #nder the power of e"inent do"ain, na"ely2 @1A that
the entrance and occ#pation )y the conde"nor "#st )e for a per"anent,
or indefinite period, and @2A that in de*oting the property to p#)lic #se the
owner was o#sted fro" the property and depri*ed of its )eneficial #se,
were not present when the %ep#)lic entered and occ#pied the astell*i
property in 19B7.
Jntena)le also is the %ep#)licIs contention that altho#gh the contract
)etween the parties was one of lease on a year to year )asis, it was /in
reality a "ore or less per"anent right to occ#py the pre"ises #nder the
g#ise of lease with the Iright and pri*ilegeI to )#y the property sho#ld the
lessor wish to ter"inate the lease,/ and /the right to )#y the property is
"erged as an integral part of the lease relationship . . . so "#ch so that
the fair "ar:et *al#e has )een agreed #pon, not as of the ti"e of
p#rchase, )#t as of the ti"e of occ#pancy/. 17 8e cannot accept the
%ep#)licIs contention that a lease on a year to year )asis can gi*e rise to
a per"anent right to occ#py, since )y e5press legal pro*ision a lease
"ade for a deter"inate ti"e, as was the lease of astell*iIs land in the
instant case, ceases #pon the day fi5ed, witho#t need of a de"and @Article
1++9, i*il odeA. 3either can it )e said that the right of e"inent do"ain
"ay )e e5ercised )y si"ply leasing the pre"ises to )e e5propriated @%#le
+7, !ection 1, %#les of o#rtA. 3or can it )e accepted that the %ep#)lic
wo#ld enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to )#y, or
why the %ep#)lic sho#ld enter into a si"#lated contract of lease @/#nder
30
the g#ise of lease/, as e5pressed )y co#nsel for the %ep#)licA when all the
ti"e the %ep#)lic had the right of e"inent do"ain, and co#ld e5propriate
astell*iIs land if it wanted to witho#t resorting to any g#ise whatsoe*er.
3either can we see how a right to )#y co#ld )e "erged in a contract of
lease in the a)sence of any agree"ent )etween the parties to that effect.
$o s#stain the contention of the %ep#)lic is to sanction a practice where)y
in order to sec#re a low price for a land which the go*ern"ent intends to
e5propriate @or wo#ld e*ent#ally e5propriateA it wo#ld first negotiate with
the owner of the land to lease the land @for say ten or twenty yearsA then
e5propriate the sa"e when the lease is a)o#t to ter"inate, then clai" that
the /ta:ing/ of the property for the p#rposes of the e5propriation )e
rec:oned as of the date when the ,o*ern"ent started to occ#py the
property #nder the lease, and then assert that the *al#e of the property
)eing e5propriated )e rec:oned as of the start of the lease, in spite of the
fact that the *al#e of the property, for "any good reasons, had in the
"eanti"e increased d#ring the period of the lease. $his wo#ld )e
sanctioning what o)*io#sly is a decepti*e sche"e, which wo#ld ha*e the
effect of depri*ing the owner of the property of its tr#e and fair "ar:et
*al#e at the ti"e when the e5propriation proceedings were act#ally
instit#ted in co#rt. $he %ep#)licIs clai" that it had the /right and pri*ilege/
to )#y the property at the *al#e that it had at the ti"e when it first
occ#pied the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract.
8hat was agreed e5pressly in paragraph 3o. 7 of the lease agree"ent
was that, sho#ld the lessor re6#ire the lessee to ret#rn the pre"ises in the
sa"e condition as at the ti"e the sa"e was first occ#pied )y the A(0, the
lessee wo#ld ha*e the /right and pri*ilege/ @or optionA of paying the lessor
what it wo#ld fairly cost to p#t the pre"ises in the sa"e condition as it was
at the co""ence"ent of the lease, in lie# of the lesseeIs perfor"ance of
the #nderta:ing to p#t the land in said condition. $he /fair *al#e/ at the
ti"e of occ#pancy, "entioned in the lease agree"ent, does not refer to
the *al#e of the property if )o#ght )y the lessee, )#t refers to the cost of
restoring the property in the sa"e condition as of the ti"e when the
lessee too: possession of the property. !#ch fair *al#e cannot refer to the
p#rchase price, for p#rchase was ne*er intended )y the parties to the
lease contract. It is a r#le in the interpretation of contracts that /1owe*er
general the ter"s of a contract "ay )e, they shall not )e #nderstood to
co"prehend things that are distinct and cases that are different fro" those
#pon which the parties intended to agree/ @Art. 1472, i*il odeA.
@A n#")er of circ#"stances "#st )e present in the =ta:ing>
of property for p#rposes of e"inent do"ain. F92(0, the e%propriator must
enter a private propert$. S)/+,*, the entrance into private propert$ must
be for more than a momentar$ period. T;92*, the entr$ into the propert$
should be under warrant or color of legal authorit$. F+120; , the propert$
must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informall$ appropriated or
in#uriousl$ affected. F9<0; , the utiliEation of the propert$ for public use must
be in such a wa$ as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
en#o$ment of the propert$ .
;t is clear, therefore, that the -ta<ing- of ,astellviFs
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to
have ta<en place in %("4 when the .epublic commenced to occupy
the property as lessee thereof. 8e find "erit in the contention of
astell*i that two essential elements in the taking of propert$ under the
power of eminent domain, namel$? +1, that the entrance and occupation
b$ the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and +2,
that in devoting the propert$ to public use the owner was ousted from the
propert$ and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the
/epublic entered and occupied the Castellvi propert$ in 14C5.
Jnder !ection B of %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt, the =-#st
co"pensation> is to )e deter"ined as of the date of the filing of the
co"plaint. This Court has ruled that when the ta<ing of the property
sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or ta<es place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the #ust compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is
undisputed that the .epublic was placed in possession of the
,astellvi property, by authority of the court, on %3 /ugust %(5(. The
=ta<ing0 of the ,astellvi property for the purposes of determining the
*ust compensation to be paid must, therefore, be rec<oned as of &B
8une %(5( when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.)
AD9A'8.) >. C1),/'
GR N+. 2%400, A1A1(0 15, 1974
F'/0(" <ictoria A"iga)le, is the registered owner of a lot in e)# ity.
8itho#t prior e5propriation or negotiated sale, the go*ern"ent #sed a
portion of said lot for the constr#ction of the Mango and ,orordo A*en#es.
A"iga)leIs co#nsel wrote to the 0resident of the 0hilippines, re6#esting
pay"ent of theportion of her lot which had )een appropriated )y the
go*ern"ent. $he clai" was indorsed tothe A#ditor ,eneral, who
disallowed it in his 9th .ndorse"ent. $h#s, A"iga)le filed in theco#rt a
6#o a co"plaint, against the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and 3icolas
#enca@o""issioner of 0#)lic 1ighwaysA for the reco*ery of ownership
and possession of her lot.
'n H#ly 29, 1979, the co#rt rendered its decision holding
that it had no -#risdiction o*er the plaintiffIs ca#se of action for the
reco*ery of possession and ownership of the lot on the gro#nd that the
go*ern"ent cannot )e s#ed witho#t its consent, that it had neither original
nor appellate -#risdiction to hear and decide plaintiffIs clai" for
co"pensatory da"ages, )eing a "oney clai" against the go*ern"entG
and that it had long prescri)ed, nor did it ha*e -#risdiction o*er said clai"
)eca#se the go*ern"ent had not gi*en its consent to )e s#ed.
Accordingly, the co"plaint was dis"issed.
I((1)" an the appellant s#e the go*ern"entC
R1.9,A" Des. onsidering that no annotation in fa*or of the go*ern"ent
appears at the )ac: of her certificate of title and that she has not e5ec#ted
any deed of con*eyance of any portion of her lot to the go*ern"ent, the
appellant re"ains the owner of the whole lot. /s registered owner, she
could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of land in
question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes of
ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion
by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time
because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only
relief available isfor the government to ma<e due compensation
which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the
due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or
value thereof at the time of the ta<ing.
As regards the clai" for da"ages, the plaintiff is entitled
thereto in the for" of legal interest on the price of the land fro" the ti"e it
was ta:en #p to the ti"e that pay"ent is "ade )y the go*ern"ent. In
addition, the go*ern"ent sho#ld pay for attorneyIs fees, the a"o#nt of
which sho#ld )e fi5ed )y the trial co#rt after hearing.
@3'$.2 $he owner does not need to file the #s#al clai" for
reco*ery of -#st co"pensation with the o""ission on A#dit if the
go*ern"ent ta:es o*er his property and de*otes it to p#)lic #se witho#t
the )enefit of e5propriation. 1e "ay i""ediatetly file a co"plaint with the
proper co#rt for pay"ent of his property as the ar)itrary action of the
go*ern"ent shall )e dee"ed a waiver of its i""#nity fro" s#it.A r#&, pg.
7BA
P;9.9EE9,) P2)(( I,(09010) >(. COMELEC
GR N+. 119%94, M': 22, 1995
F'/0("
$he 0hilippine 0ress Instit#te, Inc. @/00I/A is )efore this o#rt assailing the
constit#tional *alidity of resol#tion 3o. 2772 iss#ed )y respondent
o""ission on .lections @/o"elec/A and its corresponding o"elec
directi*e dated 22 March 1997, thro#gh a 0etition for ertiorari and
0rohi)ition. 0etitioner 00I is a non9stoc:, non9profit organi&ation of news
paper and "aga&ine p#)lishers.
'n 2 March 1997, o"elec pro"#lgated %esol#tion 3o.
2772, pro*iding for a o"elec !pace, which is a free print space of not
less than one half @1R2A page in at least one newspaper of general
circ#lation in e*ery pro*ince or city.
In this 0etition for ertiorari and 0rohi)ition with prayer for
the iss#ance of a $e"porary restraining order, 00I as:s #s to declare
o"elec resol#tion 3o. 2772 #nconstit#tional and *oid on the gro#nd that
it *iolates the prohi)ition i"posed )y the onstit#tion #pon the
go*ern"ent, and any of its agencies, against the ta:ing of pri*ate property
for p#)lic #se witho#t -#st co"pensation.
I((1)" May 'M.L. co"pel the "e")ers of print "edia to donate
=o"elec !pace>C
H).*" 3'. $o co"pel print "edia co"panies to donate /o"elec space/
a"o#nts to /ta:ing/ of pri*ate personal property for p#)lic #se or
p#rposes. $he ta:ing of print space here so#ght to )e effected "ay first )e
appraised #nder the p#)lic of e5propriation of pri*ate personal property for
p#)lic #se. The threshold requisites for a lawful ta<ing of private
property for public use need to be examined here+ one is the
necessity for the ta<ingJ another is the legal authority to effect the
ta<ing. The element of necessity for the ta<ing has not been shown
by respondent ,omelec. It has not )een s#ggested that the "e")ers of
00I are #nwilling to sell print space at their nor"al rates to o"elec for
election p#rposes. Indeed, the #nwillingness or rel#ctance of o"elec to
)#y print space lies at the heart of the pro)le". !i"ilarly, it has not )een
s#ggested, let alone de"onstrated, that o"elec has )een granted the
power of i""inent do"ain either )y the onstit#tion or )y the legislati*e
a#thority. A reasona)le relationship )etween that power and the
enforce"ent and ad"inistration of election laws )y o"elec "#st )e
shownG it is not cas#ally to )e ass#"ed.
$he ta:ing of pri*ate property for p#)lic #se it, of co#rse,
a#thori&ed )y the onstit#tion, )#t not witho#t pay"ent of /-#st
co"pensation/ @Article III, !ection 9A. And apparently the necessity of
paying co"pensation for /o"elec space/ is precisely what is so#ght to
)e a*oided )y respondent o""ission. $here is nothing at all to pre*ent
newspaper and "aga&ine p#)lishers fro" *ol#ntarily gi*ing free print
space to o"elec for the p#rposes conte"plated in %esol#tion 3o. 2772.
!ection 2 of resol#tion 3o. 2772 does not, howe*er, pro*ide a
constit#tional )asis for co"pelling p#)lishers, against their will, in the :ind
of fact#al conte5t here present, to pro*ide free print space for o"elec
p#rposes. !ection 2 does not constit#te a *alid e5ercise of the power of
e"inent do"ain.
As earlier noted, the "olicitor Aeneral also contended that
"ection 2 of /esolution Fo. 2552, even if read as compelling publishers to
donate Comelec space, ma$ be sustained as a valid e%ercise of the
police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casuall$
to re.uire prolonged consideration on their part. >irstly, there was no
effort 'and apparently no inclination on the part of ,omelec) to show
that the police power : essentially a power of legislation : has been
constitutionally delegated to respondent ,ommission. Secondly,
while private property may indeed be validly ta<en in the legitimate
31
exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to
show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful
ta<ing under the police power.
"ection 2 of /esolution Fo. 2552 is a blunt and heav$
instrument that purports, without a showing of e%istence of a national
emergenc$ or other imperious public necessit$, indiscriminatel$ and
without regard the the individual business condition of particular
newspapers or magaEines located in different parts of the countr$, to take
private propert$ of newspaper or magaEine publishers. 2o attempt was
made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for
the ta<ing of print space confronted the ,omelec and that Section &
of .esolution 2o. &44& was itself the only reasonable and calibrated
response to such necessity available to ,omelec. Section & does not
constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
S1D1.+,A >. G1)22)2+
GR 48%85, S)E0 30,1987
F'/0(" 'n Dece")er 7,1977, the 3ational 1o#sing A#thority @31AA filed a
co"plaint for e5propriation of parcels of land co*ering appro5i"ately 27
hectares, @in Antipolo %i&alA incl#ding the lots of Loren&o !#"#long and
."ilia <idanes9Balaoing with an area of +,++7 s6#are "eters and 4,444
s6#are "eters respecti*ely. $he land so#ght to )e e5propriated were
*al#ed )y the 31A at 01.?? per s6#are "eter adopting the "ar:et *al#e
fi5ed )y the pro*incial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescri)ing the *al#ation of property in e5propriation proceedings.
$ogether with the co"plaint was a "otion for i""ediate possession of the
properties. $he 31A deposited the a"o#nt of 0178,98?.?? with the
0hilippine 3ational Ban:, representing the =total "ar:et *al#e> of the
s#)-ect 27 hectares of land, p#rs#ant to 0residential Decree 122B which
defines =the policy on the e5propriation of pri*ate property for sociali&ed
ho#sing #pon pay"ent of -#st co"pensation.> 'n 17 Han#ary 1978, H#dge
B#ena*ent#ra ,#errero iss#ed the order iss#ing a writ of possession in
fa*or of 31A. !#"#long and <idanes9Balaoing filed a "otion for
reconsideration on the gro#nd that they had )een depri*ed of the
possession of their property witho#t d#e process of law. $his was,
howe*er, denied. $hey filed a petition for certiorari with the !#pre"e
o#rt.
I((1)" 8hether the ta:ing of pri*ate property for =sociali&ed ho#sing,>
which wo#ld )enefit a few and not all citi&ens, constit#tes ta:ing for =p#)lic
#se.>
H).*" Des. $he e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain is s#)-ect to
certain li"itations i"posed )y the constit#tion @1974A, i.e. that pri*ate
property shall not )e ta:en for p#)lic #se witho#t -#st co"pensation> @Art.
I<, sec. 9AG and that no person shall )e depri*ed of life, li)erty, or property
witho#t d#e process of law, nor shall any person )e denied the e6#al
protection of the laws> @Art. I<, sec. 1A.
The term =public use0 has ac.uired a more comprehensive
coverage. To the literal import of the term signif$ing strict use or
emplo$ment b$ the public has been added the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage. "pecificall$, urban renewal or
redevelopment and the construction of low7cost housing is recogniEed as
a public purpose, not onl$ because of the e%panded concept of public use
but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. The 145;
Constitution made it incumbent upon the "tate to establish, maintain and
ensure ade.uate social services including housing OArt. II, sec. 7P.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in
sum, the general welfare. $he p#)lic character of ho#sing "eas#res
does not change )eca#se #nits in ho#sing pro-ects cannot )e occ#pied )y
all )#t only )y those who satisfy prescri)ed 6#alifications. A )eginning has
to )e "ade, for it is not possi)le to pro*ide ho#sing for all who need it, all
at once. =!ociali&ed ho#sing> falls within the confines of =p#)lic #se>.
<ario#s factors can co"e into play in the *al#ation of
specific properties singled o#t for e5propriation. The values given by
provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas
covering several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of
the poblacion. ;ndividual differences are never ta<en into account.
$he *al#e of land is )ased on s#ch generalities as its possi)le c#lti*ation
for rice, corn, cocon#ts, or other crops. <ery often land descri)ed as
/cogonal/ has )een c#lti*ated for generations. B#ildings are descri)ed in
ter"s of only two or three classes of )#ilding "aterials and esti"ates of
areas are "ore often inacc#rate than correct. Tax values can serve as
guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for *ust compensation.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the
valuations made by assessors since they had the opportunity to
protest is illusory. $he o*erwhel"ing "ass of landowners accept
#n6#estioningly what is fo#nd in the ta5 declarations prepared )y local
assessors or "#nicipal cler:s for the". $hey do not e*en loo: at, "#ch
less analy&e, the state"ents. $he idea of e5propriation si"ply ne*er
occ#rs #ntil a de"and is "ade or a case filed )y an agency a#thori&ed to
do so.
M',+(/' >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.(
G.R. N+. 10%440 , 29 !',1'2: 199%
F'/0(" 0etitioners inherited a piece of land which was later declared as
national land"ar: d#e to )eing ascertained )y 3ational 1istoric Instit#te
@31IA as the )irthplace of (eli5 D. Manalo, the fo#nder of Iglesia ni risto.
'n the opinion of !ecretary of H#stice, he said that the place "#st )e
s#)-ected to the power of e"inent do"ain since places in*ested with
#n#s#al historical interest is a p#)lic #se which s#ch power "ay )e
a#thori&ed. $h#s, %ep#)lic, thro#gh the office of !olicitor ,eneral
instit#ted a co"plaint for e5propriation and filed an #rgent "otion for the
iss#ance for an order to per"it it to ta:e i""ediate possession of the
property. $he trial co#rt iss#ed an order a#thori&ing %ep#)lic to ta:e o*er
the property once the re6#ired s#" wo#ld ha*e )een deposited with the
M#nicipal $reas#rer of $ag#ig, Metro Manila. The petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint since such e%propriation would constituted an
application of funds directl$ or indirectl$ for the use, benefit, or support of
'glesia ni Cristo, which is contrar$ to the provision of "ection 24 +2, Article
G' of the 1485 Constitution.
I((1)" 8hether or not the =p#)lic #se> re6#ire"ent of ."inent Do"ain is
e5tant in the atte"pted e5propriation )y the %ep#)lic of a B929s6#are9
"eter parcel of land as declared )y the 31I as a national land"ar:C
H).*" Des.According to H#stice Blac:, ter" =public use0 "eans one
which confers benefit or advantage to the public and it is not
confined to actual use by public. ;t may also be said to mean public
usefulness, utility or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit.
$he ter" /p#)lic #se,/ not ha*ing )een otherwise defined )y
the constit#tion, "#st )e considered in its general concept of "eeting a
p#)lic need or a p#)lic e5igency. 1+ Blac: s#""ari&es the
characteri&ation gi*en )y *ario#s co#rts to the ter"G th#s2
0#)lic Jse. ."inent do"ain. $he constit#tional
and stat#tory )asis for ta:ing property )y e"inent
do"ain. (or conde"nation p#rposes, /p#)lic
#se/ is one which confers sa"e )enefit or
ad*antage to the p#)licG it is not confined to
act#al #se )y p#)lic. It is "eas#red in ter"s of
right of p#)lic to #se proposed facilities for which
conde"nation is so#ght and, as long as p#)lic
has right of #se, whether e5ercised )y one or
"any "e")ers of p#)lic, a /p#)lic ad*antage/ or
/p#)lic )enefit/ accr#es s#fficient to constit#te a
p#)lic #se. Montana 0ower o. *s. Bo:"a, Mont.
B77 0. 2d 7+9, 772, 774.
0#)lic #se, in constit#tional pro*isions restricting the
e5ercise of the right to ta:e pri*ate property in *irt#e of e"inent do"ain,
"eans a #se concerning the whole co""#nity as disting#ished fro"
partic#lar indi*id#als. B#t each and e*ery "e")er of society need not )e
e6#ally interested in s#ch #se, or )e personally and directly affected )y itG
if the o)-ect is to satisfy a great p#)lic want or e5igency, that is s#fficient.
%indge o. *s. Los Angeles o#nty, 2+2 J.!. 7??, B4 !.t. +89, +92, +7
L..d. 118+. $he ter" "ay )e said to "ean p#)lic #sef#lness, #tility, or
ad*antage, or what is prod#cti*e of general )enefit. It "ay )e li"ited to
the inha)itants of a s"all or restricted locality, )#t "#st )e in co""on,
and not for a partic#lar indi*id#al. $he #se "#st )e a needf#l one for the
p#)lic, which cannot )e s#rrendered witho#t o)*io#s general loss and
incon*enience. A /p#)lic #se/ for which land "ay )e ta:en defies a)sol#te
definition for it changes with *arying conditions of society, new appliances
in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and f#nctions of
go*ern"ent, and other differing circ#"stances )ro#ght a)o#t )y an
increase in pop#lation and new "odes of co""#nication and
transportation. Lat& *. Brandon, 17+ onn., 721, 2B7 A.2d 779,78+. 17
$he *alidity of the e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain
for traditional p#rposes is )eyond 6#estionG it is not at all to )e said,
howe*er, that p#)lic #se sho#ld there)y )e restricted to s#ch traditional
#ses. $he idea that /p#)lic #se/ is strictly li"ited to clear cases of /#se )y
the p#)lic/ has long )een discarded.
$he ta:ing to )e *alid "#st )e for p#)lic #se. $here was a
ti"e when it was felt that a literal "eaning sho#ld )e attached to s#ch a
re6#ire"ent. 8hate*er pro-ect is #nderta:en "#st )e for the p#)lic to
en-oy, as in the case of streets or par:s. 'therwise, e5propriation is not
allowa)le. It is not so any "ore. As long as the p#rpose of the ta:ing is
p#)lic, then the power of e"inent do"ain co"es into play. As -#st noted,
the constit#tion in at least two cases, to re"o*e any do#)t, deter"ines
what is p#)lic #se. 'ne is the e5propriation of lands to )e s#)di*ided into
s"all lots for resale at cost to indi*id#als. $he other is the transfer,
thro#gh the e5ercise of this power, of #tilities and other pri*ate enterprise
to the go*ern"ent. It is acc#rate to state then that at present whate*er
"ay )e )eneficially e"ployed for the general welfare satisfies the
re6#ire"ent of p#)lic #se.
hief H#stice (ernando, writing the ponencia in H.M. $#ason
Y o. *s. Land $en#re Ad"inistration, has *iewed the onstit#tion a
dyna"ic instr#"ent and one that /is not to )e constr#ed narrowly or
pedantically/ so as to ena)le it /to "eet ade6#ately whate*er pro)le"s the
f#t#re has in store./ (r. Hoa6#in Bernas, a noted constit#tionalist hi"self,
has aptly o)ser*ed that what, in fact, has #lti"ately e"erged is a concept
of p#)lic #se which is -#st as )road as /p#)lic welfare./
0etitioners as:2 B#t /@wAhat is the so9called #n#s#al interest
that the e5propriation of @(eli5 ManaloIsA )irthplace )eco"e so *ital as to
)e a p#)lic #se appropriate for the e5ercise of the power of e"inent
do"ain/ when only "e")ers of the Iglesia ni risto wo#ld )enefitC $his
atte"pt to gi*e so"e religio#s perspecti*e to the case deser*es little
consideration, for what sho#ld )e significant is the principal o)-ecti*e of,
not the cas#al conse6#ences that "ight follow fro", the e5ercise of the
power. The purpose in setting up the mar<er is essentially to
32
recognie the distinctive contribution of the late >elix Danalo to the
culture of the #hilippines, rather than to commemorate his founding
and leadership of the ;glesia ni ,risto.
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived
by members of the ;glesia ni ,risto than by most others could well
be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
incidental and secondary in nature. ;ndeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
EP$A >(. D1.':
G.R. N+. L59%09, 29 AE29. 1987
F'/0(" A certain parcel of land was reser*ed )y the 0resident of the
0hilippines for petitioner .5port 0rocessing Xone A#thority @.0XAA for the
esta)lish"ent of an e5port processing &one. 1owe*er, not all of the
reser*ed area was p#)lic land. $he petitioner "ade an offer to p#rchase
the lands registered in the na"e of the pri*ate respondent, )#t, the parties
failed to ha*e an agree"ent on the sale of the property. $h#s, the
petitioner filed a co"plaint for e5propriation with a prayer for the iss#ance
of a writ of possession against pri*ate respondent on the o#rt of (irst
Instance of e)#. $he respondent -#dge fa*ored the petition and iss#ed a
writ of possession a#thori&ing the petitioner to ta:e into possession the
said property. 1a*ing deter"ined the -#st co"pensation as only the iss#e
to )e resol*ed, the respondent -#dge iss#ed an order regarding the
appoint"ent of certain persons as co""issioners who are tas:ed to
report to the co#rt the -#st co"pensation for the properties so#ght to )e
e5propriated. onse6#ently, co""issioners were appointed and,
afterwards, reco""ended in their report that the a"o#nt of 017.?? per
s6#are "eter as the fair and reasona)le *al#e of -#st co"pensation for the
properties. !#)se6#ently, petitioners o)-ected to the said order on the
gro#nds that 0.D. 3o. 1744 has s#perseded !ection 7 to 8 of %#le +7 of
the %#les of co#rt on the ascertain"ent of -#st co"pensation thro#gh
co""issioners.
I((1)" 8hether or not !ections 7 to 8, %#le +7 of the %e*ised
%#les of o#rt had )een repealed or dee"ed a"ended )y 0.D. 3o. 1744
insofar as the appoint"ent of co""issioners to deter"ine the -#st
co"pensation is concerned.
H).*" $he !#pre"e o#rt r#led that the 0.D. 3o. 1744, which
eli"inates the co#rtKs discretion to appoint co""issioners p#rs#ant to
%#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt, is #nconstit#tional and *oid, since
constit#tes an i"per"issi)le encroach"ent on -#dicial prerogati*es. $he
deter"ination of /-#st co"pensation/ in e"inent do"ain cases is a -#dicial
f#nction. $he e5ec#ti*e depart"ent or the legislat#re "ay "a:e the initial
deter"inations )#t when a party clai"s a *iolation of the g#arantee in the
Bill of %ights that pri*ate property "ay not )e ta:en for p#)lic #se witho#t
-#st co"pensation, no stat#te, decree, or e5ec#ti*e order can "andate
that its own deter"ination shag pre*ail o*er the co#rtIs findings. M#ch less
can the co#rts )e
M1,9/9E'.90: +< P'2'L'M1) >(. V.M. R)'.0: C+2E+2'09+,
G.R. N+. 127820, 20 !1.: 1998
F'/0(" A co"plaint for e5propriation was filed )y the M#nicipality of
0araNa6#e against <.M. %ealty orporation in*ol*ing two parcels of land
located at 0araNa6#e, Metro Manila. $he co"plaint was in p#rs#ant to
!angg#niang Bayan %esol#tion 3o. 94997, !eries of 1994. $he co"plaint
was for the p#rpose of alle*iateing the li*ing conditions of the
#nderpri*ileged )y pro*iding ho"es for the ho"eless thro#gh a sociali&ed
ho#sing pro-ect. 0re*io#sly, an offer for the sale of the property was "ade
)y the petitioner, howe*er, the latter did not accept. $he %egional $rial
o#rt of Ma:ati iss#ed order a#thori&ing the petitioner to ta:e possession
of the s#)-ect property #pon deposit to the ler: of o#rt of an a"o#nt
e6#i*alent to 17 percent of its fair "ar:et *al#e )ase on its c#rrent ta5
declaration. 1owe*er, #pon the pri*ate respondentKs "otion to dis"iss,
the trial co#rt n#llified its pre*io#s order and dis"issed the case. $h#s,
petitioner appealed to the o#rt of Appeals. B#t the appellate co#rt
affir"ed in toto the trial co#rtKs decision.
I((1)" 8hether or not the e5ercise of the power of e"inent do"ain is
*alid.
H).*"The following essential requisites must concur before an L9C
can exercise the power of eminent domain+ '%) /n ordinance is
enacted by the local legislative council authoriing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the L9C, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.' &) The power of eminent domain is exercised for
public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.' $) There is payment of *ust compensation, as required
under Section (, /rticle ;;; of the ,onstitution, and other pertinent
laws.' ") / valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was
not accepted.
$he !#pre"e o#rt r#led that there was no co"pliance with
the first re6#isite since the "ayor so#ght to e5ercise the power of e"inent
do"ain p#rs#ant to a resol#tion only. 'rdinance is not synony"o#s to
resol#tion. An ordinance is a law, possesses a general or per"anent
character, and "a:es third reading for its enact"ent necessary. 'n the
other hand, a resol#tion is "erely a declaration of the senti"ent or opinion
of a law"a:ing )ody on a specific "atter, te"porary in nat#re and its
enact"ent re6#ired only the decision of "a-ority of all the !angg#nian
"e")ers
POWER OF TAXATION
P'(/1'. >(. S)/2)0'2: +< P18.9/ =+2G( ',* C+DD1,9/'09+,(
G.R. N+. L10405, 29 D)/)D8)2 19%0
F'/0("
'n A#g#st 41, 197B, petitioner 8enceslao 0asc#al, as
0ro*incial ,o*ernor of %i&al, instit#ted this action for declaratory relief,
with in-#nction, #pon the gro#nd that %ep#)lic Act 3o. 92?, entitled /An
Act Appropriating (#nds for 0#)lic 8or:s/, appro*ed on H#ne 2?, 1974,
contained, in section 19 @aA thereof, an ite" @B4OhPA of 087,???.?? for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, e%tension and improvement of 6asig
feeder road terminals, that, at the time of the passage and approval of
said Act, the said feeder roads were nothing but pro#ected and planned
subdivision roads within the Antonio "ubdivision situated at 6asig, /iEal
near !haw Bo#le*ard, not far away fro" the intersection )etween the
latter and .D!A, which pro#ected feeder roads do not connect an$
government propert$ or an$ important premises to the main highwa$) that
the aforementioned Antonio "ubdivision +as well as the lands on which
said feeder roads were to be construed, were private properties of
respondent >ose C. Hulueta, who, at the time of the passage and approval
of said Act, was a member of the "enate of the 6hilippines) that on 0a$,
14I;, respondent Hulueta, addressed a letter to the 0unicipal Council of
6asig, /iEal, offering to donate said pro#ected feeder roads to the
municipalit$ of 6asig, /iEal) that, on >une 1;, 14I;, the offer was
accepted b$ the council, sub#ect to the condition that the donor would
submit a plan of the said roads and agree to change the names of two of
them) that no deed of donation in favor of the municipalit$ of 6asig was,
however, e%ecuted) that on >ul$ 10, 14I;, respondent Hulueta wrote
another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of /epublic
Act. Fo. 420, and the sum of 68I,000.00 appropriated therein for the
construction of the pro#ected feeder roads in .uestion) that the municipal
council of #asig endorsed said letter of respondent Kulueta to the
7istrict 6ngineer of .ial, who, up to the present -has not made any
endorsement thereon- that inasmuch as the pro*ected feeder roads
in question were private property at the time of the passage and
approval of .epublic /ct 2o. (&3, the appropriation of #!5,333.33
therein made, for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension
and improvement of said pro*ected feeder roads, was illegal and,
therefore, void ab initio -J that said appropriation of #!5,333.33 was
made by ,ongress because its members were made to believe that
the pro*ected feeder roads in question were -public roads and not
private streets of a private subdivision-FJ that, -in order to give a
semblance of legality, when there is absolutely none, to the
aforementioned appropriation-, respondents Kulueta executed on
7ecember %&, %(5$, while he was a member of the Senate of the
#hilippines, an alleged deed of donation of the four '") parcels of
land constituting said pro*ected feeder roads, in favor of the
9overnment of the .epublic of the #hilippinesJ that said alleged
deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then
6xecutive SecretaryJ that being sub*ect to an onerous condition, said
donation partoo< of the nature of a contractJ that, such, said
donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting
members of ,ongress from being directly or indirectly financially
interested in any contract with the 9overnment, and, hence, is
unconstitutional, as well as null and void ab initio , for the
construction of the pro*ected feeder roads in question with public
funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the
aforementioned subdivision of respondent Kulueta,
I((1)" 8hether the contested ite" of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 92?
#nconstit#tional and, therefor, illegalC
H).*" 3o. $he 087,???.?? appropriation for the pro-ected feeder roads in
6#estion, the legality thereof depended #pon whether said roads were
p#)lic or pri*ate property when the )ill, which, latter on, )eca"e %ep#)lic
Act 92?, was passed )y ongress, or, when said )ill was appro*ed )y the
0resident and the dis)#rse"ent of said s#" )eca"e effecti*e, or on H#ne
2?, 1974 @see section 14 of said ActA. Inas"#ch as the land on which the
pro-ected feeder roads were to )e constr#cted )elonged then to
respondent X#l#eta, the res#lt is that said appropriation so#ght a pri*ate
p#rpose, and hence, was n#ll and *oid.
$he donation to the ,o*ern"ent, o*er fi*e @7A "onths after the appro*al
and effecti*ity of said Act, "ade, according to the petition, for the p#rpose
of gi*ing a /se")lance of legality/, or legali&ing, the appropriation in
6#estion, did not c#re its afore"entioned )asic defect. onse6#ently, a
33
-#dicial n#llification of said donation need not precede the declaration of
#nconstit#tionality of said appropriation.
Again, it is well9stated that the validity of a statute may be contested
only by one who will sustain a direct in*ury in consequence of its
enforcement. @et, there are many decisions nullifying, at the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that -the expenditure of public funds by an
officer of the State for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,-
which may be en*oined at the request of a taxpayer.

%ep#)lic Act 3o. 92? is #nconstit#tional, since the legislat#re is witho#t
power to appropriate p#)lic re*en#e for anything )#t a p#)lic p#rpose and
the pro-ect feeder roads are at the ti"e pri*ate properties. The right of
the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with its right to tax,
and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for
public purposes and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one
purpose and the devotion thereof to another purpose, no
appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public
purpose.
P1,('.', >(. M1,9/9E'. &+'2* +< 0;) C90: +< M',9.'
G.R. N+. L4817, 2% M': 1954
F'/0(" An ordinance was appro*ed )y the M#nicipal Board of the ity of
Manila which i"poses a "#nicipal occ#pation ta5 on persons e5ercising
*ario#s professions in the city and penali&es non9pay"ent of the ta5 )y a
fine of not "ore than two h#ndred pesos or )y i"prison"ent of not "ore
than si5 "onths or )y )oth s#ch fine and i"prison"ent in the discretion of
the co#rt. The ordinance was in pursuance to paragraph +1, "ection 18 of
the /evised Charter of the Cit$ of 0anila which empowers the 0unicipal
9oard of said cit$ to impose a municipal occupation ta%, not to e%ceed
6I0 per annum, on persons engaged in the various professions above
referred to the plaintiffs, after having paid their occupation ta%, now being
re.uired to pa$ the additional ta% prescribed in the ordinance. $he
plaintiffs paid the said ta5 #nder protest. $he lower co#rt declared the
*alidity of the law '10;+29F9,A 0;) ),'/0D),0 of the +2*9,',/), )#t
declared the latter illegal and *oid since its penalty pro*ided for the non9
pay"ent of ta5 was not legally a#thori&ed.
I((1)" Is this ordinance and the law a#thori&ing it constit#te class
legislation, are #n-#st and oppressi*e, and a#thori&e what a"o#nts to
do#)le ta5ationC
H).*" 3'. $o )egin with defendantsI appeal, we find that the lower co#rt
was in error in saying that the i"position of the penalty pro*ided for in the
ordinance was witho#t the a#thority of law. The last paragraph + kk , of the
ver$ section that authoriEes the enactment of this ta% ordinance +section
18 of the 0anila Charter, in e%press terms also empowers the 0unicipal
9oard to fi% penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not
e%ceed to+sic, two hundred pesos fine or si% months imprisonment, or
both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense. 1ence, the
prono#nce"ent )elow that the ordinance in 6#estion is illegal and *oid
)eca#se it i"poses a penalty not a#thori&ed )y law is clearly witho#t
)asis.
"econdl$, 'n raising the hue and cr$ of class legislation, the )#rden of
plaintiffsI co"plaint is not that the professions to which they respecti*ely
)elong ha*e )een singled o#t for the i"position of this "#nicipal
occ#pation ta5G and in any e*ent, the Legislature may, in its discretion,
select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the exercise of that
discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes
and leave the others untaxed. @ooley on $a5ation, <ol. B, Bth ed., pp.
449494497.A 0laintiffsI co"plaint is that while the law has a#thori&ed the
ity of Manila to i"pose the said ta5, it has withheld that a#thority fro"
other chartered cities, not to "ention "#nicipalities. We do not thin< it is
for the courts to *udge what particular cities or municipalities should
be empowered to impose occupation taxes in addition to those
imposed by the 2ational 9overnment. That matter is peculiarly
within the domain of the political departments and the courts would
do well not to encroach upon it. Doreover, as the seat of the 2ational
9overnment and with a population and volume of trade many times
that of any other #hilippine city or municipality, Danila, no doubt,
offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the professions, so
that it is but fair that the professionals in Danila be made to pay a
higher occupation tax than their brethren in the provinces.
$hirdly, 0laintiffs )rand the ordinance #n-#st and oppressi*e )eca#se they
say that it creates discri"ination within a class in that while professionals
with offices in Manila ha*e to pay the ta5, o#tsiders who ha*e no offices in
the city )#t practice their profession therein are not s#)-ect to the ta5.
0laintiffs "a:e a distinction that is not fo#nd in the ordinance. $he
ordinance i"poses the ta5 #pon e*ery person /e5ercising/ or /p#rs#ing/ E
in the ity of Manila nat#rally E any one of the occ#pations na"ed, )#t
does not say that s#ch person "#st ha*e his office in Manila. -hat
constitutes e%ercise or pursuit of a profession in the cit$ is a matter of
#udicial determination. The argument against double ta%ation ma$ not be
invoked where one ta% is imposed b$ the state and the other is imposed
b$ the cit$ +1 Coole$ on Ta%ation, Cth ed., p. C42,, it being widely
recognied that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the
requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect to the
same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the
political subdivisions thereof.
L.'*+/ >. C+DD9((9+,)2 +< I,0)2,'. R)>),1)
GR L19201, 1% !1,) 19%5
F'/0(" In 1977, the MB .state Inc., of Bacolod ity, donated
01?,???.?? in cash to (r. rispin %#i& then parish priest of <ictorias,
3egros 'ccidental, and predecessor of (r. asi"iro Lladoc, for the
constr#ction of a new atholic h#rch in the locality. $he total sa"o#nt
was act#ally spent for the p#rpose intended. 'n 4 March 1978, MB .state
filed the donorKs gift ta5 ret#rn. Jnder date of 29 April 19+?, the
o""issioner of Internal %e*en#e iss#ed as assess"ent for doneeKs gift
ta5 against the atholic 0arish of <ictorias, 3egros 'ccidental, of which
petitioner was the priest. $he ta5 a"o#nted to 01,47?.?? incl#ding
s#rcharges, interest of 1M "onthly fro" 17 May 1978 to 17 H#ne 19+?,
and the co"pro"ise for the late filing of the ret#rn. 0etitioner lodged a
protest to the assess"ent and re6#ested the withdrawal thereof. $he
protest and the "otion for reconsideration presented to the o""issioner
of Internal %e*en#e were denied. $he petitioner appealed to the $A on 2
3o*e")er 19+?. After hearing, the $A affir"ed the decision of the
o""issioner of Internal %e*en#e e5cept the i"position of co"pro"ise
penalty of 02?. (r. Lladoc appealed to the !#pre"e o#rt.
I((1)" 8hether a doneeKs gift ta5 "ay )e assessed against the
atholic h#rch.
H).*" Des. $he phrase =exempt from taxation,0 as e"ployed in the
onstit#tion sho#ld not )e interpreted to "ean e5e"ption fro" all :inds of
ta5es. !ection 22@4A, Art. <I of the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, e5e"pts
fro" ta5ation ce"eteries, ch#rches and personages or con*ents,
app#rtenant thereto, and all lands, )#ildings, and i"pro*e"ents #sed
e5cl#si*ely for religio#s p#rposes. The exemption is only from the
payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as
property taxes, as contra:distinguished from excise taxes. A doneeKs
gift ta5 is not a property ta5 )#t an e5cise ta5 i"posed on the transfer of
property )y way of gift inter *i*os. Its assess"ent was not on the property
the"esel*es. It does not rest #pon general ownership, )#t an e5cise #pon
the #se "ade of the properties, #pon the e5ercise of the pri*ilege of
recei*ing the properties. $he i"position of s#ch e5cise ta5 on property
#sed for religio#s p#rposes does not constit#te an i"pair"ent of the
onstit#tion.
A82' V'..): C+..)A) >(. AM19,+
GR L3908%, 15 !1,) 1988
F'/0(" 0etitioner A)ra <alley ollege is an ed#cational corporation
and instit#tion of higher learning d#ly incorporated with the !. in 19B8.
'n + H#ly 1972, the M#nicipal and 0ro*incial treas#rers @,aspar Bos6#e
and Ar"in ariaga, respecti*elyA and iss#ed a 3otice of !ei&#re #pon the
petitioner for the college lot and )#ilding @'$ V984A for the satisfaction of
said ta5es thereon. $he treas#rers ser*ed #pon the petitioner a 3otice of
!ale on 8 H#ly 1972, the sale )eing held on the sa"e day. Dr. 0aterno
Millare, then "#nicipal "ayor of Bang#ed, A)ra, offered the highest )id of
0 +,??? on p#)lic a#ction in*ol*ing the sale of the college lot and )#ilding.
$he certificate of sale was correspondingly iss#ed to hi".
$he petitioner filed a co"plaint on 1? H#ly 1972 in the co#rt
a 6#o to ann#l and declare *oid the =3otice of !ei&#re> and the =3otice of
!ale> of its lot and )#ilding located at Bang#ed, A)ra, for non9pay"ent of
real estate ta5es and penalties a"o#nting to 07,1B?.41. 'n 12 April 1974,
the parties entered into a stip#lation of facts adopted and e")odied )y the
trial co#rt in its 6#estioned decision. $he trial co#rt r#led for the
go*ern"ent, holding that the second floor of the )#ilding is )eing #sed )y
the director for residential p#rposes and that the gro#nd floor #sed and
rented )y 3orthern Mar:eting orporation, a co""ercial esta)lish"ent,
and th#s the property is not )eing #sed =e5cl#si*ely> for ed#cational
p#rposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner a*ailed of the instant
petition for re*iew on certiorari with prayer for preli"inary in-#nction )efore
the !#pre"e o#rt, )y filing said petition on 17 A#g#st 197B.
I((1)2 8hether the ollege is e5e"pt fro" ta5es.
H).*" Des. 8hile the o#rt allows a "ore li)eral and non9restricti*e
interpretation of the phrase =e5cl#si*ely #sed for ed#cational p#rposes,>
reasona)le e"phasis has always )een "ade that e5e"ption e5tends to
facilities which are incidental to and reasona)ly necessary for the
acco"plish"ent of the "ain p#rposes. 8hile the second floorKs #se, as
residence of the director, is incidental to ed#cationG the lease of the first
floor cannot )y any stretch of i"agination )e considered incidental to the
p#rposes of ed#cation. $he test of e5e"ption fro" ta5ation is the #se of
the property for p#rposes "entioned in the onstitit#tion.
/donis 2otes+ $he ! stated that if only the -#dge had read the 1974
onstit#tion, he sho#ld ha*e :nown the difference )etween the 1947 and
the 1974 onstit#tion and he co#ld not ha*e s#""arily dis"issed the
case. $here is a s#)stantial distinction )etween the 1947 and the 1974
onstit#tion. In the 1935 C+,(090109+, the re6#ire"ent for e5e"ption for
real property ta5es is 2e%clusivel$3 , while the 1973 C+,(090109+, re6#ires
34
2actuall$, directl$ J e%clusivel$3. $he ! re"anded to the o#rt of 'rigin
for f#rther hearing. @e5cerpts fro" !a)a)an 3otesA
ART. III BILL OF RIGHTS
SEC.1 DUE PROCESS OF LAW
I/;+,A >(. H)2,',*)F
GR L7995? 31 M': 1957
F'/0(" %ep#)lic Act 3o. 118? is entitled /An Act to %eg#late the %etail
B#siness./ In effect it nationali&es the retail trade )#siness. 0etitioner
attac:s the constit#tionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien
residents the e6#al protection of the laws and depri*es of their li)erty and
property witho#t d#e process of law. In answer, the respondents contend
that the Act was passed in the *alid e5ercise of the police power of the
!tate, which e5ercise is a#thori&ed in the onstit#tion in the interest of
national econo"ic s#r*i*al.
I((1)" 8hether or not the enact"ent of %.A 3o. 118? is constit#tional.
H).*" Des. $he disp#ted law was enacted to re"edy a real act#al threat
and danger to national econo"y posed )y alien do"inance and control of
the retail )#siness and free citi&ens and co#ntry fro" do"inance and
controlG that the enact"ent clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the !tate, thr# which and )y which it protects its own personality
and ins#res its sec#rity and f#t#reG that the law does not *iolate the e6#al
the distinction )etween alien and citi&en in the e5ercise of the occ#pation
reg#lated, nor the d#e process of law cla#se, )eca#se the law is
engaged in the occ#pation and reasona)ly protects their pri*ilege. $he
petition is denied.
0etitioner, for and in his own )ehalf and on )ehalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships ad*ersely affected )y the pro*isions of
%ep#)lic Act. 3o. 118?, )ro#ght this action to o)tain a -#dicial declaration
that said Act is #nconstit#tional, and to en-oin the !ecretary of (inance
and all other persons acting #nder hi", partic#larly city and "#nicipal
treas#rers, fro" enforcing its pro*isions. 6etitioner attacks the
constitutionalit$ of the Act, contending that? '%) it denies to alien residents
the e.ual protection of the laws and deprives of their libert$ and propert$
without due process of law ) In answer, the !olicitor9,eneral and the
(iscal of the ity of Manila contend that2 @1A the Act was passed in the
*alid e5ercise of the police power of the !tate, which e5ercise is
a#thori&ed in the onstit#tion in the interest of national econo"ic s#r*i*alG
a. The police power. L
$here is no 6#estion that the Act was appro*ed in the e5ercise of the
police power, )#t petitioner clai"s that its e5ercise in this instance is
attended )y a *iolation of the constit#tional re6#ire"ents of d#e process
and e6#al protection of the laws. B#t )efore proceeding to the
consideration and resol#tion of the #lti"ate iss#e in*ol*ed, it wo#ld )e well
to )ear in "ind certain )asic and f#nda"ental, al)eit preli"inary,
considerations in the deter"ination of the e*er rec#rrent conflict )etween
police power and the g#arantees of d#e process and e6#al protection of
the laws. 8hat is the scope of police power, and how are the d#e process
and e6#al protection cla#ses related to itC 8hat is the pro*ince and power
of the legislat#re, and what is the f#nction and d#ty of the co#rtsC $hese
consideration "#st )e clearly and correctly #nderstood that their
application to the facts of the case "ay )e )ro#ght forth with clarity and
the iss#e accordingly resol*ed.
It has )een said the police power is so far 9 reaching in scope, that it has
)eco"e al"ost i"possi)le to li"it its sweep. As it deri*es its e5istence
fro" the *ery e5istence of the !tate itself, it does not need to )e
e5pressed or defined in its scopeG it is said to )e co9e5tensi*e with self9
protection and s#r*i*al, and as s#ch it is the "ost positi*e and acti*e of all
go*ern"ental processes, the "ost essential, insistent and illi"ita)le.
.specially is it so #nder a "odern de"ocratic fra"ewor: where the
de"ands of society and of nations ha*e "#ltiplied to al"ost #ni"agina)le
proportionsG the field and scope of police power has )eco"e al"ost
)o#ndless, -#st as the fields of p#)lic interest and p#)lic welfare ha*e
)eco"e al"ost all9e")racing and ha*e transcended h#"an foresight.
'therwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and de"ands of p#)lic
interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressi*e world, so
we cannot deli"it )eforehand the e5tent or scope of police power )y
which and thro#gh which the !tate see:s to attain or achie*e interest or
welfare. !o it is that onstit#tions do not define the scope or e5tent of the
police power of the !tateG what they do is to set forth the li"itations
thereof. $he "ost i"portant of these are the d#e process cla#se and the
e6#al protection cla#se.
b. Limitations on police power. L
$he )asic li"itations of d#e process and e6#al protection are fo#nd in the
following pro*isions of o#r onstit#tion2
!.$I'3 1.@1A 3o person shall )e depri*ed of life, li)erty or
property witho#t d#e process of law, nor any person )e
denied the e6#al protection of the laws. @Article III, 0hil.
onstit#tionA
$hese constit#tional g#arantees which e")ody the essence of indi*id#al
li)erty and freedo" in de"ocracies, are not li"ited to citi&ens alone )#t
are ad"ittedly #ni*ersal in their application, witho#t regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
c. The, equal protection clause. L
$he e6#al protection of the law cla#se is against #nd#e fa*or and
indi*id#al or class pri*ilege, as well as hostile discri"ination or the
oppression of ine6#ality. It is not intended to prohi)it legislation, which is
li"ited either in the o)-ect to which it is directed or )y territory within which
is to operate. It does not de"and a)sol#te e6#ality a"ong residentsG it
"erely re6#ires that all persons shall )e treated ali:e, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The e.ual protection clause is not infringed b$ legislation which
applies onl$ to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds e%ists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
d. The due process clause. L
$he d#e process cla#se has to do with the reasona)leness of legislation
enacted in p#rs#ance of the police power. Is there p#)lic interest, a p#)lic
p#rposeG is p#)lic welfare in*ol*edC Is the Act reasona)ly necessary for
the acco"plish"ent of the legislat#reIs p#rposeG is it not #nreasona)le,
ar)itrary or oppressi*eC Is there s#fficient fo#ndation or reason in
connection with the "atter in*ol*edG or has there not )een a capricio#s
#se of the legislati*e powerC an the ai"s concei*ed )e achie*ed )y the
"eans #sed, or is it not "erely an #n-#stified interference with pri*ate
interestC $hese are the 6#estions that we as: when the d#e process test
is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due
process and e.ual protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
6roperl$ related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coe%ist.
TH6 1/L/2,;29 ;S TH6 6SS62,6 or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of
any democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever
exercise it, for that would be tyranny. @et there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. "o the
"tate can deprive persons of life, libert$ and propert$, provided there is
due process of law) and persons ma$ be classified into classes and
groups, provided ever$one is given the e.ual protection of the law. The
test or standard, as alwa$s, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a
reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. /nd if
distinction and classification has been made, there must be a
reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not sub*ect to *udicial review. L
3ow, in this "atter of EJUITA&LE &ALANCING, what is the proper place
and role of the co#rtsC It "#st not )e o*erloo:ed, in the first place, that the
legislat#re, which is the constit#tional repository of police power and
e5ercises the prerogati*e of deter"ining the policy of the !tate, is )y force
of circ#"stances pri"arily the -#dge of necessity, ade6#acy or
reasona)leness and wisdo", of any law pro"#lgated in the e5ercise of
the police power, or of the "eas#res adopted to i"ple"ent the p#)lic
policy or to achie*e p#)lic interest. 'n the other hand, co#rts, altho#gh
&ealo#s g#ardians of indi*id#al li)erty and right, ha*e ne*ertheless
e*inced a rel#ctance to interfere with the e5ercise of the legislati*e
prerogati*e. $hey ha*e done so early where there has )een a clear,
patent or palpa)le ar)itrary and #nreasona)le a)#se of the legislati*e
prerogati*e. Moreo*er, co#rts are not s#pposed to o*erride legiti"ate
policy, and co#rts ne*er in6#ire into the wisdo" of the law.
<. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.
N
8e are f#lly satisfied #pon a consideration of all the facts and
circ#"stances that the disp#ted law is not the prod#ct of racial hostility,
pre-#dice or discri"ination, )#t the e5pression of the legiti"ate desire and
deter"ination of the people, thr# their a#thori&ed representati*es, to free
the nation fro" the econo"ic sit#ation that has #nfort#nately )een
saddled #pon it rightly or wrongly, to its disad*antage. $he law is clearly in
the interest of the p#)lic, nay of the national sec#rity itself, and
indisp#ta)ly falls within the scope of police power, thr# which and )y
which the !tate ins#res its e5istence and sec#rity and the s#pre"e
welfare of its citi&ens.
The 7ue #rocess of Law Limitation.
'. .easonability, the test of the limitationJ determination by
legislature decisive. N
8e now co"e to d#e process as a li"itation on the e5ercise of the police
power. It has )een stated )y the highest a#thority in the Jnited !tates
that2
. . . . And the guarant$ of due process, as has often been
held, demands onl$ that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrar$ or capricious, and that the means selected shall
have a real and substantial relation to the sub#ect sought to
be attained. . . . .
35
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
"o far as the re.uirement of due process is concerned and
in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is
free to adopt whatever economic polic$ ma$ reasonabl$ be
deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that polic$
b$ legislation adapted to its purpose. $he co#rts are witho#t
a#thority either to declare s#ch policy, or, when it is declared
)y the legislat#re, to o*erride it. If the laws passed are seen
to ha*e a reasona)le relation to a proper legislati*e p#rpose,
and are neither ar)itrary nor discri"inatory, the re6#ire"ents
of d#e process are satisfied, and -#dicial deter"ination to
that effect renders a co#rt functus officio. . . . @3e))ia *s.
3ew Dor:, 78 L. ed. 9B?, 97?, 977.A
The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or ade.uac$
under all circumstances of the means adopted to carr$ out its purpose into
effect. >udged b$ this test, disputed legislation, which is not merel$
reasonable but actuall$ necessar$, must be considered not to have
infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
$he necessity of the law in 6#estion is e5plained in the e5planatory note
that acco"panied the )ill, which later was enacted into law2
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. ;ts
purpose is to prevent persons who are not citiens of
the #hilippines from having a strangle hold upon our
economic life. ;f the persons who control this vital artery
of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance
to this .epublic, who have no profound devotion to our
free institutions, and who have no permanent sta<e in
our peopleFs welfare, we are not really the masters of
our destiny. /ll aspects of our life, even our national
security, will be at the mercy of other people.
;n see<ing to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do
not propose to deprive persons who are not citiens of
the #hilippines of their means of livelihood. While this
bill see<s to ta<e away from the hands of persons who
are not citiens of the #hilippines a power that can be
wielded to paralye all aspects of our national life and
endanger our national security it respects existing
rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national
survival.
P;9.9EE9,) P;+(E;'0) F)209.9F)2 C+2E. >. T+22)(
GR 98050, 17 M'2/; 1994
F'/0(" $he 0hil0hos Mo*e"ent for 0rogress @0M0IA, a la)or organi&ation
co"posed of s#per*isory e"ployees of the 0hilippine 0hosphate (ertili&er
orporation, filed a certification election on H#ly 7, 1989 with the
Depart"ent of La)or and ."ploy"ent. $he "o*e was not contested )y
the 0hilippine 0hosphate (ertili&er orporation "anage"ent and in fact
was s#pported )y a position paper s#)"itted to the Mediator9Ar)iter on
A#g#st 11, 1989. $he "anage"ent hailed the creation of a s#per*isorKs
#nion pro*ided that they "eet all the necessary legal re6#ire"ents.
'n 'cto)er 14, 1989 the Mediator9Ar)iter Milado iss#ed an order for the
holding of the elections e5cl#ding the technical, professional and
confidential e"ployees. $hen on 3o*e")er17, 1989 respondent 0M0I
prayed for the incl#sion of technical, professional and confidential
e"ployees. 'n Dece")er 1B, 1989 )oth parties s#)"itted their position
papers on the said s#)-ect "atter. Mr. Milado, allowing the "e")ership of
other e"ployees as stated, granted the petition of 0M0I. 0etitioner then
"o*ed to ha*e the technical, professional and confidential e"ployees
re"o*ed fro" the "e")ership of the 0M0I on April 1+, 199? to the
!ecretary of La)or and ."ploy"ent and a decision was "ade on A#g#st
7, 199? dis"issing the appeal and the s#)se6#ent "otion for
reconsideration. $hen on H#ly 8, 1991 the o#rt iss#ed a te"porary
restraining order against the holding of the certification election sched#led
on H#ly 12, 1991 pending -#dicial re*iew.
I((1)" 8hether or not 01IL01'! was denied d#e process when
respondent Mediator9Ar)iter granted the a"ended petition of respondent
0M0I without according 6&'(6&K" a new opportunit$ to be heard.
H).*" 3o. $he essence of d#e process is si"ply an opportunity to be
heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to
explain oneFs side or an opportunity to see< a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. Where, as in the instant case,
petitioner #H;L#HAS agreed to file its position paper with the
Dediator:/rbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on
the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was
sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.
0oreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to
confront and e%amine the witnesses of the other part$. 9ut it did not)
instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the 0ediator7Arbiter.
Besides, petitioner had all the opport#nity to *entilate its arg#"ents in its
appeal to the !ecretary of La)or
-,+0 >( IAC
GR N+. 74457, 20 M'2/; 1987
F'/0(" .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2+9A prohi)ited the transportation of
cara)aos and cara)eef fro" one pro*ince to another. $he cara)aos of
petitioner were confiscated for *iolation of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o +2+9A while
he was transporting the" fro" Mas)ate to Iloilo. 0etitioner challenged the
constit#tionality of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2+9A. $he go*ern"ent arg#ed
that .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2+9A was iss#ed in the e5ercise of police power
to conser*e the cara)aos that were still fit for far" wor: or )reeding.
I((1)" 8hether or 3ot .' 3o. +2+9A is a *iolation of !#)stanti*e D#e
0rocess.
H).*" Des. $he thr#st of his petition is that the e5ec#ti*e order is
#nconstit#tional insofar as it a#thori&es o#tright confiscation of the
cara)ao or cara)eef )eing transported across pro*incial )o#ndaries. 1is
clai" is that the penalty is in*alid )eca#se it is i"posed witho#t according
the owner a right to )e heard )efore a co"petent and i"partial co#rt as
g#aranteed )y d#e process.
$he closed "ind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting
Idea of fair play to hear /the other side/ )efore an opinion is for"ed or a
decision is "ade )y those who sit in -#dg"ent. ')*io#sly, one side is only
one9half of the 6#estionG the other half "#st also )e considered if an
i"partial *erdict is to )e reached )ased on an infor"ed appreciation of the
iss#es in contention. It is indispensa)le that the two sides co"ple"ent
each other, as #nto the )ow the arrow, in leading to the correct r#ling after
e5a"ination of the pro)le" not fro" one or the other perspecti*e only )#t
in its totality. A -#dg"ent )ased on less that this f#ll appraisal, on the
prete5t that a hearing is #nnecessary or #seless, is tainted with the *ice of
)ias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressi*e regi"es, the
insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing which, generally spea<ing, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying co""entary on o#r -#dicial syste" that the
-#rispr#dence of this co#ntry is rich with applications of this g#aranty as
proof of o#r fealty to the r#le of law and the ancient r#di"ents of fair play.
8e ha*e consistently declared that every person, faced by the
awesome power of the State, is entitled to -the law of the land,-
which 8aniel -ebster described almost two hundred $ears ago in the
famous 8artmouth College Case, as -the law which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders *udgment only
after trial.- It has to )e so if the rights of e*ery person are to )e sec#red
)eyond the reach of officials who, o#t of "ista:en &eal or plain arrogance,
wo#ld degrade the d#e process cla#se into a worn and e"pty catchword.
This is not to sa$ that notice and hearing are imperative in ever$ case for,
to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. '%) The
conclusive presumption , for e%ample, bars the admission of contrar$
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human e%perience or
there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimatel$ presumed therefrom. '&) There are instances when the need for
e%peditions action will #ustif$ omission of these re.uisites, as in the
summar$ abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose,
which ma$ be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to
the safet$ and lives of the people. '$) 6ornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherentl$ pernicious and ma$
be summaril$ destro$ed. '") The passport of a person sought for a criminal
offense ma$ be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the
countr$ he has fled. '5) Lilth$ restaurants ma$ be summaril$ padlocked in
the interet of the public health and bawd$ houses to protect the public
morals. ;n such instances, previous *udicial hearing may be omitted
without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare
from a clear and present danger.
'n the instant case, the carabaos were arbitraril$ confiscated b$ the police
station commander, were returned to the petitioner onl$ after he had filed
a complaint for recover$ and given a supersedeas bond of 612,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos
when ordered b$ the trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed
punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to
be heard, thus denying him the centuries:old guaranty of elementary
fair play.
It has already )een re"ar:ed that there are occasions when notice and
hearing "ay )e *alidly dispensed with notwithstanding the #s#al
re6#ire"ent for these "ini"#" g#arantees of d#e process. It is also
conceded that s#""ary action "ay )e *alidly ta:en in ad"inistrati*e
proceedings as proced#ral d#e process is not necessarily -#dicial only. In
the e5ceptional cases accepted, howe*er. there is a -#stification for the
o"ission of the right to a pre*io#s hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the
pro)le" so#ght to )e corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
36
A.+,0) >. S'>)..',+
GR 131%52, M'2/; 9, 1998
F'/0(" 'n Dece")er 7, 199+, an infor"ation for rape was filed against
petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an inc#")ent Mayor of BiNan Lag#na and
B#ena*ent#ra oncepcion predicated on a co"plaint filed )y H#*ie9Lyn
0#nong)ayan.
'n Dece")er 14, 199+, H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan, thro#gh
her co#nsel Attorney %e"edios . Bal)in, and Assistant hief !tate
0rosec#tor Leonardo ,#ia), Hr., filed with the 'ffice of the o#rt
Ad"inistrator a petition for a change of *en#e and to ha*e the case
transferred and tried )y any of the %egional $rial o#rts in Metro Manila.
D#ring the pendency of the petition for change of *en#e, or
on 27 H#ne 1997, H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan, assisted )y her parents and
co#nsel, e5ec#ted an affida*it of desistance.
'n H#ne 28, 1997, Atty. %a"on .asano on )ehalf of
petitioners, "o*ed to ha*e the petition for change of *en#e dis"issed on
the gro#nd that it had )eco"e "oot in *iew of co"plainantKs affida*it of
desistance.
'n A#g#st 22, 1997, A!0 ,#ia) filed his co""ent on the
"otion to dis"iss. ,#ia) asserted that he was not aware of the desistance
of pri*ate co"plainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, wo#ld
not prod#ce any legal effect since it was the p#)lic prosec#tor who had
direction and control of the prosec#tion of the cri"inal action. 1e prayed
for the denial of the "otion to dis"iss. $he co#rt granted the "otion to
change *en#e.
'n !epte")er 17, 1997, the case was assigned )y raffle to
Branch 74, %$ Manila, with respondent H#dge Ma5i"o A. !a*ellano,
Hr.,presiding.
'n 'cto)er 7, 1997, H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan, thro#gh Atty.
Bal)in, s#)"itted to the Manila co#rt, a co"pliance where she reiterated
her decision to a)ide )y her Affida*it of Desistance.
1owe*er, in an 'rder, dated ?9 'cto)er 1997, H#dge
!a*ellano fo#nd pro)a)le ca#se for the iss#ance of warrants for the arrest
of petitioners Alonte and oncepcion witho#t pre-#dice to, and
independent of, this o#rts separate deter"ination as the trier of facts, of
the *ol#ntariness and *alidity of the Opri*ate co"plainantIsP desistance in
the light of the opposition of the p#)lic prosec#tor, Asst. hief !tate
0rosec#tor Leonardo ,#iya).
'n ?2 3o*e")er 1997, Alonte *ol#ntarily s#rrendered
hi"self to Director !antiago $oledo of the 3ational B#rea# of In*estigation
@3BIA, while oncepcion, in his case, posted the reco""ended )ail
of 017?,???.??.
'n ?7 3o*e")er 1997, petitioners were arraigned and )oth
pleaded not g#ilty to the charge. $he parties "anifested that they were
wai*ing pre9trial. $he proceedings forthwith went on. 0er H#dge !a*ellano,
)oth parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the
"erits.
B
According to Alonte, howe*er, H#dge !a*ellano allowed the
prosec#tion to present e*idence relati*e only to the 6#estion of the
*ol#ntariness and *alidity of the affida*it of desistance
It wo#ld appear that i""ediately following the arraign"ent,
the prosec#tion presented pri*ate co"plainant H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan
followed )y her parents. D#ring this hearing, 0#nong)ayan affir"ed the
*alidity and *ol#ntariness of her affida*it of desistance. !he stated that
she had no intention of gi*ing positi*e testi"ony in s#pport of the charges
against Alonte and had no interest in f#rther prosec#ting the action.
0#nong)ayan confir"ed2 @iA $hat she was co"pelled to desist )eca#se of
the harass"ent she was e5periencing fro" the "edia, @iiA that no
press#res nor infl#ence were e5erted #pon her to sign the affida*it of
desistance, and @iiiA that neither she nor her parents recei*ed a single
centa*o fro" any)ody to sec#re the affida*it of desistance.
Assistant !tate 0rosec#tor Marilyn a"po"anes then
presented, in se6#ence2 @iA 0#nong)ayans parents, who affir"ed their
signat#res on the affida*it of desistance and their consent to their
da#ghters decision to desist fro" the case, and @iiA Assistant 0ro*incial
0rosec#tor Al)erto 3of#ente, who attested that the affida*it of desistance
was signed )y 0#nong)ayan and her parents in his presence and that he
was satisfied that the sa"e was e5ec#ted freely and *ol#ntarily. (inally,
a"po"anes "anifested that in light of the decision of pri*ate
co"plainant and her parents not to p#rs#e the case, the !tate had no
f#rther e*idence against the acc#sed to pro*e the g#ilt of the acc#sed.
!he, then, "o*ed for the /dis"issal of the case/ against )oth Alonte and
oncepcion.
$here#pon, respondent -#dge said that /the case was
s#)"itted for decision./
'n 1? 3o*e")er 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an /Jrgent Motion to Ad"it
to Bail./ D#ring the pendency thereof, Attorney 0hilip !igfrid A. (ort#n, the
lead co#nsel for petitioner Alonte recei*ed a notice fro" the %$ Manila,
Branch 74, notifying hi" of the sched#le of pro"#lgation, on 18 Dece")er
1997, of the decision on the case. $he co#nsel for acc#sed oncepcion
denied ha*ing recei*ed any notice of the sched#led pro"#lgation.
'n 18 Dece")er 1997, after the case was called, Atty.
!igrid (ort#n and Atty. Hose (la"iniano "anifested that Alonte co#ld not
attend the pro"#lgation of the decision )eca#se he was s#ffering fro"
"ild hypertension and was confined at the 3BI clinic and that, #pon the
other hand, petitioner oncepcion and his co#nsel wo#ld appear not to
ha*e )een notified of the proceedings. $he pro"#lgation, ne*ertheless, of
the decision proceeded in absentiaG the reading concl#ded2
81.%.('%., -#dg"ent is here)y rendered finding the two @2A acc#sed
Mayor Bayani Alonte and B#ena*ent#ra U8ella oncepcion A19.0:
8):+,* 2)'(+,'8.) *+180 +< 0;) ;)9,+1( /29D) +< RAPE,
I((1)" 8as petitioner depri*ed of 0%'.DJ%AL DJ. 0%'.!!C
1eld2 Des. $he respondent H#dge co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion
a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction when, in total disregard of the
%e*ised %#les on .*idence and e5isting doctrinal -#rispr#dence, he
rendered a Decision in the case a .uo on the )asis of two @2A affida*its
@0#nong)ayans and Bal)insA which were ,)90;)2 D'2G)* ,+2 +<<)2)*
9,0+ )>9*),/) 8: 0;) E2+()/109+,, nor @90;+10 A9>9,A 0;) E)0909+,)2
', +EE+201,90: 0+ /2+(()C'D9,) 0;) '<<9',0( thereof, again in *iolation
of petitioners right to d#e process @Article III, 1, onstit#tionA.
The respondent 8udge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lac< or excess of *urisdiction when he
rendered a 7ecision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on
the facts which would establish that complainant was raped by
petitioner @%#le 119, Article III, 1, onstit#tionA, there)y setting a
dangero#s precedent where heino#s offenses can res#lt in con*iction
witho#t trial @then with "ore reason that si"pler offenses co#ld end #p
with the sa"e res#ltA.
8urisprudence ac<nowledges that 7C6 #.A,6SS ;2
,.;D;2/L #.A,667;29S, in particular, require 'a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with *udicial power to
hear and determine the matter before itJ 'b) that *urisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accusedJ 'c) that the
accused is given an opportunity to be heardJ and 'd) that *udgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The Court must admit that it is puEEled b$ the somewhat
strange wa$ the case has proceeded below. 6er >udge "avellano, after
the waiver b$ the parties of the pre7trial stage, the trial of the case did
proceed on the merits but that7
2The two +2, accused did not present an$
countervailing evidence during the trial. The$
did not take the witness stand to refute or den$
under oath the truth of the contents of the
private complainant@s aforementioned affidavit
which she e%pressl$ affirmed and confirmed in
Court, but, instead, thru their respective
law$ers, the$ rested and submitted the case
for decision merel$ on the basis of the private
complainant@s so called @desistance@ which, to
them, was sufficient enough for their purposes.
The$ left ever$thing to the so7called
@desistance@ of the private complainant.3
/ccording to petitioners, however, there was no such
trial for what was conducted on 34 2ovember %((4, aside from the
arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding to determine
the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed
by #unongbayan.
8hile H#dge !a*ellano has clai"s that petitioners9acc#sed
were each represented d#ring the hearing on ?7 3o*e")er 1997 with
their respecti*e co#nsel of choiceG that none of their co#nsel interposed an
intention to cross9e5a"ine rape *icti" H#*ielyn 0#nong)ayan, e*en after
she attested, in answer to respondent -#dgeIs clarificatory 6#estions, the
*ol#ntariness and tr#th of her two affida*its 9 one detailing the rape and
the other detailing the atte"pts to )#y her desistanceG the opport#nity was
"issedRnot #sed, hence waived . The rule of case law is that the right to
confront and cross7e%amine a witness @is a personal one and ma$ be
waived.3
;t should be pointed out, however, that the existence of
the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
requires that it -not only must be voluntary, but must be <nowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and li<ely consequences.- Dere silence of the holder
of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the
courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver .
The Solicitor 9eneral has aptly discerned a few of the
deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course
of trial+ '%) #etitioners have not been directed to present evidence to
prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the
purposeJ
%!
'&) the parties have not been given the opportunity to
present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
8udge for the purposeJ and '$) petitioners have not admitted the act
charged in the ;nformation so as to *ustify any modification in the
order of trial.
&3
There can be no short:cut to the legal process, and
there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in
court. 7ue process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of
honor in our 1ill of .ights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings.
A,9'A >(. C+DD9((9+, +, E.)/09+,(
GR 1049%1, 7 O/0+8)2 1994
F'/0(" In preparation for the synchroni&ed national and local elections
sched#led on 11 May 1992, the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A
iss#ed %esol#tion 2424 @>,#n Ban>A, pro"#lgating r#les and reg#lations
on )earing, carrying and transporting of firear"s or other deadly weapons,
on sec#rity personnel or )odyg#ards, on )earing ar"s )y "e")ers of
37
sec#rity agencies or police organi&ations, and organi&ation or
"aintenance of reaction forces d#ring the election period. 0#rs#ant to the
=,#n Ban,> Mr. !erapio 0. $accad, !ergeant9at9Ar"s, 1o#se of
%epresentati*es, wrote ongress"an (rancisc B. Aniag Hr., who was then
ongress"an of the 1st District of B#lacan re6#esting the ret#rn of the 2
firear"s iss#ed to hi" )y the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. Aniag
i""ediately instr#cted his dri*er, .rnesto Arellano, to pic: #p the firear"s
fro" his ho#se at <alle <erde and ret#rn the" to ongress. $he
police"en "anning the o#tpost flagged down the car dri*en )y Arellano
as it approached the chec:point. $hey searched the car and fo#nd the
firear"s neatly pac:ed in their g#n cases and placed in a )ag in the tr#n:
of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. $hereafter, the
police referred ArellanoKs case to the 'ffice of the ity 0rosec#tor for
in6#est. $he referral did not incl#de Aniag as a"ong those charged with
an election offense. $he ity 0rosec#tor in*ited Aniag to shed light on the
circ#"stances "entioned in ArellanoKs sworn e5planation. Aniag
e5plained that Arellano did not *iolate the firear"s )an as he in fact was
co"plying with it when apprehended )y ret#rning the firear"s to
ongress. $he 'ffice of the ity 0rosec#tor iss#ed a resol#tion
reco""ending that the case against Arellano )e dis"issed and that the
=#nofficial> charge against Aniag )e also dis"issed. 3e*ertheless, the
'M.L. directing the filing of infor"ation against Aniag and Arellano
for *iolation of !ec. 2+1, par. @6A, of B0 881 otherwise :nown as the
'"ni)#s .lection ode, in relation to !ec. 42 of %A 71++
I((1)" 8hether or not the "anner )y which 'M.L. proceeded
against petitioner r#ns co#nter to the d#e process cla#se of the
onstit#tion
H).*" Des. The manner by which ,AD6L6, proceeded against
petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the ,onstitution
T he facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the
#2# with violation of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode. 2or was he
sub*ected by the ,ity #rosecutor to a preliminary investigation for
such offense. The non:disclosure by the ,ity #rosecutor to the
petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation
is violative of due process which requires that the procedure
established by law should be obeyed.
The CK01(1C argues that petitioner was given the chance
to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the Cit$ 6rosecutor
regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that
petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of e%planation regarding the
incident . This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the
essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. 7ue
process guarantees the observance of both substantive and
procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
,onstitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
!#ch constit#ted a *iolation of his right to d#e process.
1ence, it cannot )e contended that petitioner was f#lly gi*en the
opport#nity to "eet the acc#sation against hi" as he was not informed
that he was himself a respondent in the case. $h#s, the warrantless
search cond#cted )y the 030 is declared illegal and the firear"s sei&ed
d#ring the search cannot )e #sed as e*idence in any proceeding against
the petitioner. %esol#tion 3o. 929?829 is #nconstit#tional, and therefore,
set aside.
P;9.9EE9,) C+DD1,9/'09+, S'0)..90) C+2E. >. A./1'F
GR 84818, D)/ 18, 1989
F'/0(" By *irt#e of %ep#)lic Act 771B, the 0hilippine o""#nications
!atellite orporation @01IL'M!A$A was granted =a franchise to
esta)lish, constr#ct, "aintain and operate in the 0hilippines, at s#ch
places as the grantee "ay select, station or stations and associated
e6#ip"ent and facilities for international satellite co""#nications.> !ince
19+8, It has )een leasing its satellite circ#its to 0LD$, 0hilippine ,lo)al
o""#nications, and other teleco""#nication co"panies. It was e5e"pt
fro" the -#risdiction of the 3ational $eleco""#nications o""ission
@3$A. 1owe*er, p#rs#ant to .5ec#ti*e 'rder @.'A 19+, it was placed
#nder the -#risdiction, control and reg#lation of 3$, incl#ding all its
facilities and ser*ices and the fi5ing of rates. I"ple"enting said e5ec#ti*e
order, 3$ re6#ired 01IL'M!A$ to apply for the re6#isite certificate of
p#)lic con*enience.. 'n 9 !epte")er 1987, 01IL'M!A$ filed with 3$
an application for a#thority to contin#e operating and "aintaining the
sa"e facilities, to contin#e pro*iding the international satellite
co""#nications ser*ices, and to charge the c#rrent rates applied for in
rendering s#ch ser*ices. 0ending hearing, it also applied for a pro*isional
a#thority so that it can contin#e to operate and "aintain the facilities,
pro*ide the ser*ices and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein
applied for. $he 3$ e5tended the pro*isional a#thority of 01IL'M!A$,
)#t it directed 01IL'M!A$ to charge "odified red#ced rates thro#gh a
red#ction of 17M on the present a#thori&ed rates. 01IL'M!A$ assailed
said order.
I((1)" 8hether the 3$ is re6#ired to pro*ide notice and hearing to
01IL'M!A$ in its rate9fi5ing order, which fi5ed a te"porary rate
pending final deter"ination of 01IL'M!A$Ks application.
H).*" D.!. $he order in 6#estion which was iss#ed )y respondent Alc#a&
no do#)t contains all the attri)#tes of a 6#asi9-#dicial ad-#dication.
(ore"ost is the fact that said order pertains e5cl#si*ely to petitioner and to
no other. (#rther, it is pre"ised on a finding of fact, altho#gh patently
s#perficial, that there is "erit in a red#ction of so"e of the rates charged9
)ased on an initial e*al#ation of petitionerIs financial state"ents9witho#t
affording petitioner the )enefit of an e5planation as to what partic#lar
aspect or aspects of the financial state"ents warranted a corresponding
rate red#ction. 3o rationali&ation was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, disc#ssed, which pro"pted respondents to i"pose
as "#ch as a fifteen percent @17MA rate red#ction. It is not far9fetched to
ass#"e that petitioner co#ld )e in a )etter position to rationali&e its rates
*is9a9*is the *ia)ility of its )#siness re6#ire"ents. $he rates it charges
res#lt fro" an e5ha#sti*e and detailed st#dy it cond#cts of the "#lti9
faceted intricacies attendant to a p#)lic ser*ice #nderta:ing of s#ch nat#re
and "agnit#de. 8e are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
petitionerIs ratiocination that an i""ediate red#ction in its rates wo#ld
ad*ersely affect its operations and the 6#ality of its ser*ice to the p#)lic
considering the "aintenance re6#ire"ents, the pro-ects it still has to
#nderta:e and the financial o#tlay in*ol*ed. 3ota)ly, petitioner was not
e*en afforded the opport#nity to cross9e5a"ine the inspector who iss#ed
the report on which respondent 3$ )ased its 6#estioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made
b$ respondent FTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to
its 2EC/S;:8C7;,;/L >C2,T;A2S.0 't, however, insists that notice and
hearing are not necessar$ since the assailed order is merel$ incidental to
the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporar$ in nature. This postulate
is bereft of merit.
The 2T,, in the exercise of its rate:fixing power, is
limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which con*ointly more
than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power. The 2T, order violates procedural due process because it
was issued motu proprio, without notice to #H;L,ADS/T and
without the benefit of a hearing. Said order was based merely on an
=initial evaluation,0 which is a unilateral evaluation, but had
#H;L,ADS/T been given an opportunity to present its side before
the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate
reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service
could have been shown and demonstrated to 2T,. .eduction of
rates was made without affording #H;L,ADS/T the benefit of an
explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial
statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. #H;L,ADS/T
was not even afforded the opportunity to cross:examine the
inspector who issued the report on which 2T, based its questioned
order. While the 2T, may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of #H;L,ADS/T, such rate:fixing
order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness.
ANG TI&A- VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)
%9 PHIL %35? G.R. NO. 4%49%? 27 FE& 1940
F'/0(" $here was agree"ent )etween Ang $i)ay and the 3ational La)or
Jnion, Inc @3LJA. $he 3LJ alleged that the s#pposed lac: of leather
"aterial clai"ed )y $ori)io $eodoro was )#t a sche"e adopted to
syste"atically discharge all the "e")ers of the 3LJ, fro" wor:. And this
a*er"ent is desired to )e pro*ed )y the petitioner with the records of the
B#rea# of #sto"s and Boo:s of Acco#nts of nati*e dealers in leather.
$hat 3ational 8or:erIs Brotherhood Jnion of Ang $i)ay is a co"pany or
e"ployer #nion do"inated )y $ori)io $eodoro, which was alleged )y the
3LJ as an illegal one. $he I%, decided the case and ele*ated it to the
!#pre"e o#rt, )#t a "otion for new trial was raised )y the 3LJ. B#t the
Ang $i)ay filed a "otion for opposing the said "otion.
I((1)" 8hether or not the "otion for new trial sho#ld )e granted.
H).*" Des. $he interest of -#stice wo#ld )e )etter ser*ed if the "o*ant is
gi*en opport#nity to present at the hearing the doc#"ents referred to in
his "otion and s#ch other e*idence as "ay )e rele*ant to the "ain iss#e
in*ol*ed.
It "#st )e noted that the I% is a special co#rt. It is "ore an
ad"inistrati*e )oard than a part of the integrated -#dicial syste" of the
nation. C'/ is not narrowl$ constrained b$ technical rules of procedure,
and e.uit$ and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound b$ an$ technical rules
of legal evidence but ma$ inform its mind in such manner as it ma$ deem
#ust and e.uitable. The fact, however, that the C'/ ma$ be said to be free
from rigidit$ of certain procedural re.uirements does not mean that it can
in #usticiable cases coming before it, entirel$ ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential re.uirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character2
'%) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present oneFs
cause and submit evidence in support thereofJ
'&) The tribunal must consider the evidence presentedJ
'$) The decision must have something to support itselfJ
'") The evidence must be substantialJ
'5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearingJ or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affectedJ
38
'B) The tribunal or body or any of its *udges must act on its own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy,
and not simply accept the views of a subordinateJ
'4) The 1oard or body should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can
<now the various ;ssue involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSIT- VS. HON. !UDGE IGNACIO
CAPULONG
222 SCRA %44? G.R. 99327? 27 MA- 1993
F'/0(" Leonardo 1. <illa, a first year law st#dent of 0etitioner Jni*ersity,
died of serio#s physical in-#ries at hinese ,eneral 1ospital after the
initiation rites of A6#ila Legis. Bien*enido Mar6#e& was also hospitali&ed
at the apitol Medical enter. 0etitioner Dean ynthia del astillo created
a Hoint Ad"inistration9(ac#lty9!t#dent In*estigating o""ittee which was
tas:ed to in*estigate and s#)"it a report within 72 ho#rs on the
circ#"stances s#rro#nding the death of Lennie <illa. !aid notice also
re6#ired respondent st#dents to s#)"it their written state"ents within
twenty9fo#r @2BA ho#rs fro" receipt. Altho#gh respondent st#dents
recei*ed a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the
"eanti"e, they were placed on pre*enti*e s#spension. $he In*estigating
o""ittee fo#nd a pri"a facie case against respondent st#dents for
*iolation of %#le 4 of the Law !chool atalog#e entitled /Discipline./
%espondent st#dents were then re6#ired to file their written answers to the
for"al charge. 0etitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the
charges against respondent st#dents. $he Board fo#nd respondent
st#dents g#ilty of *iolating %#les on Discipline which prohi)its participation
in ha&ing acti*ities. 1owe*er, in *iew of the lac: of #nani"ity a"ong the
"e")ers of the Board on the penalty of dis"issal, the Board left the
i"position of the penalty to the Jni*ersity Ad"inistration. Accordingly, (r.
Bernas i"posed the penalty of dis"issal on all respondent st#dents.
%espondent st#dents filed with %$ Ma:ati a $%' since they are
c#rrently enrolled. $his was granted. A day after the e5piration of the
te"porary restraining order, Dean del astillo created a !pecial Board to
in*estigate the charges of ha&ing against respondent st#dents A)as and
Mendo&a. $his was re6#ested to )e stric:en o#t )y the respondents and
arg#ed that the creation of the !pecial Board was totally #nrelated to the
original petition which alleged lac: of d#e process. $his was granted and
reinstate"ent of the st#dents was ordered.
I((1)" 8as there denial of d#e process against the respondent st#dents.
H).*" $here was no denial of d#e process, "ore partic#larly proced#ral
d#e process. $he Dean of the Ateneo Law !chool, notified and re6#ired
respondent st#dents to s#)"it their written state"ent on the incident.
Instead of filing a reply, respondent st#dents re6#ested thro#gh their
co#nsel, copies of the charges. $he nat#re and ca#se of the acc#sation
were ade6#ately spelled o#t in petitionersI notices. 0resent is the twin
ele"ents of notice and hearing.
The Dinimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner
university herein, thus+
'%) the students must be informed in W.;T;29 of the nature and
cause of any accusation against themJ
'&) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them
with the assistance of counsel, if desired+
'$) they shall be informed of the evidence against them
'") they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalfJ
and
'5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.
It cannot serio#sly )e asserted that the a)o*e re6#ire"ents
were not "et. 8hen, in *iew of the death of Leonardo <illa, petitioner
ynthia del astillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law !chool, notified and
re6#ired respondent st#dents on (e)r#ary 11, 1991 to s#)"it within
twenty9fo#r ho#rs their written state"ent on the incident,

the records
show that instead of filing a repl$, respondent students re.uested through
their counsel, copies of the charges. -hile of the students mentioned in
the Lebruar$ 11, 1441 notice dul$ submitted written statements, the others
failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an e%tension of up to
Lebruar$ 18, 1441 to file their statements.

Ind#)ita)ly, the nat#re and ca#se of the acc#sation were
ade6#ately spelled o#t in petitionersI notices dated (e)r#ary 1B and 2?,
1991.
30
It is to )e noted that the (e)r#ary 2?, 1991 letter which 6#oted
%#le 3o. 4 of its %#les of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law
!chool atalog#e was addressed indi*id#ally to respondent st#dents.
6etitioners@ noticesMletters dated (e)r#ary 11, (e)r#ary 1B and 2? clearl$
show that respondent students were given ample opportunit$ to adduce
evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.
The re.uisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the
ver$ start of the investigations before the >oint Administration Lacult$7
"tudent Committee, the law firm of AonEales 9atiler and 9ilog and
Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of
respondent students.
.espondent students may not use the argument that
since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the
written statements which became the basis of petitionersF >ebruary
%", %((% order, they were denied procedural due process. 9ranting
that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to
detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases
involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross
examination. An /7D;2;ST./T;M6 #.A,667;29 conducted to
investigate students@ participation in a haEing activit$ need not be clothed
with the attributes of a #udicial proceeding. A closer e5a"ination of the
March 2, 1991 hearing which characteriEed the rules on the investigation
as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no right
to e%amine affiants7neoph$tes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our
previous ruling in /lcua .

%espondent st#dentsI contention that the in*estigating
co""ittee failed to consider their e*idence is far fro" the tr#th )eca#se
the (e)r#ary 1B, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after
recei*ing the written state"ents and hearing the testi"onies of se*eral
witnesses. !i"ilarly, the Disciplinary BoardIs resol#tion dated March 1?,
1991 was preceded )y a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent
st#dents were s#""oned to answer clarificatory 6#estions.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
P)+E.) >(. V)2'
GR 45%85, N+>. 1%, 1937
F'/0(" $he instant petition ste"s fro" the application for )ail filed )y o
Jn-ieng. 1e clai"s that he is innocent of the cri"e charged against hi",
that he has no e5isting cri"inal record and that he wo#ld o)ser*e proper
cond#ct in the f#t#re if his application for )ail is granted. $he application
was referred to the Ins#lar 0ro)ation 'ffice, )#t was conse6#ently denied.
$he denial was pre"ised on the gro#nd that Act Fo. C221 provides
probation onl$ to those provinces with available funds for the salar$ of
probation officers, and the province referred to has no sufficient funds.
$h#s, petitioner now co"es )efore the o#rt assailing the constit#tionality
of the Act for )eing *iolati*e of the e6#al protection cla#se.
I((1)" 8hether or not there is a *iolation of the e6#al protection
g#aranteeC
H).*" Des. $he pro)ation act is in *iolation of the said constit#tional
g#arantee. It constit#tes as a class legislation which discri"inates against
persons of the sa"e class and fa*or others. 0ersonKs with si"ilar
circ#"stances "ay )e afforded with the pri*ilege of pro)ation "erely d#e
to the discretion of the pro*incial officers. 1ence, the o#rt r#led that the
said order is not constit#tional.
In the case at )ar, the res#ltant ine6#ality "ay )e said to
flow fro" the #nwarranted delegation of legislati*e power, altho#gh
perhaps this is necessarily the res#lt in e*ery case. In the instant case,
one pro*ince "ay appropriate the necessary f#nd to defray the salary of a
pro)ation officer, while another pro*ince "ay ref#se or fail to do so. In
s#ch a case, the 0ro)ation Act wo#ld )e in operation in the for"er
pro*ince )#t not in the latter. $his "eans that a person otherwise co"ing
within the p#r*iew of the law wo#ld )e a)le to en-oy the )enefits of
pro)ation in one pro*ince while another person si"ilarly sit#ated in
another pro*ince wo#ld )e denied those sa"e )enefits. $his is o)no5io#s
discri"ination. 8hile ine6#ality "ay res#lt in the application of the law and
in the confer"ent of the )enefits therein pro*ided, ine6#ality is not in al
cases the necessary res#lt. 8hate*er "ay )e the case, it is clear that
!ection 11 of the 0ro)ation Act creates a sit#ation in which discri"ination
and ine6#ality are per"itted or allowed.
8e are of the opinion that !ection 11 of Act. B221 per"its of
the denial of the e6#al protection of the law and is on that acco#nt )ad.
We see no difference = 16TW662 / L/W WH;,H 762;6S 6EC/L
#.AT6,T;A20 and a = L/W WH;,H #6.D;TS A> SC,H 762;/L0. /
law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it permits of un*ust and illegal discrmmination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.
I/;+,A >(. H)2,',*)F
GR 7995, M': 31, 1957

F'/0(" 9s#pra9
I((1)" 8hether or not there is a *iolation of the e6#al protection cla#seC
H).*" 3one. $he e6#al protection of the law cla#se is against #nd#e fa*or
and indi*id#al or class pri*ilege, as well as hostile discri"ination or the
oppression of ine6#ality. It is not intended to prohi)it legislation, which is
li"ited either in the o)-ect to which it is directed or )y territory within which
is to operate. It does not de"and a)sol#te e6#ality a"ong residentsG it
"erely re6#ires that all persons shall )e treated ali:e, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class,
if it applies ali<e to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exists for ma<ing a distinction between those who fall
within such class and those who do not.
39
VI. The 6qual #rotection Limitation
a. ')-ections to alien participation in retail trade. E $he ne5t 6#estion that
now poses sol#tion is, Does the law deny the e6#al protection of the lawsC
As pointed o#t a)o*e, the "ere fact of alienage is the root and ca#se of
the distinction )etween the alien and the national as a trader. The alien
resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted
countryJ his stay here is for personal convenienceJ he is attracted b$
the lure of gain and profit. &is aim or purpose of sta$, we admit, is neither
illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturall$ lacking in that spirit of lo$alt$
and enthusiasm for this countr$ where he temporaril$ sta$s and makes his
living, or of that spirit of regard, s$mpath$ and consideration for his Lilipino
customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness
and e%ploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien
go back to his beloved countr$ and his beloved kin and countr$men. $he
e5perience of the co#ntry is that the alien retailer has shown s#ch #tter
disregard for his c#sto"ers and the people on who" he "a:es his profit,
that it has )een fo#nd necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it "ay
see".
/nother ob*ection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never
really ma<es a genuine contribution to national income and wealth.
He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains
and profits he ma<es are not invested in industries that would help
the countryFs economy and increase national wealth. $he alienIs
interest in this co#ntry )eing "erely transient and te"porary, it wo#ld
indeed )e ill9ad*ised to contin#e entr#sting the *ery i"portant f#nction of
retail distri)#tion to his hands.
$he practices resorted to )y aliens in the control of distri)#tion, as already
pointed o#t a)o*e, their secret "anip#lations of stoc:s of co""odities
and prices, their #tter disregard of the welfare of their c#sto"ers and of
the #lti"ate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are "ere
g#ests, which practices, "anip#lations and disregard do not attend the
e5ercise of the trade )y the nationals, show the e5istence of real and
act#al, positi*e and f#nda"ental differences )etween an alien and a
national which f#lly -#stify the legislati*e classification adopted in the retail
trade "eas#re. These differences are certainl$ a valid reason for the "tate
to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. -e would be doing
violence to fact and realit$ were we to hold that no reason or ground for a
legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
8. 7ifference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for
distinction. N
$he a)o*e o)-ectiona)le characteristics of the e5ercise of the retail trade
)y the aliens, which are act#al and real, f#rnish s#fficient gro#nds for
legislati*e classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. !o"e
"ay disagree with the wisdo" of the legislat#reIs classification. $o this we
answer, that this is the prerogati*e of the law9"a:ing power. !ince the
Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and
all persons of one class are treated ali<e , and as it cannot be said that
the classification is patentl$ unreasonable and unfounded, it is in dut$
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative
and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of e.ual protection
established b$ the Constitution.
1roadly spea<ing, the power of the legislature to ma<e distinctions
and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by the
equal protection of the laws clause. $he legislati*e power ad"its of a
wide scope of discretion, and a law can )e *iolati*e of the constit#tional
li"itation only when the classification is witho#t reasona)le )asis.
(A*+,9( N+0)(" Jnder the a)o*e"entioned case, the case was decided
#nder the 1947 onstit#tion wherein PARIT- RIGHTS were granted to
J.!. iti&ens.)
V9..)A'( >(. H91 C;9+,A T('9 P'+ H+
GR 29%4%, N+>. 10,1978
F'/0(" ity ordinance 3o +747, prohi)its aliens fro" )eing
e"ployed or engaged or participate in any position or association or
)#siness en#"erated therein, whether per"anent, te"porary or cas#al,
witho#t first sec#ring an e"ploy"ent per"it fro" the Mayor of Manila is
)eing 6#estioned )y the pri*ate respondent for allegedly in *iolation of the
e6#al protection g#arantee. $he trial co#rt r#led in fa*or of the n#llity of
the ordinance. 'n appeal, petitioner arg#es that the ordinance cannot )e
in*alidated on the gro#nd that it *iolated the r#le on #nifor"ity of ta5ation,
)eca#se it apples to p#re ta5 or re*en#es "eas#res and said ordinance is
not s#ch )#t is an e5ercise of the police power of the state.
I((1)" 8hether or not the said ordinance is #nconstit#tionalC
H).*" $he ordinance is #nconstit#tional. The contention that it was
not purel$ a ta% or revenue measure because its principle purpose was for
regulation has no merit. ;t is obvious that TH6 A.7;2/2,6 W/S
#C.#AS6L@ >A. TH6 ./;S;29 A> DA26@ C276. TH6 9C;S6 A>
/ .69CL/T;A2 . >urther, the assailed ordinance violates the equal
protection clause. To require a person to get a wor< permit before he
can be employed from the Dayor who may withhold or refuse it at
will is tantamount to the denial of the basic right of a person to
engage in a means of livelihood. /liens once admitted cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law.
The contention that Krdinance Fo. =I;5 is not a purel$ ta%
or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulator$ in nature
has no merit. -hile it is true that the first part which re.uires that the alien
shall secure an emplo$ment permit from the 0a$or involves the e%ercise
of discretion and #udgment in the processing and approval or disapproval
of applications for emplo$ment permits and therefore is regulator$ in
character the second part which re.uires the pa$ment of 6I0.00 as
emplo$ee@s fee is not regulator$ but a revenue measure. There is no
logic or *ustification in exacting #53.33 from aliens who have been
=,L6/.670 for employment. ;t is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The #53.33 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
excessive 1CT 16,/CS6 ;T >/;LS TA ,A2S;76. M/L;7
SC1ST/2T;/L 7;>>6.62,6S ;2 S;TC/T;A2 /DA29 ;27;M;7C/L
/L;62S WHA /.6 .6EC;.67 TA #/@ ;T. /lthough the equal
protection clause of the ,onstitution does not forbid classification, it
is imperative that the classification, should be based on real and
substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the sub*ect of
the particular legislation. The same amount of #53.33 is being
collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or
permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee
or a highly paid executive.
Ardinance 2o. B5$4 does not lay down any criterion or
standard to guide the Dayor in the exercise of his discretion . 't has
been held that where an ordinance of a municipalit$ fails to state an$
polic$ or to set up an$ standard to guide or limit the ma$or@s action,
e%presses no purpose to be attained b$ re.uiring a permit, enumerates
no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lac<s standard,
thus conferring upon the Dayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to
grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is
invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
In hinese (lo#r I"porters Association *s. 0rice
!ta)ili&ation Board, where a law granted a go*ern"ent agency power to
deter"ine the allocation of wheat flo#r a"ong i"porters, the !#pre"e
o#rt r#led against the interpretation of #ncontrolled power as it *ested in
the ad"inistrati*e officer an ar)itrary discretion to )e e5ercised witho#t a
policy, r#le, or standard fro" which it can )e "eas#red or controlled.
It was also held in 0ri"icias *s. (#goso that the a#thority
and discretion to grant and ref#se per"its of all classes conferred #pon
the Mayor of Manila )y the %e*ised harter of Manila is not #ncontrolled
discretion )#t legal discretion to )e e5ercised within the li"its of the law.
'rdinance 3o. +747 is *oid )eca#se it does not contain or
s#ggest any standard or criterion to g#ide the "ayor in the e5ercise of the
power which has )een granted to hi" )y the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of
law and equal protection rule of the ,onstitution.
+/e.uiring a person before he can be emplo$ed to get a
permit from the Cit$ 0a$or of 0anila who ma$ withhold or refuse it at will
is tantamount to den$ing him the basic right of the people in the
6hilippines to engage in a means of livelihood. -hile it is true that the
6hilippines as a "tate is not obliged to admit aliens within its territor$,
once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. $he
shelter of protection #nder the d#e process and e6#al protection cla#se is
gi*en to all persons, )oth aliens and citi&ens.A
D1D.'+ >(. C+D).)/
GR 52245, !',. 22, 1980

F'/0(" $he 0etition alleges that petitioner, 0atricio D#"lao, is a for"er
,o*ernor of 3#e*a <i&caya. 0etitioner D#"lao specifically 6#estions the
constit#tionality of section B of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 72 as discri"inatory
and contrary to the e6#al protection and d#e process g#arantees of the
onstit#tion. !aid !ection B pro*ides2
"ec. C. "pecial 8is.ualification 7 'n addition to violation of
section 10 of Art. N''7C of the Constitution and
dis.ualification mentioned in e%isting laws, which are hereb$
declared as dis.ualification for an$ of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof.
An$ retired elective provincial, cit$ of municipal official
+1,who has received pa$ment of the retirement benefits to
which he is entitled under the law and +2,who shall have
been =I $ears of age at the commencement of the term of
office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be .ualified
to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired.
0etitioner D#"lao alleges that the aforecited pro*ision is directed
insidio#sly against hi", and that the classification pro*ided therein is
)ased on /p#rely ar)itrary gro#nds and, therefore, class legislation.
I((1)" 8hether or not said pro*ision *iolates the e6#al protection
g#aranteeC
H).*" 3o. 0etitioner D#"laoIs contention that section B of B0 Blg. 72 is
discri"inatory against hi" personally is )elied )y the fact that se*eral
petitions for the dis6#alification of other candidates for local positions
)ased on the challenged pro*ision ha*e already )een filed with the
'M.L.. $his tellingly o*erthrows D#"laoIs contention of intentional or
p#rposef#l discri"ination.
$he assertion that !ection B of B0 Blg. 72 is contrary to the
safeg#ard of e6#al protection is neither well ta:en. The constitutional
guarantee of e.ual protection of the laws is sub#ect to rational
40
classification. 'f the groupings are based on reasonable and real
differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differentl$ from
another class. >or purposes of public service, employees B5 years of
age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. 6mployees attaining that age are sub*ect to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.
In respect of election to pro*incial, city, or "#nicipal
positions, to re6#ire that candidates sho#ld not )e "ore than +7 years of
age at the ti"e they ass#"e office, if applica)le to e*eryone, "ight or
"ight not )e a reasona)le classification altho#gh, as the !olicitor ,eneral
has inti"ated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. 'n the
other hand, it "ight )e that persons "ore than +7 years old "ay also )e
good electi*e local officials.
o"ing now to the case of retirees. %etire"ent fro"
go*ern"ent ser*ice "ay or "ay not )e a reasona)le dis6#alification for
electi*e local officials. (or one thing, there can also )e retirees fro"
go*ern"ent ser*ice at ages, say )elow +7. It "ay neither )e reasona)le
to dis6#alify retirees, aged +7, for a +79year old retiree co#ld )e a good
local official -#st li:e one, aged +7, who is not a retiree.
B#t, in the case of a +79year old electi*e local official, who
has retired fro" a pro*incial, city or "#nicipal office, there is reason to
disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had
retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new
blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for
government wor< is present, and what is emphatically significant is
that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and
unavailable for the same government wor<, but, which, by virtue of a
change of mind, he would li<e to assume again . 't is for the ver$
reason that ine.ualit$ will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision. >ust as that provision does not den$ e.ual
protection, neither does it permit such denial @see 0eople *s. <era, +7
0hil. 7+ O1944PA. 0ersons si"ilarly sit#ated are si"ilarly treated.
In fine, it )ears reiteration that the equal protection clause
does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all
those belonging to the same. The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of $ounger blood in local governments. The classification in
.uestion being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid
even if at times, it ma$ be susceptible to the ob#ection that it is marred b$
theoretical inconsistencies.
@3'$.2 $he 6#estioned law is A)2D',) to the E12E+()( for which it was
enactedA
P;9.9EE9,) A((+/9'09+, +< S)2>9/) ECE+20)2(, 9,/. >(. D29..+,
GR 81958, !1,) 30, 1988

F'/0(" 0hilippine Association of !er*ice .5porters, inc. @0A!.IA, is a
do"estic corporation engaged principally in the recr#it"ent of (ilipino
wor:ers, "ale and fe"ale for o*erseas e"ploy"ent. 0A!.I see:s to
challenge the constit#tionality of the Depart"ent 'rder 3o. 1 series of
1998 of the Depart"ent of La)or. !aid order prohi)ited and s#spended
the o*erseas deploy"ent of (ilipina Do"estic and ho#sehold wor:ers.
$heir "ain contention is that the order is in*alid for the D'L. erroneo#sly
e5ercised police power, which is an ad-#nct on the powers of congress,
and not e5ec#ti*e in character. Moreo*er, it alleged that there was a
*iolation of the e6#al protection cla#se for it only so#ght to s#spend the
deploy"ent of (ilipina wor:ers, th#s there was discri"ination.
I((1)" 8hether or not there is a *iolation of the e6#al protection cla#seC
H).*" 3o. $he o#rt is satisfied that the classification "ade3 9 the
preference for fe"ale wor:ers 9 rests on s#)stantial distinctions.
As a "atter of -#dicial notice, the o#rt is well aware of the
#nhappy plight that has )efallen o#r fe"ale la)or force a)road, especially
do"estic ser*ants, a"id e5ploitati*e wor:ing conditions "ar:ed )y, in not
a few cases, physical and personal a)#se. The sordid tales of
maltreatment suffered b$ migrant Lilipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed b$ testimonies of returning workers, are
compelling motives for urgent Aovernment action. As precisel$ the
caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
victims of e%ploitation. 'n fulfilling that dut$, the Court sustains the
Aovernment@s efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In
the first place, there is no e*idence that, e5cept perhaps for isolated
instances, o#r "en a)road ha*e )een afflicted with an identical
predica"ent. $he petitioner has proffered no arg#"ent that the
,o*ern"ent sho#ld act si"ilarly with respect to "ale wor:ers. The ,ourt,
of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men
are superior to women. What the ,ourt is saying is that it was largely
a matter of evidence 'that women domestic wor<ers are being ill:
treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or
arbitrary yardstic< that the 9overnment acted in this case. It is
e*idence capa)le indeed of #n6#estiona)le de"onstration and e*idence
this o#rt accepts. $he o#rt cannot, howe*er, say the sa"e thing as far
as "en are concerned. $here is si"ply no e*idence to -#stify s#ch an
inference. !#ffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are
concerned, this ,ourt is content that distinctions are borne by the
evidence. 7iscrimination in this case is *ustified.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is
germane to the purpose behind the measure . !n.uestionabl$, it is the
avowed ob#ective of 8epartment Krder Fo. 1 to enhance the protection
for Lilipino female overseas workers. 15 This Court has no .uarrel that in
the midst of the terrible mistreatment Lilipina workers have suffered
abroad, a ban on deplo$ment will be for their own good and welfare.
HIMAGAN >(. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. N+. 113811 O/0+8)2 7, 1994, 7APUNAN, !."
F'/0(" 0etitioner, a police"an was i"plicated in the :illing of Ben-a"in
Machitar, Hr. and the atte"pted "#rder of Berna)e Machitar. After the
infor"ations for "#rder and atte"pted "#rder were filed, the trial co#rt
iss#ed an 'rder s#spending petitioner #ntil the ter"ination of the case on
the )asis of !ection B7, %.A. +977. In response, petitioner filed a "otion to
lift the order for his s#spension, relying on !ection B2 of 0.D. 8?7 of the
i*il !er*ice Decree, that his s#spension sho#ld )e li"ited to 9? days.
%espondent -#dge denied the "otion pointing o#t that #nder !ection B7 of
%.A. +977, the acc#sed shall )e s#spended fro" office #ntil his case is
ter"inated. $he "otion for reconsideration of the order of denial was,
li:ewise, denied. 1ence, the petition for certiorari and "anda"#s to set
aside the orders of respondent H#dge and to co""and hi" to lift
petitionerIs pre*enti*e s#spension. 0etitioner posits that as a "e")er of
the 0hilippine 3ational 0olice, he is co*ered )y the i*il !er*ice Law,
partic#larly !ec. B2 of 0D 8?7 of the i*il !er*ice Decree, which li"its the
"a5i"#" period of s#spension to ninety @9?A days. 1e clai"s that an
i"position of pre*enti*e s#spension of o*er 9? days is contrary to the i*il
!er*ice Law and wo#ld )e a *iolation of his constit#tional right to e6#al
protection of laws.
I((1)" 8hether or not the i"position of pre*enti*e s#spension of o*er
9? days is a *iolation of his constit#tional right to e6#al protection of lawsC
H).* 3o. 1e clai"s that an i"position of pre*enti*e s#spension of o*er
9? days is contrary to the i*il !er*ice Law and wo#ld )e a *iolation of his
constit#tional right to e6#al protection of laws. 1e f#rther asserts that the
re6#ire"ents in !ec. B7 of %.A. +977 that /the co#rt shall i""ediately
s#spend the acc#sed fro" office #ntil the case is ter"inated/ and the
s#cceeding sentence, /!#ch case shall )e s#)-ect to contin#o#s trial and
shall )e ter"inated within ninety @9?A days fro" arraign"ent of the
acc#sed/ are )oth s#)stanti*e and sho#ld )e ta:en together to "ean that
if the case is not ter"inated within 9? days, the period of pre*enti*e
s#spension "#st )e lifted )eca#se of the co""and that the trial "#st )e
ter"inated within ninety @9?A days fro" arraign"ent.
8e disagree.
F92(0. $he lang#age of the first sentence of !ec. B7 of %.A. +977 is clear,
plain and free fro" a")ig#ity. It gi*es no other "eaning than that the
s#spension fro" office of the "e")er of the 030 charged with gra*e
offense where the penalty is si5 years and one day or "ore shall last #ntil
the ter"ination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the
termination of the case. The second sentence of the same "ection
providing that the trial must be terminated within ninet$ +40, da$s from
arraignment does not .ualif$ or limit the first sentence. The two can stand
independentl$ of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension.
$he second deals with the ti"e fro" within which the trial sho#ld )e
finished.
!#ppose the trial is not ter"inated within ninety days fro" arraign"ent,
sho#ld the s#spension of acc#sed )e liftedC $he answer is certainly no.
8hile the law #ses the "andatory word /shall/ )efore the phrase /)e
ter"inated within ninety @9?A days/, there is nothing in /.A. =45I that
suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the
trial is not terminated within that period. Fonetheless, the >udge who fails
to decide the case within the period without #ustifiable reason ma$ be
sub#ect to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the
facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liabilit$. If the trial is #nreasona)ly
delayed witho#t fa#lt of the acc#sed s#ch that he is depri*ed of his right to
a speedy trial, he is not witho#t a re"edy. 1e "ay as: for the dis"issal of
the case. !ho#ld the co#rt ref#se to dis"iss the case, the acc#sed can
co"pel its dis"issal )y certiorari, prohi)ition or "anda"#s, or sec#re his
li)erty )y ha)eas corp#s.
S)/+,*. 0etitioner "isapplies !ec. B2 of 0D 8?7. A "etic#lo#s reading of
the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of pre*enti*e
s#spension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal
cases, as here. 8hat is "ore, !ection B2 e5pressly li"its the period of
pre*enti*e s#spension to ninety @9?A days. !ec. 91 of %.A. +977 which
states that /$he i*il !er*ice Law and its i"ple"enting r#les shall apply to
all personnel of the Depart"ent/ si"ply "eans that the pro*isions of the
i*il !er*ice Law and its i"ple"enting r#les and reg#lations are
applica)le to "e")ers of the 0hilippine 3ational 0olice insofar as the
pro*isions, r#les and reg#lations are not inconsistent with %.A. +977.
ertainly, !ection B2 of the i*il !er*ice Decree which li"its the
pre*enti*e s#spension to ninety @9?A days cannot apply to "e")ers of the
41
030 )eca#se !ec. B7 of %.A. +997 pro*ides differently, that is, the
s#spension where the penalty i"posed )y law e5ceeds si5 @+A years shall
contin#e #ntil the case is ter"inated.
T;92*. 0etitionerIs reliance on Layno and Deloso is "isplaced. $hese
cases all ste""ed fro" charges in *iolation of %.A. 4?19 @1?+?A,
otherwise :nown as the Anti9,raft and orr#pt 0ractices Act which, #nli:e
%.A. +977, is silent on the d#ration of the pre*enti*e s#spension. !ec. 14
of %.A. 4?19 reads as follows2
F+120;. (ro" the deli)erations of the Bica"eral onference o""ittee
on 3ational Defense relati*e to the )ill that )eca"e %.A. +977, the
"eaning of !ection B7 of %.A. +977 insofar as the period of s#spension is
concerned )eco"es all the "ore clear.
$he foregoing disc#ssions re*eal the legislati*e intent to place on
pre*enti*e s#spension a "e")er of the 030 charged with gra*e felonies
where the penalty i"posed )y law e5ceeds si5 years of i"prison"ent and
which s#spension contin#es #ntil the case against hi" is ter"inated.
The reason why members of the #2# are treated
differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the
badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions.
;f a suspended policeman criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending,
his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact
that the accused is in uniform and armed.
$he e6#al protection cla#se e5ists to pre*ent #nd#e fa*or or
pri*ilege. %ecogni&ing the e5istence of real differences a"ong "en, the
e6#al protection cla#se does not de"and a)sol#te e6#ality. It "erely
re6#ires that all persons shall )e treated ali:e, #nder li:e circ#"stances
and conditions )oth as to the pri*ileges conferred and lia)ilities enforced.
$h#s, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid
classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. 'f
the classification is based on real and substantial differences ) is
germane to the purpose of the law) applies to all members of the same
class) and applies to current as well as future conditions, the classification
ma$ not be impugned as violating the Constitution@s e.ual protection
guarantee.
J19,0+ >(. COMELEC
G.R. N+. 189%98, F)821'2:, 22. 2010
P1,+. C!"
3ote2 $he ! re*ersed its Dece")er 1, 2??9 decision *ia the M%s of
'M.L. and "o*ant9inter*enors
FACTS" In preparation for the 2?1? elections, the o""ission on
.lections @'M.L.A iss#ed %esol#tion 3o. 8+78 [ the ,#idelines on
the (iling of ertificates of andidacy @oA and 3o"ination of 'fficial
andidates of %egistered 0olitical 0arties in onnection with the May 1?,
2?1? 3ational and Local .lections. !ec. B of %esol#tion 3o. 8+78
pro*ides that =Any person holding a p#)lic appointi*e office or position 5 5
5 shall )e considered ipso facto resigned fro" his office #pon the filing of
his certificate of candidacy @a#to"atic resignationA howe*er it e5e"pts
those elected officials saying that =Any person holding an electi*e office or
position shall not )e considered resigned #pon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the sa"e or any other electi*e office or position.>
!ec.14@par. 4A of %ep#)lic Act @=%.A.>A 3o. 94+9 pro*ides2 =5 5 5 any
person holding a p#)lic appointi*e office or position 5 5 5 shall )e
considered ipso facto resigned fro" hisRher office 5 5 5.>
!ec. ++ of B0 Blg. 881, or the '"ni)#s .lection ode, reads2 =5 5 5 Any
person holding a p#)lic appointi*e office or position 5 5 5 shall )e
considered ipso facto resigned fro" his office #pon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.>
0etitioners were appointi*e officers of the go*ern"ent who were planning
to r#n in the 2?1? elections so#ght the n#llification of !ec. B@aA on the
gro#nd, a"ong others, that it is discri"inatory and *iolates the e6#al
protection cla#se of the onstit#tion. $he !#pre"e o#rt r#led in their
fa*or. $his pro"pted the 'M.L. to file a "otion for reconsideration
and the "o*ant9inter*enors with their own "otion for reconsideration9in9
inter*ention.
ISSUES" 1A 8hether the assailed decision is contrary to the constit#tional
proscription against the participation of p#)lic appointi*e officials and
"e")ers of the "ilitary in partisan political acti*ity.
2A 8hether the assailed pro*isions do not *iolate the e6#al
protection cla#se when they accord differential treat"ent to electi*e and
appointi*e officials.
4A 8hether the assailed pro*isions do not s#ffer fro" the
infir"ity of o*er)readth.
HELD" D.! to all.
$he o#rt now r#les that !ection B@aA of %esol#tion 8+78, !ection ++ of
the '"ni)#s .lection ode, and the second pro*iso in the third paragraph
of !ection 14 of %A 94+9 are not #nconstit#tional.
W!ection B@aA of 'M.L. %esol#tion 8+78 o"pliant with Law
!ection B@aA of 'M.L. %esol#tion 8+78 is a faithf#l reflection of the
present state of the law and -#rispr#dence on the "atter, *i&.2
I,/1D8),0 AEE+9,09>) O<<9/9'.. 9 Jnder !ection 14 of %A 94+9, which
reiterates !ection ++ of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, any person holding a
p#)lic appointi*e office or position, incl#ding acti*e "e")ers of the Ar"ed
(orces of the 0hilippines, and officers and e"ployees in go*ern"ent9
owned or 9controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidac$.

I,/1D8),0 E.)/0)* O<<9/9'.. [ Jpon the other hand, p#rs#ant to !ection
1B of %A 9??+ or the (air .lection Act, which repealed !ection +7 of the
'"ni)#s .lection ode and rendered ineffecti*e !ection 11 of %.A. 8B4+
insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only #pon the start
of the ca"paign period corresponding to the positions for which they are
r#nning, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidac$ for the same or an$ other
elected office or position. In fine, an elected official "ay r#n for another
position witho#t forfeiting his seat.

These laws and regulations implement Section &'"), /rticle ;H:1 of
the %(!4 ,onstitution, which prohibits civil service officers and
employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign. T;) 9,0),09+, 0+ 9DE+() ' (029/0 .9D90'09+, +, 0;)
E'209/9E'09+, +< /9>9. ()2>9/) +<<9/)2( ',* )DE.+:))( 9, E'209(',
E+.909/'. /'DE'9A,( 9( 1,D9(0'G'8.).
$o e"phasi&e its i"portance, this constit#tional )an on ci*il ser*ice
officers and e"ployees is presently reflected and i"ple"ented )y a
n#")er of stat#tes. @e.g. !ection B+@)A@2+A, hapter 7 and !ection 77,
hapter 8 [ )oth of !#)title A, $itle I, Boo: < of the Ad"inistrati*e ode
of 1987A. !ection 2+1@iA of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 881 @the '"ni)#s
.lection odeA f#rther "a:es inter*ention )y ci*il ser*ice officers and
e"ployees in partisan political acti*ities an election offense. The intent of
both ,ongress and the framers of our ,onstitution to limit the
participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan
political activities is too plain to be mista<en.

9ut "ection 2+C,, Article 'N79 of the 1485 Constitution and the
implementing statutes appl$ onl$ to civil servants holding apolitical
offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover
elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that =GtIhe civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the 9overnment, including government:owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.0 This is because elected public
officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan
political activities almost all year round, even outside of the
campaign period. #olitical partisanship is the inevitable essence of a
political office, elective positions included.
NSection "'a) of .esolution !B4!, Section %$ of ./ ($B(, and Section
BB of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode 7o 2ot Miolate the 6qual #rotection
,lause
In tr#th, this o#rt has already r#led s6#arely on whether these dee"ed9
resigned pro*isions challenged in the case at )ar *iolate the e6#al
protection cla#se of the onstit#tion in (ariNas, et al. *. .5ec#ti*e
!ecretary, et al.

$he petitioners in (ariNas th#s )ro#ght an e6#al protection challenge
against !ection 1B, with the end in *iew of ha*ing the dee"ed9resigned
pro*isions =apply e6#ally> to )oth elected and appointi*e officials. 8e
held, howe*er, that the legal dichotom$ created b$ the (egislature is a
reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions
between the two classes of officials. onse6#ently, the contention that
!ection 1B of the (air .lection Act, in relation to !ections ++ and +7 of the
'"ni)#s .lection ode, infringed on the e6#al protection cla#se of the
onstit#tion, failed "#ster.
In said case, the o#rt r#led that2
2"ubstantial distinctions clearl$ e%ist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
An the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of
their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the
appointing authority.
/nother substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
that under Section 55, ,hapter !, Title ;, Subsection /. ,ivil Service
,ommission, 1oo< M of the /dministrative ,ode of %(!4 '6xecutive
Arder 2o. &(&), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the
civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or ta<e 'sic) part in any election except to vote.
Cnder the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to ta<e part
in political and electoral activities.
42
1y repealing Section B4 but retaining Section BB of the Amnibus
6lection ,ode, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within
the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification. "ince the classification #ustif$ing "ection 1C of /ep. Act Fo.
400=, i.e., elected officials vis7O7vis appointive officials, is anchored upon
material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging
under the same classification are similarly treated, the e.ual
protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.3
$he o#rt declared these pro*isions co"pliant with the e6#al protection
cla#se. It held that (9) in reg#lating the speech of its e"ployees, the state
as e"ployer has interests that differ significantly fro" those it possesses
in reg#lating the speech of the citi&enry in generalG (99) the co#rts "#st
therefore )alance the legiti"ate interest of e"ployee free e5pression
against the interests of the e"ployer in pro"oting efficiency of p#)lic
ser*icesG (999) if the e"ployeesK e5pression interferes with the "aintenance
of efficient and reg#larly f#nctioning ser*ices, the li"itation on speech is
not #nconstit#tionalG and (9>) the Legislat#re is to )e gi*en so"e fle5i)ility
or latit#de in ascertaining which positions are to )e co*ered )y any
stat#tory restrictions. Therefore, insofar as government emplo$ees are
concerned, the correct standard of review is an ;2T6.6ST:1/L/2,;29
/##.A/,H, a means7end scrutin$ that e%amines the closeness of fit
between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in .uestion.
NSection "'a) of .esolution !B4!, Section %$ of ./ ($B(, and Section
BB of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode 7o 2ot Suffer from Averbreadth
>irst , according to the assailed Decision, the challenged provisions of law
are overl$ broad because the$ appl$ indiscriminatel$ to all civil servants
holding appointive posts, without due regard for the t$pe of position being
held b$ the emplo$ee running for elective office and the degree of
influence that ma$ be attendant thereto. Such a myopic view obviously
fails to consider a different, yet equally plausible, threat to the
government posed by the partisan potential of a large and growing
bureaucracy+ the danger of systematic abuse perpetuated by a
=powerful political machine0 that has amassed =the scattered
powers of government wor<ers0 so as to give itself and its
incumbent wor<ers an =unbrea<able grasp on the reins of power.0
Second , the assailed 8ecision also held that the challenged provisions of
law are overl$ broad because the$ are made to appl$ indiscriminatel$ to
all civil servants holding appointive offices, without due regard for the t$pe
of elective office being sought, whether it be partisan or nonpartisan in
character, or in the national, municipal or baranga$ level. The Court ruled
that? A perusal of /esolution 8=58 will immediatel$ disclose that the rules
and guidelines set forth therein refer to the filing of certificates of
candidacy and nomination of official candidates of registered
political parties, in connection with the Day %3, &3%3 2ational and
Local 6lections. Abviously, these rules and guidelines, including the
restriction in Section "'a) of .esolution !B4!, were issued
specifically for purposes of the Day %3, &3%3 2ational and Local
6lections, which, it must be noted, are decidedly partisan in
character. Thus, it is clear that the restriction in Section "'a) of ./
!B4! applies only to the candidacies of appointive officials vying for
partisan elective posts in the Day %3, &3%3 2ational and Local
6lections. An this score, the overbreadth challenge leveled against
Section "'a) is clearly unsustainable. "imilarl$, a considered review of
"ection 1; of /A 4;=4 and "ection == of the Kmnibus 1lection Code, in
con#unction with other related laws on the matter, will confirm that these
provisions are li<ewise not intended to apply to elections for
nonpartisan public offices. The only elections which are relevant to
the present inquiry are the elections for barangay offices, since
these are the only elections in this country which involve
nonpartisan public offices. ;n this regard, it is well to note that from
as far bac< as the enactment of the Amnibus 6lection ,ode in %(!5,
,ongress has intended that these nonpartisan barangay elections be
governed by S#6,;/L .CL6S, including a separate rule on deemed
resignations which is found in Section $( of the Amnibus 6lection
,ode.
In the Jnited !tates, clai"s of facial o*er)readth ha*e )een entertained
only where, in the -#dg"ent of the co#rt, the possi)ility that protected
speech of others "ay )e "#ted and percei*ed grie*ances left to fester
@d#e to the possi)le inhi)itory effects of o*erly )road stat#tesA o#tweighs
the possi)le har" to society in allowing so"e #nprotected speech or
cond#ct to go #np#nished. (acial o*er)readth has li:ewise not )een
in*o:ed where a li"iting constr#ction co#ld )e placed on the challenged
stat#te, and where there are readily apparent constr#ctions that wo#ld
c#re, or at least s#)stantially red#ce, the alleged o*er)readth of the
stat#te.

;n the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting
incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they
actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less li<ely evil of
having arguably protected candidacies bloc<ed by the possible
inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.
&92'+A+ )0 '.. >. T;) P;9.9EE9,) T210; C+DD9((9+,
GR N+. 192935? D)/)D8)2 7, 2010
!. M),*+F'
FACTS"
COMMISSIONER !OSE T. ALMONTE >(. HONORA&LE CONRADO M.
VASJUE$ ',* CONCERNED CITI$ENS
G.R. N+. 953%7 M': 23, 1995
$o p#t this case in perspecti*e it sho#ld )e stated at the o#tset that it does
not concern a de"and )y a citi&en for infor"ation #nder the freedo" of
infor"ation g#arantee of the onstit#tion. %ather it concerns the power of
the 'ffice of the '")#ds"an to o)tain e*idence in connection with an
in*estigation cond#cted )y it *is9a9*is the clai" of pri*ilege of an agency
of the ,o*ern"ent.
F'/0(" 0etitioner Al"onte was for"erly o""issioner of the .cono"ic
Intelligence and In*estigation B#rea# @.IIBA, while 0ere& is hief of the
.IIBIs B#dget and (iscal Manage"ent Di*ision. $he s#)poena d#ces
tec#" was iss#ed )y the '")#ds"an in connection with his in*estigation
of an anony"o#s letter, written )y an e"ployee of the .IIB and a
concerned citi&en, alleging that f#nds representing sa*ings fro" #nfilled
positions in the .IIB had )een illegally dis)#rsed. $here were #nfilled
positions )eca#se one h#ndred ninety @19?A personnel were dis"issed,
and allegedly, these 19? personnel contin#ed to recei*e their salaries as
=ghost agents.>
0etitioner Al"onte denied the allegations and as:ed that the
co"plaint )e dis"issed and the case considered closed. !i"ilarly
petitioner 0ere&, )#dget chief of the .IIB, denied sa*ings had )een
reali&ed fro" the i"ple"entation of of ..'. 3o. 127 @dis"issal of 19?
personnel.A
$ he ,raft In*estigation 'fficer of the '")#ds"anIs office,
Hose (. !aNo as:ed for a#thority to cond#ct a preli"inary in*estigation.
Anticipating the grant of his re6#est, he iss#ed a s#)poena to petitioners
Al"onte and 0ere&, re6#iring the" to s#)"it their co#nter9affida*its and
the affida*its of their witnesses, as well as a s#)poena d#ces tec#" to the
hief of the .IIBIs Acco#nting Di*ision ordering hi" to )ring /all
doc#"ents relating to 0ersonal !er*ices (#nds for the year 1988 and all
e*idence, s#ch as *o#chers @salaryA for the whole plantilla of .IIB for
1988./
0etitioners Al"onte and 0ere& "o*ed to 6#ash the s#)poena and the
s#)poena d#ces tec#". %espondent '")#ds"an granted the "otion to
6#ash the s#)poena in *iew of the fact that there were no affida*its filed
against petitioners. B#t he denied their "otion to 6#ash the
s#)poena d#ces tec#". 1e r#led that petitioners were not )eing forced to
prod#ce e*idence against the"sel*es, since the s#)poena d#ces
tec#" was directed to the hief Acco#ntant, petitioner 3erio %ogado. In
addition the '")#ds"an ordered the hief of the %ecords a !ection of
the .IIB, petitioner .lisa %i*era, to prod#ce )efore the in*estigator /all
doc#"ents relating to 0ersonnel !er*ice (#nds, for the year 1988, and all
doc#"ents, salary *o#chers for the whole plantilla of the .IIB for 1988,
within ten @1?A days fro" receipt hereof./
0etitioners Al"onte and 0ere& "o*ed for reconsideration, stating that, the
'")#ds"an can act only /in any appropriate case, and s#)-ect to s#ch
li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law/ and that the co"plaint in this case
is #nsigned and #n*erified, th#s the case is not an appropriate one.
According to the", those co"plainants who wrote the letter sho#ld )e
identified and sho#ld sign the co"plaint. 'therwise, their right #nder the
e6#al protection cla#se of the onstit#tion will )e *iolated. $he "otion for
reconsideration, ha*ing )een denied, hence, this petition.
I((1)2 8o3 petitonerKs right to e6#al protection of the laws has )een
*iolated.
H).*" 3'. The Constitution e%pressl$ en#oins the Kmbudsman to act on
an$ complaint filed -in any form or manner- concerning official acts or
omissions. +Art. N', P 12,? The Kmbudsman and his 8eputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptl$ on complaints filed in an$ form
or manner against public officials or emplo$ees of the Aovernment, or an$
subdivision, agenc$, or instrumentalit$ thereof, including government7
owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notif$ the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
$he '")#ds"an Act of 1989 pro*ides in \ 2+@2A2 $he 'ffice
of the '")#ds"an shall recei*e co"plaints fro" any so#rce in whate*er
for" concerning an official act or o"ission. It shall act on the co"plaint
i""ediately and if it finds the sa"e entirely )aseless, it shall dis"iss the
sa"e and infor" the co"plainant of s#ch dis"issal citing the reasons
therefor. If it finds a reasona)le gro#nd to in*estigate f#rther, it shall first
f#rnish the respondent p#)lic officer or e"ployee with a s#""ary of the
co"plaint and re6#ire hi" to s#)"it a written answer within se*enty9two
ho#rs fro" receipt thereof. If the answer is fo#nd satisfactory, it shall
dis"iss the case.
Accordingly, in Dia& *. !andigan)ayan the o#rt held that
testi"ony gi*en at a fact9finding in*estigation and charges "ade in a
pleading in a case in co#rt constit#ted a s#fficient )asis for the
'")#ds"an to co""ence in*estigation, )eca#se a for"al co"plaint was
really not necessary. %ather than referring to the for" of co"plaints,
therefore, the phrase /in an appropriate case/ in Art. ;I, \ 12 "eans any
case concerning official act or o"ission which is alleged to )e /illegal,
#n-#st, i"proper, or inefficient./ $he phrase /s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as
43
"ay )e pro*ided )y law/ refers to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y
ongress or, in the a)sence thereof, to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e
i"posed )y the co#rts. Such limitations may well include a
requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the
public excluded, as exception to the general nature of the
proceedings in the Affice of the Ambudsman. / reconciliation is
thereby made between the demands of national security and the
requirement of accountability enshrined in the ,onstitution.
-hat has been said above disposes of petitioners@
contention that the anon$mous letter7complaint against them is nothing
but a ve%atious prosecution. ;t only remains to say that the general
investigation in the AmbudsmanF s office is precisely for the purpose
of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed against hasty,
malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the
State from useless and expensive trials. There ma$ also be benefit
resulting from such limited in camera inspection in terms of increased
public confidence that the privilege is not being abused and increased
likelihood that no abuse is in fact occurring.
2or is there violation of petitionerFs right to the equal
protection of the laws. #etitioners complain that -in all forum and
tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via
their verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities
fully disclosed,- while in proceedings before the Affice of the
Ambudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation.

;n the first place, there can be no ob*ection to this
procedure because it is provided in the ,onstitution
itself.
;n the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the
filing of complaints -in any form and in a manner,- the
framers of the ,onstitution too< into account the well:
<nown reticence of the people which <eep them from
complaining against official wrongdoings.
Thirdly, the Affice of the Ambudsman is different from
the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those sub*ect to its *urisdiction are
public officials who, through official pressure and
influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
held against them. An the other hand complainants are
more often than not poor and simple fol< who cannot
afford to hire lawyers
.
$he '")#ds"an is designated )y the onstit#tion
/protectors of the people/ and as s#ch they are re6#ired )y it /to act
pro"ptly on co"plaints in any for" or "anner against p#)lic officials or
e"ployees of the ,o*ern"ent, or any s#)di*ision, agency or
instr#"entality thereof, incl#ding go*ern"ent9owned or controlled
corporation./ .*en if the s#)poenaed doc#"ents are treated as
pres#"pti*ely pri*ileged, this decision wo#ld only -#stify ordering their
inspection in ca"era )#t not their nonprod#ction. A)o*e all, there "#st )e
a scr#p#lo#s protection of the doc#"ents deli*ered. $he o#rt th#s
dis"issed the petition, )#t it is directed that the inspection of s#)poenaed
doc#"ents )e "ade personally in ca"era )y the '")#ds"an, and with
all the safeg#ards o#tlined in this decision.
@NOTE" 0etitioners complain that -in all forum and tribunals . . . the
aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their verified
complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed ,
while in proceedings before the Affice of the Ambudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place,
there can )e no o)-ection to this proced#re )eca#se it is pro*ided in the
onstit#tion itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting
the filing of complaints -in any form and in a manner,- the framers of
the ,onstitution too< into account the well:<nown reticence of the
people which <eep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this o#rt had occasion to point o#t, the 'ffice of the
'")#ds"an is different fro" the other in*estigatory and prosec#tory
agencies of the go*ern"ent )eca#se those s#)-ect to its -#risdiction are
p#)lic officials who, thro#gh official press#re and infl#ence, can 6#ash,
delay or dis"iss in*estigations held against the". 'n the other hand
co"plainants are "ore often than not poor and si"ple fol: who cannot
afford to hire lawyers. A
ORMOC SUGAR COMPAN-, INC., >(. TREASURER OF ORMOC CIT-
G.R. N+. L23794, F)821'2: 17, 19%8, &ENG$ON, !.P., !."
F'/0(" In19+B, the M#nicipal Board of 'r"oc ity passed 'rdinance
3o. B i"posing /on any and all prod#ctions of centrif#gal s#gar "illed at
the 'r"oc !#gar o"pany, Inc., in 'r"oc ity a "#nicipal ta5 e6#i*alent
to one per cent#" @1MA per e5port sale to J!A and other foreign
co#ntries./ 0ay"ents for said ta5 were "ade, #nder protest, )y 'r"oc
!#gar o"pany, Inc.
'r"oc !#gar o"pany, Inc. filed )efore the (I with
ser*ice of a copy #pon the !olicitor ,eneral, a co"plaint against the ity
of 'r"oc as well as its $reas#rer, M#nicipal Board and Mayor, alleging
that the afore9stated ordinance is #nconstit#tional for )eing *iolati*e of the
e6#al protection cla#se and the r#le of #nifor"ity of ta5ation, aside fro"
)eing an e5port ta5 for)idden #nder !ection 2287 of the %e*ised
Ad"inistrati*e ode.$he respondent asserted that the ta5 ordinance was
within the cityIs power to enact #nder the Local A#tono"y Act and that the
sa"e did not *iolate the afore9cited constit#tional li"itations.
I((1)" 8hether or not the ordinance *iolates the e6#al protection
cla#se.
H).*" Des. $he onstit#tion in the )ill of rights pro*ides2 /. . . nor shall
any person )e denied the e6#al protection of the laws./ $he e6#al
protection cla#se applies only to persons or things identically sit#ated and
does not )ar a reasona)le classification of the s#)-ect of legislation, and a
classification is reasona)le where @1A it is )ased on s#)stantial distinctions
which "a:e real differencesG @2A these are ger"ane to the p#rpose of the
lawG @4A the classification applies not only to present conditions )#t also to
f#t#re conditions which are s#)stantially identical to those of the presentG
@BA the classification applies only to those who )elong to the sa"e class.
A per#sal of the re6#isites instantly shows that the 6#estioned
ordinance does not "eet the", for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Armoc Sugar ,ompany, ;nc. and none
other. At the time of the ta%ing ordinance@s enactment, Krmoc "ugar
Compan$, 'nc., was the onl$ sugar central in the cit$ of Krmoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The ta%ing ordinance should not be singular
and e%clusive as to e%clude an$ subse.uentl$ established sugar central,
of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the ta%. As it is now,
even if later a similar compan$ is set up, it cannot be sub#ect to the ta%
because the ordinance e%pressl$ points onl$ to Krmoc Cit$ "ugar
Compan$, 'nc. as the entit$ to be levied upon.
ART.2 SEARCHES & SEIZURES
PEOPLE >(. MARTI
G.R. N+. 815%1, !',1'2: 18,1991
FACTS" Andre Marti went to the )ooth of the Manila 0ac:ing and .5port
(orwarders in the 0istang 0ilipino o"ple5, .r"ita, Manila, carrying with
the" B gift9 wrapped pac:ages. $he pac:ages were not inspected )y
Anita %eyes, the proprietress, as Marti ref#sed, who ass#red her that the
pac:ages si"ply contained )oo:s, cigars, and glo*es and were gifts to his
friend in X#rich. &owever, before deliver$ of appellant@s bo% to the 9ureau
of Customs andM or 9ureau of 6osts, 0r. >ob /e$es, proprietor and
husband of Anita /e$es, following standard operating procedure, opened
the bo%es for final inspection. -hen he opened appellant@s bo%, a peculiar
order emitted therefrom. &is curiosit$ aroused. &e s.ueeEed one of the
bundles allegedl$ containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Kpening
one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from
the opening of one of the gloves. &e made an opening on one of the
cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. >ob
/e$es reported the incident to the F9' and re.uested a laborator$
e%amination of the samples he e%tracted from the cellophane wrapper. It
t#rned o#t that the dried lea*es were "ari-#ana flowering tops as certified
)y the forensic che"ist of the 3arcotics !ection of the 3BI.
U $hereafter, an infor"ation was filed against appellant for
*iolation of %.A. +B27 @Dangero#s Dr#gs ActA. Appellant contends that the
e*idence s#)-ect of the i"p#ted offense had )een o)tained in *iolation of
his constit#tional rights against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res and
pri*acy of co""#nication and therefore arg#es that the sa"e sho#ld )e
held inad"issi)le in e*idence.
ISSUE" 8hether or not an act of a pri*ate indi*id#al, allegedly in *iolation
of appellantIs constit#tional rights, )e in*o:ed against the stateC
RULING" 3'. In the a)sence of go*ern"ental interference, the li)erties
g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion cannot )e in*o:ed against the !tate. This
constitutional right refers to the immunity of oneFs person, whether
citien or alien, from interference by government.The contraband in
the case at bar came into possession of the government without the
latter transgressing appellantFs rights against unreasonable
searches and seiures.
$he constit#tional proscription against #nlawf#l searches
and sei&#res applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tas<ed with the enforcement of the law. $h#s, it co#ld
only )e in*o:ed against the !tate to who" the restraint against ar)itrary
and #nreasona)le e5ercise of power is i"posed. ;f the search is made at
the behest or initiation of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without
the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
searches and seiures cannot be invo<ed for only the act of private
individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. ;n sum, the protection
against unreasonable searches and seiures cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
STONEHILL >(. DIO7NO
G.R. N+. L19550, !1,) 19, 19%7
F'/0(" Jpon application of the officers of the go*ern"ent
@respondent prosec#torsA, se*eral -#dges @respondent -#dgesA iss#ed a
total of B2 search warrants against petitioners Y or the corporations of
which they were officers, directed to an$ peace officer, to search the
persons named andM or the premises of their offices, warehouses, andM or
44
residences, and to seiEe several personal properties as the -sub*ect of
the offenseJ stolen or embeelled or the fruits of the offense,- or
-used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense- as violation of ,entral 1an< Laws, Tariff and ,ustoms Laws
'T,,), 2;., and the .#,.-
Alleging that the afore"entioned search warrants are n#ll Y
*oid, said petitioners !tonehill, et.al. filed wR the ! this original action for
certiorari, prohi)ition, "anda"#s and in-#nction.
I((1)("
1. 8hether the right against #nlafwf#l search and sei&#res "ay )e
in*o:ed )y artificial )eingsC
2. 8hether or not the search warrants in 6#estion were *alidly
iss#edC
4. 8hether or not the articles sei&ed )y *irt#e of the warrants are
ad"issi)le in e*idenceC
H).*"
1. D.!. Artificial )eings are also entitiled to the g#arantee
altho#gh they "ay )e re6#ired to open their )oo:s of acco#nts for
e5a"ination )y the !tate in the e5ercise of 0'LI. 0'8.%.
2. D.!. $wo points "#st )e stressed in connection with Art. III,
!ection 2 of the onstit#tion2 @aA that no warrant shall iss#e )#t #pon
pro)a)le ca#se to )e deter"ined )y the -#dge in the "anner set forth
thereinG and @)A that the warrant shall partic#larly descri)e the things to )e
sei&ed.
3one of these re6#ire"ents has )een co"plied with.
'ndeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural
and #uridical persons therein named had committed a violation of Central
9ank (aws, Tariff and Customs (aws, 'nternal /evenue +Code, and
/evised 6enal Code./2o specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a conse.uence, it was impossible for the
#udges who issued the warrants to have found the e%istence of a probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the part$ against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal
laws.
$o #phold the *alidity of the warrants in 6#estion wo#ld )e to
wipe o#t co"pletely one of the "ost f#nda"ental rights g#aranteed in o#r
onstit#tion, for it wo#ld place the sanctity of the do"icile and the pri*acy
of co""#nication and correspondence at the "ercy of the whi"s, caprice
or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted L to outlaw
the so:called general warrants. ;t is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of <een political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is li<ely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.
!#ch is the serio#sness of the irreg#larities co""itted in
connection with the disp#ted search warrants, that this o#rt dee"ed it fit
to a"end !ection 4 of %#le 122 of the for"er %#les of o#rt 1B )y
pro*iding in its co#nterpart, #nder the %e*ised %#les of o#rt 17 that /a
search warrant shall not iss#e #pon pro)a)le ca#se in connection with
one specific offense./ 3ot satisfied with this 6#alification, the o#rt added
thereto a paragraph, directing that -no search warrant shall issue for
more than one specific offense.-
$he gra*e *iolation of the onstit#tion "ade in the
application for the contested search warrants was co"po#nded )y the
description therein "ade of the effects to )e searched for and sei&ed, to
wit2
/Boo:s of acco#nts, financial records,
*o#chers, -o#rnals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit -o#rnals,
typewriters, and other doc#"ents andRor
papers showing all )#siness transactions
incl#ding dis)#rse"ent receipts, )alance
sheets and related profit and loss
state"ents./
$h#s, the warrants a#thori&ed the search for and sei&#re of
records pertaining to /LL )#siness transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. $he
warrants sanctioned the sei&#re of all records of the petitioners and the
afore"entioned corporations, whate*er their nat#re, th#s openly
contra*ening the e5plicit co""and of o#r Bill of %ights E that the things
to )e sei&ed )e partic#larly descri)ed E as well as tending to defeat its
"a-or o)-ecti*e2 the eli"ination of general warrants.
9eneral search warrants are outlawed because they
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion
of peace officers. $he warrants sanctioned the sei&#re of all records of
the petitioners and the afore"entioned corporations, whate*er their
nat#re, th#s openly contra*ening the e5plicit co""and of o#r Bill of
%ights99 THAT THE THINGS TO &E SEI$ED &E PARTICULARL-
DESCRI&ED9 as well as tending to defeat its "a-or o)-ecti*e2 the
eli"ination of general warrants.
4. 3'. %elying #pon Moncado *s. 0eopleIs o#rt @8? 0hil. 1A,
%espondent9 0rosec#tors "aintain that, e*en if the searches and sei&#res
#nder consideration were #nconstit#tional, the doc#"ents, papers and
things th#s sei&ed are ad"issi)le in e*idence against petitioners herein.
!pon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimousl$ of the opinion
that the position taken in the 0oncado case must be abandoned. !aid
position was in line with the A"erican co""on law r#le, that the cri"inal
sho#ld not )e allowed to go free "erely /)eca#se the consta)le has
)l#ndered,/ #pon the theory that the constit#tional prohi)ition against
#nreasona)le searches and sei&#res is protected )y "eans other than the
e5cl#sion of e*idence #nlawf#lly o)tained, s#ch as the co""on9law
action for da"ages against the searching officer, against the party who
proc#red the iss#ance of the search warrant and against those assisting in
the e5ec#tion of an illegal search, their cri"inal p#nish"ent, resistance,
witho#t lia)ility to an #nlawf#l sei&#re, and s#ch other legal re"edies as
"ay )e pro*ided )y other laws.
1owe*er, "ost co""on law -#risdictions ha*e already gi*en
#p this approach and e*ent#ally adopted THE E3CLUSIONAR- RULE,
reali&ing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional in*unction against unreasonable searches and
seiures. In the lang#age of H#dge Learned 1and2
-/s we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of
evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is
that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. ;n earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection enoughJ but
that is true no longer. Anly in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seiing officials, <nows that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will that wrong be repressed-.
8e hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado
case "#st )e, as it is here)y, a)andonedG that the warrants for the search
of three @4A residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the %esol#tion
of H#ne 29, 19+2 are n#ll and *oid.
S+.9>), >(. M'G'(9'2
GR N+. 82585, N+>)D8)2 14, 1988
F'/0(" 0etitioner L#is Beltran contends, a"ong others, that his
constit#tional rights were *iolated when respondent -#dge issued a
warrant of arrest against him without personall$ e%amining the
complainant and the witnesses, if an$, to determine probable cause.
0etitioner contends that the onstit#tion now re6#ires the -#dge to
personally e5a"ine the co"plainant and his witnesses in his
deter"ination of pro)a)le ca#se for the iss#ance of warrants of arrests.
$he )asis for his contention was the fact that the word =personally> was
added after the word =deter"ined>, and the phrase =other responsi)le
officers as "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law> was o"itted.
I((1)" Is the petitionerKs contention correctC
H).*" 3o. $he pertinent onstit#tional pro*ision is highlighted herein
)elow2

A20. III, S)/. 2. T;) 29A;0 +< 0;) E)+E.) 0+ 8)
()/12) 9, 0;)92 E)2(+,(, ;+1()(, E'E)2( ',*
)<<)/0( 'A'9,(0 1,2)'(+,'8.) ()'2/;)( ',*
()9F12)( +< @;'0)>)2 ,'012) ',* <+2 ',:
E12E+() (;'.. 8) 9,>9+.'8.), ',* ,+ ()'2/;
@'22',0 +2 @'22',0 +< '22)(0 (;'.. 9((1) )C/)E0
1E+, E2+8'8.) /'1() 0+ 8) *)0)2D9,)*
personally 8: 0;) B1*A) '<0)2 )C'D9,'09+,
1,*)2 +'0; +2 '<<92D'09+, +< 0;) /+DE.'9,',0
',* 0;) @90,)(()( ;) D': E2+*1/), ',*
E'209/1.'2.: *)(/2989,A 0;) E.'/) 0+ 8)
()'2/;)* ',* 0;) E)2(+,( +2 0;9,A( 0+ 8)
()9F)*.
$he addition of the word -personally- after the word
-determined- and the deletion of the grant of a#thority )y the 1974
onstit#tion to iss#e warrants to /other responsi)le officers as "ay )e
a#thori&ed )y law/, has apparently con*inced petitioner Beltran that the
onstit#tion now re6#ires the -#dge to personally e5a"ine the
co"plainant and his witnesses deter"ination of pro)a)le ca#se for the
iss#ance of warrants of arrest. $his is not an acc#rate interpretation.
-hat the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing *udge to satisfy himself the
existence of probable cause. 'n satisf$ing himself of the e%istence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, TH6 8C796 ;S
2AT .6EC;.67 TA #6.SA2/LL@ 6H/D;26 TH6 ,AD#L/;2/2T
/27 H;S W;T26SS6S.
Lollowing established doctrine and procedure, he shall? +1,
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrestJ or +2, if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscalFs report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
!o#nd policy dictates this proced#re, otherwise -#dges
wo#ld )e #nd#ly laden with the preli"inary e5a"ination and in*estigation
of cri"inal co"plaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed )efore their co#rts.
S9.>' >(. H+,+2'8.) P2)(9*9,A !1*A) +< RTC +< N)A2+( O29),0'.
GR N+. 8175%, O/0+8)2 21, 1991
45
F'/0(" 'n H#ne 12, 198+, <illa"or, Hr., chief of the 0 3arco"
Detach"ent in D#"ag#ete ity, 0ro*ince of 3egros 'riental, filed an
Application for !earch 8arrant with the %$ against petitioners !il*a.
%espondent H#dge, on the sa"e day iss#ed !earch 8arrant 3o. 1,
directing the police officers to search the roo" of Marlon !il*a in the
residence of 3ico"edes !il*a for *iolation of %A +B27 otherwise :nown as
Dangero#s Dr#gs Act of 1972. D#ring the search cond#cted )y the police
officers, they also sei&ed "oney )elonging to petitioner Antonieta !il*a
a"o#nting to 01,241.B?.
$hereafter, Antonieta !il*a filed a "otion for the ret#rn of the
said a"o#nt on the gro#nd that the search warrant only a#thori&ed the
police officers to sei&e "ari-#ana dried lea*es, cigarettes and -oint, and
that said officers failed or ref#sed to "a:e a ret#rn of the said search
warrant in *iolation of !ec. 11, %#le 12+ of the %#les of o#rt.
I((1)" 8hether or not petitionersK right to personal li)erty and sec#rity of
ho"es against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res as conte"plated in
Art. III, !ec. 2 of the 1987 onstit#tion was *iolated.
H).*2 Des. $he a)o*e"entioned section and !ecs. 4 and B, %#le 12+ of
the %#les of o#rt pro*ide that the -#dge "#st, before issuing a search
warrant, determine, whether there is probable cause by examining
the complainant and witness through searching questions and
answers.The o#rt held that the -#dge failed to co"ply with the legal
re6#ire"ent that he "#st e5a"ine the applicant and his witness in the
for" of searching 6#estions and answers in order to deter"ine the
e5istence of pro)a)le ca#ses as pro*ided in the said stat#tory pro*ision.
The depositions of the witnesses did not only contain
leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions
propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were
merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all
that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on the blan<s
provided.
=$he Fprobable causeF re6#ired to -#stify the iss#ance of a
search warrant co"prehends such facts and circumstances as will induce
a cautious man to rel$ upon them and act in pursuant thereof.'f the 8
6#estions as:ed, the 1st, 2nd and Bth pertain to identity. $he 4rd and 7th
are leading not searching 6#estions. $he +th, 7th and 8th refer to the
description of the personalities to )e sei&ed, which is identical to that in
the !earch 8arrant and s#ffers fro" the sa"e lac: of partic#larity. The
examination conducted W/S 9626./L ;2 2/TC.6 /27 D6.6L@
.6#6T;T;ACS of the deposition of said witness. Dere generaliation
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements or probable
cause upon which a warrant may issue.-
Li:ewise, this o#rt pre*io#sly declared that search warrants
iss#ed are in*alid if it is d#e to the fail#re of the -#dge to e5a"ine the
witness in the for" of searching 6#estions and answers. 0ertinent portion
of the decision reads2
/Moreo*er, a per#sal of the deposition of 0RLt. (lorencio
Angeles shows that it was too )rief and short. .6S#A2762T 8C796
7;7 2AT 6H/D;26 H;D F;2 TH6 >A.D A> S6/.,H;29 EC6ST;A2S
/27 /2SW6.SF. A2 TH6 ,A2T./.@, TH6 EC6ST;A2S /SO67
W6.6 L6/7;29 /S TH6@ ,/LL67 >A. / S;D#L6 F@6SF A. F2AF
/2SW6.. As held in V#intero *s. 3BI, Ithe 6#estions propo#nded )y
respondent .5ec#ti*e H#dge to the applicantIs witness are not s#fficiently
searching to esta)lish pro)a)le ca#se. /s<ing of leading questions to
the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements
for issuance of a valid search warrant.-
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the *udge must
strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that
he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As /the capricio#s disregard )y
the -#dge in not co"plying with the re6#ire"ents )efore iss#ance of
search warrants constit#tes a)#se of discretion/.
$he officers i"ple"enting the search warrant clearly a)#sed
their a#thority when they sei&ed the "oney of Antonieta !il*a. $his is
highly irreg#lar considering that Antonieta !il*a was not e*en na"ed as
one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the sei&#re of
"oney )#t only of "ari-#ana lea*es, cigarettes and -oints, and that the
search warrant was iss#ed for the sei&#re of personal property @aA s#)-ect
of the offense and @)A #sed or intended to )e #sed as "eans of
co""itting an offense and 3'$ for personal property stolen or e")e&&led
or other proceeds of fr#its of the offense. $h#s, the then presiding H#dge
'ntal li:ewise a)#sed his discretion when he re-ected the "otion of
petitioner Antonieta !il*a see:ing the ret#rn of her sei&ed "oney.
M+2',+ >(. V9>+
GR ,+. L2219%, !1,) 30, 19%7
F'/0(" 'n 3o*e")er 24, 19+1, 0etititoner han !a# 8ah, a hinese
citi&en, arri*ed in the 0hilippines to *isit her co#sin, !a"e#l Malaps,
together with her "inor son, with her first "arriage, (# Dan (#n. $hey
were per"itted in the 0hilippines #nder a te"porary *isitorKs *isa for 2
"onths after they posted a cash )ond of 0B,???.??. !he "arried Morano,
a (ilipino citi&en. $he o""issioner of I""igration as:ed the" to lea*e
the co#ntry d#e to the e5piration of the e5tensions they applied for.
'nstead of leaving, the$ petitioned the CL' of 0anila for
mandamus to compel the Commissioner to cancel petitionersB Alien
Certificate of /egistration) prohibition to stop the Commissioner from
issuing a warrant of arrest. $he trial co#rt r#led in fa*o#r of han )#t
dis"issed the petition with respect to (# Dan (#n. Both petitioners and
respondent appealed.
0etitioners assail the constit#tionality of !ec. 47 @aA of the
I""igration Act of 19B?, which states that, 2The following aliens shall be
arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of 'mmigration or an$
other officer designated b$ him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of 'mmigration after a determination b$ the
9oard of Commissioners of the e%istence of the ground deportation as
charged against the alien %%%.3 0etitioners contend that the a)o*e
pro*ision trenches #pon the constit#tional "andate in /rt. ;;;, Sec. % '$).
They say that the ,onstitution limits to *udges the authority to issue
warrants of arrest.
I((1)" 8hether or not !ec. 47 @aA of the I""igration Act of 19B? is
#nconstit#tional.
H).*" 3o. $he o#rt held that, !ec. 1 @4A, Art. III does not re6#ire -#dicial
inter*ention in the e5ec#tion of a final order of deportation iss#ed in
accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an
order of arrest in the exercise of *udicial power /S / ST6#
#.6L;D;2/.@ A. ;2,;762T/L TA #.AS6,CT;A2 A.
#.A,667;29S >A. / 9;M62 A>>62S6 A. /7D;2;ST./T;M6
/,T;A2, ,+0 '( / D6/SC.6 ;27;S#62S/1L6 TA ,/..@ ACT /
M/L;7 76,;S;A2 1@ / ,AD#6T62T A>>;,;/L , such as legal order
of deportation, issued by the ,ommissioner of ;mmigration, in
pursuance of a valid legislation.
;t is thoroughly established that ,ongress has power to
order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it
deems hurtful. Awing to the nature of the proceeding, the
deportation of an alien who is found in this country in violation of
law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. This is
so, although the inquiry devolves upon executive officers, and their
findings of fact, after / fair though summary hearing, are made
conclusive.
The determination of the propriety of deportation is not
a prosecution for, or a conviction of, crimeJ nor is the deportation a
punishment, even though the facts underlying the decision may
constitute a crime under local law. The proceeding is in effect simply
a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it does not
want. The coincidence of local penal law with the polic$ of congress is
purel$ accidental, and, though supported b$ the same facts, a criminal
prosecution and a proceeding for deportation are separate and
independent.
;n consequence, the constitutional guarantee set forth
in Section %'$), /rticle ;;; of the ,onstitution aforesaid requiring that
the issue of probable cause be determined by a *udge, does not
extend to deportation proceedings.
$he *iew, we, here e5press f#nds s#pport in the disc#ssions
d#ring the constit#tional con*ention. $he con*ention recogni&ed, as
sanctioned )y d#e process, possi)ilities and cases of depri*ation of
li)erty, other than )y order of a co"petent co#rt.
Indeed, the power to deport or e5pel aliens is an attri)#te of
so*ereignty. !#ch power is planted on the /accepted "a5i" of
international law, that e*ery so*ereign nation has the power, as inherent in
so*ereignty, and essential to self9preser*ation, to for)id the entrance of
foreigners within its do"inions./ !o it is, that this o#rt once aptly
re"ar:ed that there can )e no contro*ersy on the fact that where aliens
are ad"itted as te"porary *isitors, /the law is to the effect that te"porary
*isitors who do not depart #pon the e5piration of the period of stay granted
the" are s#)-ect to deportation )y the o""issioner of I""igration, for
ha*ing *iolated the li"itation or condition #nder which they were ad"itted
as non9i""igrants @I""igration Law, !ec. 47@aA, s#)section @7A .A. +14,
as a"endedA.
And, in a case directly in point, where the power of the
o""issioner to iss#e warrants of arrest was challenged as
#nconstit#tional )eca#se /s#ch power is only *ested in a -#dge )y !ection
1, paragraph 4, Article III of o#r onstit#tion/, this o#rt declared E
-This argument overloo<s the fact that the stay of
appellant 2g Hua To as temporary visitor is sub*ect to certain
contractual stipulations as contained in the cash bond put up by
him, among them, that in case of breach the ,ommissioner may
require the recommitment of the person in whose favor the bond has
been filed. The ,ommissioner did nothing but to enforce such
condition. Such a step is necessary to enable the ,ommissioner to
prepare the ground for his deportation under section $4 'a) of
,ommonwealth /ct B%$. / contrary interpretation would render such
power nugatory to the detriment of the State.-
It is in this conte5t that we r#le that !ection 47 @aA of the
I""igration Act of 19B? is not constit#tionally proscri)ed.
H'2>): >(. S',09'A+
GR N+. 82544, !1,) 28, 1988
F'/0(" 0etitioners were a"ong the twenty9two s#spected pedophiles who
were apprehended after a three7month surveillance b$ the Commission on
'mmigration and 8eportation +C'8, in 6agsan#an, (aguna. $hey were
apprehended )y *irt#e of Mission 'rders iss#ed )y respondent !antiago.
0etitioner contends the *alidity of their detention in ID Detention enter,
assailing, inter alia, that respondent *iolated Art. III, !ec. 2 of the 1987
onstit#tion prohi)iting #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res since ID
agents were not clothed with *alid 8arrants of arrest, search and sei&#res
as re6#ired )y the said pro*ision.
46
I((1)("
1. 8hether or not there was a *alid warrantless
arrestC
2. Ass#"ing arg#endo that the arrest was not
*alid, is there a *alid )asis for the confine"ent of herein petitionerC
4. Is the onstit#tional prohi)ition against
warrantless arrest Y searches applica)le hereinC
H).*"
1. D.!. $here can )e no 6#estion that the right against #nreasona)le
searches and sei&#res g#aranteed )y Article III, !ection 2 of the 1987
onstit#tion, is a*aila)le to all persons, incl#ding aliens, whether acc#sed
of cri"e or not @Moncado *s. 0eopleIs o#rt, 8? 0hil. 1 O19B8P. 'ne of the
constit#tional re6#ire"ents of a *alid search warrant or warrant of arrest is
that it "#st )e )ased #pon pro)a)le ca#se. 0ro)a)le ca#se has )een
defined as referring to /s#ch facts and circ#"stances antecedent to the
iss#ance of the warrant that in the"sel*es are s#fficient to ind#ce a
ca#tio#s "an to rely on the" and act in p#rs#ance thereof>.
$he 1987 %#les on ri"inal 0roced#re also pro*ide that an
arrest without a warrant ma$ be effected b$ a peace officer or even a
private person +1, when such person has committed, actuall$ committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence) and +2, when an
offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it @%#le 114,
!ection 7A.
;n this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on
probable cause determined after close surveillance for three '$)
months during which period their activities were monitored. The
existence of probable cause *ustified the arrest and the seiure of the
photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Those
articles were seied as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are
therefore, admissible in evidence @!ection 12, %#le 12+, 1987 %#les on
ri"inal 0roced#reA.
2. D.!. 6ven assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was
not valid at its inception, the records show that formal deportation
charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on B
March 1988. 8arrants of arrest were iss#ed against the" on 7 March
1988 /for *iolation of !ection 47, B7 and B+ of the I""igration Act and
!ection +9 of the Ad"inistrati*e ode.- / hearing is presently being
conducted by a 1oard of Special ;nquiry. The restraint against their
persons, therefore, has become legal. The Writ has served its
purpose. The process of the law is being followed ',ru vs. Dontoya,
L:$(!&$, >ebruary &5, %(45, B& S,./ 5"$). -Where a personFs
detention was later made by virtue of a *udicial order in relation to
criminal cases subsequently filed against the detainee, his petition
for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic- @Beltran *s. ,arcia,
L9B9?1B, April 4?, 1979, 89 !%A 717A. 't is a fundamental rule that a
writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has
become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning
@Mats#ra *s. Director of 0risons, 77 0hil. 1?7? O19B7PA.
That petitioners were not caught in the act does not make
their arrest illegal. #etitioners were found with young boys in their
respective rooms, the ones with >ohn "herman being naked, !nder
those circumstances the C'8 agents had reasonable grounds to believe
that petitioners had committed -pedophilia- defined as -psycho:
sexual perversion involving children- ' Qraft71bbing 6s$chopatia
"e%ualis, p. III) 6araphilia +or unusual se%ual activit$, in which children
are the preferred se%ual ob#ect +-ebster@s Third Few 'nternational
8ictionar$, 1451 ed., p. 1==I, :"olicitor Aeneral@s /eturn of the -rit, on p.
10<. While not a crime under the .evised #enal ,ode, it is behavior
offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of the
State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social
well:being of our youth '/rticle ;;, Section %$, %(!4 ,onstitution).
/t any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be
released on bail should be considered as a waiver of any irregularity
attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity
@allanta *. <illan#e*a, L92B+B+ Y L92B+7B, H#ne 2?, 1977, 77 !%A 477G
Bagcal *s. <illara&a, L9+177?, Han#ary 41, 1984, 12? !%A 727A.
4. 3'. $he deportation charges instit#ted )y respondent o""issioner
are in accordance with !ection 47@aA of the 0hilippine I""igration Act of
19B?, in relation to !ection +9 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode.
!ection 47@aA pro*ides in part2
'a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the ,ommissioner of
;mmigration and 7eportation or any other
officer designated by him for the purpose
and deported upon the warrant of the
,ommissioner of ;mmigration and
7eportation after a determination by the
1oard of ,ommissioners of the existence
of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alienJ
The foregoing provision should be construed in its entiret$ in view of the
summar$ and indivisible nature of a deportation proceeding, otherwise,
the ver$ purpose of deportation proceedings would be defeated.
Section $4'a) is not constitutionally proscribed 'Dorano vs. Mivo, L:
&&%(B, 8une $3, %(B4, &3 S,./ 5B&). The specific constraints in both
the %($5 and %(!4 ,onstitutions, which are substantially identical,
contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. 7eportation
proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. /n
order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. ;t is
preventive, not a penal process. ;t need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with ordinary ,ourt proceedings.
-;t is of course well:settled that deportation proceedings do not
constitute a criminal action. The order of deportation is not a
punishment, it being merely the return to his country of an alien who
has bro<en the conditions upon which he could continue to reside
within our borders. The deportation proceedings are administrative
in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly
in accordance with the ordinary court proceedings . ;t is essential,
however, that the warrant of arrest shall give the alien sufficient
information about the charges against him, relating the facts relied
upon. ;t is also essential that he be given a fair hearing with the
assistance of counsel, if he so desires, before unpre*udiced
investigators. However, all the strict rules of evidence governing
*udicial controversies do not need to be observedJ only such as are
fundamental and essential, li<e the right of cross:examination.
A.>'2)F >(. CFI
G.R. N+. 45358, !',1'2: 29, 1937
F'/0(" 'n H#ne 4, 194+, the chief of the secret ser*ice of the Anti9Js#ry
Board, of the Depart"ent of H#stice, presented to H#dge .d#ardo
,#tierre& Da*id then presiding o*er the o#rt of (irst Instance of
$aya)as, an affida*it alleging that according to relia)le infor"ation, the
petitioner :ept in his ho#se in Infanta, $aya)as, )oo:s, doc#"ents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers #sed )y hi" in connection with his
acti*ities as a "oney9lender, charging #s#rio#s rates of interest in
*iolation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affida*it, the chief of the
secret ser*ice stated that his answers to the 6#estions were correct to the
)est of his :nowledge and )elief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own <nowledge of the facts but upon the
information received by him from a reliable person. Jpon the affida*it
in 6#estion the -#dge, on said date, iss#ed the warrant which is the s#)-ect
"atter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitionerIs ho#se at any
ti"e of the day or night, the sei&#re of the )oo:s and doc#"ents a)o*e9
"entioned and the i""ediate deli*ery thereof to hi" to )e disposed of in
accordance with the law. 8ith said warrant, se*eral agents of the Anti9
Js#ry Board entered the petitionerIs store and residence at se*en oIcloc:
on the night of H#ne B, 194+, and sei&ed and too: possession of the
following articles2 internal re*en#e licenses for the years 1944 to 194+,
one ledger, two -o#rnals, two cash)oo:s, nine order )oo:s, fo#r
note)oo:s, fo#r chec: st#)s, two "e"orand#"s, three )an:)oo:s, two
contracts, fo#r st#)s, forty9eight st#)s of p#rchases of copra, two
in*entories, two )#ndles of )ills of lading, one )#ndle of credit receipts,
one )#ndle of st#)s of p#rchases of copra, two pac:ages of
correspondence, one receipt )oo: )elonging to L#is (ernande&, fo#rteen
)#ndles of in*oices and other papers, "any doc#"ents and loan contracts
with sec#rity and pro"issory notes, 7?B chits, pro"issory notes and st#)s
of #sed chec:s of the 1ong:ong Y !hanghai Ban:ing orporation. $he
search for and sei&#re of said articles were "ade with the opposition of
the petitioner who stated his protest )elow the in*entories on the gro#nd
that the agents sei&ed e*en the originals of the doc#"ents. As the articles
had not )een )ro#ght i""ediately to the -#dge who iss#ed the search
warrant, the petitioner, thro#gh his attorney, filed a "otion on H#ne 8,
194+, praying that the agent ."ilio L. !iongco, or any other agent, )e
ordered i""ediately to deposit all the sei&ed articles in the office of the
cler: of co#rt and that said agent )e declared g#ilty of conte"pt for ha*ing
diso)eyed the order of the co#rt.
$he petitioner as:s that the warrant of H#ne 4, 194+, iss#ed
)y the o#rt of (irst Instance of $aya)as, ordering the search of his ho#se
and the sei&#re, at any ti"e of the day or night, of certain acco#nting
)oo:s, doc#"ents and papers )elonging to hi" in his residence sit#ated
in Infanta, 0ro*ince of $aya)as, as well as the order of a later date,
a#thori&ing the agents of the Anti9Js#ry Board to retain the articles sei&ed,
)e declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in 6#estion
)e ret#rned to hi".
I((1)" Is the warrant of arrest herein illegally iss#edC
H).*" D.!. !ection 1, paragraph 4, of Article III of the onstit#tion,
relati*e to the )ill of rights, pro*ides that /$he right of the people to )e
sec#re in their persons, ho#ses, papers, and effects against #nreasona)le
searches and sei&#res shall not )e *iolated, and no warrants shall iss#e
)#t #pon pro)a)le ca#se, to )e deter"ined )y the -#dge after e5a"ination
#nder oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witnesses he "ay
prod#ce, and partic#larly descri)ing the place to )e searched, and the
persons or things to )e sei&ed./ !ection 97 of ,eneral 'rders, 3o. 78
pro*ides that -/ search warrant shall not issue except for probable
cause and upon application supported by oath particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seied.- It will )e noted that )oth pro*isions require that there be not
47
only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that
the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by
oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. ;n its
broadest sense, an = A/TH0 includes any form of attestation by
which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an
act faithfully and truthfullyJ and it is sometimes defined as an
outward pledge given by the person ta<ing it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to
9od. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal <nowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual ma<ing the affidavit and see<ing the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause .The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is
whether it has been drawn in such a manner that #6.8C.@ could be
charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.
It will li:ewise )e noted that section 1, paragraph 4, of Article
III of the onstit#tion prohi)its #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res.
Jnreasona)le searches and sei&#res are a "enace against which the
constit#tional g#aranties afford f#ll protection. $he ter" -unreasonable
search and seiure- is not defined in the Constitution or in Aeneral
Krders, Fo. I8, and it is said to have no fi%ed, absolute or unchangeable
meaning, although the term has been defined in general language. /ll
illegal searches and seiures are unreasonable while lawful ones are
reasonable. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
or seiure in any particular case is purely a *udicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the search and seiure was
made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured
In *iew of the foregoing and #nder the a)o*e9cited
a#thorities, it appears that TH6 />>;7/M;T , which served as the
exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question and
the subsequent seiure of the boo<s, documents and other papers
are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the
petitioner was sub*ected.
Another gro#nd alleged )y the petitioner in as:ing that the
search warrant )e declared illegal and cancelled is that it was not
s#pported )y other affida*its aside fro" that "ade )y the applicant. In
other words, it is contended that the search warrant cannot )e iss#ed
#nless it )e s#pported )y affida*its "ade )y the applicant and the
witnesses to )e presented necessarily )y hi". !ection 1, paragraph 4, of
Article III of the onstit#tion pro*ides that no warrants shall iss#e )#t #pon
pro)a)le ca#se, to )e deter"ined )y the -#dge after e5a"ination #nder
oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witnesses he "ay prod#ce.
!ection 98 of ,eneral 'rders, 3o. 78 pro*ides that the -#dge or -#stice
"#st, )efore iss#ing the warrant, e5a"ine #nder oath the co"plainant and
any witnesses he "ay prod#ce and ta:e their depositions in writing. 't is
the practice in this #urisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
applicant or complainant to the application. 't is admitted that the #udge
who issued the search warrant in this case, relied e%clusivel$ upon the
affidavit made b$ agent 0ariano A. Almeda and that he did not re.uire nor
take the deposition of an$ other witness. Feither the Constitution nor
Aeneral Krders, Fo. I8 provides that it is of imperative necessit$ to take
the depositions of the witnesses to be presented b$ the applicant or
complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in
re.uiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisf$
the committing magistrate of the e%istence of probable cause. Therefore, if
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the #udge ma$
dispense with that of other witnesses.
;nasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was
insufficient because H;S O2AWL6796 A> TH6 >/,TS W/S 2AT
#6.SA2/L but merely H6/.S/@, it is the duty of the *udge to
require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance
of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
<nowledge, it is sufficient if the *udge is satisfied that there exists
probable causeJ when the applicantFs <nowledge of the facts is mere
hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
<nowledge of the facts is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the
warrant issued is li<ewise illegal because it was based only on the
affidavit of the agent who had no personal <nowledge of the facts.
$he petitioner alleged as another gro#nd for the declaration
of the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation thereof, the fact
that it a#thori&ed its e5ec#tion at night. !ection 1?1 of ,eneral 'rders,
3o. 78 a#thori&es that the search )e "ade at night when it is positi*ely
asserted in the affida*it that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to )e searched. As we have declared the affidavit insufficient and
the warrant issued e%clusivel$ upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the
contention is e.uall$ well founded and that the search could not legall$ be
made at night.
Kne of the grounds alleged b$ the petitioner in support of his
contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lac< of an
adequate description of the boo<s and documents to be seied.
!ection 1, paragraph 4, of Article III of the onstit#tion, and section 97 of
,eneral 'rders, 3o. 78 pro*ide that the affida*it to )e presented, which
shall ser*e as the )asis for deter"ining whether pro)a)le ca#se e5ists
and whether the warrant sho#ld )e iss#ed, must contain a particular
description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seied. These provisions are mandatory and must be strictly
complied with but where, by the nature of the goods to be seied,
their description must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
could issue. $he only description of the articles gi*en in the affida*it
presented to the -#dge was as follows2 /that there are being kept in said
premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used
b$ him in connection with his activities as mone$7lender, charging a
usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law. Ta<ing into
consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that
no other more adequate and detailed description could have been
given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof. The description so made
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer
of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to identify the articles, which he did.
$he last gro#nd alleged )y the petitioner, in s#pport of his
clai" that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the
articles were seied in order that the /nti:Csury 1oard might provide
itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases
which might be filed against him for violation of the /nti:Csury Law.
'fishing expedition) At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised
)efore the co#rt, it clearly appeared that the )oo:s and doc#"ents had
really )een sei&ed to ena)le the Anti9Js#ry Board to cond#ct an
in*estigation and later #se all or so"e of the articles in 6#estion as
e*idence against the petitioner in the cri"inal cases that "ay )e filed
against hi". $he sei&#re of )oo:s and doc#"ents )y "eans of a search
warrant, for the p#rpose of #sing the" as e*idence in a cri"inal case
against the person in whose possession they were fo#nd, is
#nconstit#tional )eca#se it "a:es the warrant #nreasona)le, and it is
e6#i*alent to a *iolation of the constit#tional pro*ision prohi)iting the
co"p#lsion of an acc#sed to testify against hi"self. $herefore, it
appearing that at least nineteen of the doc#"ents in 6#estion were sei&ed
for the p#rpose of #sing the" as e*idence against the petitioner in the
cri"inal proceeding or proceedings for *iolation of the Anti9Js#ry Law,
which it is atte"pted to instit#te against hi", we hold that the search
warrant iss#ed is illegal and that the doc#"ents sho#ld )e ret#rned to hi".
FKT1? 'n sum, the ruling ma$ be summariEed as follows?
%. That the provisions of the ,onstitution and 9eneral Arders, 2o.
5!, relative to search and seiure, should be given a liberal
construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the
constitutional guaranties whole and in their full forceJ
&. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form and
fundamentally restrict the en*oyment of the ownership, possession
and use of the personal property of the individual, they should be
strictly construedJ
$. That the search and seiure made are illegal for the following
reasons+ 'a) 1ecause the warrant was based solely upon the affidavit
of the petitioner who had 2A personal <nowledge of the facts
necessary to determine the existence or non:existence of probable
cause, and 'b) because the warrant was issued for the sole purpose
of seiing evidence which would later be used in the criminal
proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, for
violation of the /nti: Csury LawJ
". That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it
does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the
possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated, neither could
the search and seiure be made at nightJ
5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of
witnesses to corroborate the applicant or complainant in cases
where the latter has personal <nowledge of the facts, when the
applicantFs or complainantFs <nowledge of the facts is merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the *udge to require affidavits of other
witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists J
B. That a detailed description of the person and place to be
searched and the articles to be seied is necessary, but where, by
the nature of the articles to be seied, their description must be
rather general, it is not required that a technical description be given,
as this would mean that no warrant could issueJ
@Adonis 3otes2 $he con-#ncti*e word OANDP in Art. 4, sec.4 is ,+0 to )e
"eant as &OTH o"plainant Y 8itness sho#ld each prod#ce affida*its.
$he H#dge "ay re6#ire the affida*it solely of the co"plainant if it is itself
s#fficient to esta)lish pro)a)le ca#se. [ Al*are& *s. (IA
S+29',+ M'0' >(. !1*A) !+()E;9,) &':+,'
GR 50720, M'2/; 2%, 1984, D) C'(02+ !.

F'/0(" !oriano Mata was acc#sed #nder 0residential Decree @0DA 81?, as
a"ended )y 0D 14?+, the infor"ation against hi" alleging that !oriano
Mata offered, too: and arranged )ets on the Hai Alai ga"e )y =selling
illegal tic:ets :nown as SMasiao tic:etsK witho#t any a#thority fro" the
0hilippine Hai Alai Y A"#se"ent orporation or fro" the go*ern"ent
a#thorities concerned.>
48
6etitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found
the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance
of the same, so that he had to in.uire from the Cit$ Liscal its whereabouts,
and to which in.uir$ >udge >osephine Q. 9a$ona replied, 2it is with the
court3. $he H#dge then handed the records to the (iscal who attached
the" to the records. $his led Mata to file a "otion to 6#ash and ann#l the
search warrant and for the ret#rn of the articles sei&ed, citing and
in*o:ing, a"ong others, !ection B of %#le 12+ of the %e*ised %#les of
o#rt. $he "otion was denied )y the H#dge, stating that the co#rt has
"ade a thoro#gh in*estigation and e5a"ination #nder oath of Bernardo J.
,oles and %eynaldo $. Mayote, "e")ers of the Intelligence !ection of
472nd 0 o.R0olice District II I30G that in fact the co#rt "ade a
certification to that effectG and that the fact that doc#"ents relating to the
search warrant were not attached i""ediately to the record of the cri"inal
case is of no "o"ent, considering that the r#le does not specify when
these doc#"ents are to )e attached to the records. Mata ca"e to the
!#pre"e o#rt and prayed that the search warrant )e declared in*alid for
its alleged fail#re to co"ply with the re6#isites of the onstit#tion and the
%#les of o#rt
I((1)" 8hether or not the search warrant was *alid.
H).*" 3'. 8e hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for
)eing *iolati*e of the onstit#tion and the %#les of o#rt.
Jnder the onstit#tion /no search warrant shall iss#e )#t
#pon pro)a)le ca#se to )e deter"ined )y the H#dge or s#ch other
responsi)le officer as "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law after e5a"ination #nder
oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the witnesses he "ay prod#ce/.
More e"phatic and detailed is the i"ple"enting r#le of the
constit#tional in-#nction, !ection B of %#le 12+ which pro*ides that the
-#dge "#st )efore iss#ing the warrant personally e5a"ine on oath or
affir"ation the co"plainant and any witnesses he "ay prod#ce and ta:e
their depositions in writing, and attach the" to the record, in addition to
any affida*its presented to hi".
Dere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are
thus not sufficient. The examining 8udge has to ta<e depositions in
writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to
attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the 8udge may be able to properly determine the existence
or non:existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for per*ury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
-e, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegalit$ b$ the failure of the >udge to conform with the essential re.uisites
of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
The *udgeFs insistence that she examined the
complainants under oath has become dubious by petitionerFs claim
that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers
connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant, after
he demanded the same from the lower court since they were not
attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the bac<
of the *oint affidavit of the complainants. As stated earlier, )efore he
filed his "otion to 6#ash the search warrant and for the ret#rn of the
articles sei&ed, he was f#rnished, #pon his re6#est, certified tr#e copies of
the said affida*its )y the ler: of o#rt )#t which certified tr#e copies do
not )ear any certification at the )ac:. 6etitioner likewise claims that his
%ero% cop$ of the said #oint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case
does not show also the certification of respondent #udge. $his do#)t
)eco"es "ore confir"ed )y respondent H#dgeIs own ad"ission, while
insisting that she did e5a"ine thoro#ghly the applicants, that she did not
take the deposition of 0a$ote and Aoles because to have done so would
be to hold a #udicial proceeding which will be open and public, such that,
according to her, the persons sub#ect of the intended raid will #ust
disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.
o#ld it )e that the certification was "ade )elatedly to c#re
the defect of the warrantC Be that as it "ay, there was no /deposition in
writing/ attached to the records of the case in palpa)le disregard of the
stat#tory prohi)ition heretofore 6#oted.
%espondent H#dge i"presses this o#rt that the #rgency to
stop the illegal ga")ling that l#res e*ery "an, wo"an and child, and e*en
the lowliest la)orer who co#ld hardly "a:e )oth ends "eet -#stifies her
action. !he clai"s that in order to a)ate the proliferation of this illegal
/"asiao/ lottery, she tho#ght it "ore pr#dent not to cond#ct the ta:ing of
deposition which is done #s#ally and p#)licly in the co#rt roo".
$wo points "#st )e "ade clear. $he ter" /depositions/ is
so"eti"es #sed in a )road sense to descri)e any written state"ent
*erified )y oathG )#t in its "ore technical and appropriate sense the
"eaning of the word is li"ited to written testi"ony of a witness gi*en in
the co#rse of a -#dicial proceeding in ad*ance of the trial or hearing #pon
oral e5a"ination. B A deposition is the testi"ony of a witness, p#t or ta:en
in writing, #nder oath or affir"ation )efore a co""issioner, e5a"iner or
other -#dicial officer, in answer to interloc#tory and cross interloc#tory, and
#s#ally s#)scri)ed )y the witnesses. 7 $he searching 6#estions
propo#nded to the applicants of the search warrant and his witnesses
"#st depend to a large e5tent #pon the discretion of the H#dge -#st as
long as the answers esta)lish a reasona)le gro#nd to )elie*e the
co""ission of a specific offense and that the applicant is one a#thori&ed
)y law, and said answers partic#larly descri)e with certainty the place to
)e searched and the persons or things to )e sei&ed. $he e5a"ination or
in*estigation which "#st )e #nder oath "ay not )e in p#)lic. It "ay e*en
)e held in the secrecy of his cha")ers. (ar "ore i"portant is that the
e5a"ination or in*estigation is not "erely ro#tinary )#t one that is
thoro#gh and elicit the re6#ired infor"ation. $o repeat, it "#st )e #nder
oath and "#st )e in writing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES >( NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. N+. 109%33, !1.: 20, 1994, MELO, !.
F'/0(" Jpon application of !0'4 %ay"#ndo Jnti*eros, %$ H#dge
Art#ro de ,#ia iss#ed in the "orning of !epte")er B, 1991 a search
warrant a#thori&ing the search and sei&#re of an /#ndeter"ined 6#antity
of Metha"pheta"ine 1ydrochloride co""only :nown as sha)# and its
paraphernalias/ in the pre"ises of appellantIs ho#se. &owever, the search
warrant was not implemented immediatel$ due to the lack of police
personnel to form the raiding team. At a)o#t 9 oIcloc: in the e*ening of
that day, a raiding tea" was finally organi&ed. In the final )riefing of the
raiding tea" at the police station, it was agreed #pon that 0'1 <enerando
L#na will )#y sha)# fro" appellant and after his ret#rn fro" appellantIs
ho#se, the raiding tea" will i"ple"ent the search warrant. A "ar:ed
"oney consisting of a 01?? )ill )earing serial no. 0V 429B?+ was gi*en
)y the !tation o""ander to 0'1 L#na and entered in the police log)oo:
0'1 L#na with a co"panion proceeded to appellantIs ho#se to i"ple"ent
the search warrant. Barangay apt. Maig#e, 3or"a del %osario and
appellant witnessed the search at appellantIs ho#se. !0'4 de la r#& and
0'4 (rancisco fo#nd a )lac: canister containing sha)#, an al#"in#" foil,
a palti: .22 cali)er atop the $< set, three #sed a""#nitions in a c#p and
three wallets, one containing the "ar:ed "oney. !0'1 3o*ero fo#nd
inside a show )o5 al#"in#" foils, nap:ins and a )#rner.
3or"ando del %osario was charged with Illegal 0ossession
of (irear" and A""#nitions and Illegal !ale of %eg#lated Dr#gs.
I((1)("
1. 8hether or not the i"ple"entation of the search warrant was
lawf#l and that the o)-ect sei&ed "ay )e #sed to pro*e Del
%osarioKs g#iltC
2. 8hether the a""#nition was *alidly sei&ed as an incident to a
lawf#l arrestC
H).*"
1. 3o. According to the *ersion of the prosec#tion, d#ring the alleged )#y9
)#st operation, acc#sed9appellant handed o*er to <eneracion L#na, the
alleged pose#r9)#yer, a 6#antity of sha)#, and L#na in t#rn paid acc#sed9
appellant a "ar:ed 1?? )ill and then returned to the police station and
informed the raiding team that he had alread$ bought the shabu from
accused7appellant. Thereupon, the raiding team proceeded to the house
of accused7appellant to implement the search warrant. The version of the
prosecution is highl$ incredible. $he record is de*oid of any reason why
the police officers did not "a:e any atte"pt to arrest acc#sed9appellant at
the ti"e he allegedly sold the sha)# to <eneracion L#na who was
acco"panied )y another police officer. $hat was the opport#ne "o"ent to
arrest acc#sed9appellant. The version foisted by the prosecution upon
this ,ourt is contrary to human experience in the ordinary course of
human conduct. The usual procedure in a buy:bust operation is for
the police officers to arrest the pusher of drugs at the very moment
he hands over the dangerous drug to the poseur:buyer. That is the
every reason why such a police operation is called a -1C@:1CST-
operation. The police poseur:buyer -buys0 dangerous drugs from
the pusher and -bust- 'arrests) him the moment the pusher hands
over the drug to the police officer.
8e th#s entertain serio#s do#)ts that the sha)# contained in
a s"all canister was act#ally sei&ed or confiscated at the residence of
acc#sed9appellant. in conse6#ence, the "anner the police officers
cond#cted the s#)se6#ent and "#ch9delayed search is highly irreg#lar.
Jpon )arging into the residence of acc#sed9appellant, the police officers
fo#nd hi" lying down and they i""ediately arrested and detained hi" in
the li*ing roo" while they searched the other parts of the ho#se. Altho#gh
they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called
in only after the police"en had already entered acc#sed9appellantIs
residence @pp. 22924, tsn, Dece")er 11, 1991A, and, therefore, the
police"en had "ore than a"ple ti"e to plant the sha)#.
/t any rate, accused:appellant cannot be convicted of
possession of the shabu contained in a canister and allegedly seied
at his house, for the charge against him was for selling shabu. Sale
is totally different from possession.
0oreover, the search warrant implemented b$ the raiding
part$ authoriEed only the search and seiure shabu and paraphernalia
for the use thereof and no other. = the descri)ed 6#antity of
Metha"pheta"ine 1ydrochloride co""only :nown as sha)# and its
paraphernalia/. / search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to underta<e a finishing expedition to
seie and confiscate any and all <inds of evidence or articles relating
to a crime. The ,onstitution itself and the .ules of ,ourt, specifically
mandate that the search warrant must particularly describe the
things to be seied. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for
the police officers to seie the firearm which was not mentioned,
much less described with particularity, in the search warrant.
2. 3'. 2either may it be maintained that the gun was seied in the
course of an arrest, for as earlier observed, 7el .osarioFs arrest was
far from regular and legal. Said firearm, having been illegally seied,
the same is not admissible in evidence.
49
UD9. >. R'D+(
GR 815%7, 9 !1,) 1990
F'/0(" $he %egional Intelligence 'perations Jnit of the apital o""and
@%I'J9A0'MA recei*ed confidential infor"ation a)o#t a "e")er of the
30A !parrow Jnit @li6#idation s6#adA )eing treated for a g#nshot wo#nd
at the !t. Agnes 1ospital in %oose*elt A*en#e, V#e&on ity. Jpon
*erification, it was fo#nd that the wo#nded person, who was listed in the
hospital records as %onnie Ha*elon, is act#ally %olando D#ral, a "e")er
of the 30A li6#idation s6#ad, responsi)le for the :illing of 2 A0'M
soldiers the day )efore. D#ral was then transferred to the %egional
Medical !er*ices of the A0'M, for sec#rity reasons. 8hile confined
thereat, D#ral was positi*ely identified )y eyewitnesses as the g#n"an
who went on top of the hood of the A0'M "o)ile patrol car, and fired
at the 2 A0'M soldiers seated inside the car.onse6#ently, D#ral was
referred to the aloocan ity (iscal who cond#cted an in6#est and
thereafter filed with the %egional $rial o#rt of aloocan ity an
infor"ation charging %olando D#ral alias %onnie Ha*elon with the cri"e of
=Do#)le M#rder with Assa#lt Jpon Agents of 0ersons in A#thority.>
A petition for ha)eas corp#s was filed with the !#pre"e o#rt on
)ehalf of %o)erto J"il, %olando D#ral, and %enato <illan#e*a. $he o#rt
iss#ed the writ of ha)eas corp#s. A %et#rn of the 8rit was filed. J"il and
<illan#e*a posted )ail )efore the %egional $rial o#rt of 0asay ity where
charges for *iolation of the Anti9!#)*ersion Act had )een filed against
the", and they were accordingly released.
I((1)" 8hether D#ral can )e *alidly arrested witho#t any warrant of arrest
for the cri"e of re)ellion.
H).*" Des. D#ral was arrested for )eing a "e")er of the 3ew 0eoples
Ar"y @30AA, an o#tlawed s#)*ersi*e organi&ation. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of .olando 7ural without warrant is
*ustified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. $he cri"es of re)ellion, s#)*ersion, conspiracy or proposal to
co""it s#ch cri"es, and cri"es or offenses co""itted in f#rtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constit#te direct assa#lts against the
!tate and are in the nat#re of contin#ing cri"es. $he arrest of persons
in*ol*ed in the re)ellion whether as its fighting ar"ed ele"ents, or for
co""itting non9*iolent acts )#t in f#rtherance of the re)ellion, is "ore an
act of capt#ring the" in the co#rse of an ar"ed conflict, to 6#ell the
re)ellion, than for the p#rpose of i""ediately prosec#ting the" in co#rt for
a stat#tory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a *udge of the existence of probable cause before
the issuance of a *udicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. $he a)sence of a -#dicial warrant is no legal
i"pedi"ent to arresting or capt#ring persons co""itting o*ert acts of
*iolence against go*ern"ent forces, or any other "ilder acts )#t e6#ally in
p#rs#ance of the re)ellio#s "o*e"ent. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled b$ the e%igencies of the situation that involves the ver$ survival
of societ$ and its government and dul$ constituted authorities.
P)+E.) >. S1/2+
GR 93239, 18 M'2/; 1991
F'/0(" 0at. (#lgencio went to Arlie %egaladoKs ho#se at . V#i"po to
"onitor acti*ities of .dison !J%' @acc#sedA. "ucro was reported to be
selling mari#uana at a chapel & meters away from /egaladoBs house.
"ucro was monitored to have talked and e%changed things three times.
These activities are reported through radio to 6M(t. "eraspi. A third )#yer
was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as
%onnie Maca)ante. (ro" that "o"ent, 0RLt.!eraspi proceeded to the
area. 8hile the police officers were at the Do#th 1ostel in Maaga"a !t.
(#lgencio told Lt. !eraspi to intercept. Maca)ante was intercepted at
Ma)ini and Maaga"a crossing in front of A:lan Medical center.
Maca)ante saw the police and threw a tea )ag of "ari-#ana on the
gro#nd. Maca)ante ad"itted )#ying the "ari-#ana fro" !#cro in front of
the chapel.
$he police tea" intercepted and arrested !J%' at the
corner of . V#i"po and <eterans. %eco*ered were 19 stic:s and B
tea)ags of "ari-#ana fro" a cart inside the chapel and another tea)ag
fro" Maca)ante.
I((1)" 8hether or not the arrest witho#t warrant is lawf#l.
H).*" Des. Search and seiures supported by a valid warrant of arrest
is not an absolute rule. .ule %&B, Sec %& of .ules of ,riminal
#rocedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.'#eople v.
,astiller. The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from
the fact that their knowledge re.uired from the surveillance was
insufficient to fulfill re.uirements for its issuance . However, warantless
search and seiures are legal as long as #.A1/1L6 ,/CS6 existed.
The police officers have personal <nowledge of the actual
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the
accused. /s police officers were the ones conducting the
surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of
their duties.
@It was held that when a police officer sees the offense,
altho#gh at a distance, or hears the distr#r)ances created there)y, and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he "ay effect an arrest witho#t a
warrant. $he offense is dee"ed co""itted in the presence or within the
*iew of the officer.A
PEOPLE >. RODRIGUE$A
G.R. N+. 95902, F)821'2: 4, 1992, R)A'.'*+, !."
F'/0(" I $ad#ran together with !R!gt. Molinawe and other officers
recei*ed fro" a confidential infor"er that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohi)ited dr#gs in $agas, Daraga, Al)ay. !gt. Molinawe ga*e the
"oney to $ad#ran who acted as the pose#r )#yer. 1e was told to loo: for
a certain Don, the alleged seller of prohi)ited dr#gs. After agreeing on the
price of 02??.?? for 1?? gra"s of "ari-#ana, Don halted and later on Don
ga*e $ad#ran /a certain o)-ect wrapped in a plastic/ which was later
identified as "ari-#ana, and recei*ed pay"ent therefor. $hereafter,
$ad#ran ret#rned to the head6#arters and "ade a report regarding his
said p#rchase of "ari-#ana. !#)se6#ently, Ma-or Xeide" ordered a tea"
to cond#ct an operation to apprehend the s#spects. In the e*ening of the
sa"e date, appellant, Lonceras and !ego*ia was arrested. $he
consta)les were not, howe*er, ar"ed with a warrant of arrest when they
apprehended the three acc#sed.
$hereafter, agents of the 3arcotics o""and @3A%'MA
cond#cted a raid in the ho#se of Ho*encio %odrig#e&a, father of appellant.
D#ring the raid, they were a)le to confiscate dried "ari-#ana lea*es and a
plastic syringe, a"ong others. $he search, howe*er, was not a#thori&ed
)y any search warrant. $he %$ fo#nd %odrig#e&a g#ilty of *iolating
the Dangero#s Dr#g Act.
I((1)" 8hether or not the e*idence confiscated d#ring the raid cond#cted
in the ho#se of Ho*encio %odrig#e&a is ad"issi)le in e*idence.
H).*" 3'. / buy:bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by
peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.
Applied to the case at )ar, the ter" in flagrante delicto re6#ires that the
s#spected dr#g dealer "#st )e ca#ght redhanded in the act of selling
"ari-#ana or any prohi)ited dr#g to a person acting or posing as a )#yer.
'n the instant case, however, the procedure adopted b$ the
FA/CK0 agents failed to meet this .ualification. 9ased on the ver$
evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of
dried mari#uana leaves, C'C Taduran immediately released appellant
/odrigueEa instead of arresting and taking him into his custod$. This act
of C'C Taduran, assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of mari#uana
did take place, is decidedl$ contrar$ to the natural course of things and
inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a bu$7bust operation . ;t is
rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without having been
sub*ected to the sanctions imposed by law. ;t is, in fact, a dereliction
of duty by an agent of the law.
/s provided in the present ,onstitution, a search, to be
valid, must generally be authoried by a search warrant duly issued
by the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this
,ourt has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and
seiures even without a search warrant. Thus, '%) when the owner of
the premises waives his right against such incursionJ '&) when the
search is incidental to a lawful arrestJ '$) when it is made on vessels
and aircraft for violation of customs lawsJ '") when it is made on
automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration lawsJ '5) when it involves prohibited articles in plain
viewJ or 'B) in cases of inspection of buildings and other premises
for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a
search may be validly made even without a search warrant.
;n the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the
2/.,AD agents in the house of 8ovencio .odriguea was not
authoried by any search warrant. ;t does not appear, either, that the
situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. 1ence,
appellantIs right against #nreasona)le search and sei&#re was clearly
*iolated. The FA/CK0 agents could FKT have #ustified their act b$
invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had alread$
been put under surveillance for .uite some time. Had it been their
intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily
could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
@In the case at )ar, the police officer, acting as pose#r9)#yer
in a =)#y9)#st operation>, inst7ead of arresting the s#spect and ta:ing hi"
into c#stody after the sale, ret#rned to police head6#arters and filed his
report. It was only in the e*ening of the sa"e day that the police officer,
witho#t a warrant, arrested the s#spect at the latterKs ho#se where dried
"ari-#ana lea*es were fo#nd and confiscated. It was held that the arrest
and the sei&#re were #nlawf#l.A

R+.90+ G+ >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.(
G.R. N+. 101837 F)821'2: 11, 1992, FELICIANO, !."
F'/0(" On H#ly 2, 1991, petitioner entered 8ilson !t., where it is a one9
way street and started tra*elling in the opposite or /wrong/ direction. At the
corner of 8ilson and H. A)ad !antos !ts., petitionerIs and .ldon Mag#anIs
cars nearly )#"ped each other. 0etitioner alighted fro" his car, wal:ed
50
o*er and shot Mag#an inside his car. 0etitioner then )oarded his car and
left the scene. A sec#rity g#ard at a near)y resta#rant was a)le to ta:e
down petitionerIs car plate n#")er. <erification at the L$' showed that
the car was registered to one .lsa Ang ,o.$he sec#rity g#ard of the )a:e
shop positi*ely identified ,o as the sa"e person who had shot Mag#an.
$he police la#nched a "anh#nt for petitioner. 'n H#ly 8, 1991,
0etitioner presented hi"self )efore the !an H#an 0olice !tation to *erify
news reports that he was )eing h#nted )y the policeG he was
acco"panied )y two @2A lawyers. $he police forthwith detained hi". $hat
sa"e day, the police pro"ptly filed a co"plaint for fr#strated ho"icide
against petitioner with the 'ffice of the 0ro*incial 0rosec#tor of %i&al. $he
0rosec#tor filed an infor"ation for "#rder )efore the %$. o#nsel for
petitioner filed with the 0rosec#tor an o"ni)#s "otion for i""ediate
release and proper preli"inary in*estigation, alleging that the warrantless
arrest of petitioner was #nlawf#l and that no preli"inary in*estigation had
)een cond#cted )efore the infor"ation was filed.
I((1)" 8R3 a lawf#l warrantless arrest had )een effected )y the !an H#an
0olice in respect of petitioner ,o.
H).*" 3'. !ection 7 of %#le 114 of the 1987 %#les on ri"inal 0roced#re
pro*ides that =a peace officer or a pri*ate person "ay, witho#t warrant,
arrest a person>2
+a, 8hen, in his presence, the person to )e
arrested has co""itted, is act#ally co""itting,
or is atte"pting to co""it an offenseG
@b, 8hen an offense has in fact -#st )een
co""itted, and he has personal :nowledge of
facts indicating that the person to )e arrested
has co""itted itG and
+c, 555
In this case, there was no lawf#l warrantless arrest of
petitioner within the "eaning of !ection 7 of %#le 114. #etitionerFs
-arrest- too< place six 'B) days after the shooting of Daguan. The
arresting officers obviousl$ were not present, within the "eaning of
!ection 7@aA, at the ti"e petitioner had allegedly shot Mag#an. 2either
could the -arrest- effected six 'B) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected -when Gthe shooting hadI in fact
*ust been committed- within the meaning of Section 5'b). Doreover,
none of the -arresting- officers had any -personal <nowledge- of
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot
Daguan. $he infor"ation #pon which the police acted had )een deri*ed
fro" state"ents "ade )y alleged e$ewitnesses to the shooting. That
information did not, however, constitute -personal <nowledge.-
ROMEO POSADAS >(. CA
G.R. N+. 89139, A1A1(0 2, 1990, GANCA-CO, !.
F'/0(" 'n 'cto)er 1+, 198+, 0atrol"an Jrsicio Jnga) and 0at. J")ra
J"par, )oth "e")ers of the Integrated 3ational 0olice @I30A of Da*ao
assigned with the Intelligence $as: (orce, were conducting a
surveillance along Dagallanes Street, 7avao ,ity. -hile the$ were
within the premises of the /iEal 0emorial Colleges the$ spotted petitioner
carr$ing a buri bag and the$ noticed him to be acting suspiciousl$. The$
approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the
'F6. 6etitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get awa$ was thwarted
b$ the two notwithstanding his resistance.The$ then checked the buri
bag of the petitioner where the$ found one +1, caliber .;8 "mith J -esson
revolver, two +2, rounds of live ammunition for a .;8 caliber gun, a smoke
+tear gas, grenade, and two +2, live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun.
$hey )ro#ght the petitioner to the police station for f#rther in*estigation
and as:ed hi" to show the necessary license or a#thority to possess
firear"s and a""#nitions fo#nd in his possession )#t he failed to do so.
1e was prosec#ted for illegal possession of firear"s and
a""#nitions in the %$ wherein after a plea of not g#ilty.0etitioner was
fo#nd g#ilty of the offense charged.
I((1)" 8R3 the warrantless search on the person of petitioner is *alid.
H).*" Des. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves
and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not
<now that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense
of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They *ust suspected
that he was hiding something in the buri bag. The said
circumstances did not *ustify an arrest without a warrant.
&owever, there are man$ instances where a warrant and
seiEure can be effected without necessaril$ being preceded b$ an arrest,
foremost of which is the -STA# /27 S6/.,H- 'a.<.a. STA# P >.;SO
without a search warrant at military or police chec<points. As
between a warrantless search and seiure conducted at military or
police chec<points and the search thereat in the case at bar , there is
no .uestion that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that
unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The
probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that
he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right
and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
;t is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they
shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an
exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
,learly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained
under the exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seiures has not been violated.
there are "any instances where a warrant and sei&#re can
)e effected witho#t necessarily )eing preceded )y an arrest, fore"ost of
which is the /stop and search/ witho#t a search warrant at "ilitary or
police chec:points, the constit#tionality or *alidity of which has )een
#pheld )y this o#rt in <al"onte *s. de <illa, 7 as follows2
/0etitioner <al"onteIs general allegation to the
effect that he had )een stopped and searched
witho#t a search warrant )y the "ilitary "anning
the chec:points, witho#t "ore, i.e., witho#t stating
the details of the incidents which a"o#nt to a
*iolation of his right against #nlawf#l search and
sei&#re, is not s#fficient to ena)le the o#rt to
deter"ine whether there was a *iolation of
<al"onteIs right against #nlawf#l search and
sei&#re. 3ot all searches and sei&#res are
prohi)ited. $hose which are reasona)le are not
for)idden. A reasona)le search is not to )e
deter"ined )y any fi5ed for"#la )#t is to )e
resol*ed according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside
the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is par<ed on
the public fair grounds, or simply loo<s into a
vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
$he setting #p of the 6#estioned chec:points in
<alen&#ela @and pro)a)ly in other areasA "ay )e
considered as a security measure to enable the
2,.7, to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
and order for the benefit of the public. hec:points
"ay also )e regarded as "eas#res to thwart plots to
desta)ili&e the go*ern"ent in the interest of p#)lic
sec#rity. In this connection, the o#rt "ay ta:e -#dicial
notice of the shift to #r)an centers and their s#)#r)s of
the ins#rgency "o*e"ent, so clearly reflected in the
increased :illings in cities of police and "ilitary "en )y
30A /sparrow #nits,/ not to "ention the a)#ndance of
#nlicensed firear"s and the alar"ing rise in
lawlessness and *iolence in s#ch #r)an centers, not all
of which are reported in "edia, "ost li:ely )ro#ght
a)o#t )y deteriorating econo"ic conditions 9 which all
s#" #p to what one can rightly consider, at the *ery
least, as a)nor"al ti"es. 1etween the inherent right
of the state to protect its existence and promote
public welfare and an individualFs right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
$r#e, the "anning of chec:points )y the "ilitary is
s#scepti)le of a)#se )y the "en in #nifor" in the sa"e
"anner that all go*ern"ental power is s#scepti)le of
a)#se. B#t, at the cost of occasional incon*enience,
disco"fort and e*en irritation to the citi&en, the
chec:points d#ring these a)nor"al ti"es, when
cond#cted within reasona)le li"its, are part of the price
we pay for an orderly society and a peacef#l
co""#nity./
$h#s, as )etween a warrantless search and sei&#re cond#cted at "ilitary
or police chec:points and the search thereat in the case at )ar, there is no
6#estion that, indeed, the latter is "ore reasona)le considering that #nli:e
in the for"er, it was effected on the )asis of a pro)a)le ca#se. $he
pro)a)le ca#se is that when the petitioner acted s#spicio#sly and
atte"pted to flee with the )#ri )ag there was a pro)a)le ca#se that he
was concealing so"ething illegal in the )ag and it was the right and d#ty
of the police officers to inspect the sa"e.
It is too "#ch indeed to re6#ire the police officers to search the )ag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall ha*e o)tained a search
warrant for the p#rpose. !#ch an e5ercise "ay pro*e to )e #seless, f#tile
and "#ch too late.
In 0eople *s. (I of %i&al, this o#rt held as follows2
/. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensa)ly necessary, the
"echanics prescri)ed )y the onstit#tion and reiterated in the %#les of
o#rt "#st )e followed and satisfied. B#t 8e need not arg#e that there
are e5ceptions. $h#s in the e5traordinary e*ents where warrant is not
necessary to effect a *alid search or sei&#re, or when the latter cannot )e
perfor"ed e5cept witho#t warrant, what constit#tes a reasona)le or
#nreasona)le search or sei&#re )eco"es p#rely a -#dicial 6#estion,
deter"ina)le fro" the #ni6#eness of the circ#"stances in*ol*ed,
incl#ding the p#rpose of the search or sei&#re, the presence or a)sence of
51
pro)a)le ca#se, the "anner in which the search and sei&#re was "ade,
the place or thing searched and the character of the articles proc#red./
$he o#rt reprod#ces with appro*al the following dis6#isition of the
!olicitor ,eneral2
/$he assailed search and sei&#re "ay still )e -#stified as a:in to a -stop
and fris<- sit#ation whose o)-ect is either to deter"ine the identity of a
s#spicio#s indi*id#al or to "aintain the stat#s 6#o "o"entarily while the
police officer see:s to o)tain "ore infor"ation. $his is ill#strated in the
case of $erry *s. 'hio, 492 J.!. 1 @19+8A. In this case, two "en
repeatedly wal:ed past a store window and ret#rned to a spot where they
apparently conferred with a third "an. $his aro#sed the s#spicion of a
police officer. $o the e5perienced officer, the )eha*ior of the "en
indicated that they were si&ing #p the store for an ar"ed ro))ery. 8hen
the police officer approached the "en and as:ed the" for their na"es,
they "#")led a reply. 8here#pon, the officer gra))ed one of the", sp#n
hi" aro#nd and fris:ed hi". (inding a concealed weapon in one, he did
the sa"e to the other two and fo#nd another weapon. In the prosec#tion
for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal
search and sei&#re was p#t #p. $he Jnited !tates !#pre"e o#rt held
that /a police officer "ay in appropriate circ#"stances and in an
appropriate "anner approach a person for the p#rpose of in*estigating
possi)le cri"inal )eha*ior e*en tho#gh there is no pro)a)le ca#se to
"a:e an arrest./ In s#ch a sit#ation, it is reasona)le for an officer rather
than si"ply to shr#g his sho#lder and allow a cri"e to occ#r, to stop a
s#spicio#s indi*id#al )riefly in order to deter"ine his identity or "aintain
the stat#s 6#o while o)taining "ore infor"ation. . . .
learly, the search in the case at )ar can )e s#stained #nder
the e5ceptions heretofore disc#ssed, and hence, the constit#tional
g#arantee against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res has not )een
*iolated./
PEOPLE >(. ROGELIO MENGOTE
G.R. N+. 87059, !1,) 22, 1992, CRU$, !.
F'/0(" 'n A#g#st 8, 1987, the 8estern 0olice District @80DA received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious:
loo<ing persons at the corner of 8uan Luna and 2orth 1ay 1oulevard
in Tondo, Danila. A s#r*eillance tea" of plainclothes"en was forthwith
dispatched to the place. 0atrol"en %olando Mercado and Al)erto H#an
narrated that they saw two "en /loo:ing fro" side to side,/ one of who"
was holding his a)do"en. The$ approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run awa$ but were
unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The
suspects were then searched. 'ne of the", who t#rned o#t to )e the
acc#sed9appellant, was fo#nd with a .48 cali)er !"ith and 8esson
re*ol*er with si5 li*e )#llets in the cha")er. 1is co"panion, later identified
as 3icanor Morellos, had a fan :nife secreted in his front right pants
poc:et. $he weapons were ta:en fro" the".
An infor"ation was filed against the acc#sed9appellant
)efore the %$ for illegal possession of firear"s. $he o#rt con*icted
Mengote for *iolation of 0D 18++ and sentenced to recl#sion perpet#a. 't
is submitted in the Appellant@s 9rief that the revolver should not have been
admitted in evidence because of its illegal seiEure. Fo warrant therefor
having been previousl$ obtained. Feither could it have been seiEed as an
incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of 0engote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant.
I((1)" 8R3 Mengote can )e held lia)le for illegal possession of firear"s.
H).*" 3'. $here is no 6#estion that e*idence o)tained as a res#lt of an
illegal search or sei&#re is inad"issi)le in any proceeding for any p#rpose.
$hat is the a)sol#te prohi)ition of Article III, !ection 4@2A, of the
onstit#tion. $his is the cele)rated e5cl#sionary r#le )ased on the
-#stification gi*en )y H#dge Learned 1and that /only in case the
prosec#tion, which itself controls the sei&ing officials, :nows that it cannot
profit )y their wrong will the wrong )e repressed./
$he !olicitor ,eneral, while conceding the r#le, "aintains that it is not
applica)le in the case at )ar. 1is reason is that the arrest and search of
Mengote and the sei&#re of the re*ol*er fro" hi" were lawf#l #nder %#le
114, !ection 7, of the %#les of o#rt reading as follows2
!ec. 7. Arrest witho#t warrantG when lawf#l. A peace officer or pri*ate
person "ay witho#t a warrant, arrest a person2
@aA 8hen, in his presence, the person to )e arrested has co""itted, is
act#ally co""itting, or is atte"pting to co""it an offenseG
@)A 8hen an offense has in fact -#st )een co""itted, and he has
personal :nowledge of facts indicating that the person to )e arrested has
co""itted itG and
@cA 8hen the person to )e arrested is a prisoner who has escaped fro" a
penal esta)lish"ent or place where he is ser*ing final -#dg"ent or
te"porarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
)eing transferred fro" one confine"ent to another.
In cases falling #nder paragraphs @aA and @)A hereof, the person arrested
witho#t a warrant shall )e forthwith deli*ered to the nearest police station
or -ail, and he shall )e proceeded against in accordance with %#le 112,
!ection 7.
8e ha*e caref#lly e5a"ined the wording of this r#le and cannot see how
we can agree with the prosec#tion.
0ar. @cA of !ection 7 is o)*io#sly inapplica)le as Mengote was not an
escapee fro" a penal instit#tion when he was arrested. 8e therefore
confine o#rsel*es to deter"ining the lawf#lness of his arrest #nder either
0ar. @aA or 0ar. @)A of this section.
0ar. @aA re6#ires that the person )e arrested @1A after he has co""itted or
while he is act#ally co""itting or is at least atte"pting to co""it an
offense, @2A in the presence of the arresting officer.
$hese re6#ire"ents ha*e not )een esta)lished in the case at )ar. At the
ti"e of the arrest in 6#estion, the acc#sed9appellant was "erely /loo:ing
fro" side to side/ and /holding his a)do"en,/ according to the arresting
officers the"sel*es. $here was apparently no offense that had -#st )een
co""itted or was )eing act#ally co""itted or at least )eing atte"pted )y
Mengote in their presence.
$he !olicitor ,eneral submits that the actual e%istence of an offense was
not necessar$ as long as 0engote@s acts created a reasonable suspicion
on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an
offense had been committed and that the accused7appellant had
committed it. The .uestion is, -hat offenseD -hat offense could possibl$
have been suggested b$ a person looking from side to side and holding
his abdomen and in a place not e%actl$ forsakenD
These are certainl$ not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made
them less so, if at all. 't might have been different if 0engote had been
apprehended at an ungodl$ hour and in a place where he had no reason
to be, like a darkened alle$ at ; o@clock in the morning. 9ut he was
arrested at 11?;0 in the morning and in a crowded street shortl$ after
alighting from a passenger #eep with his companion. &e was not skulking
in the shadows but walking in the clear light of da$. There was nothing
clandestine about his being on that street at that bus$ hour in the blaEe of
the noonda$ sun.
Kn the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of
them innocent, wh$ his e$es were darting from side to side and he was
holding his abdomen. 'f the$ e%cited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not
been shown what their suspicion was all about . ;n fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
because of the telephone call from the informer that there were
-suspicious:loo<ing- persons in that vicinity who were about to
commit a robbery at 2orth 1ay 1oulevard.',AD#/.6 TH;S W;TH ##
vs. #AS/7/S). The caller did not e%plain wh$ he thought the men looked
suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
;t would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily
arrested and searched *ust because he is holding his abdomen, even
if it be possibly because of a stomach:ache, or if a peace officer:
could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty loo< on suspicion
that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing
or attempting it. $his si"ply cannot )e done in a free society. $his is not
a police state where order is e5alted o*er li)erty or, worse, personal
"alice on the part of the arresting officer "ay )e -#stified in the na"e of
sec#rity.
'n the recent case of #eople v. Dalmstedt, the Court sustained the
warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his
waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon
inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. 'n 6eople v.
Claudio, the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
carr$ing behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the
seat before him. &is suspicion aroused, he surreptitiousl$ e%amined the
bag, which he found to contain mari#uana. &e then and there made the
warrantless arrest and seiEure that we subse.uentl$ upheld on the ground
that probable cause had been sufficientl$ established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support
the arresting officersF suspicion other than DengoteFs darting eyes
and his hand on his abdomen. 1y no stretch of the imagination could
it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had *ust been
committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.
$his case is si"ilar to #eople v. /minnudin, where the o#rt held that
the warrantless arrest of the acc#sed was #nconstit#tional. $his was
effected while he was co"ing down a *essel, to all appearances no less
innocent than the other dise")ar:ing passengers. 1e had not co""itted
nor was he act#ally co""itting or atte"pting to co""it an offense in the
presence of the arresting officers. 1e was not e*en acting s#spicio#sly. In
short, there was no pro)a)le ca#se that, as the prosec#tion incorrectly
s#ggested, dispensed with the constit#tional re6#ire"ent of a warrant.
0ar. @)A is no less applica)le )eca#se its no less stringent re6#ire"ents
ha*e also not )een satisfied. $he prosec#tion has not shown that at the
ti"e of MengoteIs arrest an offense had in fact -#st )een co""itted and
that the arresting officers had personal :nowledge of facts indicating that
52
Mengote had co""itted it. All they had was hearsay infor"ation fro" the
telephone caller, and a)o#t a cri"e that had yet to )e co""itted.
$he tr#th is that they did not :now then what offense, if at all, had )een
co""itted and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the
acc#sed9appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the
police head6#arters, that they learned of the ro))ery in his ho#se and of
MengoteIs s#pposed in*ol*e"ent therein. 8 As for the illegal possession
or the firear" fo#nd on MengoteIs person, the police"en disco*ered this
only after he had )een searched and the in*estigation cond#cted later
re*ealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
9efore these events, the peace officers had no <nowledge even of
DengoteF identity, let alone the fact 'or suspicion) that he was
unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery
of 7angananFs house.
/t the time of the arrest in question, the accused:
appellant was merely -loo<ing from side to side- and -holding his
abdomen,- according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparently no offense that had *ust been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Dengote in their
presence. There was nothing to support the arresting officersF
suspicion other than DengoteFs darting eyes and his hand on his
abdomen. #ar. 'b) is no less applicable because has not been shown
that at the time of DengoteFs arrest an offense had in fact *ust been
committed and that the arresting officers had personal <nowledge of
facts indicating that Dengote had committed it. /ll they had was
hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime
that had yet to be committed.
SAMM- MALACAT >(. CA
G.R. N+. 123595, D)/)D8)2 12, 1997, DAVIDE, !R., !.
F'/0(" In response to )o") threats reported se*en days earlier, %odolfo
D#, a "e")er of the 80D, along with 4 other police"en were on foot
patrol along RueEon 9lvd, Ruiapo when the$ chanced upon 2 groups of
0uslim7looking men posted at opposite sides of RueEon 9lvd. The men
were acting suspiciousl$ with their e$es moving ver$ fast. D# and his
co"panions o)ser*ed the gro#ps for a)o#t 4? "ins. $he "e")ers fled
when they approached one of the gro#ps. 1owe*er, D# ca#ght #p with the
petitioner. Jpon searching the latter, he fo#nd a frag"entation grenade
t#c:ed inside petitionerIs /front waist line./ 'ne of D#Ks co"panions
apprehended A)d#l asan fro" who" a .48 cali)er pistol was reco*ered.
!a""y Malacat was charged with *iolation of !ec.4 of 0D
18++ for illegal possession of hand grenade.
I((1)" 8R3 the warrantless arrest of petitioner is *alid.
H).*2 3o. .*en granting e5 gratia that petitioner was in possession of a
grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were in*alid, as will )e
disc#ssed )elow.
$he general r#le as regards arrests, searches and sei&#res
is that a warrant is needed in order to *alidly effect the sa"e. $he
onstit#tional prohi)ition against #nreasona)le arrests, searches and
sei&#res refers to those effected witho#t a *alidly iss#ed warrant, s#)-ect
to certain e5ceptions. As regards *alid warrantless arrests, these are
fo#nd in !ection 7, %#le 114 of the %#les of o#rt, which reads, in part2
!ec. 7. Arrest, witho#t warrantG when lawf#l A
peace officer or a pri*ate person "ay, witho#t a
warrant, arrest a person2
@aA 8hen, in his presence, the person to )e
arrested has co""itted, is act#ally co""itting, or
is atte"pting to co""it an offenseG
@)A 8hen an offense has in fact -#st )een
co""itted, and he has personal :nowledge of
facts indicating that the person to )e arrested has
co""itted itG and
@cA 8hen the person to )e arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest #nder the circ#"stances conte"plated #nder !ection
7@aA has )een deno"inated as one -in flagrante delicto,- while that
#nder !ection 7@)A has )een descri)ed as a -hot pursuit- arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited
to the following+ '%) customs searchesJ '&) search of moving
vehiclesJ '$) seiure of evidence in plain viewJ '") consent searchesJ
'5) a search incidental to a lawful arrestJ and 'B) a -stop and fris<.-
In the instant petition, the trial co#rt *alidated the warrantless
search as a /stop and fris:/ with /the sei&#re of the grenade fro" the
acc#sed as an appropriate incident to his arrest,/ hence necessitating a
)rief disc#ssion on the nat#re of these e5ceptions to the warrant
re6#ire"ent.
At the o#tset, we note that the trial co#rt conf#sed the
concepts of a ISTOPANDFRIS7I and of a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO
A LA=FUL ARREST. These two t$pes of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the re.uisite .uantum of proof before the$ ma$ be validl$ effected
and in their allowable scope.
In a SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LA=FUL ARREST, as
the precedent arrest determines the validit$ of the incidental search, the
legality of the arrest is 6#estioned in a large "a-ority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was "erely #sed as a prete5t for cond#cting a search.
'n this instance, the law re.uires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer ma$ search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter ma$ reach for a weapon or
for evidence to destro$, and seiEe an$ mone$ or propert$ found which was
used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which
ma$ be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the
means of escaping or committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto
or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lac< of
personal <nowledge on the part of @u, the arresting officer, or an
overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime
had *ust been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
1a*ing th#s shown the in*alidity of the warrantless arrest in
this case, plainly, the search cond#cted on petitioner co#ld not ha*e )een
one incidental to a lawf#l arrest.
8e now proceed to the -#stification for and allowa)le scope
of a ISTOPANDFRIS7I as a /li"ited protecti*e search of o#ter clothing
for weapons,/ as laid down in $erry, th#s2
-e merel$ hold toda$ that where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonabl$ to conclude in light of his
e%perience that criminal activit$ ma$ be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing ma$ be armed and presentl$ dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable in.uiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others@
safet$, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefull$ limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. "uch
a search is a reasonable search under the Lourth Amendment . . .
Ather notable points of Terry are that while probable
cause is not required to conduct a -stop and fris<,- it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a -stop and
fris<.- / =genuine reason0 must exist, in light of the police officerFs
experience and surrounding conditions , to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. (inally, a I(0+E
',*<29(GI ser*es a T=OFOLD INTEREST" (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer ma$, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause) and (2) the more
pressing interest of safet$ and self7preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadl$ weapon that could une%pectedl$ and fatall$ be
used against the police officer.
1ere, there are at least three @4A reasons why the /stop9and9fris:/ was
in*alid2
F92(0, we har)or gra*e do#)ts as to D#Is clai" that petitioner was a
"e")er of the gro#p which atte"pted to )o") 0la&a Miranda two days
earlier. $his clai" is neither s#pported )y any police report or record nor
corro)orated )y any other police officer who allegedly chased that gro#p.
Aside fro" i"pairing D#Is credi)ility as a witness, this li:ewise di"inishes
the pro)a)ility that a gen#ine reason e5isted so as to arrest and search
petitioner. If only to f#rther tarnish the credi)ility of D#Is testi"ony,
contrary to his clai" that petitioner and his co"panions had to )e chased
)efore )eing apprehended, the affida*it of arrest e5pressly declares
otherwise, i.e., #pon arri*al of fi*e @7A other police officers, petitioner and
his co"panions were /i""ediately collared./
S)/+,*, there was nothing in petitionerIs )eha*ior or cond#ct which co#ld
ha*e reasona)ly elicited e*en "ere s#spicion other than that his eyes
were /"o*ing *ery fast/ an o)ser*ation which lea*es #s incred#lo#s since
D# and his tea""ates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already
+24? p."., th#s pres#"a)ly d#s:. 0etitioner and his co"panions were
"erely standing at the corner and were not creating any co""otion or
tro#)le, as D# e5plicitly declared on cross9e5a"ination2
V And what were they doingC
A $hey were "erely standing.
V Do# are s#re of thatC
A Des, sir.
V And when yo# saw the" standing, there were nothing or they did not
create any co""otion.
A 3one, sir.
V 3either did yo# see the" create co""otionC
A 3one, sir.
T;92*, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe
that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. 2one was visible to
@u, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was discovered inside the
front waistline of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Su and petitioner, an$ telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was
53
indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Su. 'n fact, as
noted b$ the trial court?
-hen the policemen approached the accused and his companions, the$
were not $et aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline.
The$ did not see an$ bulging ob#ect in his person.
8hat is #ne6#i*ocal then in this case are )latant *iolations of petitionerIs
rights sole"nly g#aranteed in !ections 2 and 12@1A of Article III of the
onstit#tion.
PEOPLE >(. IDEL AMINNUDIN : AHNI
G.R.N+. 748%9, !1.: %, 1988, CRU$, !.
F'/0(2 Idel A"inn#din was arrested on H#ne 27, 198B, shortly after
dise")ar:ing fro" the MR< 8ilcon 9 at a)o#t 824? in the e*ening, in Iloilo
ity. $he 0 officers who were in fact waiting for hi" si"ply accosted hi",
inspected his )ag and finding what loo:ed li:ed "ari-#ana lea*es too: hi"
to their head6#arters for in*estigation.
$he two )#ndles of s#spect articles were confiscated fro" hi" and later
ta:en to the 3BI la)oratory for e5a"ination. 8hen they were *erified as
"ari-#ana lea*es, an infor"ation for *iolation of the Dangero#s Dr#gs Act
was filed against hi".
According to the prosec#tion, the 0 officers had earlier
recei*ed a tip fro" one of their infor"ers that the acc#sed9appellant was
on )oard a *essel )o#nd for Iloilo ity and was carrying "ari-#ana. Acting
on this tip, they waited for hi" in the e*ening of H#ne 27, 198B, and
approached hi" as he descended fro" the gangplan: after the infor"er
had pointed to hi". $hey detained hi" and inspected the )ag he was
carrying. It was fo#nd to contain three :ilos of what were later analy&ed as
"ari-#ana lea*es )y an 3BI forensic e5a"iner. In his defense, A"inn#din
alleged that he was ar)itrarily arrested and i""ediately handc#ffed. 1is
)ag was confiscated witho#t a search warrant.
I((1)(2
1. 8R3 the arrest was legalC
2. 8R3 the sei&ed effects "ay )e #sed as e*idence as the search
was allegedly an incident to a lawf#l arrestC

H).*"
1. 3o. $here was no warrant of arrest or search warrant iss#ed )y a -#dge
after personal deter"ination )y hi" of the e5istence of pro)a)le ca#se.
$he acc#sed9appellant was not ca#ght in flagrante nor was a cri"e a)o#t
to )e co""itted or had -#st )een co""itted to -#stify the warrantless
arrest allowed #nder %#le 114 of the %#les of o#rt. .*en e5pediency
co#ld not )e in*o:ed to dispense with the o)tention of the warrant as in
the case of %oldan *. Arca, for e5a"ple. ;t was held that vessels and
aircraft are sub*ect to warrantless searches and seiures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quic<ly
moved out of the locality or *urisdiction before the warrant can be
secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. >rom the
conflicting declarations of the #, witnesses, it is clear that they had
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to
arrest and search /minnudin. His name was <nown. The vehicle was
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. /nd from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a *udge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to *ustify the issuance of a
warrant. @et they did nothing to comply Doreover, the accused:
appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had *ust done
so.
In the "any cases where this o#rt has s#stained the
warrantless arrest of *iolators of the Dangero#s Dr#gs Act, it has always
)een shown that they were ca#ght red9handed, as res#lt of what are
pop#larly called /)#y9)#st/ operations of the narcotics agents. %#le 114
was clearly applica)le )eca#se at the precise ti"e of arrest the acc#sed
was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
;n the case at bar, the accused:appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had *ust done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplan< of the DQM Wilcon ( and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he
was li<e any of the other passengers innocently disembar<ing from
the vessel. ;t was only when the informer pointed to him as the
carrier of the mari*uana that the suddenly became suspect and so
sub*ect to apprehension. ;t was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The identification b$ the informer was the probable cause as
determined b$ the officers +and not a #udge, that authoriEed them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediatel$ arrest him.
2. 3'. $he search was not an incident of a lawf#l arrest )eca#se there
was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not co"e #nder
the e5ceptions allowed )y the %#les of o#rt. 1ence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the e*idence o)tained there)y was
inad"issi)le.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT
198 SCRA 401, G.R. N+. 91107, 19 !1, 1991
FACTS" Acc#sed9 appellant Mi:ael Mal"stead was charged for *iolation
of !ection B, Art. II of %ep#)lic Act +B27, as a"ended, otherwise :nown
as the Dangero#s Dr#gs Act of 1972, as a"ended. Acc#sed Mi:ael
Mal"stedt, a !wedish national, entered the 0hilippines for the third ti"e in
Dece")er 1988 as a to#rist. 'n May 11, 1989, the acc#sed went to
3angonogan )#s stop in !agada. An order to esta)lish a chec:point in the
said area was )eca#se it was reported that in that sa"e "orning a
a#casian co"ing fro" !agada had in his possession prohi)ited dr#gs.
8uring the inspection, suspecting the bulge on accused@s
waist, C'C Aalutan re.uired him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging ob#ect turned out to be a pouch bag with
ob#ects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one
of the wrapped ob#ects. $he wrapped o)-ects t#rned o#t to contain
hashish, a deri*ati*e of "ari-#ana. Before the acc#sed alighted fro" the
)#s, he stopped to get two @2A tra*elling )ags fro" the l#ggage carrier.
Jpon stepping o#t of the )#s, the officers got the )ags and opened the".
A teddy )ear was fo#nd in each )agand when the officers opened the
teddy )ears it also contained hashish.
ISSUE" 8hether the search "ade )y the 3A%'M officer was illegal
ha*ing no search warrant iss#ed.
HELD" 3o. $he onstit#tion g#arantees the right of the people to )e
sec#re in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seiEures. &owever, where the search is made pursuant to a
lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawf#l arrest
witho#t a warrant "ay )e "ade )y a peace officer or a pri*ate person
#nder the following circ#"stances stated in !ec. 7, %#le 11? of the r#les
on cri"inal proced#re.
Acc#sed was searched and arrested while transporting
prohi)ited dr#gs @hashishA. A cri"e was act#ally )eing co""itted )y the
acc#sed and he was ca#ght in flagrante delicto. $h#s, the search "ade
#pon his personal effects falls s6#arely #nder paragraph @1A of the
foregoing pro*isions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawf#l arrest. While it is true that the 2/.,AD officers were not
armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of
the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to
believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
P2+8'8.) /'1() has )een defined as s#ch facts and
circ#"stances which co#ld lead a reasona)le, discreet and pr#dent "an
to )elie*e that an offense has )een co""itted, and that the o)-ects
so#ght in connection with the offense are in the place so#ght to )e
searched. 8arrantless search of the personal effects of an acc#sed has
)een declared )y this o#rt as *alid, because of existence of probable
cause, where the smell of mari*uana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously and atte"pted to flee.
-arrantless search of the personal effects of an accused
has been declared b$ this Court as valid, because of e%istence of
probable cause, where the smell of mari#uana emanated from a plastic
bag owned b$ the accused, or where the accused was acting
suspiciousl$, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received b$ the FA/CK0
that vehicles coming from "agada were transporting mari#uana and other
prohibited drugs, their Commanding Kfficer also received information that
a Caucasian coming from "agada on that particular da$ had prohibited
drugs in his possession.
!aid infor"ation was recei*ed )y the o""anding 'fficer of
3A%'M the *ery sa"e "orning that acc#sed ca"e down )y )#s fro"
!agada on his way to Bag#io ity.
8hen 3A%'M recei*ed the infor"ation, a few ho#rs
)efore the apprehension of herein acc#sed, that a a#casian tra*elling
fro" !agada to Bag#io ity was carrying with hi" prohi)ited dr#gs, there
was no ti"e to o)tain a search warrant. In the $angli)en case, the police
a#thorities cond#cted a s#r*eillance at the <ictory Liner $er"inal located
at Bgy. !an 3icolas, !an (ernando 0a"panga, against persons engaged
in the traffic of dangero#s dr#gs, )ased on infor"ation s#pplied )y so"e
infor"ers. Acc#sed $angli)en who was acting s#spicio#sly and pointed
o#t )y an infor"er was apprehended and searched )y the police
a#thorities. It was held that when faced with on9the spot infor"ation, the
police officers had to act 6#ic:ly and there was no ti"e to sec#re a search
warrant.
;t must be observed that, at first, the 2/.,AD officers
merely conducted a routine chec< of the bus 'where accused was
riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was
initially made. ;t was only when one of the officers noticed a 1CL96
on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused
to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only
managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was
trying to hide his identity. >or is it not a regular norm for an innocent
man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present
his identification papers when required to do soR
'%) The receipt of information by 2/.,AD that a
,aucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession, plus ' &) the suspicious failure of the accused to produce
his passport, ta<en together as a whole, led the 2/.,AD officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
illegal from the authorities. Lrom these circumstances arose a probable
cause which #ustified the warrantless search that was made on the
personal effects of the accused. 'n other words, the acts of the FA/CK0
officers in re.uiring the accused to open his pouch bag and in opening
54
one of the wrapped ob#ects found inside said bag +which was discovered
to contain hashish, as well as the two +2, travelling bags containing two
+2, tedd$ bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted b$
accused@s own attempt to hide his identit$ b$ refusing to present his
passport, and b$ the information received b$ the FA/CK0 that a
Caucasian coming from "agada had prohibited drugs in his possession.
To deprive the FA/CK0 agents of the abilit$ and facilit$ to act
accordingl$, including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of societ$.
E(E',+ >(. CA
G.R. N+. 120431. AE29. 1, 1998
FACTS" $he e*idence for the prosec#tion, )ased on the testi"ony of 0at.
%o"eo 0agilagan, shows that on H#ly 1B, 1991, at a)o#t 1224? a."., he
and other police officers, na"ely, 0at. 8ilfredo A6#ilino, !i"plicio %i*era,
and .rlindo L#")oy of the 8estern 0olice District @80DA, 3arcotics
Di*ision went to Xa"ora and 0andacan !treets, Manila to confir" reports
of dr#g p#shing in the area. $hey saw petitioner selling /so"ething/ to
another person. After the alleged )#yer left, they approached petitioner,
identified the"sel*es as police"en, and fris:ed hi". The search $ielded
two plastic cellophane tea bags of mari#uana . -hen asked if he had more
mari#uana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen
went to his residence where the$ found ten more cellophane tea bags of
mari#uana. 0etitioner was )ro#ght to the police head6#arters where he
was charged with possession of prohi)ited dr#gs. 'n H#ly 2B, 1991,
petitioner posted )ail 4 and the trial co#rt iss#ed his order of release on
H#ly 29, 1991.
0etitioner contends that the trial and appellate co#rts erred
in con*icting hi" on the )asis of the following2 @aA the pieces of e*idence
sei&ed were inad"issi)leG @)A
ISSUE" 8R3 the "ari-#ana confiscated fro" the ho#se in addition to the
"ari-#ana confiscated while .spano waa fris:ed "ay )e #sed as
e*idenceC
HELD" 3'. $he 1987 onstit#tion g#arantees freedo" against
#nreasona)le searches and sei&#res #nder Article III, !ection 2 which
pro*ides2
/$he right of the people to )e sec#re in their persons, ho#ses, papers and
effects against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res of whate*er nat#re
and for any p#rposes shall )e in*iola)le, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall iss#e e5cept #pon pro)a)le ca#se to )e deter"ined
personally )y the -#dge after e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the
co"plainant and the witnesses he "ay prod#ce, and partic#larly
descri)ing the place to )e searched and the persons or things to )e
sei&ed./
/n exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense. ;t may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. ;n this case, the ten cellophane bags of
mari*uana seied at petitionerFs house after his arrest at #andacan
and Kamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
As regards the )ric: of "ari-#ana fo#nd inside the appellantIs ho#se, the
trial co#rt correctly ignored it apparently in *iew of its inad"issi)ility. While
initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the
warrantless search made inside the appellantFs house became
unlawful since the police operatives were not armed with a search
warrant. Such search cannot fall under - S6/.,H D/76
;2,;762T/L TA / L/W>CL /..6ST,- the same being limited to
body search and to that point within reach or control of the person
arrested , or that which may furnish him with the means of
committing violence or of escaping. In the case at )ar, appellant was
ad"ittedly o#tside his ho#se when he was arrested. 1ence, it can hardly
)e said that the inner portion of his ho#se was within his reach or control.
The articles seiEed from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the
7A,T.;26 A> S6/.,H D/76 ;2,;762T/L TA / L/W>CL /..6ST.
$he warrantless search made in his house, however, which $ielded ten
cellophane bags of mari#uana became unlawful since the police officers
were not armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreo*er, it was
)eyond the reach and control of petitioner.
P'E' >(. M'A+
G.R. N+. L273%0, F)821'2: 28, 19%8
FACTS2 0etitioner Martin Alagao, head of the co#nter9intelligence #nit of
the Manila 0olice Depart"ent, acting #pon a relia)le infor"ation recei*ed
on 3o*e")er 4, 19++ to the effect that a certain ship"ent of personal
effects, allegedly "isdeclared and #nder*al#ed, wo#ld )e released the
following day fro" the c#sto"s &one of the port of Manila and loaded on
two tr#c:s, and #pon orders of petitioner %icardo 0apa, hief of 0olice of
Manila and a d#ly dep#ti&ed agent of the B#rea# of #sto"s, cond#cted
s#r*eillance at gate 3o. 1 of the c#sto"s &one. 8hen the tr#c:s left gate
3o. 1 at a)o#t B24? in the afternoon of 3o*e")er B, 19++, ele"ents of the
co#nter9intelligence #nit went after the tr#c:s and intercepted the" at the
Agrifina ircle, .r"ita, Manila. $he load of the two tr#c:s, consisting of
nine )ales of goods, and the two tr#c:s, were sei&ed on instr#ctions of the
hief of 0olice. Jpon in*estigation, a person clai"ed ownership of the
goods and showed to the police"en a /!tate"ent and %eceipts of D#ties
ollected on Infor"al .ntry 3o. 1B7977?1/, iss#ed )y the B#rea# of
#sto"s in the na"e of a certain Bien*enido 3ag#it.
lai"ing to ha*e )een pre-#diced )y the sei&#re and
detention of the two tr#c:s and their cargo, %e"edios Mago filed charges
against the hief of 0olice and the #sto"s o""issioner.
ISSUE" 8here petitioners allowed to search and sei&e the 6#estioned
artices e*en witho#t a warrantC
HELD" Des. The policemen had authorit$ to effect the seiEure without an$
search warrant issued b$ a competent court. The Tariff and Customs
Code does not re.uire said warrant in the instant case. $he ode
a#thori&es persons ha*ing police a#thority #nder Section &&3$ of the
Tariff and ,ustoms ,ode to enter, pass thro#gh or search any land,
inclos#re, wareho#se, store or )#ilding, not being a dwelling houseG and
also to inspect, search and e%amine an$ vessel or aircraft and any tr#n:,
pac:age, )o5 or en*elope or any person on )oard, or stop and search and
e5a"ine any *ehicle, )east or person s#spected of holding or con*eying
any d#tia)le or prohi)ited article introd#ced into the 0hilippines contrary to
law, witho#t "entioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 9ut
in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said dwelling
house ma$ be entered and searched onl$ upon warrant issued b$ a #udge
or #ustice of the peace . . . ;t is our considered view, therefore, that
except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search
and seiure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs
laws.
'n the instant case, we note that petitioner 0artin Alagao and his
companion policemen did not have to make an$ search before the$ seiEed
the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and a"ended
petition, in the co#rt )elow %e"edios Mago and <alentin Lanopa did not
e*en allege that there was a search. All that they co"plained of was,
/$hat while the tr#c:s were on their way, they were intercepted witho#t
any search warrant near the Agrifina ircle and ta:en to the Manila 0olice,
where they were detained./
1ut even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect
that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case. The guaranty of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seiures is construed as recogniing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be
obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile
for contraband goods , where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
because the vehicle can be quic<ly moved out of the locality or
*urisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
$he 6#estion whether a sei&#re or a search is #nreasona)le in the
lang#age of the onstit#tion is a -#dicial and not a legislati*e 6#estionG )#t
in deter"ining whether a sei&#re is or is not #nreasona)le, all of the
circ#"stances #nder which it is "ade "#st )e loo:ed to.
-The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent
development, which has multiplied by quantity production and ta<en
possession of our highways in battalions, until the slower, animal:
drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are rare.
,onstructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense
quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they
furnish for successful commission of crime a disguising means of
silent approach and swift escape un<nown in the history of the world
before their advent. The question of their police control and
reasonable search on highways or other public places is a serious
question far deeper and broader than their use in so:called
-bootleggingF or Frum running,F which is itself is no small matter.
While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a
vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their
active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of
which the law especially guards from search and seiure without
process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilied
to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against
morality, chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and
murder, is a matter of common <nowledge. Cpon that problem a
condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our
criminal laws. Whether search of and seiure from an automobile
upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a *udicial
question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.-
1a*ing declared that the sei&#re )y the "e")ers of the Manila 0olice
Depart"ent of the goods in 6#estion was in accordance with law and )y
that sei&#re the B#rea# of #sto"s had ac6#ired -#risdiction o*er the
goods for the p#rposes of the enforce"ent of the c#sto"s and tariff laws,
to the e5cl#sion of the o#rt of (irst Instance of Manila, 8e ha*e th#s
resol*ed the principal and decisi*e iss#e in the present case.
P)+E.) >(. M1('
G.R. N+. 9%177, !',1'2: 27, 1993
55
FACTS" In the "orning of Dece")er 14, 1989, $R!gt. Hes#s Belarga,
leader of a 3A%'$I! 'MMA3D @3A%'MA tea" )ased at alarian,
Xa")oanga ity, instr#cted !gt. A"ado Ani to cond#ct s#r*eillance and
test )#y on a certain Mari M#sa of !#ter*ille, Xa")oanga ity. Infor"ation
recei*ed fro" ci*ilian infor"er was that this Mari M#sa was engaged in
selling "ari-#ana in said place. !o !gt. A"ado Ani, another 3A%'M
agent, proceeded to !#ter*ille, in co"pany with a 3A%'M ci*ilian
infor"er, to the ho#se of Mari M#sa to which ho#se the ci*ilian infor"er
had g#ided hi". $he sa"e ci*ilian infor"er had also descri)ed to hi" the
appearance of Mari M#sa. A"ado Ani was a)le to )#y one newspaper9
wrapped dried "ari-#ana for 01?.??. !gt. Ani ret#rned to the 3A%'M
office and t#rned o*er the newspaper9wrapped "ari-#ana to $R!gt. Hes#s
Belarga. !gt. Belarga inspected the st#ff t#rned o*er to hi" and fo#nd it to
)e "ari-#ana.
$he ne5t day, Dece")er 1B, 1989, a)o#t 124? 0.M., a )#y9
)#st was planned. !gt. A"ado Ani was assigned as the pose#r )#yer for
which p#rpose he was gi*en 02?.?? @with !3 ,A977884A )y Belarga. $he
)#y9)#st "oney had )een ta:en )y $R!gt. Hes#s Belarga fro" MR!gt. 3oh
!ali Mihas#n, hief of In*estigation !ection, and for which Belarga signed
a receipt. $he tea" #nder !gt. (oncargas was assigned as )ac:9#p
sec#rity. A pre9arranged signal was arranged consisting of !gt. AniIs
raising his right hand, after he had s#cceeded to )#y the "ari-#ana. $he
two 3A%'M tea"s proceeded to the target site in two ci*ilian *ehicles.
BelargaIs tea" was co"posed of !gt. Belarga, tea" leader, !gt. A"ado
Ani, pose#r )#yer, !gt. Lego and !gt. Biong.
Arri*ing at the target site, !gt. Ani proceeded to the ho#se of
Mari M#sa, while the rest of the 3A%'M gro#p positioned the"sel*es at
strategic places a)o#t 9? to 1?? "eters fro" Mari M#saIs ho#se. $R!gt.
Belarga co#ld see what went on )etween Ani and s#spect Mari M#sa fro"
where he was. Ani approached Mari M#sa, who ca"e o#t of his ho#se,
and as:ed Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted so"e "ore st#ff. Ani
ga*e Mari M#sa the 02?.?? "ar:ed "oney. After recei*ing the "oney,
Mari M#sa went )ac: to his ho#se and ca"e )ac: and ga*e A"ado Ani
two newspaper wrappers containing dried "ari-#ana. Ani opened the two
wrappers and inspected the contents. on*inced that the contents were
"ari-#ana, Ani wal:ed )ac: towards his co"panions and raised his right
hand. $he two 3A%'M tea"s, riding the two ci*ilian *ehicles, sped
towards !gt. Ani. Ani -oined BelargaIs tea" and ret#rned to the ho#se.
At the ti"e !gt. Ani first approached Mari M#sa, there were
fo#r persons inside his ho#se2 Mari M#sa, another )oy, and two wo"en,
one of who" Ani and Belarga later ca"e to :now to )e Mari M#saIs wife.
$he second ti"e, Ani with the 3A%'M tea" ret#rned to Mari M#saIs
ho#se, the wo"an, who was later :nown as Mari M#saIs wife, slipped
away fro" the ho#se. "gt. 9elarga frisked 0ari 0usa but could not find
the 620.00 marked mone$ with him. 0ari 0usa was then asked where the
620.00 was and he told the FA/CK0 team he has given the mone$ to his
wife +who had slipped awa$,. "gt. 9elarga also found a plastic bag
containing dried mari#uana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. 0ari 0usa
was then placed under arrest and brought to the FA/CK0 office. At
!#ter*ille, !gt. Ani t#rned o*er to !gt. Belarga the two newspaper9
wrapped "ari-#ana he had earlier )o#ght fro" Mari M#sa.
The appellant assails the seiEure and admission as evidence of a plastic
bag containing mari#uana which the FA/CK0 agents found in the
appellant@s kitchen. 't appears that after "gt. Ani gave the pre7arranged
signal to the other FA/CK0 agents, the latter moved in and arrested the
appellant inside the house. The$ searched him to retrieve the marked
mone$ but didn@t find it. !pon being .uestioned, the appellant said that he
gave the marked mone$ to his wife. Thereafter, TM"gt. 9elarga and "gt.
(ego went to the kitchen and noticed what TM"gt. 9elarga described as a
cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.
The$ asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a response,
the$ opened it and found dried mari#uana leaves. At the trial, the appellant
.uestioned the admissibilit$ of the plastic bag and the mari*uana it
contains but the trial court issued an Krder ruling that these are
admissible in evidence.
ISSUE" May all the e*idence herein confiscated )e e5l#ded #nder the
e5cl#sionary r#leC
HELD" 3'. B#ilt into the onstit#tion are g#arantees on the freedo" of
e*ery indi*id#al against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res )y pro*iding
in Article III, !ection 2, the following2
/$he right of the people to )e sec#re in their persons, ho#ses, papers, and
effects against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res of whate*er nat#re
and for any p#rpose shall )e in*iola)le, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall iss#e e5cept #pon pro)a)le ca#se to )e deter"ined
personally )y the -#dge after e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the
co"plainant and the witness he "ay prod#ce, and partic#larly descri)ing
the place to )e searched and the persons or things to )e sei&ed./
(#rther"ore, the onstit#tion, in confor"ity with the doctrine laid down in
!tonehill *. Dio:no, 4B declares inad"issi)le, any e*idence o)tained in
*iolation of the freedo" fro" #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res.
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search
and seiure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognied.
Thus, in /lvero v. 7ion, the ,ourt stated that -GtIhe most important
exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search
and seiure as an incident to a lawful arrest.-
%#le 12+, !ection 12 of the %#les of o#rt e5pressly a#thori&es a
warrantless search and sei&#re incident to a lawf#l arrest, th#s2
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest authories the arresting officer to ma<e a search upon the
person of the person arrested. As early as 19?9, the o#rt has r#led
that -GaIn officer ma<ing an arrest may ta<e from the person arrested
and money or property found upon his person which was used in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of
escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the
cause.- 1ence, in a buy:bust operation conducted to entrap a drug:
pusher, the law enforcement agents may seie the mar<ed money
found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even
without arrest and search warrants.
In the case at )ar, the 3A%'M agents searched the person of the
appellant after arresting hi" in his ho#se )#t fo#nd nothing. $hey then
searched the entire ho#se and, in the :itchen, fo#nd and sei&ed a plastic
)ag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seiEure, as an incident to a suspect@s lawful
arrest, ma$ e%tend be$ond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Ab*ects in the
-plain view- of an officer who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are sub*ect to seiure and may be presented as
evidence.
$he - #L/;2 M;6W - doctrine "ay not, howe*er, )e #sed to la#nch
#n)ridled searches and indiscri"inate sei&#res nor to e5tend a general
e5ploratory search "ade solely to find e*idence of defendantIs g#ilt. $he
-#L/;2 M;6W- 7A,T.;26 is usuall$ applied where a police officer is
not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating ob*ect. (#rther"ore, the
J.!. !#pre"e o#rt stated the following li"itations on the application of
the doctrine2
/8hat the Iplain *iewI cases ha*e in co""on is that the police officer in
each of the" had a prior -#stification for an intr#sion in the co#rse of which
he ca"e inad*ertently across a piece of e*idence incri"inating the
acc#sed. $he doctrine ser*es to s#pple"ent the prior -#stification 9
whether it )e a warrant for another o)-ect, hot p#rs#it, search incident to
lawf#l arrest, or so"e other legiti"ate reason for )eing present
#nconnected with a search directed against the acc#sed 9 and per"its the
warrantless sei&#re. 'f co#rse, the e5tension of the original -#stification is
legiti"ate only where it is i""ediately apparent to the police that they
ha*e e*idence )efore the"G the Iplain *iewI doctrine "ay not )e #sed to
e5tend a general e5ploratory search fro" one o)-ect to another #ntil
so"ething incri"inating at last e"erges./
;t has also been suggested that even if an ob*ect is observed in
-plain view,- the -plain view- doctrine will not *ustify the seiure of
the ob*ect where the incriminating nature of the ob*ect is not
apparent from the -plain view- of the ob*ect. Stated differently, it
must be = ;DD67;/T6L@ /##/.62T0 to the police that the items that
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
sub*ect to seiure.
'n the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in
the living room. Lailing to retrieve the marked mone$ which the$ hoped to
find, the FA/CK0 agents searched the whole house and found the
plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their
plain view when the$ arrested the appellant as to #ustif$ its seiEure. The
FA/CK0 agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before the$ sighted the plastic bag. Cnli<e Oer v. ,alifornia, where the
police officer had reason to wal< to the doorway of the ad*acent
<itchen and from which position he saw the mari*uana, the 2/.,AD
agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious
intention of fishing for more evidence.
0oreover, when the FA/CK0 agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one
corner of the kitchen, the$ had no clue as to its contents. The$ had to ask
the appellant what the bag contained. -hen the appellant refused to
respond, the$ opened it and found the mari#uana. Cnli<e Oer v.
,alifornia, where the mari*uana was visible to the police officerFs
eyes, the 2/.,AD agents in this case could not have discovered
the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not
forcibly opened it. 1ven assuming then, that the FA/CK0 agents
inadvertentl$ came across the plastic bag because it was within their
plain view, what ma$ be said to be the ob#ect in their plain view was
#ust the plastic bag and not the mari#uana. The incriminating nature of the
contents of the plastic bag was not immediatel$ apparent from the plain
view of said ob#ect. ;t cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly
betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an
observer.
8e, therefore, hold that #nder the circ#"stances of the case, the /plain
*iew/ doctrine does not apply and the "ari-#ana contained in the plastic
)ag was sei&ed illegally and cannot )e presented in e*idence p#rs#ant to
Article III, !ection 4@2A of the onstit#tion.
56
$he e5cl#sion of this partic#lar e*idence does not, howe*er, di"inish, in
any way, the da"aging effect of the other pieces of e*idence presented )y
the prosec#tion to pro*e that the appellant sold "ari-#ana, in *iolation of
Article II, !ection B of the Dangero#s Dr#gs Act of 1972. 8e hold that )y
*irt#e of the testi"onies of !gt. Ani and $R!gt. Belarga and the two
wrappings of "ari-#ana sold )y the appellant to !gt. Ani, a"ong other
pieces of e*idence, the g#ilt of the appellant of the cri"e charged has
)een pro*ed )eyond reasona)le do#)t.
VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA
G.R. NO. 83988 SEPTEM&ER 29, 1989
FACTS" 'n 2? Han#ary 1987, the 3ational apital %egion District
o""and @3%DA was acti*ated to "aintain peace and order, the
3%D installed chec:points in *ario#s parts of <alen&#ela, Metro
Manila. 0etitioners a*er that, )eca#se of the installation of said
chec:points, the residents of <alen&#ela are worried of )eing harassed
and of their safety )eing placed at the ar)itrary, capricio#s and whi"sical
disposition of the "ilitary "anning the chec:points, considering that their
cars and *ehicles are )eing s#)-ected to reg#lar searches and chec:9#ps,
especially at night or at dawn, witho#t the )enefit of a search warrant
andRor co#rt order. $heir alleged fear for their safety increased when, at
dawn of 9 H#ly 1988, Ben-a"in 0arpon, a s#pply officer of the M#nicipality
of <alen&#ela, B#lacan, was g#nned down allegedly in cold )lood )y the
"e")ers of the 3%D "anning the chec:point along McArth#r 1ighway
at Malinta, <alen&#ela, for ignoring andRor ref#sing to s#)"it hi"self to the
chec:point and for contin#ing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in
the air. 0etitioner <al"onte also clai"s that, on se*eral occasions, he had
gone thr# these chec:points where he was stopped and his car s#)-ected
to searchRchec:9#p witho#t a co#rt order or search warrant.
ISSUE2 8hether the warrantless search and sei&#re witho#t in the present
case is illegal.
HELD" 3o. 0etitionersI concern for their safety and apprehension at )eing
harassed )y the "ilitary "anning the chec:points are not s#fficient
gro#nds to declare the chec:points as per se illegal. 3o proof has )een
presented )efore the o#rt to show that, in the co#rse of their ro#tine
chec:s, the "ilitary indeed co""itted specific *iolations of petitionersI
right against #nlawf#l search and sei&#re or other rights. $he constit#tional
right against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#res is a personal right
in*oca)le only )y those whose rights ha*e )een infringed, or threatened to
)e infringed. 8hat constit#tes a reasona)le or #nreasona)le search and
sei&#re in any partic#lar case is p#rely a -#dicial 6#estion, deter"ina)le
fro" a consideration of the circ#"stances in*ol*ed.
0etitioner <al"onteIs general allegation to the effect that he
had )een stopped and searched witho#t a search warrant )y the "ilitary
"anning the chec:points, witho#t "ore, i.e., witho#t stating the details of
the incidents which a"o#nt to a *iolation of his right against #nlawf#l
search and sei&#re, is not s#fficient to ena)le the o#rt to deter"ine
whether there was a *iolation of <al"onteIs right against #nlawf#l search
and sei&#re. 3ot all searches and sei&#res are prohi)ited. $hose which
are reasona)le are not for)idden. A reasona)le search is not to )e
deter"ined )y any fi5ed for"#la )#t is to )e resol*ed according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is par<ed on the public fair
grounds, 4 or simply loo<s into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein,
these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned chec<points in
Malenuela 'and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the 2,.7, to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and
order for the benefit of the public. ,hec<points may also be regarded
as measures to thwart plots to destabilie the government, in the
interest of public security. In this connection, the Court ma$ take #udicial
notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgenc$
movement, so clearly reflected in the increased :illings in cities of police
and "ilitary "en )y 30A /sparrow #nits,/ not to "ention the a)#ndance of
#nlicensed firear"s and the alar"ing rise in lawlessness and *iolence in
s#ch #r)an centers, not all of which are reported in "edia, "ost li:ely
)ro#ght a)o#t )y deteriorating econo"ic conditions 9999 which all s#" #p
to what one can rightly consider, at the *ery least, as a)nor"al ti"es.
1etween the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individualFs right against a
warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail.
True, the manning of chec<points by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that
all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. 1ut, at the cost of
occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the
citien, the chec<points during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community.
SEC. 3 PRIACY OF COMMUNICATION
AND CORRESPONDENCE
RAMIRE$ >(. CA
G.R. N+. 93833, S)E0)D8)2 28, 1995
FACTS"
A ci*il case for da"ages was filed )y petitioner !ocorro D.
%a"ire& in the %egional $rial o#rt of V#e&on ity alleging that the
pri*ate respondent, .ster !. ,arcia, in a confrontation in the latterIs office,
allegedly *e5ed, ins#lted and h#"iliated her in a /hostile and f#rio#s
"ood/ and in a "anner offensi*e to petitionerIs dignity and personality,/
contrary to "orals, good c#sto"s and p#)lic policy./

In s#pport of her clai", petitioner prod#ced a *er)ati"
transcript of the e*ent and so#ght "oral da"ages, attorneyIs fees and
other e5penses of litigation in the a"o#nt of 0+1?,???.??, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awarda)le at the trial co#rtIs discretion.
$he transcript on which the ci*il case was )ased was c#lled fro" a tape
recording of the confrontation "ade )y petitioner. @on*ersation attached
)elowA
As a res#lt of petitionerIs recording of the e*ent and alleging
that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, pri*ate
respondent filed a cri"inal case )efore the %egional $rial o#rt of 0asay
ity for *iolation of %ep#)lic Act B2??,
0etitioner filed a Motion to V#ash the Infor"ation on the
gro#nd that the facts charged do not constit#te an offense, partic#larly a
*iolation of %.A. B2??. In an order May 4, 1989, the trial co#rt granted the
Motion to V#ash, agreeing with petitioner that 1A the facts charged do not
constit#te an offense #nder %.A. B2??G and that 2A the *iolation p#nished
)y %.A. B2?? refers to a the taping of a co""#nication )y a person other
than a participant to the co""#nication.

0ri*ate respondent filed a 0etition for %e*iew on Certiorari
with !, which forthwith referred the case to the A.
A pro"#lgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial
co#rtIs order is n#ll and *oid. 0etitioner filed a Motion for %econsideration
which A denied. 1ence, this petition.
ISSUE"
8hether or not the applica)le pro*ision of %ep#)lic Act
B2?? does not apply to the taping of a pri*ate con*ersation b$ one of the
parties to the conversation.
HELD"
(irst, legislati*e intent is deter"ined principally fro" the
lang#age of a stat#te. 8here the lang#age of a stat#te is clear and
#na")ig#o#s, the law is applied according to its e5press ter"s, and
interpretation wo#ld )e resorted to only where a literal interpretation wo#ld
)e either i"possi)le or a)s#rd or wo#ld lead to an in-#stice.
!ection 1 of %.A. B2?? entitled, / An Act to 0rohi)it and
0enali&ed 8ire $apping and 'ther %elated <iolations of 0ri*ate
o""#nication and 'ther 0#rposes,/ pro*ides2
!ec. 1. It shall )e #nlawf#ll for any person, not
)eing a#thori&ed )y all the parties to any pri*ate
co""#nication or spo:en word, to tap any wire
or ca)le, or )y #sing any other de*ice or
arrange"ent, to secretly o*erhear, intercept, or
record s#ch co""#nication or spo:en word )y
#sing a de*ice co""only :nown as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or wal:ie9tal:ie or
tape recorder, or howe*er otherwise descri)ed.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
ma<es it illegal for any person, not authoried by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such communication
by means of a tape recorder. The law ma<es no distinction as to
whether the party sought to be penalied by the statute ought to be a
party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. $he stat#teIs intent to penali&e all persons #na#thori&ed
to "a:e s#ch recording is #nderscored )y the #se of the 6#alifier -any-.
onse6#ently, as respondent o#rt of Appeals correctly concl#ded, /e*en
a @personA pri*y to a co""#nication who records his pri*ate con*ersation
with another witho#t the :nowledge of the latter @willA 6#alify as a *iolator/
#nder this pro*ision of %.A. B2??.
/ perusal of the Senate ,ongressional .ecords,
moreover, supports the respondent courtFs conclusion that in
enacting ../. "&33 our lawma<ers indeed contemplated to ma<e
illegal, unauthoried tape recording of private conversations or
communications ta<en either by the parties themselves or by third
persons.
$he #na")ig#ity of the e5press words of the pro*ision, ta:en
together with the deli)erations fro" the ongressional %ecord, therefore
plainly s#pports the *iew held )y the respondent co#rt that the pro*ision
see:s to penali&e e*en those pri*y to the pri*ate co""#nications. Where
the law ma<es no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
!econd, the nat#re of the con*ersations is i""aterial to a
*iolation of the stat#te. $he s#)stance of the sa"e need not )e
specifically alleged in the infor"ation. 8hat %.A. B2?? penali&es are the
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording pri*ate
co""#nications )y "eans of the de*ices en#"erated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section % of ../. "&33.
(inally, petitionerIs contention that the phrase /pri*ate
co""#nication/ in !ection 1 of %.A. B2?? does not incl#de /pri*ate
con*ersations/ narrows the ordinary "eaning of the word /co""#nication/
to a point of a)s#rdity. The word ,ADDC2;,/T6 comes from the latin
57
word communicare , meaning -to share or to impart.- In its ordinary
signification, co""#nication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, , as in a ,A2M6.S/T;A2, or signifies the -process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through
a common system of symbols 'as language signs or gestures)-.
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non:
verbal, written or expressive communications of -meanings or
thoughts- which are li<ely to include the emotionally:charged
exchange, on >ebruary &&, %(!!, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latterFs office. /ny doubts about the
legislative bodyFs meaning of the phrase -private communication-
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms -conversation-
and -communication- were interchangeably used by Senator TaSada
in his 6xplanatory 2ote to the bill quoted below+
It has )een said that innocent people ha*e nothing to
fear fro" their conversations )eing o*erheard. B#t
this state"ent ignores the #s#al nat#re of
conversations as well the #ndenia)le fact that "ost,
if not all, ci*ili&ed people ha*e so"e aspects of their
li*es they do not wish to e5pose. (ree conversations
are often characteri&ed )y e5aggerations, o)scenity,
agreea)le falsehoods, and the e5pression of anti9
social desires of *iews not intended to )e ta:en
serio#sly. $he right to 0;) privacy of
communication , a"ong others, has e5pressly )een
ass#red )y o#r onstit#tion. 3eedless to state here,
the fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion "#st ha*e recogni&ed
the nat#re of conversations )etween indi*id#als and
the significance of "anIs spirit#al nat#re, of his
feelings and of his intellect. $hey "#st ha*e :nown
that part of the pleas#res and satisfactions of life are
to )e fo#nd in the #na#dited, and <2)) )C/;',A) +<
communication )etween indi*id#als E free fro"
e*ery #n-#stifia)le intr#sion )y whate*er "eans.

'n Aaanan vs. 'ntermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the
issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone
extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation
without authoriation did not violate ../. "&33 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those -device's) or
arrangement's)- enumerated therein, following the principle that
-penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.-

The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts
and circumstances pointing to a violation of /.A. C200 suffer from no
ambiguit$, and the statute itself e%plicitl$ mentions the unauthoriEed
recording of private communications with the use of tape7recorders as
among the acts punishable.
'3<.%!A$I'32
0laintiff !occoro D. %a"ire& @h#chiA E ,ood Afternoon MIa".
Defendant .ster !. ,arcia @.!,A E Ano )a ang nangyari sa Iyo,
na:ali"ot :a na :#ng paano :a nap#nta rito, por:e "e")er :a na,
"ags#")ong :a :#ng ano ang gagawin :o sa Iyo.
1J1I E Lasi, na:a d#ty a:o noon.
.!, E $apos iniwan no. @"icA
1J1I E 1indi "Ia", pero ilan )eses na nila a:ong )inali:an, sa)ing
ganoon E
.!, E Ito and @sicA "asasa)i :o sa Iyo, ayaw :#ng @sicA "ag e5plain :a,
:asi hanggang 1?2?? p."., :ina)#:asan hindi :a na p#"aso:. 3gayon
a:o ang )a)ali: sa Iyo, nag9aaply :a sa !tates, nag9aaply :a sa re*iew
"o, :#ng :a:ailanganin ang certification "o, :ali"#tan "o na :asi hindi
:a sa a:in "a:a:ahingi.
1J1I E 1indi MIa". Lasi ang ano :o talaga noon i9cocontin#e :o #p
to 1?2?? p.".
.!, E 9astos ka, na:ali"#tan "o na :#ng paano :a p#"aso: dito sa
hotel. Mags#")ong :a sa Jnion :#ng g#sto "o. 3a:ali"#tan "o na :#ng
paano :a na:apaso: dito /Do yo# thin: that on yo#r own "a:a:apaso: :a
:#ng hindi a:o. 0an#n#")yoyan na :ita @!in#s#")atan na :itaA.
1J1I E It#t#loy :o na MIa" sana ang d#ty :o.
.!, E Laso ilang )eses na a:ong )ina)ali:an doon ng "ga no @sicA :o.
.!, E 3a:ali"#tan "o na )a :#ng paano :a p#"aso: sa hotel, :#ng on
yo#r own "erit ala" :o na"an :#ng gaano :a /:a )o)o/ "o. Mara"i ang
nag9aaply ala" :ong hindi :a papasa.
1J1I E L#"#ha :a"i ng e5a" noon.
.!, E 'o, pero hindi :a papasa.
1J1I E .h, )a:it a:o ang na:#ha ni Dr. $a"ayo
.!, E L#:#nin :a :asi a:o.
1J1I E .h, di sana E
.!, E 1#wag "ong ipag"ala:i na "ay #ta: :a :asi wala kang utak.
A:ala "o )a "a:#:#ha :a dito :#ng hindi a:o.
1J1I E Mag9ee5plain a:o.
.!, E 1#wag na, hindi a:o "ag9papa9e5plain sa Iyo, "a:aalala :a :#ng
paano :a p#"a9rito. /6utang7ina/ sasa)i9sa)ihin "o :a"ag9ana: ng
nanay at tatay "o ang "ga "ag#lang :o.
.!, E 8ala na a:ong pa:iala", dahil nandito :a sa loo), nasa la)as :a
p#wede :a ng hindi p#"aso:, o:ey yan nasaloo) :a #"alis :a doon.
1J1I E Lasi MIa", )in)ali:an a:o ng "ga taga Jnion.
.!, E 3andiyan na rin a:o, pero h#wag "ong :ali"#tan na hindi :a
"a:a:apaso: :#ng hindi a:o. L#ng hindi "o :ini:ilala yan o:ey lang sa
a:in, dahil tapos :a na.
1J1I E Ina9ano :o "Ia" na #tang na loo).
.!, E 1#wag na lang, hindi "o #tang na loo), :asi :#ng )aga sa no,
nilapastangan "o a:o.
1J1I E 0aano :ita nilapastangananC
.!, E Ma)#ti pa l#"a)as :a na. 1indi na a:o "a:i:ipag#sap sa Iyo.
L#"a)as :a na. Mags#")ong :a.

C)/9.9' $1.1)0' >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.(
(G.R. N+. 107838, F)821'2: 20, 199%)
M),*+F', !.,
FACTS" ecilia X#l#eta is the wife of Alfredo Martin. 'n March 2+,
1982, ecilia entered the clinic of her h#s)and, a doctor of "edicine, and
in the presence of her "other, a dri*er and pri*ate respondentIs secretary,
forcibl$ opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband@s clinic and took
1I5 documents consisting of private correspondence between 8r. 0artin
and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, 8r.
0artin@s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seiEed for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
dis6#alification fro" the practice of "edicine which petitioner had filed
against her h#s)and. Dr. Martin, hence )ro#ght an action for the reco*ery
of the doc#"ents and papers and for da"ages against ecilia. $he trial
co#rt rendered its -#dg"ent declaring Dr. Martin as the capitalRe5cl#si*e
owner of the said properties. $he o#rt of Appeals affir"ed the decision of
the trial co#rt.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the doc#"ents and papers sei&ed )y ecilia
are ad"issi)le in e*idence against Dr. Martin.
HELD" 3'. $he doc#"ents and papers in 6#estion are inad"issi)le
in e*idence. The constitutional in#unction declaring the privac$ of
communication and correspondence :to be< inviolable is no less
applicable simpl$ because it is the wife +who thinks herself aggrieved b$
her husband@s infidelit$, who is the part$ against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
,onstitution is if there is a -lawful order Gfrom aI court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.- /ny
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible -for any purpose in any proceeding.-
$he inti"acies )etween h#s)and and wife do not -#stify any one of the"
in )rea:ing the drawers and ca)inets of the other and in ransac:ing the"
for any telltale e*idence of "arital infidelity. A person, )y contracting
"arriage, does not shed hisRher integrity or his right to pri*acy as an
indi*id#al and the constit#tional protection is e*er a*aila)le to hi" or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
b$ making it privileged. Feither husband nor wife ma$ testif$ for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Feither ma$ be e%amined without the consent of the other as to
an$ communication received in confidence b$ one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified e%ceptions. 9ut one thing is freedom of
communicationJ .uite another is a compulsion for each one to share
what one <nows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the dut$
of fidelit$ that each owes to the other.
FELIPE NAVARRO >( COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. N+. 121087, A1A1(0 2%, 1999,MENDO$A, !.
F'/0("
!tanley Hal)#ena and .nri6#e I:e Lingan, who were
reporters of the radio station together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
.ntertain"ent ity following reports that it was showing n#de dancers.
After the three had seated the"sel*es at a ta)le and ordered )eer, a
scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and )egan to perfor" a strip act.
As she re"o*ed her )rassieres, Hal)#ena )ro#ght o#t his ca"era and
too: a pict#re. $his called the attention of Dante Li6#in, the floor "anager,
who together with a sec#rity g#ard, Ale5 !ioco, approached Hal)#ena and
de"anded to :now why he too: a pict#re which res#lted to a heated
arg#"ent. 8hen Hal)#ena saw that !ioco was a)o#t to p#ll o#t his g#n,
he ran o#t of the -oint followed )y his co"panions. $hey went to the police
station to report the "atter. In a while, Li6#in and !ioco arri*ed on a
"otorcycle who were "et )y petitioner 3a*arro who tal:ed with the" in a
corner for aro#nd fifteen "in#tes. Afterwards, petitioner 3a*arro t#rned to
Hal)#ena and, p#shing hi" to the wall, c#rsed hi". 0etitioner 3a*arro
then p#lled o#t his firear" and coc:ed it, and, pressing it on the face of
Hal)#ena. At this point, Lingan inter*ened. $he two then had a heated
e5change. As Lingan was a)o#t to t#rn away, petitioner 3a*arro hit hi"
with the handle of his pistol. Lingan fell on the floor, )lood flowing down
his face. 1e tried to get #p, )#t petitioner 3a*arro ga*e hi" a fist )low on
the forehead which floored hi". !nknown to petitioner Favarro, >albuena
was able to record on tape the e%change between petitioner and the
deceased. This was submitted as evidence.
I((1)"
8hether or not the tape is ad"issi)le as e*idence in *iew of %A B2??
which prohi)it wire tappingC
H).*" 3o, it "ay not. !ec. 1 of %A B2?? pro*ides that = It shall also )e
#nlawf#l for any person, )e he a participant or not in the act or acts
58
penali&ed in the ne5t preceding sentence to :nowingly possess any tape
record, wire record, disc record, or any other s#ch record, or copies
thereof, of any co""#nication or spo:en word sec#red either )efore or
after the effecti*e date of this Act in the "anner prohi)ited )y this lawG or
to replay the sa"e for any other person or personsG or to co""#nicate the
contents thereof, either *er)ally or in writing, or to f#rnish transcriptions
thereof, whether co"plete or partial, to any other person2 0ro*ided, $hat
the #se of s#ch record or any copies thereof as e*idence in any ci*il,
cri"inal in*estigation or trial of offenses "entioned in section 4 hereof,
shall not )e co*ered )y this prohi)ition
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording
of #.;M/T6 ,ADDC2;,/T;A2S. !ince the exchange between
petitioner 2avarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is
not prohibited. 3or is there any 6#estion that it was d#ly a#thenticated. A
*oice recording is a#thenticated )y the testi"ony of a witness @1A that he
personally recorded the con*ersationG @2A that the tape played in co#rt was
the one he recordedG and @4A that the *oices on the tape are those of the
persons s#ch are clai"ed to )elong.
OPLE >. TORRES
9... 2o. %&4B!5J 8uly &$, %((!J #uno, 8.
FACTS"
0etitioner Blas 'ple prays that the ! in*alidate Ad"inistrati*e 'rder 3o.
4?8 entitled /Adoption of a 3ational o"p#teri&ed Identification %eference
!yste"/ on two i"portant constit#tional gro#nds2 one, it is a #s#rpation of
the power of ongress to legislate, and two, it i"per"issi)ly intr#des on
o#r citi&enryIs protected &one of pri*acy.
ISSUE"
8hether A' 4?8 *iolates the constit#tionally "andated right to pri*acy
HELD. -)(. /ssuming, arguendo, that /.A. 2o. $3! need not be the
sub*ect of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy. The essence of privacy is the -right to be let alone.-
The S, prescinds from the premise that the right to
privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the ,onstitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that /.A. 2o. $3! is
*ustified by some ,AD#6LL;29 ST/T6 ;2T6.6ST and that it is
2/..AWL@ 7./W2.
/.A. 2o. $3! is predicated on two considerations+ '%) the
need to provide our citiens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social
security providers and other government instrumentalities and '&)
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions
and misrepresentations by persons see<ing basic services. It is
de)ata)le whether these interests are co"pelling eno#gh to warrant the
iss#ance of A.'. 3o. 4?8. &UT =HAT IS NOT ARGUA&LE IS THE
&ROADNESS, THE VAGUENESS, THE OVER&READTH OF A.O. NO.
308 =HICH IF IMPLEMENTED =ILL PUT OUR PEOPLEQS RIGHT TO
PRIVAC- IN CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER.
$he heart of A.'. 3o. 4?8 lies in its !ection B which pro*ides for a
0op#lation %eference 3#")er @0%3A as a /co""on reference n#")er to
esta)lish a lin:age a"ong concerned agencies/ thro#gh the #se of
/Bio"etrics $echnology/ and /co"p#ter application designs./ A.'. 3o.
4?8 sho#ld also raise o#r antennas for a f#rther loo: will show that it does
not state whether encoding of data is li"ited to )iological infor"ation
alone for identification p#rposes. I, <'/0, 0;) S+.9/90+2 G),)2'. /.'9D(
0;'0 0;) '*+E09+, +< 0;) I*),09<9/'09+, R)<)2),/) S:(0)D @9..
/+,029810) 0+ 0;) IA),)2'09+, +< E+E1.'09+, *'0' <+2 *)>).+ED),0
E.',,9,A.I This is an admission that the #.2 will not be used solely
for identification but the generation of other data with remote
relation to the avowed purposes of /.A. 2o. $3!. ,learly, the
indefiniteness of /.A. 2o. $3! can give the government the roving
authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than
the identification of the individual through his #.2.
$he potential for "is#se of the data to )e gathered #nder A.'. 3o. 4?8
cannot )e #nderplayed as the dissenters do. 0#rs#ant to said
ad"inistrati*e order, an indi*id#al "#st present his 0%3 e*ery ti"e he
deals with a go*ern"ent agency to a*ail of )asic ser*ices and sec#rity.
1is transactions with the go*ern"ent agency will necessarily )e recorded
E whether it )e in the co"p#ter or in the doc#"entary file of the agency.
$he indi*id#alIs file "ay incl#de his transactions for loan a*ail"ents,
inco"e ta5 ret#rns, state"ent of assets and lia)ilities, rei")#rse"ents for
"edication, hospitali&ation, etc. The more frequent the use of the #.2,
the better the chance of building a huge formidable information base
through the electronic lin<age of the files. The data may be gathered
for gainful and useful government purposesJ but the existence of
this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of
our authorities to resist. ;t does not provide who shall control and
access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose.
These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty
the integrity of the information. TH6.6 /.6 /LSA 2A ,A2T.ALS
TA 9C/.7 /9/;2ST L6/O/96 A> ;2>A.D/T;A2. When the
access code of the control programs of the particular computer
system is bro<en, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,
can ma<e use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate
the data stored within the system.
It is plain and the ! held that A.'. 3o. 4?8 falls short of ass#ring that
personal infor"ation which will )e gathered a)o#t o#r people will only )e
processed for #ne6#i*ocally specified p#rposes. The lac< of proper
safeguards in this regard of A.K. Fo. ;08 may interfere with the
individualFs liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to
trac< down his movementJ it ma$ also enable unscrupulous persons
to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
self:incriminationJ it ma$ pave the wa$ for -fishing expeditions b$
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
searches and seiEures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the
#.2, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we
consider that the individual lac<s control over what can be read or
placed on his ;7, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. The$ threaten the ver$ abuses that the 9ill of /ights seeks to
prevent.

$he ! re-ected the arg#"ent of the !olicitor ,eneral that an indi*id#al
has a reasona)le e5pectation of pri*acy with regard to the 3ational ID and
the #se of )io"etrics technology as it stands on 6#ic:sand. TH6
.6/SA2/1L626SS A> / #6.SA2FS 6H#6,T/T;A2 A> #.;M/,@
76#627S A2 / TWA:#/.T T6ST+ '%) whether by his conduct, the
individual has exhibited an expectation of privacyJ and '&) whether
this expectation is one that society recognies as reasonable. The
factual circumstances of the case determine the reasonableness of
the expectation. &owever, other factors, such as customs, ph$sical
surroundings and practices of a particular activit$, ma$ serve to create or
diminish this e%pectation. $he #se of )io"etrics and co"p#ter technology
in A.'. 3o. 4?8 does not ass#re the indi*id#al of a reasona)le e5pectation
of pri*acy.
3e5t, the !olicitor ,eneral #rges the ! to *alidate A.'. 3o. 4?8Is
a)ridg"ent of the right of pri*acy )y #sing THE RATIONAL
RELATIONSHIP TEST. 1e stressed that the p#rposes of A.'. 3o. 4?8
are2 @1A to strea"line and speed #p the i"ple"entation of )asic
go*ern"ent ser*ices, @2A eradicate fra#d )y a*oiding d#plication of
ser*ices, and @4A generate pop#lation data for de*elop"ent planning. 1e
concl#des that these p#rposes -#stify the inc#rsions into the right to
pri*acy for the "eans are rationally related to the end. $he ! was not
i"pressed )y the arg#"ent. In Morfe *. M#t#c, the ! #pheld the
constit#tionality of %.A. 4?19, the Anti9,raft and orr#pt 0ractices Act, as
a *alid police power "eas#re. 8e declared that the law, in co"pelling a
p#)lic officer to "a:e an ann#al report disclosing his assets and lia)ilities,
his so#rces of inco"e and e5penses, did not infringe on the indi*id#alIs
right to pri*acy. $he law was enacted to pro"ote "orality in p#)lic
ad"inistration )y c#rtailing and "ini"i&ing the opport#nities for official
corr#ption and "aintaining a standard of honesty in the p#)lic ser*ice.
$he sa"e circ#"stances do not o)tain in the case at )ar. >or one, ../.
$3%( is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, ../. $3%(
itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were
prohibited and penalied, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid
abuses. ;n the case at bar, /.A. 2o. $3! may have been impelled by a
worthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is
not narrowly drawn. They must satisfactorily show the presence of
compelling state interests and that the law, rule or regulation is
narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. $his approach is de"anded )y the
1987 onstit#tion whose entire "atri5 is designed to protect h#"an rights
and to pre*ent a#thoritarianis". In case of do#)t, the least we can do is to
lean towards the stance that will not p#t in danger the rights protected )y
the onstit#tions.
In the case at )ar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
government which by issuing /.A. 2o. $3! pressures the people to
surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on
the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. ,i*en the
record9:eeping power of the co"p#ter, only the indifferent fail to percei*e
the danger that A.'. 3o. 4?8 gi*es the go*ern"ent the power to co"pile a
de*astating dossier against #ns#specting citi&ens.
$h#s, the petition was ,%A3$.D.
SECTION !
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
THE UNITED STATES >( FELIPE &USTOS, ET AL.
G.R. N+. L12592, M'2/; 8, 1918.
F'/0(" In the latter part of 1917, n#"ero#s citi&ens of the 0ro*ince
of 0a"panga asse")led, and prepared and signed a petition to the
.5ec#ti*e !ecretary charging %o"an 0#nsalan, -#stice of the peace of
Maca)e)e and Masantol, 0a"panga, with "alfeasance in office and
as:ing for his re"o*al.
59
$he .5ec#ti*e !ecretary referred the papers to the -#dge of
first instance for the 7th H#dicial District re6#esting in*estigation, proper
action, and report. $he -#stice of the peace was notified and denied the
charges. $he -#dge of first instance, ha*ing esta)lished g#ilt,
reco""ended to the ,o*ernor9,eneral that the respondent )e re"o*ed
fro" his position as -#stice of the peace and it is ordered that the
proceedings had in this case )e trans"itted to the .5ec#ti*e
!ecretary.Later the -#stice of the peace filled a "otion for a new trialG the
-#dge of first instance granted the "otion, doc#"ents were introd#ced
asserting that the -#stice of the peace was the *icti" of prosec#tion, and
that charges were "ade for personal reasons. 1e was then ac6#itted.
$hereafter, in 191+, a cri"inal action for li)el against the defendants who
earlier initiated the petition for the -#dgeKs re"o*al was instit#ted. $he (I
of 0a"panga fo#nd the defendants g#ilty.
I((1)" 8hether or not the defendants are g#ilty of a li)el of %o"an
0#nsalan, -#stice of the peace of Maca)e)e and Masantol, 0ro*ince of
0a"panga.
H).*" 3o.$he onstit#tion of the Jnited !tates and the !tate
constit#tions g#arantee the right of freedo" of speech and press and the
right of asse")ly and petition. 8e are therefore, not s#rprised to find
0resident McLinley in that Magna harta of 0hilippine Li)erty, the
Instr#ction to the !econd 0hilippine o""ission, of April 7, 19??, laying
down the in*iola)le r#le -That no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the 9overnment for a redress of
grievances.-
$he 0hilippine Bill, the Act of ongress of H#ly 1, 19?2, and the Hones
Law, the Act of ongress of A#g#st 29, 191+, in the nat#re of organic acts
for the 0hilippines, contin#ed this g#aranty. $he words 6#oted are not
#nfa"iliar to st#dents of onstit#tional Law, for they are the co#nterpart of
the first a"end"ent to the onstit#tion of the Jnited !tates, which the
A"erican people de"anded )efore gi*ing their appro*al to the
onstit#tion.
$hese paragraphs fo#nd in the 0hilippine Bill of %ights are not thread)are
*er)iage. $he lang#age carries with it all the applica)le -#rispr#dence of
great .nglish and A"erican onstit#tional cases. And what are these
principlesD Golumes would inade.uatel$ answer. 9ut included are the
following?
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs. ,omplete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of
free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses
of officialdom. Den in public life may suffer under a hostile and an
un*ust accusationJ the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a
clear conscience. / public officer must not be too thin:s<inned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Anly thus can the
intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Af course,
criticism does not authoried defamation. Fevertheless, as the
individual is less than the "tate, so must e%pected criticism be born for the
common good . .ising superior to any official, or set of officials, to the
,hief 6xecutive, to the Legislature, to the 8udiciary : to any or all the
agencies of 9overnment : #C1L;, A#;2;A2 should be the constant
source of liberty and democracy.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticie *udicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of
vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit sub*ect for proper comment. ;f the people cannot
criticie a *ustice of the peace or a *udge the same as any other
public officer, public opinion will be effectively muled . Attempted
terroriEation of public opinion on the part of the #udiciar$ would be t$rann$
of the basest sort. The sword of 8amocles in the hands of a #udge does
not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his
prerogative as a citiEen and to stand up bravel$ before an$ official. An the
contrary, it is a 7CT@ which every one owes to society or to the State
to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. ;t is further
the duty of all <now of any official dereliction on the part of a
magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts
to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish
them. 'n the words of 0r. >ustice Aa$ner, who contributed so largel$ to
the law of libel. -The people are not obliged to spea< of the conduct of
their officials in whispers or with bated breath in a free government,
but only in a despotism.-
$he .;9HT TA /SS6D1L6 /27 #6T;T;A2 is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the
right of free speech. /SS6D1L@ means a right on the part of citiens
to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
#6T;T;A2 means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the
government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling
and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made.
+1,6ublic polic$, +2,the welfare of societ$, and +;,the orderl$ administration
of government have demanded protection for public opinion. $he
ine*ita)le and incontesta)le res#lt has )een the de*elop"ent and
adoption of the DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE.
/The 7A,T.;26 A> #.;M;L6967 ,ADDC2;,/T;A2S rests upon
public policy, Fwhich loo<s to the free and unfettered administration
of *ustice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances
afford an immunity to the evil:disposed and malignant slanderer.F-
P29>9.)A) is classified as either A&SOLUTE or JUALIFIED. -ith the first,
we are not concerned. /s to qualified privilege, it is as the words
suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice.
$he r#le is th#s stated )y Lord a"p)ell, . H.
-/ communication made bona fide upon any sub*ect:matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he
has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding
interest or duty, although it contained incriminatory matter which
without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.-
A pertinent illustration of the application of .ualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the
character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer
or a board having some interest or dut$ in the matter. 6ven when the
statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief
in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle
of privilege ma$ still cover the mistake of the individual. 1ut the
statements must be made under an honest sense of dutyJ a self:
see<ing motive is destructive. #ersonal in*ury is not necessary. /ll
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
*ustice and of public affairs. The 7CT@ under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this
person in good faith believe he is acting in pursuance thereof
although in fact he is mista<en. The privilege is not defeated by the
mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A
further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the
complaint should be made. The rule is that if a part$ applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective
functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case
out of the privilege.
'n the usual case D/L;,6 can be presumed from defamatory words.
#.;M;L696 destroys that #.6SCD#T;A2. The onus of proving malice
then lies on the plaintiff.
$he plaintiff "#st )ring ho"e to the defendant the e5istence of "alice as
the tr#e "oti*e of his cond#ct. >alsehood and the absence of probable
cause will amount to proof of malice.
A pri*ileged co""#nication sho#ld not )e s#)-ected to "icroscopic
e5a"ination to disco*er gro#nds of "alice or falsity. !#ch e5cessi*e
scr#tiny wo#ld defeat the protection which the law throws o*er pri*ileged
co""#nications. $he #lti"ate test is that of )ona fides.
1a*ing ascertained the attit#de which sho#ld )e ass#"ed relati*e to the
)asic rights of freedo" of speech and press and of asse")ly and petition,
ha*ing e"phasi&ed the point that our (ibel (aw as a statute must be
construed with reference to the guaranties of our Krganic (aw, and having
sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of
this case with these principles.
It is tr#e that the partic#lar words set o#t in the infor"ation, if said of a
pri*ate person, "ight well )e considered li)elo#s per se. $he charges
"ight also #nder certain concei*a)le conditions con*ict one of a li)el of a
go*ern"ent official. /s a general rule words imputing to a *udge or a
*ustice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or
misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. 1ut as
suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of
direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus
qualifiedly privileged. 6xpress malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. >urther, although the charges are probably not true as
to the *ustice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the
petitioners. 9ood faith surrounded their action. #robable cause for
them to thin< that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citiens : to secure the
removal from office of a person thought to be venal : were *ustifiable.
;n no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citiens
did not eagerly seie on a frivolous matter but on instances which
not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were
sufficient in an investigation by a *udge of first instance to convince
him of their seriousness. 2o undue publicity was given to the
petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the *ustice of
the peace was proper. /nd finally the charges and the petition were
submitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary, the
6xecutive Secretary.
The present facts are further essentiall$ different from those
established in other cases in which private individuals have been
convicted of libels of public officials. Dalice, traduction, falsehood,
calumny, against the man and not the officer , have been the causes
of the verdict of guilty.
8e find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the
r#les concerning 6#alified pri*ilege, growing o#t of constit#tional
g#aranties in o#r )ill of rights. Instead of p#nishing citi&ens for an honest
60
endea*or to i"pro*e the p#)lic ser*ice, we sho#ld rather co""end the"
for their good citi&enship. $he defendants and appellants are ac6#itted.
P)+E.) >(. A.'2/+,
GR 4%551, D)/. 12, 1939
FACTS" As an after"ath of the decision rendered )y the o#rt of first
Instance of 0a"panga in cri"inal case 3o. 7744, $he 0eople of the
0hilippines *s. !al*ador Alarcon, et al., con*icting the acc#sed therein E
e5cept one E of the cri"e of ro))ery co""itted in )and, a denunciator$
letter, signed b$ (uis 0. Taruc, was addressed to &is 1%cellenc$, the
6resident of the 6hilippines.
A copy of said letter fo#nd its way to the herein respondent,
(ederico MaNgahas who, as col#"nist of the $ri)#ne, a newspaper of
general circ#lation in the 0hilippines, 6#oted the letter in an article
p#)lished )y hi" in the iss#e of that paper of !epte")er 24, 1947. $he
o)-ectiona)le portion, written in !panish, is inserted in the following
petition of the pro*incial fiscal of 0a"panga, filed with the o#rt of (irst
Instance of that pro*ince on !epte")er 29, 1947. 'n the sa"e date, the
lower co#rt ordered the respondent to appear and show ca#se. $he
respondent appeared and filed an answer, alleging that the p#)lication of
the letter in 6#estion is in line with the constit#tional g#arantee of freedo"
of the press.
ISSUE"
8hether the p#)lication of the letter in 6#estion is within the
p#r*iew of constit#tional g#arantee of freedo" of the press, hence the
acc#sed cannot )e held g#ilty in conte"pt of co#rtC
HELD"
1. D.!. $he ele"ents of conte"pt )y newspaper p#)lications
are well defined )y the cases ad-#dicated in this as in other -#risdictions.
2ewspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or
influence the courts in administering *ustice in a pending suit or
proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
punish able by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is
ended. ;t must, however, clearly appear that such publications do
impede, interfere with, and embarrass the administration of *ustice
before the author of the publications should be held for contempt.
What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments is the all:important duty of the court to
administer *ustice in the decision of a pending case. There is no
pending case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a
decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, we
believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter
complained of was published after the Court of Lirst 'nstance of
6ampanga had decided the aforesaid criminal case for robber$ in band,
and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. $he
fact that a "otion to reconsider its order confiscating the )ond of the
acc#sed therein was s#)se6#ently filed "ay )e ad"ittedG )#t, the
i"portant consideration is that it was then witho#t power to reopen or
"odify the decision which it had rendered #pon the "erits of the case, and
co#ld not ha*e )een infl#enced )y the 6#estioned p#)lication.
'f it be contended, however, that the publication of the
.uestioned letter constitutes contempt of the Court of Appeals where the
appeal in the criminal case was then pending, as was the theor$ of the
provincial fiscal below which was accepted b$ the lower court, we ta<e
the view that in the interrelation of the different courts forming our
integrated *udicial system, one court is not an agent or
representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish
contempts in vindication of the authority and de corum which are not
its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and
this last court be comes thereb$ charged with the authorit$ to deal with
contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal.
$he !olicitor9,eneral, in his )rief, s#ggests that /e*en if
there had )een nothing "ore pending )efore the trial co#rt, this still had
-#risdiction to p#nish the acc#sed for conte"pt, for the reason that the
p#)lication scandali&ed the co#rt. $he r#le s#ggested, which has its origin
at co""on law, is in*ol*ed in so"e do#)t #nder "odern .nglish law and
in the Jnited !tates, -the weight of authority, however, is clearly to
the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted under
our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press.- Kther
considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As
stated, the rule imported into this #urisdiction is that newspaper
publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the
courts in administering #ustice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute
criminal contempt which is summaril$ punishable b$ the courts) that the
rule is otherwise after the case is ended. I, '0 .)'(0 0@+ 9,(0',/)(, 0;9(
C+120 ;'( )C)2/9()* 0;) E+@)2 0+ E1,9(; <+2 /+,0)DE0 I+, 0;)
E2)()2>'09>) ',* +, 0;) >9,*9/'09>) E29,/9E.), +, 0;) /+22)/09>) ',*
,+0 +, 0;) 2)0'.9'0+2: 9*)' +< E1,9(;D),0I. ,ontempt of court is in
the nature of a criminal offense , and in considering the probable effects
of the article alleged to be contemptuous, ever$ fair and reasonable
inference consistent with the theor$ of defendant@s innocence will be
indulged, and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in law e%ists as to the
guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the due
administration of #ustice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he
must be ac.uitted.
A:)2 P2+*1/09+, PT- L0*. >(. C'E1.+,A
GR 82380, AE29., 29, 1988, FELICIANO, !.
FACTS"
$he petitioner infor"ed pri*ate respondent H#an 0once
.nrile a)o#t the pro-ected "otion pict#re entitled /$he (o#r Day
%e*ol#tion/ enclosing a synopsis of it, the f#ll te5t of which is set o#t
)elow2 $he (o#r Day %e*ol#tion is a si5 ho#r "ini9series a)o#t 0eople
0owerEa #ni6#e e*ent in "odern history that9"ade possi)le the 0eacef#l
re*ol#tion in the 0hilippines in 198+. (aced with the tas: of dra"ati&ing
these re"ar:a)le e*ents, screenwriter Da*id 8illia"son and history 0rof
Al Mcoy ha*e chosen a /doc#9dra"a/ style and created Ofo#rP fictitio#s
characters to trace the re*ol#tion fro" the death of !enator A6#ino, to the
(e) re*ol#tion and the fleeing of Marcos fro" the co#ntry.
0ri*ate respondent .nrile replied that /he wo#ld not and will
not appro*e of the #se, appropriation, reprod#ction andRor e5hi)ition of his
na"e, or pict#re, or that of any "e")er of his fa"ily in any cine"a or
tele*ision prod#ction, fil" or other "edi#" for ad*ertising or co""ercial
e5ploitation/. 0etitioners acceded to this de"and and the na"e of pri*ate
respondent .nrile was deleted fro" the "o*ie script. 'n 24 (e)r#ary
1988, pri*ate respondent filed a o"plaint with application for $e"porary
%estraining 'rder and 8ilt of 0retion with the %egional $rial o#rt of
Ma:ati see:ing to en-oin petitioners fro" prod#cing the "o*ie /$he (o#r
Day %e*ol#tion/. $he co"plaint alleged that petitionersI prod#ction of the
"ini9series witho#t pri*ate respondentIs consent and o*er his o)-ection,
constit#tes an o)*io#s *iolation of his right of pri*acy.
ISSUE" 8hether or not petitionersK right to freedo" of e5pression
o#tweigh pri*ate respondent .nrileKs right to pri*acyC
HELD" D.!. $he freedo" of speech incl#des the freedom to film and
produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or to diffuse them through television. In o#r day and age,
"otion pict#res are a #ni*ersally #tili&ed *ehicle of co""#nication and
"edi#" of e5pression. Along with the press, radio and television, motion
pictures constitute a principal medium of mass communication for
information, education and entertainment. Motion pict#res are i"portant
)oth as a "edi#" for the co""#nication of ideas and the e5pression of
the artistic i"p#lse. $heir effects on the perception )y o#r people of iss#es
and p#)lic officials or p#)lic fig#res as well as the pre*ailing c#lt#ral traits
is considera)le. ;mportance of motion pictures as an organ of public
opinion lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as
well as to inform. $here is no clear di*iding line )etween what in*ol*es
:nowledge and what affords pleas#re. If s#ch a distinction were s#stained,
there is a di"in#tion of the )asic right to free e5pression./This freedom is
available in our country both to locally:owned and to foreign:owned
motion picture companies. >urthermore, the circumstance that the
production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected
to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of
freedom of speech and of expression.
$he co#nter9)alancing clai" of pri*ate respondent is to a
right of privacy. $he right of pri*acy or /the right to )e let alone,/ li:e the
right of free e5pression, is not an a)sol#te right. / limited intrusion into
a personFs privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that
person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited
from him or to be published about him constitute of apublic
character. Succinctly put, TH6 .;9HT A> #.;M/,@ cannot be
invo<ed resist publication and dissemination of D/TT6.S A>
#C1L;, ;2T6.6ST. The interest sought to be protected by the right
of privacy is the right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the
wrongful publiciing of the private affairs and activities of an
individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern.
(agunEad v. Gda. de AonEales, on which private respondent
relies heavil$, recogniEed a right to privac$ in a conte%t which included a
claim to freedom of speech and of e%pression. (agunEad involved a suit
for enforcement of a licensing agreement between a motion picture
producer as licensee and the widow and famil$ of the late 0oises 6adilla
as licensors. $his agree"ent ga*e the licensee the right to prod#ce a
"otion pict#re portraying the life of Moises 0adilla, a "ayoralty candidate
of the 3acionalista 0arty for the M#nicipality of Magallon, 3egros
'ccidental d#ring the 3o*e")er 1971 elections and for whose "#rder,
,o*ernor %afael Lacson, a "e")er of the Li)eral 0arty then in power and
his "en were tried and con*icted. 'n affirming the #udgment of the lower
court enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had
produced the motion picture and e%hibited it but refused to pa$ the
stipulated ro$alties, the Court, through 0me. >ustice 0elencio7&errera,
said?
/3either do we agree with petitionerIs
s#)"ission that the Licensing Agree"ent is
n#ll and *oid for lac: of, or for ha*ing an illegal
ca#se or consideration, while it is tr#e that
petitioner had p#rchased the rights to the )oo:
entitled I$he Moises 0adilla !tory,I that did not
dispense with the need for prior consent and
a#thority fro" the deceased heirs to portray
p#)licly episodes in said deceasedIs life and in
that of his "other and the "e")ers of his
fa"ily. As held in !ch#yler *. #rtis, @O1897P,
1B7 3D B4B, B2 3., 41 L%A 28+. B9 A" !t
%ep +71A, @a privilege ma$ be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to
protect his memor$, but the privilege e%ists for
61
the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings
and to prevent a violation of their own rights in
the character and memor$ of the deceased.@
0etitionerIs a*er"ent that pri*ate respondent
did not ha*e any property right o*er the life of
Moises 0adilla since the latter was a p#)lic
fig#re, is neither well ta:en. Being a p#)lic
fig#re ipso facto does not a#to"atically destroy
in toto a personIs right to pri*acy. $he right to
in*ade a personIs pri*acy to disse"inate p#)lic
infor"ation does not e5tend to a fictional or
no*eli&ed representation of a person, no "atter
how p#)lic a fig#re he or she "ay )e @,arner
*. $riangle 0#)lications, D3D, 97 (. !#pp.,
7+B, 7B9 O1971PA. 'n the case at bar, while it is
true that petitioner e%erted efforts to present a
true7to7life stor$ of 0oises 6adilla, petitioner
admits that he included a little romance in the
film because without it, it would be a drab stor$
of torture and brutalit$./
I, L'A1,F'*, 0;) C+120 ;'* ,))*, '( @) ;'>) 9, 0;) 9,(0',0 /'(), 0+
*)'. @90; /+,02'E+()* /.'9D( 0+ <2))*+D +< (E))/; ',* +<
)CE2)((9+, ',* 0+ E29>'/:. L'A1,F'* 0;) .9/),()) 9, )<<)/0 /.'9D)*,
9, 0;) ,'D) +< <2))*+D +< (E))/; ',* )CE2)((9+,, a right to produce
a motion picture biography at least partly -fictionalied- of Doises
#adilla without the consent of and without paying pre:agreed
royalties to the widow and family of #adilla. I, 2)B)/09,A 0;)
.9/),())Q( /.'9D, 0;) C+120 ('9*?
Lastly, neither do we find "erit in petitionerIs
contention that the Licensing Agree"ent
infringes on the constit#tional right of freedo"
of speech and of the press, in that, as a citi&en
and as a newspaper"an, he had the right to
e5press his tho#ghts in fil" on the p#)lic life of
Moises 0adilla witho#t prior restraint. $he right
of freedo" of e5pression, indeed, occ#pies a
preferred position in the Ihierarchy of ci*il
li)ertiesI
$he pre*ailing doctrine is that the ,L6/. /27
#.6S62T 7/296. .CL6 is s#ch a
li"itation. Another criterion for per"issi)le
li"itation on freedo" of speech and of the
press, which incl#des s#ch *ehicles of the
"ass "edia as radio, tele*ision and the
"o*ies, is the F1/L/2,;29:A>:;2T6.6STS
T6STF . $he principle @re.uires a court to take
conscious and detailed consideration of the
interpla$ of interests observable in a given
situation or t$pe of situation@
In the case at )ar, the interests o)ser*a)le are
the right to pri*acy asserted )y respondent and
the right of freedo" of e5pression in*o:ed )y
petitioner. Taking into account the interpla$ of
those interests, we hold that under the
particular circumstances presented and
considering the obligations assumed in the
(icensing Agreement entered into b$
petitioner, the validit$ of such agreement will
have to be upheld particularl$ because the
limits of freedom of e%pression are reached
when e%pression touches upon matters of
essentiall$ private concern.
8hether the I&ALANCING OF INTERESTS TESTI or the ICLEAR AND
PRESENT DANGER TESTI )e applied in respect of the instant 0etitions,
the o#rt )elie*es that a different concl#sion "#st here )e reached2 $he
prod#ction and fil"ing )y petitioners of the pro-ected "otion pict#re /The
Lour 8a$ /evolution does not, in the circumstances of this case,
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent@s right of
privac$.
1. ;t may be observed at the outset that what is involved in the
instant case is a prior and direct restraint on the part of the
respondent 8udge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by
petitioners. $he respondent H#dge has restrained petitioners fro" fil"ing
and prod#cing the entire proposed "otion pict#re. It is i"portant to note
that in Lag#n&ad, there was no prior restrain of any :ind i"posed #pon the
"o*ie prod#cer who in fact co"pleted and e5hi)ited the fil" )iography of
Moises 0adilla. Beca#se of the preferred character of the constit#tional
rights of freedo" of speech and of e5pression, a weighty pres#"ption of
in*alidity *itiates "eas#res of prior restraint #pon the e5ercise of s#ch
freedo"s. $he in*alidity of a "eas#re of prior restraint does not, of
co#rse, "ean that no s#)se6#ent lia)ility "ay lawf#lly )e i"posed #pon a
person clai"ing to e5ercise s#ch constit#tional freedo"s. The
respondent 8udge should have stayed his hand, instead of issuing
an ex:parte Temporary .estraining Arder one day after filing of a
complaint by the private respondent and issuing a #reliminary
;n*unction twenty '&3) days laterJ for the pro*ected motion picture
was as yet uncompleted and hence 2AT exhibited to any audience.
2either private respondent nor the respondent trial 8udge <new what
the completed film would precisely loo< li<e. There was, in other
words, 2A -,L6/. /27 #.6S62T 7/296.- of any violation of any
right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully assert.
2. $he s#)-ect "atter of /$he (o#r Day %e*ol#tion/ relates to the non7
blood$ change of government that took place at 1pifanio de los "antos
Avenue in Lebruar$ 148=, and the train of e*ents which led #p to that
deno#e"ent. learly, s#ch s#)-ect "atter is one of p#)lic interest and
concern. ;ndeed, it is, petitionersF argue, of international interest. The
sub*ect thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this
country and as such, must be regarded as having passed into the
public domain and as an appropriate sub*ect for speech and
expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The sub*ect
matter, as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and ,6.T/;2L@
2AT TA TH6 #.;M/T6 L;>6 A> #.;M/T6 .6S#A2762T #A2,6
62.;L6. Cnli<e in Lagunad, which concerned the life story of
Doises #adilla necessarily including at least his immediate family,
what we have here is not a film biography, more or less fictionalied,
of private respondent #once 6nrile. /$he (o#r Day %e*ol#tion/ is not
principally a)o#t, nor is it foc#sed #pon, the "an H#an 0once .nrileG )#t it
is co"pelled, if it is to )e historical, to refer to the role played )y H#an
0once .nrile in the precipitating and the constit#ent e*ents of the change
of go*ern"ent in (e)r#ary 198+.
4. The e%tent of the intrusion upon the life of private respondent >uan
6once 1nrile that would be entailed b$ the production and e%hibition of
The Lour 8a$ /evolution would, therefore, be L;D;T67 ;2
,H/./,T6.. $he e5tent of that intr#sion, as this o#rt #nderstands the
synopsis of the proposed fil", "ay )e generally described as such
intrusion as is reasonably necessary to <eep that film a truthful
historical account. #rivate respondent does not claim that
petitioners threatened to depict in -The >our 7ay .evolution- any
part of the private life of private respondent or that of any member of
his family.
B. At all rele*ant ti"es, d#ring which the "o"ento#s e*ents, clearly of
p#)lic concern, that petitioners propose to fil" were ta:ing place, pri*ate
respondent was what 0rofs. 0rosser and Leeton ha*e referred to as a
/p#)lic fig#re2/
-/ #C1L;, >;9C.6 has been defined as a person who, by his
accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in
his doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a Fpublic
personage.F He is, in other words, a celebrity. ')*io#sly to )e incl#ded
in this category are those who ha*e achie*ed so"e degree of rep#tation
)y appearing )efore the p#)lic, as in the case of an actor, a professional
)ase)all player, a p#gilist, or any other entertainer. $he list is, howe*er,
)roader than this. ;t includes public officers, famous inventors and
explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy,
and no less a personage than the 9rand 6xalted .uler of a lodge. ;t
includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where public
attention is focused upon him as a person.
Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least,
their right of privacy. $hree reasons were gi*en, "ore or less
indiscri"ately, in the decisions/ that they had so#ght p#)licity and
consented to it, and so co#ld not co"plain when they recei*ed itG that their
personalities and their affairs had already )eco"e p#)lic, and co#ld no
longer )e regarded as their own pri*ate )#sinessG and that the press had a
pri*ilege, #nder the onstit#tion, to infor" the p#)lic a)o#t those who
ha*e )eco"e legiti"ate "atters of p#)lic interest. 'n one or another of
these gro#nds, and so"eti"es all, it was held that there was no lia)ility
when they were gi*en additional p#)licity, as to "atters legiti"ately within
the scope of the p#)lic interest they had aro#sed.
The privilege of giving publicity to news, and other matters of public
interest, was held to arise out of the desire and the right of the public
to <now what is going on in the world, and the freedom of the press
and other agencies of information to tell it. F26WSF includes all
events and items of information which are out of the ordinary
humdrum routine, and which ha*e Ithat indefina)le 6#ality of infor"ation
which aro#ses p#)lic attention.I To a ver$ great e%tent the press, with its
e%perience or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in
making its own definition of news, as a glance at an$ morning newspaper
will sufficientl$ indicate. It incl#des ho"icide and other cri"es, arrests and
police raides, s#icides, "arriages and di*orces, accidents, a death fro"
the #se of narcotics, a wo"an with a rare disease, the )irth of a child to a
twel*e year old girl, the reappearance of one s#pposed to ha*e )een
"#rdered years ago, and #ndo#)tedly "any other si"ilar "atters of
gen#ine, if "ore or less deplora)le, pop#lar appeal.
#rivate respondent is a -public figure- precisely because, inter alia,
of his participation as a principal actor in the culminating events of
the change of government in >ebruary %(!B. 1ecause his
participation therein was ma*or in character, a film reenactment of
the peaceful revolution that fails to ma<e reference to the role played
by private respondent would be grossly unhistorical. The right of
privacy of a -public figure- is necessarily 2/..AW6. than that of
an ordinary citien. #rivate respondent has not retired into the
62
seclusion of simple private citienship. He continues to be a -public
figure.- /fter a successful political campaign during which his
participation in the 67S/ .evolution was directly or indirectly
referred to in the press, radio and television, he sits in a very public
place, the Senate of the #hilippines.
7. $he line of e6#ili)ri#" in the specific conte5t of the instant case
)etween the constit#tional freedo" of speech and of e5pression and the
right of pri*acy, "ay )e "ar:ed o#t in ter"s of a re6#ire"ent that the
proposed "otion pict#re "#st )e fairly tr#thf#l and historical in its
presentation of e*ents. There must, in other words, be no <nowing or
rec<less disregard of truth in depicting the participation of private
respondent in the 67S/ .evolution. There must, further, be no
presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent
and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal
facts. The proposed motion picture should not enter into what Dme.
8ustice Delencio:Herrera in Lagunad referred to as -matters of
essentially private concern.- To the extent that -The >our 7ay
.evolution- limits itself in portraying the participation of private
respondent in the 67S/ .evolution to those events which are
directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the 67S/
.evolution, the intrusion into private respondentFs privacy cannot be
regarded as unreasonable and actionable. !#ch portrayal "ay )e
carried o#t e*en witho#t a license fro" pri*ate respondent.
&+2B'. >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.(
GR 12%4%%, !',. 14, 1999, &ELLOSILLO, !.
FACTS" 0etitioners Art#ro Bor-al and Ma5i"o !oli*en are a"ong the
incorporators of 0hilippines $oday, Inc. @0$IA, now 0hil!$A% Daily, Inc.,
owner of $he 0hilippine !tar. Between May and H#ly 1989 a series of
articles written )y petitioner Bor-al was p#)lished on different dates in his
col#"n Haywal:er. $he articles dealt with the alleged ano"alo#s acti*ities
of an -organier of a conference without naming or identif$ing private
respondent. 3either did it refer to the (3L$ as the conference therein
"entioned. $hereafter, pri*ate respondent filed a co"plaint with the
3ational 0ress l#) @30A against petitioner Bor-al for #nethical cond#ct.
1e acc#sed petitioner Bor-al of #sing his col#"n as a for" of le*erage to
o)tain contracts for his p#)lic relations fir", AA Bor-al Associates. In t#rn,
petitioner Bor-al p#)lished a re-oinder to the challenge of pri*ate
respondent not only to protect his na"e and honor )#t also to ref#te the
clai" that he was #sing his col#"n for character assassination. 7
Apparently not satisfied with his co"plaint with the 30, pri*ate
respondent filed a cri"inal case for li)el against petitioners Bor-al and
!oli*en, a"ong others.
ISSUE" 8hether the disp#ted articles constit#te pri*ileged
co""#nications as to e5e"pt the a#thor fro" lia)ility.
HELD" D.!. ;n order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named.
I0 9( '.(+ ,+0 (1<<9/9),0 0;'0 0;) +<<),*)* E'20: 2)/+A,9F)* ;9D().< '(
0;) E)2(+, '00'/G)* +2 *)<'D)*, 810 90 D1(0 8) (;+@, 0;'0 '0 .)'(0 '
0;92* E)2(+, /+1.* 9*),09<: ;9D '( 0;) +8B)/0 +< 0;) .98).+1(
E18.9/'09+,.
%egretta)ly, these re6#isites ha*e not )een co"plied with in the case at
)ar.
The questioned articles written by 1or*al do not identify private
respondent Wenceslao as the organier of the conference. The first
of the 8aywal<er articles which appeared in the $% Day %(!( issue of
The #hilippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private
respondent was the person referred to therein. Surely, as observed
by petitioners, there were millions of -heroes- of the 67S/
.evolution and anyone of them could be -self:proclaimed- or an
-organier of seminars and conferences. As a "atter of fact, in his
H#ne 1989 col#"n petitioner Bor-al wrote a)o#t the /so9called (irst
3ational onference on Land $ransportation whose principal organi&ers
are not specified/ . 3either did the disclose the identity of the conference
organi&er since these contained only an en#"eration of na"es where
pri*ate respondent (rancisco 8enceslao was descri)ed as .5ec#ti*e
Director and !po:es"an and not as a conference organi&er. $he printo#t
and tentati*e progra" of the conference were de*oid of any indication of
8enceslao as organi&er. $he printo#t which contained an article entitled
/8ho 'rgani&ed the 3L$C/ did not e*en "ention pri*ate respondentIs
na"e, while the tentati*e progra" only deno"inated pri*ate respondent
as /<ice hair"an and .5ec#ti*e Director,/ and not as organi&er.
2o less than private respondent himself admitted that the >2,LT
had several organiers and that he was only a part of the
organiation, th#s 9
Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he
was the person spo<en of in 1or*alFs columns. $he for"er e*en called
#p col#"nist Bor-al to in6#ire if he @8enceslaoA was the one referred to in
the s#)-ect articles. 1is letter to the editor p#)lished in the B H#ne 1989
iss#e of $he 0hilippine !tar e*en showed pri*ate respondent 8enceslaoIs
#ncertainty 9
;dentification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended
party is himself unsure that he was the ob*ect of the verbal attac<. It
is well to note that the re*elation of the identity of the person all#ded to
ca"e not fro" petitioner Bor-al )#t fro" pri*ate respondent hi"self when
he s#pplied the infor"ation thro#gh his B H#ne 1989 letter to the editor.
1ad pri*ate respondent not re*ealed that he was the /organi&er/ of the
(3L$ referred to in the Bor-al articles, the p#)lic wo#ld ha*e re"ained in
)lissf#l ignorance of his identity. It is therefore clear that on the ele"ent of
identifia)ility alone the case falls.
8e now proceed to resol*e the other iss#es and pass #pon the pertinent
findings of the co#rts a 6#o on wether the disp#ted articles constit#te
pri*ileged co""#nications as to e5e"pt the a#thor fro" lia)ility.
Art. 47B. %e6#ire"ent for p#)licity. 9 .*ery
defa"atory i"p#tation is pres#"ed to )e
"alicio#s, e*en if it )e tr#e, if no good intention
and -#stifia)le "oti*e for "a:ing it is shown,
e5cept in the following cases2
1A A pri*ate co""#nication "ade )y any
person to another in the perfor"ance of any
legal, "oral or social d#tyG and,
2A A fair and tr#e report, "ade in good faith,
witho#t any co""ents or re"ar:s, of any
-#dicial, legislati*e or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nat#re, or of any
state"ent, report or speech deli*ered in said
proceedings, or of any other act perfor"ed )y
p#)lic officers in the e5ercise of their f#nctions.
/ #.;M;L6967 ,ADDC2;,/T;A2 may be either absolutely
privileged or qualifiedly privileged. /1SALCT6L@ #.;M;L6967
,ADDC2;,/T;A2S are those which are not actionable even if the
author has acted in bad faith. /n example is found in Sec. %%, /rt. M;,
of the %(!4 ,onstitution which exempts a member of ,ongress from
liability for any speech or debate in the ,ongress or in any
,ommittee thereof. Cpon the other hand, EC/L;>;67L@ #.;M;L6967
,ADDC2;,/T;A2S containing defamatory imputations are not
actionable unless found to have been made without good intention
or *ustifiable motive. To this genre belong -private communications-
and -fair and true report without any comments or remar<s.-
;ndisputably, petitioner 1or*alFs questioned writings are not within
the exceptions of /rt. $5" of The .evised #enal ,ode for, as
correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private
communications nor fair and true report without any comments or
remar<s. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under /rt. $5" is not an
exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since >/;.
,ADD62T/.;6S A2 D/TT6.S A> #C1L;, ;2T6.6ST are li<ewise
privileged. The rule on privileged communications had its genesis
not in the nationFs penal code but in the 1ill of .ights of the
,onstitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press. Art.
III, !ec. B, pro*ides2 3o law shall )e passed a)ridging the freedo" of
speech, of e5pression, or of the press, or the right of the people to
peacea)ly asse")le and petition the go*ern"ent for redress of
grie*ances. In the case of J.! *s. B#stos, this ,ourt ruled that
publications which are privileged for reasons of public policy are
protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech. This
constitutional right cannot be abolished by the mere failure of the
legislature to give it express recognition in the statute punishing
libels.
The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom
of the press . To be more specific, no culpability could be imputed to
petitioners for the alleged offending publication without doing
violence to the concept of privileged communications implicit in the
freedom of the press. As was so well p#t )y H#stice Malcol" in B#stos2
@6ublic polic$, the welfare of societ$, and the
orderl$ administration of government have
demanded protection of public opinion. The
inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.@
The doctrine formulated in these two '&) cases resonates the rule
that privileged communications must, sui generis, be protective of
public opinion.
$o reiterate, >/;. ,ADD62T/.;6S A2 D/TT6.S A> #C1L;,
;2T6.6ST are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
*udicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a
#C1L;, #6.SA2 ;2 H;S #C1L;, ,/#/,;T@, it is not necessarily
actionable. ;n order that such discreditable imputation to a public
63
official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact
or a comment based on a false supposition. ;f the comment is an
expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mista<en, as long as it
might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of
public interest. In his testi"ony, pri*ate respondent spelled o#t the
o)-ecti*es of the conference th#s 9
5 5 5 5 $he principal conference o)-ecti*e is to
co"e #p with a draft of an '"ni)#s Bill that will
e")ody a long ter" land transportation policy for
presentation to ongress in its ne5t reg#lar
session in H#ly. !ince last Han#ary, the 3ational
onference on Land $ransportation @3L$A, the
conference secretariat, has )een enlisting
s#pport fro" all sectors to ens#re the s#ccess of
the pro-ect.27 O$!3, 29 H#ly 1991, p. 17.P
0ri*ate respondent li:ewise testified that the (3L$ was raising f#nds
thro#gh solicitation fro" the p#)lic 9
The declared ob*ective of the conference, the composition of its
members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended
to be funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely
imbued with #C1L;, ;2T6.6ST. An organi&ation s#ch as the (3L$
ai"ing to rein*ent and reshape the transportation laws of the co#ntry and
see:ing to so#rce its f#nds for the pro-ect fro" the p#)lic at large cannot
dissociate itself fro" the p#)lic character of its "ission. As s#ch, it cannot
)#t in*ite close scr#tiny )y the "edia o)liged to infor" the p#)lic of the
legiti"acy of the p#rpose of the acti*ity and of the 6#alifications and
integrity of the personalities )ehind it.

RE-ES >(.&AGATSING
GR %53%%, N+>. 9, 1983, F)2,',*+, !.
FACTS"
0etitioner, retired H#stice HB L. %eyes, on )ehalf of the Anti9
Bases oalition so#ght a per"it fro" the ity of Manila to hold a peacef#l
"arch and rally on 'cto)er 2+, 1984 fro" 22?? to 72?? in the afternoon,
starting fro" the L#neta, a p#)lic par:, to the gates of the Jnited !tates
.")assy, hardly two )loc:s away. 'nce there, and in an open space of
p#)lic property, a short progra" wo#ld )e held.
$he filing of this s#it for "anda"#s with alternati*e prayer
for writ of preli"inary "andatory in-#nction on 'cto)er 2?, 1984 was d#e
to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not )een infor"ed of any
action ta:en on his re6#est on )ehalf of the organi&ation to hold a rally. It
t#rned o#t that on 'cto)er 19, s#ch per"it was denied. 0etitioner was
#naware of s#ch a fact as the denial was sent )y ordinary "ail. $he
reason for ref#sing a per"it was d#e to police intelligence reports which
strongly "ilitate against the ad*isa)ility of iss#ing s#ch per"it at this ti"e
and at the place applied for./ $o )e "ore specific, reference was "ade to
persistent intelligence reports affir"OingP the plans of s#)*ersi*eRcri"inal
ele"ents to infiltrate andRor disr#pt any asse")ly or congregations where
a large n#")er of people is e5pected to attend./
ISSUE" 8hether or not there was a denial of freedo" of e5pression
arising fro" the denial of the per"itC
HELD" Des. $he onstit#tion is 6#ite e5plicit2 /3o law shall )e passed
a)ridging the freedo" of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peacea)ly to asse")le and petition the ,o*ern"ent for redress of
grie*ances./ >ree speech, li<e free press, may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subse.uent liabilit$ whether in
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a -clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that Gthe StateI has a right to prevent.- (reedo" of
asse")ly connotes the right of the people to "eet peacea)ly for
cons#ltation and disc#ssion of "atters of p#)lic concern. ;t is entitled to
be accorded the utmost deference and respect. ;t is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. 1ven prior to the 14;I Constitution,
>ustice 0alcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessar$
conse.uence of our republican institutions and complements the right of
free speech. $o paraphrase the opinion of H#stice %#tledge, spea:ing for
the "a-ority of the A"erican !#pre"e o#rt in $ho"as *. ollins, it was
not )y accident or coincidence that the rights to freedo" of speech and of
the press were co#pled in a single g#arantee with the rights of the people
peacea)ly to asse")le and to petition the go*ern"ent for redress of
grie*ances. All these rights, while not identical, are insepara)le. In e*ery
case, therefore, where there is a li"itation placed on the e5ercise of this
right, the -#diciary is called #pon to e5a"ine the effects of the challenged
go*ern"ental act#ation. The sole *ustification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of
democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health, or any other legitimate public interest.
2. 3owhere is the rationale that #nderlies the freedo" of e5pression and
peacea)le asse")ly )etter e5pressed than in this e5cerpt fro" an opinion
of H#stice (ran:f#rter2 't must never be forgotten, however, that the 9ill of
/ights was the child of the 1nlightenment. 9ack of the guarant$ of free
speech la$ faith in the power of an appeal to reason b$ all the peaceful
means for gaining access to the mind. 't was in order to avert force and
e%plosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that
the guarant$ of free speech was given a generous scope. 9ut utterance in
a conte%t of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and
become part of an instrument of force. "uch utterance was not meant to
be sheltered b$ the Constitution. 8hat was rightf#lly stressed is the
a)andon"ent of reason, the #tterance, whether *er)al or printed, )eing in
a conte5t of *iolence. It "#st always )e re"e")ered that this right
li:ewise pro*ides for a safety *al*e, allowing parties the opport#nity to gi*e
*ent to their *iews, e*en if contrary to the pre*ailing cli"ate of opinion. (or
if the peacef#l "eans of co""#nication cannot )e a*ailed of, resort to
non9peacef#l "eans "ay )e the only alternati*e. 3or is this the sole
reason for the e5pression of dissent. It "eans "ore than -#st the right to
)e heard of the person who feels aggrie*ed or who is dissatisfied with
things as they are. ;ts value may lie in the fact that there may be
something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true
ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well:defined limits. What is
guaranteed is peaceable assembly. Ane may not advocate disorder
in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloa< of
dissent. The ,onstitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
rally or assembly. .esort to force is ruled out and outbrea<s of
violence to be avoided. $he #t"ost cal" tho#gh is not re6#ired. As
pointed o#t in an early 0hilippine case, penned in 19?7 to )e precise,
Jnited !tates *. Ap#rado2 /It is rather to )e e5pected that "ore or less
disorder will "ar: the p#)lic asse")ly of the people to protest against
grie*ances whether real or i"aginary, )eca#se on s#ch occasions feeling
is always wro#ght to a high pitch of e5cite"ent, and the greater the
grie*ance and the "ore intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a r#le, will
)e the disciplinary control of the leaders o*er their irresponsi)le followers./
;t bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invo<ed,
riotous conduct, in*ury to property, and acts of vandalism must be
avoided. $o gi*e free rein to oneIs destr#cti*e #rges is to call for
conde"nation. It is to "a:e a "oc:ery of the high estate occ#pied )y
intellect#al li)erty in o#r sche"e of *al#es.
4. There can be no legal ob*ection, absent the existence of a clear
and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as
the place where the peace rally would start. $he 0hilippines is
co""itted to the *iew e5pressed in the pl#rality opinion, of 1949 *intage,
of H#stice %o)erts in 1ag#e *. I'2 IWhenever the title of streets and
par<s may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citiens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citiens. $he pri*ilege of a citi&en of
the Jnited !tates to #se the streets and par:s for co""#nication of *iews
on national 6#estions "ay )e reg#lated in the interest of allG it is not
a)sol#te, )#t relati*e, and "#st )e e5ercised in s#)ordination to the
general co"fort and con*enience, and in consonance with peace and
good orderG )#t it "#st not, in the g#ise of reg#lation, )e a)ridged or
denied./ $he a)o*e e5cerpt was 6#oted with appro*al in 0ri"icias *.
(#goso. 0ri"icias "ade e5plicit what was i"plicit in M#nicipality of a*ite
*. %o-as, a 1917 decision, where this o#rt categorically affir"ed that
pla&as or par:s and streets are o#tside the co""erce of "an and th#s
n#llified a contract that leased 0la&a !oledad of plaintiff9"#nicipality.
%eference was "ade to s#ch pla&a /)eing a pro"enade for p#)lic #se,/
which certainly is not the only p#rpose that it co#ld ser*e. $o repeat, there
can )e no *alid reason why a per"it sho#ld not )e granted for the
proposed "arch and rally starting fro" a p#)lic par: that is the L#neta.
B. 2either can there be any valid ob*ection to the use of the streets
to the gates of the CS 6mbassy, hardly two bloc<s away at the .oxas
1oulevard. 0ri"icias *. (#goso has resol*ed any l#r:ing do#)t on the
"atter. In holding that the then Mayor (#goso of the ity of Manila sho#ld
grant a per"it for a p#)lic "eeting at 0la&a Miranda in V#iapo, this o#rt
categorically declared2 /'#r concl#sion finds s#pport in the decision in the
case of 8illis o5 *s. !tate of 3ew 1a"pshire, 412 J.!., 7+9. In that
case, the stat#te of 3ew 1a"pshire 0. L. chap. 1B7, section 2, pro*iding
that Uno parade or procession #pon any gro#nd a)#tting thereon, shall )e
per"itted #nless a special license therefor shall first )e o)tained fro" the
select"en of the town or fro" licensing co""ittee,I was constr#ed )y the
!#pre"e o#rt of 3ew 1a"pshire as not conferring #pon the licensing
)oard #nfettered discretion to ref#se to grant the license, and held *alid.
And the !#pre"e o#rt of the Jnited !tates, in its decision @19B1A penned
)y hief H#stice 1#ghes affir"ing the -#dg"ent of the !tate !#pre"e
o#rt, held that Ta statute requiring persons using the public streets
for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from
the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the
rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the
statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are
strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the
time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to
conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity
64
to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse license, . . .I/ 3or sho#ld the point "ade
)y hief H#stice 1#ghes in a s#)se6#ent portion of the opinion )e
ignored. -,ivil liberties, as guaranteed by the ,onstitution, imply the
existence of an organied society maintaining public order without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted
abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in
order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use
of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with
civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the
good order upon which they ultimately depend. $he control of tra*el
on the streets of cities is the "ost fa"iliar ill#stration of this recognition of
social need. 8here a restriction of the #se of highways in that relation is
desired to pro"ote the p#)lic con*enience in the interest of all, it cannot
)e disregarded )y the atte"pted e5ercise of so"e ci*il right which in other
circ#"stances wo#ld )e entitled to protection./
7. $here is a no*el aspect to this case. If the rally were confined to
L#neta, no 6#estion, as noted, wo#ld ha*e arisen. So, too, if the march
would end at another par<. /s previously mentioned though, there
would be a short program upon reaching the public space between
the two gates of the Cnited States 6mbassy at .oxas 1oulevard.
That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on
the resolution adopted at the closing session of the /nti:1ases
,oalition. The 6hilippines is a signator$ of the Gienna Convention on
8iplomatic /elations and binding on the 6hilippines. The second
paragraph of its Article 22 reads? 2. The receiving "tate is under a special
dut$ to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission
against an$ intrusion or damage and to prevent an$ disturbance of the
peace of the mission or impairment of its dignit$./ $he onstit#tion
adopts the generall$ accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, $o the e5tent that the <ienna on*ention is a
restate"ent of the generally accepted principles of international law, it
sho#ld )e a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there
were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or
disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity,
there would be a *ustification for the denial of the permit insofar as
the terminal point would be the 6mbassy. Doreover, respondent
Dayor relied on Ardinance 2o. 4&(5 of the ,ity of Danila prohibiting
the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of
five hundred '533) feet from any foreign mission or chanceryJ and for
other purposes. Cnless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra
vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive,
in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly. 6ven if shown then to be
applicable, that question still confronts this ,ourt.
1y way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of '%)the date, '&)the
#C1L;, #L/,6 where and '$)the time when it will ta<e place. ;f it
were a #.;M/T6 #L/,6, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should
be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid ob*ections to the grant of the
permit or to its grant but at another public place. ;t is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. ;f
he is of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of
a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded,
they can have recourse to the proper *udicial authority. (ree speech
and peacea)le asse")ly, along with the other intellect#al freedo"s, are
highly ran:ed in o#r sche"e of constit#tional *al#es. It cannot )e too
strongly stressed that on the -#diciary, 9 e*en "ore so than on the other
depart"ents 9 rests the gra*e and delicate responsi)ility of ass#ring
respect for and deference to s#ch preferred rights. 3o *er)al for"#la, no
sanctifying phrase can, of co#rse, dispense with what has )een so
felicitio#sly ter"ed )y H#stice 1ol"es /as the so*ereign prerogati*e of
-#dg"ent./ 3onetheless, the pres#"ption "#st )e to incline the weight of
the scales of -#stice on the side of s#ch rights, en-oying as they do
precedence and pri"acy. ,learly then, to the extent that there may be
inconsistencies between this resolution and that of 2avarro v.
Millegas, that case is pro tanto modified. So it was made clear in the
original resolution of Actober &5, %(!$.
9. %espondent Mayor posed the iss#e of the applica)ility of 'rdinance
3o. 7297 of the ity of Manila prohi)iting the holding or staging of rallies
or de"onstrations within a radi#s of fi*e h#ndred @7??A feet fro" any
foreign "ission or chanceryG and for other p#rposes. 't is to be admitted
that it finds support in the previousl$ .uoted Article 22 of the Gienna
Convention on 8iplomatic /elations. There was no showing, however,
that the distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less
than 533 feet. 6ven if it could be shown that such a condition is
satisfied, it does not follow that respondent Dayor could legally act
the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could
still be challenged. ;t could be argued that a case of unconstitutional
application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of
peaceable assembly presents itself. /s in this case there was no
proof that the distance is less than 533 feet, the need to pass on that
issue was obviated. Should it come, then the qualification and
observation of 8ustices Da<asiar and #lana certainly cannot be
summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free
speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.
P90' >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.(
GR 8080%, O/0. 5, 1989
F'/0(" 'n Dece")er 1 and 4, 1984, p#rs#ing an Anti9!"#t a"paign
initiated )y the Mayor of the ity of Manila, %a"on D. Bagatsing,
ele"ents of the !pecial Anti93arcotics ,ro#p, A#5iliary !er*ices B#rea#,
8estern 0olice District, I30 of the Metropolitan 0olice (orce of Manila,
sei&ed and confiscated fro" dealers, distri)#tors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewal:s, "aga&ines, p#)lications and other
reading "aterials )elie*ed to )e o)scene, pornographic and indecent and
later )#rned the sei&ed "aterials in p#)lic at the Jni*ersity )elt along .M.
%ecto A*en#e, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and se*eral
officers and "e")ers of *ario#s st#dent organi&ations. A"ong the
p#)lications sei&ed, and later )#rned, was =0inoy 0lay)oy> "aga&ines
p#)lished and co9edited )y Leo 0ita. 'n 7 Dece")er 1984, 0ita filed a
case for in-#nction with prayer for iss#ance of the writ of preli"inary
in-#nction see:ing to en-oin and or restrain Bagatsing, a)rera and their
agents fro" confiscating his "aga&ines or fro" otherwise pre*enting the
sale or circ#lation thereof clai"ing that the "aga&ine is a decent, artistic
and ed#cational "aga&ine which is not per se o)scene, and that the
p#)lication is protected )y the onstit#tional g#arantees of freedo" of
speech and of the press.
I((1)" 8hether the Mayor can order the sei&#re of =o)scene> "aterials as
a res#lt of an anti9s"#t ca"paign.
H).*" 3'. 8e cannot 6#arrel with the )asic post#late s#ggested )y
appellant that sei&#re of allegedly o)scene p#)lications or "aterials
deser*es close scr#tiny )eca#se of the constitutional guarantee
protecting the right to express oneself in print 'Sec. (, /rt. ;M), and
the protection afforded by the constitution against unreasonable
searches and seiure 'Sec. $, /rt. ;M). It "#st )e e6#ally conceded,
howe*er, that freedom of the press is not without restraint, as the
state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature
that is offensive to public morals, /lso well settled is the rule that the
right against unreasonable searches and seiures recognies certain
exceptions, as when there is consent to the search or seiure, or
search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a vehicle or
movable structure
$he o#rt states at the o#tset that it is not the first ti"e that it is )eing
as:ed to prono#nce what IO&SCENEI "eans or what "a:es for an
o)scene or pornographic literat#re. .arly on, in 6eople vs. Qottinger, the
o#rt laid down TH6 T6ST, in determining the existence of obscenity,
as follows+ -whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene,
is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such
immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other
article charged as being obscene may fall.- -/2ATH6. T6ST,/ so
Lottinger f#rther declares, -is that which shoc<s the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency.- Lottinger hastened to say,
howe*er, that -GwIhether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case,- and that ultimately, the
question is to be decided by the -*udgment of the aggregate sense of
the community reached by it.-
A)o#t three decades later, this o#rt pro"#lgated 6eople v. Ao 6in, 1? a
prosec#tion #nder Article 2?1 of the %e*ised 0enal ode. ,o 0in was also
e*en ha&ier2
. . . 8e agree with co#nsel for appellant in part. If s#ch
pict#res, sc#lpt#res and paintings are shown in art e5hi)its
and art galleries for the ca#se of art, to )e *iewed and
appreciated )y people interested in art, there wo#ld )e no
offense co""itted. &owever, the pictures here in .uestion
were used not e%actl$ for art@s sake but rather for
commercial purposes. In other words, the s#pposed artistic
6#alities of said pict#res were )eing co""erciali&ed so that
the ca#se of art was of secondary or "inor i"portance. ,ain
and profit wo#ld appear to ha*e )een the "ain, if not the
e5cl#si*e consideration in their e5hi)itionG and it wo#ld not
)e s#rprising if the persons who went to see those pict#res
and paid entrance fees for the pri*ilege of doing so, were not
e5actly artists and persons interested in art and who
generally go to art e5hi)itions and galleries to satisfy and
i"pro*e their artistic tastes, but rather people desirous of
satisf$ing their morbid curiosit$ and taste, and lust, and for
love for e%citement, including the $outh who because of their
immaturit$ are not in a position to resist and shield
themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these
pictures.
As the o#rt declared, the iss#e is a co"plicated one, in which the fine
lines ha*e neither )een drawn nor di*ided. It is easier said than done to
say, indeed, that if -the pictures here in question were used not
exactly for artFs sa<e but rather for commercial purposes,- the
pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection.
65
It was 0eople *. 0adan y Alo*a, 14 howe*er, that introd#ced to 0hilippine
-#rispr#dence the -redeeming- element that should accompan$ the work,
to save it from a valid prosecution. 8e 6#ote2
. . . -e have had occasion to consider offenses like the
e%hibition of still or moving pictures of women in the nude,
which we have condemned for obscenit$ and as offensive
to morals. ;n those cases, one might yet claim that
there was involved the element of artJ that
connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors
might find inspiration in the showing of pictures in the
nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer
na<edness, as models in tableaux vivants. 1ut an
actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts
of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In
it, there is no roo" for art. 'ne can see nothing in it )#t
clear and #n"itigated o)scenity, indecency, and an
offense to p#)lic "orals, inspiring and ca#sing as it does,
nothing )#t l#st and lewdness, and e5erting a corr#pting
infl#ence specially on the yo#th of the land. . . .
In a "#ch later decision, ,on&ale& *. Lalaw Latig)a:, the o#rt, following
trends in the Jnited !tates, adopted the test " -Whether to the average
person, applying contemporary standards, the dominant theme of
the material ta<en as a whole appeals to prurient interest.- Oalaw:
Oatigba< represented a mar<ed departure from Oottinger in the
sense that it measured obscenity in terms of the -7AD;2/2T
TH6D6- of the wor< rather than isolated passages, which were
central to Oottinger 'although both cases are agreed that
-contemporary community standards- are the final arbiters of what
is -obscene-). Lalaw9Latig)a: #ndertoo: "oreo*er to "a:e the
deter"ination of o)scenity essentially a -#dicial 6#estion and as a
conse6#ence, to te"per the wide discretion Lottinger had gi*en #nto law
enforcers.
The lack of uniformit$ in /merican *urisprudence as to what constitutes
-obscenity- has been attributed to the reluctance of the courts to
recogniEe the constitutional dimension of the problem. Apparentl$, the
courts have assumed that obscenit$ is not included in the guarant$ of
free speech, an assumption that, as we averred, has allowed a climate of
opinions among magistrates predicated upon arbitrar$, if vague theories of
what is acceptable to societ$. And :t<here is little likelihood, sa$s Tribe,
that this development has reached a state of rest, or that it will ever do so
until the Court recogniEes that obscene speech is speech nonetheless,
although it is sub#ect 7777 as in all speech 7777 to regulation in the interests
of :societ$ as a whole< 7777 but not in the interest of a uniform vision of how
human se%ualit$ should be regarded and portra$ed.
;n the case at bar, there is no challenge on the right of the State, in
the legitimate exercise of police power, to suppress smut ::::
provided it is smut. >or obvious reasons, smut is not smut simply
because one insists it is smut. So is it equally evident that individual
tastes develop, adapt to wide:ranging influences, and <eep in step
with the rapid advance of civiliation. What shoc<ed our forebears,
say, five decades ago, is not necessarily repulsive to the present
generation. 8ames 8oyce and 7.H. Lawrence were censored in the
thirties yet their wor<s are considered important literature today. &(
9oyaFs La Da*a desnuda was once banned from public exhibition but
now adorns the worldFs most prestigious museums.
B#t neither sho#ld we say that /o)scenity/ is a )are @no p#n intendedA
"atter of opinion. As we said earlier, it is the di*ergent perceptions of "en
and wo"en that ha*e pro)a)ly co"po#nded the pro)le" rather than
resol*ed it.
8hat the o#rt is i"pressing, plainly and si"ply, is that the .uestion is
not, and has not been, an eas$ one to answer, as it is far from being a
settled matter. -e share Tribe@s disappointment over the discouraging
trend in American decisional law on obscenit$ as well as his pessimism on
whether or not an acceptable solution is in sight.
;n the final analysis perhaps, the tas< that confronts us is less heroic
than rushing to a -perfect- definition of -obscenity-, if that is
possible, as evolving standards for proper police conduct faced with
the problem, which, after all, is the plaint specifically raised in the
petition.
1owe*er, this "#ch we ha*e to say.
Cndoubtedly, -immoral- lore or literature comes within the ambit of
free expression, although not its protection. ;n free expression
cases, this ,ourt has consistently been on the side of the exercise of
the right, barring a -clear and present danger- that would warrant
State interference and action. 1ut, so we asserted in .eyes v.
1agatsing, -the burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger that would *ustify adverse action . . . lies on the . . .
authoritGiesI.-
-There must be ob*ective and convincing, not sub*ective or
con*ectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present
danger.- /It is essential for the *alidity of . . . pre*io#s restraint or
censorship that the . . . a#thority does not rely solely on his own appraisal
of what the p#)lic welfare, peace or safety "ay re6#ire./
/$o -#stify s#ch a li"itation, there "#st )e proof of s#ch weight and
s#fficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test./
As we so strongl$ stressed in 9agatsing, a case involving the deliver$ of a
political speech, the presumption is that the speech may validly be
said. The burden is on the State to demonstrate the existence of a
danger, a danger that must not only be '%) clear but also, '&) present,
to *ustify State action to stop the speech. 0eanwhile, the Aovernment
must allow it +the speech,. 't has no choice. &owever, if it acts
notwithstanding that 'absence of evidence of a clear and present
danger), it must come to terms with, and be held accountable for,
7C6 #.A,6SS.
$he o#rt is not convinced that the private respondents have shown
the required proof to *ustify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the
literature for which "andatory in-#nction had )een so#ght )elow. (irst of
all, they were not possessed of a lawf#l co#rt order2 @1A finding the said
"aterials to )e pornography, and @2A a#thori&ing the" to carry o#t a
search and sei&#re, )y way of a search warrant.
The Court of Appeals has no .uarrel that . . . freedom of the press is not
without restraint, as the state has the right to protect societ$ from
pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals. ;= Feither do
we. 9ut it brings us back to s.uare one? were the literature so
confiscated pornographicD That we have laws punishing the author,
publisher and sellers of obscence publications +"ec. 1, Art. 201, /evised
6enal Code, as amended b$ 6.8. Fo. 4=0 and 6.8. Fo. 4=4,, is also fine,
but the .uestion, again, is? &as the petitioner been found guilt$ under the
statuteD
The fact that the former respondent DayorFs act was sanctioned by
-police power- is no license to seie property in disregard of due
process.
Hence, we ma<e this resume.
%. The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant
from a *udge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in orderJ
&. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought
to be seied are -obscene-, and pose a clear and present danger of
an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and actionJ
$. The *udge must determine whether or not the same are indeed
-obscene+- the question is to be resolved on a case:to:case basis
and on His HonorFs sound discretion. +a matter of #udicial
determination,
". ;f, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue
the search warrant prayed forJ
5. The proper suit is then brought in the court under /rticle &3% of
the .evised #enal ,odeJ
B. /ny conviction is sub*ect to appeal. The appellate court may
assess whether or not the properties seied are indeed -obscene-
These do not foreclose, however, defenses under the ,onstitution or
applicable statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power
under the ,ivil ,ode or the .evised #enal code.
3'$.2 In other words, the deter"ination of what is 2obscene3 is a B1*9/9'.
<1,/09+,.
SOCIAL =EATHER STATIONS, INC. V. COMELEC
G.R. N+.147571? M': 5, 2001
F'/0(" 0etitioners )ro#ght this action for prohi)ition to en-oin the
o""ission on .lections fro" enforcing \7.B of %A. 3o.9??+ @(air
.lection ActA. 0etitioner !8! states that it wishes to cond#ct an election
s#r*ey thro#gho#t the period of the elections )oth at the national and local
le*els and release to the "edia the res#lts of s#ch s#r*ey as well as
p#)lish the" directly. 0etitioner La"ahalan 0#)lishing orporation, on the
other hand, states that it intends to p#)lish election s#r*ey res#lts #p to
the last day of the elections on May 1B,2??1. #etitioners claimed that
said provision, which prohibited the publication of surveys affecting
national candidates fifteen days before an election, and surveys
affecting local candidates seven days before an election. %espondent
o""ission on .lections -#stifies the restrictions in \7.B of %.A. 3o. 9??+
as necessary to pre*ent the "anip#lation and corr#ption of the electoral
process )y #nscr#p#lo#s and erroneo#s s#r*eys -#st )efore the election.
I((1)" 8hether or not \7.B of %.A. 3o. 9??+ constit#tes an
#nconstit#tional a)ridg"ent of freedo" of speech, e5pression, and the
press.
H).*" D.!. $he !#pre"e o#rt in its "a-ority opinion concl#ded that the
disp#ted pro*ision constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of the
freedom of speech, expression and the press.
66
$o )e s#re, \7.B lays a prior restraint on freedo" of speech, e5pression,
and the press )y prohi)iting the p#)lication of election s#r*ey res#lts
affecting candidates within the prescri)ed periods of fifteen @17A days
i""ediately preceding a national election and se*en @7A days )efore a
local election. 1ecause of the preferred status of the constitutional
rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is
vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, =any system
of prior restraints of expression comes to this ,ourt bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . =. $he ,o*ern"ent
Sth#s carries a hea*y )#rden of showing -#stification for the enforce"ent of
s#ch restraint.K$here is th#s a re*ersal of the nor"al pres#"ption of
*alidity that inheres in e*ery legislation.
3or "ay it )e arg#ed that )eca#se of Art. I;9, \B of the onstit#tion,
which gi*es the 'M.L. s#per*isory power to reg#late the en-oy"ent
or #tili&ation of franchise for the operation of "edia of co""#nication, no
pres#"ption of in*alidity attaches to a "eas#re li:e \7.B. >or as we have
pointed out in sustaining the ban on media political advertisements,
the grant of power to the ,AD6L6, under /rt. ;H:,, U" is limited to
ensuring =equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply0 as
well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such
media facilities for =public information campaigns and forums
among candidates.0 $his o#rt stated2
$he technical effect of Article I; @A @BA of the onstit#tion
"ay )e seen to )e that no presumption of invalidit$ arises
in respect of e%ercises of supervisor$ or regulator$
authorit$ on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of
securing e.ual opportunit$ among candidates for political
office, although such supervision or regulation ma$ result
in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free
press.
0/. >!"T'C1 QA6!FAF dissents. &e re#ects as inappropriate the test of
clear and present danger for determining the validit$ of PI.B. Indeed, as
has )een pointed o#t in 's"eNa *. 'M.L., this test was originally
for"#lated for the criminal law and only later appropriated for free speech
cases. &ence, while it ma$ be useful for determining the validit$ of laws
dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiar$ speech, it ma$ not be
ade.uate for such regulations as the one in .uestion. Lor such a test is
concerned with .uestions of the gravit$ and imminence of the danger as
basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of PI.C and similar
regulations.
Instead, M%. HJ!$I. LA0J3A3 p#rports to engage in a for" of
)alancing )y =weighing and balancing the circumstances to
determine whether public interest Gin free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible electionsI is served by the regulation of the free
en*oyment of the right(P. After can*assing the reasons for the
prohi)ition, i.e., to pre*ent last9"in#te press#re on *oters, the creation of
)andwagon effect to fa*or candidates, "isinfor"ation, the 2#unking3 of
weak and 2losing3 candidates b$ their parties, and the form of election
cheating called 2dagdag7bawas3 and invoking the "tateBs power to
supervise media of information during the election period @pages 1191+A,
the dissenting opinion si"ply concl#des2
<iewed in the light of the legiti"ate and significant o)-ecti*es of !ection
7.B, it "ay )e seen that its li"iting i"pact on the rights of free speech and
of the press is not #nd#ly repressi*e or #nreasona)le. Indeed, it is a "ere
restriction, not an a)sol#te prohi)ition, on the p#)lication of election
s#r*eys. It is li"ited in d#rationG it applies only d#ring the period when the
*oters are pres#"a)ly conte"plating who" they sho#ld elect and when
they are "ost s#scepti)le to s#ch #nwarranted pers#asion. $hese s#r*eys
"ay )e p#)lished thereafter. @0ages 17918A
The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these
considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression.
;nstead, reliance is placed on /rt. ;H:,, U". /s already stated, the
purpose of /rt. ;H:,, U" is to =ensure equal opportunity, time, and
space and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates.0 Hence the validity of the ban on media advertising. It is
noteworthy that %.A. 3o. 9??+, \1B has lifted the )an and now allows
candidates to ad*ertise their candidacies in print and )roadcast "edia.
Indeed, to s#stain the )an on the p#)lication of s#r*ey res#lts wo#ld
sanction the censorship of all spea:ing )y candidates in an election on the
gro#nd that the #s#al )o")asts and hyper)olic clai"s "ade d#ring the
ca"paigns can conf#se *oters and th#s de)ase the electoral process.
;n sum, the dissent has engaged only in a balancing at the margin.
This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the
challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression,
and the press with little protection. (or anyone who can )ring a
pla#si)le -#stification forward can easily show a rational connection
)etween the stat#te and a legiti"ate go*ern"ental p#rpose. In contrast,
the )alancing of interest #nderta:en )y then H#stice astro in ,on&ales *.
'M.L.,O7P fro" which the dissent in this case ta:es its c#e, was a
strong one res#lting in his concl#sion that \7?9B of %.A. 3o. B88?, which
li"ited the period of election ca"paign and partisan political acti*ity, was
an #nconstit#tional a)ridg"ent of freedo" of e5pression.
T;) OK&29', T)(0
$he Jnited !tates !#pre"e o#rt, thro#gh hief H#stice 8arren, held in
!nited "tates v. K@9rien2 -G/I government regulation is sufficiently
*ustified G%I if it is within the constitutional power of the 9overnmentJ
G&I if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interestJ G$I if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expressionJ and G"I if the incidental restriction on alleged >irst
/mendment freedoms Gof speech, expression and pressI is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.-
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content7based from
content7neutral regulations and is said to have become canonical in the
review of such laws. It is noteworthy that the K@9rien test has )een applied
)y this o#rt in at least two cases. Cnder this test, even if a law furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be
invalidated if such governmental interest is -not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.- Moreo*er, even if the purpose is
unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should
nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression
is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in
question.
'#r in6#iry sho#ld accordingly foc#s on these two considerations as
applied to \7.B. $o s#""ari&e then, we hold that \7.B is in*alid )eca#se
According to the o#rt, !ection 7.B was in*alid )eca#se of three reasons2
'%) it imposed a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, '&) it
was a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even
though such suppression was only for a limited period, and '$) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted could be achieved by
means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. $he
petition for prohi)ition was granted.
>irst. Sec. 5." fails to meet criterion of the A?1rien test because the
causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental
interest ma<es such interest =not unrelated to the suppression of
free expression.0 1y prohibiting the publication of election survey
results because of the possibility that such publication might
undermine the integrity of the election, U5." actually suppresses a
whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same sub*ect matter by 26WS#/#6. ,ALCD2;STS,
./7;A /27 TM ,ADD62T/TA.S, /.D,H/;. TH6A.;STS, /27
ATH6. A#;2;A2 D/O6.S. ;n effect, U5." shows a 1;/S for a
particular sub*ect matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring #6.SA2/L
A#;2;A2 to ST/T;ST;,/L .6SCLTS. $he constit#tional g#arantee of
freedo" of e5pression "eans that =the go*ern"ent has no power to
restrict e5pression )eca#se of its "essage, its ideas, its s#)-ect "atter, or
its content.>O11P $he inhi)ition of speech sho#ld )e #pheld only if the
e5pression falls within one of the few #nprotected categories dealt with in
haplins:y *. 3ew 1a"pshire,O12P th#s2
$here are certain well9defined and narrowly li"ited classes of speech, the
pre*ention and p#nish"ent of which ha*e ne*er )een tho#ght to raise any
onstit#tional pro)le". $hese incl#de the lewd and o)scene, the profane,
the li)elo#s, and the ins#lting or SfightingK words F those which )y their
*ery #tterance inflict in-#ry or tend to incite an i""ediate )reach of the
peace. O!P#ch #tterances are no essential part of any e5position of ideas,
and are of s#ch slight social *al#e as a step to tr#th that any )enefit that
"ay )e deri*ed fro" the" is clearly o#tweighed )y the social interest in
order and "orality.
3or is there -#stification for the prior restraint which \7.B lays on protected
speech. In 3ear *. Minnesota,O14P it was held2
O$heP protection e*en as to pre*io#s restraint is not a)sol#tely #nli"ited.
B#t the li"itation has )een recogni&ed only in e5ceptional cases. . . . 3o
one wo#ld 6#estion )#t that a go*ern"ent "ight pre*ent act#al
o)str#ction to its recr#iting ser*ice or the p#)lication of the sailing dates of
transports or the n#")er and location of troops. 'n si"ilar gro#nds, the
pri"ary re6#ire"ents of decency "ay )e enforced against o)scene
p#)lications. $he sec#rity of the co""#nity life "ay )e protected against
incite"ents to acts of *iolence and the o*erthrow )y force of orderly
go*ern"ent . . . .
$h#s, contrary to the clai" of the !olicitor ,eneral, the prohibition
imposed by U5." cannot be *ustified on the ground that it is only for a
limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a
limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct,
absolute, and substantial. It constit#tes a total s#ppression of a category
of speech and is not "ade less so )eca#se it is only for a period of fifteen
@17A days i""ediately )efore a national election and se*en @7A days
i""ediately )efore a local election.
This sufficientl$ distinguishes PI.C from /.A. Fo. ==C=, P11+b,, which this
Court found to be valid in 2ational #ress ,lub v. ,AD6L6, and
AsmeSa v. ,AD6L6,< Lor the ban imposed by ../. 2o. BB"B, U%%'b)
is not only authoried by a specific constitutional provision, but it
also provided an alternative so that, as this ,ourt pointed out in
AsmeSa, there was actually no ban but only a substitution of media
advertisements by the ,AD6L6, space and ,AD6L6, hour.
Second. 6ven if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is
unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction
67
of free expression is only incidental, U5." nonetheless fails to meet
criterion of the A?1rien test, namely, that the restriction be not
greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As
already stated, \7.B ai"s at the pre*ention of last9"in#te press#re on
*oters, the creation of )andwagon effect, =-#n:ing> of wea: or =losing>
candidates, and resort to the for" of election cheating called =dagdag9
)awas.> #raiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they
cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of
expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by
punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of
apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils.
$h#s, #nder the Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987,O17P the 'M.L. is gi*en
the power2
T+ (0+E ',: 9..)A'. '/09>90:, +2 /+,<9(/'0), 0)'2 *+@,,
',* (0+E ',: 1,.'@<1., .98).+1(, D9(.)'*9,A +2 <'.()
).)/09+, E2+E'A',*', '<0)2 *1) ,+09/) ',* ;)'29,A.
$his is s#rely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained
in U5.". 0#rs#ant to this power of the 'M.L., it can confiscate )og#s
s#r*ey res#lts calc#lated to "islead *oters. andidates can ha*e their
own s#r*eys cond#cted. 3o right of reply can )e in*o:ed )y others. 3o
principle of e6#ality is in*ol*ed. It is a free "ar:et to which each candidate
)rings his ideas. As for the p#rpose of the law to pre*ent )andwagon
effects, it is do#)tf#l whether the ,o*ern"ent can deal with this nat#ral9
eno#gh tendency of so"e *oters. !o"e *oters want to )e identified with
the =winners.> !o"e are s#scepti)le to the herd "entality. an these )e
legiti"ately prohi)ited )y s#ppressing the p#)lication of s#r*ey res#lts
which are a for" of e5pressionC It has )een held that =O"ereP legislati*e
preferences or )eliefs respecting "atters of p#)lic con*enience "ay well
s#pport reg#lation directed at other personal acti*ities, )#t )e ins#fficient
to -#stify s#ch as di"inishes the e5ercise of rights so *ital to the
"aintenance of de"ocratic instit#tions.>
1ecause of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech,
expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity. Indeed, /any syste" of prior restraints of
e5pression co"es to this o#rt )earing a hea*y pres#"ption against its
constit#tional *alidity. . . . $he ,o*ern"ent Ith#s carries a hea*y )#rden of
showing -#stification for the enforce"ent of s#ch restraint.I/ $here is th#s a
re*ersal of the nor"al pres#"ption of *alidity that inheres in e*ery legislation.
2or may it be argued that because of /rt. ;H:,, U" of the ,onstitution,
which gives the ,AD6L6, supervisory power to regulate the
en*oyment or utiliation of franchise for the operation of media of
communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure li<e
U5.". >or as we have pointed out in sustaining the ban on media
political advertisements, the grant of power to the ,AD6L6, under /rt.
;H:,, U" is limited to ensuring -equal opportunity, time, space, and the
right to reply- as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for
the use of such media facilities for -public information campaigns and
forums among candidates.-
NOTE" T;) power to regulate, *+)( ,+0 9,/.1*) 0;) power to prohibit.
ASSEMBLY & PETITION
PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO
G.R. N+. L1800, !',1'2: 27, 1948,F)29', !.
FACTS" 0ri"icias, *ia petition for "anda"#s, so#ght to co"pel (#goso to
iss#e a per"it for the holding of a p#)lic "eeting at 0la&a Miranda to
petition the go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances.
$he 0hilippine legislat#re has delegated the e5ercise of the police power
to the M#nicipal Board of the ity of Manila, the legislati*e )ody of the
ity. It has )een granted the following legislati*e powers, to wit2 /@pA to
pro*ide for the prohi)ition and s#ppression of riots, affrays, dist#r)ances,
and disorderly asse")lies, @#A to reg#late the #se of streets, a*en#es ...
par:s, ce"eteries and other p#)lic places./ $h#s, the M#nicipal Board
enacted sections 8BB and 1119 of the %e*ised 'rdinances of 1927, which
prohi)it, as an offense against p#)lic peace, and penali&e as a
"isde"eanor, /any act, in any p#)lic place, "eeting, or procession,
tending to dist#r) the peace or e5cite a riotG or collect with other persons in
a )ody or crowd for any #nlawf#l p#rposeG or dist#r) or dis6#iet any
congregation engaged in any lawf#l asse")ly./ !.. 1119 states that the
streets and p#)lic places of the city shall )e :ept free and clear for the #se
of the p#)lic, and the sidewal:s and crossings for the pedestrians, and the
sa"e shall only )e #sed or occ#pied for other p#rposes as pro*ided )y
ordinance or reg#lationZ 6rovided that the holding of an$ parade or
procession in an$ street or public places shall onl$ be done if a 0a$orBs
permit is securedT
The 0a$orBs reason for refusing the permit was his reasonable ground to
believe, based on previous utterances and the fact that passions on the
part of the losing groups remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will
be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people
in their government, and in the dul$ constituted authorities, which might
threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order. 1owe*er,
petitionerKs re6#est was for a per"it /to hold a peacef#l p#)lic "eeting./
ISSUE" 8as the MayorKs ref#sal to grant the per"it to peacea)ly
asse")le *iolati*e of the onstit#tionC
HELD" D.!. T;) 29A;0( +< <2))*+D +< (E))/; ',* 0+ E)'/)<1..:
'(()D8.) ',* E)0909+, 0;) A+>)2,D),0 <+2 2)*2)(( +< A29)>',/)( '2)
<1,*'D),0'. E)2(+,'. 29A;0( +< 0;) E)+E.) 2)/+A,9F)* ',*
A1'2',0))* 8: 0;) C+,(090109+,. The exercise of those rights is not
absoluteJ it may be regulated so that it shall in*ure the equal
en*oyment of others having equal rights, or the rights of the
community or society. $he power to reg#late the e5ercise of s#ch rights
is the /police power/999 the power to prescri)e reg#lations, to pro"ote the
health, "orals, peace, ed#cation, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people999 e5ercised )y the legislati*e )ranch )y the
enact"ent of laws reg#lating those rights, and it "ay )e delegated to
political s#)di*isions, s#ch as towns, "#nicipalities, and cities a#thori&ing
their legislati*e )odies, called "#nicipal and city co#ncils to enact
ordinances for the p#rpose.
!.. 1119 is s#scepti)le to two constr#ctions2
'%) That the Dayor has unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to
grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly )
9+2
'&) That the applicant has the right to a permit, which shall be granted
by the Dayor, sub*ect only to the latterFs reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the
purpose, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places
by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimie
the ris< of disorder.
The ,ourt adopted the second constructionJ the ordinance only
confers upon the Dayor the discretion, in issuing the permit, to
determine or specify the streets or public places where the meeting
may be held. ;t does not confer upon him unfettered discretion to
refuse to grant the license. / statute requiring persons using the
public streets to procure a special license therefor from the local
authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of
assembly, WH6.6 TH6 L;,62S;29 /CTHA.;T;6S /.6 ST.;,TL@
L;D;T67 , in the issuance of licenses, to consider the time, place, and
manner of the parade and procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide
proper policing. Atherwise, it would be tantamount to authoriing the
Dayor to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
holding of meetings.
The Dunicipal 1oard is empowered only to regulate the use of
streets, par<s, and the other public places. IREGULATEI includes
the power to control, govern, and restrain, but not suppress or
prohibit. The legislative police power of the 0unicipal 9oard to enact
ordinances regulating reasonabl$ the e%ercise of the fundamental
personal rights of the citiEens in the streets and other public places
cannot be delegated to the Dayor by conferring upon him
unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and
control his action b$ which its impartial e%ecution can be secured or
partialit$ and oppression prevented.
=/n ordinance in that case sub*ects to the unrestrained will of a
single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties
under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or control
his action. 1is action or non9action "ay proceed fro" en"ity or
pre-#dice, fro" partisan &eal or ani"osity, fro" fa*oritis" and other
i"proper infl#ences and "oti*es easy of conceal"ent.>
/n ordinance which clothes a single individual with such power is
void. I, 0;) )C)2/9() +< E+.9/) E+@)2, 0;) /+1,/9. D':, 9, 90(
*9(/2)09+,, 2)A1.'0) 0;) )C)2/9() +< (1/; 29A;0( 9, ' 2)'(+,'8.)
D',,)2, 810 /',,+0 (1EE2)(( 0;)D, *92)/0.: +2 9,*92)/0.:, 8:
'00)DE09,A 0+ /+DD90 0;) E+@)2 +< *+9,A (+ 0+ 0;) D':+2 +2 ',:
+0;)2 +<<9/)2. The discretion with which the council is vested is a
legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not
discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and
arbitrary authority, ma<ing him in its exercise a petty tyrant.
-;t is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations
create public disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or
manifestly threaten some tangible public or private mischief that the
law interferes.-
/Krdinances to be valid must be reasonable) the$ must not be
oppressive) the$ must be fair and impartial) the$ must not be so
framed as to allow their enforcement to rest on official discretion0
=Where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion
of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical operation.0 @$he o#rt cited
a J.!. caseA
The power of municipalities to regulate the use of public streets is
conceded. The privilege of a citien to use the streets may be
regulated in the interest of allJ it is not absolute. The authority of a
municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public highways is
consistent with civil liberties, a means of safeguarding the good
order upon which they ultimately depend. 8here a restriction of the
68
#se of highways is designed to pro"ote the p#)lic con*enience in the
interest of all, it cannot )e disregarded )y the atte"pted e5ercise of so"e
ci*il right which in other circ#"stances wo#ld )e entitled to protection. As
reg#lation of the #se of the streets for parades and processions is a
traditional e5ercise of control )y local go*ern"ent, the 6#estion is whether
that control is e5erted so as not to deny or #nwarrantedly a)ridge the right
of asse")ly and the opport#nities for the co""#nication of tho#ght and
the disc#ssion of p#)lic 6#estions i""e"orially associated with resort to
p#)lic places.
$he o#rt, citing a J.!. case, held+ =/ municipal ordinance requiring
the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public
streets, highways, public par<s, or public buildings of the city and
authoriing the director of public safety, for the purpose of
preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse
to issue a permit 'and not merely to regulate) when after
investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the
application, he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is
not a valid exercise of the police power.
Streets and par<s have immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public and have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citiens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public places has been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citiens. The
privilege of a citien to use the streets and par<s for communication
of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of allJ
it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in
consonance with peace and good orderJ 1CT ;T DCST 2AT, ;2 TH6
9C;S6 A> .69CL/T;A2, 16 /1.;7967 A. 762;67.
;f the Ardinance =does not ma<e comfort or convenience in the use
of streets or par<s the standard of official action,0 instead, it enables
a single official to refuse a permit on his D6.6 A#;2;A2 that such
refusal will prevent Friots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage, ;T
;S MA;7. ;t can be an instrument of arbitrary suppression of free
expression of views on national affairs.
0oreover, the power conferred upon the Legislature to ma<e laws
cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or
authority, e%cept police regulation which are conferred upon the
legislative bod$ of a municipal corporation. The police power to regulate
the use of streets and other public places has been conferred b$ the
(egislature upon the 0unicipal 9oard of the Cit$. The (egislature has not
conferred upon the 0a$or the same power.
Besides, a grant of #nreg#lated and #nli"ited power to grant or ref#se a
per"it for the #se of streets and other p#)lic places for processions,
parades, or "eetings, wo#ld )e n#ll and *oid. Jnder o#r de"ocratic
syste" of go*ern"ent, no s#ch #nli"ited power "ay )e *alidly granted to
any officer of the go*ern"ent, e5cept perhaps in cases of national
e"ergency.
/FEAR OF SERIOUS IN!UR- /',,+0 '.+,) B1(09<: (1EE2)((9+, +< <2))
(E))/; ',* '(()D8.:. It is the f#nction of speech to free "en fro" the
)ondage of irrational fears. To *ustify suppression of free speech, there
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practicedJ that the danger apprehended is imminent and
the evil to be prevented is a serious one.> ;mminent danger can -#stify
prohi)ition '3LD I( the e*il apprehended is 2).'09>).: ()29+1(. $hat
speech is li:ely to res#lt in so"e *iolence or in destr#ction of property is
not eno#gh to -#stify its s#ppression. There must be the probability of
serious in*ury to the state.
MALA&ANAN >. RAMENTO
G.R. N+. L%2270? M': 21, 1984, F)2,',*+, !.
F'/0(" 0etitioners were st#dents of ,regorio Araneta Jni*ersity,
granted )y the school a#thorities to hold a "eeting, howe*er they "#st
co"ply with so"e ter"s and conditions. Instead of following the ter"s and
conditions, the st#dents contin#ed their "arch to the Life !cience )#ilding,
outside the area stated in the permit. lasses were dist#r)ed d#e to the
noise. It was o#tside the area co*ered )y their per"it. The$ continued
their demonstration, giving utterance to language severel$ critical of the
!niversit$ authorities and using megaphones in the process. There was,
as a result, disturbance of the classes being held. Also, the non7academic
emplo$ee, within hearing distance, stopped their work because of the
noise created. $hen on !epte")er 9, 1982, they were infor"ed thro#gh a
"e"orand#" that they were #nder pre*enti*e s#spension for their fail#re
to e5plain the holding of an illegal asse")ly in front of the Life !cience
B#ilding. $he *alidity thereof was challenged )y petitioners )oth )efore the
(I of %i&al and )efore the Ministry of .d#cation, #lt#re and !ports.
%espondent, %a"ento, as director of the 3ational apital %egion, fo#nd
petitioners g#ilty of the charge of holding an illegal asse")ly which was
characteri&ed )y the *iolation of the per"it granted res#lting in the
dist#r)ance of classes and oral defa"ation. The penalt$ was suspension
for one academic $ear.
I((1)("
1. 8hether or not the decision of responded *iolates the
constit#tional rights of freedo" of peacea)le asse")ly and
free speechC
2. 8hether or not the s#spension "eted o#t )y the school
a#thorities are not *iolati*e of d#e processC
H).*"
1. NO. As is 6#ite clear fro" the opinion in R):)( >. &'A'0(9,A, the
invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it
the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been
disregarded. Both are e")raced in the concept of freedo" of e5pression,
which is identified with the li)erty to disc#ss p#)licly and tr#thf#lly, any
"atter of p#)lic interest witho#t censorship or p#nish"ent and which -is
not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing . . . of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent.- In the a)o*e case, a per"it was so#ght to hold a
peacef#l "arch and rally fro" the L#neta p#)lic par: to the gates of the
Jnited !tates .")assy, hardly two )loc:s away, where in an open space
of p#)lic property, a short progra" wo#ld )e held, 2ecessarily then, the
question of the use of a public par< and of the streets leading to the
Cnited States 6mbassy was before this ,ourt. We held that streets
and par<s have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and have been used for purposes of assembly to
communicate thoughts between citiens and to discuss public
issues.
$he sit#ation here is different. $he asse")ly was to )e held
NOT in a public place )#t in private premises , property of respondent
Jni*ersity. $here is in the %eyes opinion as part of the s#""ary this
rele*ant e5cerpt2 -The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will ta<e place. ;f it were a private place,
only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal
possession is required.- 0etitioners did see: s#ch consent. It was
granted. According to the petition2 /'n A#g#st 27, 1982, )y *irt#e of a
per"it granted to the" )y the school ad"inistration, the !#pre"e !t#dent
o#ncil where yo#r petitioners are a"ong the officers, held a ,eneral
Asse")ly at the <MA! )as:et)all co#rt of the respondent Jni*ersity./
$here was an e5press ad"ission in the o""ent of pri*ate respondent
Jni*ersity as to a per"it ha*ing )een granted for petitioners to hold a
st#dent asse")ly. The specific question to be resolved then is
whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action
and the penalty imposed, there was an infringement of the right to
peaceable assembly and its cognate right of free speech.
0etitioners in*o:e their rights to peacea)le asse")ly and free speech.
$hey were entitled to do so. $hey en-oy the said right li:e the rest of the
citi&ens the freedo" to e5press their *iews and co""#nicate their
tho#ghts to those disposed to listen in gatherings s#ch as was held in this
case. $hey do not, shed their constit#tional rights to freedo" of speech or
e5pression at the schoolho#se gate. While, therefore, the authority of
educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognied, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional
safeguards. 'n a "ore specific le*el, there is pers#asi*e force to this
for"#lation in the (ortas opinion2 The principal use to which the
schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during
prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of activities.
/mong those activities is personal intercommunication among the
students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of
attending schoolJ it is also an important part of the educational
process. / studentFs rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. 8hen he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or
on the ca"p#s d#ring the a#thori&ed ho#rs, he may express his
opinions, e*en on contro*ersial s#)-ects li:e the conflict in <ietna", if he
does so without Fmaterially and substantially interferGingI with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the schoolF
and without colliding with the rights of others. . . . 1ut conduct by
the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason : whether it
stems from time, place, or type of behavior : materially disrupts
classwor< or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others is, of course, not immunied by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech.-
')-ection is "ade )y pri*ate respondents to the tenor of the speeches )y
the st#dent leaders. ;f in the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on, utterances, extremely
critical, at times even vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. !t#dent leaders are hardly the ti"id, diffident types.
$hey are li:ely to )e asserti*e and dog"atic. $hey wo#ld )e ineffecti*e if
d#ring a rally they spea: in the g#arded and -#dicio#s lang#age of the
acade"e. At any rate, e*en a sy"pathetic a#dience is not disposed to
accord f#ll credence to their fiery e5hortations. $hey ta:e into acco#nt the
e5cite"ent of the occasion, the propensity of spea:ers to e5aggerate, the
e5#)erance of yo#th. They may give the spea<ers the benefit of their
applause, but with the activity ta<ing place in the school premises
and during the daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without pre*udice to the ta<ing of
disciplinary action for conduct, which -materially disrupts classwor<
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.-
69
'ne last "atter. The ob*ection was raised that petitioners failed to
exhaust administrative remedies, That is true, but hardly decisive.
Here, a purely legal question is presented. Such being the case,
especially so where a decision on a question of law is imperatively
called for, and time being of the essence, this ,ourt has invariably
viewed the issue as ripe for ad*udication. 8hat cannot )e too
s#fficiently stressed is that the constit#tional rights to peacea)le asse")ly
and free speech are in*o:ed )y petitioners. Doreover, there was, and
very li<ely there will continue to be in the future, militancy and
assertiveness of students on issues that they consider of great
importance, whether concerning their welfare or the general public.
That they have a right to do as citiens entitled to all the protection
in the 1ill of .ights.
It wo#ld )e "ost appropriate then, as was done in the case
of %eyes *. Bagatsing, for this o#rt to lay down the principles for the
g#idance of school a#thorities and st#dents ali:e. The rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to students of
educational institutions. 2ecessarily, their exercise to discuss
matters affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to be
sub*ected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless
there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive
evil that the state has a right to present. As a corollary, the #t"ost
leeway and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or
#tterances "ade. The peaceable character of an assembly could be
lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent,
whatever grievances that may be aired being susceptible to
correction through the ways of the law. ;f the assembly is to be held
in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request
arbitrarily or unreasonably. ;n granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid
disruption of classes or stoppage of wor< of the non:academic
personnel.
2. D.!. 6ven if, however, there be violations of its terms, the penalty
incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense. ;t does not
follow however, that the petitioners can be totally absolved for the
events that transpired. /dmittedly, there was a violation of the terms
of the permit. The rally was held at a place other than that specified,
in the second floor lobby, rather than the bas<etball court, of the
MD/S building of the Cniversity. Doreover, it was continued longer
than the period allowed. According to the decision of %a"ento, the
concerted acti*ity went on #ntil 724?p". 0ri*ate respondent co#ld th#s,
ta:e disciplinary action. 'n those facts, howe*er, an ad"onition, e*en a
cens#re certainly not a s#spension co#ld )e the appropriate penalty.
While the discretion of both respondent Cniversity and responded
.amento is recognied, the rule of reason, the dictate of fairness
calls for a much lesser penalty. ;f the consent of proportionally
between the offense committed and the sanction imposed is not
followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise
to a due process question . To avoid this constitutional ob*ection, it
is the holding of this court that a one:wee< suspension would be
punishment enough.
DELA CRU$ >. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. N+. 12%183, M'2/; 25, 1999, &)..+(9..+, !.
FACTS"
$he respecti*e school principals s#)"itted reports to the
!ecretary of D.! regarding the participation of p#)lic school teachers
@petitionersA in an illegal stri:e and their defiance to the ret#rn9to9wor:
order iss#ed )y the D.! !ecretary. $he !ec. of D.! on his own filed
an ad"inistrati*e co"plaint against the petitioners for the said acts which
were considered as a *iolation of the i*il !er*ice Decree of the
0hilippines. (or fail#re to s#)"it their answers the !ec. of D.! iss#ed
an order of dis"issal against the teachers which was i"ple"ented
i""ediately. 0etitioners appealed to the Merit !yste"s 0rotection Board
@M!0BA and then to the i*il !er*ice o""ission @!A. $he ! fo#nd
petitioners g#ilty of /cond#ct pre-#dicial to the )est interest of the ser*ice/
for ha*ing participated in the "ass actions and i"posed #pon the" the
red#ced penalty of si5 @+A "onthsI s#spension. 1owe*er, in *iew of the
length of ti"e that petitioners had )een o#t of the ser*ice )y reason of the
i""ediate i"ple"entation of the dis"issal orders of !ecretary ariNo, the
! li:ewise ordered petitionersI a#to"atic reinstate"ent in the ser*ice
witho#t )ac: wages. 0etitioners were #nhappy with the ! decision.
$hey initially filed petitions for certiorari with the ! which were all referred
to the A. $he A r#led that the 6#estioned resol#tions of the i*il
!er*ice o""ission finding petitioners g#ilty of cond#ct pre-#dicial to the
)est interest of the ser*ice were )ased on reasona)le and -#stifia)le
gro#ndsG that petitionersI percei*ed grie*ances were no e5c#se for the"
not to cond#ct classes and defy the ret#rn9to9wor: order iss#ed )y their
s#periorsG that the i""ediate e5ec#tion of the dis"issal orders of
!ecretary ariNo was sanctioned #nder law.
0etitioners contend that the o#rt of Appeals grie*o#sly
erred in affir"ing the ! resol#tions finding the" g#ilty of cond#ct
pre-#dicial to the )est interest of the ser*ice when their only /offense/ was
to e5ercise their constit#tional right to peacea)ly asse")le and petition
the go*ern"ent for redress of their grie*ances. Moreo*er petitioners insist
that the "ass actions of !epte")erR'cto)er 199? were not /stri:es/ as
there was no act#al disr#ption of classes. 0etitioners therefore as: for
e5oneration or, in the alternati*e, award of )ac: wages for the period of
three @4A years when they were not allowed to wor: while awaiting
resol#tion of their appeals )y the M!0B and !, ded#cting the period of
si5 @+A "onthsI s#spension e*ent#ally "eted the".
ISSUES"
1. 8'3 the p#)lic school teachers were in*ol*ed in a =stri:e>C
2. 8'3 the teachers sho#ld )e penali&ed for participating in
the stri:eC
4. 8'3 penali&ing the teachers for participation in the stri:e
a"o#nts to a denial of their right to peacea)ly asse")leC
HELD"
1. -ES. $he persistent ref#sal of the stri:ing teachers to call the "ass
actions )y the con*entional ter" /stri:e/ did not erase the true nature of
the mass actions as unauthoried stoppages of wor< the purpose of
which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachersF economic
grievances. $he "ass actions staged )y Metro Manila p#)lic school
teachers amounted to a stri<e in every sense of the term, constituting
as they did, a concerted and unauthoried stoppage of or absence
from wor< which it was said teachersF sworn duty to perform, carried
out for essentially economic reasons L to protest and pressure the
G+>)2,D),0 to correct what, a"ong other grie*ances, the stri:ers
percei*ed to )e the #n-#st or pre-#dicial i"ple"entation of the salary
standardi&ation law insofar as they were concerned, the non9pay"ent or
delay in pay"ent of *ario#s fringe )enefits and allowances to which they
were entitled, and the i"position of additional teaching loads and longer
teaching ho#rs.
2. -ES. $he teachers were penali&ed not )eca#se they e5ercised their
right to peacea)ly asse")le )#t )eca#se of the "anner )y which s#ch
right was e5ercised, i.e., going on #na#thori&ed and #nilateral a)sences
th#s disr#pting classes in *ario#s schools in Metro Manila which prod#ced
ad*erse effects #pon the st#dents for whose ed#cation the teachers were
responsi)le.
/lthough petitioners contend that classes were not
actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately
appointed by Secretary ,ariSo, that the prompt remedial action ta<en
by Secretary ,ariSo might have partially deflected the adverse
effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability
of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the
very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary.
=This ,ourt denies the claim that the teachers were thereby denied
their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be
upheld, li<e any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable
limits so as not to pre*udice the public welfare.0 The public school
teachers in these mass actions did not exercise their constitutional
rights within reasonable limits. An the contrary, they committed acts
pre*udicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass
protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
refusing to go bac< even after they had been ordered to do so. 1ad
the teachers a*ailed of their free ti"e 9 recess, after classes, wee:ends or
holidays 9 to dra"ati&e their grie*ances and to dialog#e with the proper
a#thorities within the )o#nds of law, no one 9 not the D.!, the ! or
e*en the !#pre"e o#rt 9 co#ld ha*e held the" lia)le for their
participation in the "ass actions.
4. NO. In /olando Aan v. Civil "ervice Commission, it was held that for
the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances to be upheld, li<e any other liberty, it must be
exercised within reasonable limits so as not to pre*udice the public
welfare. $he p#)lic school teachers in the case of the 199? "ass actions
did not e5ercise their constit#tional rights within reasona)le li"its. An the
contrary, they committed acts pre*udicial to the best interest of the
service by staging the mass protests on regular school days,
abandoning their classes and refusing to go bac< even after they
had been ordered to do so. H'* 0;) 0)'/;)2( '>'9.)* +< 0;)92 <2)) 09D)
N 2)/)((, '<0)2 /.'(()(, @))G),*( +2 ;+.9*':( N 0+ *2'D'09F) 0;)92
A29)>',/)( ',* 0+ *9'.+A1) @90; 0;) E2+E)2 '10;+2909)( @90;9, 0;)
8+1,*( +< .'@, ,+ +,) N ,+0 0;) DECS, 0;) CSC +2 )>), 0;)
S1E2)D) C+120 N /+1.* ;'>) ;).* 0;)D .9'8.) <+2 0;)92 E'209/9E'09+,
9, 0;) D'(( '/09+,(.
$he arg#"ent that the rights of free e5pression and
asse")ly co#ld not )e lightly disregarded as they occ#py a preferred
position in the hierarchy of ci*il li)erties is not applica)le to defend the
*alidity of the 199? "ass actions )eca#se there is a higher consideration
in*ol*ed here which is the ed#cation of the yo#th.

PHILIPPINE &LOOMING MILLS EMPLO-EES ORGANI$ATION >.
PHILIPPINE &LOOMING MILLS CO. INC.
G.R. N+. L31195, !1,) 5, 1973, M'G'(9'2, !.
F'/0(" !o"eti"e in 19+9, petitioner decided to stage a "ass
de"onstration in MalacaNang in protest against alleged a)#ses of the
0asig 0olice. %espondent o"pany, howe*er re6#ested petitioner that
70
the first9shift wor:ers sho#ld not participate in the stri:e for it will #nd#ly
pre-#dice the nor"al operation of the co"pany. Despite the warning, all
the wor:ers incl#ding those who were in first9shift still participated in the
rally. 6rior to that, respondent compan$ informed that workers who belong
in the first7shift, who were without previous leave of absence approved b$
the compan$, who shall participate in the rall$ shall be dismissed for it is a
clear violation of the e%isting C9A and is tantamount to an illegal strike.
%espondent co"pany then filed a charge against petitioners and later
dis"issed so"e of its e"ployees.
I((1)(" 8hether or not the constit#tional freedo"s of speech and
e5pression of the petitioner were *iolated )y the respondent co"pany in
pre*enting so"e of its e"ployees to participate in the rally and later
dis"issed so"e of the".
H).*" 3o. $here is need of )riefly restating )asic concepts and principles
which #nderlie the iss#es posed )y the case at )ar.
@1A In a de"ocracy, the preser*ation and enhance"ent of the dignity and
worth of the h#"an personality is the central core as well as the cardinal
article of faith of o#r ci*ili&ation. $he in*iola)le character of "an as an
indi*id#al "#st )e /protected to the largest possi)le e5tent in his tho#ghts
and in his )eliefs as the citadel of his person.
@2A The 1ill of .ights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty,
equality and security -against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no
patience with general principles.0
In the pithy lang#age of Mr. H#stice %o)ert Hac:son, the purpose of the
1ill of .ights is to withdraw -certain sub*ects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of ma*orities
and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. AneFs rights to life, liberty and property, to free
speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a voteJ they depend on
the outcome of no elections.- Las:i proclai"ed that /the happiness of
the indi*id#al, not the well9)eing of the !tate, was the criterion )y which its
)eha*io#r was to )e -#dged. 1is interests, not its power, set the li"its to
the a#thority it was entitled to e5ercise.
@4A The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right
to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the
sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphoris" of H#stice 1ol"es, to
protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we
cherishJ or as !ocrates insin#ated, not only to protect the "inority who
want to tal:, )#t also to )enefit the "a-ority who ref#se to listen. And as
H#stice Do#glas cogently stresses it, the li)erties of one are the li)erties of
allG and the li)erties of one are not safe #nless the li)erties of all are
protected.
@BA The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not
only civil rights but also political rights essential to manFs en*oyment
of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.
Thru these freedoms the citiens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but
also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline
of abusive public officers. The citiEen is accorded these rights so that
he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions
on erring public officers and emplo$ees.
@7A While the 1ill of .ights also protects property rights, the primacy
of human rights over property rights is recognied. 1ecause these
freedoms are -delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society- and the -threat of sanctions may deter their
exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,-
they -need breathing space to survive,- permitting government
regulation only -with narrow specificity.-
0roperty and property rights can )e lost thr# prescriptionG )#t h#"an rights
are i"prescripti)le. If h#"an rights are e5ting#ished )y the passage of
ti"e, then the Bill of %ights is a #seless atte"pt to li"it the power of
go*ern"ent and ceases to )e an efficacio#s shield against the tyranny of
officials, of "a-orities, of the infl#ential and powerf#l, and of oligarchs 9
political, econo"ic or otherwise.
'n the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of
assembly occup$ a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutionsJ and
such priorit$ gives these liberties the sanctit$ and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions. $he superiority of these freedoms over
property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its
ob*ect or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory
nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or
impairs property rights . An the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.
!o it has )een stressed that the (1)= >.667ADS A> S#66,H0 and
(2)=A> TH6 #.6SS0 as well as (3)=A> #6/,6>CL /SS6D1L@ /27
A> #6T;T;A2 >A. .67.6SS A> 9.;6M/2,6S0 are absolute when
directed against public officials or -when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed,-
even relying on the balancing:of:interests test.
$he respondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations, after opining that the "ass
de"onstration was not a declaration of stri:e, concl#ded that )y their
/concerted act and the occ#rrence of a te"porary stoppage of wor:,/
herein petitioners are g#ilty of )argaining in )ad faith and hence *iolated
the collecti*e )argaining agree"ent with pri*ate respondent 0hilippine
Bloo"ing Mills o., Inc. "et against and tested b$ the foregoing principles
governing a democratic societ$, such a conclusion cannot be sustained.
The demonstration held by petitioners was against alleged abuses of
some #asig policemen, 2AT against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstration was purely and completely an
exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right
of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular
before the appropriate governmental agency, the ,hief 6xecutive,
against the police officers of the municipality of #asig. They
exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and
protection from what they believe were police excesses. /s a matter
of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect
herein petitioner Cnion and its members from the harassment of
local police officers. ;t was to the interest of herein private
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to ta<e up the cudgels
for, its employees, so that they can report to wor< free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence perform more
efficiently their respective tas<s to enhance its productivity as well
as profits. &erein respondent emplo$er did not even offer to intercede for
its emplo$ees with the local police. 8as it sec#ring peace for itself at the
e5pense of its wor:ersC 8as it also inti"idated )y the local police or did it
enco#rage the local police to terrori&e or *e5 its wor:ersC ;ts failure to
defend its own employees all the more wea<ened the position of its
laborers vis:a:vis the alleged oppressive police, who might have
been all the more emboldened thereby to sub*ect its lowly
employees to further indignities.
;n see<ing sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as
their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of
local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utiliing only
the weapons afforded them by the ,onstitution he untrammelled
en*oyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees, is a plea for the preservation merely of
their property rights. !#ch apprehended loss or da"age wo#ld not spell
the difference )etween the life and death of the fir" or its owners or its
"anage"ent. $he e"ployeesI pathetic sit#ation was a star: reality
a)#sed, harassed and persec#ted as they )elie*ed they were )y the
peace officers of the "#nicipality. /s above intimated, the condition in
which the employees found themselves vis:a:vis the local police of
#asig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Daterial loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human
being bro<en in morale and brutalied in spirit can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
for retribution, denial of which is li<e rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, TH6 #.;D/,@ A> HCD/2 .;9HTS, >.667AD
A> 6H#.6SS;A2, A> #6/,6>CL /SS6D1L@ /27 A> #6T;T;A2
>A. .67.6SS A> 9.;6M/2,6S o*er #.A#6.T@ .;9HTS has )een
s#stained. ."phatic reiteration of this )asic tenet as a co*eted )oon at
once the shield and ar"or of the dignity and worth of the h#"an
personality, the all9cons#"ing ideal of o#r enlightened ci*ili&ation
)eco"es '#r d#ty, if freedo" and social -#stice ha*e any "eaning at all
for hi" who toils so that capital can prod#ce econo"ic goods that can
generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the emplo$er, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement
and a cause for the dismissal from emplo$ment of the demonstrating
emplo$ees, stretches undul$ the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is -a potent means of inhibiting speech- and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
The collective bargaining agreement which fi%es the working shifts of the
emplo$ees, according to the respondent Court of 'ndustrial /elations, in
effect imposes on the workers the dut$ . . . to observe regular working
hours. $he strained constr#ction of the o#rt of Ind#strial %elations that
s#ch stip#lated wor:ing shifts deny the wor:ers the right to stage a "ass
de"onstration against police a)#ses d#ring wor:ing ho#rs, constit#tes a
*irt#al tyranny o*er the "ind and life of the wor:ers and deser*es se*ere
conde"nation. %en#nciation of the freedo" sho#ld not )e predicated on
s#ch a slender gro#nd.
The mass demonstration staged b$ the emplo$ees on 0arch C, 14=4
could not have been legall$ en#oined b$ an$ court, for such an in#unction
would be trenching upon the freedom of e%pression of the workers, even if
it legall$ appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. $he respondent o#rt
of Ind#strial %elations in the case at )ar concedes that the "ass
de"onstration was not a declaration of a stri:e /as the sa"e is not rooted
71
in any ind#strial disp#te altho#gh there is a concerted act and the
occ#rrence of a te"porary stoppage of wor:./
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its
employees to participate in the demonstration and that they
suggested to the Cnion that only the first and regular shift from B
/.D. to & #.D. should report for wor< in order that loss or damage to
the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union,
namely the complete unity of the Cnion members as well as their
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the
maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediate
action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with
*urisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police.
irc#lation is one of the aspects of freedo" of e5pression. If
de"onstrators are red#ced )y one9third, then )y that "#ch the circ#lation
of the iss#es raised )y the de"onstration is di"inished. $he "ore the
participants, the "ore persons can )e apprised of the p#rpose of the rally.
Moreo*er, the a)sence of one9third of their "e")ers will )e regarded as a
s#)stantial indication of dis#nity in their ran:s which will ener*ate their
position and a)et contin#ed alleged police persec#tion. At any rate, the
Jnion notified the co"pany two days in ad*ance of their pro-ected
de"onstration and the co"pany co#ld ha*e "ade arrange"ents to
co#nteract or pre*ent whate*er losses it "ight s#stain )y reason of the
a)sence of its wor:ers for one day, especially in this case when the Jnion
re6#ested it to e5c#se only the day9shift e"ployees who will -oin the
de"onstration on March B, 19+9 which re6#est the Jnion reiterated in
their telegra" recei*ed )y the co"pany at 927? in the "orning of March B,
19+9, the day of the "ass de"onstration @pp. B29B4, rec.A. There was a
lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in
re#ecting the re.uest of the !nion for e%cuse from work for the da$ shifts
in order to carr$ out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a gro#nd for
dis"issal the "ass de"onstration held against the 0asig police, not
against the co"pany, is gross *indicti*eness on the part of the e"ployer,
which is as #nchristian as it is #nconstit#tional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice.
1ecause the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all
its employees and wor<ers to *oin the mass demonstration against
alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight '!)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint
on their freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to
petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm committed an
unfair labor practice defined in !ection B@a91A in relation to !ection 4 of
%ep#)lic Act 3o. 877, otherwise :nown as the Ind#strial 0eace Act.
!ection 4 of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 877 g#arantees to the e"ployees the right
/to engage in concerted acti*ities for . . . "#t#al aid or protection/G while
!ection B@a91A regards as an #nfair la)or practice for an e"ployer /to
interfere with, restrain or coerce e"ployees in the e5ercise of their rights
g#aranteed in !ection $hree./
8e repeat that the o)*io#s p#rpose of the "ass de"onstration staged )y
the wor:ers of the respondent fir" on March B, 19+9, was for their "#t#al
aid and protection against alleged police a)#ses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the e"ployees to engage in
s#ch a co""on action to )etter shield the"sel*es against s#ch alleged
police indignities. $he insistence on the part of the respondent fir" that
the wor:ers for the "orning and reg#lar shifts sho#ld not participate in the
"ass de"onstration, #nder pain of dis"issal, was as heretofore stated, /a
potent "eans of inhi)iting speech./
!#ch a concerted action for their "#t#al help and protection, deser*es at
least e6#al protection as the concerted action of e"ployees in gi*ing
p#)licity to a letter co"plaint charging a )an: president with i""orality,
nepotis", fa*oritis" and discri"ination in the appoint"ent and pro"otion
of )an: e"ployees. 8e f#rther r#led in the %ep#)lic !a*ings Ban: case,
s#pra, that for the e"ployees to co"e within the protecti*e "antle of
!ection 4 in relation to !ection B@a91A of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 877, /it is not
necessary that #nion acti*ity )e in*ol*ed or that collecti*e )argaining )e
conte"plated,/ as long as the concerted acti*ity is for the f#rtherance of
their interests.
As stated clearly in the stip#lation of facts e")odied in the 6#estioned
order of respondent o#rt dated !epte")er 17, 19+9, the co"pany,
/while e5pressly ac:nowledging, that the de"onstration is an inaliena)le
right of the Jnion g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion,/ nonetheless
e"phasi&ed that /any de"onstration for that "atter sho#ld not #nd#ly
pre-#dice the nor"al operation of the co"pany/ and /warned the 0BM.'
representati*es that wor:ers who )elong to the first and reg#lar shifts, who
witho#t pre*io#s lea*e of a)sence appro*ed )y the o"pany, partic#larly
the officers present who are the organi&ers of the de"onstration, who
shall fail to report for wor: the following "orning @March B, 19+9A shall )e
dis"issed, )eca#se s#ch fail#re is a *iolation of the e5isting BA and,
therefore, wo#ld )e a"o#nting to an illegal stri:e @GA/ @p. III, petitionerIs
)riefA. !#ch threat of dis"issal tended to coerce the e"ployees fro"
-oining the "ass de"onstration. 1owe*er, the iss#es that the e"ployees
raised against the local police, were "ore i"portant to the" )eca#se they
had the co#rage to proceed with the de"onstration, despite s#ch threat of
dis"issal. $he "ost that co#ld happen to the" was to lose a dayIs wage
)y reason of their a)sence fro" wor: on the day of the de"onstration.
'ne dayIs pay "eans "#ch to a la)orer, "ore especially if he has a fa"ily
to s#pport. Det, they were willing to forego their one9day salary hoping that
their de"onstration wo#ld )ring a)o#t the desired relief fro" police
a)#ses. B#t "anage"ent was ada"ant in ref#sing to recogni&e the
s#perior legiti"acy of their right of free speech, free asse")ly and the
right to petition for redress.
Beca#se the respondent co"pany ostensi)ly did not find it necessary to
de"and fro" the wor:ers proof of the tr#th of the alleged a)#ses inflicted
on the" )y the local police, it there)y concedes that the e*idence of s#ch
a)#ses sho#ld properly )e s#)"itted to the corresponding a#thorities
ha*ing -#risdiction o*er their co"plaint and to who" s#ch co"plaint "ay
)e referred )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines for proper in*estigation and
action with a *iew to disciplining the local police officers in*ol*ed.
'n the other hand, while the respondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations
fo#nd that the de"onstration /paraly&ed to a large e5tent the operations of
the co"plainant co"pany,/ the respondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations
did not "a:e any finding as to the fact of loss act#ally s#stained )y the
fir". $his significant circ#"stance can only "ean that the fir" did not
s#stain any loss or da"age. It did not present e*idence as to whether it
lost e5pected profits for fail#re to co"ply with p#rchase orders on that dayG
or that penalties were e5acted fro" it )y c#sto"ers whose orders co#ld
not )e filled that day of the de"onstrationG or that p#rchase orders were
cancelled )y the c#sto"ers )y reason of its fail#re to deli*er the "aterials
orderedG or that its own e6#ip"ent or "aterials or prod#cts were da"aged
d#e to a)sence of its wor:ers on March B, 19+9. 'n the contrary, the
co"pany sa*ed a si&a)le a"o#nt in the for" of wages for its h#ndreds of
wor:ers, cost of f#el, water and electric cons#"ption that day. !#ch
sa*ings co#ld ha*e a"ply co"pensated for #nreali&ed profits or da"ages
it "ight ha*e s#stained )y reason of the a)sence of its wor:ers for only
one day.
I<
/part from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of
the employees, the dismissal of the eight '!) leaders of the wor<ers
for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being
absent from wor<, constitutes a denial of social *ustice li<ewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. !ection 7
of Article II of the onstit#tion i"poses #pon the !tate /the pro"otion of
social -#stice to ins#re the well9)eing and econo"ic sec#rity of all of the
people,/ which g#arantee is e"phasi&ed )y the other directi*e in !ection +
of Article ;I< of the onstit#tion that /the !tate shall afford protection to
la)or . . ./ %espondent o#rt of Ind#strial %elations as an agency of the
!tate is #nder o)ligation at all ti"es to gi*e "eaning and s#)stance to
these constit#tional g#arantees in fa*or of the wor:ing "anG for otherwise
these constit#tional safeg#ards wo#ld )e "erely a lot of /"eaningless
constit#tional patter./ Jnder the Ind#strial 0eace Act, the o#rt of
Ind#strial %elations is en-oined to effect the policy of the law /to eli"inate
the ca#ses of ind#strial #nrest )y enco#raging and protecting the e5ercise
)y e"ployees of their right to self9organi&ation for the p#rpose of collecti*e
)argaining and for the pro"otion of their "oral, social and econo"ic well9
)eing./ It is "ost #nfort#nate in the case at )ar that respondent o#rt of
Ind#strial %elations, the *ery go*ern"ental agency designed therefor,
failed to i"ple"ent this policy and failed to :eep faith with its a*owed
"ission its raison dIetre as ordained and directed )y the onstit#tion.
;t has been li<ewise established that a violation of a constitutional
right divests the court of *urisdictionJ and as a consequence its
*udgment is null and void and confers no rights. %elief fro" a cri"inal
con*iction sec#red at the sacrifice of constit#tional li)erties, "ay )e
o)tained thro#gh ha)eas corp#s proceedings e*en long after the finality of
the -#dg"ent. $h#s, ha)eas corp#s is the re"edy to o)tain the release of
an indi*id#al, who is con*icted )y final -#dg"ent thro#gh a forced
confession, which *iolated his constit#tional right against self9
incri"inationG or who is denied the right to present e*idence in his defense
as a depri*ation of his li)erty witho#t d#e process of law, e*en after the
acc#sed has already ser*ed sentence for twenty9two years.
Both the respondents o#rt of Ind#strial %elations and pri*ate fir"
trenched #pon these constit#tional i""#nities of petitioners. Both failed to
accord preference to s#ch rights and aggra*ated the inh#"anity to which
the aggrie*ed wor:ers clai"ed they had )een s#)-ected )y the "#nicipal
police. 1a*ing *iolated these )asic h#"an rights of the la)orers, the
,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations ousted itself of *urisdiction and the
questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
%ecognition and protection of s#ch freedo"s are i"perati*e on all p#)lic
offices incl#ding the co#rts
28
as well as pri*ate citi&ens and corporations,
the e5ercise and en-oy"ent of which "#st not )e n#llified )y "ere
proced#ral r#le pro"#lgated )y the o#rt Ind#strial %elations e5ercising a
p#rely delegate legislati*e power, when e*en a law enacted )y ongress
"#st yield to the #ntra""elled en-oy"ent of these h#"an rights. There is
no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to en*oy them
is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one
article or the staging of one demonstration. ;t is a continuing
immunity to be invo<ed and exercised when exigent and expedient
whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced,
inhumanities to be condemned. Atherwise these guarantees in the
1ill of .ights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. /nd in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the
latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an
72
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and eal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with
which to pay for competent legal services.
<I.
Does the "ere fact that the "otion for reconsideration was filed two @2A
days late defeat the rights of the petitioning e"ployeesC 'r "ore directly
and concretely, does the inad*ertent o"ission to co"ply with a "ere
o#rt of Ind#strial %elations proced#ral r#le go*erning the period for filing
a "otion for reconsideration or appeal in la)or cases, pro"#lgated
p#rs#ant to a legislati*e delegation, pre*ail o*er constit#tional rightsC $he
answer sho#ld )e o)*io#s in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord
supremacy to the foregoing rules of the ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations
over basic human rights sheltered by the ,onstitution, is not only
incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that
the ,onstitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and
regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The
dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the
aforesaid ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations procedural rule of necessity
should be affirmed. Such a ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations rule as
applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen
the constitutional rights affected,F but instead constrict the same to
the point of nullifying the en*oyment thereof by the petitioning
employees. Said ,ourt of ;ndustrial .elations rule, promulgated as it
was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the ,onstitution and the
law. / period of five '5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved wor<ers,
who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the o#rt of Appeals and the !#pre"e
o#rt, a period of fifteen @17A days has )een fi5ed for the filing of the
"otion for re hearing or reconsideration @!ee. 1?, %#le 71G !ec. 1, %#le
72G !ec. 1, %#le 7+, %e*ised %#les of o#rtA. $he delay in the filing of the
"otion for reconsideration co#ld ha*e )een only one day if !epte")er 28,
19+9 was not a !#nday. $his fact accent#ates the #nreasona)leness of
the o#rt of Ind#strial are concerned.
It is a proced#ral r#le that generally all ca#ses of action and defenses
presently a*aila)le "#st )e specifically raised in the co"plaint or answerG
so that any ca#se of action or defense not raised in s#ch pleadings, is
dee"ed wai*ed. 1owe*er, a constit#tional iss#e can )e raised any ti"e,
e*en for the first ti"e on appeal, if it appears that the deter"ination of the
constit#tional iss#e is necessary to a decision of the case, the *ery lis
mota of the case witho#t the resol#tion of which no final and co"plete
deter"ination of the disp#te can )e "ade. It is th#s seen that a
proced#ral r#le of ongress or of the !#pre"e o#rt gi*es way to a
constit#tional right. In the instant case, the proced#ral r#le of the o#rt of
Ind#strial %elations, a creat#re of ongress, "#st li:ewise yield to the
constit#tional rights in*o:ed )y herein petitioners e*en )efore the
instit#tion of the #nfair la)or practice charged against the" and in their
defense to the said charge.
&':', >(. E2D90'
G.R. N+. 1%9838, AE29. 25, 200%, AF/1,', !.
F'/0(" 0etitioners allege that they are citi&ens and ta5payers of the
0hilippines and that their rights as organi&ations and indi*id#als were
*iolated when the rally they participated in on 'cto)er +, 2??7 was
*iolently dispersed )y police"en i"ple"enting Batas 0a")ansa @B.0.A
3o. 88?. Malacanang also iss#ed a policy deno"inated as =ali)rated
0re9e"pti*e %esponse> @0%A on all rallies. !aid =0% 0olicy> pro*ides,
a"ong others2
The rule of calibrated preemptive
response is now in force, in lieu of maximum
tolerance. The authorities will not stand
aside while those with ill intent are herding a
witting or unwitting mass of people and
inciting them into actions that are inimical to
public order, and the peace of mind of the
national community.
Cnlawful mass actions will be
dispersed. The ma*ority of law:abiding
citiens have the right to be protected by a
vigilant and proactive government.
We appeal to the detractors of the
government to engage in lawful and peaceful
conduct befitting of a democratic society.
The$ assail 1atas #ambansa 2o. !!3 as well as the polic$ of
=,alibrated #reemptive .esponse- or C6/ and seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the -no permit, no rally- policy and the ,#.
policy recentl$ announced.
6etitioners contend that 9atas 6ambansa Fo. 880 is clearl$
a violation of the Constitution and the International o*enant on i*il and
0olitical %ights and other h#"an rights treaties of which the 0hilippines is
a signatory. The$ argue that 9.6. Fo. 880 re.uires a permit before one
can stage a public assembl$ regardless of the presence or absence of a
clear and present danger. It also c#rtails the choice of *en#e and is th#s
rep#gnant to the freedo" of e5pression cla#se as the ti"e and place of a
p#)lic asse")ly for" part of the "essage for which the e5pression is
so#ght. (#rther"ore, it is not content9ne#tral as it does not apply to "ass
actions in s#pport of the go*ern"ent. $he words /lawf#l ca#se,/ /opinion,/
/protesting or infl#encing/ s#ggest the e5position of so"e ca#se not
espo#sed )y the go*ern"ent. Also, the phrase /"a5i"#" tolerance/
shows that the law applies to asse")lies against the go*ern"ent )eca#se
they are )eing tolerated. As a content9)ased legislation, it cannot pass the
strict scrutin$ test.
%espondentKs arg#e2
1. 0etitioners ha*e no standing )eca#se they ha*e not
presented e*idence that they had )een =in-#red, arrested or
detained )eca#se of the 0%,> and that =those arrested
stand to )e charged with *iolating Batas 0a")ansa O3o.P
88? and other offenses.>
2. 3either B.0. 3o. 88? nor 0% is *oid on its face.
0etitioners cannot honestly clai" that the ti"e, place and
"anner reg#lation e")odied in B.0. 3o. 88? *iolates the
three9pronged test for s#ch a "eas#re, to wit2 @aA B.0. 3o.
88? is content9ne#tral, i.e., it has no reference to content of
reg#lated speechG @)A B.0. 3o. 88? is narrowly tailored to
ser*e a significant go*ern"ental interest, i.e., the interest
cannot )e e6#ally well ser*ed )y a "eans that is less
intr#si*e of free speech interestsG and @cA B.0. 3o. 88?
lea*es open alternati*e channels for co""#nication of the
infor"ation.
3. B.0. 3o. 88? is content9ne#tral as seen fro" the te5t of the
law. !ection 7 re6#ires the state"ent of the p#)lic
asse")lyKs ti"e, place and "anner of cond#ct. It entails
traffic re9ro#ting to pre*ent gra*e p#)lic incon*enience and
serio#s or #nd#e interference in the free flow of co""erce
and trade. (#rther"ore, nothing in B.0. 3o. 88? a#thori&es
the denial of a per"it on the )asis of a rallyKs progra"
content or the state"ents of the spea:ers therein, e5cept
#nder the constit#tional precept of the =clear and present
danger test.> $he stat#s of B.0. 3o. 88? as a content9
ne#tral reg#lation has )een recogni&ed in 's"eNa *.
o"elec.
4. Adiong *. o"elec held that B.0. 3o. 88? is a content9
ne#tral reg#lation of the ti"e, place and "anner of holding
p#)lic asse")lies and the law passes the test for s#ch
reg#lation, na"ely, these reg#lations need only a s#)stantial
go*ern"ental interest to s#pport the".
7. !angalang *. Inter"ediate Appellate o#rtO9P held that a
local chief e5ec#ti*e has the a#thority to e5ercise police
power to "eet =the de"ands of the co""on good in ter"s
of traffic decongestion and p#)lic con*enience.>
(#rther"ore, the discretion gi*en to the "ayor is narrowly
circ#"scri)ed )y !ections 7 @dA, and + @aA, @)A, @cA, @dA, @eA,
14 and 17 of the law.
6. $he standards set forth in the law are not inconsistent.
=lear and con*incing e*idence that the p#)lic asse")ly will
create a clear and present danger to p#)lic order, p#)lic
safety, p#)lic con*enience, p#)lic "orals or p#)lic health>
and =i""inent and gra*e danger of a s#)stanti*e e*il> )oth
e5press the "eaning of the =clear and present danger test.>
7. 0% is si"ply the responsi)le and -#dicio#s #se of "eans
allowed )y e5isting laws and ordinances to protect p#)lic
interest and restore p#)lic order. $h#s, it is not acc#rate to
call it a new r#le )#t rather it is a "ore pro9acti*e and
dyna"ic enforce"ent of e5isting laws, reg#lations and
ordinances to pre*ent chaos in the streets. It does not
replace the r#le of "a5i"#" tolerance in B.0. 3o. 88?.
%espondent Mayor Hoselito Atien&a, for his part, s#)"itted in his
o""ent that the petition in ,.%. 3o. 1+9848 sho#ld )e dis"issed on the
gro#nd that %ep#)lic /ct 2o. 4%B3 gives the Dayor power to deny a
permit independently of 1.#. 2o. !!3J that his denials of permits
were under the =clear and present danger0 rule as there was a
clamor to stop rallies that disrupt the economy and to protect the
lives of other peopleJ that 8. 1. L. .eyes v. 1agatsing,G%%I #rimicias
v. >ugoso,G%&I and 8acinto v. ,/,G%$I have affirmed the
constitutionality of requiring a permitJ that the permit is for the use
of a public place and not for the exercise of rightsJ and that 1.#. 2o.
!!3 is not a content:based regulation because it covers all rallies.
$he petitions were ordered consolidated on (e)r#ary 1B, 2??+. After the
s#)"ission of all the o""ents, the o#rt set the cases for oral
arg#"ents on April B, 2??+,O1BP stating the principal iss#es, as follows2
73
I((1)("
1. 'n the constit#tionality of Batas 0a")ansa 3o. 88?, specifically
!ections B, 7, +, 12 14@aA and 1B@aA thereof, and %ep#)lic Act 3o. 71+?2
@aA Are these content9ne#tral or content9)ased reg#lationsC
@)A Are they *oid on gro#nds of o*er)readth or *ag#enessC
@cA Do they constit#te prior restraintC
@dA Are they #nd#e delegations of powers to MayorsC
@eA Do they *iolate international h#"an rights treaties and the Jni*ersal
Declaration of 1#"an %ightsC
2. 'n the constit#tionality and legality of the policy of ali)rated
0ree"pti*e %esponse @0%A2
@aA Is the policy *oid on its face or d#e to *ag#enessC
@)A Is it *oid for lac: of p#)licationC
@cA Is the policy of 0% *oid as applied to the rallies of !epte")er 2+ and
'cto)er B, 7 and +, 2??7C
H).*"
P)0909+,)2(K (0',*9,A /',,+0 8) ()29+1(.: /;'..),A)*. Their right as
citiEens to engage in peaceful assembl$ and e%ercise the right of petition,
as guaranteed b$ the Constitution, is directl$ affected b$ 9.6. Fo. 880
which re.uires a permit for all who would publicl$ assemble in the nationBs
streets and parks. $hey ha*e, in fact, p#rposely engaged in p#)lic
asse")lies witho#t the re6#ired per"its to press their clai" that no s#ch
per"it can )e *alidly re6#ired witho#t *iolating the onstit#tional
g#arantee. %espondents, on the other hand, ha*e challenged s#ch action
as contrary to law and dispersed the p#)lic asse")lies held witho#t the
per"it.
I. &.P. 880 IS
CONSTITUTIONAL
$he first point to "ar: is that the right to peacea)ly asse")le and petition
for redress of grie*ances is, together with freedo" of speech, of
e5pression, and of the press, a right that en-oys pri"acy in the real" of
constit#tional protection. (or these rights constit#te the *ery )asis of a
f#nctional de"ocratic polity, witho#t which all the other rights wo#ld )e
"eaningless and #nprotected. As stated in Hacinto *. A, the o#rt, as
early as the onset of this cent#ry, in J.!. *. Ap#rado, already #pheld the
right to asse")ly and petition, as follows2
There is no question as to the petitioners? rights to peaceful
assembly to petition the government for a redress of grievances and,
for that matter, to organie or form associations for purposes not
contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted activities.
These rights are guaranteed by no less than the ,onstitution,
partic#larly !ections B and 8 of the Bill of %ights, !ection 2@7A of Article I;,
and !ection 4 of Article ;III. H#rispr#dence a)o#nds with hallowed
prono#nce"ents defending and pro"oting the peopleKs e5ercise of these
rights. As early as the onset of this cent#ry, this o#rt in J.!. *s.
Ap#rado, already #pheld the right to asse")ly and petition and e*en went
as far as to ac:nowledge2
= ;t is rather to be expected that more or less
disorder will mar< the public assembly of the people
to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is
always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and
the greater, the grievance and the more intense the
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. 1ut if the prosecution be
permitted to seie upon every instance of such
disorderly conduct by individual members of a
crowd as an excuse to characterie the assembly as
a seditious and tumultuous rising against the
authorities, then the right to assemble and to
petition for redress of grievances would expose all
those who too< part therein to the severest and
most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which
they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing
to the prosecuting authorities. ;f instances of
disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the
guilty individuals should be sought out and
punished therefor, but the utmost discretion must
be exercised in drawing the line between disorderly
and seditious conduct and between an essentially
peaceable assembly and a tumultuous uprising.0
Again, in 0ri"icias *. (#goso, the ,ourt li<ewise sustained the primacy
of freedom of speech and to assembly and petition over comfort and
convenience in the use of streets and par<s.
3e5t, howe*er, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. In 0ri"icias, this o#rt said2
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the
people recognied and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. 1ut it is a
settled principle growing out of the nature of well:
ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights
is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall
not be in*urious to the equal en*oyment of others
having equal rights, nor in*urious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign =police power,0 which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people. $his so*ereign police
power is e5ercised )y the go*ern"ent thro#gh its
legislati*e )ranch )y the enact"ent of laws reg#lating
those and other constit#tional and ci*il rights, and it "ay
)e delegated to political s#)di*isions, s#ch as towns,
"#nicipalities and cities )y a#thori&ing their legislati*e
)odies called "#nicipal and city co#ncils enact ordinances
for p#rpose.
1. It is th#s clear that the o#rt is called #pon to protect the e5ercise
of the cognate rights to free speech and peacef#l asse")ly, arising fro"
the denial of a per"it. $he onstit#tion is 6#ite e5plicit2 =3o law shall )e
passed a)ridging the freedo" of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peacea)ly to asse")le and petition the ,o*ern"ent for redress of
grie*ances.> (ree speech, li:e free press, "ay )e identified with the
li)erty to disc#ss p#)licly and tr#thf#lly any "atter of p#)lic concern
witho#t censorship or p#nish"ent. $here is to )e then no pre*io#s
restraint on the co""#nication of *iews or s#)se6#ent lia)ility whether in
li)el s#its, prosec#tion for sedition, or action for da"ages, or conte"pt
proceedings #nless there )e a =clear and present danger of a s#)stanti*e
e*il that Othe !tateP has a right to pre*ent.> >reedom of assembly
connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation
and discussion of matters of public concern. ;t is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and respect. ;t is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom
of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that the state has a right to prevent. .*en prior to the 1947
onstit#tion, H#stice Malcol" had occasion to stress that it is a necessary
conse6#ence of o#r rep#)lican instit#tions and co"ple"ents the right of
free speech. $o paraphrase the opinion of H#stice %#tledge, spea:ing for
the "a-ority of the A"erican !#pre"e o#rt in $ho"as *. ollins, it was
not )y accident or coincidence that the rights to freedo" of speech and of
the press were co#pled in a single g#arantee with the right of the people
peacea)ly to asse")le and to petition the go*ern"ent for redress of
grie*ances. All these rights, while not identical, are insepara)le. In e*ery
case, therefore, where there is a li"itation placed on the e5ercise of this
right, the -#diciary is called #pon to e5a"ine the effects of the challenged
go*ern"ental act#ation. $he sole -#stification for a li"itation on the
e5ercise of this right, so f#nda"ental to the "aintenance of de"ocratic
instit#tions, is the danger, of a character )oth gra*e and i""inent, of a
serio#s e*il to p#)lic safety, p#)lic "orals, p#)lic health, or any other
legiti"ate p#)lic interest.
2. 3owhere is the rationale that #nderlies the freedo" of
e5pression and peacea)le asse")ly )etter e5pressed than in this e5cerpt
fro" an opinion of H#stice (ran:f#rter2 =It "#st ne*er )e forgotten,
howe*er, that the Bill of %ights was the child of the .nlighten"ent. Bac:
of the g#aranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to reason
)y all the peacef#l "eans for gaining access to the "ind. It was in order
to a*ert force and e5plosions d#e to restrictions #pon rational "odes of
co""#nication that the g#aranty of free speech was gi*en a genero#s
scope. B#t #tterance in a conte5t of *iolence can lose its significance as
an appeal to reason and )eco"e part of an instr#"ent of force. !#ch
#tterance was not "eant to )e sheltered )y the onstit#tion.> 8hat was
rightf#lly stressed is the a)andon"ent of reason, the #tterance, whether
*er)al or printed, )eing in a conte5t of *iolence. It "#st always )e
re"e")ered that this right li:ewise pro*ides for a safety *al*e, allowing
parties the opport#nity to gi*e *ent to their *iews, e*en if contrary to the
pre*ailing cli"ate of opinion. (or if the peacef#l "eans of co""#nication
cannot )e a*ailed of, resort to non9peacef#l "eans "ay )e the only
alternati*e. 3or is this the sole reason for the e5pression of dissent. It
"eans "ore than -#st the right to )e heard of the person who feels
aggrie*ed or who is dissatisfied with things as they are. Its *al#e "ay lie
in the fact that there "ay )e so"ething worth hearing fro" the dissenter.
That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well7
defined limits. -hat is guaranteed is peaceable assembl$. Kne ma$ not
advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion
under the cloak of dissent. $he onstit#tion frowns on disorder or t#"#lt
attending a rally or asse")ly. %esort to force is r#led o#t and o#t)rea:s
of *iolence to )e a*oided. $he #t"ost cal" tho#gh is not re6#ired. As
pointed o#t in an early 0hilippine case, penned in 19?7 to )e precise,
Jnited !tates *. Ap#rado2 =It is rather to )e e5pected that "ore or less
disorder will "ar: the p#)lic asse")ly of the people to protest against
grie*ances whether real or i"aginary, )eca#se on s#ch occasions feeling
is always wro#ght to a high pitch of e5cite"ent, and the greater the
grie*ance and the "ore intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a r#le, will
)e the disciplinary control of the leaders o*er their irresponsi)le followers.>
74
It )ears repeating that for the constit#tional right to )e in*o:ed, rioto#s
cond#ct, in-#ry to property, and acts of *andalis" "#st )e a*oided. $o
gi*e free rein to oneKs destr#cti*e #rges is to call for conde"nation. It is to
"a:e a "oc:ery of the high estate occ#pied )y intellect#al li)erty in o#r
sche"e of *al#es.
There can be no legal ob*ection, absent the existence of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. $he 0hilippines
is co""itted to the *iew e5pressed in the pl#rality opinion, of 1949 *intage
of, H#stice %o)erts in 1ag#e *. I'2 =8hene*er the title of streets and
par:s "ay rest, they ha*e i""e"orially )een held in tr#st for the #se of
the p#)lic and, ti"e o#t of "ind, ha*e )een #sed for p#rposes of
asse")ly, co""#nicating tho#ghts )etween citi&ens, and disc#ssing
p#)lic 6#estions. !#ch #se of the streets and p#)lic places has, fro"
ancient ti"es, )een a part of the pri*ileges, i""#nities, rights and li)erties
of citi&ens. $he pri*ilege of a citi&en of the Jnited !tates to #se the
streets and par:s for co""#nication of *iews on national 6#estions "ay
)e reg#lated in the interest of allG it is not a)sol#te, )#t relati*e, and "#st
)e e5ercised in s#)ordination to the general co"fort and con*enience,
and in consonance with peace and good orderG )#t "#st not, in the g#ise
of respondents, )e a)ridged or denied.> $he a)o*e e5cerpt was 6#oted
with appro*al in 0ri"icias *. (#goso. 0ri"icias "ade e5plicit what was
i"plicit in M#nicipality of a*ite *. %o-as, a 1917 decision, where this
o#rt categorically affir"ed that pla&as or par:s and streets are o#tside
the co""erce of "an and th#s n#llified a contract that leased 0la&a
!oledad of plaintiff9"#nicipality. %eference was "ade to s#ch pla&a
=)eing a pro"enade for p#)lic #se,> which certainly is not the only p#rpose
that it co#ld ser*e. To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a
permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally
starting from a public par< that is the Luneta.
B. 2either can there be any valid ob*ection to the use of the
streets to the gates of the CS embassy, hardly two bloc<s away at
the .oxas 1oulevard. #rimicias v. >ugoso has resolved any lur<ing
doubt on the matter. ;n holding that the then Dayor >ugoso of the
,ity of Danila should grant a permit for a public meeting at #laa
Diranda in Euiapo, this ,ourt categorically declared+ ='#r concl#sion
finds s#pport in the decision in the case of 8illis o5 *. !tate of 3ew
1a"pshire, 412 J.!., 7+9. In that case, the stat#te of 3ew 1a"pshire
0.L. chap. 1B7, section 2, pro*iding that no parade or procession #pon
any gro#nd a)#tting thereon, shall )e per"itted #nless a special license
therefor shall first )e o)tained fro" the select"en of the town or fro"
licensing co""ittee,K was constr#ed )y the !#pre"e o#rt of 3ew
1a"pshire as not conferring #pon the licensing )oard #nfettered
discretion to ref#se to grant the license, and held *alid. And the !#pre"e
o#rt of the Jnited !tates, in its decision @19B1A penned )y hief H#stice
1#ghes affir"ing the -#dg"ent of the !tate !#pre"e o#rt, held that Sa
stat#te re6#iring persons #sing the p#)lic streets for a parade or
procession to proc#re a special license therefor fro" the local a#thorities
is not an #nconstit#tional a)ridg"ent of the rights of asse")ly or of
freedo" of speech and press, where, as the stat#te is constr#ed )y the
state co#rts, the licensing a#thorities are strictly li"ited, in the iss#ance of
licenses, to a consideration of the ti"e, place, and "anner of the parade
or procession, with a *iew to conser*ing the p#)lic con*enience and of
affording an opport#nity to pro*ide proper policing, and are not in*ested
with ar)itrary discretion to iss#e or ref#se license, W W W. =3or sho#ld the
point "ade )y hief H#stice 1#ghes in a s#)se6#ent portion of the opinion
)e ignored2 =i*il li)erties, as g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion, i"ply the
e5istence of an organi&ed society "aintaining p#)lic order witho#t which
li)erty itself wo#ld )e lost in the e5cesses of #nrestricted a)#ses. $he
a#thority of a "#nicipality to i"pose reg#lations in order to ass#re the
safety and con*enience of the people in the #se of p#)lic highways has
ne*er )een regarded as inconsistent with ci*il li)erties )#t rather as one of
the "eans of safeg#arding the good order #pon which they #lti"ately
depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most
familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a
restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to
promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be
disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in
other circumstances would be entitled to protection.0
5 5 5

+. 5 5 5 $he principle #nder A"erican doctrines was gi*en
#tterance )y hief H#stice 1#ghes in these words2 =$he 6#estion, if the
rights of free speech and peacea)le asse")ly are to )e preser*ed, is not
as to the a#spices #nder which the "eeting is held )#t as to its p#rposeG
not as to the relations of the spea:ers, )#t whether their #tterances
transcend the )o#nds of the freedo" of speech which the onstit#tion
protects.> $here co#ld )e danger to p#)lic peace and safety if s#ch a
gathering were "ar:ed )y t#r)#lence. $hat wo#ld depri*e it of its
peacef#l character. It is tr#e that the licensing official, here respondent
Mayor, is not de*oid of discretion in deter"ining whether or not a per"it
wo#ld )e granted. It is not, howe*er, #nfettered discretion. 8hile
pr#dence re6#ires that there )e a realistic appraisal not of what "ay
possi)ly occ#r )#t of what "ay pro)a)ly occ#r, gi*en all the rele*ant
circ#"stances, still the ass#"ption [ especially so where the asse")ly is
sched#led for a specific p#)lic place [ is that the per"it "#st )e for the
asse")ly )eing held there. $he e5ercise of s#ch a right, in the lang#age
of H#stice %o)erts, spea:ing for the A"erican !#pre"e o#rt, is not to )e
=a)ridged on the plea that it "ay )e e5ercised in so"e other place.>
5 5 5
8. 1y way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date,
the public place where and the time when it will ta<e place. ;f it were
a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to
its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise
whether there may be valid ob*ections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. ;t is an indispensable condition
to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test
be the standard for the decision reached. ;f he is of the view that
there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
the proper *udicial authority . >ree speech and peaceable assembly,
along with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ran<ed in our
scheme of constitutional values. ;t cannot be too strongly stressed
that on the *udiciary, :: even more so than on the other departments
V rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for
and deference to such preferred rights. 2o verbal formula, no
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with what has been so
felicitiously termed by 8ustice Holmes =as the sovereign prerogative
of *udgment.0 2onetheless, the presumption must be to incline the
weight of the scales of *ustice on the side of such rights, en*oying as
they do precedence and primacy. 5 5 5.
B.0. 3o. 88? was enacted after this o#rt rendered its decision in
%eyes.
$he pro*isions of B.0. 3o. 88? practically codify the r#ling in %eyes2
;t is very clear, therefore, that 1.#. 2o. !!3 is 2AT /2
/1SALCT6 1/2 A> #C1L;, /SS6D1L;6S 1CT / .6ST.;,T;A2
TH/T S;D#L@ .69CL/T6S TH6 T;D6, #L/,6 /27 D/226. A>
TH6 /SS6D1L;6S. This was adverted to in AsmeSa v. ,omelec,G&3I
where the ,ourt referred to it as a =content:neutral0 regulation of the
time, place, and manner of holding public assemblies
A fair and i"partial reading of B.0. 3o. 88? th#s readily shows that
it refers to all :inds of p#)lic asse")liesO22P that wo#ld #se p#)lic places.
$he reference to =lawf#l ca#se> does not "a:e it content9)ased )eca#se
asse")lies really ha*e to )e for lawf#l ca#ses, otherwise they wo#ld not
)e =peacea)le> and entitled to protection. 3either are the words =opinion,>
=protesting> and =infl#encing> in the definition of p#)lic asse")ly content
)ased, since they can refer to any s#)-ect. $he words =petitioning the
go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances> co"e fro" the wording of the
onstit#tion, so its #se cannot )e a*oided. (inally, "a5i"#" tolerance is
for the protection and )enefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
content of the e5pressions in the rally.
(#rther"ore, TH6 #6.D;T can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. $his is a recogni&ed
e5ception to the e5ercise of the right e*en #nder 0;) U,9>)2('.
D)/.'2'09+, +< H1D', R9A;0( ',* 0;) I,0)2,'09+,'. C+>),',0 +, C9>9.
',* P+.909/'. R9A;0(. Jni*ersal Declaration of 1#"an %ights
Article 2?
1. .*eryone has the right to freedo" of peacef#l
asse")ly and association.
5 5 5
Article 29
1. .*eryone has d#ties to the co""#nity in which alone
the free and f#ll de*elop"ent of his personality is possi)le.
2. In the e5ercise of his rights and freedo"s, e*eryone
shall )e s#)-ect only to s#ch li"itations as are deter"ined )y
law solely for the p#rpose of sec#ring d#e recognition and
respect for the rights and freedo"s of others and of "eeting
the -#st re6#ire"ents of "orality, p#)lic order and the general
welfare in a de"ocratic society.
4. $hese rights and freedo"s "ay in no case )e
e5ercised contrary to the p#rposes and principles of the Jnited
3ations.
$he International o*enant on i*il and 0olitical %ights
Article 19.
1. .*eryone shall ha*e the right to hold opinions witho#t
interference.
2. .*eryone shall ha*e the right to freedo" of
e5pressionG this right shall incl#de freedo" to see:, recei*e
and i"part infor"ation and ideas of all :inds, regardless of
75
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the for" of art, or
thro#gh any other "edia of his choice.
4. $he e5ercise of the rights pro*ided for in
paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special d#ties and
responsi)ilities. It "ay therefore )e s#)-ect to certain
restrictions, )#t these shall only )e s#ch as are pro*ided )y
law and are necessary2
@aA (or respect of the rights or rep#tations of othersG
@)A (or the protection of national sec#rity or of p#)lic
order @ordre p#)licA, or of p#)lic health or "orals.
C+,02'2: 0+ E)0909+,)2K( /.'9D, THE LA= IS VER- CLEAR ',* 9(
nowhere vague in its provisions. OP18.9/P *+)( ,+0 ;'>) 0+ 8)
*)<9,)*. I0( +2*9,'2: D)',9,A 9( @)..G,+@,. 8e)sterKs Dictionary
defines it, th#s2
p#)lic, n, 5 5 5 2a2 an organi&ed )ody of people 5
5 5 42 a gro#p of people disting#ished )y
co""on interests or characteristics 5 5 5.
Fot ever$ e%pression of opinion is a public assembl$. The law
refers to 2rall$, demonstration, march, parade, procession or an$ other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place.3 "o it does not
cover an$ and all kinds of gatherings.
2either is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the
right to peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to
avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils ,ongress
has the right to prevent.
$here is, li:ewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is
not relevant to the regulation.
/s to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a
precise and sufficient standard V the clear and present danger test
stated in Sec. B'a). The reference to 2imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil3 in "ec. =+c, substantiall$ means the same thing and is
not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent 0a$or has the
same power independentl$ under /epublic Act Fo. 51=0:2C< is thus not
necessar$ to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued b$ the
parties in their arguments.
>inally, for those who cannot wait, Section %5 of the law provides for
an alternative forum through the creation of freedom par<s where no
prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any
time+
!ec. 17. (reedo" par:s. [ .*ery city and
"#nicipality in the co#ntry shall within si5
"onths after the effecti*ity of this Act
esta)lish or designate at least one s#ita)le
=freedo" par:> or "all in their respecti*e
-#risdictions which, as far as practica)le,
shall )e centrally located within the
po)lacion where de"onstrations and
"eetings "ay )e held at any ti"e witho#t
the need of any prior per"it.
In the cities and "#nicipalities of
Metropolitan Manila, the respecti*e "ayors
shall esta)lish the freedo" par:s within the
period of si5 "onths fro" the effecti*ity this
Act.
$his )rings #p the point, howe*er, of co"pliance with this pro*ision.
$he !olicitor ,eneral stated d#ring the oral arg#"ents that, to his
:nowledge, only e)# ity has declared a freedo" par: [ (#ente
's"eNa.
$hat of Manila, the !#n:en ,ardens, has since )een con*erted into a golf
co#rse, he added.
;f this is so, the degree of observance of 1.#. 2o. !!3?s mandate that
every city and municipality set aside a freedom par< within six
months from its effectivity in %(!5, or &3 years ago, would be
pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have been ta<en for
granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the peaceful
revolution of %(!B.

,onsidering that the existence of such freedom par<s is an essential
part of the law?s system of regulation of the people?s exercise of
their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the ,ourt is
constrained to rule that after thirty '$3) days from the finality of this
7ecision, no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such
right in any public par< or plaa of a city or municipality until that
city or municipality shall have complied with Section %5 of the law.
>or without such alternative forum, to deny the permit would in
effect be to deny the right. =/dvance notices0 should, however, be
given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and orderly
proceedings.
II. THE CPR IS NULL #
VOID
$he o#rt now co"es to the "atter of the 0%. As stated earlier, the
!olicitor ,eneral has conceded that the #se of the ter" sho#ld now )e
discontin#ed, since it does not "ean anything other than the "a5i"#"
tolerance policy set forth in B.0. 3o. 88?. $his is stated in the Affida*it of
respondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary .d#ardo .r"ita, s#)"itted )y the
!olicitor ,eneral, th#s2
/t any rate, the ,ourt rules that in view of the maximum
tolerance mandated by 1.#. 2o. !!3, ,#. serves no valid purpose if
it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it
means something else. /ccordingly, what is to be followed is and
should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum
tolerance, which specifically means the following+
!ec. 4. Definition of ter"s. [ (or p#rposes of this Act2
5 5 5
@cA =Ma5i"#" tolerance> "eans the
highest degree of restraint that the "ilitary, police and
other peace :eeping a#thorities shall o)ser*e d#ring
a p#)lic asse")ly or in the dispersal of the sa"e.
5 5 5
!ec. 9. 3on9interference )y law enforce"ent
a#thorities. [ Law enforce"ent agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a p#)lic asse")ly.
1owe*er, to ade6#ately ens#re p#)lic safety, a law
enforce"ent contingent #nder the co""and of a
responsi)le police officer "ay )e detailed and
stationed in a place at least one h#ndred @1??A "eters
away fro" the area of acti*ity ready to "aintain peace
and order at all ti"es.
!ec. 1?. 0olice assistance when re6#ested. [ It shall
)e i"perati*e for law enforce"ent agencies, when
their assistance is re6#ested )y the leaders or
organi&ers, to perfor" their d#ties always "indf#l that
their responsi)ility to pro*ide proper protection to
those e5ercising their right peacea)ly to asse")le
and the freedo" of e5pression is pri"ordial. $owards
this end, law enforce"ent agencies shall o)ser*e the
following g#idelines2
@aA Me")ers of the law enforce"ent contingent
who deal with the de"onstrators shall )e in co"plete
#nifor" with their na"eplates and #nits to which they
)elong displayed pro"inently on the front and dorsal
parts of their #nifor" and "#st o)ser*e the policy of
="a5i"#" tolerance> as herein definedG
@)A $he "e")ers of the law enforce"ent
contingent shall not carry any :ind of firear"s )#t "ay
)e e6#ipped with )aton or riot stic:s, shields, crash
hel"ets with *isor, gas "as:s, )oots or an:le high
shoes with shin g#ardsG
@cA $ear gas, s"o:e grenades, water cannons, or
any si"ilar anti9riot de*ice shall not )e #sed #nless
the p#)lic asse")ly is attended )y act#al *iolence or
serio#s threats of *iolence, or deli)erate destr#ction
of property.
!ec. 11. Dispersal of p#)lic asse")ly with per"it. [
3o p#)lic asse")ly with a per"it shall )e dispersed.
1owe*er, when an asse")ly )eco"es *iolent, the
police "ay disperse s#ch p#)lic asse")ly as follows2
@aA At the first sign of i"pending *iolence, the
ran:ing officer of the law enforce"ent contingent shall
call the attention of the leaders of the p#)lic asse")ly
and as: the latter to pre*ent any possi)le dist#r)anceG
@)A If act#al *iolence starts to a point where
roc:s or other har"f#l o)-ects fro" the participants
are thrown at the police or at the non9participants, or
at any property ca#sing da"age to s#ch property, the
ran:ing officer of the law enforce"ent contingent shall
a#di)ly warn the participants that if the dist#r)ance
persists, the p#)lic asse")ly will )e dispersedG
@cA If the *iolence or dist#r)ance pre*ailing as
stated in the preceding s#)paragraph sho#ld not stop
or a)ate, the ran:ing officer of the law enforce"ent
contingent shall a#di)ly iss#e a warning to the
participants of the p#)lic asse")ly, and after allowing
76
a reasona)le period of ti"e to lapse, shall
i""ediately order it to forthwith disperseG
@dA 3o arrest of any leader, organi&er or
participant shall also )e "ade d#ring the p#)lic
asse")ly #nless he *iolates d#ring the asse")ly a
law, stat#te, ordinance or any pro*ision of this Act.
!#ch arrest shall )e go*erned )y Article 127 of the
%e*ised 0enal ode, as a"endedG
@dA Isolated acts or incidents of disorder or
)reach of the peace d#ring the p#)lic asse")ly "ay
)e peacef#lly dispersed.
5 5 5
!ec. 12. Dispersal of p#)lic asse")ly witho#t per"it.
[ 8hen the p#)lic asse")ly is held witho#t a per"it
where a per"it is re6#ired, the said p#)lic asse")ly
"ay )e peacef#lly dispersed.
!ec. 14. 0rohi)ited acts. [ $he following shall
constit#te *iolations of the Act2
@eA ')str#cting, i"peding, disr#pting or
otherwise denying the e5ercise of the right to peacef#l
asse")lyG
@fA $he #nnecessary firing of firear"s )y a
"e")er of any law enforce"ent agency or any
person to disperse the p#)lic asse")lyG
@gA Acts descri)ed here#nder if co""itted within
one h#ndred @1??A "eters fro" the area of acti*ity of
the p#)lic asse")ly or on the occasion thereof2
5 5 5
B. the carrying of firear"s )y "e")ers of the law
enforce"ent #nitG
7. the interfering with or intentionally dist#r)ing
the holding of a p#)lic asse")ly )y the #se of a "otor
*ehicle, its horns and lo#d so#nd syste"s.
>urthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by
petitioners where mayors do not act on applications for a permit and
when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not produce
one, the rally is immediately dispersed. ;n such a situation, as a
necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists
who can show the police = an application0 duly filed on a given date
can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their
application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the permit
being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the
authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in
which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the
procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.
In s#", this o#rt reiterates ITS &ASIC POLIC- OF UPHOLDING THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF OUR PEOPLE, ESPECIALL- FREEDOM
OF E3PRESSION AND FREEDOM OF ASSEM&L-. In se*eral policy
addresses, hief H#stice Arte"io <. 0angani)an has repeatedly *owed to
#phold the li)erty of o#r people and to n#rt#re their prosperity. 1e said
that =in cases in*ol*ing li)erty, the scales of -#stice sho#ld weigh hea*ily
against the go*ern"ent and in fa*or of the poor, the oppressed, the
"arginali&ed, the dispossessed and the wea:. Indeed, laws and actions
that restrict f#nda"ental rights co"e to the co#rts with a hea*y
pres#"ption against their *alidity. $hese laws and actions are s#)-ected
to heightened scr#tiny.>
SUMMAR-"
1. >or this reason, the so:called calibrated preemptive
response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struc< down as a dar<ness that shrouds
freedom. ;t merely confuses our people and is used by
some police agents to *ustify abuses.
2. An the other hand, 1.#. 2o. !!3 cannot be condemned
as unconstitutionalJ it does not curtail or unduly restrict
freedomsJ it merely regulates the use of public places
as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. F'2
<2+D 8)9,A 9,(9*9+1(, OD'C9D1D 0+.)2',/)P 9( <+2 0;)
8),)<90 +< 2'..:9(0(, ,+0 0;) A+>)2,D),0.
$. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
=permits0 is valid because it is sub*ect to the
constitutionally:sound =clear and present danger0
standard.
&'0'( P'D8',(' &.A. 880
A, A/0 E,(129,A T;) F2)) EC)2/9() &: T;) P)+E.) O< T;)92 R9A;0
P)'/)'8.: T+ A(()D8.) A,* P)0909+, T;) G+>)2,D),0 5A,*6 F+2
O0;)2 P12E+()(
&) 90 ),'/0)* 8: 0;) &'0'(',A P'D8',(' 9, ()((9+, '(()D8.)*"
S)/09+, 1. T90.) . R T;9( A/0 (;'.. 8) G,+@, '( OT;) P18.9/
A(()D8.: A/0 +< 1985.P
S)/. 2. D)/.'2'09+, +< E+.9/:. R T;) /+,(090109+,'. 29A;0 +< 0;)
E)+E.) E)'/)'8.: 0+ '(()D8.) ',* E)0909+, 0;) A+>)2,D),0 <+2
2)*2)(( +< A29)>',/)( 9( )((),09'. ',* >90'. 0+ 0;) (02),A0; ',*
(0'89.90: +< 0;) S0'0). T+ 0;9( ),*, 0;) S0'0) (;'.. ),(12) 0;) <2))
)C)2/9() +< (1/; 29A;0 @90;+10 E2)B1*9/) 0+ 0;) 29A;0( +< +0;)2( 0+ .9<),
.98)20: ',* )M1'. E2+0)/09+, +< 0;) .'@.
S)/. 3. D)<9,909+, +< 0)2D(. R F+2 E12E+()( +< 0;9( A/0"
(') OP18.9/ '(()D8.:P D)',( ',: 2'..:, *)D+,(02'09+,, D'2/;,
E'2'*), E2+/)((9+, +2 ',: +0;)2 <+2D +< D'(( +2 /+,/)20)* '/09+,
;).* 9, ' E18.9/ E.'/) <+2 0;) E12E+() +< E2)(),09,A ' .'@<1. /'1()?
+2 )CE2)((9,A ', +E9,9+, 0+ 0;) A),)2'. E18.9/ +, ',: E'209/1.'2
9((1)? +2 E2+0)(09,A +2 9,<.1),/9,A ',: (0'0) +< '<<'92( @;)0;)2
E+.909/'., )/+,+D9/ +2 (+/9'.? +2 E)0909+,9,A 0;) A+>)2,D),0 <+2
2)*2)(( +< A29)>',/)(.
T;) E2+/)((9+,(, 2'..9)(, E'2'*)(, *)D+,(02'09+,(, E18.9/
D))09,A( ',* '(()D8.'A)( <+2 2).9A9+1( E12E+()( (;'.. 8) A+>)2,)*
8: .+/'. +2*9,',/)(? P2+>9*)*, ;+@)>)2, T;'0 0;) *)/.'2'09+, +<
E+.9/: '( E2+>9*)* 9, S)/09+, 2 +< 0;9( A/0 (;'.. 8) <'90;<1..:
+8()2>)*.
T;) *)<9,909+, ;)2)9, /+,0'9,)* (;'.. ,+0 9,/.1*) E9/G)09,A
',* +0;)2 /+,/)20)* '/09+, 9, (029G) '2)'( 8: @+2G)2( ',* )DE.+:))(
2)(1.09,A <2+D ' .'8+2 *9(E10) '( *)<9,)* 8: 0;) L'8+2 C+*), 90(
9DE.)D),09,A 21.)( ',* 2)A1.'09+,(, ',* 8: 0;) &'0'( P'D8',('
&9.',A 227.
(8) OP18.9/ E.'/)P (;'.. 9,/.1*) ',: ;9A;@':, 8+1.)>'2*,
'>),1), 2+'*, (02))0, 829*A) +2 +0;)2 0;+2+1A;<'2), E'2G, E.'F'
(M1'2), ',*H+2 ',: +E), (E'/) +< E18.9/ +@,)2(;9E @;)2) 0;) E)+E.)
'2) '..+@)* '//)((.
(/) OM'C9D1D 0+.)2',/)P D)',( 0;) ;9A;)(0 *)A2)) +<
2)(02'9,0 0;'0 0;) D9.90'2:, E+.9/) ',* +0;)2 E)'/) G))E9,A '10;+2909)(
(;'.. +8()2>) *129,A ' E18.9/ '(()D8.: +2 9, 0;) *9(E)2('. +< 0;)
('D).
(*) OM+*9<9/'09+, +< ' E)2D90P (;'.. 9,/.1*) 0;) /;',A) +<
0;) E.'/) ',* 09D) +< 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.:, 2)2+109,A +< 0;) E'2'*) +2
(02))0 D'2/;, 0;) >+.1D) +< .+1*(E)'G)2( +2 (+1,* (:(0)D ',*
(9D9.'2 /;',A)(.
S)/. 4. P)2D90 @;), 2)M192)* ',* @;), ,+0 2)M192)*. A
@2900), E)2D90 (;'.. 8) 2)M192)* <+2 ',: E)2(+, +2 E)2(+,( 0+
+2A',9F) ',* ;+.* ' E18.9/ '(()D8.: 9, ' E18.9/ E.'/). H+@)>)2, ,+
E)2D90 (;'.. 8) 2)M192)* 9< 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: (;'.. 8) *+,) +2 D'*)
9, (1) ' <2))*+D E'2G *1.: )(0'8.9(;)* 8: .'@ +2 +2*9,',/) +2 (2) 9,
E29>'0) E2+E)20:, 9, @;9/; /'() +,.: 0;) /+,(),0 +< 0;) +@,)2 +2 0;)
+,) ),090.)* 0+ 90( .)A'. E+(()((9+, 9( 2)M192)*, +2 (3) 9, 0;) /'DE1(
+< ' A+>)2,D),0+@,)* ',* +E)2'0)* )*1/'09+,'. 9,(090109+, @;9/;
(;'.. 8) (18B)/0 0+ 0;) 21.)( ',* 2)A1.'09+,( +< ('9* )*1/'09+,'.
9,(090109+,. P+.909/'. D))09,A( +2 2'..9)( ;).* *129,A ',: ).)/09+,
/'DE'9A, E)29+* '( E2+>9*)* <+2 8: .'@ '2) NOT /+>)2)* 8: 0;9( A/0.

S)/. 5. AEE.9/'09+, 2)M192)D),0(. A.. 'EE.9/'09+,( <+2 '
E)2D90 (;'.. /+DE.: @90; 0;) <+..+@9,A A19*).9,)("
(') T;) 'EE.9/'09+,( (;'.. 8) 9, @2909,A ',* (;'.. 9,/.1*) 0;)
,'D)( +< 0;) .)'*)2( +2 +2A',9F)2(? 0;) E12E+() +< (1/; E18.9/
'(()D8.:? 0;) *'0), 09D) ',* *12'09+, 0;)2)+<, ',* E.'/) +2 (02))0( 0+
8) 1()* <+2 0;) 9,0),*)* '/09>90:? ',* 0;) E2+8'8.) ,1D8)2 +<
E)2(+,( E'209/9E'09,A, 0;) 02',(E+20 ',* 0;) E18.9/ '**2)(( (:(0)D(
0+ 8) 1()*.
(8) T;) 'EE.9/'09+, (;'.. 9,/+2E+2'0) 0;) *10: ',*
2)(E+,(989.90: +< 'EE.9/',0 1,*)2 S)/09+, 8 ;)2)+<.
(/) T;) 'EE.9/'09+, (;'.. 8) <9.)* @90; 0;) +<<9/) +< 0;) D':+2
+< 0;) /90: +2 D1,9/9E'.90: 9, @;+() B129(*9/09+, 0;) 9,0),*)* '/09>90:
9( 0+ 8) ;).*, '0 .)'(0 <9>) (5) @+2G9,A *':( 8)<+2) 0;) (/;)*1.)*
E18.9/ '(()D8.:.
(*) UE+, 2)/)9E0 +< 0;) 'EE.9/'09+,, @;9/; D1(0 8) *1.:
'/G,+@.)*A)* 9, @2909,A, 0;) +<<9/) +< 0;) /90: +2 D1,9/9E'. D':+2
(;'.. /'1() 0;) ('D) 0+ 9DD)*9'0).: 8) E+(0)* '0 ' /+,(E9/1+1(
E.'/) 9, 0;) /90: +2 D1,9/9E'. 819.*9,A.
S)/. %. A/09+, 0+ 8) 0'G), +, 0;) 'EE.9/'09+,. R
77
(') I0 (;'.. 8) 0;) *10: +< 0;) D':+2 +2 ',: +<<9/9'. '/09,A 9,
;9( 8);'.< 0+ 9((1) +2 A2',0 ' E)2D90 1,.)(( 0;)2) 9( /.)'2 ',*
/+,>9,/9,A )>9*),/) 0;'0 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: @9.. /2)'0) ' /.)'2 ',*
E2)(),0 *',A)2 0+ E18.9/ +2*)2, E18.9/ ('<)0:, E18.9/ /+,>),9),/),
E18.9/ D+2'.( +2 E18.9/ ;)'.0;.
(8) T;) D':+2 +2 ',: +<<9/9'. '/09,A 9, ;9( 8);'.< (;'.. '/0 +,
0;) 'EE.9/'09+, @90;9, 0@+ (2) @+2G9,A *':( <2+D 0;) *'0) 0;)
'EE.9/'09+, @'( <9.)*, <'9.9,A @;9/;, 0;) E)2D90 (;'.. 8) *))D)*
A2',0)*. S;+1.* <+2 ',: 2)'(+, 0;) D':+2 +2 ',: +<<9/9'. '/09,A 9,
;9( 8);'.< 2)<1() 0+ '//)E0 0;) 'EE.9/'09+, <+2 ' E)2D90, ('9*
'EE.9/'09+, (;'.. 8) E+(0)* 8: 0;) 'EE.9/',0 +, 0;) E2)D9()( +< 0;)
+<<9/) +< 0;) D':+2 ',* (;'.. 8) *))D)* 0+ ;'>) 8)), <9.)*.
(/) I< 0;) D':+2 9( +< 0;) >9)@ 0;'0 0;)2) 9( 9DD9,),0 ',*
A2'>) *',A)2 +< ' (18(0',09>) )>9. @'22',09,A 0;) *),9'. +2
D+*9<9/'09+, +< 0;) E)2D90, ;) (;'.. 9DD)*9'0).: 9,<+2D 0;) 'EE.9/',0
@;+ D1(0 8) ;)'2* +, 0;) D'00)2.
(*) T;) '/09+, +, 0;) E)2D90 (;'.. 8) 9, @2909,A ',* ()2>)* +,
0;) 'EE.9/'5,06 @90;9, 0@),0:<+12 ;+12(.
()) I< 0;) D':+2 +2 ',: +<<9/9'. '/09,A 9, ;9( 8);'.< *),9)( 0;)
'EE.9/'09+, +2 D+*9<9)( 0;) 0)2D( 0;)2)+< 9, ;9( E)2D90, 0;) 'EE.9/',0
D': /+,0)(0 0;) *)/9(9+, 9, ', 'EE2+E29'0) /+120 +< .'@.
(<) I, /'() (190 9( 82+1A;0 8)<+2) 0;) M)02+E+.90', T29'.
C+120, 0;) M1,9/9E'. T29'. C+120, 0;) M1,9/9E'. C92/190 T29'. C+120, 0;)
R)A9+,'. T29'. C+120, +2 0;) I,0)2D)*9'0) AEE)..'0) /+120, 90(
*)/9(9+,( D': 8) 'EE)'.)* 0+ 0;) 'EE2+E29'0) /+120 @90;9, <+20:)9A;0
(48) ;+12( '<0)2 2)/)9E0 +< 0;) ('D). N+ 'EE)'. 8+,* ',* 2)/+2* +,
'EE)'. (;'.. 8) 2)M192)*. A *)/9(9+, A2',09,A (1/; E)2D90 +2
D+*9<:9,A 9< 9, 0)2D( ('09(<'/0+2: 0+ 0;) 'EE.9/',0 (;'.. 8)
9DD)*9'0).: )C)/10+2:.
(A) A.. /'()( <9.)* 9, /+120 1,*)2 0;9( ()/09+, (;'.. 8)
*)/9*)* @90;9, 0@),0:<+12 (24) ;+12( <2+D *'0) +< <9.9,A. C'()( <9.)*
;)2)1,*)2 (;'.. 8) 9DD)*9'0).: ),*+2()* 0+ 0;) )C)/109>) B1*A) <+2
*9(E+(909+, +2, 9, ;9( '8(),/), 0+ 0;) ,)C0 9, 2',G.
(;) I, '.. /'()(, ',: *)/9(9+, D': 8) 'EE)'.)* 0+ 0;)
S1E2)D) C+120.
(9) T).)A2'E;9/ 'EE)'.( 0+ 8) <+..+@)* 8: <+2D'. 'EE)'.(
'2) ;)2)8: '..+@)*.
S)/. 7. U() +< P18.9/ 0;2+2+1A;<'2). R S;+1.* 0;) E2+E+()* E18.9/
'(()D8.: 9,>+.>) 0;) 1(), <+2 ', 'EE2)/9'8.) .),A0; +< 09D), +< ',:
E18.9/ ;9A;@':, 8+1.)>'2*, '>),1), 2+'* +2 (02))0, 0;) D':+2 +2 ',:
+<<9/9'. '/09,A 9, ;9( 8);'.< D':, 0+ E2)>),0 A2'>) E18.9/
9,/+,>),9),/), *)(9A,'0) 0;) 2+10) 0;)2)+< @;9/; 9( /+,>),9),0 0+
0;) E'209/9E',0( +2 2)2+10) 0;) >);9/1.'2 02'<<9/ 0+ ',+0;)2 *92)/09+,
(+ 0;'0 0;)2) @9.. 8) ,+ ()29+1( +2 1,*1) 9,0)2<)2),/) @90; 0;) <2))
<.+@ +< /+DD)2/) ',* 02'*).
S)/. 8. R)(E+,(989.90: +< 'EE.9/',0. R I0 (;'.. 8) 0;) *10: ',*
2)(E+,(989.90: +< 0;) .)'*)2( ',* +2A',9F)2( +< ' E18.9/ '(()D8.: 0+
0'G) '.. 2)'(+,'8.) D)'(12)( ',* (0)E( 0+ 0;) ),* 0;'0 0;) 9,0),*)*
E18.9/ '(()D8.: (;'.. 8) /+,*1/0)* E)'/)<1..: 9, '//+2*',/) @90;
0;) 0)2D( +< 0;) E)2D90. T;)() (;'.. 9,/.1*) 810 ,+0 8) .9D90)* 0+ 0;)
<+..+@9,A"
(') T+ 9,<+2D 0;) E'209/9E',0( +< 0;)92 2)(E+,(989.90: 1,*)2
0;) E)2D90?
(8) T+ E+.9/) 0;) 2',G( +< 0;) *)D+,(02'0+2( 9, +2*)2 0+
E2)>),0 ,+,*)D+,(02'0+2( <2+D *9(21E09,A 0;) .'@<1. '/09>909)( +<
0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.:?
(/) T+ /+,<)2 @90; .+/'. A+>)2,D),0 +<<9/9'.( /+,/)2,)* ',*
.'@ ),<+2/)2( 0+ 0;) ),* 0;'0 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: D': 8) ;).*
E)'/)<1..:?
(*) T+ ()) 0+ 90 0;'0 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: 1,*)20'G), (;'.. ,+0
A+ 8):+,* 0;) 09D) (0'0)* 9, 0;) E)2D90? ',*
()) T+ 0'G) E+(909>) (0)E( 0;'0 *)D+,(02'0+2( *+ ,+0 D+.)(0
',: E)2(+, +2 *+ ',: '/0 1,*1.: 9,0)2<)29,A @90; 0;) 29A;0( +< +0;)2
E)2(+,( ,+0 E'209/9E'09,A 9, 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.:.
S)/. 9. N+,9,0)2<)2),/) 8: .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 '10;+2909)(. R L'@
),<+2/)D),0 'A),/9)( (;'.. ,+0 9,0)2<)2) @90; 0;) ;+.*9,A +< ' E18.9/
'(()D8.:. H+@)>)2, 0+ '*)M1'0).: ),(12) E18.9/ ('<)0:, ' .'@
),<+2/)D),0 /+,09,A),0 1,*)2 0;) /+DD',* +< ' 2)(E+,(98.) E+.9/)
+<<9/)2 D': 8) *)0'9.)* ',* (0'09+,)* 9, ' E.'/) '0 .)'(0 +,) ;1,*2)*
(100) D)0)2( '@': <2+D 0;) '2)' +< '/09>90: 2)'*: 0+ D'9,0'9, E)'/)
',* +2*)2 '0 '.. 09D)(.
S)/. 10. P+.9/) '((9(0',/) @;), 2)M1)(0)*. R I0 (;'.. 8) 9DE)2'09>)
<+2 .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 'A),/9)(, @;), 0;)92 '((9(0',/) 9( 2)M1)(0)* 8:
0;) .)'*)2( +2 +2A',9F)2(, 0+ E)2<+2D 0;)92 *109)( '.@':( D9,*<1. 0;'0
0;)92 2)(E+,(989.90: 0+ E2+>9*) E2+E)2 E2+0)/09+, 0+ 0;+() )C)2/9(9,A
0;)92 29A;0 E)'/)'8.: 0+ '(()D8.) ',* 0;) <2))*+D +< )CE2)((9+, 9(
E29D+2*9'.. T+@'2*( 0;9( ),*, .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 'A),/9)( (;'..
+8()2>) 0;) <+..+@9,A A19*).9,)("
(') M)D8)2( +< 0;) .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 /+,09,A),0 @;+ *)'.
@90; 0;) *)D+,(02'0+2( (;'.. 8) 9, /+DE.)0) 1,9<+2D @90; 0;)92
,'D)E.'0)( ',* 1,90( 0+ @;9/; 0;): 8).+,A *9(E.':)* E2+D9,),0.: +,
0;) <2+,0 ',* *+2('. E'20( +< 0;)92 1,9<+2D ',* D1(0 +8()2>) 0;)
E+.9/: +< OD'C9D1D 0+.)2',/)P '( ;)2)9, *)<9,)*?
(8) T;) D)D8)2( +< 0;) .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 /+,09,A),0 (;'.. ,+0
/'22: ',: G9,* +< <92)'2D( 810 D': 8) )M19EE)* @90; 8'0+, +2 29+0
(09/G(, (;9).*(, /2'(; ;).D)0( @90; >9(+2, A'( D'(G(, 8++0( +2 ',G.)
;9A; (;+)( @90; (;9, A1'2*(?
(/) T)'2 A'(, (D+G) A2),'*)(, @'0)2 /',,+,(, +2 ',: (9D9.'2
',0929+0 *)>9/) (;'.. ,+0 8) 1()* 1,.)(( 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: 9(
'00),*)* 8: '/01'. >9+.),/) +2 ()29+1( 0;2)'0( +< >9+.),/), +2
*).98)2'0) *)(021/09+, +< E2+E)20:.
S)/. 11. D9(E)2('. +< E18.9/ '(()D8.: @90; E)2D90. R N+ E18.9/
'(()D8.: @90; ' E)2D90 (;'.. 8) *9(E)2()*. H+@)>)2, @;), ',
'(()D8.: 8)/+D)( >9+.),0, 0;) E+.9/) D': *9(E)2() (1/; E18.9/
'(()D8.: '( <+..+@("
(') A0 0;) <92(0 (9A, +< 9DE),*9,A >9+.),/), 0;) 2',G9,A
+<<9/)2 +< 0;) .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 /+,09,A),0 (;'.. /'.. 0;) '00),09+, +<
0;) .)'*)2( +< 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: ',* '(G 0;) .'00)2 0+ E2)>),0 ',:
E+((98.) *9(0128',/)?
(8) I< '/01'. >9+.),/) (0'20( 0+ ' E+9,0 @;)2) 2+/G( +2 +0;)2
;'2D<1. +8B)/0( <2+D 0;) E'209/9E',0( '2) 0;2+@, '0 0;) E+.9/) +2 '0
0;) ,+,E'209/9E',0(, +2 '0 ',: E2+E)20: /'1(9,A *'D'A) 0+ (1/;
E2+E)20:, 0;) 2',G9,A +<<9/)2 +< 0;) .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 /+,09,A),0 (;'..
'1*98.: @'2, 0;) E'209/9E',0( 0;'0 9< 0;) *9(0128',/) E)2(9(0(, 0;)
E18.9/ '(()D8.: @9.. 8) *9(E)2()*?
(/) I< 0;) >9+.),/) +2 *9(0128',/) E2)>'9.9,A '( (0'0)* 9, 0;)
E2)/)*9,A (18E'2'A2'E; (;+1.* ,+0 (0+E +2 '8'0), 0;) 2',G9,A +<<9/)2
+< 0;) .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 /+,09,A),0 (;'.. '1*98.: 9((1) ' @'2,9,A 0+
0;) E'209/9E',0( +< 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.:, ',* '<0)2 '..+@9,A '
2)'(+,'8.) E)29+* +< 09D) 0+ .'E(), (;'.. 9DD)*9'0).: +2*)2 90 0+
<+20;@90; *9(E)2()?
(*) N+ '22)(0 +< ',: .)'*)2, +2A',9F)2 +2 E'209/9E',0 (;'.. '.(+
8) D'*) *129,A 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: 1,.)(( ;) >9+.'0)( *129,A 0;)
'(()D8.: ' .'@, (0'010), +2*9,',/) +2 ',: E2+>9(9+, +< 0;9( A/0. S1/;
'22)(0 (;'.. 8) A+>)2,)* 8: A209/.) 125 +< 0;) R)>9()* P),'. C+*), '(
'D),*)*?
()) I(+.'0)* '/0( +2 9,/9*),0( +< *9(+2*)2 +2 82)'/; +< 0;)
E)'/) *129,A 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.: D': 8) E)'/)<1..: *9(E)2()*.
S)/. 12. D9(E)2('. +< E18.9/ '(()D8.: @90;+10 E)2D90. R =;), 0;)
E18.9/ '(()D8.: 9( ;).* @90;+10 ' E)2D90 @;)2) ' E)2D90 9( 2)M192)*,
0;) ('9* E18.9/ '(()D8.: D': 8) E)'/)<1..: *9(E)2()*.
S)/. 13. P2+;9890)* '/0(. R T;) <+..+@9,A (;'.. /+,(09010) >9+.'09+,(
+< 0;) A/0"
(') T;) ;+.*9,A +< ',: E18.9/ '(()D8.: '( *)<9,)* 9, 0;9( A/0
8: ',: .)'*)2 +2 +2A',9F)2 @90;+10 ;'>9,A <92(0 ()/12)* 0;'0 @2900),
E)2D90 @;)2) ' E)2D90 9( 2)M192)* <2+D 0;) +<<9/) /+,/)2,)*, +2 0;)
1() +< (1/; E)2D90 <+2 (1/; E12E+()( 9, ',: E.'/) +0;)2 0;', 0;+()
()0 +10 9, ('9* E)2D90" P2+>9*)*, ;+@)>)2, T;'0 ,+ E)2(+, /', 8)
E1,9(;)* +2 ;).* /29D9,'..: .9'8.) <+2 E'209/9E'09,A 9, +2 '00),*9,A ',
+0;)2@9() E)'/)<1. '(()D8.:?
(8) A28902'2: ',* 1,B1(09<9)* *),9'. +2 D+*9<9/'09+, +< '
E)2D90 9, >9+.'09+, +< 0;) E2+>9(9+,( +< 0;9( A/0 8: 0;) D':+2 +2 ',:
+0;)2 +<<9/9'. '/09,A 9, ;9( 8);'.<?
(/) T;) 1,B1(09<9)* ',* '28902'2: 2)<1('. 0+ '//)E0 +2
'/G,+@.)*A) 2)/)9E0 +< 0;) 'EE.9/'09+, <+2 ' E)2D90 8: 0;) D':+2 +2
',: +<<9/9'. '/09,A 9, ;9( 8);'.<?
(*) O8(021/09,A, 9DE)*9,A, *9(21E09,A +2 +0;)2@9() *),:9,A
0;) )C)2/9() +< 0;) 29A;0 0+ E)'/)<1. '(()D8.:?
()) T;) 1,,)/)(('2: <929,A +< <92)'2D( 8: ' D)D8)2 +< ',:
.'@ ),<+2/)D),0 'A),/: +2 ',: E)2(+, 0+ *9(E)2() 0;) E18.9/
'(()D8.:?
(<) A/0( 9, >9+.'09+, +< S)/09+, 10 ;)2)+<?
(A) A/0( *)(/298)* ;)2)1,*)2 9< /+DD900)* @90;9, +,)
;1,*2)* (100) D)0)2( <2+D 0;) '2)' +< '/09>90: +< 0;) E18.9/ '(()D8.:
+2 +, 0;) +//'(9+, 0;)2)+<"
1. 0;) /'22:9,A +< ' *)'*.: +2 +<<),(9>) @)'E+, +2 *)>9/) (1/; '(
<92)'2D, E9..8+C, 8+D8, ',* 0;) .9G)?
2. 0;) /'22:9,A +< ' 8.'*)* @)'E+, ',* 0;) .9G)?
78
3. 0;) D'.9/9+1( 812,9,A +< ',: +8B)/0 9, 0;) (02))0( +2
0;+2+1A;<'2)(?
4. 0;) /'22:9,A +< <92)'2D( 8: D)D8)2( +< 0;) .'@ ),<+2/)D),0 1,90?
5. 0;) 9,0)2<)29,A @90; +2 9,0),09+,'..: *9(01289,A 0;) ;+.*9,A +< '
E18.9/ '(()D8.: 8: 0;) 1() +< ' D+0+2 >);9/.), 90( ;+2,( ',* .+1*
(+1,* (:(0)D(.
S)/. 14. P),'.09)(. R A,: E)2(+, <+1,* A19.0: ',* /+,>9/0)* +< ',:
+< 0;) E2+;9890)* '/0( *)<9,)* 9, 0;) 9DD)*9'0).: E2)/)*9,A ()/09+,
(;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* '( <+..+@("
(') >9+.'09+, +< (18E'2'A2'E; (') (;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* 8: 9DE29(+,D),0
+< +,) D+,0; ',* +,) *': 0+ (9C D+,0;(?
(8) >9+.'09+,( +< (18E'2'A2'E;( (8), (/), (*), ()), (<), ',* 90)D 4,
(18E'2'A2'E; (A) (;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* 8: 9DE29(+,D),0 +< (9C D+,0;(
',* +,) *': 0+ (9C :)'2(?
(/) >9+.'09+, +< 90)D 1, (18E'2'A2'E; (A) (;'.. 8) E1,9(;)* 8:
9DE29(+,D),0 +< (9C D+,0;( ',* +,) *': 0+ (9C :)'2( @90;+10
E2)B1*9/) 0+ E2+()/109+, 1,*)2 P2)(9*),09'. D)/2)) N+. 18%%?
(*) >9+.'09+,( +< 90)D 2, 90)D 3, +2 90)D 5 +< (18E'2'A2'E; (A) (;'..
8) E1,9(;)* 8: 9DE29(+,D),0 +< +,) *': 0+ 0;920: *':(.
S)/. 15. F2))*+D E'2G(. R E>)2: /90: ',* D1,9/9E'.90: 9, 0;) /+1,02:
(;'.. @90;9, (9C D+,0;( '<0)2 0;) )<<)/09>90: +< 0;9( A/0 )(0'8.9(; +2
*)(9A,'0) '0 .)'(0 +,) (190'8.) O<2))*+D E'2GP +2 D'.. 9, 0;)92
2)(E)/09>) B129(*9/09+,( @;9/;, '( <'2 '( E2'/09/'8.), (;'.. 8)
/),02'..: .+/'0)* @90;9, 0;) E+8.'/9+, @;)2) *)D+,(02'09+,( ',*
D))09,A( D': 8) ;).* '0 ',: 09D) @90;+10 0;) ,))* +< ',: E29+2
E)2D90.
I, 0;) /909)( ',* D1,9/9E'.909)( +< M)02+E+.90', M',9.', 0;)
2)(E)/09>) D':+2( (;'.. )(0'8.9(; 0;) <2))*+D E'2G( @90;9, 0;)
E)29+* +< (9C D+,0;( <2+D 0;) )<<)/09>90: 0;9( A/0.
S)/. 1%. C+,(090109+,'.90:.NS;+1.* ',: E2+>9(9+, +< 0;9( A/0
8) *)/.'2)* 9,>'.9* +2 1,/+,(090109+,'., 0;) >'.9*90: +2
/+,(090109+,'.90: +< 0;) +0;)2 E2+>9(9+,( (;'.. ,+0 8) '<<)/0)* 0;)2)8:.
S)/. 17. R)E)'.9,A /.'1(). R A.. .'@(, *)/2))(, .)00)2( +<
9,(021/09+,(, 2)(+.109+,(, +2*)2(, +2*9,',/)( +2 E'20( 0;)2)+< @;9/;
'2) 9,/+,(9(0),0 @90; 0;) E2+>9(9+,( +< 0;9( A/0 '2) ;)2)8: 2)E)'.)*,
'D),*)*, +2 D+*9<9)* '//+2*9,A.:.
S)/. 18. E<<)/09>90:. R T;9( A/0 (;'.. 0'G) )<<)/0 1E+, 90(
'EE2+>'..
AEE2+>)*, O/0+8)2 22, 1985.
G2)A+29+ AA.9E': >(. !1', R19F
G.R. N+. L45459, M'2/; 13, 1937, L'12)., !.
F'/0(" 9s#pra9
I((1)" 8hether or not there was a *iolation of the freedo" of religionC
H).*" 3o. $he prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the
principle of separation of church and state. 8itho#t the necessity of
ad*erting to the historical )ac:gro#nd of this principle in o#r co#ntry, it is
s#fficient to say that o#r history, not to spea: of the history of "an:ind,
has ta#ght #s that the #nion of ch#rch and state is pre-#dicial to )oth, for
occasions "ight arise when the state will #se the ch#rch, and the ch#rch
the state, as a weapon in the f#rtherance of their respecti*e ends and
ai"s. $he Malolos onstit#tion recogni&ed this principle of separation of
ch#rch and state in the early stages of o#r constit#tional de*elop"entG it
was inserted in the $reaty of 0aris )etween the Jnited !tates and !pain
of Dece")er 1?, 1898, reiterated in 0resident McLinleyIs Instr#ctions to
the 0hilippine o""ission, reaffir"ed in the 0hilippine Bill of 19?2 and in
the A#tono"y Act of A#g#st 29, 191+, and finally e")odied in the
onstit#tion of the 0hilippines as the s#pre"e e5pression of the (ilipino
0eople. It is al"ost trite to say now that in this co#ntry we en-oy )oth
religio#s and ci*il freedo". All the officers of the ,o*ern"ent, fro" the
highest to the lowest, in ta:ing their oath to s#pport and defend the
onstit#tion, )ind the"sel*es to recogni&e and respect the constit#tional
g#arantee of religio#s freedo", with its inherent li"itations and recogni&ed
i"plications. ;t should be stated that what is guaranteed by our
,onstitution is .6L;9;ACS L;16.T@, not mere .6L;9;ACS
TAL6./T;A2.
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, however, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is
not a denial of its influence in human affairs. .eligion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to
his ,reator is recognied. And, in so far as it instills into the "inds the
p#rest principles of "orality, its infl#ence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the >ilipino people, in the preamble of their
,onstitution, implored -the aid of 7ivine #rovidence, in order to
esta)lish a go*ern"ent that shall e")ody their ideals, conser*e and
de*elop the patri"ony of the nation, pro"ote the general welfare, and
sec#re to the"sel*es and their posterity the )lessings of independence
#nder a regi"e of -#stice, li)erty and de"ocracy,/ they thereby
manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. $he
ele*ating infl#ence of religion in h#"an society is recogni&ed here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscri"inately
accorded to religio#s sects and deno"inations. '#r onstit#tion and laws
e5e"pt fro" ta5ation properties de*oted e5cl#si*ely to religio#s p#rposes
@sec. 1B, s#)sec. 4, Art. <I, onstit#tion of the 0hilippines and sec. 1,
s#)sec. 'rdinance appended theretoG Assess"ent Law, sec. 4BB, par OcP,
Ad". odeA sectarian aid is not prohi)ited when a priest, preacher,
"inister or other religio#s teacher or dignitary as s#ch is assigned to the
ar"ed forces or to any penal instit#tion, orphanage or leprosari#" @sec.
14, s#)sec. 4 Art. <I, onstit#tion of the 0hilippinesA. 'ptional religio#s
instr#ction in the p#)lic schools is )y constit#tional "andate allowed @sec.
7, Art. ;III, onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, in relation to sec. 928, Ad.
odeA. $h#rsday and (riday of 1oly 8ee:, $han:sgi*ing Day, hrist"as
Day, and !#ndays are "ade legal holidays @sec. 29, Ad". odeA )eca#se
of the sec#lar idea that their o)ser*ance is cond#ci*e to )eneficial "oral
res#lts. $he law allows di*orce )#t p#nishes polyga"y and )iga"yG and
certain cri"es against religio#s worship are considered cri"es against the
f#nda"ental laws of the state @see arts. 142 and 144, %e*ised 0enal
odeA.
Act 3o. B?72 conte"plates no religio#s p#rpose in *iew.
8hat it gi*es the Director of 0osts is the discretionary power to deter"ine
when the iss#ance of special postage sta"ps wo#ld )e /ad*antageo#s to
the ,o*ern"ent./ 'f co#rse, the phrase /ad*antageo#s to the
,o*ern"ent/ does not a#thori&e the *iolation of the onstit#tion. It does
not a#thori&e the appropriation, #se or application of p#)lic "oney or
property for the #se, )enefit or s#pport of a partic#lar sect or ch#rch. In the
present case, howe*er, the iss#ance of the postage sta"ps in 6#estion )y
the Director of 0osts and the !ecretary of 0#)lic 8or:s and
o""#nications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not
issued and sold for the benefit of the .oman ,atholic ,hurch. 2or
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. 'n the contrary, it appears fro" the letter of the Director of 0osts
of H#ne 7, 194+, incorporated on page 2 of the petitionerIs co"plaint, that
the only p#rpose in iss#ing and selling the sta"ps was /to ad*ertise the
0hilippines and attract "ore to#rists to this co#ntry./ $he officials
concerned "erely too: ad*antage of an e*ent considered of international
i"portance /to gi*e p#)licity to the 0hilippines and its people/. It is
significant to note that the sta"ps as act#ally designed and printed,
instead of showing a atholic h#rch chalice as originally planned,
contains a "ap of the 0hilippines and the location of the ity of Manila,
and an inscription as follows2 /!eat ;;;III International .#charistic
ongress, (e). 497, 1947./ 8hat is e"phasi&ed is not the .#charistic
ongress itself )#t Manila, the capital of the 0hilippines, as the seat of
that congress. It is o)*io#s that while the iss#ance and sale of the sta"ps
in 6#estion "ay )e said to )e insepara)ly lin:ed with an e*ent of a
religio#s character, the res#lting propaganda, if any, recei*ed )y the
%o"an atholic h#rch, was not the ai" and p#rpose of the ,o*ern"ent.
8e are of the opinion that the ,o*ern"ent sho#ld not )e e")arrassed in
its acti*ities si"ply )eca#se of incidental res#lts, "ore or less religio#s in
character, if the p#rpose had in *iew is one which co#ld legiti"ately )e
#nderta:en )y appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
A,*2)( G'2/)(, )0. '., >(. H+,. N1D)29',+ G. E(0),F+, )0. '..
G.R. N+. L53487, M': 25, 1981,AM19,+, !.
FACTS" $he )arangay co#ncil of <alencia, 'r"oc ity issued four '")
resolutions regarding the acquisition of the wooden image of San
Micente >errer to be used in the celebration of his annual feast day.
'ne of the resol#tions f#rther pro*ided that the )arangay co#ncil, in
accordance with the practice in .astern Leyte, o#ncil"an $o"as
a)atingan, the Chairman or her"ano "ayor of the fiesta, would be the
caretaker of the image of "an Gicente Lerrer and that the image would
remain in his residence for one $ear and until the election of his successor
as chairman of the ne%t feast da$.
"everal da$s after the fiesta or on April 11, 145=, on the
occasion of his sermon during a mass, Lather Ksmea allegedl$ uttered
defamator$ remarks against the baranga$ captain, 0anuel C. Geloso,
apparentl$ in connection with the disputed image. That incident provoked
Geloso to file against Lather Ksmea in the cit$ court of Krmoc Cit$ a
charge for grave oral defamation. Lather Ksmea retaliated b$ filing
administrative complaints against Geloso on the grounds of immoralit$,
grave abuse of authorit$, acts unbecoming a public official and ignorance
of the law. 0eanwhile, the image of "an Gicente Lerrer remained in the
Catholic church of Galencia. 9ecause Lather Ksmea did not accede to the
re.uest of Cabatingan to have custod$ of the image and maliciousl$
ignored the council@s resolutions, the council enacted another resolution,
authoriEing the hiring of a law$er to file a replevin case against Lather
Ksmea for the recover$ of the image. An 8une %", %(4B, the barangay
council passed another resolution, appointing Meloso as its
representative in the replevin case.
The replevin case was filed in the cit$ court of Krmoc Cit$
against Lather Ksmea and 9ishop Cipriano !rgel. After the )arangay
co#ncil had posted a cash )ond of eight h#ndred pesos, (ather 's"ea
79
t#rned o*er the i"age to the co#ncil. ln his answer to the co"plaint for
reple*in, he assailed the constit#tionality of the said resol#tions li)rary
Later, he and three other persons, Andres ,arces, a
"e")er of the Aglipayan h#rch, and two atholic lay"en, Hes#s
.d#llantes and 3icetas Dagar, filed against the )arangay co#ncil and its
"e")ers @e5cl#ding two "e")ersA a co"plaint in the o#rt of (irst
Instance at 'r"oc ity, praying for the ann#l"ent of the said resol#tions.
$he lower co#rt dis"issed the co"plaint. lt #pheld the *alidity of the
resol#tions.
ISSUE" 8hether the resol#tions contra*ene !ection 7 of Article III of the
onstit#tion.
HELD" NO. The wooden image was purchased in connection with the
celebration of the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San
Micente >errer, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio
residents . 'ne of the highlights of the fiesta was the "ass. onse6#ently,
the i"age of the patron saint had to )e placed in the ch#rch when the
"ass was cele)rated. If there is nothing #nconstit#tional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and ha*ing a patron saint for the )arrio, then any acti*ity
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint @s#ch as the
ac6#isition and display of his i"ageA cannot )e )randed as illegal. /s
noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio:religious
affair. ;ts celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities.
The fiesta relieves the monotony and drudgery of the lives of the
masses.
$he )arangay co#ncil designated a lay"an as the c#stodian
of the wooden i"age in order to forestall any s#spicion that it is fa*oring
the atholic ch#rch. / more practical reason for that arrangement
would be that the image, if placed in a laymanFs custody, could easily
be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in
connection with prayers and novenas.
$he contradictory positions of the petitioners are shown in
their affida*its. 0etitioner ,arces swore that the said resol#tions favored
the Catholic church. 'n the other hand, petitioners Dagar and .d#llantes
swore that the resol#tions pre#udiced the Catholics )eca#se they co#ld
see the i"age in the ch#rch only once a year or d#ring the fiesta. The
,ourt finds that the momentous issues of separation of church and
state, freedom of religion annd the use of public money to favor any
sect or church are not involved at all in this case even remotely or
indirectly. lt is not a microcosmic test case on those issues. This
case is a petty quarrel over the custody of a saintFs image. lt would
never have arisen if the parties had been more diplomatic and tactful
and if >ather Asmea had ta<en the trouble of causing contributions
to be solicited from his own parishioners for the purchase of ',+0;)2
9D'A) of San Micente >errer to be installed in his church.
There can be no question that the image in question
belongs to the barangay council. >ather Asmea claim that it belongs
to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as owner of the image,
has the right to determine who should have custody thereof. I< 90
/;++()( 0+ /;',A) 90( D9,* ',* *)/9*)( 0+ A9>) 0;) 9D'A) 0+ 0;)
C'0;+.9/ /;12/; 0;'0 '/09+, @+1.* ,+0 >9+.'0) 0;) C+,(090109+,
8)/'1() 0;) 9D'A) @'( '/M192)* @90; private funds ',* 9( 90( E29>'0)
E2+E)20:. $he co#ncil has the right to ta:e "eas#res to reco*er
possession of the i"age )y enacting %esol#tions 3os. 1? and 12.
2ot every governmental activity which involves the
expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is
violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public
money or property. ;n AA.9E': >(. R19F, B" #hil. &3%, what was
involved was /ct 2o. "35& which appropriated sixty thousand pesos
for the cost of plates and the printing of postage sta"ps with new designs.
Jnder the law, the Director of 0osts, with the appro*al of the Depart"ent
1ead and the 0resident of the 0hilippines, iss#ed in 194+ postage sta"ps
to co""e"orate the cele)ration in Manila of the 44rd International
.#charistic ongress sponsored )y the atholic h#rch. The purpose of
the stamps was to raise revenue and advertise the #hilippines. The
design of the stamps showed a map of the #hilippines and nothing
about the ,atholic ,hurch. 2o religious purpose was intended. $he
instant case is easily disting#isha)le fro" GerEosa vs. LernandeE, B9
0hil., +27 and 77 0hil. 4?7, where a religio#s )rotherhood, La
Archicofradia del !antisi"o !acra"ento, organi&ed for the p#rpose of
raising f#nds to "eet the e5penses for the ann#al fiesta in honor of the
Most 1oly !acra"ent and the <irgin Lady of ,#adal#pe, was held
acco#nta)le for the f#nds which it held as tr#stee.
(inding that the petitioners ha*e no ca#se of action for the
ann#l"ent of the )arangay resol#tions, the lower co#rtIs -#dg"ent
dis"issing their a"ended petition is affir"ed.
AD)29/', &98.) S+/9)0: >(. C90: +< M',9.'
G.R. N+. L9%37, AE29. 30, 1957, F).9C, !.
F'/0(" 0laintiff9appellant is a foreign, non9stoc:, non9profit,
religio#s, "issionary corporation d#ly registered and doing )#siness in the
0hilippines. In the co#rse of its "inistry, plaintiffIs 0hilippine agency has
)een distri)#ting and selling )i)les andRor gospel portions thereof @e5cept
d#ring the Hapanese occ#pationA thro#gho#t the 0hilippines and
translating the sa"e into se*eral 0hilippine dialects. 'n May 29 1974, the
acting ity $reas#rer of the ity of Manila infor"ed plaintiff that it was
cond#cting the )#siness of general "erchandise since 3o*e")er, 19B7,
witho#t pro*iding itself with the necessary MayorIs per"it and "#nicipal
license. 0laintiff protested against this re6#ire"ent, )#t the ity $reas#rer
de"anded that plaintiff deposit and pay the s#" of 07, 891.B7 which it
paid #nder protest. A s#it was )ro#ght )y plaintiff against defendant.
I((1)" 8'3 the imposition of the fees constit#te ', 9DE'92D),0 of the
free7e%ercise of religion of the petitioner as imposed on its sale and
distribution of bibles.
H).*" -ES. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
en*oyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the
right to disseminate religious information. /ny restraint of such right
can only be *ustified li<e other restraints of freedom of expression on
the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
The fees under Ardinance 2o. &5&(, as amended, cannot be applied
to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and
en*oyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. $here is a difference when
the ta5 is i"posed #pon the inco"e or property of the religio#s
organi&ation and one i"posed against the acts of disse"inating religio#s
infor"ation. $o ta5 the latter is i"pair the free e5ercise and en-oy"ent of
its religio#s profession and worship as well as its rights of disse"ination of
religio#s )eliefs regardless of the a"o#nt of s#ch fees.
/s to Ardinance 2o. $333 requiring the obtention of a mayor?s permit
before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or
80
occupations enumerated therein, we do not find that it imposes any
charge upon the en*oyment of a right granted by the ,onstitution,
nor tax the exercise of religious practices. Ardinance 2o. $333
cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to plaintiff
Society. B#t as Ardinance 2o. &5&( of the ,ity of Danila, as
amended, is not applicable to plaintiff:appellant and defendant:
appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff
Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair
plaintiffFs right to the free exercise and en*oyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs, 8e find that 'rdinance 3o. 4???, as a"ended, is also
inapplica)le to said )#siness, trade or occ#pation of the plaintiff.
/In the case of M#rdoc: *s. 0ennsyl*ania, it was held that an ordinance
re6#iring that a license )e o)tained )efore a person co#ld can*ass or
solicit orders for goods, paintings, pict#res, wares or "erchandise cannot
)e "ade to apply to "e")ers of Heho*ahIs 8itnesses who went a)o#t
fro" door to door distri)#ting literat#re and soliciting people to Ip#rchaseI
certain religio#s )oo:s and pa"phlets, all p#)lished )y the 8atch $ower
Bi)le Y $ract !ociety. $he IpriceI of the )oo:s was twenty9fi*e cents each,
the IpriceI of the pa"phlets fi*e cents each. It was shown that in "a:ing
the solicitations there was a re6#est for additional Icontri)#tionI of twenty9
fi*e cents each for the )oo:s and fi*e cents each for the pa"phlets.
Lesser s#" were accepted, howe*er, and )oo:s were e*en donated in
case interested persons were witho#t f#nds.
An the above facts the Supreme ,ourt held that it could not be said
that petitioners were engaged in commercial rather than a religious
venture. Their activities could not be described as embraced in the
occupation of selling boo<s and pamphlets. $hen the o#rt contin#ed2
FWe do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free
from all financial burdens of government. !ee ,ros-ean *s. A"erican
0ress o., 297 J.!., 244, 27?, 8? L. ed. ++?, ++8, 7+ !. t. BBB. 8e ha*e
here so"ething 6#ite different, for e5a"ple, fro" a ta5 on the inco"e of
one who engages in religio#s acti*ities or a ta5 on property #sed or
e"ployed in connection with those acti*ities. It is one thing to i"pose a ta5
on the inco"e or property of a preacher. It is 6#ite another thing to e5act a
ta5 fro" hi" for the pri*ilege of deli*ering a ser"on. $he ta5 i"posed )y
the ity of Heannette is a flat license ta5, pay"ent of which is a condition
of the e5ercise of these constit#tional pri*ileges. The power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
en*oyment. . . . Those who can tax the exercise of this religious
practice can ma<e its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the
resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the
privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can
close all its doors to all Fthose who do not have a full purse.
Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable manner
would thus be denied the needy. . . .
;t is contended however that the fact that the license tax can
suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so.
1ut that is to disregard the nature of this tax. ;t is a license tax : a flat
tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the 1ill of
.ights . . . The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of
these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship
which this ,ourt has repeatedly struc< down. . . . It is not a no"inal
fee i"posed as a reg#latory "eas#re to defray the e5penses of policing
the acti*ities in 6#estion. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license ta5
le*ied and collected as a condition to the p#rs#it of acti*ities whose
en-oy"ent is g#aranteed )y the constit#tional li)erties of press and
religion and ine*ita)ly tends to s#ppress their e5ercise. $hat is al"ost
#nifor"ly recogni&ed as the inherent *ice and e*il of this flat license ta5.I
2or could dissemination of religious information be conditioned
upon the approval of an official or manager even if the town were
owned by a corporation as held in the case of Marsh *s. !tate of
Ala)a"a @42+ J.!. 7?1A or )y the Jnited !tates itself as held in the case
of $#c:er *s. $e5as @42+ J.!. 717A. In the for"er case the !#pre"e o#rt
e5pressed the opinion that the right to en-oy freedo" of the press and
religion occ#pies a preferred position as against the constit#tional right of
property owners.
IA.)(9' ,9 C29(0+ >(. CA
G.R. N+. 119%73, !1.: 2%, 199%, P1,+, !.
F'/0(" 0etitioner Iglesia ni risto, a d#ly organi&ed religio#s
organi&ation, has a tele*ision progra" entitled /Ang Iglesia ni risto/ aired
on hannel 2 e*ery !at#rday and on hannel 14 e*ery !#nday. $he
progra" presents and propagates petitionerIs religio#s )eliefs, doctrines
and practices often ti"es in co"parati*e st#dies with other religions.
0etitioner s#)"itted to the respondent Board of %e*iew for Mo*ing
0ict#res and $ele*ision the <$% tapes of its $< progra" !eries 3os. 11+,
119, 121 and 128. The 9oard classified the series as N or not for public
viewing on the ground that the$ offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is e%pressl$ prohibited b$ law.
In its first co#rse of action against respondent Board, I3
appealed to the 'ffice of the 0resident where it was fa*ored and then
again, )efore the V#e&on ity %$ alleging that the respondent Board
acted witho#t -#risdiction or with gra*e a)#se of discretion in re6#iring
petitioner to s#)"it the <$% tapes of its $< progra" and in 59rating the",
where it I3 again won )#t was directed to refrain fro" attac:ing other
religions. $he o#rt of Appeals re*ersed the sa"e.
I((1)"
1. 8hether the M$%B has -#risdiction to re*iew petitionerIs $< progra"
entitled /Ang Iglesia ni ristoC
2. 8hether the action of respondent M$%B 59rating petitionerIs $<
0rogra" !eries 3os. 117, 119, and 121 sho#ld )e s#stainedC
H).*"
1. -ES. The right to religious profession and worship has a TWA:
>AL7 /S#6,T, vi ., '%) freedom to believe and '&) freedom to act on
oneFs beliefs. The =first is absolute0 as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The =second is sub*ect to regulation0
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.
We thus re*ect petitionerFs postulate that its religious
program is per se beyond review by the respondent 1oard. ;ts public
broadcast on TM of its religious program brings it out of the bosom
of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes
and ears of children. The ,ourt reiterates the rule that the exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring
about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which
the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare.
/ laisse faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to
the liberal mind but history counsels the ,ourt against its blind
adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern
in our country today. Across the sea and in o#r shore, the )loodiest and
)itterest wars fo#ght )y "en were ca#sed )y irreconcila)le religio#s
differences. '#r co#ntry is still not safe fro" the rec#rrence of this
st#ltifying strife considering o#r warring religio#s )eliefs and the fanaticis"
with which so"e of #s cling and claw to these )eliefs. .*en now, we ha*e
yet to settle the near cent#ry old strife in Mindanao, the roots of which
ha*e )een no#rished )y the "istr#st and "is#nderstanding )etween o#r
hristian and M#sli" )rothers and sisters. $he )ewildering rise of weird
religio#s c#lts espo#sing *iolence as an article of faith also pro*es the
wisdo" of o#r r#le re-ecting a strict let alone policy on the e5ercise of
religion. (or s#re, we shall contin#e to s#)-ect any act pinching the space
for the free e5ercise of religion to a heightened scr#tiny )#t we shall not
lea*e its rational e5ercise to the irrationality of "an. >or when religion
divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
2. NO. (irst, The evidence shows that the respondent 1oard x:rated
petitioners TM series for -attac<ing- either religions, especially the
,atholic church. /n examination of the evidence will show that the
so:called -attac<s- are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of other religions. $he *ideotapes were not *iewed
)y the respondent co#rt as they were not presented as e*idence. Det they
were considered )y the respondent co#rt as indecent, contrary to law and
good c#sto"s, hence, can )e prohi)ited fro" p#)lic *iewing #nder section
4@cA of 0D 198+. This ruling clearly suppresses petitionerFs freedom
of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion.
!econd, e*en a sideglance at section 4 of 0D 3o. 198+ will re*eal
that, the gro#nd -attac<s against another religion- in 59rating the
religio#s progra" of petitioner, is not among the grounds to *ustify an
order prohibiting the broadcast of petitionerFs television program.
The ground attack against another religion was merel$ added b$ the
respondent 9oard in its /ules. This rule is void for it runs smack against
the hoar$ doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot e%pand
the letter and spirit of the law the$ seek to enforce.
$hird, in 59rating the $< progra" of the petitioner, the respondents
failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. 'n American 9ible
"ociet$ v. Cit$ of 0anila, this Court held? -The constitutional guaranty
of free exercise and en*oyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. /ny
restraint of such right can be *ustified li<e other restraints on
freedom of expression on the ground that there is aclear and present
danger of an$ substantive evil which the "tate has the right to prevent.
In <ictoriano *s. .li&alde %ope 8or:ers Jnion, we f#rther r#led that /. . . it
is only where it is #na*oida)ly necessary to pre*ent ani""ediate and
gra*e danger to the sec#rity and welfare of the co""#nity that
infringe"ent of religio#s freedo" "ay )e -#stified, and only to the s"allest
e5tent necessary to a*oid the danger./
(astl$, the records show that the decision of the respondent 9oard,
affirmed b$ the respondent appellate court, is completel$ bereft of findings
of facts to #ustif$ the conclusion that the sub#ect video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing
whatsoever of the t$pe of harm the tapes will bring about especiall$ the
gravit$ and imminence of the threatened harm. #rior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be *ustified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and
imminent evil which has ta<en the life of a reality already on ground.
E&RALINAG )0. '.. >(. THE DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS OF CE&U
G.R N+. 95770, M'2/; 1, 1993
FACTS"
81
All the petitioners in these two cases were e%pelled from
their classes b$ the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
re.uired b$ /epublic Act Fo. 12=I and b$ 8epartment Krder Fo. 8 of
81C" making the flag ceremon$ compulsor$ in all educational institutions.
Heho*ahIs 8itnesses ad"ittedly teach their children not to sal#te the flag,
sing the national anthe", and recite the patriotic pledge for they )elie*e
that those are /acts of worship or religious devotion which the$ cannot
conscientiousl$ give . . . to an$one or an$thing e%cept Aod. The$ feel
bound b$ the 9ible@s command to guard ourselves from idols * 1 >ohn
I?21. The$ consider the flag as an image or idol representing the "tate.
$hey thin: the action of the local a#thorities in co"pelling the flag sal#te
and pledge transcends constit#tional li"itations on the !tateIs power and
in*ades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the onstit#tion protect
against official control
1owe*er, the petitioners herein ha*e not raised in iss#e the
constit#tionality of the a)o*e pro*ision of the new Ad"inistrati*e ode of
1987. $hey ha*e targeted only %ep#)lic Act 3o. 12+7 and the
i"ple"enting orders of the D.!.
ISSUE"
8hether or not the e5p#lsion of st#dents )y reason of not
#pholding the flag sal#te law is #nconstit#tionalC
HELD"
D.!. $he 4?9year old decision of ! in ,erona #pholding the flag sal#te
law and appro*ing the e5p#lsion of st#dents who ref#se to o)ey it, is not
lightly to )e trifled with.
It is so"ewhat ironic howe*er, that after the ,erona r#ling
had recei*ed legislati*e cachet )y its in corporation in the Ad"inistrati*e
ode of 1987, the present o#rt )elie*es that the ti"e has co"e to re9
e5a"ine it. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge, during a
flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from oneFs *ob or of being
expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present
generation of >ilipinos who cut their teeth on the 1ill of .ights which
guarantees their rights to free speech NN and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship @!ec. 7, Article III, 1987 onstit#tionG
Article I<, !ection 8, 1974 onstit#tionG Article III, !ection 1O7P, 1947
onstit#tionA.
.eligious freedom is a fundamental right which is
entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among
human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his ,reator
@hief H#stice .nri6#e M. (ernandoIs separate opinion in ,er"an *s.
Barangan, 147 !%A 71B, 74?9741A.
The right to religious profession and worship has a
TWA:>AL7 /S#6,T, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
oneFs belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is sub*ect to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare
The sole *ustification for a prior restraint or limitation on
the exercise of religious freedom +according to the late Chief >ustice
Claudio Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aerman vs. 9arangan, 1;I
"C/A I1C, I15, is the existence of a grave and present danger of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest,
that the State has a right 'and duty) to prevent.- /bsent such a threat
to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is
not *ustified.
The S, is not persuaded that by exempting the
8ehovahFs Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national
anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group which
admittedly comprises a -small portion of the school population- will
sha<e up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation
-untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for the
flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes-
@,erona *s. !ec. of .d#cation, 1?+ 0hil. 2, 2B,. /fter all, what the
petitioners see< only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not
exclusion from the public schools where they may study the
,onstitution, the democratic way of life and form of government, and
learn not only the arts, sciences, #hilippine history and culture but
also receive training for a vocation of profession and be taught the
virtues of -patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for
national heroes, the rights and duties of citienship, and moral and
spiritual values @!ec. 4O2P, Art. ;I<, 1987 onstit#tionA as part of the
c#rric#la. 6xpelling or banning the petitioners from #hilippine
schools will bring about the very situation that this ,ourt had feared
in 9erona. >orcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of
the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious
beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for
dully constituted authorities.
As Mr. H#stice Hac:son re"ar:ed in 8est <irginia *s. Barnette, 419 J.!.
+2B @19B4A2
. . . $o )elie*e that patriotis" will not flo#rish if patriotic cere"onies are
*ol#ntary and spontaneo#s instead of a co"p#lsory ro#tine is to "a:e an
#nflattering esti"ate of the appeal of o#r instit#tions to free "inds. . . .
8hen they Odi*ersityP are so har"less to others or to the !tate as those
we deal with here, the price is not too great. B#t freedo" to differ is not
li"ited to things that do not "atter "#ch. $hat wo#ld )e a "ere shadow of
freedo". $he test of its s#)stance is the right to differ as to things that
to#ch the heart of the e5isting order.
(#rther"ore, let it )e noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, . . . L assuming that such unity and loyalty can be attained
through coercion L is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable
at the expense of religious liberty. / desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means. @Meyer *s. 3e)ras:a, 2+2 J.!. 49?, +7
L. ed. 1?B2, 1?B+.A
Doreover, the expulsion of members of 8ehovahFs Witnesses from
the schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as
#hilippine citiens, under the %(!4 ,onstitution, to receive free
education, for it is the duty of the State to -protect and promote the
right of all citiens to quality education . . . and to ma<e such
education accessible to all 'Sec. %, /rt. H;M).
S, holds that a similar exemption may be accorded to the 8ehovahFs
Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of
respect for their religious beliefs, however -biarre- those beliefs
may seem to others. 2evertheless, their right not to participate in the
flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises . It is appropriate to recall the Hapanese occ#pation of o#r
co#ntry in 19B2919BB when e*ery (ilipino, regardless of religio#s
pers#asion, in fear of the in*ader, sal#ted the Hapanese flag and )owed
)efore e*ery Hapanese soldier. 0erhaps, if petitioners had li*ed thro#gh
that dar: period of o#r history, they wo#ld not 6#i))le now a)o#t sal#ting
the 0hilippine flag. (or when li)eration ca"e in 19BB and o#r own flag was
pro#dly hoisted aloft again, it was a )ea#tif#l sight to )ehold that "ade o#r
hearts po#nd with pride and -oy o*er the newly9regained freedo" and
so*ereignty of o#r nation.
Altho#gh the o#rt #pholds in this decision the petitionersI right #nder o#r
onstit#tion to ref#se to sal#te the 0hilippine flag on acco#nt of their
religio#s )eliefs, we hope, ne*ertheless, that another foreign in*asion of
o#r co#ntry will not )e necessary in order for o#r co#ntry"en to appreciate
and cherish the 0hilippine flag.
E(02'*' >(. E(/29012
A.M. N+. P021%51, !1,) 22, 200%
(NOTE" S029/0 ,)102'. 8),)>+.),/) *is9]9*is S029/0 S)E'2'09+,H S029/0
N)102'.90:)
FACTS"
In a sworn9letter co"plaint dated H#ly 27, 2???, co"plainant Ale-andro
.strada re6#ested H#dge Hose (. aoi)es, Hr., presiding -#dge of Branch
274, %egional $rial o#rt of Las 0iNas ity, for an in*estigation of
respondent !oledad .scritor, co#rt interpreter in said co#rt, for li*ing with
a "an not her h#s)and, and ha*ing )orne a child within this li*e9in
arrange"ent. .strada )elie*es that .scritor is co""itting an i""oral act
that tarnishes the i"age of the co#rt, th#s she sho#ld not )e allowed to
re"ain e"ployed therein as it "ight appear that the co#rt condones her
act.O2P onse6#ently, respondent was charged with co""itting
=disgracef#l and i""oral cond#ct> #nder Boo: <, $itle I, hapter <I, !ec.
B+@)A@7A of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode.
/espondent 1scritor testified that when she entered the #udiciar$ in 1444,
she was alread$ a widow, her husband having died in 1448. "he admitted
that she started living with (uciano Ruilapio, >r. without the benefit of
marriage more than twent$ $ears ago when her husband was still alive but
living with another woman. "he also admitted that she and Ruilapio have
a son. 9ut as a member of the religious sect known as the >ehovahBs
-itnesses and the -atch Tower and 9ible Tract "ociet$, respondent
asserted that their con#ugal arrangement is in conformit$ with their
religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation. 'n fact, after
ten $ears of living together, she e%ecuted on >ul$ 28, 1441, a 28eclaration
of 6ledging Laithfulness.3
Lor >ehovahBs -itnesses, the 8eclaration allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned b$ their spouses to enter into
marital relations . The 8eclaration thus makes the resulting union moral
and binding within the congregation all over the world e%cept in countries
where divorce is allowed. As laid o#t )y the tenets of their faith, the
8ehovah?s congregation requires that at the time the declarations are
executed, the couple cannot secure the civil authorities? approval of
the marital relationship because of legal impediments. Knl$ couples
who have been baptiEed and in good standing ma$ e%ecute the
8eclaration, which re.uires the approval of the elders of the congregation.
As a matter of practice, the marital status of the declarants and their
respective spousesB commission of adulter$ are investigated before the
declarations are e%ecuted. 1scritor and RuilapioBs declarations were
e%ecuted in the usual and approved form prescribed b$ the >ehovahBs
-itnesses, approved b$ elders of the congregation where the declarations
were e%ecuted, and recorded in the -atch Tower Central Kffice.
0oreover, the >ehovahBs congregation believes that once all legal
impediments for the couple are lifted, the validit$ of the declarations
ceases, and the couple should legaliEe their union. In .scritorKs case,
altho#gh she was widowed in 1998, there)y lifting the legal i"pedi"ent to
"arry on her part, her "ate was still not capacitated to re"arry. $h#s,
their declarations re"ained *alid. 'n sum, therefore, insofar as the
congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the con#ugal
arrangement between 1scritor and Ruilapio and the$ remain members in
good standing in the congregation.
82
ISSUE"
8hether or not the Ad"inistrati*e case herein sho#ld )e dis"issedC
HELD"
D.!. In o#r decision dated A#g#st B, 2??4, after a long and ard#o#s
scr#tiny into the origins and de*elop"ent of the religion cla#ses in the
Jnited !tates @J.!.A and the 0hilippines, we held that in resol*ing clai"s
in*ol*ing religio#s freedo" '% ) 1626MAL62T 26CT./L;T@ A.
/,,ADDA7/T;A2, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit,
intent and framewor< underlying the religion clauses in our
,onstitutionJ and '&) in deciding respondent?s =plea of exemption
based on the >ree 6xercise ,lause0 'from the law with which she is
administratively charged), it is the ,AD#6LL;29 ST/T6 ;2T6.6ST
T6ST, the strictest test, which must be applied.
In s#", a re*iew of the 'ld 8orld antecedents of religion shows the
"o*e"ent of esta)lish"ent of religion as an engine to pro"ote state
interests, to the principle of non9esta)lish"ent to allow the free e5ercise of
religion.
(1) R).9A9+, C.'1()( 9, 0;) U.S. C+,0)C0
J.!. history has produced TWA identifiably different, even opposing,
strains of *urisprudence on the religion clauses.
%. >irst is TH6 ST/27/.7 A> S6#/./T;A2, which ma$ take
the form of either 'a) strict separation or 'b) the tamer version
of strict neutrality or separation , or what Dr. 8ustice ,arpio
refers to as the second theory of governmental neutrality .
Although the latter form is not as hostile to religion as the former ,
both are anchored on the 8effersonian premise that a =wall
of separation0 must exist between the state and the ,hurch
to protect the state from the church. Both protect the principle
of ch#rch9state separation with a rigid reading of the principle.
&. An the other hand, the second standard, the
1626MAL62T 26CT./L;T@ A. /,,ADDA7/T;A2, is
buttressed by the view that 0;) @'.. +< ()E'2'09+, 9( D)',0 0+
E2+0)/0 0;) /;12/; <2+D 0;) (0'0).
FIRST STANDARD" S029/0 S)E'2'09+, ',* S029/0 N)102'.90:HS)E'2'09+,
$he STRICT SEPARATIONIST believes that the 6stablishment ,lause
was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state?s
hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two.
According to this Heffersonian *iew, an =absolute barrier0 to formal
interdependence of religion and state needs to be erected. .eligious
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the
state. 2or could the state ad*ust its secular programs to alleviate
burdens the programs placed on believers. 'nly the co"plete
separation of religion fro" politics wo#ld eli"inate the for"al infl#ence of
religio#s instit#tions and pro*ide for a free choice a"ong political *iews,
th#s a strict =wall of separation> is necessary.
"trict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is deepl$ embedded in
American histor$ and contemporar$ practice that enormous amounts of
aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion from government in return for
huge amounts of mostl$ indirect aid from religion. (or e5a"ple, less than
twenty9fo#r ho#rs after ongress adopted the (irst A"end"entKs
prohi)ition on laws respecting an esta)lish"ent of religion, ongress
decided to e5press its than:s to ,od Al"ighty for the "any )lessings
en-oyed )y the nation with a resol#tion in fa*or of a presidential
procla"ation declaring a national day of $han:sgi*ing and 0rayer. $h#s,
strict separationists are ca#ght in an aw:ward position of clai"ing a
constit#tional principle that has ne*er e5isted and is ne*er li:ely to.
The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the STRICT
NEUTRALIT- OR SEPARATIONIST VIE=, @or, the governmental
neutralit$ theor$A finds )asis in .*erson *. Board of .d#cation, where the
o#rt declared that HeffersonKs =wall of separation> encaps#lated the
"eaning of the (irst A"end"ent. 1owe*er, unli<e the strict
separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the =wall of
separation0 does not require the state to be their adversary.0
.ather, the state must be 26CT./L in its relations with groups of
religious believers and non:believers. =!tate power is no "ore to )e
#sed so as to handicap religions than it is to fa*or the".> The strict
neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding
that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for
purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or
pri*ileges or i"poses d#ties or o)ligations. Anly secular criteria may be
the basis of government action. It does not per"it, "#ch less re6#ire,
acco""odation of sec#lar progra"s to religio#s )elief.
The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if
applied in interpreting the 6stablishment ,lause, it could lead to a de
facto voiding of religious expression in the >ree 6xercise ,lause. As
pointed o#t )y H#stice ,old)erg in his conc#rring opinion in A)ington
!chool District *. !che"ppP strict neutrality could lead to =a brooding
and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active,
hostility to the religious0 which is prohibited by the
,onstitution.0rofessor La#rence $ri)e co""ented in his a#thoritati*e
treatise, *i&2
$o "ost o)ser*ers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with
the very idea of a free exercise clause. $he (ra"ers, whate*er specific
applications they "ay ha*e intended, clearly en*isioned religion as
so"ething specialG they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing
the free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science.
The strict neutrality approach all but erases this distinction. $h#s it is
not s#rprising that the OJ.!.P !#pre"e o#rt has re-ected strict ne#trality,
per"itting and so"eti"es "andating religio#s classifications.
$h#s, the dilemma of the separationist approach, whether in the form
of strict separation or strict neutrality, is that while the 8effersonian
wall of separation =captures the spirit of the /merican ideal of
church:state separation,0 in real life, church and state are not and
cannot be totally separate. This is all the more true in contemporary
times when both the government and religion are growing and
expanding their spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in the
intersection of government and religion at many points.
SECOND STANDARD" &),)>+.),0 N)102'.90:HA//+DD+*'09+,
$he theory of )ene*olent ne#trality or acco""odation is pre"ised on a
different *iew of the =wall of separation,> associated with 8illia"s, fo#nder
of the %hode Island colony. Cnli<e the 8effersonian wall that is meant
to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect the
church from the state
1enevolent neutrality recognies that religion plays an important
role in the public life of the Cnited States as shown by many
traditional government practices which, to strict neutralit$, pose
1stablishment Clause .uestions. Among these are the inscription of 2'n
Aod -e Trust3 on American currenc$) the recognition of America as 2one
nation under Aod3 in the official pledge of allegiance to the flag) the
"upreme CourtBs time7honored practice of opening oral argument with the
invocation 2Aod save the !nited "tates and this &onorable Court3) and
the practice of Congress and ever$ state legislature of pa$ing a chaplain,
usuall$ of a particular 6rotestant denomination, to lead representatives in
pra$er. These practices clearl$ show the preference for one theological
viewpoint* the existence of and potential for intervention by a god *
over the contrar$ theological viewpoint of atheism. Church and
government agencies also cooperate in the building of low7cost housing
and in other forms of poor relief, in the treatment of alcoholism and drug
addiction, in foreign aid and other government activities with strong moral
dimension.
EC'DE.)( +< '//+DD+*'09+,( 9, AD)29/', B129(E21*),/) also
a)o#nd, incl#ding, )#t not li"ited to the C.S. ,ourt declaring the
following acts as constitutional+ a state hiring a #resbyterian
minister to lead the legislature in daily prayers, or requiring
employers to pay wor<ers compensation when the resulting
inconsistency between wor< and Sabbath leads to dischargeJ for
government to give money to religiously:affiliated organiations to
teach adolescents about proper sexual behaviorJ or to provide
religious school pupils with boo<sJ or bus rides to religious schoolsJ
or with cash to pay for state:mandated standardied tests.
(1) L)A9(.'09>) A/0( ',* 0;) F2)) EC)2/9() C.'1()
As with the other rights #nder the onstit#tion, the rights e")odied in the
%eligion cla#ses are in*o:ed in relation to go*ern"ental action, al"ost
in*aria)ly in the for" of legislati*e acts.
9enerally spea<ing, a legislative act that purposely aids or inhibits
religion will be challenged as unconstitutional, either because it
violates the >ree 6xercise ,lause or the 6stablishment ,lause or
both. This is true whether one subscribes to the separationist
approach or the benevolent neutrality or accommodationist
approach.
B#t the "ore diffic#lt religion cases in*ol*e legislati*e acts which ha*e a
sec#lar p#rpose and general applica)ility, )#t "ay incidentally or
inad*ertently aid or )#rden religio#s e5ercise. $ho#gh the go*ern"ent
action is not religio#sly "oti*ated, these laws ha*e a =)#rdenso"e effect>
on religio#s e5ercise.
$he benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed,
not to promote the government?s favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person?s or institution?s religion.
As H#stice Brennan e5plained, the =government GmayI ta<e religion
into accountWto exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious
exercise may flourish.0 ;n the ideal world, the legislature would
recognie the religions and their practices and would consider them,
when practical, in enacting laws of general application. 1ut when
83
the legislature fails to do so, religions that are threatened and
burdened may turn to the courts for protection.
$h#s, what is so#ght #nder the theory of acco""odation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an
exemption from its application or its =burdensome effect,0 whether
by the legislature or the courts. Most of the free e5ercise clai"s )ro#ght
to the J.!. o#rt are for e5e"ption, not in*alidation of the facially ne#tral
law that has a =)#rdenso"e> effect.
(2) FREE E3ERCISE !129(E21*),/)" S;)28)20, -+*)2 ',* SD90;
$he pinnacle of free exercise protection and the theory of
accommodation in the J.!. )losso"ed in the case of !her)ert *. <erner,
which ruled that state regulation that indirectly restrains or punishes
religious belief or conduct must be sub*ected to strict scrutiny under
the >ree 6xercise ,lause. According to !her)ert, when a law of
general application infringes religious exercise, albeit incidentally,
the state interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount and
compelling as to override the free exercise claim. Atherwise, the
,ourt itself will carve out the exemption.
;t is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all
the laws of the landJ but when general laws conflict with scruples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some
=compelling state interest0 intervenes.
Thus, Sherbert and subsequent cases held that when government
action burdens, even inadvertently, a sincerely held religious belief
or practice, the state must *ustify the burden by demonstrating that
the law embodies a compelling interest, that no less restrictive
alternative exists, and that a religious exemption would impair the
state?s ability to effectuate its compelling interest. As in other
instances of state action affecting f#nda"ental rights, negati*e i"pacts on
those rights de"and the highest le*el of -#dicial scr#tiny. After !her)ert,
this strict scr#tiny )alancing test res#lted in co#rt9"andated religio#s
e5e"ptions fro" facially9ne#tral laws of general application whene*er
#n-#stified )#rdens were fo#nd.
Then, in the %(4& case of Wisconsin v. @oder,GB%I the C.S. ,ourt
again ruled that religious exemption was in order, notwithstanding
that the law of general application had a criminal penalty. Csing
heightened scrutiny, the ,ourt overturned the conviction of /mish
parents for violating Wisconsin compulsory school:attendance laws.
The ,ourt, in effect, granted exemption from a neutral, criminal
statute that punished religiously motivated conduct.
The cases of Sherbert and @oder laid out the following doctrines+ @a)
free exercise clause claims were sub*ect to heightened scrutiny or
compelling interest test if government substantially burdened the
exercise of religionJ 'b) heightened scrutiny or compelling interest
test governed cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of
religion triggered a criminal or civil penalty, as well as cases where
the burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted in the
forfeiture of a government benefitJ and 'c) the ,ourt could carve out
accommodations or exemptions from a facially neutral law of general
application, whether general or criminal.
$he !her)ert9Doder doctrine had fi*e "ain co"ponents. (irst, action was
protectedEcond#ct )eyond speech, press, or worship was incl#ded in the
shelter of freedo" of religion. 3either !her)ertKs ref#sal to wor: on the
!a))ath nor the A"ish parentsK ref#sal to let their children attend ninth
and tenth grades can )e classified as cond#ct protected )y the other
cla#ses of the (irst A"end"ent. !econd, indirect i"positions on religio#s
cond#ct, s#ch as the denial of twenty9si5 wee:s of #ne"ploy"ent
ins#rance )enefits to Adel !her)ert, as well as direct restraints, s#ch as
the cri"inal prohi)ition at iss#e in Doder, were prohi)ited. $hird, as the
lang#age in the two cases indicate, the protection granted was
extensive. Anly extremely strong governmental interests *ustified
impingement on religious conduct, as the absolute language of the
test of the >ree 6xercise ,lause suggests.
(3) ACCOMMODATION 1,*)2 0;) R).9A9+, C.'1()(
A <2)) )C)2/9() /.'9D co#ld res#lt to THREE 7INDS OF
ACCOMMODATION2 'a) those which are found to be constitutionally
compelled, i.e., required by the >ree 6xercise ,lauseJ 'b) those
which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., not required by the >ree
6xercise ,lause but nonetheless permitted by the 6stablishment
,lauseJ and 'c) those which the religion clauses prohibit.
A. MANDATOR- ACCOMMODATION res#lts when the o#rt finds that
acco""odation is required by the >ree 6xercise ,lause, i.e, when the
o#rt itself car*es o#t an e5e"ption. This accommodation occurs when
all three conditions of the compelling interest test are met+

+1, a statute or government action has burdened claimantBs free e%ercise
of religion, and there is no doubt as to the sincerit$ of the religious beliefG
+2, the state has failed to demonstrate a particularl$ important or
compelling governmental goal in preventing an e%emption) and
+;, that the state has failed to demonstrate that it used the least restrictive
means.
;n these cases, the ,ourt finds that the in*ury to
religious conscience is so great and the advancement of public
purposes is incomparable that only indifference or hostility could
explain a refusal to ma<e exemptions. $h#s, if the stateKs o)-ecti*e
co#ld )e ser*ed as well or al"ost as well )y granting an e5e"ption to
those whose religio#s )eliefs are )#rdened )y the reg#lation, the o#rt
"#st grant the e5e"ption. The @oder case is an example where the
,ourt held that the state must accommodate the religious beliefs of
the /mish who ob*ected to enrolling their children in high school as
required by law. $he !her)ert case is another e5a"ple where the o#rt
held that the state #ne"ploy"ent co"pensation plan "#st acco""odate
the religio#s con*ictions of !her)ert.
&. PERMISSIVE ACCOMMODATION , the o#rt finds that the State
may, but is not required to, accommodate religious interests. $he
J.!. 8al& case ill#strates this sit#ation where the J.!. !#pre"e o#rt
#pheld the constit#tionality of tax exemption given by 2ew @or< to
church properties, but did not rule that the state was required to
provide tax exemptions. $he o#rt declared that =@tAhe li"its of
per"issi)le state acco""odation to religion are )y no "eans co9
e5tensi*e with the noninterference "andated )y the (ree .5ercise
la#se.> 'ther e5a"ples are Xorach *. la#son, allowing released ti"e in
p#)lic schools and Marsh *. ha")ers, allowing pay"ent of legislati*e
chaplains fro" p#)lic f#nds. 0arenthetically, the o#rt in !"ith has r#led
that this is the only acco""odation allowed )y the %eligion la#ses.
C. PROHI&ITED ACCOMMODATION. as when the ,ourt finds no
basis for a mandatory accommodation, or it determines that the
legislative accommodation runs afoul of the establishment or the
free exercise clause, it results to a ;n this case, the ,ourt finds that
establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation
interests. $o say that there are *alid e5e"ptions )#ttressed )y the (ree
.5ercise la#se does not "ean that all clai"s for free e5ercise
e5e"ptions are *alid. /n example where accommodation was
prohibited is Dc,ollum v. 1oard of 6ducation, where the ,ourt ruled
against optional religious instruction in the public school premises.
,i*en that a free e5ercise clai" co#ld lead to three different res#lts, the
6#estion now re"ains as to how the o#rt sho#ld deter"ine which action
to ta:e. In this regard, it is the strict scr#tiny9co"pelling state interest test
which is "ost in line with the )ene*olent ne#trality9acco""odation
approach.
Jnder the benevolent:neutrality theory, the principle #nderlying the (irst
A"end"ent is that <2))*+D 0+ /'22: +10 +,)K( *109)( 0+ ' S1E2)D)
&)9,A 9( ', 9,'.9),'8.) 29A;0, ,+0 +,) *)E),*),0 +, 0;) A2'/) +<
.)A9(.'012). %eligio#s freedo" is seen as a s#)stanti*e right and not
"erely a pri*ilege against discri"inatory legislation. With religion loo<ed
upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality
allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
4. %eligion la#ses in the 0hilippine onte5t2 onstit#tion, H#rispr#dence
and 0ractice
a. J! onstit#tion and -#rispr#dence *is9]9*is 0hilippine onstit#tion
By -#5taposing the A"erican onstit#tion and -#rispr#dence against that
of the 0hilippines, it is i""ediately clear that one cannot si"ply concl#de
that we ha*e adoptedEloc:, stoc: and )arrelEthe religion cla#ses as
e")odied in the (irst A"end"ent, and therefore, the J.!. o#rtKs
interpretation of the sa"e. Jnli:e in the J.!. where legislati*e e5e"ptions
of religion had to )e #pheld )y the J.!. !#pre"e o#rt as constit#ting
per"issi*e acco""odations, si"ilar e5e"ptions for religion are
"andatory acco""odations #nder o#r own constit#tions. $h#s, o#r 1947,
1974 and 1987 onstit#tions contain pro*isions on ta5 e5e"ption of
ch#rch property,O124P salary of religio#s officers in go*ern"ent instit#tions,
O12BP and optional religio#s instr#ction.O127P '#r own prea")le also
in*o:es the aid of a di*ine )eing.O12+P $hese constit#tional pro*isions are
wholly o#rs and ha*e no co#nterpart in the J.!. onstit#tion or its
a"end"ents. $hey all re*eal witho#t do#)t that the (ilipino people, in
adopting these constit#tions, "anifested their adherence to the
)ene*olent ne#trality approach that re6#ires acco""odations in
interpreting the religion cla#ses.
$he arg#"ent of Mr. H#stice arpio that the A#g#st B, 2??4 ponencia was
erroneo#s insofar as it asserted that the 1947 onstit#tion incorporates
the 8al& r#ling as this case was decided s#)se6#ent to the 1947
onstit#tion is a "isreading of the ponencia. 8hat the ponencia pointed
o#t was that e*en as early as 1947, or "ore than three decades )efore
the J.!. o#rt co#ld *alidate the e5e"ption in 8al& as a for" or
per"issi)le acco""odation, we ha*e already incorporated the sa"e in
o#r onstit#tion, as a "andatory acco""odation.
$here is no a")ig#ity with regard to the 0hilippine onstit#tionKs
depart#re fro" the J.!. onstit#tion, insofar as religio#s acco""odations
are concerned. It is ind#)ita)le that benevolent neutrality:
84
accommodation, whether mandator$ or permissive, is the spirit, intent
and fra"ewor: #nderlying the 0hilippine onstit#tion.O128P As stated in
o#r Decision, dated A#g#st B, 2??42
The history of the religion clauses in the %(!4 ,onstitution shows
that these clauses were largely adopted from the >irst /mendment of
the C.S. ,onstitution 5555 0hilippine -#rispr#dence and co""entaries on
the religio#s cla#ses also contin#ed to )orrow a#thorities fro" J.!.
-#rispr#dence witho#t artic#lating the star: distinction )etween the two
strea"s of J.!. -#rispr#dence Oi.e., separation and )ene*olent ne#tralityP.
'ne "ight si"ply concl#de that the 0hilippine onstit#tions and
-#rispr#dence also inherited the disarray of J.!. religion cla#se
-#rispr#dence and the two identifia)le strea"sG th#s, when a religion
cla#se case co"es )efore the o#rt, a separationist approach or a
)ene*olent ne#trality approach "ight )e adopted and each will ha*e J.!.
a#thorities to s#pport it. 'r, one "ight concl#de that as the history of the
(irst A"end"ent as narrated )y the o#rt in .*erson s#pports the
separationist approach, 0hilippine -#rispr#dence sho#ld also follow this
approach in light of the 0hilippine religion cla#sesK history. As a res#lt, in
a case where the party clai"s religio#s li)erty in the face of a general law
that inad*ertently )#rdens his religio#s e5ercise, he faces an al"ost
ins#r"o#nta)le wall in con*incing the o#rt that the wall of separation
wo#ld not )e )reached if the o#rt grants hi" an e5e"ption. $hese
concl#sions, howe*er, are not and were ne*er warranted )y the 1987,
1974 and 1947 onstit#tions as shown )y other pro*isions on religion in
all three constit#tions. It is a cardinal r#le in constit#tional constr#ction
that the constit#tion "#st )e interpreted as a whole and apparently
conflicting pro*isions sho#ld )e reconciled and har"oni&ed in a "anner
that will gi*e to all of the" f#ll force and effect. >rom this construction,
it will be ascertained that the intent of the framers was to adopt a
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses
in the #hilippine constitutions, and the enforcement of this intent is
the goal of construing the constitution
8e therefore re-ect Mr. H#stice arpioKs total adherence to the J.!.
o#rtKs interpretation of the religion cla#ses to effecti*ely deny
acco""odations on the sole )asis that the law in 6#estion is ne#tral and
of general application. (or e*en if it were tr#e that =an #n)ro:en line of
J.!. !#pre"e o#rt decisions> has ne*er held that =an indi*id#alKs
religio#s )eliefs Odo notP e5c#se hi" fro" co"pliance with an otherwise
*alid law prohi)iting cond#ct that the !tate is free to reg#late,> our own
,onstitutions have made significant changes to accommodate and
exempt religion. #hilippine *urisprudence shows that the ,ourt has
allowed exemptions from a law of general application, in effect,
interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and
permissive accommodations.
$o ill#strate, in A"erican Bi)le !ociety *. ity of Manila, the Court granted
to plaintiff e%emption from a law of general application based on the >ree
6xercise ,lause. In this case, plaintiff was re6#ired )y an ordinance to
sec#re a "ayorKs per"it and a "#nicipal license as ordinarily re6#ired of
those engaged in the )#siness of general "erchandise #nder the cityKs
ordinances. 0laintiff arg#ed that this a"o#nted to =religio#s censorship
and restrained the free e5ercise and en-oy"ent of religio#s profession, to
wit2 the distri)#tion and sale of )i)les and other religio#s literat#re to the
people of the 0hilippines.> Altho#gh the o#rt categorically held that the
6#estioned ordinances were not applica)le to plaintiff as it was not
engaged in the )#siness or occ#pation of selling said ="erchandise> for
profit, it also r#led that applying the ordinance to plaintiff and re6#iring it to
sec#re a license and pay a license fee or ta5 wo#ld i"pair its free e5ercise
of religio#s profession and worship and its right of disse"ination of
religio#s )eliefs =as the power to ta5 the e5ercise of a pri*ilege is the
power to control or s#ppress its en-oy"ent.> $he decision states in part,
*i&2
The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and en*oyment of
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. /ny restraint of such right can
only be *ustified li<e other restraints of freedom of expression on the
grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.
/t this point, we must emphasie that the adoption of
the benevolent neutrality:accommodation approach does not mean
that the ,ourt ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise
claim comes before it. $his is an erroneo#s reading of the fra"ewor:
which the dissent of Mr. H#stice arpio see"s to entertain. /lthough
benevolent neutrality is the lens with which the ,ourt ought to view
religion clause cases, the interest of the state should also be
afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the purpose of the test
L to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and forbidden
religious exercise.
555 8hile the o#rt cannot adopt a doctrinal for"#lation that can eli"inate
the diffic#lt 6#estions of -#dg"ent in deter"ining the degree of )#rden on
religio#s practice or i"portance of the state interest or the s#fficiency of
the "eans adopted )y the state to p#rs#e its interest, the o#rt can set a
doctrine on the ideal towards which religio#s cla#se -#rispr#dence sho#ld
)e directed. We here lay down the doctrine that in #hilippine
*urisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality approach not only
because of its merits as discussed above, but more importantly,
because our constitutional history and interpretation indubitably
show that benevolent neutrality is the launching pad from which the
,ourt should ta<e off in interpreting religion clause cases. $he ideal
towards which this approach is directed is the protection of religio#s li)erty
=not only for a minority, however small: not only for a ma*ority,
however large but for each of us0 to the greatest extent possible
within flexible constitutional limits.
II. $1. J%%.3$ 0%'..DI3,!
8e now res#"e fro" where we ended in o#r A#g#st B, 2??4 Decision. As
"entioned, what re"ained to )e resol*ed, #pon which re"and was
necessary, pertained to the final tas: of s#)-ecting this case to the caref#l
application of the compelling state interest test, i.e., deter"ining
whether respondent is entitled to e5e"ption, an iss#e which is essentially
fact#al or e*identiary in nat#re.
There has never been any question that the state has an interest in
protecting the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the
sound administration of *ustice. Indeed, the pro*isions )y which
respondentKs relationship is said to ha*e i"pinged, e.g., Boo: <, $itle I,
hapter <I, !ec. B+@)A@7A of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode, Articles 44B
and 4B9 of the %e*ised 0enal ode, and e*en the pro*isions on "arriage
and fa"ily in the i*il ode and (a"ily ode, all clearly de"onstrate the
!tateKs need to protect these sec#lar interests.
Be that as it "ay, the free exercise of religion is specifically
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our ,onstitution. ;t is
a fundamental right that en*oys a preferred position in the hierarchy
of rights L =the most inalienable and sacred of human rights,0 in the
words of 8efferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend that the
state?s interest is important, because our ,onstitution itself holds
the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in
specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to
religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the
>ree 6xercise ,lause as a source of right by itself.
$h#s, it is not the State?s broad interest in =protecting the institutions
of marriage and the family,0 or even =in the sound administration of
*ustice0 that must be weighed against respondent?s claim, but the
State?s narrow interest in refusing to ma<e an exception for the
cohabitation which respondent?s faith finds moral. ;n other words,
the government must do more than assert the ob*ectives at ris< if
exemption is givenJ it must precisely show how and to what extent
those ob*ectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This,
the Solicitor 9eneral failed to do.
$o paraphrase H#stice Blac:"#nKs application of the co"pelling interest
test, the State?s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that
unbending application of a criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill
any compelling interest, if it does not, in fact, attempt to enforce that
prohibition. ;n the case at bar, the State has not evinced any
concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges
against respondent or her partner. $he !tate has ne*er so#ght to
prosec#te respondent nor her partner. $he !tateKs asserted interest th#s
a"o#nts only to the sy")olic preser*ation of an #nenforced prohi)ition.
Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. H. Bellosillo and <it#g, in
their conc#rring opinions in o#r Decision, dated A#g#st B, 2??4, to deny
the e5e"ption wo#ld effecti*ely )rea: #p =an otherwise ideal #nion of two
indi*id#als who ha*e "anaged to stay together as h#s)and and wife
Oappro5i"ately twenty9fi*e yearsP> and ha*e the effect of defeating the
*ery s#)stance of "arriage and the fa"ily.
$he !olicitor ,eneral also arg#ed against respondentKs religio#s freedo"
on the )asis of "orality, i.e., that =the con-#gal arrange"ent of respondent
and her li*e9in partner sho#ld not )e condoned )eca#se ad#ltero#s
relationships are constantly frowned #pon )y society>G and =that !tate laws
on "arriage, which are "oral in nat#re, ta:e clear precedence o*er the
religio#s )eliefs and practices of any ch#rch, religio#s sect or
deno"ination on "arriage. <erily, religio#s )eliefs and practices sho#ld
not )e per"itted to o*erride laws relating to p#)lic policy s#ch as those of
"arriage.>
$he a)o*e arg#"ents are "ere reiterations of the arg#"ents raised )y
M"e. H#stice Dnares9!antiago in her dissenting opinion to o#r Decision
dated A#g#st B, 2??4, which she offers again in toto. $hese arg#"ents
ha*e already )een addressed in o#r decision dated A#g#st B, 2??4.O17BP
In said Decision, we noted that M"e. H#stice Dnares9!antiagoKs
dissenting opinion dwelt "ore on the standards of "orality, witho#t
categorically holding that religio#s freedo" is not in iss#e.P 8e, therefore,
went into a disc#ssion on "orality, in order to show that2
@aA $he p#)lic "orality e5pressed in the law is necessarily sec#lar for in
o#r constit#tional order, the religion cla#ses prohi)it the state fro"
esta)lishing a religion, incl#ding the "orality it sanctions. $h#s, when the
law spea:s of =i""orality> in the i*il !er*ice Law or =i""oral> in the
ode of 0rofessional %esponsi)ility for lawyers, or =p#)lic "orals> in the
%e*ised 0enal ode, or ="orals> in the 3ew i*il ode,O179P or ="oral
character> in the onstit#tion,O1+?P the distinction )etween p#)lic and
sec#lar "orality on the one hand, and religio#s "orality, on the other,
sho#ld )e :ept in "indG
85
@)A /lthough the morality contemplated by laws is secular,
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interestsJ
@cA $he -#risdiction of the o#rt e5tends only to p#)lic and sec#lar
"orality. 8hate*er prono#nce"ent the o#rt "a:es in the case at )ar
sho#ld )e #nderstood only in this real" where it has a#thority.
@dA 1a*ing disting#ished )etween p#)lic and sec#lar "orality and religio#s
"orality, the "ore diffic#lt tas: is deter"ining which i""oral acts #nder
this p#)lic and sec#lar "orality fall #nder the phrase =disgracef#l and
i""oral cond#ct> for which a go*ern"ent e"ployee "ay )e held
ad"inistrati*ely lia)le.'nly one cond#ct is in 6#estion )efore this o#rt,
i.e., the con-#gal arrange"ent of a go*ern"ent e"ployee whose partner is
legally "arried to another which 0hilippine law and -#rispr#dence consider
)oth i""oral and illegal.
While there is no dispute that under settled *urisprudence,
respondent?s conduct constitutes =disgraceful and immoral
conduct,0 the case at bar involves the defense of religious freedom,
therefore none of the cases cited by Dme. 8ustice @nares:Santiago
apply. There is no *urisprudence in #hilippine *urisdiction holding
that the defense of religious freedom of a member of the 8ehovah?s
Witnesses under the same circumstances as respondent will not
prevail over the laws on adultery, concubinage or some other law.
We cannot summarily conclude therefore that her conduct is
li<ewise so =odious0 and =barbaric0 as to be immoral and
punishable by law.
In this case, the government?s conduct may appear innocent and
nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. ;n
the interpretation of a document, such as the 1ill of .ights, designed
to protect the minority from the ma*ority, the question of which
perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreo*er, the
te5t, history, str#ct#re and *al#es i"plicated in the interpretation of the
cla#ses, all point toward this perspecti*e. $h#s, s#)stanti*e e6#alityEa
reading of the religion cla#ses which lea*es )oth politically do"inant and
the politically wea: religio#s gro#ps e6#al in their ina)ility to #se the
go*ern"ent @lawA to assist their own religion or )#rden othersEma<es
the most sense in the interpretation of the 1ill of .ights, a document
designed to protect minorities and individuals from mobocracy in a
democracy 'the ma*ority or a coalition of minorities).
As pre*io#sly disc#ssed, our ,onstitution adheres to TH6
1626MAL62T 26CT./L;T@ /##.A/,H that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the >ree
6xercise ,lause.$h#s, in arg#ing that respondent sho#ld )e held
ad"inistrati*ely lia)le as the arrange"ent she had was 2illegal per se
because, b$ universall$ recogniEed standards, it is inherentl$ or b$ its ver$
nature bad, improper, immoral and contrar$ to good conscience,3 the
!olicitor ,eneral failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.
>inally, even assuming that the AS9 has proved a compelling state
interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the
least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of
the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state end
that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. /gain, the
Solicitor 9eneral utterly failed to prove this element of the test. 'ther
than the two doc#"ents offered as cited a)o*e which esta)lished the
sincerity of respondentKs religio#s )elief and the fact that the agree"ent
was an internal arrange"ent within respondentKs congregation, no iota of
e*idence was offered. In fact, the records are )ereft of e*en a fee)le
atte"pt to proc#re any s#ch e*idence to show that the "eans the state
adopted in p#rs#ing this co"pelling interest is the least restricti*e to
respondentKs religio#s freedo".
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent 6scritor?s con*ugal arrangement cannot
be penalied as she has made out a case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. $he o#rt
recogni&es that state interests "#st )e #pheld in order that freedo"s 9
incl#ding religio#s freedo" 9 "ay )e en-oyed. ;n the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable
to an authority higher than the state, and so TH6 ST/T6 ;2T6.6ST
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will
erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom.
;2 TH6 /1S62,6 A> / SHAW;29 TH/T SC,H ST/T6 ;2T6.6ST
6H;STS, D/2 DCST 16 /LLAW67 TA SC1S,.;16 TA TH6
;2>;2;T6.
ESTRADA >(. ESCRITUR SUMMAR-"
1enevolent 2eutrality recogni&es that the go*ern"ent "#st
p#rs#e its sec#lar goals and interests, )#t at the sa"e ti"e,
stri*e to #phold religio#s li)erty to the greatest e5tent
possi)le within fle5i)le constit#tional li"its. $h#s, altho#gh
the "orality conte"plated )y laws is sec#lar +secular
moralit$,, )ene*olent ne#trality co#ld allow for
acco""odation of "orality )ased n religion +religious
secularit$,, pro*ided it does not offend co"pelling state
interests.
$he COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST in*ol*es a
three9step process. $he o#rt e5plained this process in
detail, )y showing the 6#estions which "#st )e answered in
each step, viE?
1. 2&as the statute or government action created
a burden on the free e%ercise of religionD3 The
courts often look into the sincerit$ of the
religious belief, but without in.uiring into the
truth of the belief. $he (%.. .;.%I!.
LAJ!. prohi)its in6#iring a)o#t its tr#th.
2. $he o#rt then as:s2 2's there a sufficientl$
compelling state interest to #ustif$ the
infringement of religious libert$D3 In this step,
$1. ,'<.%3M.3$ 1A! $' .!$ABLI!1
$1A$ I$! 0J%0'!.! A%. L.,I$IMA$.
('% $1. !$A$. A3D $1A$ $1.D A%.
'M0.LLI3,.
3. $he o#rt as:s2 2&as the state in achieving its
legitimate purposes used the least instrusive
means possible so that the free e%ercise is not
infringed an$ more thanh necessar$ to achieve
the legitimate goal of the stateD3 $he analysis
re6#ires the state to show that the "eans in
which it is achie*eing its legiti"ate state
o)-ecti*e is the L.A!$ I3$%J!I<. M.A3!,
i.e., it has chosen a way to achie*e its
legiti"ate state end that i"poses as little as
possi)le on religio#s li)erties.
MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
GR NO. 88211, S)E0)D8)2. 15, 1989
F'/0(" (erdinand .. Marcos was deposed fro" the presidency *ia the
non9*iolent =people power> re*ol#tion and forced into e5ile. 0res. ora&on
. A6#ino was declared 0resident of the 0hils #nder a re*ol#tionary
go*ern"ent. 1owe*er, the ratification of the 1987 onstit#tion f#rther
strengthened the legiti"acy of Mrs A6#inoKs a#thority. $he co#ntry was far
fro" )eing sta)ili&ed, tho#gh, as contin#ed threats fro" *ario#s sectors
ranging fro" the re)els to the followers of the Marcoses and e*en those
that were initiators of the people power re*ol#tion. 0r. 0arcos has
signified, in his deathbed, to return to the 6hils. 9ut 0rs A.uino
considering the dire conse.uences to the nation of his return has stood
firml$ on the decision to bar the his and his famil$Bs return.
$he case for petitioners is fo#nded on the assertion that the
right of the Marcoses to ret#rn to the 0hilippines is g#aranteed #nder the
following pro*isions of the Bill of %ights, to wit2
!ection 1. 3o person shall )e depri*ed of life, li)erty,
or property witho#t d#e process of law, nor shall any
person )e denied the e6#al protection of the laws.
555 555 555
!ection +. $he li)erty of a)ode and of changing the
sa"e within the li"its prescri)ed )y law shall not )e
i"paired e5cept #pon lawf#l order of the co#rt.
3either shall the right to tra*el )e i"paired e5cept in
the interest of national sec#rity, p#)lic safety, or
p#)lic health, as "ay )e pro*ided )y law.
$he petitioners contend that the 0resident is witho#t power to i"pair the
li)erty of a)ode of the Marcoses )eca#se only a court "ay do so within
the limits prescribed b$ law. 3or "ay the 0resident i"pair their right to
tra*el )eca#se no law has a#thori&ed her to do so. $hey ad*ance the *iew
that )efore the right to tra*el "ay )e i"paired )y any a#thority or agency
of the go*ern"ent, there "#st )e legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of 0r.
0arcos and his famil$ to return to the 6hilippines is guaranteed.
I((1)"
1. 8hether or not the right of the Marcoses of the li)erty of
a)ode and the right to tra*el are *iolatedC
2. 8hether the 0resident has the power to )ar the petitioners
fro" ret#rning ho"eC
H).*"
1. 3'. ;t must be emphasied that the individual right involved is not
the right to travel from the #hilippines to other countries or within
the #hilippines. $hese are what the right to tra*el wo#ld nor"ally
86
connote. 6ssentially, the right involved is the right to return to oneFs
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent
from although related to the right to travel. $h#s, the Jni*ersal
Declaration of 1#"ans %ights and the International o*enant on i*il and
0olitical %ights treat the right to freedo" of "o*e"ent and a)ode within
the territory of a state, the right to lea*e a co#ntry, and the right to enter
oneIs co#ntry as separate and distinct rights. $he Declaration spea:s of
the -right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders
of each state- OArt. 14@1AP separately fro" the -right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country.- OArt. 14@2A.P
'n the other hand, the o*enant g#arantees the /right to li)erty of
"o*e"ent and freedo" to choose his residence/ OArt. 12@1AP and the right
to /)e free to lea*e any co#ntry, incl#ding his own./ OArt. 12@2AP which
rights "ay )e restricted )y s#ch laws as /are necessary to protect national
sec#rity, p#)lic order, p#)lic health or "orals or the separate rights and
freedo"s of others./ OArt. 12@4AP as disting#ished fro" the /right to enter
his own co#ntry/ of which one cannot )e /ar)itrarily depri*ed./ OArt. 12@BA.P
;t would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
right to return to oneFs country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to oneFs country is not among the
rights specifically guaranteed in the 1ill of .ights , which treats only
of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well:
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of international law and, under our
,onstitution, is part of the law of the land G/rt. ;;, Sec. & of the
,onstitution.I H+@)>)2, 90 9( distinct and separate from the right to
travel ',* en*oys a different protection under the ;nternational
,ovenant of ,ivil and #olitical .ights, i.e., against being -arbitrarily
deprived- thereof.
2. D.!. To the 6resident, the problem is one of balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the e%ercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the #residentFs residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people. 't is founded on the dut$ of
the 6resident, as steward of the people. $o paraphrase $heodore
%oose*elt, it is not only the power of the 0resident )#t also his d#ty to do
anything not for)idden )y the onstit#tion or the laws that the needs of the
nation de"and. ;t is a '% ) power borne by the #residentFs duty to
preserve and defend the ,onstitution. ;t also may be viewed as a '&)
power implicit in the #residentFs duty to ta<e care that the laws are
faithfully executed .
It wo#ld not )e acc#rate, howe*er, to state that /e5ec#ti*e
power/ is the power to enforce the laws, for the 0resident is head of state
as well as head of go*ern"ent and whate*er powers inhere in s#ch
positions pertain to the office #nless the onstit#tion itself withholds it.
(#rther"ore, the onstit#tion itself pro*ides that the e5ec#tion of the laws
is only one of the powers of the 0resident. ;t also grants the #resident
other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of
law, e.g., his power over the countryFs foreign relations.
Altho#gh the 1987 onstit#tion i"poses li"itations on the
e5ercise of specific powers of the 0resident, it "aintains intact what is
traditionally considered as within the scope of /e5ec#ti*e power./
orollarily, the powers of the #resident cannot be said to be limited
only to the specific powers enumerated in the ,onstitution. >aced
with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Darcoses to return to the #hilippines, the #resident is, under the
,onstitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in
arriving at a decision. More than that, ha*ing sworn to defend and
#phold the onstit#tion, the 0resident has the o)ligation #nder the
onstit#tion to protect the people, pro"ote their welfare and ad*ance the
national interest. It "#st )e )orne in "ind that the onstit#tion, aside fro"
)eing an allocation of power is also a social contract where)y the people
ha*e s#rrendered their so*ereign powers to the !tate for the co""on
good. 1ence, lest the officers of the ,o*ern"ent e5ercising the powers
delegated )y the people forget and the ser*ants of the people )eco"e
r#lers, the onstit#tion re"inds e*eryone that /OsPo*ereignty resides in the
people and all go*ern"ent a#thority e"anates fro" the"./ OArt. II, !ec. 1.P
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, !R. >(. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. N+. L%2100, M': 30, 198%, FERNAN, !."
FACTS" 0etitioner %icardo L. Manotoc, Hr., is one of the two principal
stoc:holders of $rans9Ins#lar Manage"ent, Inc. and the Manotoc
!ec#rities, Inc., a stoc: )ro:erage ho#se. (ollowing the /r#n/ on stoc:
)ro:erages ca#sed )y stoc: )ro:er !anta"ariaIs flight fro" this
-#risdiction, petitioner, who was then in the Jnited !tates, ca"e ho"e,
and together with his co9stoc:holders, filed a petition with the !ec#rities
and .5change o""ission for the appoint"ent of a "anage"ent
co""ittee for Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc and for $rans9Ins#lar Manage"ent,
Inc. $he petition relati*e to the Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. was granted and a
"anage"ent co""ittee was organi&ed and appointed.
0ending disposition of !. ase, the !. re6#ested the o""issioner
of I""igration not to clear petitioner for depart#re and a "e"orand#" to
this effect was iss#ed )y the o""issioner. 8hen a $orrens title
s#)"itted to and accepted )y Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. was s#spected to
)e a fa:e, si5 of its clients filed si5 separate cri"inal co"plaints against
petitioner and one %a#l Le*eri&a, Hr., as president and *ice9president,
respecti*ely, of Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. In d#e co#rse, corresponding
cri"inal charges for estafa were filed )y the in*estigating fiscal. In all
cases, petitioner has )een ad"itted to )ail with (,J Instance orporation
as s#rety.
0etitioner filed )efore each of the trial co#rts a "otion entitled, /"otion for
per"ission to lea*e the co#ntry,/ stating as gro#nd therefor his desire to
go to the Jnited !tates, /relati*e to his )#siness transactions and
opport#nities./ $he prosec#tion opposed said "otion and after d#e
hearing, )oth trial -#dges denied the sa"e.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the constit#tional right of li)erty of a)ode is herein
*iolatedC
HELD" 3'. / court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to
bail from leaving the #hilippines. This is a necessary consequence
of the nature and function of a bail bond.
The ob*ect of a bail bond is to relieve the accused of
imprisonment and the state of the burden of <eeping him, pending
the trial, and at the sa"e ti"e, to p#t the acc#sed as "#ch #nder the
power of the co#rt as if he were in c#stody of the proper officer, and to
sec#re the appearance of the acc#sed so as to answer the call of the
co#rt and do what the law "ay re6#ire of hi"./
The condition imposed upon petitioner to ma<e himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. The result of the
obligation assumed by appellee 'surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court,
was to prohibit said accused from leaving the *urisdiction of the
#hilippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the *urisdiction of the courts from which
they issued does not extend beyond that of the #hilippines they
would have no binding force outside of said *urisdiction.
Indeed, if the acc#sed were allowed to lea*e the 0hilippines witho#t
s#fficient reason, he "ay )e placed )eyond the reach of the co#rts.
-The effect of a recogniance or bail bond, when fully executed or
filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer
the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in
their charge to <eepers of his own selection. Such custody has been
regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment . The
sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the
principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
state.-
;f the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the
state, more so then has the court from which the sureties merely
derive such right, and whose *urisdiction over the person of the
principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In
fact, this inherent right of the co#rt is recogni&ed )y petitioner hi"self,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total li)erty to lea*e the co#ntry,
for he wo#ld not ha*e filed the "otion for per"ission to lea*e the co#ntry
in the first place, if it were otherwise.
Also, petitioner@s case is not on all fours with the "hepherd case. 'n the
latter case, the accused was able to show the urgent necessit$ for her
travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the
proposed travel thereb$ satisf$ing the court that she would compl$ with
the conditions of her bail bond. In contrast, petitioner in this case has not
satisfactorily shown any of the a)o*e. As aptly o)ser*ed )y the !olicitor
,eneral in his co""ent2
A per#sal of petitionerIs IMotion for 0er"ission to Lea*e the
o#ntryI will show that it is solely predicated on petitionerIs
wish to tra*el to the Jnited !tates where he will, allegedly
attend to so"e )#siness transactions and search for
)#siness opport#nities. Lrom the tenor and import of
petitioner@s motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be
discerned to #ustif$ the grant of #udicial imprimatur thereto.
0etitioner has not s#fficiently shown that there is a)sol#te
necessity for hi" to tra*el a)road. 0etitionerIs "otion )ears
no indication that the alleged )#siness transactions co#ld not
)e #nderta:en )y any other person in his )ehalf. 3either is
there any hint that petitionerIs a)sence fro" the Jnited
!tates wo#ld a)sol#tely precl#de hi" fro" ta:ing ad*antage
of )#siness opport#nities therein, nor is there any showing
that petitionerIs non9presence in the Jnited !tates wo#ld
ca#se hi" irrepara)le da"age or pre-#dice.
#etitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or
shown that his surety has agreed to it. He merely alleges that his
surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.
$he co#rt cannot allow the acc#sed to lea*e the co#ntry witho#t the
assent of the s#rety )eca#se in accepting a )ail )ond or recogni&ance, the
go*ern"ent i"pliedly agrees /that it will not ta:e any proceedings with the
principal that will increase the ris:s of the s#reties or affect their re"edies
against hi".
$he constitutional right to travel being invo<ed by petitioner is not an
absolute right. #etitioner?s contention that having been admitted to
bail as a matter of right, neither the co#rts which granted hi" )ail nor the
!ec#rities and .5change o""ission which has no -#risdiction o*er his
li)erty, co#ld not pre*ent hi" fro" e5ercising his constit#tional right to
tra*el, is #ntena)le.
87
$he constit#tional right to tra*el )eing in*o:ed )y petitioner is not an
a)sol#te right. !ection 7, Article I< of the 1974 onstit#tion states2
/$he li)erty of a)ode and of tra*el shall not )e i"paired
except upon lawful order of the court, or when
necessary in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health.-
$o o#r "ind, the order of the trial co#rt releasing petitioner on )ail
constit#tes s#ch lawf#l order as conte"plated )y the a)o*e96#oted
constit#tional pro*ision.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO >(. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. N+. 94284, AE29. 8, 1991, MELENCIOHERRERA, !.
FACTS" 0etitioner was charged with *iolation of !ection 2? @BA of the
%e*ised !ec#rities Act. In d#e ti"e, he posted )ail for his pro*isional
li)erty. More than two @2A years after the filing of the Infor"ation,
respondent 0eople of the 0hilippines filed an Jrgent e5 parte Motion to
cancel the passport of and to iss#e a hold9depart#re 'rder against
acc#sed9petitioner on the gro#nd that he had gone a)road se*eral ti"es
witho#t the necessary o#rt appro*al res#lting in postpone"ents of the
arraign"ent and sched#led hearings.
The /egional Trial Court issued an Krder directing the
8epartment of Loreign Affairs to cancel 6etitioner@s passport or to den$
his application therefor, and the Commission on 'mmigration to prevent
6etitioner from leaving the countr$. $his order was based primaril$ on the
Trial Court@s finding that since the filing of the 'nformation the accused
has not $et been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on
the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show
that accused /icardo C. "ilverio, "r. has left the countr$ and has gone
abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court/. 0etitionerIs
Motion for %econsideration was denied. 0etitionerIs ertiorari 0etition
)efore the o#rt of Appeals was li:ewise denied.
6etitioner takes the posture, that while the 1485 Constitution recogniEes
the power of the Courts to curtail the libert$ of abode within the limits
prescribed b$ law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel
onl$ on grounds of interest of national securit$, public safet$ or public
health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the
14;I and 145; Constitutions.
Jnder the 1947 onstit#tion, the li)erty of a)ode and of tra*el were
treated #nder one pro*ision. Article III, !ection 1 @BA thereof reads2
/$he li)erty of a)ode and of changing the sa"e within the
li"its prescri)ed )y law shall not )e i"paired./
$he 1974 onstit#tion altered the 1947 te5t )y e5plicitly incl#ding the
li)erty of tra*el, th#s2
/$he li)erty of a)ode and of tra*el shall not )e i"paired
e5cept #pon lawf#l order of the co#rt or when necessary in
the interest of national sec#rity, p#)lic safety, or p#)lic
health/ @Article I<, !ection 7A.
$he 1987 onstit#tion has split the two freedo"s into two distinct
sentences and treats the" differently, to wit2
/!ec. +. $he li)erty of a)ode and of changing the sa"e
within the li"its prescri)ed )y law shall not )e i"paired
e5cept #pon lawf#l order of the co#rt. 3either shall the right
to tra*el )e i"paired e5cept in the interest of national
sec#rity, p#)lic safety, or p#)lic health, as "ay )e pro*ided
)y law./
6etitioner thus theoriEes that under the 1485 Constitution, Courts can
impair the right to travel onl$ on the grounds of national securit$, public
safet$, or public health.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the right to tra*el can )e i"paired #pon lawf#l
order of the o#rt, even on grounds other than the -interest of
national security, public safety or public health-
HELD" D.!. /rticle ;;;, Section B of the %(!4 ,onstitution should be
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired
even without ,ourt Arder, the appropriate executive officers or
administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to
impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of
-national security, public safety, or public health- and -as may be
provided by law,- a limitive phrase which did not appear in the %(4$
text @$he onstit#tion, Bernas, Hoa6#in ,., !.H., <ol. I, (irst .dition, 1987,
p. 2+4A.
/pparently, the phraseology in the %(!4 ,onstitution was a reaction
to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel #rocessing ,enter, which issued
certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party
Article III, !ection + of the 1987 onstit#tion should by no means be
construed as delimiting the inherent power of the ,ourts to use all
means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases
pending before them. 8hen )y law -#risdiction is conferred on a o#rt or
-#dicial officer, all a#5iliary writs, process and other "eans necessary to
carry it into effect "ay )e e"ployed )y s#ch o#rt or officer @%#le 147,
!ection +, %#les of o#rtA.
#etitionerFs argument that the ruling in Danotoc, 8r., v. ,ourt of
/ppeals, et al. 'supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon
an accused admitted to bail to ma<e himself available at all times
whenever the ,ourt requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the %(!4
,onstitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail
bond has remained unchanged whether under the %($5, the %(4$, or
the %(!4 ,onstitution. 1esides, the Danotoc ruling on that point was
but a re:affirmation of that laid down long before in #eople v. Cy
Tuising, B% #hil. "3" '%($5).
#etitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has
violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the ,ourt
when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those
orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused
were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the
territorial confines of the country. 1olding an acc#sed in a cri"inal
case within the reach of the o#rts )y pre*enting his depart#re fro" the
0hilippines "#st )e considered as a *alid restriction on his right to tra*el
so that he "ay )e dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party
in any criminal proceeding is the #eople of the #hilippines. ;t is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course
and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself amenable at all times to ,ourt Arders and processes.
SEC. " RIGHT TO INFORMATION
LEGASPI VS. CIVIL SEVICE COMMISSION
150 SCRA 530, 1987
FACTS" 9!J0%A9
ISSUE" 8hether or not Legaspi sho#ld )e allowed s#ch right
HELD"
$he constit#tional right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic
concern is recogni&ed in the Bill of %ights. These constitutional
provisions are self:executing. $hey s#pply the r#les )y "eans of which
the right to infor"ation "ay )e en-oyed )y g#aranteeing the right and
"andating the d#ty to afford access to so#rces of infor"ation. 1ence, the
f#nda"ental right therein recogni&ed "ay )e asserted )y the people #pon
the ratification of the constit#tion witho#t need for any ancillary act of the
Legislat#re. 8hat "ay )e pro*ided for )y the Legislat#re are reasona)le
conditions and li"itations #pon the access to )e afforded which "#st, of
necessity, )e consistent with the declared !tate policy of f#ll p#)lic
disclos#re of all transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest.
>or every right of the people recognied as
fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
who govern, to respect and protect that right. $hat is the *ery essence
of the Bill of %ights in a constit#tional regi"e. 'nly go*ern"ents operating
#nder f#nda"ental r#les defining the li"its of their power so as to shield
indi*id#al rights against its ar)itrary e5ercise can properly clai" to )e
constit#tional. 8itho#t a go*ern"entIs acceptance of the li"itations
i"posed #pon it )y the onstit#tion in order to #phold indi*id#al li)erties,
witho#t an ac:nowledg"ent on its part of those d#ties e5acted )y the
rights pertaining to the citi&ens, the Bill of %ights )eco"es a sophistry, and
li)erty, the #lti"ate ill#sion.
;n recogniing the peopleFs right to be informed, both
the %(4$ ,onstitution and the 2ew ,harter expressly mandate the
duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records,
documents, papers and in addition, government research data used
as basis for policy development, sub*ect to such limitations as may
be provided by law. $he g#arantee has )een f#rther enhanced in the
3ew onstit#tion with the adoption of a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re, this
ti"e /s#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law,/ in Article II,
!ection 28 thereof, to wit2
!#)-ect to reasona)le conditions prescri)ed )y law, the !tate adopts and
i"ple"ents a policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing
p#)lic interest. @Art. II, !ec. 28A.
In the $anada case, s#pra, the constit#tional g#arantee was )olstered )y
what this o#rt declared as an i"perati*e d#ty of the go*ern"ent officials
concerned to p#)lish all i"portant legislati*e acts and resol#tions of a
p#)lic nat#re as well as all e5ec#ti*e orders and procla"ations of general
applica)ility. 8e granted Manda"#s in said case, and in the process, 8e
fo#nd occasion to e5po#nd )riefly on the nat#re of said d#ty2
. . . $hat d#ty "#st )e enforced if the onstit#tional right of the people to
)e infor"ed on "atters of p#)lic concern is to )e gi*en s#)stance and
88
reality. $he law itself "a:es a list of what sho#ld )e p#)lished in the
'fficial ,a&ette. !#ch listing, to o#r "ind, lea*es respondents with no
discretion whatsoe*er as to what "#st )e incl#ded or e5cl#ded fro" s#ch
p#)lication. @$anada *. $#*era, s#pra, at 49A
The absence of discretion on the part of government agencies in
allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records
in the Affice of the .egister of 7eeds, is emphasied in Subido vs.
Aaeta, s#pra2
6xcept, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination
is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty
under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the
motives, reasons, and ob*ects of the person see<ing access to the
records. ;t is not their prerogative to see that the information which
the records contain is not flaunted before public gae, or that
scandal is not made of it. ;f it be wrong to publish the contents of the
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody
thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. . . . @!#)ido *.
'&aeta, s#pra at 488A.
;t is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this ,ourt that
government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure
of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose
sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the
right to information may be exercised by the public. In the !#)ido
case, 8e recogni&ed the a#thority of the %egister of Deeds to reg#late the
"anner in which persons desiring to do so, "ay inspect, e5a"ine or copy
records relating to registered lands. 1owe*er, the reg#lations which the
%egister of Deeds "ay pro"#lgate are confined to2
. . . prescri)ing the "anner and ho#rs of e5a"ination to the end that
da"age to or loss of, the records "ay )e a*oided, that #nd#e interference
with the d#ties of the c#stodian of the )oo:s and doc#"ents and other
e"ployees "ay )e pre*ented, that the right of other persons entitled to
"a:e inspection "ay )e ins#red . . . @!#)ido *s. '&aeta, 8? 0hil. 484,
487A.
Applying the !#)ido r#ling )y analogy, 8e recogni&ed a si"ilar a#thority
in a "#nicipal -#dge, to reg#late the "anner of inspection )y the p#)lic of
cri"inal doc:et records in the case of Baldo&a *s. Di"aano @Ad". Matter
3o. 112?9MH, May 7, 197+, 71 !%A 1BA. !aid ad"inistrati*e case was
filed against the respondent -#dge for his alleged ref#sal to allow
e5a"ination of the cri"inal doc:et records in his sala. Jpon a finding )y
the In*estigating H#dge that the respondent had allowed the co"plainant
to open and *iew the s#)-ect records, 8e a)sol*ed the respondent. In
effect, 8e ha*e also held that the r#les and conditions i"posed )y hi"
#pon the "anner of e5a"ining the p#)lic records were reasona)le.
In )oth the !#)ido and the Baldo&a cases, 8e were e"phatic in '#r
state"ent that the a#thority to reg#late the "anner of e5a"ining p#)lic
records does not carry with it the power to prohi)it. A distinction has to )e
"ade )etween the discretion to ref#se o#tright the disclos#re of or access
to a partic#lar infor"ation and the a#thority to reg#late the "anner in
which the access is to )e afforded. $he first is a li"itation #pon the
a*aila)ility of access to the infor"ation so#ght, which only the Legislat#re
"ay i"pose @Art. III, !ec. +, 1987 onstit#tionA. $he second pertains to
the go*ern"ent agency charged with the c#stody of p#)lic records. Its
a#thority to reg#late access is to )e e5ercised solely to the end that
da"age to, or loss of, p#)lic records "ay )e a*oided, #nd#e interference
with the d#ties of said agencies "ay )e pre*ented, and "ore i"portantly,
that the e5ercise of the sa"e constit#tional right )y other persons shall )e
ass#red @!#)ido *s. '&aeta, s#praA.
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be sub*ect
to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody
thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and
to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the
part of said agencies. ,ertainly, its performance cannot be made
contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Atherwise, the
en*oyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty,
not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ
of Dandamus in a proper case.
B#t what is a proper case for Manda"#s to iss#eC In the case )efore Js,
the p#)lic right to )e enforced and the conco"itant d#ty of the !tate are
#ne6#i*oca)ly set forth in the onstit#tion. $he decisi*e 6#estion on the
propriety of the iss#ance of the writ of Manda"#s in this case is, whether
the infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner is within the a")it of the
constit#tional g#arantee.
$he incorporation in the onstit#tion of a g#arantee of
access to infor"ation of p#)lic concern is a recognition of the essentiality
of the free flow of ideas and infor"ation in a de"ocracy @Baldo&a *.
Di"aano, Ad". Matter 3o. 112?9MH, May 7, 197+, 17 !%A 1BA. In the
sa"e way that free disc#ssion ena)les "e")ers of society to cope with
the e5igencies of their ti"e @$hornhill *s. Ala)a"a, 41? J.!. 88, 1?2
O1949PA, access to infor"ation of general interest aids the people in
de"ocratic decision9"a:ing @87 1ar*ard Law %e*iew 17?7 O197BP )y
gi*ing the" a )etter perspecti*e of the *ital iss#es confronting the nation.
1ut the constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. ;t does not open every
door to any and all information. Cnder the ,onstitution, access to
official records, papers, etc., are -sub*ect to limitations as may be
provided by law- '/rt. ;;;, Sec. 4, second sentence). $he law "ay
therefore e5e"pt certain types of infor"ation fro" p#)lic scr#tiny, s#ch as
those affecting national sec#rity. It follows that, in e*ery case, the
a*aila)ility of access to a partic#lar p#)lic record "#st )e circ#"scri)ed
)y the nat#re of the infor"ation so#ght, i.e., @aA )eing of p#)lic concern or
one that in*ol*es p#)lic interest, and, @)A not )eing e5e"pted )y law fro"
the operation of the constit#tional g#arantee. The threshold .uestion is,
therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
public concern.
$his 6#estion is first addressed to the go*ern"ent agency
ha*ing c#stody of the desired infor"ation. 1owe*er, as already disc#ssed,
this does not gi*e the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny
access. In case of denial of access, the go*ern"ent agency has the
)#rden of showing that the infor"ation re6#ested is not of p#)lic concern,
or, if it is of p#)lic concern, that the sa"e has )een e5e"pted )y law fro"
the operation of the g#arantee. $o hold otherwise will ser*e to dil#te the
constit#tional right. As aptly o)ser*ed, /. . . the go*ern"ent is in an
ad*antageo#s position to "arshall and interpret arg#"ents against
release . . ./ $o safeg#ard the constit#tional right, e*ery denial of access
)y the go*ern"ent agency concerned is s#)-ect to re*iew )y the co#rts,
and in the proper case, access "ay )e co"pelled )y a writ of Manda"#s.
'n determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. #ublic
concern- like -public interest- is a term that eludes e%act definition.
9oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of sub#ects which the public ma$
want to know , either
%
because these directly affect their lives, or
&
simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citien. ;n the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
$he p#)lic concern in*o:ed in the case of $aNada *. $#*era, s#pra, was
the need for ade6#ate notice to the p#)lic of the *ario#s laws which are to
reg#late the actions and cond#ct of citi&ens. In !#)ido *s. '&aeta, s#pra,
the p#)lic concern dee"ed co*ered )y the stat#tory right was the
:nowledge of those real estate transactions which so"e )elie*ed to ha*e
)een registered in *iolation of the onstit#tion.
$he infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner in this case is the tr#th of the
clai" of certain go*ern"ent e"ployees that they are ci*il ser*ice eligi)les
for the positions to which they were appointed. $he onstit#tion e5pressly
declares as a !tate policy that2
Appoint"ents in the ci*il ser*ice shall )e "ade only according to "erit
and fitness to )e deter"ined, as far as practica)le, and e5cept as to
positions which are policy deter"ining, pri"arily confidential or highly
technical, )y co"petiti*e e5a"ination. @Art. I;, B, !ec. 2. O2PA.
#ublic office being a public trust, G,onst., /rt. H;, Sec+ %I it is the
legitimate concern of citiens to ensure that government positions
are eligibles. #ublic officers are at all times accountable to the
people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.
1ut then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public
interest. >or Dandamus to lie in a given case, the information must
not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee.
In the instant, case while ref#sing to confir" or deny the clai"s of
eligi)ility, the respondent has failed to cite any pro*ision in the i*il
!er*ice Law which wo#ld li"it the petitionerIs right to :now who are, and
who are not, ci*il ser*ice eligi)les. 8e ta:e -#dicial notice of the fact that
the na"es of those who pass the ci*il ser*ice e5a"inations, as in )ar
e5a"inations and licens#re e5a"inations for *ario#s professions, are
released to the p#)lic. &ence, there is nothing secret about one@s civil
service eligibilit$, if actuall$ possessed. 0etitionerIs re6#est is, therefore,
neither #n#s#al nor #nreasona)le. And when, as in this case, the
go*ern"ent e"ployees concerned clai" to )e ci*il ser*ice eligi)les, the
p#)lic, thro#gh any citi&en, has a right to *erify their professed eligi)ilities
fro" the i*il !er*ice o""ission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access
to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of
the respondent ,ommission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
Dandamus, therefore lies.
VALMONTE VS. &ELMONTE
170 SCRA 25%, 1989
FACTS"
9!J0%A9
89
ISSUE" 8hether or not "anda"#s lies to co"pel respondent to perfor"
the acts so#ght )y petitioner to )e done, in p#rs#ance of their right to
infor"ation
HELD"
Des. $he peopleKs right to infor"ation is li"ited to "atters of
p#)lic concern and is f#rther s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as "ay )e
pro*ided )y law. $he ,!I! is a tr#stee of contri)#tions fro" the
go*ern"ent and its e"ployees and ad"inistration of *ario#s ins#rance
progra"s for the )enefit of the latter. Cndeniably, its funds assume a
public character. ;t is the legitimate concern of the public to ensure
that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of
maximiing the benefits to insured government employees.
$he p#)lic nat#re of the loana)le f#nds of the ,!I! and the
p#)lic office held )y the alleged )orrowers "a:e the infor"ation so#ght
clearly a "atter of p#)lic interest and concern.
(#rther"ore, the /constit#ent9"inistrant/ dichoto"y
characteri&ing go*ern"ent f#nction has long )een rep#diated. $hat the
,!I!, in granting the loans, was e5ercising a proprietary f#nction wo#ld
not -#stify the e5cl#sion of the transactions fro" the co*erage and scope
of the right to infor"ation.
/espondent ne%t asserts that the documents evidencing the
loan transactions of the A"'" are private in nature and hence, are not
covered b$ the Constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern which guarantees +a,ccess to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions onl$.
't is argued that the records of the A"'", a government
corporation performing proprietar$ functions, are outside the coverage of
the people@s right of access to official records. 't is further contended that
since the loan function of the A"'" is merel$ incidental to its insurance
function, then its loan transactions are not covered b$ the constitutional
polic$ of full public disclosure and the right to information which is
applicable onl$ to official transactions.
(irst of all, the /constit#ent 9999"inistrant/ dichoto"y
characteri&ing go*ern"ent f#nction has long )een rep#diated. In A(A
*. onfederation of Jnions and ,o*ern"ent orporations and 'ffices
O,.%. 3os. L921B8B and L924+?7, 3o*e")er 29, 19+9, 4? !%A +BBP, the
o#rt said that the go*ern"ent, whether carrying o#t its so*ereign
attri)#tes or r#nning so"e )#siness, discharges the sa"e f#nction of
ser*ice to the people.
Conse.uentl$, that the A"'", in granting the loans, was
e%ercising a proprietar$ function would not #ustif$ the e%clusion of the
transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
Doreover, the intent of the members of the
,onstitutional ,ommission of %(!B, to include government:owned
and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them
within the coverage of the State policy of full public disclosure is
manifest from the records of the proceedings
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive,
and considering further that government7owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietar$ or governmental functions
are accountable to the people, the ,ourt is convinced that transactions
entered into by the 9S;S, a government:controlled corporation
created by special legislation are within the ambit of the peopleFs
right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings.
'n fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted b$ the A"'", sub#ect to reasonable regulations
that the latter ma$ promulgate relating to the manner and hours of
e%amination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records ma$ be
avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records ma$ be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to
inspect the records ma$ be insured
However, although citiens are afforded the right to
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to -access to official
records,- the ,onstitution does not accord them a right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the li<e in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTO&ATO VS. GRP PEACE PANEL
GR N+. 183591, O/0+8)2 14, 2008
FACTS"
8hen 0resident ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo ass#"ed office, the
"ilitary offensi*e against the MIL( was s#spended and the go*ern"ent
so#ght a res#"ption of the peace tal:s. $he MIL(, according to a leading
MIL( "e")er, initially responded with deep reser*ation, )#t when
0resident Arroyo as:ed the ,o*ern"ent of Malaysia thro#gh 0ri"e
Minister Mahathir Moha""ad to help con*ince the MIL( to ret#rn to the
negotiating ta)le, the MIL( con*ened its entral o""ittee to serio#sly
disc#ss the "atter and, e*ent#ally, decided to "eet with the ,%0.
$he parties "et in L#ala L#"p#r on March 2B, 2??1, with the tal:s
)eing facilitated )y the Malaysian go*ern"ent, the parties signing on the
sa"e date the Agree"ent on the ,eneral (ra"ewor: for the %es#"ption
of 0eace $al:s Between the ,%0 and the MIL(. $he MIL( thereafter
s#spended all its "ilitary actions.
(or"al peace tal:s )etween the parties were held in $ripoli, Li)ya
fro" H#ne 2?922, 2??1, the o#tco"e of which was the ,%09MIL( $ripoli
Agree"ent on 0eace @$ripoli Agree"ent 2??1A containing the )asic
principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation2 !ec#rity
Aspect, %eha)ilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Do"ain Aspect. 8ith regard
to the Ancestral Do"ain Aspect, the parties in $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1
si"ply agreed =that the sa"e )e disc#ssed f#rther )y the 0arties in their
ne5t "eeting.>
A second ro#nd of peace tal:s was held in y)er-aya, Malaysia on
A#g#st 797, 2??1 which ended with the signing of the I"ple"enting
,#idelines on the !ec#rity Aspect of the $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1 leading
to a ceasefire stat#s )etween the parties. $his was followed )y the
I"ple"enting ,#idelines on the 1#"anitarian %eha)ilitation and
De*elop"ent Aspects of the $ripoli Agree"ent 2??1, which was signed on
May 7, 2??2 at 0#tra-aya, Malaysia. 3onetheless, there were "any
incidence of *iolence )etween go*ern"ent forces and the MIL( fro" 2??2
to 2??4. Meanwhile, then MIL( hair"an !ala"at 1ashi" passed away
on H#ly 14, 2??4 and he was replaced )y Al 1a- M#rad, who was then the
chief peace negotiator of the MIL(. M#radKs position as chief peace
negotiator was ta:en o*er )y Mohagher I6)al.
In 2??7, se*eral e5ploratory tal:s were held )etween the parties in
L#ala L#"p#r, e*ent#ally leading to the crafting of the draft M'A9AD in its
final for", which, as "entioned, was set to )e signed last A#g#st 7, 2??8.
Before the o#rt is what is perhaps the "ost contentio#s =consens#s>
e*er e")odied in an instr#"ent [ the M'A9AD which is assailed
principally )y the present petitions )earing doc:et n#")ers 184791,
184772, 184894, 184971 and 1849+2. o""only i"pleaded as
respondents are the ,%0 0eace 0anel on Ancestral Do"ain and the
0residential Ad*iser on the 0eace 0rocess @0A00A 1er"ogenes .speron,
Hr. 'n H#ly 24, 2??8, the 0ro*ince of 3orth ota)atoOand <ice9,o*ernor
.""an#el 0iNol filed a petition, doc:eted as ,.%. 3o. 184791, for
Manda"#s and 0rohi)ition with 0rayer for the Iss#ance of 8rit of
0reli"inary In-#nction and $e"porary %estraining 'rder. In*o:ing the right
to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern, petitioners see: to co"pel
respondents to disclose and f#rnish the" the co"plete and official copies
of the M'A9AD incl#ding its attach"ents, and to prohi)it the slated signing
of the M'A9AD, pending the disclos#re of the contents of the M'A9AD
and the holding of a p#)lic cons#ltation thereon. !#pple"entarily,
petitioners pray that the M'A9AD )e declared #nconstit#tional. $his initial
petition was followed )y se*eral other petitions )y other parties. $he o#rt
ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
ISSUE"
8hether there is a *iolation of the peopleKs right to infor"ation on "atters
of p#)lic concern @1987 onstit#tion, Article III, !ec. 7A #nder a state
policy of f#ll disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest @1987
onstit#tion, Article II, !ec. 28A incl#ding p#)lic cons#ltation #nder
%ep#)lic Act 3o. 71+? @L'AL ,'<.%3M.3$ 'D. '( 1991C
HELD" D.!. $he right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic
concern shall )e recogni&ed. Access to official records, and to
doc#"ents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to go*ern"ent research data #sed as )asis for policy
de*elop"ent, shall )e afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations as
"ay )e pro*ided )y law.
As early as 19B8, in !#)ido *. '&aeta, the o#rt has recogni&ed the
stat#tory right to e5a"ine and inspect p#)lic records, a right which was
e*ent#ally accorded constit#tional stat#s.
The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both
the %(4$ ,onstitution and the %(!4 ,onstitution, has been
recognied as a self:executory constitutional right.
In the 197+ case of Baldo&a *. 1on. H#dge Di"aano,the o#rt r#led
that access to p#)lic records is predicated on the right of the people to
ac6#ire infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern since, #ndo#)tedly, in a
de"ocracy, the p#)ic has a legiti"ate interest in "atters of social and
political significance. $he incorporation of this right in the onstit#tion is a
recognition of the f#nda"ental role of free e5change of infor"ation in a
de"ocracy. $here can )e no realistic perception )y the p#)lic of the
nationKs pro)le"s, nor a "eaningf#l de"ocratic decision9"a:ing if they
are denied access to infor"ation of general interest. Infor"ation is
needed to ena)le the "e")ers of society to cope with the e5igencies of
the ti"es. As has )een aptly o)ser*ed2 =Maintaining the flow of s#ch
infor"ation depends on protection for )oth its ac6#isition and its
disse"ination since, if either process is interr#pted, the flow ine*ita)ly
ceases.>
In the sa"e way that free disc#ssion ena)les "e")ers of society to
cope with the e5igencies of their ti"e, access to infor"ation of general
interest aids the people in de"ocratic decision9"a:ing )y gi*ing the" a
)etter perspecti*e of the *ital iss#es confronting the nation, so that they
"ay )e a)le to critici&e and participate in the affairs of the go*ern"ent in a
responsi)le, reasona)le and effecti*e "anner. It is )y ens#ring an
#nfettered and #ninhi)ited e5change of ideas a"ong a well9infor"ed
p#)lic that a go*ern"ent re"ains responsi*e to the changes desired )y
the people.
$he M'A9AD is a "atter of p#)lic concern
90

That the sub*ect of the information sought in the present
cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious challenge. ;n
fact, respondents admit that the DA/:/7 is indeed of public
concern. ;n previous cases, the ,ourt found that the regularity of
real estate transactions entered in the .egister of 7eeds, the need
for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the civil service
eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of 9S;S
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery
of the Darcoses? alleged ill:gotten wealth,G%&3I and the identity of
party:list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern.
Cndoubtedly, the DA/:/7 sub*ect of the present cases is of public
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
Datters of public concern covered by the right to information
include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract. In not disting#ishing as to the e5ec#tory nat#re or co""ercial
character of agree"ents, the o#rt has categorically r#led that the right to
infor"ation =conte"plates incl#sion of negotiations leading to the
cons#""ation of the transaction.> ertainly, a cons#""ated contract is
not a re6#ire"ent for the e5ercise of the right to infor"ation. 'therwise,
the people can ne*er e5ercise the right if no contract is cons#""ated,
and if one is cons#""ated, it "ay )e too late for the p#)lic to e5pose its
defects.

.equiring a consummated contract will <eep the public in the
dar< until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the ,onstitution could not have
intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citienry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the 1ill of .ights.
8e can allow neither an e"asc#lation of a constit#tional right, nor a
retreat )y the !tate of its a*owed =policy of f#ll disclos#re of all its
transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic interest.>
Intended as a =splendid sy""etry> to the right to infor"ation #nder
the Bill of %ights is the policy of p#)lic disclos#re #nder !ection 28, Article
II of the onstit#tion. $he policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re en#nciated in
a)o*e96#oted !ection 28 co"ple"ents the right of access to infor"ation
on "atters of p#)lic concern fo#nd in the Bill of %ights. $he right to
infor"ation g#arantees the right of the people to de"and infor"ation,
while !ection 28 recogni&es the d#ty of officialdo" to gi*e infor"ation
e*en if no)ody de"ands.
$he policy of p#)lic disclos#re esta)lishes a concrete ethical
principle for the cond#ct of p#)lic affairs in a gen#inely open de"ocracy,
with the peopleKs right to :now as the centerpiece. It is a "andate of the
!tate to )e acco#nta)le )y following s#ch policy. $hese pro*isions are
*ital to the e5ercise of the freedo" of e5pression and essential to hold
p#)lic officials at all ti"es acco#nta)le to the people.
8hether !ection 28 is self9e5ec#tory, the records of the
deli)erations of the onstit#tional o""ission so disclose.
E/;'A'2': >(. S)/2)0'2: +< !1(09/)
G.R. N+. 132%01, O/0+8)2 12, 1998
FACTS"
'n H#ne 27, 199+, this o#rt affir"ed the con*iction of petitioner Leo
.chegaray y 0ilo for the cri"e of rape of the 1? year9old da#ghter of his
co""on9law spo#se and the i"position #pon hi" of the death penalty for
the said cri"e.
0etitioner d#ly filed a Motion for %econsideration raising "ainly fact#al
iss#es, and on its heels, a !#pple"ental Motion for %econsideration
raising for the first ti"e the iss#e of the constit#tionality of %ep#)lic Act
3o. 7+79 @the death penalty lawA and the i"position of the death penalty
for the cri"e of rape.
'n (e)r#ary 7, 1998, this o#rt denied petitionerIs Motion for
%econsideration and !#pple"ental Motion for %econsideration with a
finding that ongress d#ly co"plied with the re6#ire"ents for the
rei"position of the death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is
not #nconstit#tional.
In the "eanti"e, ongress had seen it fit to change the "ode of
e5ec#tion of the death penalty fro" electroc#tion to lethal in-ection,OBP and
passed %ep#)lic Act 3o. 8177, A3 A$ D.!I,3A$I3, D.A$1 BD
L.$1AL I3H.$I'3 A! $1. M.$1'D '( A%%DI3, 'J$ A0I$AL
0J3I!1M.3$, AM.3DI3, ('% $1. 0J%0'!. A%$IL. 81 '( $1.
%.<I!.D 0.3AL 'D., A! AM.3D.D BD !.$I'3 2B '( %.0JBLI
A$ 3'. 7+79.O7P 0#rs#ant to the pro*isions of said law, the !ecretary of
H#stice pro"#lgated the %#les and %eg#lations to I"ple"ent %ep#)lic Act
3o. 8177 @/i"ple"enting r#les/AO+P and directed the Director of the B#rea#
of orrections to prepare the Lethal In-ection Man#al.
'n March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a 0etition for 0rohi)ition, In-#nction
andRor $e"porary %estraining 'rder to en-oin respondents !ecretary of
H#stice and Director of the B#rea# of 0risons fro" carrying o#t the
e5ec#tion )y lethal in-ection of petitioner #nder %.A. 3o. 8177 and its
i"ple"enting r#les as these are #nconstit#tional and *oid for )eing,
a"ong others2 @dAan #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power )y ongress,
@eA an #nlawf#l e5ercise )y respondent !ecretary of the power to legislate,
and @fA an #nlawf#l delegation of delegated powers )y the !ecretary of
H#stice to respondent Director.
ISSUE" 8as there #nd#e delegation with respect to the restriction
i"posed on the accessi)ility of the Man#al of .5ec#tionC
HELD" D.!. A caref#l reading of %.A. 3o. 8177 wo#ld show that there is
no #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power fro" the !ecretary of H#stice to
the Director of the B#rea# of orrections for the si"ple reason that #nder
the Ad"inistrati*e ode of 1987, the B#rea# of orrections is a "ere
constit#ent #nit of the Depart"ent of H#stice. (#rther, the Depart"ent of
H#stice is tas:ed, a"ong others, to ta:e charge of the /ad"inistration of
the correctional syste"./ 1ence, the i"port of the phraseology of the law
is that the !ecretary of H#stice sho#ld s#per*ise the Director of the B#rea#
of orrections in pro"#lgating the Lethal In-ection Man#al, in cons#ltation
with the Depart"ent of 1ealth.
1owe*er, the %#les and %eg#lations to I"ple"ent %ep#)lic Act 3o. 8177
s#ffer serio#s flaws that co#ld not )e o*erloo:ed. $o )egin with,
so"ething )asic appears "issing in !ection 19 of the i"ple"enting r#les
which pro*ides2
/!.. 19. .;.J$I'3 0%'.DJ%.. 9 Details of the
proced#re prior to, d#ring and after ad"inistering the lethal
in-ection shall )e set forth in a "an#al to )e prepared )y the
Director. $he "an#al shall contain details of, a"ong others,
the se6#ence of e*ents )efore and after e5ec#tionG
proced#res in setting #p the intra*eno#s lineG the
ad"inistration of the lethal dr#gsG the prono#nce"ent of
deathG and the re"o*al of the intra*eno#s syste".
"aid manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be
limited to authoriEed prison personnel./
Thus, the ,ourts finds in the first paragraph of Section %( of the
implementing rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of 8ustice has
practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on the
execution procedure to the 7irector of the 1ureau of ,orrections, by
not providing for a mode of review and approval thereof. 1eing a
mere constituent unit of the 7epartment of 8ustice, the 1ureau of
,orrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of 8ustice as
the rule:ma<ing authority under ../. 2o. !%44. Such apparent
abdication of departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph
invalid.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the ,ourt finds the
requirement of confidentiality of the contents of the manual even
with respect to the convict unduly suppressive. ;t sees no legal
impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a copy of
the manual. $he contents of the "an#al are "atters of p#)lic concern
/which the p#)lic "ay want to :now, either )eca#se these directly affect
their li*es, or si"ply )eca#se s#ch "atters nat#rally aro#se the interest of
an ordinary citi&en./O+2P !ection 7 of Article III of the 1987 onstit#tion
pro*ides2
/!.. 7. $he right of the people to infor"ation on "atters of
p#)lic concern shall )e recogni&ed. Access to official
records, and to doc#"ents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to go*ern"ent
research data #sed as a )asis for policy de*elop"ent, shall
)e afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itation as "ay )e
pro*ided )y law./
$he incorporation in the onstit#tion of a guarantee of access to
information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of
the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy. In the sa"e
way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their time, access to information of general interest
aids the people in democratic decision:ma<ing by giving them a
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.
C;'>)F >(. PCGG
G.R. N+. 13071%, D)/)D8)2 9, 1998, PANGANI&AN, !."
FACTS"
0etitioner as:s this o#rt to define the nat#re and the e5tent of the
peopleIs constit#tional right to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern.
7oes this right include access to the terms of government
negotiations prior to their consummation or conclusionR Day the
government, through the #residential ,ommission on 9ood
9overnment '#,99), be required to reveal the proposed terms of a
compromise agreement with the Darcos heirs as regards their
alleged ill:gotten wealthR More specifically, are the IG),)2'.
AA2))D),0I and IS1EE.)D),0'. AA2))D),0,I )oth dated Dece")er 28,
1994 and e5ec#ted )etween the 0,, and the Marcos heirs, *alid and
)indingC
91
T;) C'()
These are the main .uestions raised in this original action seeking

+1, to prohibit and :e<n#oin respondents :6CAA and its chairman< from
privatel$ entering into, perfecting andMor e%ecuting an$ greement with the
heirs of the late 6resident Lerdinand 1. 0arcos . . . relating to and
concerning the properties and assets of Lerdinand 0arcos located in the
6hilippines andMor abroad * including the so7called 0arcos gold hoard)
and
+2, to :c<ompel respondent:s< to make public all negotiations and
agreement, be the$ ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or
relating to such negotiations and agreement between the 6CAA and the
0arcos heirs.
T;) F'/0(
0etitioner (rancisco I. ha*e&, as /ta5payer, citi&en and for"er
go*ern"ent official who initiated the prosec#tion of the Marcoses and their
cronies who co""itted #n"itigated pl#nder of the p#)lic treas#ry and the
syste"atic s#)-#gation of the co#ntryIs econo"y,/ alleges that what
i"pelled hi" to )ring this action were se*eral news reports 2 )annered in
a n#")er of )roadsheets so"eti"e in !epte")er 1997. $hese news
ite"s referred to @1A the alleged disco*ery of )illions of dollars of Marcos
assets deposited in *ario#s coded acco#nts in !wiss )an:sG and @2A the
reported e5ec#tion of a co"pro"ise, )etween the go*ern"ent @thro#gh
0,,A and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
0etitioner, in*o:ing his constit#tional right to infor"ation 4 and the
correlati*e d#ty of the state to disclose p#)licly all its transactions
in*ol*ing the national interest, B de"ands that respondents "a:e p#)lic
any and all negotiations and agree"ents pertaining to 0,,Is tas: of
reco*ering the MarcosesI ill9gotten wealth. 1e clai"s that any co"pro"ise
on the alleged )illions of ill9gotten wealth in*ol*es an iss#e of /para"o#nt
p#)lic interest,/ since it has a /de)ilitating effect on the co#ntryIs
econo"y/ that wo#ld )e greatly pre-#dicial to the national interest of the
(ilipino people. 1ence, the people in general ha*e a right to :now the
transactions or deals )eing contri*ed and effected )y the go*ern"ent.
%espondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a co"pro"ise
agree"ent with the Marcos heirs. $hey clai", tho#gh, that petitionerIs
action is pre"at#re, )eca#se there is no showing that he has as:ed the
0,, to disclose the negotiations and the Agree"ents. And e*en if he
has, 0,, "ay not yet )e co"pelled to "a:e any disclos#re, since the
proposed ter"s and conditions of the Agree"ents ha*e not )eco"e
effecti*e and )inding.
ISSUE"
8hether or not this o#rt co#ld re6#ire the 0,, to disclose to the p#)lic
the details of any agree"ent, perfected or not, with the MarcosesC
HELD"
(irst !#)stanti*e Iss#e2
0#)lic Disclos#re of $er"s of Any Agree"ent, 0erfected or 3ot
In see:ing the p#)lic disclos#re of negotiations and agree"ents pertaining
to a co"pro"ise settle"ent with the Marcoses as regards their alleged ill9
gotten wealth, petitioner in*o:es the following pro*isions of the
onstit#tion2
!ec. 7 OArticle IIIP. $he right of the people to infor"ation on
"atters of p#)lic concern shall )e recogni&ed. Access to
official records, and to doc#"ents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
go*ern"ent research data #sed as )asis for policy
de*elop"ent, shall )e afforded the citi&en, s#)-ect to s#ch
li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law.
!ec. 28 OArticle IIP. !#)-ect to reasona)le conditions
prescri)ed )y law, the !tate adopts and i"ple"ents a policy
of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re of all its transactions in*ol*ing p#)lic
interest.
%espondentsI opposite *iew is that the a)o*e constit#tional pro*isions
refer to co"pleted and operati*e official acts, not to those still )eing
considered. As regards the assailed Agree"ents entered into )y the
0,, with the Marcoses, there is yet no right of action that has accr#ed,
)eca#se said Agree"ents ha*e not )een appro*ed )y the 0resident, and
the Marcos heirs ha*e failed to f#lfill their e5press #nderta:ing therein.
$h#s, the Agree"ents ha*e not )eco"e effecti*e. %espondents add that
they are not aware of any ongoing negotiation for another co"pro"ise
with the Marcoses regarding their alleged ill9gotten assets.
$he I9,<+2D'09+,I and the I02',('/09+,(I referred to in the s#)-ect
pro*isions of the onstit#tion have as yet no defined scope and extent.
There are no specific laws prescribing the exact limitations within
which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged. However, the following are some of the recognied
restrictions+
(1) ,'09+,'. ()/1290: D'00)2( ',* 9,0)..9A),/) 9,<+2D'09+,
(2) 02'*) ()/2)0( ',* 8',G9,A 02',('/09+,(
(3) /29D9,'. D'00)2(, ',*
(4) +0;)2 /+,<9*),09'. 9,<+2D'09+,.
Li"itations to the %ight2
(1) N'09+,'. S)/1290: M'00)2(
At the *ery least, this -#risdiction recogni&es the co""on law holding that
there is a go*ern"ental pri*ilege against p#)lic disclos#re with respect to
state secrets regarding "ilitary, diplo"atic and other national sec#rity
"atters. B#t where there is no need to protect s#ch state secrets, the
pri*ilege "ay not )e in*o:ed to withhold doc#"ents and other infor"ation,
pro*ided that they are e5a"ined /in strict confidence/ and gi*en
/scr#p#lo#s protection./
Li:ewise, infor"ation on inter9go*ern"ent e5changes prior to the
concl#sion of treaties and e5ec#ti*e agree"ents "ay )e s#)-ect to
reasona)le safeg#ards for the sa:e of national interest.
(2) T2'*) S)/2)0( ',* &',G9,A T2',('/09+,(
$he drafters of the onstit#tion also #ne6#i*ocally affir"ed that, aside
fro" national sec#rity "atters and intelligence infor"ation, trade or
ind#strial secrets +pursuant to the 'ntellectual 6ropert$ Code and other
related laws, as well as )an:ing transactions @pursuant to the "ecrec$ of
9ank 8eposits Act 28, are also e5e"pted fro" co"p#lsory disclos#re.
(3) C29D9,'. M'00)2(
Also e5cl#ded are classified law enforce"ent "atters, s#ch as those
relating to the apprehension, the prosec#tion and the detention of
cri"inals, which co#rts "ay nor in6#ire into prior to s#ch arrest, detention
and prosec#tion. .fforts at effecti*e law enforce"ent wo#ld )e serio#sly
-eopardi&ed )y free p#)lic access to, for e5a"ple, police infor"ation
regarding resc#e operations, the wherea)o#ts of f#giti*es, or leads on
co*ert cri"inal acti*ities.
(4) O0;)2 C+,<9*),09'. I,<+2D'09+,
$he .thical !tandards Act f#rther prohi)its p#)lic officials and e"ployees
fro" #sing or di*#lging /confidential or classified infor"ation officially
:nown to the" )y reason of their office and not "ade a*aila)le to the
p#)lic./ 'ther ac:nowledged li"itations to infor"ation access incl#de
diplo"atic correspondence, closed door a)inet "eetings and e5ec#ti*e
sessions of either ho#se of ongress, as well as the internal deli)erations
of the !#pre"e o#rt.
S/+E)" M'00)2( +< P18.9/ C+,/)2, ',* T2',('/09+,( I,>+.>9,A P18.9/
I,0)2)(0
In <al"onte *. Bel"onte Hr., the o#rt e"phasi&ed that the infor"ation
so#ght "#st )e -matters of public concern,- access to which may be
limited by law. !i"ilarly, the state policy of f#ll p#)lic disclos#re e5tends
only to -transactions involving public interest- and "ay also )e
-sub*ect to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.- As to the
"eanings of the ter"s IPU&LIC INTERESTI and IPU&LIC CONCERN,I
the o#rt, in Legaspi *. i*il !er*ice o""ission, el#cidated2
In deter"ining whether or not a partic#lar infor"ation is of
p#)lic concern there is no rigid test which can )e applied.
/0#)lic concern/ li:e /p#)lic interest/ is a ter" that el#des
e5act definition. 1oth terms embrace a broad spectrum of
sub*ects which the public may want to <now, either
because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citien. In the final analysis, it is for the co#rts to
deter"ine on a case )y case )asis whether the "atter at
iss#e is of interest or i"portance, as it relates to or affects
the p#)lic.
onsidered a p#)lic concern in the a)o*e9"entioned case was the
-legitimate concern of citiens to ensure that government positions
are eligibles.- !o was the need to gi*e the general p#)lic ade6#ate
notification of *ario#s laws that reg#late and affect the actions and
cond#ct of citi&ens, as held in $aNada. Li:ewise did the -public nature of
the loanable funds of the 9S;S and the public office held by the
alleged borrowers 'members of the defunct 1atasang #ambansa)-
qualify the information sought in Malmonte as matters of public
interest and concern. In A6#ino9!ar"iento *. Morato, the o#rt also
held that official acts of public officers done in pursuit if their official
functions are public in characterJ hence, the records pertaining to
such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the
constitutional right of access to public records.
Jnder R)E18.9/ A/0 N+. %713, p#)lic officials and e"ployees are
mandated to -provide information on their policies and procedures
in clear and understandable language, GandI ensure openness of
information, public consultations and hearings whenever
appropriate . . .,- except when -otherwise provided by law or when
required by the public interest.- ;n particular, the law mandates free
public access, at reasonable hours, to the annual performance
reports of offices and agencies of government and government:
owned or controlled corporationsJ and the statements of assets,
liabilities and financial disclosures of all public officials and
employees.
;n general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in
connection with their official functions must be accessible to the
public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental
92
affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an opportunity
to determine whether those to whom they have entrusted the affairs
of the government are honesty, faithfully and competently
performing their functions as public servants. Cndeniably, the
essence of democracy lies in the free flow of thoughtJ but thoughts
and ideas must be well:informed so that the public would gain a
better perspective of vital issues confronting them and, thus, be able
to criticie as well as participate in the affairs of the government in a
responsible, reasonable and effective manner. ertainly, it is )y
ens#ring an #nfettered and #ninhi)ited e5change of ideas a"ong a well9
infor"ed p#)lic that a go*ern"ent re"ains responsi*e to the changes
desired )y the people.
T;) N'012) +< 0;) M'2/+()(Q A..)A)* I..G+00), =)'.0;
.5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 1, pro"#lgated on (e)r#ary 28, 198+, only two @2A
days after the Marcoses fled the co#ntry, created the 0,, which was
pri"arily tas:ed to assist the 0resident in the reco*ery of *ast go*ern"ent
reso#rces allegedly a"assed )y for"er 0resident Marcos, his i""ediate
fa"ily, relati*es and close associates )oth here and a)road.
Jnder .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 2, iss#ed twel*e @12A days later, all persons
and entities who had :nowledge or possession of ill9gotten assets and
properties were warned and, #nder pain of penalties prescri)ed )y law,
prohi)ited fro" concealing, transferring or dissipating the" or fro"
otherwise fr#strating or o)str#cting the reco*ery efforts of the go*ern"ent.
'n May 7, 198+, another directi*e @.' 3o. 1BA was iss#ed gi*ing
additional powers to the 0,, which, ta:ing into acco#nt the o*erriding
considerations of national interest and national s#r*i*al, re6#ired it to
achie*e e5peditio#sly and effecti*ely its *ital tas: of reco*ering ill9gotten
wealth.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the
DarcosesF alleged ill:gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and
imbued with public interest. 8e "ay also add that - ;LL:9ATT62
W6/LTH,- by its very nature, assumes a public character. Based on
the afore"entioned .5ec#ti*e 'rders, -ill:gotten wealth- refers to
assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by
former #resident Darcos, his immediate family, relatives and close
associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of
government funds or propertiesJ or their having ta<en undue
advantage of their public officeJ or their use of powers, influences or
relationships, -resulting in their un*ust enrichment and causing
grave damage and pre*udice to the >ilipino people and the .epublic
of the #hilippines.- ,learly, the assets and properties referred to
supposedly originated from the government itself. To all intents and
purposes, therefore, they belong to the people. As s#ch, #pon
recon*eyance they will )e ret#rned to the p#)lic treas#ry, s#)-ect only to
the satisfaction of positi*e clai"s of certain persons as "ay )e ad-#dged
)y co"petent co#rts. Another declared o*erriding consideration for the
e5peditio#s reco*ery of ill9gotten wealth is that it "ay )e #sed for national
econo"ic reco*ery.
8e )elie*e the foregoing dis6#isition settles the 6#estion of whether
petitioner has a right to respondentsI disclos#re of any agree"ent that
"ay )e arri*ed at concerning the MarcosesI p#rported ill9gotten wealth.
A//)(( 0+ I,<+2D'09+, +, N)A+09'09,A T)2D(
1ut does the constitutional provision li<ewise guarantee access to
information regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the
final agreementR This same clarification was sought and clearly
addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their
deliberations, which we quote hereunder+
M%. !JA%.X. And when we say transactions which sho#ld
)e disting#ished fro" contracts, agree"ents, or treaties or
whate*er, does the ,entle"an refer to the steps leading to
the cons#""ation of the contract, or does he refer to the
contract itselfC
M%. '0L.. The transactions used here, ' suppose, is
generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
contract, and alread$ a consummated contract, 0r.
6residing Kfficer.
M%. !JA%.X. $his conte"plates incl#sion of negotiations
2leading3 to the cons#""ation of the transactionC
M%. '0L.. Ses, sub#ect to reasonable safeguards on the
national interest.
,onsidering the intent of the ,onstitution, we believe that it is
incumbent upon the #,99 and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information
on any proposed settlement they have decided to ta<e up with the
ostensible owners and holders of ill:gotten wealth. Such information,
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra:agency or inter:agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still
in the process of being formulated or are in the -exploratory- stage.
$here is a need, of co#rse, to o)ser*e the sa"e restrictions on disclos#re
of infor"ation in general, as disc#ssed earlier E s#ch as on "atters
in*ol*ing national sec#rity, diplo"atic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified infor"ation.
S#$%&'( ) R&*+% %' F',- A..'$&/%&'(
SSS EDE.+:))( A((+/9'09+, >(. C+120 +< AEE)'.(
GR 85279, !1.: 28,1989
FACTS" A co"plaint for da"ages was filed )y the !!! against the
officers and "e")ers of the !!! ."ployees Association alleging that on
H#ne 9, 1987, said officers and "e")ers staged an illegal stri:e and
)arricaded the entrances to the !!! )#ilding. !aid action pre*ented non9
stri:ing e"ployees fro" reporting for wor: and clients fro" transacting
with the !!!. !aid stri:e was reported to the 0#)lic !ector La)or
Manage"ent o#ncil that ordered the stri:ers to ret#rn to wor:. !tri:ers
ref#sed conse6#ently inc#rring da"ages for the !!!.
ISSUE" 8hether or not !!! e"ployees ha*e the right to stri:e.
HELD" 3'. $he 1987 onstit#tion, in the Article on !ocial H#stice and
1#"an %ights, pro*ides that the !tate /shall g#arantee the rights of all
wor:ers to self9organi&ation, collecti*e )argaining and negotiations, and
peacef#l concerted acti*ities, incl#ding the right to stri:e in accordance
with law/ OArt. ;III, !ec. 4P.
1y itself, this provision would seem to recognie the right of all
wor<ers and employees, including those in the public sector, to
stri<e. 1ut the ,onstitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub:/rticle on the ,ivil Service ,ommission, it
provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as -all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
9overnment, including government:owned or controlled
corporations with original charters,- that -GtIhe right to self:
organiation shall not be denied to government employees- G/rt.
;H'1), Sec. &'%) and '53)I. #arenthetically, the 1ill of .ights also
provides that -GtIhe right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged- G/rt.
;;;, Sec. !I. Thus , while there is no question that the ,onstitution
recognies the right of government employees to organie , it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to
stri<e.
%esort to the intent of the fra"ers of the organic law )eco"es helpf#l in
#nderstanding the "eaning of these pro*isions. / reading of the
proceedings of the ,onstitutional ,ommission that drafted the %(!4
,onstitution would show that in recogniing the right of government
employees to organie , the commissioners intended to limit the right
to the formation of unions or associations only, without including
the right to stri<e.
$h#s, o""issioner .#logio %. Ler#", one of the sponsors of the
pro*ision that /OtPhe right to self9organi&ation shall not )e denied to
go*ern"ent e"ployees/ OArt. I;@BA, !ec. 2@7AP, in answer to the
apprehensions e5pressed )y o""issioner A")rosio B. 0adilla, <ice9
0resident of the o""ission, e5plained2
M%. L.%JM. I thin: what I will try to say will not ta:e that long.
When we proposed this amendment providing for self:
organiation of government employees, it does not mean
that because they have the right to organie, they also
have the right to stri<e. $hat is a different "atter. 8e are only
tal:ing a)o#t organi&ing, #niting as a #nion. 8ith regard to the
right to stri:e, e*eryone will re"e")er that in the Bill of %ights,
there is a pro*ision that the right to for" associations or
societies whose p#rpose is not contrary to law shall not )e
a)ridged. 3ow then, if the p#rpose of the state is to prohi)it the
stri:es co"ing fro" e"ployees e5ercising go*ern"ent
f#nctions, that co#ld )e done )eca#se the "o"ent that is
prohi)ited, then the #nion which will go on stri:e will )e an
illegal #nion. And that pro*ision is carried in %ep#)lic Act 877.
In %ep#)lic Act 877, wor:ers, incl#ding those fro" the
go*ern"ent9owned and controlled, are allowed to organi&e )#t
they are prohi)ited fro" stri:ing. !o, the fear of o#r honora)le
<ice90resident is #nfo#nded. It does not "ean that )eca#se
we appro*e this resol#tion, it carries with it the right to stri:e.
$hat is a different "atter. As a "atter of fact, that s#)-ect is
now )eing disc#ssed in the o""ittee on !ocial H#stice
)eca#se we are trying to find a sol#tion to this pro)le". 8e
:now that this pro)le" e5istsG that the "o"ent we allow
any)ody in the go*ern"ent to stri:e, then what will happen if
the "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces will go on stri:eC 8hat will
happen to those people trying to protect #sC !o that is a "atter
of disc#ssion in the o""ittee on !ocial H#stice. 1ut, ;
repeat, the right to form an organiation 7A6S 2AT
,/..@ with it the right to stri<e. O%ecord of the
onstit#tional o""ission, *ol. I, p. 7+9P.
B#t are e"ployees of the !!! co*ered )y the prohi)ition against stri:esC
93
$he o#rt is of the considered *iew that they are. onsidering that #nder
the 1987 onstit#tion -GtIhe civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the 9overnment,
including government:owned or controlled corporations with original
charters- G/rt. ;H'1), Sec. &'%)J see also Sec. % of 6.A. 2o. %!3 where
the employees in the civil service are denominated as -government
employees-I and that the SSS is one such government:controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under ../.
2o. %%B%, its employees are part of the civil service O3A!.' *.
3L%, ,.%. 3os. +987? Y 7?297, 3o*e")er 2B, 1988P and are co*ered
)y the i*il !er*ice o""issionIs "e"orand#" prohi)iting stri:es. $his
)eing the case, the stri:e staged )y the e"ployees of the !!! was illegal.
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that -the terms
and conditions of employment in the 9overnment, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed by
L/W- +"ection 11, the 'ndustrial 6eace Act, /.A. Fo. 85I, as amended
and Article 255, the (abor Code, 6.8. Fo. CC2, as amended,. Since the
terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law,
government wor<ers cannot use the same weapons employed by
wor<ers in the private sector to secure concessions from their
employers.
The principle behind labor unionism in #.;M/T6 ;27CST.@ is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
.elations between private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. Sub*ect to the minimum requirements of
wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionied private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining.
;n 9AM6.2D62T 6D#LA@D62T, however, it is the legislature and,
where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of
government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. /nd
this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules,
and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.
It is the stand, therefore, of this o""ission that 1@ .6/SA2 A> TH6
2/TC.6 A> TH6 #C1L;, 6D#LA@6. and TH6 #6,CL;/.
,H/./,T6. A> TH6 #C1L;, S6.M;,6, it must necessarily regard
the right to stri<e given to unions in private industry as not applying
to public employees and civil service employees. ;t has been stated
that the 9overnment, in contrast to the private employer, protects
the interest of all people in the public service , and that accordingly,
such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations
could not exist in the relations between government and those whom
they employ.
..'. 3o. 18?, which pro*ides g#idelines for the e5ercise of the right to
organi&e of go*ern"ent e"ployees, while clinging to the sa"e philosophy,
has, howe*er, relaxed the r#le to allow negotiation where the ter"s and
conditions of e"ploy"ent in*ol*ed are not a"ong those fi5ed )y law.
$h#s2
!.$I'3 14. $er"s and conditions of e"ploy"ent or
i"pro*e"ents thereof, e5cept those that are fi5ed )y law,
"ay )e the s#)-ect of negotiations )etween d#ly recogni&ed
e"ployeesI organi&ations and appropriate go*ern"ent
a#thorities.
$he sa"e e5ec#ti*e order has also pro*ided for the general
"echanis" for the settle"ent of la)or disp#tes in the p#)lic
sector, to wit2
!.$I'3 1+. $he i*il !er*ice and la)or laws and
proced#res, whene*er applica)le, shall )e followed in the
resol#tion of co"plaints, grie*ances and cases in*ol*ing
go*ern"ent e"ployees. In case any disp#te re"ains
#nresol*ed after e5ha#sting all the a*aila)le re"edies #nder
e5isting laws and proced#res, the parties "ay -ointly refer
the disp#te to the O0#)lic !ector La)or9Manage"entP
o#ncil for appropriate action.
9overnment employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the ,ongress for the betterment of the
terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of
legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies
for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. ;f there be
any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the #ublic
Sector Labor:Danagement ,ouncil for appropriate action . 1ut
employees in the civil service may not resort to stri<es, wal<outs and
other temporary wor< stoppages, li<e wor<ers in the private sector,
to pressure the 9overnment to accede to their demands.
V9/0+29',+ >(. E.9F'.*) R+E) =+2G)2(Q U,9+,
GR 2524%, S)E0. 12,1974
FACTS" Appellee Ben-a"in <ictoriano is a "e")er of /Iglesia ni risto/,
an e"ployee of the .li&alde %ope (actory, Inc, and a "e")er of the
.li&alde %ope 8or:ersI Jnion which had with the o"pany a BA
containing a /.+()* (;+E pro*ision which states that Me")ership in the
Jnion shall )e re6#ired as a condition of e"ploy"ent for all per"anent
e"ployees wor:ers co*ered )y this Agree"ent.
!nder "ection C+a,, paragraph C, of /A 85I, the emplo$er was not
precluded from making an agreement with a labor organiEation to re.uire
as a condition of emplo$ment membership therein, if such labor
organiEation is the representative of the emplo$ees. 8hen %A 447? was
enacted, it introd#ced an a"end"ent2 ... /)#t s#ch agree"ent shall not
co*er "e")ers of any religio#s sects which prohi)it affiliation of their
"e")ers in any s#ch la)or organi&ation/.
As a member of a sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with an$
labor organiEation, appellee resigned from the !nion. Thereafter, the
!nion asked the Compan$ to separate Appellee from service in view of
the fact that he was resigning from the !nion as a member. Appellee filed
an action for in-#nction.
ISSUE" 8'3 %A 447? is #nconstit#tional since it infringes on the right to
for" lawf#l associationsC
HELD" 3o. %A 447? does not infringe right to association. Both the
onstit#tion and %A 877 recogni&e freedo" of association. What the
,onstitution and the ;ndustrial #eace /ct recognie and guarantee is
the -right- to form or *oin associations. a right co"prehends at least
two )road notions, na"ely2 first , liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of
legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without
being prevented by lawJ and second, power, whereby an employee
may, as he pleases, *oin or refrain from 8oining an association. ;t is,
therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he
should *oin or not an associationJ and should he choose to *oin, he
himself ma<es up his mind as to which association he would *oinJ
and even after he has *oined, he still retains the liberty and the power
to leave and cancel his membership with said organiation at any
time. ;t is clear, therefore, that the right to *oin a union includes the
right to abstain from *oining any union. Inas"#ch as what )oth the
onstit#tion and the Ind#strial 0eace Act ha*e recogni&ed, and
g#aranteed to the e"ployee, is 0;) I29A;0I to *oin associations of his
choice, it wo#ld )e a)s#rd to say that the law also i"poses, in the sa"e
)reath, #pon the e"ployee the d#ty to -oin associations.
$he right to refrain fro" -oining la)or orgs recogni&ed )y of
the Ind#strial 0eace Act is li"ited. The legal protection granted to such
right to refrain from *oining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a
union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop. 1y virtue, of a
closed shop agreement, before ./ $$53, if any person, regardless of
his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to <eep his
employment, he must become a member of the collective bargaining
union. Hence, the right of said employee not to *oin the labor union
is curtailed and withdrawn. To that all7embracing coverage of the closed
shop arrangement, /A ;;I0 introduced an exception ? -but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organiation-.
It "erely e5cl#des ipso -#re fro" the application and co*erage of the
closed shop agree"ent the e"ployees )elonging to any religio#s sects
which prohi)it affiliation of their "e")ers with any la)or organi&ation.
8hat the e5ception pro*ides, therefore, is that "e")ers of said religio#s
sects cannot )e co"pelled or coerced to -oin la)or #nions e*en when said
#nions ha*e closed shop agree"ents with the e"ployersG that in spite of
any closed shop agree"ent, "e")ers of said religio#s sects cannot )e
ref#sed e"ploy"ent or dis"issed fro" their -o)s on the sole gro#nd that
they are not "e")ers of the collecti*e )argaining #nion. ;t is clear,
therefore, that the assailed /ct, far from infringing the constitutional
provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. ;t
does not prohibit the members of said .6L;9;ACS S6,TS from
affiliating with labor unions. ;t still leaves to said members the liberty
and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religio#s )eliefs, the "e")ers of said religio#s sects
prefer to sign #p with the la)or #nion, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religio#s faith, they ref#se to sign #p, they can do soG the
law does not coerce them to *oin J neither does the law prohibit them
from *oining J and neither may the employer or labor union compel
them to *oin. ./ $$53, therefore, does not violate the constitutional
provision on freedom of association.
I, 2)" I&P D)D8)2(;9E *1)( *).9,M1),/: +< A00: M'2/9'. E*9..9+,
A.C 1928, A1A1(0 3 1978
FACTS" $he IB0 #nani"o#sly adopted a resol#tion co""ending to the
! to re"o*e Marcial .dillion, a d#ly licensed practising lawyer, fro" the
roll of attorneys )eca#se of his st#))orn ref#sal to pay his "e")ership
d#es despite d#e notice. .dillon ref#sed to pay )elie*ing it to )e an
in*asion of his constit#tional rights as he was )eing co"pelled to )e a
"e")er of the IB0 and to pay its d#es was a precondition to "aintaining
his stat#s as a lawyer.
ISSUE" Is co"pelling a lawyer to )e a "e")er of the IB0 *iolating oneKs
constit#tional freedo" to associateC
HELD" 3o. The S, maintains that the ;1# does not ma<e a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is not already a member of. 1y
virtue of his passing the 1ar exams, 6dillon automatically becomes
an ;1# member.
94
$he first o)-ection posed )y the respondent is that the o#rt is witho#t
power to co"pel hi" to )eco"e a "e")er of the Integrated Bar of the
0hilippines, hence, !ection 1 of the o#rt %#le is #nconstit#tional for it
i"pinges on his constit#tional right of freedo" to associate @and not to
associateA. Aur answer is+ To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
;ntegrated 1ar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.
;ntegration does not ma<e a lawyer a member of any group of which
he is not already a member. He became a member of the 1ar when
he passed the 1ar examinations. /ll that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organiation for the well:defined but
unorganied and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a
member.
1ar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his ;ntegrated 1ar
,hapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is sub*ected is the payment of annual
dues. $he !#pre"e o#rt, in order to further the StateFs legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be
shared by the sub*ects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
L the lawyers.
Ass#"ing that the 6#estioned pro*ision does in a sense co"pel a lawyer
to )e a "e")er of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is *ustified as
an exercise of the police power of the state
$he o#rt f#rther "aintains that said IB0 fees is a regulatory measure
intended to raise f#nds for carrying o#t its o)-ecti*es and p#rposes of the
integration. $he o#rt carries the constit#tional power and d#ty to
pro"#lgate r#les that concern ad"issions and practice of law, incl#ding
the integration of the 0hilippine Bar.
Section 10 Non-Impairment Clause
R100)2 >(. E(0)8',
G.R. N+. L 3708 M': 18, 1953
FACTS" 'n 2? A#g#st 19B1, %oyal L. %#tter sold to 0lacido H. .ste)an
two @2A parcels of land sit#ated in the ity of Manila. $o sec#re the
pay"ent of said )alance of 0B,8??, a first "ortgage o*er the sa"e
parcels of land was constit#ted in fa*or of %#tter. $he deed of sale ha*ing
)een registered, a new title was iss#ed in fa*or of 0lacido H. .ste)an with
the "ortgage d#ly annotated on the )ac: thereof. .ste)an failed to pay
the two install"ents as agreed #pon, as well as the interest that had
accr#ed thereon, and so on 2 A#g#st 19B9, %#tter instit#ted an action in
the o#rt of (irst Instance @(IA Manila to reco*er the )alance d#e, the
interest d#e thereon, and the attorneyKs fees stip#lated in the contract. $he
co"plaint also contains a prayer for the sale of the properties "ortgaged
in accordance with law. 1steban admitted averments of the complaint but
set up defense on the moratorium clause embodied in /A ;C2 +approved
2= >ul$ 14C8,, allowing a war sufferer eight +8, $ears from the settlement
of his claim b$ the 6hilippine -ar 8amage Commission. After a "otion for
s#""ary -#dg"ent has )een presented )y .ste)an, and the re6#isite
e*idence s#)"itted co*ering the rele*ant facts, the co#rt rendered
-#dg"ent dis"issing the co"plaint holding that the o)ligation which %#tter
see:s to enforce is not yet de"anda)le #nder the "oratori#" law. %#tter
filed a "otion for reconsideration wherein he raised for the first ti"e the
constit#tionality of the "oratori#" law, )#t the "otion was denied. %#tter
appealed.
ISSUE" 8hether %ep#)lic Act 4B2 is #nconstit#tional for )eing *iolati*e of
the constit#tional pro*ision for)idding the i"pair"ent of the o)ligation of
contractsC
HELD" D.!. !tat#tes declaring a "oratori#" on the enforce"ent of
"onetary o)ligations are not of recent enact"ent. Moratori#" laws ha*e
)een adopted =d#ring ti"es of financial distress, especially when incident
to, or ca#sed )y, a war.> The Doratorium Law is a valid exercise by the
State of its police power, being an emergency measure. /lthough
conceding that the obligations of the contract were impaired, the
impairment was within the police power of the State as that power
was called into exercise by the public economic emergency which
the legislature had found to exist.
The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a
moratorium statute lies in the determination of TH6 #6.;A7 A>
SCS#62S;A2 A> TH6 .6D67@. ;t is required that such suspension
be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the
constitution.
1erein, o)ligations had )een pending since 19B7 as a res#lt
of the iss#ance of .5ec#ti*e 'rders 27 and 42 and at present their
enforce"ent is still inhi)ited )eca#se of the enact"ent of %ep#)lic Act
4B2 and would continue to be unenforceable during the 87$ear period
granted to prewar debtors to afford the" an opport#nity to reha)ilitate
the"sel*es, which in plain language means that the creditors would
have to observe a vigil of at least %& years before they could effect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far bac< as %("%. This period
seems to be unreasonable, if not oppressive.
While the purpose of ,ongress is plausible, and should
be commended, the relief accorded wor<s in*ustice to creditors who
are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. $heir hope to effect
collection )eco"es e5tre"ely re"ote, "ore so if the credits are
#nsec#red. /nd the in*ustice is more patent when, under the law, the
debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of
the relief. $h#s, the o#rt declared that the contin#ed operation and
enforce"ent of %ep#)lic Act 4B2 at the present ti"e is #nreasona)le and
oppressi*e, and sho#ld not )e prolonged a "in#te longer, and the sa"e
sho#ld )e declared n#ll and *oid and witho#t effect. $his also holds tr#e
as regards .5ec#ti*e 'rders 27 and 42, considering that said 'rders
contain no li"itation whatsoe*er in point of ti"e as regards the
s#spension of the enforce"ent and effecti*ity of "onetary o)ligations.
$his prono#nce"ent is "ost especially needed in *iew of the re*i*al
cla#se e")odied in said Act if and when it is declared #nconstit#tional or
in*alid.

O209A'( ',* C+. L0*. P'20,)2(;9E >(. F)'09 &',G ',* T21(0 C+.
GR 24%70, D)/. 14, 1979
FACTS" 0laintiff 'rtigas was engaged in the )#siness of de*eloping and
selling residential lots in 1ighway 1ills !#)di*ision, Mandal#yong. It sold
to *endees 0adilla and Angeles two lots @Lots 7 and +A in install"ents
#nder separate agree"ents of sale. $he *endees transferred their rights to
ha*e&. Jpon co"pletion of pay"ent, plaintiff e5ec#ted the deeds of sale
which contained a restriction, inter alia, that the lots shall )e #sed )y the
)#yer e5cl#si*ely for residential p#rposes. $he restriction was annotated in
the titles of ha*e&. Defendant (eati )o#ght fro" her the lots and the
)#ilding restrictions were also annotated in its titles. (eati "aintains that
the area along the western part of .D!A fro" !haw Bl*d. to 0asig %i*er,
where the lots were located, has )een declared a co""ercial and
ind#strial &one per %esol#tion 27 of the M#nicipal o#ncil of
Mandal#yong. !o, it started constr#cting a 8',G on the lots. 0laintiff
de"anded that (eati stop its constr#ction. $he latter ref#sed, arg#ing that
the )#ilding was in accordance with the &oning reg#lations and it had
o)tained )#ilding and planning per"its.
6laintiff sought the help of the court to command Leati to compl$ with the
restrictions annotated in its title. The trial court held that the restrictions
were subordinate to the .esolution, which was a valid exercise of
police power. ;t upheld the classification by the Dunicipal ,ouncil as
having rendered ineffective the restrictions. B#t plaintiff, in a "otion for
reconsideration which was s#)se6#ently denied, arg#ed that said o#ncil
had no power to n#llify the contract#al o)ligations ass#"ed )y (eati.
ISSUE" 8hether the M#nicipal %esol#tion, declaring the lots as part of the
co""ercial and ind#strial &one of the "#nicipality, superseded the
restrictions imposed by Artigas, which was a contract#al #nderta:ing
)etween the parties to the sale
HELD" D.!^ The Local /utonomy /ct empowers a Dunicipal ,ouncil
to adopt oning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the
municipality. ,ranting that the %esol#tion is not an ordinance, it is a
reg#latory "eas#re. $he general welfare cla#se is li)erally interpreted in
case of do#)t to gi*e "ore power to local go*ern"ents in pro"oting its
econo"ic conditions, the social welfare and "aterial progress of the
people in the co""#nity. The exceptions are =existing vested rights0
arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on
one hand and a $rd party on the other, in which case, the original
terms and provisions of the contract should govern. While non:
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of
police power. The exercise of this power may be *udicially inquired
into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, un*ust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or violation
of applicable constitutional guarantees.
$he %esol#tion was passed in the exercise of police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order
and general welfare of the people in the locality. The lots in question
not only front the highwayJ industrial and commercial complexes
have flourished about the place. 67S/ was a main traffic artery. The
resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the
health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. $he right to
e5ercise the police power is a contin#ing one and a )#siness lawf#l today
"ay in the f#t#re, )eca#se of changed sit#ationR growth of pop#lation,
)eco"e a "enace to the p#)lic health and welfare, and )e re6#ired to
yield to the p#)lic good.
The State, to promote the general welfare, may interfere
with personal liberty, property, business and occupations. $he
%esol#tion was reasona)le, a legiti"ate response to a felt p#)lic need, not
whi"sical or oppressi*e. The non:impairment of contracts clause will
not bar a police power legislation, which is not li<ely to succumb to
the challenge that because of it, contractual rights are rendered
nugatory.
.5isting laws are read into contracts agreed #pon )y the
parties to fi5 o)ligations )etween the". $he reser*ation of essential
attri)#tes of so*ereign power is also read intro contracts as a post#late of
the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against
impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by
virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile a government,
which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order
of society. $he law for"s part of, and is read into e*ery contract #nless
clearly e5cl#ded therefro" in those cases allowed.
95
.6#ity will not enforce a restriction #pon the #se of property
)y in-#nction where the property has so changed in character and
en*iron"ent as to "a:e it #nfit or #nprofita)le for #se sho#ld the
restriction )e enforced. "ince it is now unprofitable and a health7and7
comfort haEard to use lots I and = for strictl$ residential purposes, Leati
should be permitted, on the strength of the /esolution, to use the same for
commercial purposes. $here is no pro*iso in the %esol#tion e5pressly
declaring that the ordinance was not intended to interfere with the
agree"ent )etween the parties. Thus, even if the restrictions where
assumed by >eati, the contractual underta<ing cannot be enforced
as against the police power legislation.
LO$ANO >(. THE HONORA&LE ANTONIO M. MARTINE$
G.R. N+. L%3419, D)/)D8)2 18, 198%, -AP, !
F'/0(" 9s#pra9
I((1)" 8hether or not B0 22 i"pairs freedo" of contractC
H).*" 3o. $he gra*a"en of the offense p#nished )y B.0. 22 is the act of
"a:ing and iss#ing a worthless chec: or a chec: that is dishonored #pon
its presentation for pay"ent. ;t is not the non:payment of an obligation
which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of sanctions, the ma<ing of worthless chec<s and putting
them is circulation. Beca#se of its deleterio#s effects on the p#)lic
interest, the practice is proscri)ed )y the law. $he law p#nishes the act
not as an offense against property, )#t an offense against p#)lic order.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally
protected is freedom to enter into -lawful- contracts . ,ontracts
which contravene public policy are not lawful. We must bear in mind
that chec<s can not be categoried as mere contracts. ;t is a
commercial instrument which, in this modern day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for moneyJ it form part of the
ban<ing system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory
power of the state.
RODOLFO T. GAN$ON >(. THE HONORA&LE SANCHO -. INSERTO
G.R. N+. L5%450. !1.: 25, 1983, GUTIERRE$, !R., !
F'/0(" 0etitioner %odolfo ,an&on initiated proceedings to e5tra9-#dicially
foreclose a real estate "ortgage e5ec#ted )y the pri*ate respondents in
his fa*or. $he Deed of %eal .state Mortgage e5ec#ted )etween %andolph
$a-anlangit and .ste)an $a-anlangit as "ortgagors on one hand and
%odolfo ,an&on as "ortgagee on the other hand was to sec#re the
pay"ent )y the $a-anlangits of a pro"issory note a"o#nting to
0B?,???.?? in fa*or of ,an&on.
$hereafter, petitioner ,regorio Lira, in his capacity as e59oficio pro*incial
sheriff of Iloilo ser*ed personal notice of the foreclos#re proceedings on
the pri*ate respondents. A day )efore the sched#led p#)lic a#ction, the
pri*ate respondents filed a ci*il action for specific perfor"ance, da"ages,
and prohi)ition with preli"inary in-#nction against the petitioners with the
respondent co#rt. $he action, so#ght to declare the e5tra-#dicial
foreclos#re proceedings and all proceedings ta:en in connection therewith
n#ll and *oid. $he trial co#rt iss#ed an order en-oining the pro*incial sheriff
fro" proceeding with the sched#led a#ction sale.
Before act#al trial, the pri*ate respondents filed a /Motion (or %elease 'f
%eal .state And (or $he ler: 'f o#rt $o Accept Bond 'r ash In Lie#
$hereof,/ to which the petitioners interposed an 'pposition. $he
respondent co#rt granted the respondentsI "otion.
I((1)" 8hether or not the trial co#rt ma$ order the cancellation of a
mortgage lien annotated in a Torrens Certificate of Title to secure the
pa$ment of a promissor$ note and substitute such mortgage lien with a
suret$ bond appro*ed )y the sa"e co#rt to sec#re the pay"ent of the
pro"issory noteC
H).*" 3o. $he 6#estioned co#rt orders violate the non7impairment of
contracts clause guaranteed under the Constitution. !#)stit#tion of the
"ortgage with a s#rely )ond to sec#re the pay"ent of the 0B?.???.??
note wo#ld in effect change the ter"s and conditions of the "ortgage
contract. .*en )efore trial on the *ery iss#es affecting the contract, the
respondent co#rt has directed a de*iation fro" its ter"s, di"inished its
efficiency and dispensed with a pri"ary condition.
/ mortgage is but an accessory contract. The consideration of the
mortgage is the same consideration of the principal contract without
which it cannot exist as an independent contract. The mortgage lien
in favor of petitioner .odolfo 9anon is inseparable from the
mortgaged property. ;t is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To
substitute the mortgage with a surety bond would convert such lien
from a right in rem, to a right in personam. This conversion can not
be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the mortgagee under the
mortgage contract .
Doreover, the questioned orders violate the non:impairment of
contracts clause guaranteed under the ,onstitution. Substitution of
the mortgage with a surety bond to secure the payment of the
#"3,333.33 note would in effect change the terms and conditions of
the mortgage contract. .*en )efore trial on the *ery iss#es affecting the
contract, the respondent co#rt has directed a de*iation fro" its ter"s,
di"inished its efficiency, and dispensed with a pri"ary condition
%I!$'01.% ,AMB'A *s. 1'3. AL(%.D' %JX
,.%. 3o. L97+291. H#ne 27, 1988,0ADILLA, H
(acts2 'n H#ly 19, 1979, he was arrested for *agrancy, witho#t a warrant
of arrest, )y 0atrol"an Art#ro 0alencia. $hereafter, petitioner was )ro#ght
to 0recinct 2, Manila, where he was )oo:ed for *agrancy and then
detained therein together with se*eral others.$he following day, H#ly
2?,1979, d#ring the line#p of fi*e @7A detainees, incl#ding petitioner,
co"plainant .rlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, /that one is a
co"panion./ After the identification, the other detainees were )ro#ght
)ac: to their cell )#t petitioner was ordered to stay on. 8hile the
co"plainant was )eing interrogated )y the police in*estigator, petitioner
was told to sit down in front of her.
'n H#ly 24, 1979, an infor"ation for ro))ery was filed against the
petitioner.
'n A#g#st 22, 1979, petitioner was arraigned. $hereafter, hearings were
held. 'n April 2, 198?, the prosec#tion for"ally offered its e*idence and
then rested its case.
'n H#ly 1B, 198?, petitioner, )y co#nsel, instead of presenting his
defense, "anifested in open co#rt that he was filing a Motion to Ac6#it or
De"#rrer to .*idence. 'n A#g#st 14, 198?, petitioner filed said Motion
predicated on the gro#nd that the cond#ct of the line9#p, witho#t notice to,
and in the a)sence of, his co#nsel *iolated his constit#tional rights to
co#nsel and to d#e process.
Iss#e2 8hether or not there was a *iolation of petitionerKs constit#tional
right to co#nselC
%#ling2 3o. $he right to co#nsel attaches #pon the start of an
in*estigation, i.e. when the in*estigating officer starts to as: 6#estions to
elicit infor"ation andRor confessions or ad"issions fro" the
respondentRacc#sed. At s#ch point or stage, the person )eing interrogated
"#st )e assisted )y co#nsel to a*oid the pernicio#s practice of e5torting
false or coerced ad"issions or confessions fro" the lips of the person
#ndergoing interrogation, for the co""ission of an offense.
$he o#rt has consistently held that no c#stodial in*estigation shall )e
cond#cted #nless it )e in the presence of co#nsel, engaged )y the person
arrested, or )y any person in his )ehalf, or appointed )y the co#rt #pon
petition either of the detainee hi"self or )y anyone in his )ehalf, and that,
while the right "ay )e wai*ed, the wai*er shall not )e *alid #nless "ade in
writing and in the presence of co#nsel.
As aptly o)ser*ed, howe*er, )y the !olicitor ,eneral, the police line9#p
was not part of the c#stodial in6#est, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled, at s#ch stage, to co#nsel. 8hen the process had not yet shifted
fro" the in*estigatory to the acc#satory as when police in*estigation does
not elicit a confession the acc#sed "ay not yet a*ail of the ser*ices of his
lawyer. !ince petitioner in the co#rse of his identification in the police line9
#p had not yet )een held to answer for a cri"inal offense, he was,
therefore, not depri*ed of his right to )e assisted )y co#nsel )eca#se the
acc#satory process had not yet set in. $he police co#ld not ha*e *iolated
petitionerIs right to co#nsel and d#e process as the confrontation )etween
the !tate and hi" had not )eg#n.
0eople *s. Maca"
248 !%A 4?+,V#iason, H.
(A$!2 $he acc#sed [appellant was charged with the cri"e of ro))ery
with ho"icide. Acc#sed and his )rother was s#ddenly apprehended )y the
sec#rity g#ards and )ro#ght to the police head6#arters in V#e&on ity.
$hey were also forced to ad"it certain things, after which, he together with
all the acc#sed were in handc#ffs )ore cont#sions ca#sed )y )lows
indicted on their faces d#ring c#stodial in*estigation. $hereafter, they was
)ro#ght to hospital )efore each s#r*i*ing *icti"s and "ade to line9#p for
identification.
I!!J.2 8hether or not the right to co#nsel has )een *iolated d#ring
c#stodial in*estigation.
%JLI3,2 Des. It is appropriate to e5tend the co#nsel g#arantee to
critical stages of prosec#tion e*en )efore the trial. $he law enforce"ent
"achinery at present in*ol*es critical confrontations of the acc#sed )y the
prosec#tion at pre9trial proceedings /where the res#lt "ight well settle the
acc#sedIs fate and red#ce the trial itself to a "ere for"ality./ A police line9
#p is considered a /critical/ stage of the proceedings. After the start of the
c#stodial in*estigation, any identification of an #nco#nseled acc#sed
"ade in a police line9#p is inad"issi)le.
96
0eople *s. H#dge Ayson
177 !%A 21+, 3ar*asa, H.
(acts2 (elipe %a"os was a tic:et freight cler: of the 0hilippines Airlines
assigned at its Bag#io station. It was alleged that he was in*ol*ed in
irreg#larities in the sales of a plane tic:ets, $he 0AL notified hi" of an
in*estigation to )e cond#cted. $he in*estigation was sched#led in
accordance with 0ALKs code of cond#ct. A letter was sent )y %a"os
stating his willingness to settle the a"o#nt. $wo "onths after a cri"e of
.stafa was charged against %a"os. .*idence was presented )y the
prosec#tion containing %a"osK ad"ission and state"ent, to which
defendantKs arg#ed that the confession was ta:en witho#t the acc#sed
)eing represented )y a lawyer and right to re"ain silent.
Iss#e2 8hether or not right to c#stodial in*estigation has )een *iolated.
1eld2 3'. $he rights a)o*e specified, to repeat, e5ist only in
/c#stodial interrogations,/ or /in9c#stody interrogation of acc#sed
persons./ As the o#rt has already stated, )y c#stodial interrogation is
"eant /6#estioning initiated )y law enforce"ent officers after a person
has )een ta:en into c#stody or otherwise depri*ed of his freedo" of action
in any significant way./It is a*owedly deri*ed fro" the decision of the J.!.
!#pre"e o#rt in Miranda *. Ari&ona, a decision descri)ed as an
/earth6#a:e in the world of law enforce"ent./
!ection 2? states that whene*er any person is /#nder in*estigation for the
co""ission of an offense/99
1A he shall ha*e the right to re"ain silent and to co#nsel, and to )e
infor"ed of s#ch right,
2A nor force, *iolence, threat, inti"idation, or any other "eans which
*itiates the free will shall )e #sed against hi"G and
4A any confession o)tained in *iolation of 5 5 @these rights shall )e
inad"issi)le in e*idence.
In Miranda, hief H#stice 8arren s#""ari&ed the proced#ral safeg#ards
laid down for a person in police c#stody, /in9c#stody interrogation/ )eing
regarded as the co""ence"ent of an ad*ersary proceeding against the
s#spect.
0eople *s 0inlac
1+7 !%A +7B, 0A%A!, H.
(acts2 Acc#sed %onilo 0inlac y Li)ao was charged in two @2A separate
infor"ation. $he trial co#rt fo#nd the acc#sed g#ilty. 1ence the a#to"atic
re*iew. According to 0inlac, at a)o#t 22?? 0.M., April 9, 198+, three @4A
0olice"en, ca"e to his ho#se in $ag#ig and arrested the acc#sed for
ro))ing Mr. !ato and for :illing Mr. 'sa"#, witho#t any 8arrant of Arrest
shown to hi" despite his de"and. Before he was )ro#ght first to the
ho#ses of Mr. !ato and Mr. 'sa"#, they wal:ed hi" aro#nd and showed
hi" the destroyed windowG and thereafter )ro#ght hi" inside the ho#se. In
short, he was ordered to reenact according to what the police theori&ed
how the cri"e was co""itted. It was at this "o"ent that the prints of the
sole of acc#sedIs shoes were all o*er the pre"ises of 'sa"# and !atoIs
ho#ses. $hat d#ring the in*estigation at the 0olice 1ead6#arters, he was
tort#red and forced to ad"it the cri"es charged.
Iss#e2Is the constit#tional right of the acc#sed 0inlac #nder c#stodial
in*estigation to )e infor"ed of his right to re"ain silent and to co#nsel
co"plied withC
1eld2 3'. $he right "#st )e pres#"ed to conte"plate the
trans"ission of "eaningf#l infor"ation rather than -#st the cere"onial and
perf#nctory recitation of an a)stract constit#tional principle. As a r#le,
therefore, it wo#ld not )e s#fficient for a police officer -#st to repeat to the
person #nder in*estigation the pro*isions of the onstit#tion. 1e is not
only d#ty9)o#nd to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitledG
he "#st also e5plain their effects in practical ter"s. $he right of a person
#nder interrogation /to )e infor"ed/ i"plies a correlati*e o)ligation on the
part of the police in*estigator to e5plain, and conte"plates an effecti*e
co""#nication that res#lts in #nderstanding what is con*eyed. !hort of
this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot tr#ly )e said that the person
has )een /infor"ed/ of his rights.
(#rther"ore, the acc#sed was not assisted )y co#nsel and his alleged
wai*er was "ade witho#t the assistance of co#nsel. $he record of the
case is also replete with e*idence which was not satisfactorily re)#tted )y
the prosec#tion, that the acc#sed was "altreated and tort#red for se*en
@7A solid ho#rs )efore he signed the prepared e5tra9-#dicial confession.
0.'0L. '( $1. 01ILI00I3.! *s. B.33D DD
,.%. 3o. 7B717, (e)r#ary 24, 1988, M.L.3I'91.%%.%A, H.
(acts2 (elled )y a g#nshot wo#nd on the nec:, which ca#sed his death
appro5i"ately, was hristian Langel y 0hilippe, a !wiss to#rist who was
*acationing on the Boracay Island together with his sister and so"e
friends. A police report was entered in the police )lotter of the Malay
0olice !#)9station, Malay, A:lan. !#spect Benny Dy *ol#ntarily
s#rrendered to the s#)9station co""ander with his cali)er 48.
Acting on the report, hief of 0olice $a")ong prepared a
o"plaint charging the Acc#sed, Benny Dy, the owner of /BennyIs Bar/
sit#ated on the Island, with the cri"e of M#rder 8ith the Jse of
Jnlicensed firear"s. After trial, the lower o#rt find the acc#sed
g#ilty of the cri"e of M#rder. 1ence, this appeal.
Iss#e 8hether the trial co#rt erred in holding that co"pliance with
the constit#tional proced#re on c#stodial interrogation is not applica)le in
the case.
1eld2 3o. $he case history and the doc#"entary e*idence attest
strongly to AppellantIs oral confession and *ol#ntary s#rrender. $he
sworn o"plaint for /M#rder with Jse of Jnlicensed (irear"/ signed )y
the hief of 0olice also attests to AppellantIs oral confession.$hat
o"plaint for"s part of the record of the proceedings )efore the M#nicipal
irc#it $rial o#rt of B#r#anga, A:lan, and is pri"a facie e*idence of the
facts therein stated. $he fact of AppellantIs s#rrender is f#rther )orne o#t
)y the 'rder of the M#nicipal irc#it $rial o#rt H#dge, categorically
reciting that /no warrant of arrest is iss#ed for the apprehension of the
acc#sed for the reason that he is already #nder police c#stody )efore the
filing of the co"plaint./
ontrary to the defense contention, the oral confession
"ade )y the acc#sed to 0at. 0adilla that he had shot a to#rist and that the
g#n he had #sed in shooting the *icti" was in his )ar which he wanted
s#rrendered to the hief of 0olice is co"petent e*idence against hi". $he
declaration of an acc#sed ac:nowledging his g#ilt of the offense charged
"ay )e gi*en in e*idence against hi" @!ee. 29, %#le 14?, %#les of o#rtA.
It "ay in a sense )e also regarded as part of the res gestae. $he r#le is
that, any person, otherwise co"petent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is co"petent to testify as to the s#)stance of what he heard if
he heard and #nderstood all of it. An oral confession need not )e repeated
*er)ati", )#t in s#ch a case it "#st )e gi*en in s#)stance. 8hat
was told )y the Acc#sed to 0at, 0adilla was a spontaneo#s state"ent not
elicited thro#gh 6#estioning, )#t gi*en an ordinary "anner. 3o written
confession was so#ght to )e presented in e*idence as a res#lt of for"al
c#stodial in*estigation.
0.'0L. '( $1. 01ILI00I3.! *s. A%3.L ALIA3D' y B%I'3.!
,.%. 3o. 117B87, Dece")er 12, 1997, 0J3', H.
(acts2 $he appelant Arnel Alicando was charged with the cri"e of rape
with ho"icide against the person of a "inor Lha&ie Mae 0enecilla @fo#r
years oldA. Alicando was arrested and interrogated )y 0'4 Danilo $an. 1e
*er)ally confessed his g#ilt witho#t the assistance of co#nsel. 'n the
)asis of his #nco#nselled *er)al confession and follow #p interrogations,
the police ca"e to :now and reco*ered fro" appellantIs ho#se, Lha&ie
MaeIs green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a )#ri "at, a stained pillow
and a stained $9shirt all of which were presented as e*idence for the
prosec#tion.
97
$he appellant was arraigned and pleaded g#ilty. $he trial
co#rt fo#nd appellant g#ilty and sentenced hi" to death. $he case is on
a#to"atic re*iew considering the death penalty i"posed )y the trial co#rt.
Iss#e2 8hether the trial co#rt erred in con*icting the acc#sed.
1eld2 Des. !o"e prosec#tion e*idence, offered independently of
the plea of g#ilt of the appellant, were inad"issi)le, yet, were considered
)y the trial co#rt in con*icting the appellant. It is now fa"iliar learning that
the onstit#tion has stig"ati&ed as inad"issi)le e*idence #nco#nselled
confession or ad"ission as pro*ided #nder !ection 12 paragraphs @1A and
@4A of Article III of the onstit#tion. It is not only the #nco#nselled
confession that is conde"ned as inad"issi)le, )#t also e*idence deri*ed
therefro". $he pillow and the $9shirt with the alleged )loodstains were
e*idence deri*ed fro" the #nco#nselled confession illegally e5tracted )y
the police fro" the appellant.
$he o#rt ha*e not only constit#tionali&ed the Miranda
warnings in o#r -#risdiction. $hey ha*e also adopted the li)ertarian
e5cl#sionary r#le :nown as the /fr#it of the poisono#s tree/. According to
this r#le, once the pri"ary so#rce @the /tree/A is shown to ha*e )een
#nlawf#lly o)tained, any secondary or deri*ati*e e*idence @the / fr#it / A
deri*ed fro" it is also inad"issi)le. $he r#le is )ased on the principle that
e*idence illegally o)tained )y the !tate sho#ld not )e #sed to gain other
e*idence )eca#se the originally illegally o)tained e*idence taints all
e*idence s#)se6#ently o)tained.
$he )#rden to pro*e that an acc#sed wai*ed his right to
re"ain silent and the right to co#nsel )efore "a:ing a confession #nder
c#stodial interrogation rests with the prosec#tion. It is also the )#rden of
the prosec#tion to show that the e*idence deri*ed fro" confession is not
tainted as /fr#it of the poisono#s tree./ $he )#rden has to )e discharged
)y clear and con*incing e*idence. Indeed, par. 1 of !ection 12 of Article III
of the onstit#tion pro*ides only one "ode of wai*er E the wai*er "#st
)e in writing and in the presence of co#nsel. In the case at )ar, the
records show that the prosec#tion #tterly failed to discharge this )#rden.
I3'.3I' BA!' *s. HJD,. L.' 1. %A0A$AL'
A.M. 3o. %$H99+91447. March 7, 1997, %'M.%', H.
!ince the deter"ination of whether or not the e*idence of g#ilt against the
acc#sed is strong is a "atter of -#dicial discretion, the -#dge is "andated
to cond#ct a hearing e*en in cases where the prosec#tion chooses to -#st
file a co""ent or lea*e the application for )ail to the discretion of the
co#rt.
(acts2 $he co"plainant Inocencio Basco, father of the *icti", charged
respondent H#dge Leo M. %apatalo of %$, Branch 42, Agoo, La Jnion
with gross ignorance or willf#l disregard of esta)lished r#le of law for
granting )ail to an acc#sed %oger Morente in a "#rder case witho#t
recei*ing e*idence and cond#cting a hearing.
In his co""ent, respondent H#dge alleged that he granted
the petition )ased on the prosec#torIs option not to oppose the petition as
well as the latterIs reco""endation setting the )ail)ond in the a"o#nt of
08?,???.??. 1e a*erred that when the prosec#tion chose not to oppose
the petition for )ail, he had the discretion on whether to appro*e it or not.
Iss#e2 8hether a petition for )ail can )e granted witho#t cond#cting a
hearing.
1eld2 3o. 8hen the grant of )ail is discretionary, the prosec#tion
has the )#rden of showing that the e*idence of g#ilt against the acc#sed
is strong. 1owe*er, the deter"ination of whether or not the e*idence of
g#ilt is strong, )eing a "atter of -#dicial discretion, re"ains with the -#dge.
/$his discretion )y the *ery nat#re of things, "ay rightly )e e5ercised only
after the e*idence is s#)"itted to the co#rt at the hearing. !ince the
discretion is directed to the weight of the e*idence and since e*idence
cannot properly )e weighed if not d#ly e5hi)ited or prod#ced )efore the
co#rt, it is o)*io#s that a proper e5ercise of -#dicial discretion re6#ires that
the e*idence of g#ilt )e s#)"itted to the co#rt, the petitioner ha*ing the
right of cross e5a"ination and to introd#ce his own e*idence in re)#ttal./
onse6#ently, in the application for )ail of a person charged
with a capital offense p#nisha)le )y death, recl#sion perpet#a or life
i"prison"ent, a hearing, whether s#""ary or otherwise in the discretion
of the co#rt, "#st act#ally )e cond#cted to deter"ine whether or not the
e*idence of g#ilt against the acc#sed is strong. If a party is denied the
opport#nity to )e heard, there wo#ld )e a *iolation of proced#ral d#e
process.
A hearing is li:ewise re6#ired if the prosec#tion ref#ses to
add#ce e*idence in opposition to the application to grant and fi5 )ail.
orollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for )ail is re6#ired is
for the co#rt to ta:e into consideration the g#idelines set forth in !ection +,
%#le 11B of the %#les of o#rt in fi5ing the a"o#nt of )ail. $he
a)sence of o)-ection fro" the prosec#tion is ne*er a )asis for granting )ail
to the acc#sed. It is the co#rtIs deter"ination after a hearing that the g#ilt
of the acc#sed is not strong that for"s the )asis for granting )ail.
0eople *s. Donato
,.%. 3o. 792+9, H#ne 7, 1991,Da*ide, Hr., H.
(acts2 In the cri"inal case filed with the %egional $rial o#rt of Manila,
pri*ate respondent !alas and his co9acc#sed were charged for the cri"e
of re)ellion #nder Article 14B, in relation to Article 147 of the %e*ised
0enal ode @%0A. At the ti"e the Infor"ation was filed, !alas and his co9
acc#sed were in "ilitary c#stody following their arrest. A day after the
filing of the original infor"ation, a petition for ha)eas corp#s for !alas and
his co9acc#sed was filed with the !#pre"e o#rt which was dis"issed in
the o#rtKs %esol#tion on the )asis of the agree"ent of the parties #nder
which !alas /will re"ain in legal c#stody and will face trial )efore the co#rt
ha*ing c#stody o*er his person/ and the warrants for the arrest of his co9
acc#sed are dee"ed recalled and they shall )e i""ediately released )#t
shall s#)"it the"sel*es to the co#rt ha*ing -#risdiction o*er their
person.!alas filed with the trial co#rt a Motion to V#ash the Infor"ation.
%espondent H#dge denied the "otion to 6#ash. !#)se6#ently, !alas filed
a petition for )ail, which herein petitioner opposed on the gro#nd that
since re)ellion )eca"e a capital offense #nder the pro*isions of
0residential Decrees @0DA, which a"ended Article 147 of the %0, )y
i"posing the penalty of recl#sion perpet#a to death on those who
pro"ote, "aintain, or head a re)ellion so the acc#sed is no longer entitled
to )ail as e*idence of his g#ilt is strong.
'n 7 H#ne 1987, the 0resident iss#ed an .5ec#ti*e 'rder @.'A repealing,
a"ong others, the 0Ds and restoring to f#ll force and effect Article 147 of
the %0. $h#s, the original penalty for re)ellion, prision "ayor and a fine
not to e5ceed 02?,???.??, was restored.
Iss#e2 8hether or not the right to )ail "ay, #nder certain circ#"stances,
)e denied to a person who is charged with a )aila)le offense
1eld2 Des. Bail cannot )e denied to !alas for he is charged with the cri"e
of re)ellion as defined in Article 14B of the %e*ised 0enal ode to which is
attached the penalty of prision "ayor and a fine not e5ceeding
02?,???.??. It is, therefore, a )aila)le offense #nder !ection 14 of Article
III of the 1987 onstit#tion which pro*ides th#s2 All persons, e5cept those
charged with offenses p#nisha)le )y recl#sion perpet#a when e*idence of
g#ilt is strong, shall, )efore con*iction, )e )aila)le )y s#fficient s#reties, or
)e released on recogni&ance as "ay )e prescri)ed )y law. $he right to
)ail shall not )e i"paired e*en when the pri*ilege of the writ of ha)eas
corp#s is s#spended. .5cessi*e )ail shall not )e re6#ired.
!alas has, howe*er, wai*ed his right to )ail in the cri"inal case. In
agreeing to re"ain in legal c#stody e*en d#ring the pendency of the trial
of his cri"inal case, he has e5pressly wai*ed his right to )ail.$his o#rt
has recogni&ed wai*ers of constit#tional rights s#ch as, for e5a"ple, the
right against #nreasona)le searches and sei&#resG the right to co#nsel
and to re"ain silentG and the right to )e heard. $he only li"itation to the
wai*er of right to )ail is that pro*ide in Art. + of the i*il ode. %ights "ay
)e wai*ed, #nless the wai*er is contrary to law, p#)lic order, p#)lic policy,
"orals, or good c#sto"s, or pre-#dicial to a third person with a right
recogni&ed )y law.
0eople *s. (ortes
,.%. 3o. 9?+B4, H#ne 27, 1994, Da*ide, H%., H.
(acts2 $he con*iction of Ag#stin (ortes for the rape of a 149year old si5th
grade p#pil and the denial )y the trial co#rt of his application for )ail
pending his appeal fro" the -#dg"ent of con*iction are 6#estioned in
these consolidated cases.
In ,.%. 3o. 9?+B4, the acc#sed appeals fro" the decision of the %egional
$rial o#rt. $he co#rt a 6#o, in its Decision, fo#nd the acc#sed g#ilty
)eyond reasona)le do#)t of rape and sentenced hi" to s#ffer the penalty
of recl#sion perpet#a and pay the *icti" the s#" of 02?,???.??.
In ,.%. 3o. 91177, the s#)-ect "atter we are concerned with, the acc#sed
see:s to ann#l and set aside two related orders of the said trial co#rt
denying his application for )ail, filed after his con*iction, to sec#re his
pro*isional li)erty pending the resol#tion of his appeal.
Iss#e2 8hether or not )efore con*iction )y final -#dg"ent, the acc#sed
en-oys the constit#tional pres#"ption of innocence, and is therefore
entitled to )ail as a "atter of right
%#ling2 3o. It is clear fro" !ection 14, Article III of the 1987 onstit#tion
and !ection 4, %#le 11B of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt, as a"ended, that2
. . . )efore con*iction, )ail is either a "atter of right or of discretion. It is a
"atter of right when the offense charged is p#nisha)le )y any penalty
lower than recl#sion perpet#a. $o that e5tent the right is a)sol#te.
555 555 555
Jpon the other hand, if the offense charged is p#nisha)le )y recl#sion
perpet#a, )ail )eco"es a "atter of discretion. It shall )e denied if the
e*idence of g#ilt is strong. $he co#rtIs discretion is li"ited to deter"ining
whether or not e*idence of g#ilt is strong. B#t once it is deter"ined that
the e*idence of g#ilt is not strong, )ail also )eco"es a "atter of right. . . .
$he clear i"plication, therefore is that if an acc#sed who is charged with a
cri"e p#nisha)le )y recl#sion perpet#a is con*icted )y the trial co#rt and
sentenced to s#ffer s#ch a penalty, )ail is neither a "atter of right on the
part of the acc#sed nor of discretion on the part of the co#rt. In s#ch a
sit#ation, the co#rt wo#ld not ha*e only deter"ined that the e*idence of
g#ilt is strong which wo#ld ha*e )een s#fficient to deny )ail e*en
)efore con*iction [ it wo#ld ha*e li:ewise r#led that the acc#sedIs g#ilt
has )een pro*en )eyond reasona)le do#)t. Bail "#st not then )e granted
to the acc#sed d#ring the pendency of his appeal fro" the -#dg"ent of
con*iction.
98
In the instant case, the rape for which the acc#sed was indicted is
p#nisha)le )y recl#sion perpet#a p#rs#ant to Article 447 of the %e*ised
0enal odeG he was con*icted therefor and s#)se6#ently sentenced to
ser*e that penalty. It is th#s e*ident that the trial co#rt correctly denied his
application for )ail d#ring the pendency of the appeal.
o"endador *s. De <illa
,.%. 3o. 94177, A#g#st 2, 1991, r#&, H.
(acts2 $hese fo#r cases ha*e )een consolidated )eca#se they in*ol*e
practically the sa"e parties and related iss#es arising fro" the sa"e
incident.
$he petitioners in ,.%. 3os. 94177 and 9+9B8 and the pri*ate
respondents in ,.%. 3os. 97?2? and 97B7B are officers of the Ar"ed
(orces of the 0hilippines facing prosec#tion for their alleged participation
in the failed co#p dI etat that too: place on Dece")er 1 to 9, 1989.
In ,.%. 3o. 94177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohi)ition
and "anda"#s, they are 6#estioning the cond#ct of the 0re9$rial
In*estigation @0$IA 0anel constit#ted to in*estigate the charges against
the" and the creation of the ,eneral o#rt Martial @,MA con*ened to try
the".
In ,.%. 3o. 9+9B8, the petitioners, )esides challenging the legality of
,M 3o. 1B, see: certiorari against its r#ling denying the" the right to
pere"ptory challenge as granted )y Article 18 of o". Act 3o. B?8.
In ,.%. 3o. 97?2?, the s#)-ect "atter we are concerned with, the orders
of the respondent -#dge of the %egional $rial o#rt of V#e&on ity are
assailed on certiorari on the gro#nd that he has no -#risdiction o*er ,M
3o. 1B and no a#thority either to set aside its r#ling denying )ail to the
pri*ate respondents.
Iss#e2 8hether or not the right to )ail in*o:ed )y the pri*ate respondents
in ,.%. 3os. 97?2? has traditionally not )een recogni&ed and is not
a*aila)le in the "ilitary, as an e5ception to the general r#le e")odied in
the Bill of %ights
1eld2 Des. $he right to )ail in*o:ed )y the pri*ate respondents in ,.%.
3os. 97?2? has traditionally not )een recogni&ed and is not a*aila)le in
the "ilitary, as an e5ception to the general r#le e")odied in the Bill of
%ights. $he right to a speedy trial is gi*en "ore e"phasis in the "ilitary
where the right to )ail does not e5ist. $he #ni6#e str#ct#re of the "ilitary
sho#ld )e eno#gh reason to e5e"pt "ilitary "en fro" the constit#tional
co*erage on the right to )ail. 3ational sec#rity considerations sho#ld also
i"press #pon this 1onora)le o#rt that release on )ail of respondents
constit#tes a da"aging precedent.
$he arg#"ent that denial fro" the "ilitary of the right to )ail
wo#ld *iolate the e6#al protection cla#se is not accepta)le. $his g#aranty
re6#ires e6#al treat"ent only of persons or things si"ilarly sit#ated and
does not apply where the s#)-ect of the treat"ent is s#)stantially different
fro" others. $he acc#sed officers can co"plain if they are denied )ail and
other "e")ers of the "ilitary are not. B#t they cannot say they ha*e )een
discri"inated against )eca#se they are not allowed the sa"e right that is
e5tended to ci*ilians.
BADL'3 <. !I!'3
A.M. 3o. 929794+?9?, April +, 1997, %egalado, H.
(acts2 $he 'ffice of the ity 0rosec#tor in Dag#pan ity filed an
infor"ation for do#)le "#rder against se*eral acc#sed and thereafter
raffled to respondent -#dge. $he acc#sed filed a petition for rein*estigation
which was granted )y the trial co#rt. D#ring the rein*estigation, the
acc#sed filed a petition for )ail on a !at#rday, and re6#ested that it )e set
for hearing the i""ediately following Monday. 'n this latter date, the
prosec#tion filed an opposition to the petition for )ail alleging, a"ong
others, that the infor"ation was filed on the )ases of the sworn state"ents
of se*eral eyewitnesses to the incident which constit#tes clear and strong
e*idence of the g#ilt of all the acc#sed. 3e*ertheless, a hearing on the
petition was p#rportedly held )y the trial co#rt and )ail was granted for the
pro*isional li)erty of each of the acc#sed. A "otion for reconsideration
was filed )y the prosec#tion )#t the sa"e was denied )y respondent
-#dge. !ignificantly, the orders granting )ail, and that denying
reconsideration thereof, )eca"e the s#)-ect of a petition for certiorari filed
)y the prosec#tion and were s#)se6#ently ann#lled and set aside )y A.
$he pri*ate co"plainant filed a "otion for respondent -#dge to inhi)it
hi"self fro" the case. %espondent -#dge denied the "otion to inhi)it and
later also denied the "otion for reconsideration. $o s#pport and -#stify his
grant of )ail to the acc#sed, respondent -#dge a*ers that ti"e was of the
essence, considering that the acc#sed had )een detained since 'cto)er
21, 1991 and that the prosec#tion failed to interpose an o)-ection to the
granting of )ail and to as: for an opport#nity to pro*e the strength of the
e*idence of g#ilt against the acc#sed.
Iss#e2 8hether or not respondent -#dge was -#stified in his grant of )ail to
the acc#sed.
1eld2 8hile the deter"ination of whether or not the e*idence of g#ilt is
strong is a "atter of -#dicial discretion, this discretion "ay )e e5ercised
only after e*idence is s#)"itted to the co#rt. $he prosec#tion "#st )e
gi*en an opport#nity to present, within a reasona)le ti"e, all the e*idence
that it "ay desire to introd#ce )efore the co#rt "ay resol*e the "otion for
)ail. If the prosec#tion sho#ld )e denied s#ch an opport#nity, there wo#ld
)e a *iolation of proced#ral d#e process, and the order of the co#rt
granting )ail sho#ld )e considered *oid on that gro#nd. .*en if the
prosec#tion ref#ses to add#ce e*idence or fails to interpose an o)-ection
to the "otion for )ail, it is still "andatory for the co#rt to cond#ct a hearing
or as: searching and clarificatory 6#estions fro" which it "ay infer the
strength of the e*idence of g#ilt, or the lac: of it, against the acc#sed.
$he o)stinate persistence of respondent -#dge in post#ring that he did
cond#ct a hearing is )elied )y the fact that the order granting )ail lea*es
"#ch to )e desired. It does not contain the re6#isite s#""ary of the
e*idence presented )y the parties and necessary to s#pport the grant of
)ail.
SMA3'$' <. A
,.%. 3o. L9+21??, May 4?, 198+, (ernan, H.
(acts2 0etitioner %icardo L. Manotoc, Hr., is one of the two principal
stoc:holders of $rans9Ins#lar Manage"ent, Inc., where he acts as
president and the Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc., a stoc: )ro:erage ho#se.
$ogether with his co9stoc:holders, he filed a petition with the !ec#rities
and .5change o""ission for the appoint"ent of a "anage"ent
co""ittee for the aforesaid co"panies, which petition was granted.
0ending disposition of the !. case, !. re6#ested the then
o""issioner of I""igration not to clear petitioner for depart#re and a
"e"orand#" to this effect was iss#ed. 8hen a $orrens title s#)"itted to
and accepted )y Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. was s#spected to )e fa:e, si5 of
its clients filed si5 separate cri"inal co"plaints against petitioner and the
*ice9president of Manotoc !ec#rities, Inc. orresponding cri"inal charges
for estafa were filed and in all cases, petitioner was ad"itted to )ail.
0etitioner filed )efore each of the trial co#rts a "otion entitled, /"otion for
per"ission to lea*e the co#ntry,/ stating as gro#nd therefor his desire to
go to the Jnited !tates, /relati*e to his )#siness transactions and
opport#nities./ $he prosec#tion opposed said "otion and )oth trial -#dges
denied the sa"e. 0etitioner li:ewise wrote the I""igration o""issioner
re6#esting the withdrawal of the latterIs "e"orand#", )#t said re6#est
was denied. 0etitioner filed a petition for certiorari and "anda"#s )efore
the A see:ing to ann#l the orders of the trial co#rts. A denied the
petition. 0etitioner filed the instant petition for re*iew on certiorari.
0etitioner filed a "otion for lea*e to go a)road pendente lite, )#t the o#rt
denied said "otion. 0etitioner contends that ha*ing )een ad"itted to )ail
as a "atter of right, neither the co#rts which granted hi" )ail nor the
!ec#rities and .5change o""ission which has no -#risdiction o*er his
li)erty, co#ld pre*ent hi" fro" e5ercising his constit#tional right to tra*el.
Iss#e2 Does a person facing a cri"inal indict"ent and pro*isionally
released on )ail ha*e an #nrestricted right to tra*elC
1eld2 3o. $he o)-ect of )ail is to relie*e the acc#sed of i"prison"ent and
the state of the )#rden of :eeping hi", pending the trial, and at the sa"e
ti"e, to p#t the acc#sed as "#ch #nder the power of the co#rt as if he
were in c#stody of the proper officer, and to sec#re the appearance of the
acc#sed so as to answer the call of the co#rt and do what the law "ay
re6#ire of hi". $he condition i"posed #pon petitioner to "a:e hi"self
a*aila)le at all ti"es whene*er the co#rt re6#ires his presence operates
as a *alid restriction on his right to tra*el. $o allow the acc#sed fro"
lea*ing the -#risdiction of the 0hilippines wo#ld render n#gatory the co#rtsI
orders and processes and inas"#ch as the -#risdiction of the co#rts fro"
which they iss#ed does not e5tend )eyond that of the 0hilippines they
wo#ld ha*e no )inding force o#tside of said -#risdiction. Indeed, if the
acc#sed were allowed to lea*e the 0hilippines witho#t s#fficient reason,
he "ay )e placed )eyond the reach of the co#rts.
$A$AD <. !A3DI,A3BADA3
,.%. 3o. 72447949, March 21, 1988, Dap, H.
(acts2 o"plainant, Antonio de los %eyes, originally filed what he ter"ed
/a report/ with the Legal 0anel of 0! on 'cto)er 197B, containing
charges of alleged *iolations of %A 3o. 4?19 against then !ecretary of
0#)lic Infor"ation (rancisco !. $atad. $he /report/ was "ade to /sleep/ in
the office of the 0! #ntil Dece")er 1979, when the 197B co"plaint was
res#rrected in the for" of a for"al co"plaint filed with the $anod)ayan.
$he $anod)ayan acted on the co"plaint in April 198? )y referring the
co"plaint to the I!, 0!, for in*estigation and report. In H#ne 198?, the
I! report was s#)"itted to the $anod)ayan, reco""ending the filing of
charges for graft and corr#pt practices against for"er Minister $atad and
Antonio L. antero. By 'cto)er 1982, all affida*its and co#nter9affida*its
were in the case was already for disposition )y the $anod)ayan. 1owe*er,
it was only in H#ly 1987 that a resol#tion was appro*ed )y the
$anod)ayan, reco""ending the filing of the corresponding cri"inal
infor"ations against the acc#sed (rancisco $atad. (i*e @7A cri"inal
infor"ations were filed with the !andigan)ayan in H#ne 1987, all against
petitioner $atad. 0etitioner clai"s that the $anod)ayan c#lpa)ly *iolated
the constit#tional "andate of /d#e process/ in #nd#ly prolonging the
ter"ination of the preli"inary in*estigation and in filing the corresponding
99
infor"ations only after "ore than a decade fro" the alleged co""ission
of the p#rported offenses.
Iss#e2 8hether or not petitioner was depri*ed of his constit#tional right to
d#e process.
1eld2 $he long delay in the ter"ination of the preli"inary in*estigation )y
the $anod)ayan is *iolati*e of the constit#tional right of the acc#sed to
d#e process. !#)stantial adherence to the re6#ire"ents of the law
go*erning the cond#ct of preli"inary in*estigation, incl#ding s#)stantial
co"pliance with the ti"e li"itation prescri)ed )y the law for the resol#tion
of the case )y the prosec#tor, is part of the proced#ral d#e process
constit#tionally g#aranteed )y the f#nda"ental law. It has )een s#ggested
that the long delay in ter"inating the preli"inary in*estigation sho#ld not
)e dee"ed fatal, for e*en the co"plete a)sence of a preli"inary
in*estigation does not warrant dis"issal of the infor"ation. $r#e9)#t the
a)sence of a preli"inary in*estigation can )e corrected )y gi*ing the
acc#sed s#ch in*estigation. B#t an #nd#e delay in the cond#ct of a
preli"inary in*estigation can not )e corrected, for #ntil now, "an has not
yet in*ented a de*ice for setting )ac: ti"e.
,ALMA3 *s. !A3DI,A3BADA3
,% 72+7?, !ept. 12, 198+
(acts2 'n 'cto)er 22, 1984, then 0resident Marcos created a (act9
(inding Board to in*estigate the assassination of 3inoy A6#ino. $he
"inority and "a-ority reports of the Board )oth agreed that %olando
,al"an was not the assassin )#t was "erely a fall g#y of the "ilitary
which plotted the assassination itself. $he "inority report tags 2+ persons,
headed )y ,eneral <er, as respondents to the case. Marcos re-ected the
reports of the Board and st#c: to his clai" that it was ,al"an who :illed
A6#ino. $hereafter, !andigan)ayan and $anod)ayan ac6#itted the
respondents of the cri"e charged, declaring the" innocent and totally
a)sol*ing the" of any ci*il lia)ility. In this petition, 0etitioners !at#rnina
,al"an, wife of the late %olando ,al"an, and 29 others filed the present
action alleging that respondent co#rts co""itted serio#s irreg#larities
constit#ting "istrial and res#lting in "iscarriage of -#stice and gross
*iolation of the constit#tional rights of the so*ereign people of the
0hilippines to d#e process of law. Allegedly, then 0resident Marcos had
ordered the respondent co#rts to whitewash the cri"inal cases against the
2+ respondents acc#sed and prod#ce a *erdict of ac6#ittal. In his
co""ent, the Dep#ty $anod)ayan Man#el 1errera, affir"ed the
allegations and re*ealed that MalacaNang had planned the scenario of the
trial. %espondents9acc#sed prayed for its denial.
Iss#e2 8hether or not the trial was a "oc: trial and that the pre9
deter"ined -#dg"ent of ac6#ittal was #nlawf#l and *oid a) initio.
1eld2 Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt cannot per"it s#ch a sha" trial and
*erdict and tra*esty of -#stice to stand #nrectified. $he co#rts of the land
#nder its aegis are co#rts of law and -#stice and e6#ity. $hey wo#ld ha*e
no reason to e5ist if they were allowed to )e #sed as "ere tools of
in-#stice, deception and d#plicity to s#)*ert and s#ppress the tr#th,
instead of repositories of -#dicial power whose -#dges are sworn and
co""itted to render i"partial -#stice to all ali:e who see: the enforce"ent
or protection of a right or the pre*ention or redress of a wrong, witho#t fear
or fa*or and re"o*ed fro" the press#res of politics and pre-#dice. More
so, in the case at )ar where the people and the world are entitled to :now
the tr#th, and the integrity of o#r -#dicial syste" is at sta:e. In life, as an
acc#sed )efore the "ilitary tri)#nal, 3inoy had pleaded in *ain that as a
ci*ilian he was entitled to d#e process of law and trial in the reg#lar ci*il
co#rts )efore an i"partial co#rt with an #n)iased prosec#tor. In death,
3inoy, as the *icti" of the /treachero#s and *icio#s assassination/ and the
relati*es and so*ereign people as the aggrie*ed parties plead once "ore
for d#e process of law and a retrial )efore an i"partial co#rt with an
#n)iased prosec#tor. $he o#rt is constrained to declare the sha" trial a
"oc: trial the non9trial of the cent#ry9and that the pre9deter"ined
-#dg"ent of ac6#ittal was #nlawf#l and *oid a) initio.
AL'3$. *s. !A<.LLA3'
,% 141+72, March 9, 1998
(acts2 H#*ie9lyn 0#nong)ayan charged Bayani Alonte, the inc#")ent
"ayor of BiNan, Lag#na, with the cri"e of rape. According to
0#nong)ayan, on or a)o#t !epte")er 12, 199+, Alonte offered her a
drin:ing water which "ade her di&&y and wea:. $hereafter, Alonte
#nlawf#lly and felonio#sly had carnal :nowledge with her against her will
and consent. D#ring the pendency case, howe*er, H#*ie9lyn
0#nong)ayan, assisted )y her parents and co#nsel, e5ec#ted an affida*it
desisting her testi"onies against Alonte. 3onetheless, respondent H#dge
!a*ellano fo#nd Alonte g#ilty )eyond reasona)le do#)t of the heino#s
cri"e of rape. Accordingly, the acc#sed did not present any co#nter*ailing
e*idence d#ring the trial. $hey did not ta:e the witness stand to ref#te or
deny #nder oath the tr#th of the contents of the pri*ate co"plainantIs
afore"entioned affida*it. $hey left e*erything to the so9called /desistance/
of the pri*ate co"plainant. In this petition, Alonte a*ers that respondent
H#dge co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of
-#risdiction when respondent H#dge rendered a decision in the case
there)y depri*ing hi" of his onstit#tional right to )e pres#"ed innocent.
Iss#e2 8hether or not the pres#"ption of innocence stands in fa*or of
Alonte.
1eld2 3'. In the trial of cri"inal cases, the constit#tional pres#"ption of
innocence in fa*or of an acc#sed re6#ires that an acc#sed )e gi*en
s#fficient opport#nity to present his defense. !o, with the prosec#tion as to
its e*idence. 1ence, any de*iation fro" the reg#lar co#rse of trial sho#ld
always ta:e into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case,
whether in the prosec#tion or defense. $here can )e no short9c#t to the
legal process, and there can )e no e5c#se for not affording an acc#sed
his f#ll day in co#rt. D#e process, rightly occ#pying the first and fore"ost
place of honor in o#r Bill of %ights, is an enshrined and in*al#a)le right
that cannot )e denied e*en to the "ost #ndeser*ing. In the case at )ar,
the affida*it of desistance of H#*ie9Lyn 0#nong)ayan does not contain any
state"ent that disa*ows the *eracity of her co"plaint against petitioners
)#t "erely see:s to /)e allowed to withdraw/ her co"plaint and to
discontin#e with the case for *aried other reasons. In 0eople *s. Balla)are
we ha*e said that any recantation "#st )e tested in a p#)lic trial with
s#fficient opport#nity gi*en to the party ad*ersely affected )y it to cross9
e5a"ine the recanting witness. A retraction does not necessarily negate
an earlier declaration. 1ence, when confronted with a sit#ation where a
witness recants his testi"ony, co#rts "#st not a#to"atically e5cl#de the
original testi"ony solely on the )asis of the recantation. $hey sho#ld
deter"ine which testi"ony sho#ld )e gi*en credence thro#gh a
co"parison of the original testi"ony and the new testi"ony, applying the
general r#les of e*idence.
0.'0L. *s. D%AMAD'
,% 21427, 'ct. 29, 1971
(acts2 In a drin:ing session, 0a)leo Dra"ayo and 0aterno .c#)in )ro#ght
#p the idea of :illing .stelito 3ogali&a so that he co#ld not testify in the
ro))ery case which Dra"ayo and .c#)in was a pri"e s#spect thereof.
$hat sa"e night, .c#)in hit .stelito with a piece of wood on the side of the
head while Dra"ayo repeatedly sta))ed hi" with a short pointed )olo.
$he ne5t "orning, Dra"ayo went to the ho#se of the deceased and
infor"ed the latterIs widow ora&on that he had -#st seen the cada*er of
.stelito. Jpon inter*iew, the hief of 0olice noticed )lood stains on the
tro#sers of Dra"ayo and as:ed the latter to e5plain where he o)tained it.
Dra"ayo answered that it was ca#sed )y his da#ghter who has a s:in
ail"ent. It was on this )asis that Dra"ayo and .c#)in were charged of the
cri"e of "#rder. Jpon trial, the lower co#rt fo#nd Dra"ayo and .c#)in
g#ilty )eyond reasona)le do#)t )asing on the testi"onies offered )y the
prosec#tion. In this appeal, Acc#sed9Appellants in*o:e their constit#tional
right to )e declared pres#"pti*ely innocent.
Iss#e2 8hether or not the Acc#ssed9Appellants constit#tional right to )e
pres#"ed innocent can stand against -#dg"ent of con*iction against
the".
1eld2 3'. $he pres#"ption of innocence co#ld not co"e to appellantsK
resc#e as it was "ore than s#fficiently o*erco"e )y the proof that was
offered )y the prosec#tion. Acc#sation is not, according to the
f#nda"ental law, synony"o#s with g#ilt. It is inc#")ent on the
prosec#tion to de"onstrate that c#lpa)ility lies. Appellants were not e*en
called #pon then to offer e*idence on their )ehalf. $heir freedo" is forfeit
only if the re6#isite 6#ant#" of proof necessary for con*iction )e in
e5istence. $heir g#ilt "#st )e shown )eyond reasona)le do#)t. $o s#ch a
standard, this o#rt has always )een co""itted. $here is need, therefore,
for the "ost caref#l scr#tiny of the testi"ony of the state, )oth oral and
doc#"entary, independently of whate*er defense is offered )y the
acc#sed. 'nly if the -#dge )elow and the appellate tri)#nal co#ld arri*e at
a concl#sion that the cri"e had )een co""itted precisely )y the person
on trial #nder s#ch an e5acting test sho#ld the sentence )e one of
con*iction. It is th#s re6#ired that e*ery circ#"stance fa*oring his
innocence )e d#ly ta:en into acco#nt. $he proof against hi" "#st s#r*i*e
the test of reasonG the strongest s#spicion "#st not )e per"itted to sway
-#dg"ent. $he conscience "#st )e satisfied that on the defendant co#ld
)e laid the responsi)ility for the offense chargedG that not only did he
perpetrate the act that it a"o#nted to a cri"e. 8hat is re6#ired then is
"oral certainty. 8ith the testi"ony of record pointing to no other
concl#sion e5cept the perpetration of the :illing )y appellants, the effort of
their co#nsel sho#ld not )e attended with s#ccess.
By reasona)le do#)t is not "eant that which of possi)ility "ay arise, )#t it
is that do#)t engendered )y an in*estigation of the whole proof and an
ina)ility, after s#ch in*estigation, to let the "ind rest easy #pon the
certainly of g#ilt. A)sol#te certainty of g#ilt is not de"anded )y the law to
con*ict of any cri"inal charge )#t "oral certainty is re6#ired, and this
certainty is re6#ired as to e*ery proposition of proof re6#isite to constit#te
the offense.
0eople *. 1olgado
,% 28?9, March 22, 197?
(acts2 Appellant (risco 1olgado was charged in the co#rt of (irst
Instance of %o")lon with slight illegal detention )eca#se according to the
infor"ation, )eing a pri*ate person, he did /felonio#sly and witho#t
-#stifia)le "oti*e, :idnap and detain one Arte"ia (a)reag in the ho#se of
100
Antero 1olgado for a)o#t eight ho#rs. 'n the day set for trial, he appeared
alone witho#t the assistance of a lawyer. 1e was s#)se6#ently arraigned
and pleaded g#ilty #pon the instr#ction of a certain Mr. 3#"eriano
'ca"po. .H#dge"ent was rendered con*icting hi" of the cri"e of
:idnapping and serio#s illegal detention.
Iss#e2 8hether the acc#sed was afforded of his right
to )e heard )y hi"self and co#nselC
1eld2 3o. Jnder the circ#"stances, partic#larly the 6#alified plea
gi*en )y the acc#sed who was #naided )y co#nsel, it was not pr#dent, to
say the least, for the trial co#rt to render s#ch a serio#s -#dg"ent finding
the acc#sed g#ilty of a capital offense, and i"posing #pon hi" s#ch a
hea*y penalty as ten years and one day of prision "ayor to twenty years,
witho#t a)sol#te any e*idence to deter"ine and clarify the tr#e facts of the
case.
$he proceedings in the trial co#rt are irreg#lar fro" the
)eginning. It is e5pressly pro*ided in o#r r#les of o#rt, %#le 112, section
4, that2 If the defendant appears witho#t attorney, he "#st )e infor"ed )y
the co#rt that it is his right to ha*e attorney )eing arraigned., and "#st )e
as:ed if he desires the aid of attorney, the o#rt "#st assign attorney de
oficio to defend hi". A reasona)le ti"e "#st )e allowed for proc#ring
attorney.
Jnder this pro*ision, when a defendant appears witho#t attorney, the
co#rt has fo#r i"portant d#ties to co"ply with2 1 E It "#st infor" the
defendant that it is his right to ha*e attorney )efore )eing arraignedG 2 E
After gi*ing hi" s#ch infor"ation the co#rt "#st as: hi" if he desires the
aid of an attorneyG 4 E If he desires and is #na)le to e"ploy attorney, the
co#rt "#st assign attorney de oficio to defend hi"G and B E If the acc#sed
desires to proc#re an attorney of his own the co#rt "#st grant hi" a
reasona)le ti"e therefor.
3ot one of these d#ties had )een co"plied with )y the trial co#rt. $he
record discloses that said co#rt did not infor" the acc#sed of his right to
ha*e an attorney nor did it as: hi" if he desired the aid of one. $he trial
co#rt failed to in6#ire whether or not the acc#sed was to e"ploy an
attorney, to grant hi" reasona)le ti"e to proc#re or assign an attorney de
oficio. $he 6#estion as:ed )y the co#rt to the acc#sed was /Do yo# ha*e
an attorney or are yo# going to plead g#iltyC/ 3ot only did s#ch a 6#estion
fail to infor" the acc#sed that it was his right to ha*e an attorney )efore
arraign"ent, )#t, what is worse, the 6#estion was so fra"ed that it co#ld
ha*e )een constr#ed )y the acc#sed as a s#ggestion fro" the co#rt that
he plead g#ilt if he had no attorney. And this is a denial of fair hearing in
*iolation of the d#e process cla#se contained in o#r onstit#tion.
AMI'3 <. 1I'3,!'3
A.M. 3o. %$H9979147, Han#ary 22, 1999, Martine&, H.
Doctrine2
$he acc#sedIs discretion in a cri"inal prosec#tion with respect to his
choice of co#nsel is not so "#ch as to grant hi" a plenary prerogati*e
which wo#ld precl#de other e6#ally co"petent and independent co#nsels
fro" representing hi".
(acts2 At the sched#led hearing of the cri"inal case against A"ion, trial
was not held )eca#se on the day )efore the sched#led hearing, he was
infor"ed that his retained co#nsel, Atty. Depas#cat, was ill. $he hearing
was reset with a warning that no f#rther postpone"ent wo#ld )e
entertained. 'n the date of re9sched#led hearing, Atty. Depas#cat again
failed to appear. $o a*oid f#rther delay, the co#rt appointed Atty. Hacildo
of 0A' as co#nsel de oficio who was howe*er, prohi)ited to represent a
party who has retained the ser*ices of a co#nsel of his own choice. At the
ne5t sched#led hearing Atty. Depas#cat still did not show #p in co#rt. In
*iew of the fact that the *icti"Is wife, Mrs. <aflor and another go*ern"ent
witness )oth reside a)o#t 7? to 8? :ilo"eters fro" Bacolod ity, and that
the appearance of Atty. Depas#cat re"ained #ncertain, H#dge hiongson,
appointed Atty. Lao9'ng fro" the (ree Legal Aid 'ffice to represent
A"ion witho#t pre-#dice to the appearance of A"ionIs co#nsel de parte.
A"ion filed a co"plaint charging respondent -#dge with Ignorance of the
Law and 'ppression relati*e to the for"erIs cri"inal case. A"ion asserts
that his right to d#e process was *iolated and that he was depri*ed of his
constit#tional and stat#tory right to )e defended )y co#nsel of his own
choice.
Iss#e2 8hether or not respondent -#dgeIs appoint"ent of a co#nsel de
oficio constit#tes a *iolation of acc#sed9co"plainantIs right to d#e process
and a depri*ation of his constit#tional right to )e defended )y co#nsel of
his own choice.
1eld2 $he concept of /preference in the choice of co#nsel/ pertains "ore
aptly and specifically to a person #nder in*estigation. .*en if application
wo#ld )e e5tended to an acc#sed in a cri"inal prosec#tion, s#ch
preferential discretion cannot parta:e of one so a)sol#te and ar)itrary as
wo#ld "a:e the choice of co#nsel refer e5cl#si*ely to the predilection of
the acc#sed and th#s "a:e the pace of cri"inal prosec#tion entirely
dictated )y the acc#sed to the detri"ent of the e*ent#al resol#tion of the
case. Moreo*er, A"ion was not depri*ed of his s#)stanti*e and
constit#tional right to d#e process as he was d#ly accorded all the
opport#nities to )e heard and to present e*idence to s#)stantiate his
defense )#t he forfeited this right, for not appearing in co#rt together with
his co#nsel at the sched#led hearings. (inally, there is no denial of the
right to co#nsel where a co#nsel de oficio was appointed d#ring the
a)sence of the acc#sedIs co#nsel de parte p#rs#ant to the co#rtIs desire
to finish the case as early as practica)le #nder the contin#o#s trial syste".
$he ad"inistrati*e co"plaint is dis"issed.
0.1' <. 0.'0L.
,.%. 3o. 111499, !epte")er 27, 199+, Da*ide Hr., H
(A$!2 0etitioner and his co9acc#sed Hoe atre were alleged to ha*e
conspired in representing 0echo as a representati*e of .*erson
o""ercial $rading of ota)ato ity, which t#rned o#t to )e not9e5istent.
0echo was then tried and con*icted )y the !andigan)ayan for *iolation of
!ection 4@eA of %.A 3o. 4?19.
$he ! "odified the !andigan)ayan decision, holding the
petitioner g#ilty of the co"ple5 cri"e of atte"pted estafa thro#gh
falsification of official and co""ercial doc#"ents. Altho#gh the petitioner
co#ld not )e con*icted of the cri"e charged, *i&., *iolation of !ection 4@eA
of %.A 3o. 4?19, as a"ended E )eca#se the said section penali&es only
cons#""ated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not
cons#""ated E he co#ld, ne*ertheless, )e con*icted of the co"ple5
cri"e of atte"pted estafa thro#gh falsification of official and co""ercial
doc#"ents, which is necessarily incl#ded in the cri"e charged.
0etitioner filed a "otion for reconsideration as the con*iction
for estafa after his ac6#ittal fro" *iolation of %.A. 4?19 constit#tes do#)le
-eopardy. As s#ch, he co#ld not )e con*icted witho#t *iolating his right to
)e infor"ed of the acc#sation against hi".
I!!J.2 8hether or not the con*iction for estafa after ac6#ittal fro" the
original cri"e charged *iolates his right to )e infor"ed of the nat#re of the
acc#sation against hi"C
1.LD2 3'. Jnder the %#les of o#rt, when there is *ariance )etween the
offense charged in the co"plaint of infor"ation, and that pro*ed or
esta)lished )y the e*idence, and the offense as charged is incl#ded in or
necessarily incl#des the offense pro*ed, the acc#sed shall )e con*icted of
the offense pro*ed incl#ded in that which is charged, or of the offense
charged incl#ded in that which is pro*ed.
$he o#rt e5plained the o)-ecti*es of the right to )e
infor"ed2 to f#rnish the acc#sed with s#ch a description of the charge
against hi" as will ena)le hi" to "a:e his defenseG second, to a*ail
hi"self of his con*iction or ac6#ittal for protection against a f#rther
prosec#tion for the sa"e ca#seG and third, to infor" the co#rt of the facts
alleged, so that it "ay decide whether they are s#fficient in law to s#pport
a con*iction, if one sho#ld )e had.
In order that this re6#ire"ent "ay )e satisfied facts "#st )e
stated2 not concl#sions of law. 8hat deter"ines the real nat#re and ca#se
of acc#sation against an acc#sed is the act#al recital of facts stated in the
infor"ation or co"plaint and not the caption or prea")le of the
infor"ation.
It follows then that an acc#sed "ay )e con*icted of a cri"e
which altho#gh not the one charged, is necessarily incl#ded in the latter.
!'%IA3' <. !A3DI,A3BADA3 A3D 0.'0L.
,.%. 3o. L9+7972, H#ly 41, 198B, ABAD !A3$'!, H.
(A$!2 $ho"as $an was acc#sed of 6#alified theft in a co"plaint lodged
with the ity (iscal of V#e&on ity, assigned for in*estigation to the
petitioner who was then an Assistant ity (iscal. In the co#rse of the
in*estigation the petitioner de"anded 0B,???.?? fro" $an as the price for
dis"issing the case. $an reported the de"and to the 3ational B#rea# of
In*estigation which set #p an entrap"ent.
$he !andigan)ayan con*icted petitioner as g#ilty for
*iolation of !ection 4, paragraph @)A of %.A. 4?19 which penali&es2
/Directly or indirectly re6#esting or recei*ing any gift, present, share,
percentage, or )enefit, for hi"self or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction )etween the ,o*ern"ent and any other
party, wherein the p#)lic officer in his official capacity has to inter*ene
#nder the law./
0etitioner contends that the preli"inary in*estigation of a
co"plaint does not constit#te a /contract or transaction/ and th#s he
cannot )e con*icted for *iolation of %.A. 4?19. And if ac6#itted, he cannot
)e s#)se6#ently con*icted of direct )ri)ery )eca#se that wo#ld *iolate his
right to )e infor"ed of the nat#re of the acc#sation against hi".
I!!J.!2@1A 8hether or not preli"inary in*estigation constit#tes a
/transaction or contract./
@2A 8hether or not, if pre*io#s con*iction for *iolation of %.A.
4?19 were wrong, he can now )e con*icted for direct )ri)ery witho#t
*iolating his right to )e infor"ed.
1.LD2 @1A 3'. $he ter" ItransactionI as #sed thereof is not li"ited in its
scope or "eaning to a co""ercial or )#siness transaction )#t incl#des all
:inds of transaction, whether co""ercial, ci*il or ad"inistrati*e in nat#re,
pending with the go*ern"ent. $his "#st )e so, otherwise, the Act wo#ld
ha*e so stated in the /Definition of $er"s/, !ection 2 thereof. B#t it did
not. $he in*estigation was also not a contract. 3either was it a transaction
101
)eca#se this ter" "#st )e constr#ed as analogo#s to the ter" which
precedes it. A transaction, li:e a contract, is one which in*ol*es so"e
consideration as in credit transactions and this ele"ent @considerationA is
a)sent in the in*estigation cond#cted )y the petitioner.
8e agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
!andigan)ayan to ha*e con*icted hi" of *iolating !ec. 4 @)A of %.A. 3o.
4?19.
@2A D.!. $he petitioner also clai"s that he cannot )e
con*icted of )ri)ery #nder the %e*ised 0enal ode )eca#se to do so
wo#ld )e *iolati*e of as constit#tional right to )e infor"ed of the nat#re
and ca#se of the acc#sation against hi". 8rong. A reading of the
infor"ation which has )een reprod#ced herein clearly "a:es o#t a case of
)ri)ery so that the petitioner cannot clai" depri*ation of the right to )e
infor"ed.
B'%HA <. M.3D'XA
,.%. 3o. L9B7++7, H#ne 2?, 1977, (.%3A3D', H.
(A$!2 0etitioner Man#el Bor-a, acc#sed of slight physical in-#ries, was
con*icted and sentenced to s#ffer i"prison"ent for a period of twenty
days of arresto "enor )y respondent H#dge !enining, despite the
a)sence of an arraign"ent.. $he -#dge proceeded with the trial in a)sentia
and pro"#lgated the assailed decision. An appeal was d#ly ele*ated to
the o#rt of (irst Instance of e)# presided )y respondent H#dge
Mendo&a. 8itho#t any notice to petitioner and witho#t re6#iring hi" to
s#)"it his "e"orand#", a decision on the appealed case was rendered
against hi".
I!!J.2 8hether or not the decision was *alidly rendered despite
the a)sence of an arraign"ent.
1.LD2 3'. Arraign"ent is an indispensa)le re6#ire"ent in any
cri"inal prosec#tion. $he onstit#tion re6#ires that the acc#sed )e
arraigned so that he "ay )e infor"ed as to why he was indicted and what
penal offense he has to face. $his d#ty is an affir"ati*e one which the
co#rt, on its own "otion, "#st perfor", #nless wai*ed. $o e"phasi&e its
i"portance, no s#ch d#ty is laid on the co#rt with regard to the rights of
the acc#sed which he "ay )e entitled to e5ercise d#ring the trial. $hose
are rights which he "#st assert hi"self and the )enefits of which he
hi"self "#st de"and. In other words, in the arraign"ent the co#rt "#st
act of its own *olition.
It is i"perati*e that he is th#s "ade f#lly aware of possi)le
loss of freedo", e*en of his life, depending on the nat#re of the cri"e
i"p#ted to hi". At the *ery least then, he "#st )e f#lly infor"ed of why
the prosec#ting ar" of the state is "o)ili&ed against hi". 1e is th#s in a
position to enter his plea with f#ll :nowledge of the conse6#ences. 1e is
not e*en re6#ired to do so i""ediately. 1e "ay "o*e to 6#ash.
SEPARATION OF PO=ERS
IN RE" MAN$ANO
1%% SCRA 24%, 1988
FACTS"
H#dge Man&ano was designated "e")er of the Ilocos 3orte
0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice )y the 0ro*incial ,o*ernor. $he f#nction
of the o""ittee is to recei*e co"plaints and "a:e reco""endations
towards the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, partic#larly those
who are poor.
ISSUE" May the H#dge accept the designationC
HELD"
3o. $he co""ittee perfor"s ad"inistrati*e f#nctions, that
is, f#nctions which =in*ol*e the reg#lation and control o*er the cond#ct
and affairs of indi*id#als for their own welfare and the pro"#lgation of
r#les and reg#lations to )etter carry o#t the policy of the legislat#re or
s#ch as are de*oted #pon the ad"inistrati*e agency )y the organic law of
its e5istence.
Jnder the onstit#tion, the "e")ers of the !#pre"e o#rt
and other co#rts esta)lished )y law shall not )e designated to any agency
perfor"ing 6#asi9-#dicial or ad"inistrati*e f#nctions @!ection 12, Art. <III,
onstit#tionA. onsidering that "e")ership of H#dge Man&ano in the
Ilocos 3orte 0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice, which discharges
ad"inistrati*e f#nctions, will )e in *iolation of the onstit#tion. $his
declaration does not "ean that %$ H#dges sho#ld adopt an attit#de of
"onastic insensi)ility or #n)eco"ing indifference to 0ro*inceRity
o""ittee on H#stice. As inc#")ent %$ H#dges, they for" part of the
str#ct#re of go*ern"ent. $heir integrity and perfor"ance in the
ad-#dication of cases contri)#te to the solidity of s#ch str#ct#re. As p#)lic
officials, they are tr#stees of an orderly society. .*en as non9"e")ers of
0ro*incialRity o""ittees on H#stice, %$ -#dges sho#ld render
assistance to said o""ittees to help pro"ote the landa)le p#rposes for
which they e5ist, )#t only when s#ch assistance "ay )e reasona)ly
incidental to the f#lfill"ent of their -#dicial d#ties.
ANGARA VS. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 45081. !UL- 15, 193%
LAUREL, !"
FACTS"
0etitioner Hose Angara and respondents 0edro Dns#a,
Mig#el astillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates *oted for the position
of "e")er of the 3ational Asse")ly for the first district of the 0ro*ince of
$aya)as in the !epte")er 17, 1497 election. 0etitioner was proclai"ed to
)e a "e")er9elect of the 3ational Asse")ly )y the 0ro*incial Board of
an*assers. $hereafter, petitioner too: his oath.
$he 3ational Asse")ly passed a %esol#tion, confir"ing
procla"ation of Angara. Dns#a filed )efore the respondent .lectoral
o""ission a /Motion of 0rotest/ against the election of petitioner, and
praying that said respondent )e declared elected "e")er, or that the
election of said position )e n#llified.
$he respondent denied petitionerIs /Motion to Dis"iss the
0rotest./ 0etitioner arg#es that2 the onstit#tion confers e5cl#si*e
-#risdiction #pon the .lectoral o""ission solely as regards the "erits of
contested elections to the 3ational Asse")ly, and that the onstit#tion
e5cl#des fro" said -#risdiction the power to reg#late the proceedings of
said election contests, which power has )een reser*ed to the Legislati*e
Depart"ent of the ,o*ern"ent or the 3ational Asse")ly.
$he !olicitor9,eneral appeared and filed an answer in )ehalf
of the respondent, interposing the special defense that the o""ission
has )een created )y the onstit#tion as an instr#"entality of the
Legislati*e Depart"ent in*ested with the -#risdiction to decide /all contests
relating to the election, ret#rns, and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the
3ational Asse")ly/G that in adopting its resol#tion of Dece")er 9, 1947,
fi5ing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the
election of any "e")er of the 3ational Asse")ly, it acted within its
-#risdiction and in the legiti"ate e5ercise of the i"plied powers granted it
)y the onstit#tion to adopt the r#les and reg#lations essential to carry o#t
the powers and f#nctions conferred #pon the sa"e )y the f#nda"ental
lawG that in adopting its resol#tion of Han#ary 24, 194+, o*err#ling the
"otion of the petitioner to dis"iss the election protest in 6#estion, and
declaring itself with -#risdiction to ta:e cogni&ance of said protest, it acted
in the legiti"ate e5ercise of its 6#asi9-#dicial f#nctions as an
instr#"entality of the Legislati*e Depart"ent of the o""onwealth
,o*ern"ent, and hence said act is )eyond the -#dicial cogni&ance or
control of the !#pre"e o#rt, a"ong others.
0etitioner prayed for the iss#ance of a preli"inary writ of
in-#nction against the o""ission, which petition was denied /witho#t
passing #pon the "erits of the case./
ISSUE" 8hether or not the .lectoral o""ission acted witho#t or in
e5cess of its -#risdiction in ass#"ing to ta:e cogni&ance of the protest filed
102
against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the pre*io#s
confir"ation of s#ch election )y resol#tion of the 3ational Asse")ly.
HELD"
$he separation of powers is a f#nda"ental principle in o#r
syste" of go*ern"ent. It o)tains not thro#gh e5press pro*ision )#t )y
act#al di*ision in o#r onstit#tion. .ach depart"ent of the go*ern"ent
has e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of "atters within its -#risdiction, and is s#pre"e
within its own sphere. B#t it does not follow fro" the fact that the three
powers are to )e :ept separate and distinct that the onstit#tion intended
the" to )e a)sol#tely #nrestrained and independent of each other. $he
onstit#tion has pro*ided for an ela)orate syste" of chec:s and )alances
to sec#re coordination in the wor:ings of the *ario#s depart"ents of the
go*ern"ent.
$he iss#e hinges on the interpretation of section B of Article
<I of the onstit#tion. $he nat#re of the present contro*ersy shows the
necessity of a final constit#tional ar)iter to deter"ine the conflict of
a#thority )etween two agencies created )y the onstit#tion. If the conflict
were left #ndecided and #ndeter"ined, a *oid wo#ld )e created in o#r
constit#tional syste", which "ay in the long r#n pro*e destr#cti*e of the
entire fra"ewor:. Jpon principle, reason and a#thority, the !#pre"e
o#rt has -#risdiction o*er the .lectoral o""ission and the s#)-ect
"atter of the present contro*ersy for the p#rpose of deter"ining the
character, scope and e5tent of the constit#tional grant to the .lectoral
o""ission as /the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election,
ret#rns and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly./
$he transfer of the power of deter"ining the election, ret#rns
and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the Legislat#re long lodged in the
legislati*e )ody, to an independent, i"partial and non9partisan tri)#nal, is
)y no "eans a "ere e5peri"ent in the science of go*ern"ent. $he
"e")ers of the onstit#tional on*ention who fra"ed o#r f#nda"ental
law were in their "a-ority "en "at#re in years and e5perience. $he
creation of the .lectoral o""ission was designed to re"edy certain e*ils
of which the fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion were cogni&ant. (ro" the
deli)erations of o#r onstit#tional on*ention it is e*ident that the p#rpose
was to transfer in its totality all the powers pre*io#sly e5ercised )y the
Legislat#re in "atters pertaining to contested elections of its "e")ers, to
an independent and i"partial tri)#nal. It was not so "#ch the :nowledge
and appreciation of conte"porary constit#tional precedents, howe*er, as
the long9felt need of deter"ining legislati*e contests de*oid of partisan
considerations which pro"pted the people acting thro#gh their delegates
to the on*ention to pro*ide for this )ody :nown as the .lectoral
o""ission. 8ith this end in *iew, a co"posite )ody in which )oth the
"a-ority and "inority parties are e6#ally represented to off9set partisan
infl#ence in its deli)erations was created, and f#rther endowed with
-#dicial te"per )y incl#ding in its "e")ership three -#stices of the
!#pre"e o#rt.
$he grant of power to the .lectoral o""ission to -#dge all
contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of "e")ers of
the 3ational Asse")ly, is intended to )e as co"plete and #ni"paired as if
it had re"ained originally in the Legislat#re. $he e5press lodging of that
power in the .lectoral o""ission is an i"plied denial of the e5ercise of
that power )y the 3ational Asse")ly. If the power clai"ed for the 3ational
Asse")ly to reg#late the proceedings of the .lectoral o""ission and
c#t off the power of the .lectoral o""ission to lay down a period within
which protest sho#ld )e filed were conceded, the grant of power to the
co""ission wo#ld )e ineffecti*e.
$he .lectoral o""ission in s#ch a case wo#ld )e in*ested
with the power to deter"ine contested cases in*ol*ing the election,
ret#rns, and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly )#t
s#)-ect at all ti"es to the reg#lati*e power of the 3ational Asse")ly. 3ot
only wo#ld the p#rpose of the fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion of totally
transferring this a#thority fro" the legislati*e )ody )e fr#strated, )#t a d#al
a#thority wo#ld )e created with the res#ltant ine*ita)le clash of powers
fro" ti"e to ti"e. A sad spectacle wo#ld then )e presented of the
.lectoral o""ission retaining the )are a#thority of ta:ing cogni&ance of
cases referred to, )#t in reality witho#t the necessary "eans to render that
a#thority effecti*e whene*er and where*er the 3ational Asse")ly has
chosen to act, a sit#ation worse than that intended to )e re"edied )y the
fra"ers of o#r onstit#tion. $he power to reg#late on the part of the
3ational Asse")ly in proced#ral "atters will ine*ita)ly lead to the #lti"ate
control )y the Asse")ly of the entire proceedings of the .lectoral
o""ission, and, )y indirection, to the entire a)rogation of the
constit#tional grant. It is o)*io#s that this res#lt sho#ld not )e per"itted.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. POEA
G.R. NO. 7%%33, OCTO&ER 18, 1988
CRU$, !."
FACTS"
<italiano !aco was hief 'fficer of the MR< .astern 0olaris
when he was :illed in an accident. 1is widow s#ed for da"ages #nder
..'. 797 and Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 of the 0'.A. $he petitioner, as
the *essel owner, arg#ed that the co"plaint was cogni&a)le not )y the
0'.A )#t )y the !ocial !ec#rity !yste" and sho#ld ha*e )een filed
against the !tate Ins#rance (#nd. $he 0'.A ne*ertheless ass#"ed
-#risdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties r#led in
fa*or of the co"plainant.
0etitioner ca"e to this o#rt, pro"pting the !olicitor ,eneral
to "o*e for dis"issal on the gro#nd of non9e5ha#stion of ad"inistrati*e
re"edies. 'rdinarily, the decisions of the 0'.A sho#ld first )e appealed
to the 3ational La)or %elations o""ission, on the theory inter alia that
the agency sho#ld )e gi*en an opport#nity to correct the errors, if any, of
its s#)ordinates. $his case co"es #nder one of the e5ceptions, howe*er,
as the 6#estions the petitioner is raising are essentially 6#estions of law.
Moreo*er, the pri*ate respondent hi"self has not o)-ected to the
petitionerIs direct resort to this o#rt, o)ser*ing that the #s#al proced#re
wo#ld delay the disposition of the case to her pre-#dice.
ISSUE" 8hether or not there had )een a *alid delegation of power.
HELD"
8hat can )e delegated is the discretion to deter"ine how
the law "ay )e enforced, not what the law shall )e. $he ascertain"ent of
the latter s#)-ect is a prerogati*e of the legislat#re. $his prerogati*e
cannot )e a)dicated or s#rrendered )y the legislat#re to the delegate.
$here are two accepted tests to deter"ine whether or not
there is a *alid delegation of legislati*e power, *i&, the co"pleteness test
and the s#fficient standard test. Jnder the first test, the law "#st )e
co"plete in all its ter"s and conditions when it lea*es the legislat#re s#ch
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will ha*e to do is
enforce it. Jnder the s#fficient standard test, there "#st )e ade6#ate
g#idelines or stations in the law to "ap o#t the )o#ndaries of the
delegateIs a#thority and pre*ent the delegation fro" r#nning riot. Both
tests are intended to pre*ent a total transference of legislati*e a#thority to
the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislat#re
and e5ercise a power essentially legislati*e.
$he principle of non9delegation of powers is applica)le to all
the three "a-or powers of the ,o*ern"ent )#t is especially i"portant in
the case of the legislati*e power )eca#se of the "any instances when its
delegation is per"itted. $he occasions are rare when e5ec#ti*e or -#dicial
powers ha*e to )e delegated )y the a#thorities to which they legally
certain. In the case of the legislati*e power, howe*er, s#ch occasions
ha*e )eco"e "ore and "ore fre6#ent, if not necessary. $his had led to
the o)ser*ation that the delegation of legislati*e power has )eco"e the
r#le and its non9delegation the e5ception.
$he reason is the increasing co"ple5ity of the tas: of
go*ern"ent and the growing ina)ility of the legislat#re to cope directly with
the "yriad pro)le"s de"anding its attention. $he growth of society has
ra"ified its acti*ities and created pec#liar and sophisticated pro)le"s that
the legislat#re cannot )e e5pected reasona)ly to co"prehend.
!peciali&ation e*en in legislation has )eco"e necessary. $o "any of the
pro)le"s attendant #pon present9day #nderta:ings, the legislat#re "ay
not ha*e the co"petence to pro*ide the re6#ired direct and efficacio#s,
not to say, specific sol#tions. $hese sol#tions "ay, howe*er, )e e5pected
fro" its delegates, who are s#pposed to )e e5perts in the partic#lar fields
assigned to the".
$he reasons for the delegation of legislati*e powers in
general are partic#larly applica)le to ad"inistrati*e )odies. 8ith the
proliferation of speciali&ed acti*ities and their attendant pec#liar pro)le"s,
the national legislat#re has fo#nd it "ore and "ore necessary to entr#st to
ad"inistrati*e agencies the a#thority to iss#e r#les to carry o#t the general
pro*isions of the stat#te. $his is called the /power of s#)ordinate
legislation./
8ith this power, ad"inistrati*e )odies "ay i"ple"ent the )road policies
laid down in a stat#te )y /filling inI the details which the ongress "ay not
ha*e the opport#nity or co"petence to pro*ide. $his is effected )y their
pro"#lgation of what are :nown as s#pple"entary reg#lations, s#ch as
the i"ple"enting r#les iss#ed )y the Depart"ent of La)or on the new
La)or ode. $hese reg#lations ha*e the force and effect of law.
Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 is one s#ch ad"inistrati*e reg#lation. $he
"odel contract prescri)ed there)y has )een applied in a significant
n#")er of the cases witho#t challenge )y the e"ployer. $he power of the
0'.A @and )efore it the 3ational !ea"en BoardA in re6#iring the "odel
contract is not #nli"ited as there is a s#fficient standard g#iding the
delegate in the e5ercise of the said a#thority. $hat standard is
disco*era)le in the e5ec#ti*e order itself which, in creating the 0hilippine
'*erseas ."ploy"ent Ad"inistration, "andated it to protect the rights of
o*erseas (ilipino wor:ers to /fair and e6#ita)le e"ploy"ent practices./
CASI&ANG VS. AJUINO
G.R. NO. L38025. AUGUST 20, 1979
MA7ASIAR, ! P"
FACTS"
%espondent %e"igio D# was proclai"ed as the elected
Mayor of %osales, 0angasinan o*er his ri*al, petitioner, who seasona)ly
filed a protest with the trial co#rt, presided )y respondent H#dge, who
initially too: cogni&ance of the sa"e as it is #n6#estiona)ly a -#sticia)le
contro*ersy.
In the "eanti"e, 0resident Marcos iss#ed 0rocla"ation 3o.
1?81, placing the entire co#ntry #nder Martial LawG thereafter, a new
onstit#tion was adopted. D# "o*ed to dis"iss the election protest on the
gro#nd that the trial co#rt had lost -#risdiction o*er the sa"e in *iew of the
effecti*ity of the 1974 onstit#tion )y reason of which E @principallyA
!ection 9 of Article ;<II O$ransitory 0ro*isionsP and !ection 2 of Article ;I
E a political 6#estion has inter*ened in the case. D# contended that /the
pro*isions in the 1947 onstit#tion relati*e to all local go*ern"ents ha*e
)een s#perseded )y the 1974 onstit#tion.
%espondent H#dge s#stained the political 6#estion theory
and ordered the dis"issal of the electoral protest. 1ence, this petition.
103
ISSUE" 8hether or not the electoral protest filed )y the petitioner
re"ained a -#sticia)le 6#estion e*en after the 1974 onstit#tion was
adopted, th#s re"ains to )e #nder the -#risdiction of the o#rt of (irst
Instance.
HELD"
$he thr#st of the aforesaid political 6#estion theory of
respondent D# is that the 1974 onstit#tion, thro#gh !ection 9 of Article
;<II thereof, protected only those inc#")ents, li:e hi", at the ti"e of its
ratification and effecti*ity and are the only ones a#thori&ed to contin#e in
office and their ter" of office as e5tended now depends on the pleas#re
of, as the sa"e has )een entr#sted or co""itted to, the inc#")ent
0resident of the 0hilippines or the Legislati*e Depart"entG and that
!ection 2 of Article ;I thereof entr#sted to the 3ational Asse")ly the
re*a"p of the entire local go*ern"ent str#ct#re )y the enact"ent of a
local go*ern"ent code, th#s presenting a 6#estion of policy, the necessity
and e5pediency of which are o#tside the range of -#dicial re*iew. In short,
for the respondent H#dge to still contin#e ass#"ing -#risdiction o*er the
pending election protest of petitioner is for hi" to ta:e cogni&ance of a
6#estion or policy /in regard to which f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een
delegated to the Legislati*e or .5ec#ti*e )ranch of the go*ern"ent./
$he electoral protest case herein in*ol*ed has re"ained a
-#sticia)le contro*ersy. 3o political 6#estion has e*er )een interwo*en into
this case. 3or is there any act of the inc#")ent 0resident or the
Legislati*e Depart"ent to )e indirectly re*iewed or interfered with if the
respondent H#dge decides the election protest. $he ter" /political
6#estion/ connotes what it "eans in ordinary parlance, na"ely, a 6#estion
of policy. It refers to those 6#estions which #nder the onstit#tion, are to
)e decided )y the people in their so*ereign capacityG or in regard to which
f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the legislati*e or
e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the go*ern"ent. It is concerned with iss#es
dependent #pon the wisdo", not legality, of a partic#lar "eas#re/
@$aNada *s. #enco, L91?72, (e). 28, 1977A.
TASADA VS. CUENCO
G.R. NO. L10520, FE&RUAR- 28, 1957
CONCEPCION, !."
FACTS"
0etitioners Loren&o M. $aNada and Diosdado Macapagal
so#ght to o#st respondent senators fro" the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal.
0etitioners allege that the that the o""ittee on %#les for the !enate, in
no"inating !enators #enco and Delgado, and the !enate, in choosing
these respondents, as "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal, had
/acted a)sol#tely witho#t power or color of a#thority and in clear
*iolation .. of Article <I, !ection 11 of the onstit#tion/G that /in ass#"ing
"e")ership in the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal, )y ta:ing the corresponding
oath of office therefor/, said respondents had /acted a)sol#tely witho#t
color of appoint"ent or a#thority and are #nlawf#lly, and in *iolation of the
onstit#tion, #s#rping, intr#ding into and e5ercising the powers of
"e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal./
%espondents assail the co#rtKs -#risdiction to entertain the
petition, #pon the gro#nd that the power to choose si5 @+A !enators as
"e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal has )een e5pressly conferred
)y the onstit#tion #pon the !enate, despite the fact that the draft
s#)"itted to the constit#tional con*ention ga*e to the respecti*e political
parties the right to elect their respecti*e representati*es in the .lectoral
o""ission pro*ided for in the original onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, and
that the only re"edy a*aila)le to petitioners herein /is not in the -#dicial
for#"/, )#t /to )ring the "atter to the )ar of p#)lic opinion./
ISSUE" 8hether or not the case at )ar raises "erely a political 6#estion.
HELD"
8illo#gh)y l#cidly states2 /.lsewhere in this treatise the well9
:nown and well9esta)lished principle is considered that it is not within the
pro*ince of the co#rts to pass -#dg"ent #pon the policy of legislati*e or
e5ec#ti*e action. 8here, therefore, discretionary powers are granted )y
the onstit#tion or )y stat#te, the "anner in which those powers are
e5ercised is not s#)-ect to -#dicial re*iew. $he co#rts, therefore, concern
the"sel*es only with the 6#estion as to the e5istence and e5tent of these
discretionary powers.
/As disting#ished fro" the -#dicial, the legislati*e and
e5ec#ti*e depart"ents are spo:en of as the political depart"ents of
go*ern"ent )eca#se in *ery "any cases their action is necessarily
dictated )y considerations of p#)lic or political policy. $hese
considerations of p#)lic or political policy of co#rse will not per"it the
legislat#re to *iolate constit#tional pro*isions, or the e5ec#ti*e to e5ercise
a#thority not granted hi" )y the onstit#tion or )y, stat#te, )#t, within
these li"its, they do per"it the depart"ents, separately or together, to
recogni&e that a certain set of facts e5ists or that a gi*en stat#s e5ists, and
these deter"inations, together with the conse6#ences that flow therefro",
"ay not )e tra*ersed in the co#rts./ @8illo#gh)y on the onstit#tion of the
Jnited !tates, <ol. 4, p. 142+G e"phasis s#pplied.A. $o the sa"e effect is
the lang#age #sed in orp#s H#ris !ec#nd#", fro" which we 6#ote2. /It is
well9settled doctrine that political 6#estions are not within the pro*ince of
the -#diciary, e5cept to the e5tent that power to deal with s#ch 6#estions
has )een conferred #pon the co#rts )y e5press constit#tional or stat#tory
pro*isions. /It is not easy, howe*er, to define the phrase Upolitical
6#estionI, nor to deter"ine what "atters, fall within its scope. It is
fre6#ently #sed to designate all 6#estions that lie o#tside the scope of the
-#dicial 6#estions, which #nder the constit#tion, are to )e decided )y the
people in their so*ereign capacity, or in regard to which f#ll discretionary
a#thority has )een delegated to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the
go*ern"ent./
$h#s, it has )een repeatedly held that the 6#estion whether
certain a"end"ents to the onstit#tion are in*alid for non9co"pliance
with the proced#re therein prescri)ed, is not a political one and "ay )e
settled )y the o#rts.
$he ter" /political 6#estion/ connotes, in legal parlance,
what it "eans in ordinary parlance, na"ely, a 6#estion of policy. In other
words, in the lang#age of orp#s H#ris !ec#nd#" @s#praA, it refers to
/those 6#estions which, #nder the onstit#tion, are to )e decided )y the
people in their so*ereign capacity, or in regard to which f#ll discretionary
a#thority has )een delegated to the Legislat#re or e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the
,o*ern"ent./ It is concerned with iss#es dependent #pon the wisdo", not
legality, of a partic#lar "eas#re.
!#ch is not the nat#re of the 6#estion for deter"ination in
the present case. 1ere, the co#rt is called #pon to decide whether the
election of !enators #enco and Delgado, )y the !enate, as "e")ers of
the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal, #pon no"ination )y !enator 0ri"icias9a
"e")er and spo:es"an of the party ha*ing the largest n#")er of *otes in
the !enate9on )ehalf of its o""ittee on %#les, contra*enes the
constit#tional "andate that said "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal
shall )e chosen /#pon no"ination .. of the party ha*ing the second largest
n#")er of *otes/ in the !enate, and hence, is n#ll and *oid. $his is not a
political 6#estion. $he !enate is not clothed with /f#ll discretionary
a#thority/ in the choice of "e")ers of the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal. $he
e5ercise of its power thereon is s#)-ect to constit#tional li"itations which
are clai"ed to )e "andatory in nat#re. It is clearly within the legiti"ate
pro*e of the -#dicial depart"ent to pass #pon the *alidity the proceedings
in connection therewith.
SANIDAD V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L44%40. OCTO&ER 12, 197%
FACTS"
0a)lito !anidad, a newspaper col#"nist of ='*er*iew,> a
wee:ly newspaper circ#lating in Bag#io and the ordilleras, assailed the
onstit#tionality of !ec 19 of the o"elec %esol#tion 21+7 which pro*ides
that d#ring the ple)iscite ca"paign period, on the day )efore and on
ple)iscite day, no "ass "edia col#"nist, co""entator, anno#ncer or
personality shall #se his col#"n or radio or tele*ision ti"e to ca"paign for
or against the ple)iscite iss#e. 0etitioner contends that it *iolates the
freedo" of e5pression and of the press. 1ence, constit#tes as a prior
restraint in his constit#tional right. !olicitor ,eneral contends that it does
not *iolate the onstit#tion for it is a *alid i"ple"entation of the power of
o"elec to s#per*ise and reg#late "edia d#ring election or ple)iscite
period and can e5press his news thro#gh the o"elec space Y airti"e.
ISSUE" 8hether or not o"elec is granted the power to reg#late "ass
"edia d#ring election or ple)iscite period #nder Article 9 of the 19987
onstit#tion.
HELD"
It is gi*en that what was granted to o"elec was the power
to s#per*ise and reg#late the #se and en-oy"ent of franchises, per"its, or
other grants iss#ed for the operation of transportation or other p#)lic
#tilities, "edia co""#nication or infor"ation to the end that e6#al
opport#nity, ti"e and space, and the right to reply, incl#ding reasona)le,
e6#al rates therefore, for p#)lic infor"ation ca"paign and for#"s a"ong
candidates are ens#red. $he e*il so#ght to )e pre*ented is the possi)ility
that a franchise holder "ay fa*or or gi*e any #nd#e ad*antage to a
candidate.
3either the onstit#tion nor %A ++B+ can )e constr#ed to
"ean that the o"elec has also )een granted the right to s#per*ise and
reg#late the e5ercise )y "edia practitioners the"sel*es of their right to
e5pression d#ring ple)iscite periods. Media practitioners e5ercising their
freedo" of e5pression d#ring ple)iscite periods are neither the franchise
holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in*ol*ed in a
ple)iscite. o"elec %esol#tion 3o 21+7 has no stat#tory )asis.
DA$A VS. SINGSON
180 SCRA 49%, 1989
FACTS"
0etitioner was a "e")er of the o""ission on
Appoint"ents representing the Li)eral 0arty. 8ith the organi&ation of the
LD0 @La)an ng De"o:rati:ong 0ilipinoA, so"e congressional "e")ers
)elonging to the Li)eral 0arty resigned fro" said party to -oin the LD0.
8hen the o""ission on Appoint"ents were reorgani&ed, petitioner was
replaced )y an LD0 representati*e.
0etitioner contends that the organi&ation of the LD0 cannot
affect the co"position of the o""ission on Appoint"ents )eca#se LD0
is not a registered party and has not yet shown the sta)ility of a party.
ISSUE" Does the sit#ation present a =political 6#estion>C
HELD"
104
$he 6#estion is -#sticia)le. $he iss#e is one of legality not of
wisdo". $he ascertain"ent of the "anner of for"ing the o""ission on
Appoint"ents is distinct fro" the discretion of the parties to designate
there representati*es. And e*en if the 6#estion were political in nat#re, it
wo#ld still co"e #nder the e5panded power of re*iew in Article <III,
!ection 1.
DELEGATION OF PO=ER
GARCIA V. E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR-
G.R. NO. 100883. DECEM&ER 2, 1991
CRU$, ! P"
FACTS"
$he petitioner challenges %A 7?B2 on the gro#nd that it
defeats the constit#tional policy of de*eloping a self9reliant and
independent national econo"y effecti*ely controlled )y (ilipinos and the
protection of (ilipino enterprises against #nfair foreign co"petition and
trade practices. 1e clai"s that the law a)dicates all reg#lation of foreign
enterprises in this co#ntry and gi*es the" #nfair ad*antages o*er local
in*est"ents which are practically el)owed o#t in their own land with the
co"plicity of their own go*ern"ent. !pecifically, he arg#es that #nder
!ection 7 of the said law a foreign in*estor "ay do )#siness in the
0hilippines or in*est in a do"estic enterprise #p to 1??M of its capital
witho#t need of prior appro*al. $he said section "a:es certain that /the
!. or B$%0, as the case "ay )e, shall not i"pose any li"itations on
the e5tent of foreign ownership in an enterprise additional to those
pro*ided in this Act./
$he petitioner also attac:s !ection 9 )eca#se if a 0hilippine
national )elie*es that an area of in*est"ent sho#ld )e incl#ded in List ,
the )#rden is on hi" to show that the criteria en#"erated in said section
are "et. It is alleged that Articles 2, 42, Y 47 of the '"ni)#s In*est"ents
ode of 1982 are done away with )y %A 7?B2. It is also arg#ed that )y
repealing Articles B9, 7?, 7B and 7+ of the 1987 '"ni)#s In*est"ents
ode, %A 3o. 7?B2 f#rther a)andons the reg#lation of foreign in*est"ents
)y doing away with i"portant re6#ire"ents for doing )#siness in the
0hilippines.
(inally, the petitioner clai"s that the transitory pro*isions of
%A 7?B2, which allow practically #nli"ited entry of foreign in*est"ents for
three years, s#)-ect only to a s#pposed $ransitory (oreign In*est"ent
3egati*e List, not only co"pletely dereg#lates foreign in*est"ents )#t
wo#ld place (ilipino enterprises at a fatal disad*antage in their own
co#ntry.
ISSUE" 8hether or not there is a -#sticia)le 6#estion present in the case
at )ar.
HELD"
8hat is present in the case at )ar is not a de)ate on the
wisdo" or the efficacy of the Act, )#t this is a "atter on which the o#rt is
not co"petent to r#le. As ooley o)ser*ed2 /De)ata)le 6#estions are for
the legislat#re to decide. $he co#rts do not sit to resol*e the "erits of
conflicting iss#es./ In Angara *. .lectoral o""ission, H#stice La#rel
"ade it clear that /the -#diciary does not pass #pon 6#estions of wisdo",
-#stice or e5pediency of legislation./ And fittingly so for in the e5ercise of
-#dicial power, we are allowed only /to settle act#al contro*ersies in*ol*ing
rights which are legally de"anda)le and enforcea)le,/ and "ay not ann#l
an act of the political depart"ents si"ply )eca#se we feel it is #nwise or
i"practical. It is tr#e that, #nder the e5panded concept of the political
6#estion, we "ay now also /deter"ine whether or not there has )een a
gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on
the part of any )ranch or instr#"entality of the ,o*ern"ent./ $he o#rt,
howe*er, did not find any irreg#larity that e5ist in the case at )ar.
$he petitioner is co""ended for his high ci*ic spirit and his
&eal in the protection of the (ilipino in*estors against #nfair foreign
co"petition. 1is painsta:ing st#dy and analysis of the (oreign
In*est"ents Act of 1991 re*eals not only his nationalistic fer*or )#t also
an i"pressi*e grasp of this co"ple5 s#)-ect. B#t his *iews are e5pressed
in the wrong for#". $he o#rt is not a political arena. 1is o)-ections to the
law are )etter heard )y his colleag#es in the ongress of the 0hilippines,
who ha*e the power to rewrite it, if they so please, in the fashion he
s#ggests.
DELEGATION OF EMERGENC- PO=ERS
ARANETA V. DINGLASAN
(G.R. NO. L2044 AUGUST 2%, 1949)
TUASON, !."
FACTS"
$he petitions challenge the *alidity of e5ec#ti*e orders of the
0resident a*owedly iss#ed in *irt#e of o""onwealth Act 3o. +71.
In*ol*ed in cases 3os. L92?BB and L9277+ is .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. +2,
which reg#lates rentals for ho#ses and lots for residential )#ildings.
oncerned in case L94?77 is .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 192, which ai"s to
control e5ports fro" the 0hilippines. 'n the other hand, case 3o. L94?7B
relates to .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 227, which appropriates f#nds for the
operation of the ,o*ern"ent of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines d#ring the
period fro" H#ly 1, 19B9 to H#ne 4?, 197?, and for other p#rposes.
Affected in case 3o. L94?7+ is .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 22+, which
appropriates 0+,???,??? to defray the e5penses in connection with, and
incidental to, the hold l#g of the national elections to )e held in 3o*e")er,
19B9.
0etitioners rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the
."ergency 0owers Act @o""onwealth Act 3o. +71A has ceased to ha*e
any force and effect.
ISSUE" 8hether or the ."ergency 0owers Act has ceased to ha*e any
force and effect.
HELD"
Des. !ection 2+ of Article <I of the 1947 onstit#tion
pro*ides2 =In ti"e of war or other national e"ergency, the ongress "ay
)y law a#thori&e the 0resident, for a li"ited period and s#)-ect to s#ch
restrictions as it "ay prescri)e, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations to
carry o#t a declared national policy>.
Article <I of the onstit#tion pro*ides that any law passed )y
*irt#e thereof sho#ld )e /for a li"ited period./ /Li"ited/ has )een defined
to "ean /restrictedG )o#ndedG prescri)edG confined within positi*e )o#ndsG
restricti*e in d#ration, e5tent or scope./ $he words /li"ited period/ as #sed
in the onstit#tion are )eyond 6#estion intended to "ean restricti*e in
d#ration. ."ergency, in order to -#stify the delegation of e"ergency
powers, /"#st )e te"porary or it can not )e said to )e an e"ergency./
It is to )e pres#"ed that o""onwealth Act 3o. +71 was
appro*ed with this li"itation in *iew. $he opposite theory wo#ld "a:e the
law rep#gnant to the onstit#tion, and is contrary to the principle that the
legislat#re is dee"ed to ha*e f#ll :nowledge of the constit#tional scope of
its powers. $he assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act
wo#ld not )e in har"ony with the onstit#tion either. If a new and different
law were necessary to ter"inate the delegation, the period for the
delegation, it has )een correctly pointed o#t, wo#ld )e #nli"ited,
indefinite, negati*e and #ncertain. (#rther"ore, this wo#ld create the
ano"aly that, while ongress "ight delegate its powers )y si"ple
"a-ority, it "ight not )e a)le to recall the" e5cept )y a two9third *ote. In
other words, it wo#ld )e easier for ongress to delegate its powers than to
ta:e the" )ac:.
!ection B of the Act goes far to settle the legislati*e intention
of this phase of Act 3o. +71. !ection B stip#lates that /the r#les and
reg#lations pro"#lgated there#nder shall )e in f#ll force and effect #ntil
the ongress of the 0hilippines shall otherwise pro*ide./ $he silence of
the law regarding the repeal of the a#thority itself, in the face of the
e5press pro*ision for the repeal of the r#les and reg#lations iss#ed in
p#rs#ance of it, a clear "anifestation of the )elief held )y the 3ational
Asse")ly that there was no necessity to pro*ide for the for"er. It wo#ld
)e strange if ha*ing no idea a)o#t the ti"e the ."ergency 0owers Act
was to )e effecti*e the 3ational Asse")le failed to "a:e a pro*ision for
this ter"ination in the sa"e way that it did for the ter"ination of the effects
and incidents of the delegation. $here wo#ld )e no point in repealing or
ann#lling the r#les and reg#lations pro"#lgated #nder a law if the law
itself was to re"ain in force, since, in that case, the 0resident co#ld not
only "a:e new r#les and reg#lations )#t he co#ld restore the ones
already ann#lled )y the legislat#re.
It is o#r considered opinion, and we so hold, that o""onwealth Act 3o.
+71 )eca"e inoperati*e when ongress "et in reg#lar session on May
27, 19B+, and that .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. +2, 192, 227 and 22+ were
iss#ed witho#t a#thority of law. In setting the session of ongress instead
of the first special session preceded it as the point of e5piration of the Act,
we thin: gi*ing effect to the p#rpose and intention of the 3ational
Asse")ly. In a special session, the ongress "ay /consider general
legislation or only s#ch as he @0residentA "ay designate./ @!ection 9,
Article <I of the onstit#tion.A In a reg#lar session, the power ongress to
legislate is not circ#"scri)ed e5cept )y the li"itations i"posed )y the
organic law.
Jpon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will )e granted.
DELEGATION OF EMERGENC- PO=ERS
RODRIGUE$ V. GELLA
(G.R. NO. L%2%% FE&RUAR- 2, 1953)
PARAS, C.!.
FACTS"
0etitioners herein see: to in*alidate .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os.
7B7 and 7B+ iss#ed on 3o*e")er 1?, 1972, the first appropriating the s#"
of 047,87?,7?? for #rgent and essential p#)lic wor:s, and the second
setting aside the s#" of 011,4+7,+?? for relief in the pro*inces and cities
*isited )y typhoons, floods, dro#ghts, earth6#a:es, *olcanic action and
other cala"ities. !#ch .5ec#ti*e 'rders were iss#ed in *irt#e of
o""onwealth Act 3o. +71, also :nown as the ."ergency 0owers Act.
0etitionersK pri"ary contention rests on the fact that the
3ational Asse")ly intended s#ch powers to e5ist only for a li"ited period.
ISSUE" 8hether or not .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 7B7 and 7B+ are *alid.
HELD"
3o. !ection 2+ of Article <I of the onstit#tion pro*ides that
/in ti"es of war or other national e"ergency, the ongress "ay )y law
a#thori&e the 0resident, for a li"ited period and s#)-ect to s#ch
restrictions as it "ay prescri)e, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations to
carry o#t a declared national policy./ Accordingly the 3ational Asse")ly
passed o""onwealth Act 3o. +71, declaring @in section 1A the national
policy that /the e5istence of war )etween the Jnited !tates and other
co#ntries of .#rope and Asia, which in*ol*es the 0hilippines "a:es it
necessary to in*est the 0resident with e5traordinary powers in order to
"eet the res#lting e"ergency,/ and @in section 2A a#thori&ing the
0resident, /d#ring the e5istence of the e"ergency, to pro"#lgate s#ch
105
r#les and reg#lations as he "ay dee" necessary to carry o#t the national
policy declared in section 1./
Act 3o. +71 was e5pressly in p#rs#ance of the constit#tional
pro*ision, it has to )e ass#"ed that the 3ational Asse")ly intended it to
)e only for a li"ited period. If it )e contended that the Act has not yet )een
d#ly repealed, and s#ch step is necessary to a cessation of the
e"ergency powers delegated to the 0resident, the res#lt wo#ld )e
o)*io#s #nconstit#tionality, since it "ay ne*er )e repealed )y the
ongress, or if the latter e*er atte"pts to do so, the 0resident "ay wield
his *eto. $his e*ent#ality has in fact ta:en place when the 0resident
disappro*ed 1o#se Bill 3o. 727, repealing all ."ergency 0owers Acts.
$he sit#ation will "a:e the ongress and the 0resident or either as the
principal a#thority to deter"ine the indefinite d#ration of the delegation of
legislati*e powers, E in palpa)le rep#gnance to the constit#tional
pro*ision that any grant there#nder "#st )e for a li"ited period,
necessarily to )e fi5ed in the law itself and not dependent #pon the
ar)itrary or elastic will of either the ongress or the 0resident.
$he logical *iew consistent with constit#tionality is to hold
that the powers lasted only d#ring the e"ergency res#lting fro" the last
world war which fact#ally in*ol*ed the 0hilippines when Act 3o. +71 was
passed on Dece")er 1+, 19B1. $hat e"ergency, which nat#rally
ter"inated #pon the ending of the last world war, was conte"plated )y the
"e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly on the foresight that the act#al state of
war co#ld pre*ent it fro" holding its ne5t reg#lar session
Moreo*er, !ection 2+ of Article <I of the 1947 constit#tion, in
*irt#e of which Act 3o. +71 was passed, a#thori&es the delegation of
powers )y the ongress @1A in ti"es of war or @2A other national
e"ergency. $he e"ergency e5pressly spo:en of in the title and in section
1 of the Act is one /in ti"e of war,/ as disting#ished fro" /other national
e"ergency/ that "ay arise as an after9effect of war or fro" nat#ral ca#ses
s#ch as widespread earth6#a:es, typhoons, floods, and the li:e. ertainly
the typhoons that hit so"e pro*inces and cities in 1972 not only did not
res#lt fro" the last world war )#t were and co#ld not ha*e )een
conte"plated )y the legislators. At any rate, the ongress is a*aila)le for
necessary special sessions, and it cannot let the people down witho#t
so"ehow )eing answera)le thereo*er.
.*en #nder the theory of so"e "e")ers of this co#rt that
insofar as the ongress had shown its readiness or a)ility to act on a
gi*en "atter, the e"ergency powers delegated to the 0resident had )een
pro tanto withdrawn, .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 7B7 and 7B+ "#st )e
declared as ha*ing no legal anchorage. 8e can ta:e -#dicial notice of the
fact that the ongress has since li)eration repeatedly )een appro*ing acts
appropriating f#nds for the operation of the ,o*ern"ent, p#)lic wor:s, and
"any others p#rposes, with the res#lt that as to s#ch legislati*e tas: the
ongress "#st )e dee"ed to ha*e long decided to ass#"e the
corresponding power itself and to withdraw the sa"e fro" the 0resident. If
the 0resident had ceased to ha*e powers with regards to general
appropriations, none can re"ain in respect of special appropriationsG
otherwise he "ay acco"plish indirectly what he cannot do directly.
Besides, it is significant that Act 3o. +71 e5pressly li"ited the power of the
0resident to that contin#ing /in force/ appropriations which wo#ld lapse or
otherwise )eco"e inoperati*e, so that, e*en ass#"ing that the Act is still
effecti*e, it is do#)tf#l whether the 0resident can )y e5ec#ti*e orders
"a:e new appropriations. $he specific power /to contin#e in force laws
and appropriations which wo#ld lapse or otherwise )eco"e inoperati*e/ is
a li"itation on the general power /to e5ercise s#ch other powers as he
"ay dee" necessary to ena)le the ,o*ern"ent to f#lfill its responsi)ilities
and to "aintain and enforce its a#thority./ Indeed, to hold that altho#gh
the ongress has, for a)o#t se*en years since li)eration, )een nor"ally
f#nctioning and legislating on e*ery concei*a)le field, the 0resident still
has any resid#ary powers #nder the Act, wo#ld necessarily lead to
conf#sion and o*erlapping, if not conflict.
!helter "ay not )e so#ght in the proposition that the
0resident sho#ld )e allowed to e5ercise e"ergency powers for the sa:e of
speed and e5pediency in the interest and for the welfare of the people,
)eca#se we ha*e the onstit#tion, designed to esta)lish a go*ern"ent
#nder a regi"e of -#stice, li)erty and de"ocracy. In line with s#ch
pri"ordial o)-ecti*e, o#r ,o*ern"ent is de"ocratic in for" and )ased on
the syste" of separation of powers. Jnless and #ntil changed or
a"ended, we shall ha*e to a)ide )y the letter and spirit of the onstit#tion
and )e prepared to accept the conse6#ences res#lting fro" or inherent in
disagree"ents )etween, inaction or e*en ref#sal of the legislati*e and
e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. M#ch as it is i"perati*e in so"e cases to ha*e
pro"pt official action, deadloc:s in and slowness of de"ocratic processes
"#st )e preferred to concentration of powers in any one "an or gro#p of
"en for o)*io#s reasons. $he fra"ers of the onstit#tion, howe*er, had
the *ision of and were caref#l in allowing delegation of legislati*e powers
to the 0resident for a li"ited period /in ti"es of war or other national
e"ergency./ $hey had th#s entr#sted to the good -#dg"ent of the
ongress the d#ty of coping with any national e"ergency )y a "ore
efficient proced#reG )#t it alone "#st decide )eca#se e"ergency in itself
cannot and sho#ld not create power. In o#r de"ocracy the hope and
s#r*i*al of the nation lie in the wisdo" and #nselfish patriotis" of all
officials and in their faithf#l adherence to the onstit#tion.
8herefore, .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 7B7 and 7B+ are here)y
declared n#ll and *oid, and the respondents are ordered to desist fro"
appropriating, releasing, allotting, and e5pending the p#)lic f#nds set
aside therein.
DELEGATION OF PO=ERS? PRO&ATION
PEOPLE V. VERA
(G.R. NO. L45%85 NOVEM&ER 1%, 1937)
LAUREL, !.
FACTS"
0etitioners, the 0eople of the 0hilippines and the 1ong:ong
and !hanghai Ban:ing orporation, are respecti*ely the plaintiff and the
offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano # Jn-ieng is one of
the defendants, in a cri"inal case. %espondent Hose '. <era, is the H#dge
ad interi" of the se*enth )ranch of the trial co#rt who heard the
application of the defendant Mariano # Jn-ieng for pro)ation in the
aforesaid cri"inal case.
$he trial co#rt rendered -#dg"ent, con*icting Jn-ieng. Jpon
appeal, the co#rt "odified the sentence to an indeter"inate penalty of
fro" fi*e years and si5 "onths of prision correccional to se*en years, si5
"onths and twenty9se*en days of prision "ayor, )#t affir"ed the
-#dg"ent in all other respects.
$he instant proceedings ha*e to do with the application for
pro)ation filed )y Jn-ieng )efore the trial co#rt, #nder the pro*isions of Act
3o. B221 of the def#nct 0hilippine Legislat#re. Jn-ieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the cri"e of which he was
con*icted, that he has no cri"inal record and that he wo#ld o)ser*e good
cond#ct in the f#t#re. 1owe*er, the (iscal of the ity of Manila filed an
opposition to the granting of pro)ation to the Jn-ieng. $he pri*ate
prosec#tion also filed an opposition, ela)orating on the #nconstit#tionality
of Act 3o. B221, as an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power to the
pro*incial )oards of se*eral pro*inces
ISSUE" 8hether or not Act 3o. B221 constit#tes an #nd#e delegation of
legislati*e power.
HELD"
Des. Jnder the constit#tional syste", the powers of
go*ern"ent are distri)#ted a"ong three coordinate and s#)stantially
independent organs2 the legislati*e, the e5ec#ti*e and the -#dicial. .ach of
these depart"ents of the go*ern"ent deri*es its a#thority fro" the
onstit#tion which, in t#rn, is the highest e5pression of pop#lar will. .ach
has e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of the "atters within its -#risdiction, and is
s#pre"e within its own sphere.
$he power to "a:e laws E the legislati*e power E is *ested in a
)ica"eral Legislat#re )y the Hones Law @sec. 12A and in a #nica"eral
3ational Asse")ly )y the onstit#tion @Act. <I, sec. 1, onstit#tion of the
0hilippinesA. $he 0hilippine Legislat#re or the 3ational Asse")ly "ay not
escape its d#ties and responsi)ilities )y delegating that power to any other
)ody or a#thority. Any atte"pt to a)dicate the power is #nconstit#tional
and *oid, on the principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest.
/'ne of the settled "a5i"s in constit#tional law is that the power
conferred #pon the legislat#re to "a:e laws cannot )e delegated )y that
depart"ent to any other )ody or a#thority. 8here the so*ereign power of
the state has located the a#thority, there it "#st re"ainG and )y the
constit#tional agency alone the laws "#st )e "ade #ntil the onstit#tion
itself is charged. $he power to whose -#dg"ent, wisdo", and patriotis"
this high prerogati*e has )een entr#sted cannot relie*e itself of the
responsi)ilities )y choosing other agencies #pon which the power shall )e
de*ol*ed, nor can it s#)stit#te the -#dg"ent, wisdo", and patriotis" of
any other )ody for those to which alone the people ha*e seen fit to confide
this so*ereign tr#st./
$he r#le, howe*er, which for)ids the delegation of legislati*e power
is not a)sol#te and infle5i)le. It ad"its of e5ceptions. An e5ceptions
sanctioned )y i""e"orial practice per"its the central legislati*e )ody to
delegate legislati*e powers to local a#thorities. /It is a cardinal principle of
o#r syste" of go*ern"ent, that local affairs shall )e "anaged )y local
a#thorities, and general affairs )y the central a#thoritiesG and hence while
the r#le is also f#nda"ental that the power to "a:e laws cannot )e
delegated, the creation of the "#nicipalities e5ercising local self
go*ern"ent has ne*er )een held to trench #pon that r#le. !#ch legislation
is not regarded as a transfer of general legislati*e power, )#t rather as the
grant of the a#thority to prescri)ed local reg#lations, according to
i""e"orial practice, s#)-ect of co#rse to the interposition of the s#perior
in cases of necessity./ Do#)tless, also, legislati*e power "ay )e
delegated )y the onstit#tion itself. !ection 1B, paragraph 2, of article <I
of the onstit#tion of the 0hilippines pro*ides that /$he 3ational Asse")ly
"ay )y law a#thori&e the 0resident, s#)-ect to s#ch li"itations and
restrictions as it "ay i"pose, to fi5 within specified li"its, tariff rates,
i"port or e5port 6#otas, and tonnage and wharfage d#es./ And section 1+
of the sa"e article of the onstit#tion pro*ides that /In ti"es of war or
other national e"ergency, the 3ational Asse")ly "ay )y law a#thori&e
the 0resident, for a li"ited period and s#)-ect to s#ch restrictions as it "ay
prescri)ed, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations to carry o#t a declared
national policy./ It is )eyond the scope of this decision to deter"ine
whether or not, in the a)sence of the foregoing constit#tional pro*isions,
the 0resident co#ld )e a#thori&ed to e5ercise the powers there)y *ested
in hi". Jpon the other hand, whate*er do#)t "ay ha*e e5isted has )een
re"o*ed )y the onstit#tion itself.
$he case )efore #s does not fall #nder any of the e5ceptions
hereina)o*e "entioned.
$he challenged section of Act 3o. B221 in section 11 which
reads as follows2
$his Act shall apply only in those pro*inces in which the respecti*e
pro*incial )oards ha*e pro*ided for the salary of a pro)ation officer at
rates not lower than those now pro*ided for pro*incial fiscals. !aid
pro)ation officer shall )e appointed )y the !ecretary of H#stice and shall
)e s#)-ect to the direction of the 0ro)ation 'ffice.
In testing whether a stat#te constit#te an #nd#e delegation of
legislati*e power or not, it is #s#al to in6#ire whether the stat#te was
106
co"plete in all its ter"s and pro*isions when it left the hands of the
legislat#re so that nothing was left to the -#dg"ent of any other appointee
or delegate of the legislat#re. In the Jnited !tates *s. Ang $ang 1o
@O1922P, B4 0hil., 1A, this co#rt adhered to the foregoing r#le when it held
an act of the legislat#re *oid in so far as it #ndertoo: to a#thori&e the
,o*ernor9,eneral, in his discretion, to iss#e a procla"ation fi5ing the
price of rice and to "a:e the sale of it in *iolation of the procla"ation a
cri"e. $he general r#le, howe*er, is li"ited )y another r#le that to a
certain e5tent "atters of detail "ay )e left to )e filled in )y r#les and
reg#lations to )e adopted or pro"#lgated )y e5ec#ti*e officers and
ad"inistrati*e )oards.
(or the p#rpose of 0ro)ation Act, the pro*incial )oards "ay )e
regarded as ad"inistrati*e )odies endowed with power to deter"ine when
the Act sho#ld ta:e effect in their respecti*e pro*inces. $hey are the
agents or delegates of the legislat#re in this respect. $he r#les go*erning
delegation of legislati*e power to ad"inistrati*e and e5ec#ti*e officers are
applica)le or are at least indicati*e of the r#le which sho#ld )e here
adopted. An e5a"ination of a *ariety of cases on delegation of power to
ad"inistrati*e )odies will show that the ratio decidendi is at *ariance )#t, it
can )e )roadly asserted that the rationale re*ol*es aro#nd the presence
or a)sence of a standard or r#le of action E or the s#fficiency thereof E
in the stat#te, to aid the delegate in e5ercising the granted discretion. In
so"e cases, it is held that the standard is s#fficientG in others that is
ins#fficientG and in still others that it is entirely lac:ing. As a r#le, an act of
the legislat#re is inco"plete and hence in*alid if it does not lay down any
r#le or definite standard )y which the ad"inistrati*e officer or )oard "ay
)e g#ided in the e5ercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
In the case at )ar, what r#les are to g#ide the pro*incial
)oards in the e5ercise of their discretionary power to deter"ine whether or
not the 0ro)ation Act shall apply in their respecti*e pro*incesC 8hat
standards are fi5ed )y the ActC 8e do not find any and none has )een
pointed to #s )y the respondents. $he pro)ation Act does not, )y the force
of any of its pro*isions, fi5 and i"pose #pon the pro*incial )oards any
standard or g#ide in the e5ercise of their discretionary power. 8hat is
granted, if we "ay #se the lang#age of H#stice ardo&o in the recent case
of !checter, s#pra, is a /ro*ing co""ission/ which ena)les the pro*incial
)oards to e5ercise ar)itrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislat#re does not see"ingly on its own a#thority e5tend the )enefits of
the 0ro)ation Act to the pro*inces )#t in reality lea*es the entire "atter for
the *ario#s pro*incial )oards to deter"ine. In other words, the pro*incial
)oards of the *ario#s pro*inces are to deter"ine for the"sel*es, whether
the 0ro)ation Law shall apply to their pro*inces or not at all. $he
applica)ility and application of the 0ro)ation Act are entirely placed in the
hands of the pro*incial )oards. If the pro*incial )oard does not wish to
ha*e the Act applied in its pro*ince, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed a"o#nt for the salary of a pro)ation officer. $he
plain lang#age of the Act is not s#scepti)le of any other interpretation.
$his, to o#r "inds, is a *irt#al s#rrender of legislati*e power to the
pro*incial )oards.
It sho#ld )e o)ser*ed that in the case at )ar we are not
concerned with the si"ple transference of details of e5ec#tion or the
pro"#lgation )y e5ec#ti*e or ad"inistrati*e officials of r#les and
reg#lations to carry into effect the pro*isions of a law. If we were,
rec#rrence to o#r own decisions wo#ld )e s#fficient.
8e concl#de that section 11 of Act 3o. B221 constit#tes an
i"proper and #nlawf#l delegation of legislati*e a#thority to the pro*incial
)oards and is, for this reason, #nconstit#tional and *oid.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE PO=ER
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA
(G.R. NO. 7%%33 OCTO&ER 18, 1988)
CRU$, !."
FACTS"
$he pri*ate respondent in this case was awarded the s#" of
0192,???.?? )y the 0'.A for the death of her h#s)and. $he decision is
challenged )y the petitioner on the principal gro#nd that the 0'.A had no
-#risdiction o*er the case as the h#s)and was not an o*erseas wor:er.
<italiano !aco was hief 'fficer of the MR< .astern 0olaris
when he was :illed in an accident in $o:yo, Hapan on March 17, 1987.
1is widow s#ed for da"ages #nder .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 797 and
Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 of the 0'.A. $he petitioner, as owner of the
*essel, arg#ed that the co"plaint was cogni&a)le not )y the 0'.A )#t )y
the !ocial !ec#rity !yste" and sho#ld ha*e )een filed against the !tate
Ins#rance (#nd. $he 0'.A ne*ertheless ass#"ed -#risdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties r#led in fa*or of the
co"plainant. $he award consisted of 018?,???.?? as death )enefits and
012,???.?? for )#rial e5penses.
$he petitioner does not contend that !aco was not its
e"ployee or that the clai" of his widow is not co"pensa)le. 8hat it does
#rge is that he was not an o*erseas wor:er )#t a Ido"estic e"ployee and
conse6#ently his widowIs clai" sho#ld ha*e )een filed with !ocial
!ec#rity !yste", s#)-ect to appeal to the ."ployees o"pensation
o""ission. (#rther"ore, the petitioner 6#estions the *alidity of
Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 itself as *iolati*e of the principle of non9
delegation of legislati*e power. It contends that no a#thority had )een
gi*en the 0'.A to pro"#lgate the said reg#lationG and e*en with s#ch
a#thori&ation, the reg#lation represents an e5ercise of legislati*e
discretion which, #nder the principle, is not s#)-ect to delegation.
ISSUE" 8hether or not Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 is *iolati*e of the
principle of non9delegation of legislati*e power.
HELD"
3o. $he a#thority to iss#e the said reg#lation is clearly
pro*ided in !ection B@aA of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 797, reading as follows2
=... $he go*erning Board of the Ad"inistration @0'.AA, as here#nder
pro*ided shall pro"#lgate the necessary r#les and reg#lations to go*ern
the e5ercise of the ad-#dicatory f#nctions of the Ad"inistration @0'.AA. =
Legislati*e discretion as to the s#)stanti*e contents of the
law cannot )e delegated. 8hat can )e delegated is the discretion to
deter"ine how the law "ay )e enforced, not what the law shall )e. $he
ascertain"ent of the latter s#)-ect is a prerogati*e of the legislat#re. $his
prerogati*e cannot )e a)dicated or s#rrendered )y the legislat#re to the
delegate.
$here are two accepted tests to deter"ine whether or not
there is a *alid delegation of legislati*e power, *i& , the co"pleteness test
and the s#fficient standard test. Jnder the first test, the law "#st )e
co"plete in all its ter"s and conditions when it lea*es the legislat#re s#ch
that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will ha*e to do is
enforce it. Jnder the s#fficient standard test, there "#st )e ade6#ate
g#idelines or stations in the law to "ap o#t the )o#ndaries of the
delegateIs a#thority and pre*ent the delegation fro" r#nning riot. Both
tests are intended to pre*ent a total transference of legislati*e a#thority to
the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislat#re
and e5ercise a power essentially legislati*e.
$he principle of non9delegation of powers is applica)le to all
the three "a-or powers of the ,o*ern"ent )#t is especially i"portant in
the case of the legislati*e power )eca#se of the "any instances when its
delegation is per"itted. $he occasions are rare when e5ec#ti*e or -#dicial
powers ha*e to )e delegated )y the a#thorities to which they legally
certain. In the case of the legislati*e power, howe*er, s#ch occasions
ha*e )eco"e "ore and "ore fre6#ent, if not necessary. $his had led to
the o)ser*ation that the delegation of legislati*e power has )eco"e the
r#le and its non9delegation the e5ception.
$he reason is the increasing co"ple5ity of the tas: of
go*ern"ent and the growing ina)ility of the legislat#re to cope directly with
the "yriad pro)le"s de"anding its attention. $he growth of society has
ra"ified its acti*ities and created pec#liar and sophisticated pro)le"s that
the legislat#re cannot )e e5pected reasona)ly to co"prehend.
!peciali&ation e*en in legislation has )eco"e necessary. $o "any of the
pro)le"s attendant #pon present9day #nderta:ings, the legislat#re "ay
not ha*e the co"petence to pro*ide the re6#ired direct and efficacio#s,
not to say, specific sol#tions. $hese sol#tions "ay, howe*er, )e e5pected
fro" its delegates, who are s#pposed to )e e5perts in the partic#lar fields
assigned to the".
$he reasons gi*en a)o*e for the delegation of legislati*e
powers in general are partic#larly applica)le to ad"inistrati*e )odies. 8ith
the proliferation of speciali&ed acti*ities and their attendant pec#liar
pro)le"s, the national legislat#re has fo#nd it "ore and "ore necessary
to entr#st to ad"inistrati*e agencies the a#thority to iss#e r#les to carry
o#t the general pro*isions of the stat#te. $his is called the /power of
s#)ordinate legislation./ 8ith this power, ad"inistrati*e )odies "ay
i"ple"ent the )road policies laid down in a stat#te )y /filling inI the details
which the ongress "ay not ha*e the opport#nity or co"petence to
pro*ide. $his is effected )y their pro"#lgation of what are :nown as
s#pple"entary reg#lations, s#ch as the i"ple"enting r#les iss#ed )y the
Depart"ent of La)or on the new La)or ode. $hese reg#lations ha*e the
force and effect of law.
Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 2 is one s#ch ad"inistrati*e
reg#lation. $he "odel contract prescri)ed there)y has )een applied in a
significant n#")er of the cases witho#t challenge )y the e"ployer. $he
power of the 0'.A @and )efore it the 3ational !ea"en BoardA in re6#iring
the "odel contract is not #nli"ited as there is a s#fficient standard g#iding
the delegate in the e5ercise of the said a#thority. $hat standard is
disco*era)le in the e5ec#ti*e order itself which, in creating the 0hilippine
'*erseas ."ploy"ent Ad"inistration, "andated it to protect the rights of
o*erseas (ilipino wor:ers to /fair and e6#ita)le e"ploy"ent practices./
81.%.('%., the petition is DI!MI!!.D, with costs
against the petitioner.
.
DELEGATION OF PO=ER
SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
UNITED STATES VS. ANG TANG HO
G.R. NO. 17122, FE&RUAR- 27, 1922
!OHNS, !."
FACTS"
At its special session of 1919, the 0hilippine Legislat#re
passed Act 3o. 28+8, entitled /An Act penali&ing the "onopoly and
holding of, and spec#lation in, palay, rice, and corn #nder e5traordinary
circ#"stances, reg#lating the distri)#tion and sale thereof, and a#thori&ing
the ,o*ernor9,eneral, with the consent of the o#ncil of !tate, to iss#e
the necessary r#les and reg#lations therefor, and "a:ing an appropriation
for this p#rpose,/ the "aterial pro*isions of which are en#"erated.
A#g#st 1, 1919, the ,o*ernor9,eneral iss#ed a
procla"ation @.5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 74A fi5ing the price at which rice sho#ld
)e sold. A#g#st 8, 1919, Ang $ang 1o charged with the sale of rice at an
e5cessi*e price and was accordingly con*icted.
$he 6#estion here in*ol*es an analysis and constr#ction of
Act 3o. 28+8, in so far as it a#thori&es the ,o*ernor9,eneral to fi5 the
price at which rice sho#ld )e sold. It will )e noted that section 1 a#thori&es
the ,o*ernor9,eneral, with the consent of the o#ncil of !tate, for any
ca#se res#lting in an e5traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,
107
to iss#e and pro"#lgate te"porary r#les and e"ergency "eas#res for
carrying o#t the p#rposes of the Act. By its *ery ter"s, the pro"#lgation of
te"porary r#les and e"ergency "eas#res is left to the discretion of the
,o*ernor9,eneral. $he Legislat#re does not #nderta:e to specify or
define #nder what conditions or for what reasons the ,o*ernor9,eneral
shall iss#e the procla"ation, )#t says that it "ay )e iss#ed /for any
ca#se,/ and lea*es the 6#estion as to what is /any ca#se/ to the discretion
of the ,o*ernor9,eneral. $he Act also says2 /(or any ca#se, conditions
arise res#lting in an e5traordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn./
$he Legislat#re does not specify or define what is /an e5traordinary rise./
$hat is also left to the discretion of the ,o*ernor9,eneral. $he Act also
says that the ,o*ernor9,eneral, /with the consent of the o#ncil of !tate,/
is a#thori&ed to iss#e and pro"#lgate /te"porary r#les and e"ergency
"eas#res for carrying o#t the p#rposes of this Act./ It does not specify or
define what is a te"porary r#le or an e"ergency "eas#re, or how long
s#ch te"porary r#les or e"ergency "eas#res shall re"ain in force and
effect, or when they shall ta:e effect. $hat is to say, the Legislat#re itself
has not in any "anner specified or defined any )asis for the order, )#t has
left it to the sole -#dg"ent and discretion of the ,o*ernor9,eneral to say
what is or what is not /a ca#se,/ and what is or what is not /an
e5traordinary rise in the price of rice,/ and as to what is a te"porary r#le
or an e"ergency "eas#re for the carrying o#t the p#rposes of the Act.
Jnder this state of facts, if the law is *alid and the ,o*ernor9,eneral
iss#es a procla"ation fi5ing the "ini"#" price at which rice sho#ld )e
sold, any dealer who, with or witho#t notice, sells rice at a higher price, is
a cri"inal. $here "ay not ha*e )een any ca#se, and the price "ay not
ha*e )een e5traordinary, and there "ay not ha*e )een an e"ergency,
)#t, if the ,o*ernor9,eneral fo#nd the e5istence of s#ch facts and iss#ed
a procla"ation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller co""its a
cri"e.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the legislat#re #nder Act 3o. 28+8 has delegated
its power to the ,o*ernor9,eneral
HELD"
Des. $he law says that the ,o*ernor9,eneral "ay fi5 /the
"a5i"#" sale price that the ind#strial or "erchant "ay de"and./ $he law
is a general law and not a local or special law.
$he procla"ation #nderta:es to fi5 one price for rice in
Manila and other and different prices in other and different pro*inces in the
0hilippine Islands, and delegates the power to deter"ine the other and
different prices to pro*incial treas#rers and their dep#ties. 1ere, then, yo#
wo#ld ha*e a delegation of legislati*e power to the ,o*ernor9,eneral, and
a delegation )y hi" of that power to pro*incial treas#rers and their
dep#ties, who /are here)y directed to co""#nicate with, and e5ec#te all
instr#ctions e"anating fro" the Director of o""erce and Ind#stry, for
the "ost effecti*e and proper enforce"ent of the a)o*e reg#lations in
their respecti*e localities./ $he iss#ance of the procla"ation )y the
,o*ernor9,eneral was the e5ercise of the delegation of a delegated
power, and was e*en a s#) delegation of that power.
8hen Act 3o. 28+8 is analy&ed, it is the *iolation of the
procla"ation of the ,o*ernor9,eneral which constit#tes the cri"e.
8itho#t that procla"ation, it was no cri"e to sell rice at any price. In other
words, the Legislat#re left it to the sole discretion of the ,o*ernor9,eneral
to say what was and what was not /any ca#se/ for enforcing the act, and
what was and what was not /an e5traordinary rise in the price of palay,
rice or corn,/ and #nder certain #ndefined conditions to fi5 the price at
which rice sho#ld )e sold, witho#t regard to grade or 6#ality, also to say
whether a procla"ation sho#ld )e iss#ed, if so, when, and whether or not
the law sho#ld )e enforced, how long it sho#ld )e enforced, and when the
law sho#ld )e s#spended. $he Legislat#re did not specify or define what
was /any ca#se,/ or what was /an e5traordinary rise in the price of rice,
palay or corn,/ 3either did it specify or define the conditions #pon which
the procla"ation sho#ld )e iss#ed. In the a)sence of the procla"ation no
cri"e was co""itted. $he alleged sale was "ade a cri"e, if at all,
)eca#se the ,o*ernor9,eneral iss#ed the procla"ation. $he act or
procla"ation does not say anything a)o#t the different grades or 6#alities
of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale /of one ganta of rice at
the price of eighty centa*os @0?.8?A which is a price greater than that fi5ed
)y .5ec#ti*e order 3o. 74./
8e are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act 3o. 28+8, in
so far as it #nderta:es to a#thori&ed the ,o*ernor9,eneral in his
discretion to iss#e a procla"ation, fi5ing the price of rice, and to "a:e the
sale of rice in *iolation of the price of rice, and to "a:e the sale of rice in
*iolation of the procla"ation a cri"e, is #nconstit#tional and *oid.
DELEGATION OF PO=ERS
-NOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
148 SCRA %59, NO. L 74457, MARCH 20, 1987
CRU$, !"
FACTS"
.5ec#ti*e 'rder +2+9A prohi)ited the transport of the
cara)aos or cara)ao "eat across the pro*incial )o#ndaries witho#t
go*ern"ent clearance, for the p#rpose of pre*enting the indiscri"inate
sla#ghter of those ani"als.
$he petitioner had transported si5 cara)aos in
a p#"p )oat fro" Mas)ate to Iloilo when they were confiscated )y the
police station co""ander for *iolation of .' +2+9A. $he e5ec#ti*e order
defined the prohi)ition, con*icted the petitioner and i""ediately i"posed
p#nish"ent, which was carried o#t forthright. $he petitioner clai"ed that
the penalty is in*alid )eca#se it is i"posed witho#t according the owner a
right to )e heard )efore a co"petent and i"partial co#t as g#aranteed )y
d#e process. $he petitioner challenges the constit#tionality of the said
order and the i"proper e5ercise of the legislati*e power )y the for"er
0resident #nder A"end"ent 3o. + of the 1974 onstit#tion.
ISSUE" 8hether or not there is a *alid delegation of legislati*e power in
relation to the disposal of the confiscated properties
HELD"
3o. 8e also "ar:, on top of all this, the 6#estiona)le
"anner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescri)ed in the
6#estioned e5ec#ti*e order. It is there a#thori&ed that the sei&ed property
shall =)e distri)#ted to charita)le instit#tions and other si"ilar instit#tions
as the hair"an of the 3ational Meat Inspection o""ission "ay see fit,
in the case of cara)eef, and to deser*ing far"ers thro#gh dispersal ad the
Director of the Ani"al Ind#stry "ay see fit, in the case of cara)aos.> $he
phrase ="ay see fit> is an e5tre"ely genero#s and dangero#s condition, if
condition it is. It is laden with perilo#s opport#nities for partiality and a)#se
and e*en corr#ption, 'ne searches in *ain for the #s#al standard and the
reasona)le g#idelines, or )etter still, the li"itations that the said officers
"#st o)ser*e when they "a:e their distri)#tion. $here is none. $heir
options are apparently )o#ndless. 8ho shall )e the fort#nate )eneficiaries
of their generosity and )y what criteria shall they )e chosenC 'nly the
officers na"ed can s#pply the answer, they and they alone "ay choose
the grantee as they see fit, and in their own e5cl#si*e discretion.
DELEGATION OF PO=ER
SECTION 1, ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
TA&LARIN >(. GUTIERRE$
G.R. N+. 781%4 !1.: 31, 1987
FELICIANO, ! ."
FACTS"
$he petitioners so#ght ad"ission into colleges or schools of
"edicine for the school year 198791988. 1owe*er, the petitioners either
did not ta:e or did not s#ccessf#lly ta:e the 3ational Medical Ad"ission
$est @3MA$A re6#ired )y the Board of Medical .d#cation, one of the
p#)lic respondents, and ad"inistered )y the pri*ate respondent, the
enter for .d#cational Meas#re"ent @.MA.
$he petitioners so#ght to en-oin the !ecretary of .d#cation,
#lt#re and !ports, the Board of Medical .d#cation and the enter for
.d#cational Meas#re"ent fro" enforcing !ection 7 @aA and @fA of %ep#)lic
Act 3o. 2482, as a"ended, and M.! 'rder 3o. 72, series of 1987 and
fro" re6#iring the ta:ing and passing of the 3MA$ as a condition for
sec#ring certificates of eligi)ility for ad"ission and fro" ad"inistering the
3MA$.
$he trial co#rt denied said petition. $he 3MA$ was
cond#cted and ad"inistered as pre*io#sly sched#led.
%ep#)lic Act 2482, as a"ended )y %ep#)lic Acts 3os. B22B
and 79B+, :nown as the /Medical Act of 1979/ with one of its )asic
o)-ecti*es was to pro*ide for the standardi&ation and reg#lation of "edical
ed#cation.
$he stat#te, a"ong other things, created a Board of Medical
.d#cation with the f#nctions specified in !ection 7 of the stat#te incl#de
the following2
@aA $o deter"ine and prescri)e re6#ire"ents for ad"ission into a
recogni&ed college of "edicineG
@fA $o accept applications for certification for ad"ission to a "edical
school and :eep a register of those iss#ed said certificateG and to collect
fro" said applicants the a"o#nt of twenty9fi*e pesos each which shall
accr#e to the operating f#nd of the Board of Medical .d#cationG
@hA $o pro"#lgate and prescri)e and enforce the necessary r#les and
reg#lations for the proper i"ple"entation of the foregoing f#nctions.
@."phasis s#ppliedA
!ection 7 prescri)es certain "ini"#" re6#ire"ents for
applicants to "edical schools and one of these is a certificate of eligi)ility
for entrance to a "edical school fro" the Board of Medical .d#cation.
M.! 'rder 3o. 72, iss#ed )y the then Minister of .d#cation, #lt#re and
!ports esta)lished a #nifor" ad"ission test called the 3ational Medical
Ad"ission $est @3MA$A as an additional re6#ire"ent for iss#ance of a
certificate of eligi)ility for ad"ission into "edical schools of the
0hilippines, )eginning with the school year 198+91987.
0ri*ate respondent enter cond#cted 3MA$s for entrance to
"edical colleges d#ring the school year 198+91987 and the year
1987.1988.
$he f#nda"ental iss#e is of co#rse the constit#tionality of the stat#te or
order assailed. 0etitioners had "ade the arg#"ent that !ection 7 @aA and
@fA of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 2482, as a"ended, offend against the constit#tional
principle which for)ids the #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power, )y failing
to esta)lish the necessary standard to )e followed )y the delegate, the
Board of Medical .d#cation.
ISSUE" 8hether or not there e5ists a s#fficient standard to )e followed )y
the Board

HELD"
Des. $he standards set for s#)ordinate legislation in the
e5ercise of r#le "a:ing a#thority )y an ad"inistrati*e agency li:e the
108
Board of Medical .d#cation are necessarily )road and highly a)stract. As
e5plained )y then Mr. H#stice (ernando in .d# *. .ricta
E
$he standard "ay )e either e5pressed or i"plied. If the
for"er, the non9delegation o)-ection is easily "et. $he standard tho#gh
does not ha*e to )e spelled o#t specifically. It co#ld )e i"plied fro" the
policy and p#rpose of the act considered as a whole. In the %eflector Law,
clearly the legislati*e o)-ecti*e is p#)lic safety. 8hat is so#ght to )e
attained as in alalang *. 8illia"s is /safe transit #pon the roads .
8e )elie*e and so hold that the necessary standards are set
forth in !ection 1 of the 1979 Medical Act2 /the standardi&ation and
reg#lation of "edical ed#cation/ and in !ection 7 @aA and 7 of the sa"e
Act, the )ody of the stat#te itself, and that these considered together are
s#fficient co"pliance with the re6#ire"ents of the non9delegation
principle.
DELEGATION OF PO=ERS
SEC. 1, ARTICLE VI # SEC. 10 (1) OF ARTICLE VII, 1987
CONSTITUTION
EMMANUEL PELAE$ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. NO. L23825, DECEM&ER 24, 19%5
CONCEPCION, !."
FACTS"
$he 0resident of the 0hilippines, p#rs#ant to !ection +8 of
the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode, iss#ed .5ec#ti*e 'rders 3os. 94 to 121,
12B and 12+ to 129G creating thirty9three @44A "#nicipalities. 0etitioner
.""an#el 0elae&, as <ice 0resident of the 0hilippines and as ta5payer,
instit#ted a special ci*il action, for a writ of prohi)ition with preli"inary
in-#nction, against the A#ditor ,eneral, to restrain hi" and his
representati*es and agents, fro" passing in a#dit any e5pendit#re of
p#)lic f#nds in i"ple"entation of said e5ec#ti*e orders.
0etitioner alleges that said e5ec#ti*e orders are n#ll and
*oid, on the gro#nd that !ection +8 has )een i"pliedly repealed )y
%ep#)lic Act 3o. 247? and constit#tes an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e
power.
1ence, since Han#ary 1, 19+?, when %ep#)lic Act 3o. 247?
)eca"e effecti*e, )arrios "ay /not )e created or their )o#ndaries altered
nor their na"es changed/ e5cept )y Act of ongress or of the
corresponding pro*incial )oard /#pon petition of a "a-ority of the *oters in
the areas affected/ and the /reco""endation of the co#ncil of the
"#nicipality or "#nicipalities in which the proposed )arrio is sit#ated./
ISSUE" 8hether or not there is an #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power
#pon the chief e5ec#ti*e
HELD"
Altho#gh ongress "ay delegate to another )ranch of the
,o*ern"ent the power to fill in the details in the e5ec#tion, enforce"ent or
ad"inistration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a *iolation of the principle
of separation of powers, that said law2 @aA )e co"plete in itself E it "#st
set forth therein the policy to )e e5ec#ted, carried o#t or i"ple"ented )y
the delegate E and @)A fi5 a standard E the li"its of which are s#fficiently
deter"inate or deter"ina)le E to which the delegate "#st confor" in the
perfor"ance of his f#nctions.

!ection +8 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode does not
"eet these well9settled re6#ire"ents for a *alid delegation of the power to
fi5 the details in the enforce"ent of a law. It does not en#nciate any policy
to )e carried o#t or i"ple"ented )y the 0resident. 3either does it gi*e a
standard s#fficiently precise to a*oid the e*il effects a)o*e referred to. In
this connection, we do not o*erloo: the fact that, #nder the last cla#se of
the first sentence of !ection +8, the 0resident2
... "ay change the seat of the go*ern"ent within any s#)di*ision to s#ch
place therein as the p#)lic welfare "ay re6#ire.
It is apparent, howe*er, fro" the lang#age of this cla#se that
the phrase /as the p#)lic welfare "ay re6#ire/ 6#alified, not the cla#ses
preceding the one -#st 6#oted, )#t only the place to which the seat of the
go*ern"ent "ay )e transferred.
Again, !ection 1? @1A of Article <II of o#r f#nda"ental law
ordains2
$he 0resident shall ha*e control of all the e5ec#ti*e
depart"ents, )#rea#s, or offices, e5ercise general
s#per*ision o*er all local go*ern"ents as "ay )e pro*ided
)y law, and ta:e care that the laws )e faithf#lly e5ec#ted.
$he power of control #nder this pro*ision i"plies the right of
the 0resident to interfere in the e5ercise of s#ch discretion as "ay )e
*ested )y law in the officers of the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s, or
offices of the national go*ern"ent, as well as to act in lie# of s#ch officers.
$his power is denied )y the onstit#tion to the .5ec#ti*e, insofar as local
go*ern"ents are concerned. 8ith respect to the latter, the f#nda"ental
law per"its hi" to wield no "ore a#thority than that of chec:ing whether
said local go*ern"ents or the officers thereof perfor" their d#ties as
pro*ided )y stat#tory enact"ents.
Jpon the other hand if the 0resident co#ld create a
"#nicipality, he co#ld, in effect, re"o*e any of its officials, )y creating a
new "#nicipality and incl#ding therein the )arrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office wo#ld there)y )eco"e *acant. $h#s, )y
"erely )randishing the power to create a new "#nicipality @if he had itA,
witho#t act#ally creating it, he co#ld co"pel local officials to s#)"it to his
dictation, there)y, in effect, e5ercising o*er the" the power of control
denied to hi" )y the onstit#tion.
$hen, also, the power of control of the 0resident o*er
e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s or offices i"plies no "ore than the
a#thority to ass#"e directly the f#nctions thereof or to interfere in the
e5ercise of discretion )y its officials. Manifestly, s#ch control does not
incl#de the a#thority either to a)olish an e5ec#ti*e depart"ent or )#rea#,
or to create a new one. As a conse6#ence, the alleged power of the
0resident to create "#nicipal corporations wo#ld necessarily connote the
e5ercise )y hi" of an a#thority e*en greater than that of control, which he
has o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s or offices. In other words,
!ection +8 of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode does not "erely fail to
co"ply with the constit#tional "andate a)o*e 6#oted. Instead of gi*ing
the 0resident less power o*er local go*ern"ents than that *ested in hi"
o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s or offices, it re*erses the
process and does the e5act opposite, )y conferring #pon hi" "ore power
o*er "#nicipal corporations than that which he has o*er said e5ec#ti*e
depart"ents, )#rea#s or offices.
In short, e*en if it did entail an #nd#e delegation of
legislati*e powers, as it certainly does, said !ection +8, as part of the
%e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode, appro*ed on March 1?, 1917, "#st )e
dee"ed repealed )y the s#)se6#ent adoption of the onstit#tion, in 1947,
which is #tterly inco"pati)le and inconsistent with said stat#tory
enact"ent.
$he .5ec#ti*e 'rders in 6#estion are here)y declared n#ll
and *oid a) initio.
8e )elie*e and so hold that the necessary standards are set
forth in !ection 1 of the 1979 Medical Act2 /the standardi&ation and
reg#lation of "edical ed#cation/ and in !ection 7 @aA and 7 of the sa"e
Act, the )ody of the stat#te itself, and that these considered together are
s#fficient co"pliance with the re6#ire"ents of the non9delegation
principle.
REPU&LIC ACT NO. %735
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A S-STEM OF INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR.
I
,eneral 0ro*isions
!ection 1. $itle. E $his Act shall )e :nown as /$he Initiati*e and
%eferend#" Act./
!ec. 2. !tate"ent of 0olicy. E $he power of the people #nder a syste" of
initiati*e and referend#" to directly propose, enact, appro*e or re-ect, in
whole or in part, the onstit#tion, laws, ordinances, or resol#tions passed
)y any legislati*e )ody #pon co"pliance with the re6#ire"ents of this Act
is here)y affir"ed, recogni&ed and g#aranteed.
!ec. 4. Definition of $er"s. E (or p#rposes of this Act, the following
ter"s shall "ean2
@aA /Initiati*e/ is the power of the people to propose a"end"ents to the
onstit#tion or to propose and enact legislations thro#gh an election
called for the p#rpose.
$here are three @4A syste"s of initiati*e, na"ely2
a.1 Initiati*e on the onstit#tion which refers to a petition proposing
a"end"ents to the onstit#tionG
a.2. Initiati*e on stat#tes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
national legislationG and
a.4. Initiati*e on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a regional, pro*incial, city, "#nicipal, or )arangay law, resol#tion or
ordinance.
@)A /Indirect initiati*e/ is e5ercise of initiati*e )y the people thro#gh a
proposition sent to ongress or the local legislati*e )ody for action.
@cA /%eferend#"/ is the power of the electorate to appro*e or re-ect a
legislation thro#gh an election called for the p#rpose. It "ay )e of two
classes, na"ely2
c.1. %eferend#" on stat#tes which refers to a petition to appro*e or re-ect
an act or law, or part thereof, passed )y ongressG and
c.2. %eferend#" on local law which refers to a petition to appro*e or re-ect
a law, resol#tion or ordinance enacted )y regional asse")lies and local
legislati*e )odies.
@dA /0roposition/ is the "eas#re proposed )y the *oters.
@eA /0le)iscite/ is the electoral process )y which an initiati*e on the
onstit#tion is appro*ed or re-ected )y the people.
@fA /0etition/ is the written instr#"ent containing the proposition and the
re6#ired n#")er of signatories. It shall )e in a for" to )e deter"ined )y
and s#)"itted to the o""ission on .lections, hereinafter referred to as
the o""ission.
@gA /Local go*ern"ent #nits/ refers to pro*inces , cities, "#nicipalities and
)arangays.
@hA /Local legislati*e )odies/ refers to the !angg#niang 0anlalawigan,
!angg#niang 0anl#ngsod, !angg#niang Bayan, and !angg#niang
3ayon.
@iA /Local e5ec#ti*es/ refers to the 0ro*incial ,o*ernors, ity or M#nicipal
Mayors and 0#nong Barangay, as the case "ay )e.
!ec. B. 8ho "ay e5ercise. E $he power of initiati*e and referend#" "ay
)e e5ercised )y all registered *oters of the co#ntry, a#tono"o#s regions,
pro*inces, cities, "#nicipalities and )arangays.
!ec. 7. %e6#ire"ents. E @aA $o e5ercise the power of initiati*e or
referend#", at least ten per cent#" @1?MA of the total n#")er of the
registered *oters, of which e*ery legislati*e district is represented )y at
least three per cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters thereof, shall sign a
petition for the p#rpose and register the sa"e with the o""ission.
@)A A petition for an initiati*e on the 1987 onstit#tion "#st ha*e at least
twel*e per cent#" @12MA of the total n#")er of registered *oters as
109
signatories, of which e*ery legislati*e district "#st )e represented )y at
least three per cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters therein. Initiati*e on
the onstit#tion "ay )e e5ercised only after fi*e @7A years fro" the
ratification of the 1987 onstit#tion and only once e*ery fi*e @7A years
thereafter.
@cA $he petition shall state the following2
c.1. contents or te5t of the proposed law so#ght to )e enacted, appro*ed
or re-ected, a"ended or repealed, as the case "ay )eG
c.2. the propositionG
c.4. the reason or reasons thereforG
c.B. that it is not one of the e5ceptions pro*ided hereinG
c.7. signat#res of the petitioners or registered *otersG and
c.+. an a)stract or s#""ary in not "ore than one h#ndred @1??A words
which shall )e legi)ly written or printed at the top of e*ery page of the
petition.
@dA A referend#" or initiati*e affecting a law, resol#tion or ordinance
passed )y the legislati*e asse")ly of an a#tono"o#s region, pro*ince or
city is dee"ed *alidly initiated if the petition thereof is signed )y at least
ten per cent#" @1?MA of the registered *oters in the pro*ince or city, of
which e*ery legislati*e district "#st )e represented )y at least three per
cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters thereinG 0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat if
the pro*ince or city is co"posed only of one @1A legislati*e district, then at
least each "#nicipality in a pro*ince or each )arangay in a city sho#ld )e
represented )y at least three per cent#" @4MA of the registered *oters
therein.
@eA A referend#" of initiati*e on an ordinance passed in a "#nicipality
shall )e dee"ed *alidly initiated if the petition therefor is signed )y at least
tenper cent#" @1?MA of the registered *oters in the "#nicipality, of which
e*ery )arangay is represented )y at least three per cent#" @4MA of the
registered *oters therein.
@fA A referend#" or initiati*e on a )arangay resol#tion or ordinance is
dee"ed *alidly initiated if signed )y at least ten per cent#" @1?MA of the
registered *oters in said )arangay.
!ec. +. !pecial %egistration. E $he o""ission on .lection shall set a
special registration day at least three @4A wee:s )efore a sched#led
initiati*e or referend#".
!ec. 7. <erification of !ignat#res. E $he .lection %egistrar shall *erify
the signat#res on the )asis of the registry list of *oters, *otersI affida*its
and *oters identification cards #sed in the i""ediately preceding election.
II
3ational Initiati*e and %eferend#"
!ec. 8. ond#ct and Date of Initiati*e or %eferend#". E $he
o""ission shall call and s#per*ise the cond#ct of initiati*e or
referend#". 8ithin a period of thirty @4?A days fro" receipt of the petition,
the o""ission shall, #pon deter"ining the s#fficiency of the petition,
p#)lish the sa"e in (ilipino and .nglish at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circ#lation and set the date of the initiati*e or
referend#" which shall not )e earlier than forty9fi*e @B7A days )#t not later
than ninety @9?A days fro" the deter"ination )y the o""ission of the
s#fficiency of the petition.
!ec. 9. .ffecti*ity of Initiati*e or %eferend#" 0roposition. E @aA $he
0roposition of the enact"ent, appro*al, a"end"ent or re-ection of a
national law shall )e s#)"itted to and appro*ed )y a "a-ority of the *otes
cast )y all the registered *oters of the 0hilippines.
If, as certified to )y the o""ission, the proposition is appro*ed )y a
"a-ority of the *otes cast, the national law proposed for enact"ent,
appro*al, or a"end"ent shall )eco"e effecti*e fifteen @17A days following
co"pletion of its p#)lication in the 'fficial ,a&ette or in a newspaper of
general circ#lation in the 0hilippines. If, as certified )y the o""ission,
the proposition to re-ect a national law is appro*ed )y a "a-ority of the
*otes cast, the said national law shall )e dee"ed repealed and the repeal
shall )eco"e effecti*e fifteen @17A days following the co"pletion of
p#)lication of the proposition and the certification )y the o""ission in
the 'fficial ,a&ette or in a newspaper of general circ#lation in the
0hilippines.
1owe*er, if the "a-ority *ote is not o)tained, the national law so#ght to )e
re-ected or a"ended shall re"ain in f#ll force and effect.
@)A $he proposition in an initiati*e on the onstit#tion appro*ed )y a
"a-ority of the *otes cast in the ple)iscite shall )eco"e effecti*e as to the
day of the ple)iscite.
@cA A national or local initiati*e proposition appro*ed )y "a-ority of the
*otes cast in an election called for the p#rpose shall )eco"e effecti*e
fifteen @17A days after certification and procla"ation )y the o""ission.
!ec. 1?. 0rohi)ited Meas#res. E $he following cannot )e the s#)-ect of
an initiati*e or referend#" petition2
@aA 3o petition e")racing "ore than one @1A s#)-ect shall )e s#)"itted to
the electorateG and
@)A !tat#tes in*ol*ing e"ergency "eas#res, the enact"ent of which are
specifically *ested in ongress )y the onstit#tion, cannot )e s#)-ect to
referend#" #ntil ninety @9?A days after its effecti*ity.
!ec. 11. Indirect Initiati*e. E Any d#ly accredited peopleIs organi&ation,
as defined )y law, "ay file a petition for indirect initiati*e with the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es, and other legislati*e )odies. $he petition shall contain a
s#""ary of the chief p#rposes and contents of the )ill that the
organi&ation proposes to )e enacted into law )y the legislat#re.
$he proced#re to )e followed on the initiati*e )ill shall )e the sa"e as the
enact"ent of any legislati*e "eas#re )efore the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es e5cept that the said initiati*e )ill shall ha*e precedence
o*er the pending legislati*e "eas#res on the co""ittee.
!ec. 12. Appeal. E $he decision of the o""ission on the findings of the
s#fficiency or ins#fficiency of the petition for initiati*e or referend#" "ay
)e appealed to the !#pre"e o#rt within thirty @4?A days fro" notice
thereof.
III
Local Initiati*e and %eferend#"
!ec. 14. 0roced#re in Local Initiati*e. E @aA 3ot less than two tho#sand
@2,???A registered *oters in case of a#tono"o#s regions, one tho#sand
@1,???A in case of pro*inces and cities, one h#ndred @1??A in case of
"#nicipalities, and fifty @7?A in case of )arangays, "ay file a petition with
the %egional Asse")ly or local legislati*e )ody, respecti*ely, proposing
the adoption, enact"ent, repeal, or a"end"ent, of any law, ordinance or
resol#tion.
@)A If no fa*ora)le action thereon is "ade )y local legislati*e )ody within
@4?A days fro" its presentation, the proponents thro#gh their d#ly
a#thori&ed and registered representati*e "ay in*o:e their power of
initiati*e, gi*ing notice thereof to the local legislati*e )ody concerned.
@cA $he proposition shall )e n#")ered serially starting fro" one @1A. $he
!ecretary of Local ,o*ern"ent or his designated representati*e shall
e5tend assistance in the for"#lation of the proposition.
@dA $wo or "ore propositions "ay )e s#)"itted in an initiati*e.
@eA 0roponents shall ha*e one h#ndred twenty @12?A days in case of
a#tono"o#s regions, ninety @9?A days in case of pro*inces and cities, si5ty
@+?A days in case of "#nicipalities, and thirty @4?A days in case of
)arangays, fro" notice "entioned in s#)section @)A hereof to collect the
re6#ired n#")er of signat#res.
@fA $he petition shall )e signed )efore the .lection %egistrar, or his
designated representati*e, in the presence of a representati*e of the
proponent, and a representati*e of the regional asse")lies and local
legislati*e )odies concerned in a p#)lic place in the a#tono"o#s region or
local go*ern"ent #nit, as the case "ay )e. !ignat#re stations "ay )e
esta)lished in as "any places as "ay )e warranted.
@gA Jpon the lapse of the period herein pro*ided, the o""ission on
.lections, thro#gh its office in the local go*ern"ent #nit concerned shall
certify as to whether or not the re6#ired n#")er of signat#res has )een
o)tained. (ail#re to o)tain the re6#ired n#")er is a defeat of the
proposition.
@hA If the re6#ired n#")er of the signat#res is o)tained, the o""ission
shall then set a date for the initiati*e at which the proposition shall )e
s#)"itted to the registered *oters in the local go*ern"ent #nit concerned
for their appro*al within ninety @9?A days fro" the date of certification )y
the o""ission, as pro*ided in s#)section @gA hereof, in case of
a#tono"o#s regions, si5ty @+?A days in case of the pro*inces and cities,
forty9fi*e @B7A days in case of "#nicipalities, and thirty @4?A days in case of
)arangays. $he initiati*e shall then )e held on the date set, after which the
res#lts thereof shall )e certified and proclai"ed )y the o""ission on
.lections.
!ec. 1B. .ffecti*ity of Local 0ropositions. E If the proposition is appro*ed
)y a "a-ority of the *otes cast, it shall ta:e effect fifteen @17A days after
certification )y the o""ission as if affir"ati*e action thereon had )een
"ade )y the local legislati*e )ody and local e5ec#ti*e concerned. If it fails
to o)tain said n#")er of *otes, the proposition is considered defeated.
!ec. 17. Li"itations on Local Initiati*es. E @aA $he power of local initiati*e
shall not )e e5ercised "ore than once a year.
@)A Initiati*e shall e5tend only to s#)-ects or "atters which are within the
legal powers of the local legislati*e )odies to enact.
@cA If at any ti"e )efore the initiati*e is held, the local legislati*e )ody shall
adopt in toto the proposition presented, the initiati*e shall )e cancelled.
1owe*er, those against s#ch action "ay, if they so desire, apply for
initiati*e in the "anner herein pro*ided.
!ec. 1+. Li"itations Jpon Local Legislati*e Bodies. E Any proposition or
ordinance or resol#tion appro*ed thro#gh the syste" of initiati*e and
referend#" as herein pro*ided shall not )e repealed, "odified or
a"ended, )y the local legislati*e )ody concerned within si5 @+A "onths
fro" the date therefro", and "ay )e a"ended, "odified or repealed )y
the local legislati*e )ody within three @4A years thereafter )y a *ote of
three9fo#rths @4RBA of all its "e")ers2 0ro*ided, howe*er, that in case of
)arangays, the period shall )e one @1A year after the e5piration of the first
si5 @+A "onths.
!ec. 17. Local %eferend#". E 3otwithstanding the pro*isions of !ection
B hereof, any local legislati*e )ody "ay s#)"it to the registered *oters of
a#tono"o#s region, pro*inces, cities, "#nicipalities and )arangays for the
appro*al or re-ection, any ordinance or resol#tion d#ly enacted or
appro*ed.
!aid referend#" shall )e held #nder the control and direction of the
o""ission within si5ty @+?A days in case of pro*inces and cities, forty9
fi*e @B7A days in case of "#nicipalities and thirty @4?A days in case of
)arangays.
$he o""ission shall certify and proclai" the res#lts of the said
referend#".
!ec. 18. A#thority of o#rts. E 3othing in this Act shall pre*ent or
precl#de the proper co#rts fro" declaring n#ll and *oid any proposition
appro*ed p#rs#ant to this Act for *iolation of the onstit#tion or want of
capacity of the local legislati*e )ody to enact the said "eas#re.
I<
(inal 0ro*isions
!ec. 19. Applica)ility of the '"ni)#s .lection ode. E $he '"ni)#s
.lection ode and other election laws, not inconsistent with the pro*isions
of this Act, shall apply to all initiati*es and referenda.
!ec. 2?. %#les and %eg#lations. E $he o""ission is here)y
e"powered to pro"#lgate s#ch r#les and reg#lations as "ay )e
necessary to carry o#t the p#rposes of this Act.
!ec. 21. Appropriations. E $he a"o#nt necessary to defray the cost of
the initial i"ple"entation of this Act shall )e charged against the
ontingent (#nd in the ,eneral Appropriations Act of the c#rrent year.
$hereafter, s#ch s#"s as "ay )e necessary for the f#ll i"ple"entation of
this Act shall )e incl#ded in the ann#al ,eneral Appropriations Act.
110
!ec. 22. !epara)ility la#se. E If any part or pro*ision of this Act is held
in*alid or #nconstit#tional, the other parts or pro*isions thereof shall
re"ain *alid and effecti*e.
!ec. 24. .ffecti*ity. E $his Act shall ta:e effect fifteen @17A days after its
p#)lication in a newspaper of general circ#lation.

Appro*ed2 A#g#st B, 1989
ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
TO&IAS VS. A&ALOS
239 SCRA 10%
FACTS"
$he "#nicipality of Mandal#yong and !an H#an )elonged to
only one legislati*e district. %.A. 7+77 ai"s to "a:e Mandal#yong into a
city. $he petitioner contends that the said law ai"s to increase the
"e")ership of the 1o#se as the con*ersion of Mandal#yong into a city
will res#lt in the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandal#yong.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the con*ersion of Ma:ati into a city is
constit#tional.
HELD"
Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt held that the creation of a new
congressional district for Mandal#yong was )#t a nat#ral conse6#ence of
Mandal#yongKs con*ersion into a city. $he onstit#tion pro*ides that =a
city sho#ld ha*e a pop#lation of at least 27?,???> and ha*ing "et this
re6#ire"ent Mandal#yong is 6#alified to )e con*erted into a city and as
pro*ided in the onstit#tion entitled to at least 1 representati*e.
MARIANO, !R. VS. COMELEC
242 SCRA 211, 1995
FACTS"
%.A. 787B, which ai"s to con*ert Ma:ati into a city, is
assailed as )eing #nconstit#tional on the gro#nds that %.A. 787B ai"s to
increase "e")ership of the 1o#se which the onstit#tion fi5es and that
%.A. 787B )eing a special law cannot change "e")ers of the 1o#ses.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the con*ersion of Ma:ati into a city is
constit#tional.
HELD"
Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt held that as was already decided
)y the !#pre"e o#rt in $o)ias *s. A)alos, the onstit#tion pro*ides that
the co"positions of the 1o#se sho#ld not )e "ore than 27? "e")ers,
J3L.!! otherwise pro*ided )y law. $he nat#ral res#lt in the creation of a
new legislati*e fro" a special law whose p#rpose is to con*ert a
"#nicipality into a city is sanctioned )y the onstit#tion.
MONTE!O VS. COMELEC
242 SCRA 45
FACTS"
Biliran, a s#)9pro*ince of Leyte was "ade into a pro*ince
which ca#sed the red#ction of the M#nicipalities #nder the 4
rd
district of
Leyte. Beca#se of this ine6#ality the 'M.L. reapportioned so"e of
the M#nicipalities fro" one district to another. Monte-o now wants to
transfer a "#nicipality @$olosaA fro" his district to another district @4
rd
A
allegedly )eca#se of so"e ine6#ality in the n#")er of registered *oters.
'M.L. thro#gh resol#tion 274+ per"itted the transfer.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 'M.L. ha*e the power to reapportion
districts.
HELD"
$he !#pre"e o#rt held that the 'M.L. does not ha*e
the power to reapportion districts )#t only to "a:e "inor ad-#st"ents.
$he o#rt added that the creation of a new pro*ince tho#gh res#lts in an
i")alance and de*al#e a citi&enKs *ote in *iolation of the e6#al protection
cla#se of the onstit#tion the only re"edy is for ongress, to "a:e a
reapportion"ent of the legislati*e districts.
REPU&LIC ACT N+. 7941
A3 A$ 0%'<IDI3, ('% $1. .L.$I'3 '( 0A%$D9LI!$
%.0%.!.3$A$I<.! $1%'J,1 $1. 0A%$D9LI!$ !D!$.M, A3D
A00%'0%IA$I3, (J3D! $1.%.('%
!ection 1. $itle. $his Act shall )e :nown as the /0arty9List !yste" Act./
!ection 2. Declaration of part y. $he !tate shall pro"ote proportional
representation in the election of representati*es to the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es thro#gh a party9list syste" of registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organi&ations or coalitions thereof, which will
ena)le (ilipino citi&ens )elonging to "arginali&ed and #nder9represented
sectors, organi&ations and parties, and who lac: well9defined political
constit#encies )#t who co#ld contri)#te to the for"#lation and enact"ent
of appropriate legislation that will )enefit the nation as a whole, to )eco"e
"e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. $owards this end, the !tate
shall de*elop and g#arantee a f#ll, free and open party syste" in order to
attain the )roadcast possi)le representation of party, sectoral or gro#p
interests in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es )y enhancing their chances to
co"pete for and win seats in the legislat#re, and shall pro*ide the si"plest
sche"e possi)le.
!ection 4. Definition of $er"s.
@aA $he party9list syste" is a "echanis" of proportional representation in
the election of representati*es to the 1o#se of %epresentati*es fro"
national, regional and sectoral parties or organi&ations or coalitions
thereof registered with the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A.
o"ponent parties or organi&ations of a coalition "ay participate
independently pro*ided the coalition of which they for" part does not
participate in the party9list syste".
@)A A party "eans either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition
of parties.
@cA A political party refers to an organi&ed gro#p of citi&ens ad*ocating an
ideology or platfor", principles and policies for the general cond#ct of
go*ern"ent and which, as the "ost i""ediate "eans of sec#ring their
adoption, reg#larly no"inates and s#pports certain of its leaders and
"e")ers as candidates for p#)lic office. It is a national party when its
constit#ency is spread o*er the geographical territory of at least a "a-ority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its constit#ency is spread o*er
the geographical territory of at least a "a-ority of the cities and pro*inces
co"prising the region.
@dA A sectoral party refers to an organi&ed gro#p of citi&ens )elonging to
any of the sectors en#"erated in !ection 7 hereof whose principal
ad*ocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,
@eA A sectoral organi&ation refers to a gro#p of citi&ens or a coalition of
gro#ps of citi&ens who share si"ilar physical attri)#tes or characteristics,
e"ploy"ent, interests or concerns.
@fA A coalition refers to an aggr#pation of d#ly registered national, regional,
sectoral parties or organi&ations for political andRor election p#rposes.
!ection B. Manifestation to 0articipate in the 0arty9List !yste". Any party,
organi&ation, or coalition already registered with the o""ission need not
register anew. 1owe*er, s#ch party, organi&ation, or coalition shall file
with the o""ission, not later than ninety @9?A days )efore the election, a
"anifestation of its desire to participate in the party9list syste".
!ection 7. %egistration. Any organi&ed gro#p of persons "ay register as a
party, organi&ation or coalition for p#rposes of the party9list syste" )y
filing with the 'M.L. not later than ninety @9?A days )efore the
election a petition *erified )y its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party9list syste" as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organi&ation or a coalition of s#ch parties or organi&ations, attaching
thereto its constit#tion, )y9laws, platfor" or progra" of go*ern"ent, list of
officers, coalition agree"ent and other rele*ant infor"ation as the
'M.L. "ay re6#ire2 0ro*ided, $hat the sectors shall incl#de la)or,
peasant, fisherfol:, #r)an poor, indigeno#s c#lt#ral co""#nities, elderly,
handicapped, wo"en, yo#th, *eterans, o*erseas wor:ers, and
professionals.
$he 'M.L. shall p#)lish the petition in at least two @2A national
newspapers of general circ#lation.
$he 'M.L. shall, after d#e notice and hearing, resol*e the petition
within fifteen @17A days fro" the date it was s#)"itted for decision )#t in
no case not later than si5ty @+?A days )efore election.
!ection +. %ef#sal andRor ancellation of %egistration. $he 'M.L.
"ay, "ot# propio or #pon *erified co"plaint of any interested party, ref#se
or cancel, after d#e notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organi&ation or coalition on any of the following
gro#nds2
@1A It is a religio#s sect or deno"ination, organi&ation or
association, organi&ed for religio#s p#rposesG
@2A It ad*ocates *iolence or #nlawf#l "eans to see: its goalG
@4A It is a foreign party or organi&ationG
@BA It is recei*ing s#pport fro" any foreign go*ern"ent,
foreign political party, fo#ndation, organi&ation, whether
directly or thro#gh any of its officers or "e")ers or indirectly
thro#gh third parties for partisan election p#rposesG
@7A It *iolates or fails to co"ply with laws, r#les or reg#lations
relating to electionsG
@+A It declares #ntr#thf#l state"ents in its petitionG
@7A It has ceased to e5ist for at least one @1A yearG or
@8A It fails to participate in the last two @2A preceding elections
or fails to o)tain at least two per cent#" @2MA of the *otes
cast #nder the party9list syste" in the two @2A preceding
elections for the constit#ency in which it has registered.
!ection 7. ertified List of %egistered 0arties. $he 'M.L. shall, not
later than si5ty @+?A days )efore election, prepare a certified list of
national, regional, or sectoral parties, organi&ations or coalitions which
ha*e applied or who ha*e "anifested their desire to participate #nder the
party9list syste" and distri)#te copies thereof to all precincts for posting in
the polling places on election day. $he na"es of the part y9list no"inees
shall not )e shown on the certified list.
!ection 8. 3o"ination of 0arty9List %epresentati*es. .ach registered
party, organi&ation or coalition shall s#)"it to the 'M.L. not later
111
than forty9fi*e @B7A days )efore the election a list of na"es, not less than
fi*e @7A, fro" which party9list representati*es shall )e chosen in case it
o)tains the re6#ired n#")er of *otes.
A person "ay )e no"inated in one @1A list only. 'nly persons who ha*e
gi*en their consent in writing "ay )e na"ed in the list. $he list shall not
incl#de any candidate for any electi*e office or a person who has lost his
)id for an electi*e office in the i""ediately preceding election. 3o change
of na"es or alteration of the order of no"inees shall )e allowed after the
sa"e shall ha*e )een s#)"itted to the 'M.L. e5cept in cases where
the no"inee dies, or withdraws in writing his no"ination, )eco"es
incapacitated in which case the na"e of the s#)stit#te no"inee shall )e
placed last in the list. Inc#")ent sectoral representati*es in the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es who are no"inated in the party9list syste" shall not )e
considered resigned.
!ection 9. V#alifications of 0arty9List 3o"inees. 3o person shall )e
no"inated as party9list representati*e #nless he is a nat#ral9)orn citi&en of
the 0hilippines, a registered *oter, a resident of the 0hilippines for a
period of not less than one @1Ayear i""ediately preceding the day of the
election, a)le to read and write, a )ona fide "e")er of the party or
organi&ation which he see:s to represent for at least ninety @9?A days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty9fi*e @27A years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a no"inee of the yo#th sector, he "#st at least )e twenty9fi*e
@27A )#t not "ore than thirty @4?A years of age on the day of the election.
Any yo#th sectoral representati*e who attains the age of thirty @4?A d#ring
his ter" shall )e allowed to contin#e in office #ntil the e5piration of his
ter".
!ection 1?. Manner of <oting. .*ery *oter shall )e entitled to two @2A
*otes2 the first is a *ote for candidate for "e")er of the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es in his legislati*e district, and the second, a *ote for the
party, organi&ations, or coalition he wants represented in the ho#se of
%epresentati*es2 0ro*ided, $hat a *ote cast for a party, sectoral
organi&ation, or coalition not entitled to )e *oted for shall not )e co#nted2
0ro*ided, finally, $hat the first election #nder the party9list syste" shall )e
held in May 1998.
$he 'M.L. shall #nderta:e the necessary infor"ation ca"paign for
p#rposes of ed#cating the electorate on the "atter of the party9list syste".
!ection 11. 3#")er of 0arty9List %epresentati*es. $he party9list
representati*es shall constit#te twenty per cent#" @2?MA of the total
n#")er of the "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es incl#ding those
#nder the party9list.
(or p#rposes of the May 1998 elections, the first fi*e @7A "a-or political
parties on the )asis of party representation in the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es at the start of the $enth ongress of the 0hilippines shall
not )e entitled to participate in the party9list syste".
In deter"ining the allocation of seats for the second *ote, the following
proced#re shall )e o)ser*ed2
@aA $he parties, organi&ations, and coalitions shall )e ran:ed
fro" the highest to the lowest )ased on the n#")er of *otes
they garnered d#ring the elections.
@)A $he parties, organi&ations, and coalitions recei*ing at
least two percent @2MA of the total *otes cast for the party9list
syste" shall )e entitled to one seat each2 0ro*ided, $hat
those garnering "ore than two percent @2MA of the *otes
shall )e entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
n#")er of *otes 2 0ro*ided, finally, $hat each party,
organi&ation, or coalition shall )e entitled to not "ore than
three @4A seats.
!ection 12. 0roced#re in Allocating !eats for 0arty9List %epresentati*es.
$he 'M.L. shall tally all the *otes for the parties, organi&ations, or
coalitions on a nationwide )asis, ran: the" according to the n#")er of
*otes recei*ed and allocate party9list representati*es proportionately
according to the percentage of *otes o)tained )y each party, organi&ation,
or coalition as against the total nationwide *otes cast for the party9list
syste".
!ection 14. 1ow 0arty9List %epresentati*es are hosen. 0arty9list
representati*es shall )e proclai"ed )y the 'M.L. )ased on the list of
na"es s#)"itted )y the respecti*e parties, organi&ations, or coalitions to
the 'M.L. according to their ran:ing in said list.
!ection 1B. $er" of 'ffice. 0arty9list representati*es shall )e elected for a
ter" of three @4A years which shall )egin, #nless otherwise pro*ided )y
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of H#ne ne5t following their election. 3o
party9list representati*es shall ser*e for "ore than three @4A consec#ti*e
ter"s. <ol#ntary ren#nciation of the office for any length of ti"e shall not
)e considered as an interr#ption in the contin#ity his ser*ice for the f#ll
ter" for which he was elected.
!ection 17. hange of AffiliationG .ffect. Any elected party9list
representati*e who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation d#ring
his ter" of office shall forfeit his seat2 0ro*ided, $hat if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation within si5 @+A "onths )efore an election,
he shall not )e eligi)le for no"ination as party9list representati*e #nder his
new party or organi&ation.
!ection 1+. <acancy. In case of *acancy in the seats reser*ed for party9
list representati*es, the *acancy shall )e a#to"atically filled )y the ne5t
representati*e fro" the list of no"inees in the order s#)"itted to the
'M.L. )y the sa"e party, organi&ation, or coalition, who shall ser*e
for the #ne5pired ter". If the list is e5ha#sted, the party, organi&ation
coalition concerned shall s#)"it additional no"inees.
!ection 17. %ights of 0arty9List %epresentati*es. 0arty9List
%epresentati*es shall )e entitled to the sa"e salaries and e"ol#"ents as
reg#lar "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es.
!ection 18. %#les and %eg#lations. $he 'M.L. shall pro"#lgate the
necessary r#les and reg#lations as "ay )e necessary to carry o#t the
p#rposes of this Act.
!ection 19. Appropriations. $he a"o#nt necessary for the i"ple"entation
of this Act shall )e pro*ided in the reg#lar appropriations for the
o""ission on .lections starting fiscal year 199+ #nder the ,eneral
Appropriations Act.
!tarting 1997, the 'M.L. is here)y a#thori&ed to #tili&e sa*ings and
other a*aila)le f#nds for p#rposes of its infor"ation ca"paign on the
party9list syste".
!ection 2?. !epara)ility la#se. If any part of this Act is held in*alid or
#nconstit#tional, the other parts or pro*isions thereof shall re"ain *alid
and effecti*e.
!ection 21. %epealing la#se. All laws, decrees, e5ec#ti*e orders, r#les
and reg#lations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the pro*isions of this
Act are here)y repealed.
!ection 22. .ffecti*ity. $his Act shall ta:e effect fifteen @17A days after its
p#)lication in a newspaper of general circ#lation.
Appro*ed, March 4, 1997.
ROMUALDE$MARCOS VS. COMELEC
248 SCRA 300, 1995
FACTS"
Monte-o then inc#")ent congress"an of the first district of
Leyte petitions for the dis6#alification of I"elda Marcos as a candidate for
the sa"e position )eca#se the latter s#pposedly lac:s the residency
re6#ire"ent of one9year. Marcos had only li*ed in $olosa recently and
ha*e yet to =reside> in the first district for the re6#ired 1 year. $he
petitioner is contending that I"elda had set #p residency in *ario#s places
thro#gho#t her lifeti"e fro" teaching in $aclo)an #p to the ti"e she
"arried where she stayed for years in !an H#an, Metro Manila.
ISSUE" 8hether or not I"elda Marcos lac:s the residency re6#ire"ent in
her candidacy.
HELD"
3o. $he ! held that $olosa re"ains as his =do"icile of
origin>. %esidence is to )e synony"o#s with do"icile partic#larly in
election law. Marcos do"icile of origin was esta)lished in $olosa )eca#se
she followed the do"icile of her parents. $his do"icile of origin was not
lost )eca#se she got "arried as residence and do"icile ha*e different
"eanings #nder ci*il law.
$he ! e*en added that considering that her h#s)and died
and she went free to choose her do"icile, her intentions were "anifest in
her actions that $olosa was to )e her do"icile.
AJUINO VS. COMELEC
248 SCRA 400, 1995
FACTS"
B#t& A6#inoKs residence re6#ire"ent is )eing contended as
he intends to r#n for congress in the newly created legislati*e district of
Ma:ati. B#t& A6#ino was contending that his lease of a condo #nit in
Ma:ati is indicati*e of the fact that he has chosen Ma:ati to )e his
do"icile and not -#st residence.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the act of A6#ino in leasing a condo #nit in Ma:ati
is indicati*e of his desire to "a:e it his do"icile.
HELD"
3o. $he o#rt r#led against A6#ino )eca#se his =leasing> of
a condo #nit is )y no "eans indicati*e of his desire to "a:e Ma:ati his
per"anent ho"e or do"icile, considering that he was still a :nown
resident of oncepcion, $arlac for the past 72 years of which happens to
)e his )irthplace.
$he !#pre"e o#rt reiterated how to s#ccessf#lly effect a
chage of do"icile2
Act#al re"o*alRact#al change of do"icile
Intention to a)andon for"er do"icile and esta)lish a new
one
Definite act which correspond with the p#rpose
CO VS. HRET
199 SCRA 293, 1991
FACTS"
'ng, a candidate for congressional elections in his local
district is )eing assailed as to his 6#alifications that his )eing a nat#ral9
)orn citi&en is 6#estiona)le along with not ha*ing co"plied with the
residency re6#ire"ent.
ISSUE" 8hether or not 'ng "et the 6#alifications and the residency
re6#ire"ent.
HELD"
112
Des. As to the "atter of citi&enship the o#rt r#led in 'ngKs fa*or
citing the following reasons2
'ngKs father was already nat#rali&ed while he was -#st 9
years old
'ngKs "other was a (ilipina pl#s the fact that a lot of
instances transpired after he reached the age of "a-ority
than reinforces the fact that he elected (ilipino citi&enship.
$hat the fact that his )rotherKs citi&enship was in fact already
answered fa*ora)ly )y the onstit#tional o""ission itself.
As to the iss#e of residence, again the co#rt r#led in 'ngKs
fa*or holding that he ne*er had any intention to a)andon his do"icile of
origin despite ha*ing stayed in Manila to st#dy or p#rs#e his personal
career.
DIMAPORO VS. MITRA
202 SCRA 779, 1991
FACTS"
0etitioner Moha""ad Ali Di"aporo was elected
%epresentati*e for the !econd Legislati*e District of Lanao del !#r d#ring
the 1987 congressional elections and too: his oath of office on Han#ary 9,
1987. 'n Han#ary 17, 199?, petitioner filed with the 'M.L. a
ertificate of andidacy for the position of %egional ,o*ernor of the
A#tono"o#s %egion in M#sli" Mindanao. $he election was sched#led for
(e)r#ary 17, 199?.
Jpon )eing infor"ed of this de*elop"ent )y the
'M.L., respondents !pea:er and !ecretary of the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es e5cl#ded petitionerKs na"e fro" the %oll of Me")ers of
the 1o#se of %epresentati*es p#rs#ant to sec.+7, Art.I; of the '"ni)#s
.lection ode, which states2 =Any electi*e official whether national or local
r#nning for any office other than the one which he is holding in a
per"anent capacity e5cept for 0resident and <ice 0resident shall )e
considered ipso facto @)y the "ere actA resigned fro" his office #pon filing
of his certificate of candidacy.>
0etitioner contends that he did not there)y lose his seat as
congress"an )eca#se !ec.+7, Art.I; of the B.0. Blg.881 is not operati*e
#nder the present onstit#tion, )eing contrary thereto, and therefore not
applica)le to the present "e")ers of the ongress.
ISSUE" 8hether or not petitioner forfeited his seat, #pon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office.
HELD"
Des. (orfeit#re is a#to"atic and per"anently effecti*e #pon
the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office. 'nce the
certificate is filed, the seat is fore*er forfeited and nothing sa*e a new
election or appoint"ent can restore the o#sted official. $he wording of the
law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy sho#ld )e ta:en into acco#nt. $he law does not "a:e the
forfeit#re dependent #pon the f#t#re contingencies, #nforeseen and
#nforeseea)le, since the *acating is e5pressly "ade as of the "o"ent of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
!IMENE$ V. CA&ANG&ANG
G.R. NO. L15905, AUGUST 3, 19%%
FACTS"
$his is an ordinary ci*il action, originally instit#ted in the
o#rt of (irst instance of %i&al, for the reco*ery, )y plaintiffs 3icanor $.
Hi"ine&, arlos H. Al)ert and Hose L. L#:)an, of se*eral s#"s of "oney,
)y way of da"ages for the p#)lication of an allegedly li)elo#s letter of the
defendant Bartolo"e a)ang)ang. Jpon )eing s#""oned, the letter
"o*ed to dis"iss the co"plaint #pon the gro#nd that the letter in 6#estion
is not li)elo#s, and that, e*en if were, said letter is a pri*ileged
co""#nication. $his "otion ha*ing )een granted )y the lower co#rt,
plaintiffs interposed the present appeal fro" the corresponding order of
dis"issal.
ISSUES"
a. 8hether or not the p#)lication in 6#estion is a pri*ileged
co""#nicationC
). 8hether or not it is li)elo#sC
HELD"
a. 3o. $he afore"entioned p#)lication does not fall within
the p#r*iew of the phrase =speech and de)ate therein> [ that is to say in
ongress [ #sed in Art.<I, sec.17 of the onstit#tion. !aid e5pression
refers to #tterances "ade )y ongress"en in the perfor"ance of their
official f#nctions, s#ch as speeches deli*ered, state"ents "ade, or *otes
cast in the halls of ongress, while the sa"e is in session as well as )ills
introd#ced in ongress, whether the sa"e is in session or not, and other
acts perfor"ed )y ongress"en, either in ongress or o#tside the
pre"ises ho#sing its offices, in the official discharge of their d#ties as
"e")ers of ongress and of ongressional o""ittees d#ly a#thori&ed
to perfor" its f#nctions as s#ch at the ti"e of the perfor"ance of the acts
in 6#estion.
$he p#)lication in*ol*ed in this case does not )elong to this
category. According to the co"plaint herein, it was an open letter to the
0resident of the 0hilippines, dated 3o*e")er 1B, 1978, when ongress
pres#"a)ly was not in session, and defendant ca#sed said letter to )e
p#)lished in se*eral newspapers of general circ#lation in the 0hilippines,
on or a)o#t said date. It is o)*io#s that, in th#s ca#sing the
co""#nication to )e so p#)lished, he was not perfor"ing his official d#ty,
either as a "e")er of ongress or as officer of any o""ittee thereof.
1ence, the said co""#nication is not a)sol#tely pri*ileged.
). 3o. $he letter in 6#estion is not s#fficient to s#pport
plaintiffKs action for da"ages. It is tr#e that the co"plaint alleges that an
open letter in 6#estion was written )y the defendant, :nowing that is false
and with the intent to i"peach plaintiffKs rep#tation, to e5pose the" to
p#)lic hatred, conte"pt, dishonor and ridic#le, and to alienate the" fro"
their associates, )#t these allegations are "ere concl#sions which are
inconsistent with the contents of said letter and cannot pre*ail o*er the
sa"e, it )eing the *ery )asis of the co"plaint. $he *ery doc#"ent #pon
which plaintiffsK action is )ased e5plicitly indicates that they "ight )e
a)sol#tely #naware of the alleged operational plans, and that they "ay )e
"erely #nwitting tools of the planners. $his state"ent is not derogatory to
the plaintiffs to the point of entitling the" to reco*er da"ages.
OSMENA V. PENDATUN
G.R. NO. L17144 OCTO&ER 28, 19%0
FACTS"
ongress"an !ergio 's"ena, Hr., in a pri*ilege speech
deli*ered )efore the 1o#se, "ade the serio#s i"p#tations of )ri)ery
against the 0resident which are 6#oted in %esol#tion 3o. 79.
ongress"an !alipada L. 0endat#n and fo#rteen other
congress"en in their capacity as "e")ers of the !pecial o""ittee
created )y 1o#se %esol#tion 3o. 79 fo#nd said congress"an g#ilty of
serio#s disorderly )eha*iorG and acting on s#ch report, the 1o#se
appro*ed on the sa"e day9)efore closing its session91o#se %esol#tion
3o. 177, declaring hi" g#ilty as reco""ended and s#spending hi" fro"
office for fifteen "onths.
ISSUES"
a. 8hether or not deli*ery of speeches attac:ing the hief
.5ec#ti*e constit#tes disorderly cond#ct for which 's"ena "ay )e
disciplinedC
). 8hether or not the resol#tion *iolated his constit#tional
a)sol#te parlia"entary i""#nity for speeches deli*ered in the
1o#seC
HELD"
a. Des. $here is no 6#estion that ongress"an 's"ena "ade a serio#s
i"p#tation of )ri)ery against the 0resident. $he 1o#se is the -#dge of
what constit#tes disorderly )eha*ior, not only )eca#se the onstit#tion
has conferred -#risdiction #pon it, )#t also )eca#se the "atter depends
"ainly on fact#al circ#"stances of which the 1o#se :nows )est )#t which
can not )e depicted in )lac: and white for presentation to, and
ad-#dication )y the o#rts. $he ho#se has e5cl#si*e powerG the co#rts
ha*e no -#risdiction to interfere. $he theory of separation of powers
fastidio#sly o)ser*ed )y this o#rt, de"ands in s#ch sit#ation a pr#dent
ref#sal to interfere.
). 3o. $he resol#tion does not *iolate the constit#tional parlia"entary
i""#nity for speeches deli*ered in the 1o#se. '#r onstit#tion enshrines
parlia"entary i""#nity which is a f#nda"ental pri*ilege in e*ery
legislati*e asse")ly of the de"ocratic world. B#t it does not protect hi"
fro" responsi)ility )efore the legislati*e )ody itself whene*er his words
and cond#ct are considered )y the latter disorderly or #n)eco"ing of a
"e")er thereof. (or #nparlia"entary cond#ct, "e")ers of the parlia"ent
or of ongress ha*e )ee, or co#ld )e cens#red, co""itted to prison,
s#spended, e*en e5pelled )y the *otes of their colleag#es.
$ANDUETA VS. DELA COSTA
G.R. NO. L4%2%7, NOVEM&ER 28, 1938
FACTS"
8hile petitioner (rancis Xand#eta was presiding o*er the 7
th
Branch of o#rts of (irst Instance of Manila, he recei*ed a new ad interi"
appoint"ent, iss#ed in accordance with o""onwealth Act 3o. 1B7, to
discharge the 'ffice of H#dge in the o#rt of (irst Instance of the B
th
H#dicial District with a#thority to preside o*er the (I of Manila and
0alawan. $he 3ational Asse")ly ad-o#rned witho#t its o""ission on
Appoint"ents ha*ing acted on said ad interi" appoint"ent.
$he o""ission on Appoint"ents of the 3ational Asse")ly
disappro*ed the ad interi" appoint"ent of petitioner. !#)se6#ently, the
0resident of the 0hilippines appointed respondent !i5to de la osta, -#dge
of first instance of the B
th
H#dicial District, with a#thority to preside o*er the
(I of Manila and 0alawan, and his appoint"ent was appro*ed )y the
o""ission on Appoint"ents of the 3ational Asse")ly.
0etitioner instit#ted 6#o warranto proceedings against
respondent and also 6#estioned the *alidity of the appoint"ent alleging
that .A. 3o. 1B7 is #nconstit#tional.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitioner "ay proceed to 6#estion the
constit#tionality of .A. 3o. 1B7 )y *irt#e of which the new ad interi"
113
appoint"ent of -#dge of first instance of the B
th
H#dicial District, to preside
o*er the (I of Manila and 0alawan, was iss#ed in his fa*orC
HELD"
3o. 0etitioner is estopped )y his own act for" proceeding to
6#estion the constit#tionality of .A. 3o. 1B7. 1e li:ewise :new, or at least
he sho#ld :now, that his ad interi" appoint"ent was s#)-ect to the
appro*al of the o""ission on Appoint"ents of the 3ational Asse")ly
and that if said o""ission were to disappro*e the sa"e, it wo#ld
)eco"e ineffecti*e and he wo#ld cease discharging the office. $he
petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interi" appoint"ent iss#ed )y
the 0resident of the o""onwealth in his fa*or, in accordance with said
.A. 3o. 1B7. 3othing or no)ody co"pelled hi" to do so. 8hen a p#)lic
official *ol#ntarily accepts an appoint"ent to an office newly created or
reorgani&ed )y law [ which new office is inco"pati)le with the one
for"erly occ#pied )y hi" [ 6#alifies for the discharge of the f#nctions
thereof )y ta:ing the necessary oath, and enters in the perfor"ance of his
d#ties )y e5ec#ting acts
inherent in said newly created or reorgani&ed office and recei*ing the
corresponding salary, he will )e considered to ha*e a)andoned the office
he was occ#pying )y *irt#e of his for"er appoint"ent, and he cannot
6#estion the constit#tionality of the law )y which he was last appointed.
1e was estopped for" 6#estioning the *alidity of said appoint"ent )y
alleging that the law, )y *irt#e of which his appoint"ent was iss#ed, is
#nconstit#tional. 1e is e5e"pted fro" said r#le only when his non9
acceptance of the new appoint"ent "ay affect p#)lic interest or when he
is co"pelled to accept it )y reason of legal e5igencies.
SECTION 14 ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
PU-AT VS. DE GU$MAN, !R.
(G.R. NO. L51122, MARCH 25, 1982)
MELENCIOHERRERA, !."
FACTS"
$his s#it for certiorari and 0rohi)ition with 0reli"inary
In-#nction is poised against the 'rder of respondent Associate
o""issioner of the !. granting Asse")ly"an .stanislao A.
(ernande& lea*e to inter*ene in !. ase 3o. 17B7.
Before he "o*ed to inter*ene he had signified his intention
to appear as co#nsel for the respondent $.. Acero, )#t which was
o)-ected to )y petitioners. Acero instit#ted at the !. 6#o warranto
proceedings, 6#estioning the election for the 11 Directors of the
International 0ipe Ind#stries orporation, a pri*ate corporation. Acero
clai"ed that the stoc:holderKs *otes were not properly co#nted. H#stice
.stanislao A. (ernande&, then "e")er of the Interi" Batasang
0a")ansa, orally entered his appearance as co#nsel for respondent
Acero to which petitioner .#genio 0#yat o)-ected on onstit#tional
gro#nds !ec.11, Art.<III, of the 1974 onstit#tion, then in force, pro*ided
that =no Asse")ly"an co#ld appear as co#nsel )eforeZ any
ad"inistrati*e )ody,> and !. was an ad"inistrati*e )ody. $he cited
constit#tional prohi)ition )eing clear, Asse")ly"an (ernande& did not
contin#e his appearance for respondent Acero.
ISSUE" 8hether or not, in inter*ening in the !. ase, Asse")ly"an
(ernande& is, in effect, appearing as co#nsel, al)eit indirectly, )efore an
ad"inistrati*e )ody in contra*ention of the onstit#tional pro*ision.
HELD"
Des. 'rdinarily, )y *irt#e of the Motion for Inter*ention,
Asse")ly"an (ernande& cannot )e said to )e appearing as co#nsel.
'stensi)ly, he is not appearing on )ehalf of another, altho#gh he is -oining
the ca#se of the pri*ate respondents. 1is appearance co#ld theoretically
)e for the protection of his ownership of ten @1?A shares of I0I in respect of
the "atter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor
respondents who ha*e their respecti*e capa)le and respected co#nsel.
1owe*er, he later had ac6#ired a "ere 02??.?? worth of
stoc: in I0I, representing ten shares o#t of 2+2,8B4 o#tstanding shares.
1e ac6#ired the" /after the fact/ that is, on May 4?, 1979, after the
contested election of Directors on May 1B, 1979, after the 6#o warranto
s#it had )een filed on May 27, 1979 )efore !. and one day )efore the
sched#led hearing of the case )efore the !. on May 41, 1979. And what
is "ore, )efore he "o*ed to inter*ene, he had signified his intention to
appear as co#nsel for respondent .#sta6#io $. . Acero, )#t which was
o)-ected to )y petitioners. %eali&ing, perhaps, the *alidity of the o)-ection,
he decided, instead, to /inter*ene/ on the gro#nd of legal interest in the
"atter #nder litigation. And it "ay)e noted that in the case filed )efore the
%i&al o#rt of (irst Instance @L971928A, he appeared as co#nsel for
defendant .5celsior, co9defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Jnder those facts and circ#"stances, there has )een an
indirect circ#"*ention of the constit#tional prohi)ition. An asse")ly"an
cannot indirectly follow the constit#tional prohi)ition not to appear as
co#nsel )efore an ad"inistrati*e tri)#nal li:e the !. )y )#ying no"inal
a"o#nt of share of one of the stoc:holders after his appearance as
co#nsel therein was contested. A r#ling #pholding the =inter*ention> wo#ld
"a:e the constit#tional pro*ision ineffecti*e. All an Asse")ly"en need to
do, if he wants to infl#ence an ad"inistrati*e )ody is to ac6#ire a "ini"al
participation in the =interest> of the client and then =inter*ene> in the
proceedings. $hat which the onstit#tion prohi)its "ay not )e done )y
indirection or )y a general legislati*e act which is intended to acco"plish
the o)-ects specifically or i"pliedly prohi)ited.
SECTION 1% ARTICLE VI 1987 CONSTITUTION
SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, !R.
(G.R. NO. 134577, NOVEM&ER 18, 1998)
PANGANI&AN, !."
FACTS"
$he !enate of the 0hilippines, with !en. Hohn 1enry %.
's"eNa as presiding officer, con*ened on H#ly 27, 1998 the first reg#lar
session of the ele*enth ongress. !enator $atad thereafter "anifested
that, with the agree"ent of !enator !antiago, allegedly the only other
"e")er of the "inority, he was ass#"ing the position of "inority leader.
1e e5plained that those who had *oted for !enator (ernan, as !enate
0resident, co"prised the /"a-ority,/ while only those who had *oted for
hi", the losing no"inee, )elonged to the /"inority./
D#ring the disc#ssion on who sho#ld constit#te the !enate
/"inority,/ !en. H#an M. (la*ier "anifested that the senators )elonging to
the La:as93JD9JMD0 0arty E n#")ering se*en @7A and, th#s, also a
"inority E had chosen !enator ,#ingona as the "inority leader. 3o
consens#s on the "atter was arri*ed at. $he following session day, the
de)ate on the 6#estion contin#ed, with !enators !antiago and $atad
deli*ering pri*ilege speeches.
Miria" Defensor !antiago and (rancisco !. $atad later
instit#ted an original petition for 6#o warranto #nder %#le ++, !ection 7,
%#les of o#rt, see:ing the o#ster of !enator $eofisto $. ,#ingona, Hr. as
"inority leader of the !enate and the declaration of !enator $atad as the
rightf#l "inority leader.
ISSUES"
1. Does the o#rt ha*e -#risdiction to settle the contro*ersyC
2. In recogni&ing %espondent ,#ingona as the !enate "inority
leader, did the !enate or its officials, partic#larly !enate 0resident
(ernan, *iolate the onstit#tion or the lawsC
HELD"
1. Des. $his o#rt has -#risdiction o*er the petition. It is well
within the power and -#risdiction of the o#rt to in6#ire whether indeed the
!enate or its officials co""itted a *iolation of the onstit#tion or gra*ely
a)#sed their discretion in the e5ercise of their f#nctions and prerogati*es.
2. 3o. 8hile the onstit#tion "andates that the 0resident of
the !enate "#st )e elected )y a n#")er constit#ting "ore than one half
of all the "e")ers thereof, it does not pro*ide that the "e")ers who will
not *ote for hi" shall ipso facto constit#te the /"inority,/ who co#ld
there)y elect the "inority leader. <erily, no law or reg#lation states that
the defeated candidate shall a#to"atically )eco"e the "inority leader.
8hile the onstit#tion is e5plicit on the "anner of electing a
!enate 0resident and a 1o#se !pea:er, it is, howe*er, dead silent on the
"anner of selecting the other officers in )oth cha")ers of ongress. All
that the harter says is that /OePach 1o#se shall choose s#ch other
officers as it "ay dee" necessary./ $he "ethod of choosing who will )e
s#ch other officers is "erely a deri*ati*e of the e5ercise of the prerogati*e
conferred )y the afore6#oted constit#tional pro*ision. $herefore, s#ch
"ethod "#st )e prescri)ed )y the !enate itself, not )y this o#rt.
AVELINO VS. CUENCO
(G.R. NO. L2821, MARCH 4, 1949)
FACTS"
!enator 0rospero !anidad filed with the !ecretary of the
!enate a resol#tion en#"erating charges against the then !enate
0resident and ordering the in*estigation thereof. 8hen the "eeting was
called to order, !enator !anidad "o*ed that the roll call )e dispensed with
)#t !enator $irona opposed said "otion. $he roll was called.
!enator !anidad ne5t "o*ed to dispense with the reading of
the "in#tes, )#t this "otion was li:ewise opposed )y !enator $irona and
Da*id.
Before and after the roll call and )efore and after the reading
of the "in#tes, !enator $aNada repeatedly stood #p to clai" his right to
deli*er his one9ho#r pri*ilege speech )#t the petitioner, then presiding,
contin#o#sly ignored hi"G and when after the reading of the "in#tes,
!enator $aNada instead on )eing recogni&ed )y the hair, the petitioner
anno#nced that he wo#ld order the arrest of any senator who wo#ld spea:
witho#t )eing pre*io#sly recogni&ed )y hi", )#t all the while, tolerating the
actions of his follower, !enator $irona, who was contin#o#sly sho#ting at
!enator !anidad /'#t of order^/ e*eryti"e the latter wo#ld as: for
recognition of !enator $aNada.
At this -#nct#re, so"e disorderly cond#ct )ro:e o#t in the
!enate gallery. !enator 0a)lo Angeles Da*id, one of the petitionerIs
followers, "o*ed for ad-o#rn"ent of session. !enator !anidad registered
his opposition to the ad-o#rn"ent of the session and this opposition was
seconded )y herein respondent who "o*ed that the "otion of
ad-o#rn"ent )e s#)"itted to a *ote. Another co""otion ens#ed.
!enator Da*id reiterated his "otion for ad-o#rn"ent and
herein respondent also reiterated his opposition to the ad-o#rn"ent and
again "o*ed that the "otion of !enator Da*id )e s#)"itted to a *ote.
!#ddenly, the petitioner )anged the ga*el and a)andoning
the hair h#rriedly wal:ed o#t of the session hall followed )y !enator
Da*id, $irona, (rancisco, $orres, Magalona and larin, while the rest of
the senators re"ained. 8here#pon !enator Melencio Arran&, !enate
114
0resident 0ro9te"pore, #rged )y those senators present too: the hair
and proceeded with the session.
!enator a)ili stood #p, and as:ed that it )e "ade of record
E it was so "ade E that the deli)erate a)andon"ent of the hair )y the
petitioner, "ade it inc#")ent #pon !enate 0resident 0ro9te"pore Arran&
and the re"aining "e")ers of the !enate to contin#e the session in order
not to paraly&e the f#nctions of the !enate.
!enate 0resident 0ro9te"pore Arran& then s#ggested that respondent )e
designated to preside o*er the session which s#ggestion was carried
#nani"o#sly. $he respondent there#pon too: the hair.
Jpon "otion of !enator Arran& which was appro*ed,
,regorio A)ad was appointed Acting !ecretary. !enator $aNada, after
)eing recogni&ed )y the hair, was then finally a)le to deli*er his pri*ilege
speech. $hereafter !enator !anidad read alo#d the co"plete te5t of said
%esol#tion @3o. +8A, and s#)"itted his "otion for appro*al thereof and the
sa"e was #nani"o#sly appro*ed.
8ith !enate 0resident 0ro9te"pore Arran& again occ#pying
the hair, after the respondent had yielded it to hi", !enator !anidad
introd#ced %esol#tion 3o. +7, entitled /%esol#tion declaring *acant the
position of the 0resident of the !enate and designated the 1onora)le
Mariano Hes#s #enco Acting 0resident of the !enate./ 0#t to a *ote, the
said resol#tion was #nani"o#sly appro*ed.
!enator #enco too: the oath.
$he ne5t day the 0resident of the 0hilippines recogni&ed the
respondent as acting president of the 0hilippines !enate.
By his petition in this 6#o warranto proceeding petitioners
as:ed the o#rt to declare hi" the rightf#l 0resident of the 0hilippines
senate and o#st respondent.
ISSUE" Does the o#rt ha*e -#risdiction o*er the petitionC
HELD"
3one. $he constit#tional grant to the !enate of the power to
elect its own president, which power sho#ld not )e interfered with, nor
ta:en o*er, )y the -#diciary.
$he o#rt will not sally into the legiti"ate do"ain of the
!enate on the plea that o#r ref#sal to intercede "ight lead into a crisis,
e*en a resol#tion. 3o state of things has )een pro*ed that "ight change
the te"per of the (ilipino people as a peacef#l and law9a)iding citi&ens.
And we sho#ld not allow o#rsel*es to )e sta"peded into a rash action
inconsistent with the cal" that sho#ld characteri&ed -#dicial deli)erations.
!#pposing that the o#rt has -#risdiction, there is #nani"ity
in the *iew that the session #nder !enator Arran& was a contin#ation of
the "orning session and that a "inority of ten senators "ay not, )y
lea*ing the 1all, pre*ent the other twel*e senators fro" passing a
resol#tion that "et with their #nani"o#s endorse"ent. $he answer "ight
)e different had the resol#tion )een appro*ed only )y ten or less.
OSMESA VS. PENDATUN
(G.R. NO. L17144, OCTO&ER 28, 19%0)
&ENG$ON, !."
FACTS"
ongress"an !ergio 's"eNa, Hr., s#)"itted to this o#rt a
*erified petition for /declaratory relief, certiorari and prohi)ition with
preli"inary in-#nction/ against ongress"an !alapida L. 0endat#n and
fo#rteen other congress"en in their capacity as "e")ers of the !pecial
o""ittee created )y 1o#se %esol#tion 3o. 79. 1e as:ed for ann#l"ent
of s#ch %esol#tion on the gro#nd of infringe"ent of his parlia"entary
i""#nity. 1e also as:ed, principally, that said "e")ers of the special
co""ittee )e en-oined fro" proceeding in accordance with it, partic#larly
the portion a#thori&ing the" to re6#ire hi" to s#)stantiate his charges of
)ri)ery against then 0resident ,arcia with the ad"onition that if he failed
to do so, he "#st show ca#se why the 1o#se sho#ld not p#nish hi".
ongress"an 's"eNa allegedG first, the %esol#tion *iolated
his constit#tional a)sol#te parlia"entary i""#nity for speeches deli*ered
in the 1o#seG second, his words constit#ted no actiona)le cond#ctG and
third, after his allegedly o)-ectiona)le speech and words, the 1o#se too:
#p other )#siness, and %#le ;<II, sec. 7 of the %#les of 1o#se pro*ides
that if other )#siness has inter*ened after the "e")er had #ttered
o)no5io#s words in de)ate, he shall not )e held to answer therefor nor )e
s#)-ect to cens#re )y the 1o#se.
$he !pecial o""ittee d#ring the pendency of his petition,
fo#nd said congress"an g#ilty of serio#s disorderly )eha*ior. $he 1o#se
appro*ed 1o#se %esol#tion 3o. 177 declaring hi" s#spended fro" office
for 17 "onths.
ISSUE" an the 1o#se of %epresentati*es discipline its "e")ers as in
the case at )arC
HELD"
Des. $he 1o#se is the -#dge of what constit#tes disorderly
)eha*io#r, not only )eca#se the onstit#tion has conferred -#risdiction
#pon it, )#t also )eca#se the "atter depends "ainly on fact#al
circ#"stances of which the 1o#se :nows )est )#t which can not )e
depicted in )lac: and white for presentation to, and ad-#dication )y the
o#rts. (or one thing, if this o#rt ass#"ed the power to deter"ine
whether 's"eNa cond#ct constit#ted disorderly )eha*io#r, it wo#ld
there)y ha*e ass#"ed appellate -#risdiction, which the onstit#tion ne*er
intended to confer #pon a coordinate )ranch of the ,o*ern"ent. $he
theory of separation of powers fastidio#sly o)ser*ed )y this o#rt,
de"ands in s#ch sit#ation a pr#dent ref#sal to interfere. .ach depart"ent,
it has )een said, had e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of "atters within its -#risdiction
and is s#pre"e within its own sphere. @Angara *s. .lectoral o""ission,
+4 0hil., 149.A
Jnder o#r for" of go*ern"ent, the -#dicial depart"ent has
no power to re*ise e*en the "ost ar)itrary and #nfair action of the
legislati*e depart"ent, or of either ho#se thereof, ta:ing in p#rs#ance of
the power co""itted e5cl#si*ely to that depart"ent )y the onstit#tion. It
has )een held )y high a#thority that, e*en in the a)sence of an e5press
pro*ision conferring the power, e*ery legislati*e )ody in which is *ested
the general legislati*e power of the state has the i"plied power to e5pel a
"e")er for any ca#se which it "ay dee" s#fficient.
$he ongress has the inherent legislati*e prerogati*e of
s#spension which the onstit#tion did not i"pair. In any e*ent, petitionerIs
arg#"ent as to the depri*ation of the districtIs representation can not )e
"ore weightly in the "atter of s#spension than in the case of
i"prison"ent of a legislatorG yet deli)erati*e )odies ha*e the power in
proper cases, to co""it one of their "e")ers to -ail.
PAREDES, !R. VS. SANDIGAN&A-AN
GR NO. 1183%4. !ANUAR- 28, 1997
FACTS"
8hile ongress"an was still 0ro*incial ,o*ernor, charges
of *iolations of the Anti9,raft Law were filed against hi" )efore the
!andigan)ayan. !#)se6#ently, he was elected to ongress. D#ring his
second ter" in ongress, the !andigan)ayan i"posed a pre*enti*e
s#spension on hi" p#rs#ant to the Anti9,raft Law. 0aredes challenged
the a#thority of the !andigan)ayan to s#spend a district representati*e.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitioner can )e s#spended.
HELD"
D.!. 0etitionerKs in*ocation of !ection 1+@4A, Article <I of the
onstit#tion which deals with the power of each 1o#se of ongress inter
alias to Sp#nish its "e")ers of ongress for disorderly )eha*ior S and
s#spend or e5pel a "e")erK )y a *ote of two?thirds of the "e")ers
s#)-ect to the 6#alification that the penalty of the s#spension spo:en of in
!ec. 14 of %A 4?19 which is not penalty )y a preli"inary pre*enti*e
"eas#re presenting fro" the fact that the latter is not )eing i"posed on
the petitioner for "is)eha*ior as a Me")er of the 1o#se of
%epresentati*e.
US VS. PONS
34 PHIL 729. 191%
FACTS"
$he respondent, together with Beliso and Lasarte were
charged with illegal i"portation of opi#". 0ons and Beliso were tried
separately on "otion of co#nsel. Lasarte had not yet )een arrested. .ach
was fo#nd g#ilty of the cri"e, charged and sentenced accordingly. Both
appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the -#dg"ent as to hi" has
)eco"e final. %espondentKs "otion alleged to pro*e that the last day of
the special session of the 0hilippine Legislat#re for 191B was the 28
th
day
of (e)r#ary, that Act 3o.2481 #nder which 0ons "#st )e p#nished if
fo#nd g#ilty, was not passed nor appro*ed on the 28
th
of (e)r#ary )#t on
March 1 of that year. Also, co#nsel for 0ons alleged that the Asse")lyKs
cloc: was stopped on (e)r#ary 18, 191B at "idnight and left so #ntil the
deter"ination of the disc#ssion of all pending "atters a"ong which was
Act 3'. 2481. to pro*e aid allegations, co#nsel arg#ed the co#rt to go
)eyond the proceedings of the Legislat#re as recorded in the -o#rnals.

ISSUE" 8hether or not the co#rt "ay go )eyond the recitals of legislat#re
-o#rnals or -#st ta:e -#dicial notice of said -o#rnals for the p#rpose of
deter"ining the date of ad-o#rn"ent when s#ch -o#rnal are clear and
e5plicitly.
HELD"
D.!. (ro" their *ery nat#re and o)-ect the records of the
Legislat#re are as i"portant as those of the -#diciary. And to in6#ire into
the *eracity of the -o#rnals of the 0hilippine Legislat#re when they are, as
we ha*e said, clear and e5plicit, wo#ld )e to *iolate )oth the letter and the
spirit of the organic laws )y which the 0hilippine go*ern"ent was )ro#ght
into e5istence, to in*ade and coordinate and independent depart"ent of
the ,o*ern"ent and to interfere with the legiti"ate powers and f#nctions
of the Legislat#re.
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., VS. GIMENE$
7 SCRA 347 (19%3)
FACTS"
0#rs#ant to the pro*isions of %A 7+?9 :nown as the (oreign
.5change Margin (ee Law, the entral Ban: iss#ed irc#lar 3'. 97 fi5ing
a #nified "argin fee of 27M on foreign e5change transaction and a
"e"orand#" esta)lishing the proced#re for application for e5e"ption
fro" pay"ent of said fee. In 3o*e")er and Dece")er 1979, and in May
19+?, asco 0hilippine he"ical o. Inc., )ro#ght foreign e5change for
115
the i"portation of #rea and for"aldehyde and paid for the "argin fee
therefore. $hen as petitioner, the entral Ban: declaring that separate
i"portation of #rea and for"aldehyde is e5e"pt fro" said fee. 8hen the
)ac: iss#e corresponding "argin fee *o#chers for the ref#nd, the a#ditor
of the )ac: iss#e the said *o#chers #pon the gro#nd that the e5e"ption
granted )y the Monetary Board is in *iolation of !ec. 2@18_ of %A 2+?9,
according to the pertinent portion of the Act, =#rea for"aldehyde> is
e5e"pted fro" the "argin fee. $he 3ational Instit#te of !cience and
$echnology f#rther affir"s that =#rea for"aldehyde> is different fro" #rea
and for"aldehyde. 1ence, the separate i"portations of these two raw
"aterials are not e5cl#ded fro" "argin fee.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the phrase =#rea for"aldehyde> as #sed in the
stat#te sho#ld )e read as =#rea> and =for"aldehyde.>
HELD"
3'. 1ence, =#rea for"aldehyde> is clearly a finished prod#ct
which is patently distinct and different fro" =#rea> and =for"aldehyde> as
#sed in the "an#fact#re of the synthetic resin :nown as =#rea
for"aldehyde.> 0etitioner contends, howe*er, that the )ill appro*ed in
ongress contained the cop#lati*e con-#nction =and> )etween the ter"
=#rea> and =for"aldehyde>, not the latter as a finished prod#ct, citing in
s#pport of this *iew the state"ents "ade on the floor of !enate, d#ring
the consideration of the )ill )efore said 1o#se, )y "e")ers thereof.
(#rther"ore, it is well settled that the enrolled )ill which #ses the ter"
=#rea for"aldehyde> is a concl#si*e #pon the co#rts as regards the tenor
of the "eas#re passed )y the ongress and appro*ed )y the 0resident.
PHILIPPINE !UDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO
227 SCRA 703. 1993
FACTS"
$he 0hilippine 0ostal orporation i"ple"ented %A 774B, a
"eas#re withdrawing the fran:ing pri*ilege fro" the !, A, %$ and
M$ along with certain other go*ern"ent offices. $he petitioners are
"e")ers of the lower co#rts who feel that their official f#nctions as -#dges
will )e pre-#diced )y the afore"entioned "eas#re. $he petitioners assail
the constit#tionality of the "eas#re on the gro#nd inter alia that it is
discri"inatory and encroached on the independence of the -#diciary.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the contention of the petitioner is tena)le.
HELD"
D.!. Jnder the doctrine of separation of powers, the o#rt
"ay not in6#ire )eyond the certification of the appro*al of a )ill fro" the
presiding officers of ongress. $he afore"entioned "eas#re is declared
#nconstit#tional insofar as it withdraws the fran:ing pri*ilege fro" the !,
A, %$ and M$ and other go*ern"ent offices.
It is alleged that %A 3o. 747B is discri"inatory )eca#se
while withdrawing the fran:ing pri*ilege of the H#diciary, it retains the
sa"e for the 0resident of the 0hilippines, the <ice90resident of the
0hilippines, !enators and "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es, the
o""ission on .lections, for"er president of he 0hilippines, widows of
for"er presidents of the 0hilippines, the national cens#s and statistics
'ffice and the general p#)lic in the filing of co"plaints against p#)lic
offices or officers.
$he e6#al protection of the laws is e")raced in the concept
of the d#e process, as #nfair discri"ination offends the re6#ire"ent of
-#stice and fair play. It has nonetheless )een e")odied in a separate
cla#se in Article III, !ection I of the onstit#tion to pro*ide for a "ore
specific g#aranty against any for" of #nd#e fa*oritis" or hostility fro" the
go*ern"ent. Ar)itrariness in general "ay )e challenged on the )asis of
the d#e process cla#se .)#t if the partic#lar act assailed parta:es of an
#nwarranted partiality or pre-#dice the sharper weapon to c#t it down is
the e6#al protection cla#se.
SEPARATION OF PO=ERS? ENROLLED &ILL DOCTRINE
ARRO-O VS. DE VENECIA
(G.R. NO. 127255. AUGUST 14, 1997)
MENDO$A, !.
FACTS"
0etitioners are "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es.
$hey )ro#ght this s#it against the respondents charging the" *iolation of
the r#les of the 1o#se which petitioners clai" are /constit#tionally
"andated/ so that their *iolation is tanta"o#nt to a *iolation of the
onstit#tion. $he present petition also challenges the *alidity of %A 3o.
82B?, which a"ends certain pro*isions of the 3ational Internal %e*en#e
ode )y i"posing so9called Wsin ta5es> @act#ally specific ta5esA on the
"an#fact#re and sale of )eer and cigarettes.
$he law originated in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es as 1.
3o. 7198. $his )ill was appro*ed on third reading on !epte")er 12, 199+
and trans"itted on !epte")er 1+, 199+ to the !enate which appro*ed it
with certain a"end"ents on third reading on 3o*e")er 17, 199+. A
)ica"eral conference co""ittee was for"ed to reconcile the disagreeing
pro*isions of the 1o#se and !enate *ersions of the )ill.
$he )ica"eral conference co""ittee s#)"itted its report to
the 1o#se at 8 a.". on 3o*e")er 21, 199+. At 112B8 a."., after a recess,
%ep. .5e6#iel Ha*ier proceeded to deli*er his sponsorship speech, after
which he was interpellate. %ep. %ogelio !ar"iento was first to interpellate.
1e was interr#pted when %ep. Arroyo "o*ed to ad-o#rn for lac: of
6#or#". %ep. Antonio #enco o)-ected to the "otion and as:ed for a
head co#nt. After a roll call, the hair @Dep#ty !pea:er %a#l Da&aA
declared the presence of a 6#or#".

%ep. Arroyo appealed the r#ling of
the hair, )#t his "otion was defeated when p#t to a *ote. $he
interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded. 0etitioner %ep. Ho:er
Arroyo registered to interpellate. 1e was fo#rth in the order. In the co#rse
of his interpellation, %ep. Arroyo anno#nced that he was going to raise a
6#estion on the 6#or#", altho#gh #ntil the end of his interpellation he
ne*er did.
'n the sa"e day, the )ill was signed )y the !pea:er of the
1o#se of %epresentati*es and the 0resident of the !enate and certified )y
the respecti*e secretaries of )oth 1o#ses of ongress as ha*ing )een
finally passed )y the 1o#se of %epresentati*es and )y the !enate on
3o*e")er 21, 199+. $he enrolled )ill was signed into law )y 0resident
(idel <. %a"os on 3o*e")er 22, 199+.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the passage of %A 3o. 82B? is in *iolation of the
r#les of the 1o#se, hence "a:ing it n#ll and *oid.
HELD"
3'. (irst, it is clear fro" the foregoing facts that what is
alleged to ha*e )een *iolated in the enact"ent of %.A. 3o 82B? are
"erely internal r#les of proced#re of the 1o#se rather than constit#tional
re6#ire"ents for the enact"ent of a law, i.e. Article <I, !ecs. 2+927. $he
onstit#tion pro*ides that =each 1o#se "ay deter"ine the r#les of its
proceedings. $he pre*ailing *iew is that they are s#)-ect to re*ocation,
"odification or wai*er at the pleas#re of the )ody adopting the" as they
are pri"arily proced#ral. o#rts ordinary ha*e no concern with their
o)ser*ance. $hey "ay )e wai*ed or disregarded )y the legislati*e )ody.
onse6#ently, "ere fail#re to confor" to the" does not ha*e the effect of
n#llifying the act ta:en if the re6#isite n#")er of "e")ers ha*e agreed to
a partic#lar "eas#re. $he a)o*e principle is s#)-ect, howe*er, to this
6#alification. 8e ha*e no "ore power to loo: into the internal proceedings
of a 1o#se than "e")ers of that 1o#se ha*e to loo: o*er o#r sho#lders,
as long as no *iolation of constit#tional pro*isions is shown.
!econd, #nder the enrolled )ill doctrine, the signing of 1. 3o.
7198 )y the !pea:er of the 1o#se and the 0resident of the !enate and
the certification )y the secretaries of )oth 1o#ses of ongress that it was
passed on 3o*e")er 21, 199+ are concl#si*e of its d#e enact"ent.
8here there is no e*idence to the contrary, the o#rt will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of )oth 1o#ses that a )ill has )een
d#ly passed. Jnder this r#le, this o#rt has ref#sed to deter"ine clai"s
that the three9fo#rths *ote needed to pass a proposed a"end"ent to the
onstit#tion had not )een o)tained, )eca#se /a d#ly a#thenticated )ill or
resol#tion i"ports a)sol#te *erify and is )inding on the co#rts./
Moreo*er, as already noted, the d#e enact"ent of the law in
6#estion is confir"ed )y the Ho#rnal of the 1o#se of 3o*e")er 21, 199+
which shows that the conference co""ittee report on 1. 3o. 7198, which
)eca"e %.A. 3o. 87B?, was appro*ed on that day. $he :eeping of the
Ho#rnal is re6#ired )y the onstit#tion, Art. <I, \1+@BA. $he Ho#rnal is
regarded as concl#si*e with respect to "atters that are re6#ired )y the
onstit#tion to )e recorded therein. As already noted, the )ill which
)eca"e %.A. 3o. 82B? is shown in the Ho#rnal. 1ence its d#e enact"ent
has )een d#ly pro*en.
81.%.('%., the petition for certiorari and prohi)ition is
DI!MI!!.D.
!URISDICTION? !UDICIAL REVIE= OF HRET DECISIONS
RO&LES >(. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRI&UNAL (HRET)
(G.R. NO. 8%%47. FE&RUAR- 5, 1990)
MEDIALDEA, !.
FACTS"
0etitioner <irgilio %o)les and pri*ate respondent %o"eo
!antos were candidates for the position of ongress"an of the 1
st
district
of aloocan ity in the May 1987 elections. 0etitioner %o)les was
proclai"ed the winner. !antos filed an election protest with respondent
1%.$, alleging that the elections were characteri&ed )y the co""ission of
electoral fra#ds and irreg#larities. 1e li:ewise prayed for the reco#nting of
the gen#ine )allots in all the 42? contested precincts. 0etitioner alleged
the late filing of the protest.
$he 1%.$ iss#ed an order setting the co""ence"ent of the
re*ision of contested )allots on !epte")er 1, 1988 and directed
protestant !antos to identify 27M of the total contested precincts which he
desires to )e re*ised first in accordance with !ection 18 of the %#les of
the 1%.$. 'n !epte")er 7, 1988, the re*ision of the )allots for 77
precincts, representing the initial 27M of all the contested precincts, was
ter"inated.
%o)les filed an Jrgent Motion to !#spend %e*ision while
!antos filed a Motion to 8ithdraw 0rotest on the #nre*ised precincts. B#t
the 1%.$ did not act on the said "otions. !antos then filed an Jrgent
Motion to %ecall and Disregard 8ithdrawal of 0rotest which was granted
)y the 1%.$. 1ence the res#"ption of the re*ision of the )allots was
ordered.
%o)les filed a Motion for %econsideration, which was
denied. 1ence, the instant petition. 0etitioner contends in the present
petition that when pri*ate respondent filed the Motion to 8ithdraw 0rotest
on Jnre*ised 0recincts and Motion to !et ase for 1earing, respondent
1%.$ lost its -#risdiction o*er the case, hence when respondent 1%.$
s#)se6#ently ordered the re*ision of the #nre*ised protested )allots,
116
notwithstanding the withdrawal of the protest, it acted witho#t -#risdiction
or with gra*e a)#se of discretion.
ISSUE" 8hether or not respondent 1%.$ has lost its -#risdiction o*er the
case.
HELD"
3'. It is noted that #pon !antosK filing of his Motion to
8ithdraw on Jnre*ised 0recincts on !epte")er 12, 1988, no action
thereon was ta:en )y respondent 1%.$. $he "ere filing of the "otion to
withdraw protest on the re"aining #ncontested precincts, witho#t any
action on the part of respondent tri)#nal, does not )y itself di*est the
tri)#nal of its -#risdiction o*er the case. H#risdiction, once ac6#ired, is not
lost #pon the instance of the parties )#t contin#es #ntil the case is
ter"inated.
$he o#rt agrees with the 1%.$ when it held that =the
$ri)#nal retains the a#thority to grant or deny the Motion, and the
withdrawal )eco"es effecti*e only when the "otion is granted. $o hold
otherwise wo#ld per"it a party to depri*e the $ri)#nal of -#risdiction
already ac6#ired.> $he o#rt therefore holds that this $ri)#nal retains the
power and the a#thority to grant or deny 0rotestantKs Motion to 8ithdraw,
if only to ins#re that the $ri)#nal retains s#fficient a#thority to see to it that
the will of the electorate is ascertained.
!ince 0rotestantIs /Motion to 8ithdraw 0rotest on the
Jnre*ised 0recincts/ had not )een acted #pon )y this $ri)#nal )efore it
was recalled )y the 0rotestant, it did not ha*e the effect of re"o*ing the
precincts co*ered there)y fro" the protest. If these precincts were not
withdrawn fro" the protest, then the granting of 0rotestantIs /Jrgent
Motion to %ecall and Disregard 8ithdrawal of 0rotest/ did not a"o#nt to
allowing the refiling of protest )eyond the regle"entary period.
In the a)sence of any clear showing of a)#se of discretion
on the part of respondent tri)#nal in pro"#lgating the assailed resol#tions,
a writ of certiorari will not iss#e. 8here the co#rt has -#risdiction o*er the
s#)-ect "atter, its orders #pon all 6#estions pertaining to the ca#se are
orders within its -#risdiction, and howe*er erroneo#s they "ay )e, they
cannot )e corrected )y certiorari. $his r#le "ore appropriately applies to
respondent 1%.$ whose independence as a constit#tional )ody has ti"e
and again )een #pheld )y the o#rt in "any cases. $h#s, =-#dicial re*iew
of decisions or final resol#tions of the 1%.$ is @th#sA possi)le only in the
e5ercise of this o#rtKs so9called e5traordinary -#risdiction, #pon a
deter"ination that the tri)#nalKs decision or resol#tion was rendered
witho#t or in e5cess of its -#risdiction, or with gra*e a)#se of discretion.
A'%DI3,LD, finding no gra*e a)#se of discretion on the
part of respondent 1o#se of %epresentati*es .lectoral $ri)#nal in iss#ing
the assailed resol#tions, the instant petition is DI!MI!!.D.
SEPARATION OF PO=ERS? LEGISLATURE R ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
(G.R. NO. L45081. !UL- 15, 193%)
LAUREL, !.
FACTS"
0etitioner Hose Angara and the respondents, 0edro Dns#a,
Mig#el astillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates for the position of
"e")er of the 3ational Asse")ly for the first district of the 0ro*ince of
$aya)as in the !epte")er 17, 1947 elections. 0etitioner was proclai"ed
winner.
$he 3ational Asse")ly passed %esol#tion 3o. 8 which
effecti*ely confir"ed the election of petitioner to the said )ody. Dns#a filed
)efore the .lectoral o""ission a =Motion of 0rotest> against the election
of petitioner. Meanwhile, on Dece")er 9, 1947, the 3ational Asse")ly, in
a resol#tion, fi5ed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of "e")ers of the 3ational
Asse")ly, notwithstanding the pre*io#s confir"ation "ade )y the".
Angara then filed a petition praying for the dis"issal of
Dns#aKs protest. 1e alleged that %esol#tion no. 8 was passed )y the
3ational Asse")ly in the e5ercise of its constit#tional prerogati*e to
prescri)e the period d#ring which protests against the election of its
"e")ers sho#ld )e presented. B#t said Motion to Dis"iss was denied )y
the .lectoral o""ission. 1ence the present petition filed )y petitioner
see:ing to restrain and prohi)it the .lectoral o""ission fro" ta:ing
f#rther cogni&ance of the protest "ade )y Dns#a against the election of
said petitioner.
ISSUES"
@1A 8hether or not the o#rt has -#risdiction o*er the
.lectoral o""ission and the s#)-ect "atter of the contro*ersy.
@2A 8hether or not the .lectoral o""ission acted witho#t
or in e5cess of its -#risdiction in ass#"ing to the cogni&ance of the protest
filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the pre*io#s
confir"ation of s#ch election )y resol#tion of the 3ational Asse")ly.
HELD"
@1A D.!. $he separation of powers is a f#nda"ental principle
in o#r syste" of go*ern"ent. It o)tains not thro#gh e5press pro*ision )#t
)y act#al di*ision in o#r onstit#tion. .ach depart"ent of the go*ern"ent
has e5cl#si*e cogni&ance of "atters within its -#risdiction, and is s#pre"e
within its own sphere.
In the case at )ar, here then is presented an act#al
contro*ersy in*ol*ing as it does a conflict of a gra*e constit#tional nat#re
)etween the 3ational Asse")ly on the one hand, and the .lectoral
o""ission on the other. $he .lectoral o""ission is a constit#tional
organ created for a specific p#rpose, na"ely to deter"ine all contests
relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the
3ational Asse")ly. Altho#gh the .lectoral o""ission "ay not )e
interfered with, when and while acting within the li"its of its a#thority, it
does not follow that it is )eyond the reach of the constit#tional "echanis"
adopted )y the people and that it is not s#)-ect to constit#tional
restrictions. $he .lectoral o""ission is not a separate depart"ent of the
go*ern"ent, and e*en if it were, conflicting clai"s of a#thority #nder the
f#nda"ental law )etween depart"ent powers and agencies of the
go*ern"ent are necessarily deter"ined )y the -#diciary in -#stifia)le and
appropriate cases. Jpon principle, reason and a#thority, we are clearly of
the opinion that #pon the ad"itted facts of the present case, this co#rt has
-#risdiction o*er the .lectoral o""ission and the s#)-ect "ater of the
present contro*ersy for the p#rpose of deter"ining the character, scope
and e5tent of the constit#tional grant to the .lectoral o""ission as /the
sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications
of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly./
@2A 3'. $he iss#e hinges on the interpretation of section B of
Article <I of the onstit#tion which pro*ides2
/!.. B. $here shall )e an .lectoral o""ission co"posed of three
H#stice of the !#pre"e o#rt designated )y the hief H#stice, and of si5
Me")ers chosen )y the 3ational Asse")ly, three of who" shall )e
no"inated )y the party ha*ing the largest n#")er of *otes, and three )y
the party ha*ing the second largest n#")er of *otes therein. $he senior
H#stice in the o""ission shall )e its hair"an. $he .lectoral
o""ission shall )e the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election,
ret#rns and 6#alifications of the "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly./ It is
i"perati*e, therefore, that we del*e into the origin and history of this
constit#tional pro*ision and in6#ire into the intention of its fra"ers and the
people who adopted it so that we "ay properly appreciate its f#ll "eaning,
i"port and significance.
$he .lectoral o""ission is a constit#tional creation,
in*ested with the necessary a#thority in the perfor"ance and e5ec#tion of
the li"ited and specific f#nction assigned to it )y the onstit#tion. $he
grant of power to the .lectoral o""ission to -#dge all contests relating to
the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of "e")ers of the 3ational
Asse")ly, is intended to )e as co"plete and #ni"paired as if it had
re"ained originally in the legislat#re. $he e5press lodging of that power in
the .lectoral o""ission is an i"plied denial of the e5ercise of that power
)y the 3ational Asse")ly.
%esol#tion 3o. 8 of the 3ational Asse")ly confir"ing the
election of "e")ers against who" no protests had )een filed at the ti"e
of its passage on Dece")er 4, 1947, cannot )e constr#ed as a li"itation
#pon the ti"e for the initiation of election contests. 8hile there "ight ha*e
)een good reason for the legislati*e practice of confir"ation of the election
of "e")ers of the legislat#re at the ti"e when the power to decide
election contests was still lodged in the legislat#re, confir"ation alone )y
the legislat#re cannot )e constr#ed as depri*ing the .lectoral o""ission
of the a#thority incidental to its constit#tional power to )e /the sole -#dge
of all contest relating to the election, ret#rns, and 6#alifications of the
"e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly/, to fi5 the ti"e for the filing of said
election protests. onfir"ation )y the 3ational Asse")ly of the ret#rns of
its "e")ers against whose election no protests ha*e )een filed is, to all
legal p#rposes, #nnecessary. As contended )y the .lectoral o""ission
in its resol#tion of Han#ary 24, 194+, o*err#ling the "otion of the herein
petitioner to dis"iss the protest filed )y the respondent 0edro Dns#a,
confir"ation of the election of any "e")er is not re6#ired )y the
onstit#tion )efore he can discharge his d#ties as s#ch "e")er.
8e hold, therefore, that the .lectoral o""ission was
acting within the legiti"ate e5ercise of its constit#tional prerogati*e in
ass#"ing to ta:e cogni&ance of the protest filed )y the respondent 0edro
Dns#a against the election of the herein petitioner Hose A. Angara, and
that the resol#tion of the 3ational Asse")ly of Dece")er 4, 1947 can not
in any "anner toll the ti"e for filing protests against the elections, ret#rns
and 6#alifications of "e")ers of the 3ational Asse")ly, nor pre*ent the
filing of a protest within s#ch ti"e as the r#les of the .lectoral o""ission
"ight prescri)e.
$he petition for a writ of prohi)ition against the .lectoral
o""ission is here)y denied.
HRET
LA$ATIN V. HRET
(G.R. NO. 84297. DECEM&ER 8, 1988)
CORTES, !.
FACTS"
0etitioner ar"elo La&atin and pri*ate respondent Loren&o
$i")ol were candidates for %epresentati*e of the first district of
0a"panga d#ring the May 11, 1987 elections. D#ring the can*assing of
the *otes, $i")ol o)-ected to the incl#sion of certain election ret#rns.
!ince the M#nicipal Board of an*assers did not r#le on his o)-ections,
$i")ol )ro#ght the "atter to the 'M.L., which initially r#led the
s#spension of the procla"ation of the winning candidate. It later ordered
the 0ro*incial Board of an*assers to proceed with the can*assing of
*otes and to proclai" the winner.
0etitioner was proclai"ed as ongress"an9elect. 0ri*ate
respondent th#s filed in the 'M.L. a petition to declare petitionerKs
procla"ation *oid a) initio and another petition to prohi)it petitioner fro"
ass#"ing office. $he 'M.L. failed to act on the second petition so
petitioner was a)le to ass#"e office. Later, the 'M.L. declared
petitionerKs procla"ation *oid a) initio. 0etitioner challenged this
117
resol#tion )efore the o#rt, which s#stained the petitioner. $h#s, pri*ate
respondent filed in the 1%.$ an election protest against petitioner.
0etitioner "o*ed to dis"iss the protest on the gro#nd that it
had )een filed late. 1owe*er, the 1%.$ r#led that the protest had )een
filed on ti"e. 0etitionerKs "otion for reconsideration was also denied.
1ence, this petition challenging the -#risdiction of the 1%.$ o*er the
protest filed )y pri*ate respondent. $o s#pport his contention, he cited
!ection 27? of the '"ni)#s .lection ode which pro*ides2
!ec. 27?. .lection contests for Batasang 0a")ansa, regional, pro*incial
and city offices . E A sworn petition contesting the election of any
Me")er of the Batasang 0a")ansa or any regional, pro*incial or city
official shall )e filed with the o""ission )y any candidate who has d#ly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has )een *oted for the sa"e office,
within ten days after the procla"ation of the res#lts of the election.
'n the other hand, in finding that the protest was flied on
ti"e, the 1%.$ relied on !ec. 9 of its %#les, to wit2
.lection contests arising fro" the 1987 ongressional elections shall )e
filed with the 'ffice of the !ecretary of the $ri)#nal or "ailed at the post
office as registered "atter addressed to the !ecretary of the $ri)#nal,
together with twel*e @12A legi)le copies thereof pl#s one @1A copy for each
protestee, within fifteen @17A days fro" the effecti*ity of these %#les on
3o*e")er 22, 1987 where the procla"ation has )een "ade prior to the
effecti*ity of these %#les, otherwise, the sa"e "ay )e filed within fifteen
@17A days fro" the date of the procla"ation . .lection contests arising
fro" the 1987 ongressional elections filed with the !ecretary of the
1o#se of %epresentati*es and trans"itted )y hi" to the hair"an of the
$ri)#nal shall )e dee"ed filed with the tri)#nal as of the date of effecti*ity
of these %#les, s#)-ect to pay"ent of filing fees as prescri)ed in !ection
17 hereof.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether or not the 1%.$ has -#risdiction o*er the protest
filed )y pri*ate respondent.
2. 8hat pro*ision of law go*erns the period for filing protests
in the 1%.$.
4. 8hether or not pri*ate respondentKs protest had )een
seasona)ly filed.
HELD"
$he o#rt is of the *iew that the protest had )een filed on
ti"e and, hence, the 1%.$ ac6#ired -#risdiction o*er it. 0rotestant filed his
protest on (e)r#ary 8, 1988, or ele*en @11A days after Han#ary 28. $he
protest, therefore, was filed well within the regle"entary period pro*ided
)y the %#les of the 1%.$.
0etitionerIs reliance on !ec. 27? of the '"ni)#s .lection
ode is "isplaced. !ec. 27? is co#ched in #na")ig#o#s ter"s and needs
no interpretation. It applies only to petitions filed )efore the 'M.L.
contesting the election of any Me")er of the Batasang 0a")ansa , or any
regional, pro*incial or city official. (#rther"ore, !ec. 27? sho#ld )e read
together with !ec. 2B9 of the sa"e code which pro*ides that the
'M.L. /shall )e the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the elections,
ret#rns and 6#alifications of all Me")ers of the Batasang 0a")ansa,
electi*e regional, pro*incial and city officials,/ reiterating Art. ;II9, !ec.
2@2A of the 1974 onstit#tion. It "#st )e e"phasi&ed that #nder the 1974
onstit#tion there was no pro*ision for an .lectoral $ri)#nal, the
-#risdiction o*er election contests in*ol*ing Me")ers of the Batasang
0a")ansa ha*ing )een *ested in the 'M.L..
$hat !ec. 27? of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, as far as
contests regarding the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of Me")ers of
the Batasang 0a")ansa is concerned, had ceased to )e effecti*e #nder
the 1987 onstit#tion is readily apparent. $he onstit#tion now *ests
e5cl#si*e -#risdiction o*er all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and
6#alifications of the Me")ers of the !enate and the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es in the respecti*e .lectoral $ri)#nals OArt. <I, !ec. 171.
$he e5cl#si*e original -#risdiction of the 'M.L. is li"ited )y
constit#tional fiat to election contests pertaining to election regional,
pro*incial and city offices and its appellate -#risdiction to those in*ol*ing
"#nicipal and )arangay offices OArt. I;9, !ec. 2@2AP.
$he power of the 1%.$, as the sole -#dge of all contests
relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of the Me")ers of the
1o#se of %epresentati*es, to pro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations relati*e to
"atters within its -#risdiction, incl#ding the period for filing election
protests )efore it, is )eyond disp#te. Its r#le9"a:ing power necessarily
flows fro" the general power granted it )y the onstit#tion.
$he inescapa)le concl#sion fro" the foregoing is that it is
well within the power of the 1%.$ to prescri)e the period within which
protests "ay )e filed )efore it. onse6#ently, pri*ate respondentIs
election protest ha*ing )een filed within the period prescri)ed )y the
1%.$, the latter cannot )e charged with lac: of -#risdiction to hear the
case. $he alleged in*alidity of the procla"ation @which had )een
pre*io#sly ordered )y the 'M.L. itselfA despite alleged irreg#larities in
connection therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the ri*al
candidates, is a "atter that is also addressed, considering the pre"ises,
to the so#nd -#dg"ent of the .lectoral $ri)#nal.
B#t then again, so long as the onstit#tion grants the 1%.$
the power to )e the sole -#dge of all contests relating to the election,
ret#rns and 6#alifications of Me")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es,
any final action ta:en )y the 1%.$ on a "atter within its -#risdiction shall,
as a r#le, not )e re*iewed )y this o#rt. $h#s, only where s#ch gra*e
a)#se of discretion is clearly shown shall the o#rt interfere with the
1%.$Is -#dg"ent. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
e5ercise of the o#rtIs collecti*e power, since no gra*e a)#se of
discretion that wo#ld a"o#nt to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction and wo#ld
warrant the iss#ance of the writs prayed for has )een clearly shown.
81.%.('%., the instant 0etition is here)y DI!MI!!.D.
0ri*ate respondentIs o#nterRross 0etition is li:ewise DI!MI!!.D.
A&&AS VS. SENATE ELECTORAL TRI&UNAL
1%% SCRA %51. 1988
GANCA-CO, !"
FACTS"
'n 'cto)er 1987, the petitioners filed )efore the respondent
!enate .lectoral $ri)#nal an election protest against 22 candidates of the
LABA3 coalition who were proclai"ed senators9elect. !#)se6#ently, the
petitioners filed with the respondent $ri)#nal a Motion for Dis6#alification
or Inhi)ition of the !enators9Me")ers thereof fro" the hearing and
resol#tion of the afore"entioned case, as respondents therein. $he
petitioners #rged the contest to )e decided )y only 4 "e")ers of the
$ri)#nal.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the !enators9Me")ers of the .lectoral $ri)#nal
"ay )e co"pelled to inhi)it the"sel*es fro" hearing the contest.
HELD"
3'. It see"s 6#ite clear to #s that in th#s pro*iding for a
$ri)#nal to )e staffed )y )oth H#stices of the ! and Me")ers of the
!enate, the onstit#tion intended that )oth those =H#dicial> and
=Legislati*e> co"ponents co""only share the d#ty and a#thority of
deciding all contests relating to the election, ret#rns and 6#alifications of
!enators.
.*ery "e")er of the tri)#nal "ay, as his conscience
dictates, refrain fro" participating in the resol#tion of a case where he
sincerely feels that his personal interests or )iases wo#ld stand in the way
of an o)-ecti*e and i"partial -#dg"ent. 8hat we are "erely saying is that
in the light of the onstit#tion, the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal cannot legally
f#nction as s#ch, a)sent its entire "e")ership of !enators and that no
a"end"ent of its r#les can confer on the 4 H#stice9Me")ers along the
power of *alid ad-#dication of a senatorial election protest.
&ONDOC VS. PINEDA
201 SCRA 792. 1991
GRISOAJUINO, !"
FACTS"
Marciano 0ineda of LD0 won against his ri*al Dr. ."igdio
Bondoc of 30 ca#sing the latter to file a protest in the 1%.$. A decision
had )een reached in which Bondoc won o*er 0ineda )y a "argin of 24
*otes. 1ence, the LD0 "e")ers in the tri)#nal insisterd on a re9
appreciation and reco#nt of the )allots cast in so"e precincts res#lting to
the increase of BondocKs lead o*er 0ineda to 1?7 *otes. ongress"an
a"as#ra coted with the ! H#stices and ongress"an erilles to
proclai" Bondoc as the winner of the contest. a"as#ra later on re*ealed
to his chief, notified the hair"an of the $ri)#nal to withdraw the
no"ination and to rescind the election of a"as#ra to the 1%.$ and
see:s to cancel the pro"#lgation of the tri)#nalKs decision in Bondoc *.
0ineda.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 1o#se of %epresentati*es co#ld change its
representati*es in the 1%.$ at the re6#est of the do"inant party.
HELD"
3'. If the 1%.$ wo#ld reser*e the interest of the party in
power, the independence of the .lectoral $ri)#nal, as e")odied in the
onstit#tion, will no longer )e protected. $he resol#tion of the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es re"o*ing ongress"an a"as#ra fro" the 1%.$ for
disloyalty to the LD0, )eca#se he cast his *ote in the fa*or of 30Ks
candidate, is a clear i"pair"ent of the constit#tional prerogati*e of the
1%.$ to the sole -#dge of the election contest )etween 0ineda and
Bondoc.
$o sanction s#ch interference )y the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es in the wor: of the 1%.$ wo#ld red#ce the $ri)#nal to a
"ere tool for the aggrandi&e"ent of the party in power @LD0A which the 4
H#stices of the ! and the lone 30 "e")er wo#ld )e powerless to stop.
A "inority party candidate "ay as well a)andon all hope at the threshold
of the tri)#nal.
As -#dges, the "e")ers of the $ri)#nal "#st )e
nonpartisan. $hey "#st discharge their f#nctions with co"plete
detach"ent, i"partiality and independence [ e*en independence fro" the
political party to which they )elong. 1ence, =disloyalty to a party> and
=)reach of party discipline> are not *alid gro#nds for the e5p#lsion of a
"e")er of the $ri)#nal. In e5pelling ongress"an a"as#ra fro" the
1%.$ for ha*ing cast a =conscience *ote> in fa*or of Bondoc, )ased
strictly on the res#lt of the e5a"ination and appreciation of the )allots and
the reco#nt of the *otes )y the $ri)#nal, the 1o#se of %epresentati*es
co""itted a gra*e a)#se of discretion, an in-#stice, and a
*iolation of the onstit#tion. Its resol#tion of e5p#lsion against
ongress"an a"as#ra is therefore n#ll and *oid.
118
CHAVE$ V. COMELEC (211 SCRA 315 519926)
G.R. NO. 105323 !UL- 3, 1992
FACTS"
0etitioner (rancisco ha*e& prays in to this o#rt for the
iss#ance of a te"porary restraining order en-oining respondent
'M.L. fro" proclai"ing the 2B
th
highest senatorial candidate. And he
also prays that -#dg"ent )e rendered re6#iring the 'M.L. to re9open
the )allot )o5es in 8?,4B8 precincts in 14 pro*inces therein en#"erated
incl#ding Metro Manila, scan the )allots for =ha*e&> *otes which were
in*alidated or declared stray and credit said scanned =ha*e&> *otes in
fa*or of petitioner.
ISSUE" 8hether or not, in the case at )ar, this o#rt has -#risdiction to
resol*e iss#e regarding the instant reg#lar election protestC
HELD"
3o. $he petitionerKs proper reco#rse is to file a reg#lar
election protest which #nder the onstit#tion and the '"ni)#s .lection
ode, e5cl#si*ely pertains to the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal. $h#s, sec.17,
Art.<I of the onstit#tion pro*ides that =the !enate and the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es shall each ha*e an .lectoral $ri)#nal which shall )e the
sole -#dge of all contests relating to their respecti*e Me")ers.> $he word
=sole> #nderscores the e5cl#si*ity of the $ri)#nalsK -#risdiction o*er the
election contests relating to their respecti*e Me")ers. $his o#rt has no
-#risdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the !enate .lectoral
$ri)#nal which has e5cl#si*e -#risdiction to act on the co"plaint of
petitioner in*ol*ing as it does, contest relating to the election of a "e")er
of the !enate. As aforesaid, petitionerKs proper reco#rse is to file a reg#lar
election protest )efore the !enate .lectoral $ri)#nal after the winning
senatorial candidates ha*e )een proclai"ed. $he proper reco#rse is for
petitioner to as: not this o#rt )#t the Legislat#re to enact re"edial
"eas#res.
DA$A V. SINGSON
180 SCRA 497, DECEM&ER 21, 1989
CRU$, !"
FACTS"
1erein petitioner %a#l A. Da&a was chosen and listed as
representati*e of the Li)eral 0arty in the o""ission on Appoint"ents
@AA.
'n !epte")er 1+, 1988, the La)an ng De"o:rati:ong
0ilipino @LD0A was reorgani&ed. $wenty fo#r @2BA "e")ers of the Li)eral
0arty resigned and -oined the LD0. Based on this, the 1o#se of
%epresentati*e re*ised its representation in the A )y withdrawing the
seat occ#pied )y the petitioner and gi*ing this to the LD0 "e")er L#is .
!ingson.
$he petitioner arg#ed that he cannot )e re"o*ed fro" A
)eca#se his election thereto is per"anent. 1e f#rther contended that LD0
is not a d#ly registered political party and has not yet attained political
sta)ility )eca#se it was -#st esta)lished recently.
ISSUE" 1. 8hether or not the 6#estion raised )y the petitioner is political
in nat#re.
2. 8hether or not the LD0 is not entitled to a seat in the
o""ission on Appoint"ents )eca#se it does not s#ffice the 6#alification
of )eing a political party.
HELD"
1. 3o. It is )eca#se what is in*ol*ed in the case at )ar is the legality, not
the wisdo" of the act of the 1o#se of %epresentati*e in re"o*ing the
petitioner fro" the A. .*en if the 6#estion were political in nat#re, it
wo#ld still co"e within the o#rts power of re*iew #nder the e5panded
-#risdiction conferred )y Article <III, !ection 1 of the onstit#tion which
incl#des the a#thority to deter"ine whether gra*e a)#se of discretion
a"o#nting to e5cess or lac: of -#risdiction has )een co""itted )y any
)ranch or instr#"entality of the go*ern"ent.
2. 3o. In the first place, the o""ission on .lection has already
appro*ed the petition of the LD0 for registration as political party.
(#rther"ore, the petitionerKs contention that LD0 "#st pro*e its
per"anence and "#st e5ist in a longer period of ti"e in not tena)le. It is
)eca#se e*en the Li)eral 0arty in 19B+ election is only fo#r @BA "onths
old, yet no 6#estion was raised as to its right to )e represented in the
o""ission.
COSETENG VS. MITRA
187 SCRA 377. 1990
FACTS"
A)lan was elected as the 12
th
"e")er of the o""ission on
Appoint"ents on !epte")er 22, 1987. A year later, the LD0 was
organi&ed as a political party. $he 1o#se o""ittee, incl#ding the 1o#se
representation in the o""ission on Appoint"ents had to )e reorgani&ed
)eca#se 178 o#t of 2?2 "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es are
affiliated with the LD0. 0etitioner oseteng of LAIBA then wrote a letter to
!pea:er Mitra re6#esting that she )e appointed as a "e")er of the
o""ission and the 1o#se .lectoral $ri)#nal. 'n Dece")er 1988, the
1o#se of %epresentati*es on "otion of the Ma-ority (loor Leader and o*er
the o)-ection of ongress"an Da&a, L0, re*ised the 1o#se Ma-ority
"e")ership in the o""ission on Appoint"ents to confor" with the new
political align"ents. 'n (e)r#ary 1989, oseteng filed a petition for 6#o
warranto and in-#nction praying the o#rt to declare as n#ll and *oid the
election of the respondent as "e")ers of the o""ission on
Appoint"ents.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the election of the respondents as "e")ers of the
o""ission on Appoint"ents sho#ld )e en-oined for ha*ing *iolated the
constit#tional "andate of proportional representation.
HELD"
3'. After deli)erating on the petition and the co""ents of
the respondents, we hold that the petition sho#ld )e dis"issed not
)eca#se it raises a political 6#estion which does not, )#t )eca#se the
re*ision of the 1o#se representation in the o""ission on Appoint"ents
is )ased on proportional representation of the political parties therein as
pro*ided in !ection 18, Article <I of the 1987 onstit#tion.
$he co"position of the 1o#se "e")ership in the
o""ission on Appoint"ents was )ased on a proportional representation
of the political parties in the 1o#se. $here are 1+? "e")ers of the LD0 in
the 1o#se. $hey represent 79M of the 1o#se "e")ership. 88M of 12
"e")ers in the o""ission wo#ld e6#al to 9 "e")ers, which "ay )e
ro#nded off to 1? "e")ers fro" the LD0. .*en if LAIBA were to )e
considered as an opposition party, its lone "e")er represents only BM of
less than 1M of the 1o#se "e")ership. 1ence she is not entitled to one
of the 12 1o#se seats in the o""ission on Appoint"ents.
GUINGONA VS. GON$ALES
214 SCRA 789. 1992
FACTS"
As a res#lt of the national elections held last May 1992, the
!enate is co"posed of the following "e")ers representing the political
affiliation2 LD0 [ 17 !enators, 30 97 senators, LALA!93JD [ 4
senators, L090D09LABA3 [ 1 senator.
$he res#lting co"position of the !enate )ased on the r#le of
proportional representation of each party is as follows.
0'LI$IAL 0A%$D
M.MB.%!1I0 0%'0'%$I'3
M.MB.%!1I0
LD0
17 7.7 "e")ers
30
7 2.7 "e")ers
LALA!
4 1.7 "e")ers
L090D09LABA3 1
.7 "e")ers
'n !epte")er 24, 1992, !enator ,#ingona filed a petition to
prohi)it respondents Al)erto %o"#lo and 8ig)erto $anada fro" sitting
and ass#"ing the position of "e")ers of the o""ission on
Appoint"ents and to prohi)it !enator 3eptali ,on&ales fro" allowing
respondents to sit as "e")ers thereof on the gro#nd that the
proposed co"pro"ise of !enator $olentino was *iolati*e of the r#le of
proportional representation as en#nciated in !ec. 18, Art. <I of the 1987
onstit#tion.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the !enate acted with or in e5cess of -#risdiction
when it designated !enator %o"#lo as the 8
th
"e")er of the A #pon
no"ination )y the LD0 and respondent !enator $anada as L0 no"inee
e*en if LD0 and L0 are entitled only to half a "e")er.
HELD"
$he pro)le" is what to do with the fraction of .7 or ` to
which each of the parties is entitled. $he LD0 "a-ority in the !enate
con*erted fractional half "e")ership into a whole "e")ership of one
senator )y adding one9half to )e a)le to elect !enator %o"#lo as the 8
th
"e")er. In so doing, the election of !enator %o"#lo ga*e "ore
representation to the LD0 and red#ced the representation of one political
party [ either the LALA!93JD or the 30. $his is clearly a *iolation of
!ection 18 )eca#se it is no longer in co"pliance with the proportional
representation of the political parties. $his pro*ision of !ection 18 on
proportional representation is "andatory in character and does not lea*e
any discretion to the "a-ority party in the !enate to diso)ey the r#le on
proportional representation. 'therwise, the party with a "a-ority
representation in the !enate or 1o#se of %epresentati*es can )e sheen
force of "e")ers i"pose its will on the hapless "inority.
$he ! laid down the following g#idelines accordingly2
1. In the !enate, a political party or coalition "#st ha*e
at least 2 d#ly elected senators for e*ery seat in the
!enate.
2. 8here there are "ore than 2 political parties
represent in the !enate, a political party or coalition
with a single senator in the !enate cannot
constit#tionally clai" a seat in the co""ission.
119
(#rther"ore, the ! said it is not "andatory to elect 12
senators and 12 "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es to the
o""ission on Appoint"ents. 8hat the onstit#tion re6#ires is that there
)e at least a "a-ority of the entire "e")ership.
&ENG$ON VS. SENATE &LUE RI&&ON COMMITTEE
203 SCRA 7%7, 1991
FACTS"
$he 0,, filed with the !andigan)ayan a ci*il case against
Lo:oy %o"#alde&, et al., in connection with ill9gotten wealth. D#ring the
pendency of the case, there were r#"ors that the properties in*ol*e in the
case were already )eing disposed of )y %o"#alde&. !enator .nrile in his
pri*ilege speech )efore the !enate called the attention of the !enate
regarding the "atter.
'n "otion of !enator Mecado, the "atter was referred to
the o""ittee on Aco#nta)ility of 0#)lic 'fficers @Bl#e %i))on
o""itteeA. $he co""ittee s#)poenaed petitioner who was also one of
the defendants in said case. 0etitioner declined to testify on the gro#nd
that his testi"ony "ight #nd#ly pre-#dice the defendants. $he co""ittee
contin#ed in its in6#iry, th#s the present petition for prohi)ition to restrain
respondent fro" in*estigating.
$he co""ittee co""ented that the o#rt cannot properly
in6#ire into the "oti*es of the law"a:ers in cond#cting legislati*e
in*estigations in aid of legislation #nder this doctrine of separation of
power. 0etitioners contend that the !enate Bl#e %i))on o""itteeIs
in6#iry has no *alid legislati*e p#rpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of
legislation
ISSUES"
1. 8hether or not the o#rt has -#risdiction to in6#ire into the
"oti*es of the law"a:ers in cond#cting legislati*e in*estigations in
aid of legislation #nder the doctrine of separation of power.
2. 8hether or not s#ch in6#iry is within the power of the
ongress to cond#ct in*estigation.
HELD"
1. D.!, the o#rt has -#risdiction o*er the present contro*ersy
for the p#rpose of deter"ining the scope and e5tent of the power of
the !enate Bl#e %i))on o""ittee to cond#ct in6#iries into pri*ate
affairs in p#rported aid of legislation.
$he separation of powers is a f#nda"ental principle in o#r
syste" of go*ern"ent. .ach depart"ent of the go*ern"ent has e5cl#si*e
cogni&ance of "atters within its -#risdiction, and is s#pre"e within its own
sphere. B#t it does not follow fro" the fact that the three powers are to )e
:ept separate and distinct that the onstit#tion intended the" to )e
a)sol#tely #nrestrained and independent of each other. $he onstit#tion
has pro*ided for an ela)orate syste" of chec:s and )alances to sec#re
coordination in the wor:ings of the *ario#s depart"ents of the
go*ern"ent.
$he o*erlapping and interlacing of f#nctions and d#ties
)etween the se*eral depart"ents, howe*er, so"eti"es "a:es it hard to
say -#st where the one lea*es off and the other )egins. In cases of
conflict, the -#dicial depart"ent is the only constit#tional organ which can
)e called #pon to deter"ine the proper allocation of powers )etween the
se*eral depart"ents and a"ong the integral or constit#ent #nits thereof.
8hen the -#diciary "ediates to allocate constit#tional
)o#ndariesG it does not assert any s#periority o*er the other depart"entsG
it does not in reality n#llify or in*alidate an act of the legislat#re, )#t only
asserts the sole"n and sacred o)ligation assigned to it )y the onstit#tion
to deter"ine conflicting clai"s of a#thority #nder the onstit#tion and to
esta)lish for the parties in an act#al contro*ersy the rights which that
instr#"ent sec#res and g#arantees to the".
2. 3', the 1987 onstit#tion e5pressly recogni&es the power of
)oth ho#ses of ongress to cond#ct in6#iries in aid of legislationG
)#t in the present case, no legislation was apparently )eing
conte"plated in connection with the said in*estigation.
$he conte"plated in6#iry )y respondent o""ittee is not
really /in aid of legislation/ )eca#se it is not related to a p#rpose within the
-#risdiction of ongress, since the ai" of the in*estigation is to find o#t
whether or not the relati*es of the 0resident or Mr. %icardo Lopa had
*iolated the /Anti9,raft and orr#pt 0ractices Act/, a "atter that appears
"ore within the pro*ince of the co#rts rather than of the legislat#re.
$he o#rt r#led that petitioners "ay not )e co"pelled )y the
respondent o""ittee to appear, testify and prod#ce e*idence )efore it, it
is only )eca#se ! hold that the 6#estioned in6#iry is not in aid of
legislation and, if p#rs#ed, wo#ld )e *iolati*e of the principle of separation
of powers )etween the legislati*e and the -#dicial depart"ents of
go*ern"ent, ordained )y the onstit#tion.
DISSENTING OPINION OF !USTICE CRU$"
$he in6#iry deals with alleged "anip#lations of p#)lic f#nds
and illicit ac6#isitions of properties now )eing clai"ed )y the 0,, for
the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines. $he p#rpose of the o""ittee is to
ascertain if and how s#ch ano"alies ha*e )een co""itted.
It is settled that the legislat#re has a right to in*estigate the
disposition of the p#)lic f#nds it has appropriatedG indeed, /an in6#iry into
the e5pendit#re of all p#)lic "oney is an indispensa)le d#ty of the
legislat#re./
Moreo*er, an in*estigation of a possi)le *iolation of a law
"ay )e #sef#l in the drafting of a"endatory legislation to correct or
strengthen that law.
ARNAULT VS. NA$ARENO
87 PHIL. 29, 1950
FACTS"
'n (e)r#ary 27, 197?, the !enate adopted a resol#tion
creating a special co""ittee to in*estigate on the p#rchase )y the
go*ern"ent of the B#ena*ista and $a")o)ong .states owned )y .rnest
B#rt as represented )y Hean Arna#lt.
$he co""ittee so#ght to deter"ine who were responsi)le
for and who )enefited fro" the transaction at the e5pense of the
go*ern"ent.
$he special co""ittee called and e5a"ined a"ong other
witness, Hean Arna#lt. 1owe*er, for the latterKs ref#sal to answer so"e of
the 6#estions propo#nded on hi", the na"e of the person to who" he
ga*e the "oney as well as answer to other pertinent 6#estions in
connection therewith, the !enate resol*ed to i"prison hi" #ntil s#ch ti"e
as he decided to answer rele*ant 6#estions p#t to hi" in connection with
the in*estigation of a go*ern"ent transaction.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the !enate has a#thority to p#nish petitioner for
conte"pt.
HELD"
$he !#pre"e o#rt said yes considering that he 6#estions
were pertinent to the p#rs#ance of the !enate %esol#tion.
$he !#pre"e o#rt also held that the offender co#ld )e
i"prisoned indefinitely )y the !tate, it )eing a contin#ing )ody, pro*ided
that the p#nish"ent did not )eco"e so long as to *iolate d#e process.
SECTION 24 R SHALL ORIGINATE E3CLUSIVEL- IN HOR
TOLENTINO VS. SECRETAR- OF FINANCE
235 SCRA %30, 1994
FACTS"
$he *al#e9added ta5 @<A$A is le*ied on the sale, )arter or
e5change of goods and properties as well as on the sale or e5change of
ser*ices. It is e6#i*alent to 1?M of the gross selling price or gross *al#e in
"oney of goods or properties sold, )artered or e5changed or of the gross
receipts fro" the sale or e5change of ser*ices.
%ep#)lic Act 3o. 771+ see:s to widen the ta5 )ase of the
e5isting <A$ syste" and enhance its ad"inistration )y a"ending the
3ational Internal %e*en#e ode.
It was challenged for alleged constit#tional infir"ities
@defectsA, a"ong others2
Law did not originate e5cl#si*ely in the 1o#se of
%epresentati*e as re6#ired )y !ection 2B, Article <I [ they contended that
to )e considered as ha*ing originated in the 1'%, it sho#ld retain the
essence of the 1o#se Bill.
ISSUE" 8hether or not there are constit#tional defects in %A 771+, since
it did not originate e5cl#si*ely in the 1o#se of %epresentati*e as re6#ired
)y !ec. 2B, Article <I.
HELD"
3o. $he !#pre"e o#rt held that the !enate is e"powered
)y the onstit#tion to conc#r with a"end"ents and propose a"end"ents,
e*en s#)stit#te the entire )ill as a whole.
A )ill originating in the 1'% "ay #ndergo s#ch e5tensi*e
changes in the !enate that the res#lt "ay)e rewriting of the wholeG As a
res#lt of the !enate action, a distinct )ill "ay )e prod#ced A3D to insist
that a re*en#e stat#te "#st s#)stantially )e the sa"e as the 1o#se )ill
wo#ld )e to deny the !enateKs power not only to =conc#r with
a"end"ents> )#t also to =propose a"end"ents.>
ALVARE$, ET AL. VS. GUINGONA, ET AL.
252 SCRA %95, 199%
FACTS"
Law con*erting "#nicipality of !antiago, Isa)ela into a city is
)eing assailed that the Bill did not originate e5cl#si*ely fro" 1'% as
"andated )y !ection 2B, Article <I of the 1987 onstit#tion since it had a
co#nterpart in the !enate.
ISSUE" 8hether or not, considering that the !enate passed !B 3o. 12B4,
its own *ersion of 1B 3o. 8817, %ep#)lic Act 3o. 772? can )e said to
ha*e originated in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es.
HELD"
A )ill of local application, s#ch as one as:ing for the
con*ersion of a "#nicipality into a city, is dee"ed to ha*e originated fro"
the 1o#se pro*ided that the )ill of the 1o#se was filed prior to the filing of
the )ill in the !enate e*en if, in the end, the !enate appro*ed its own
*ersion.
120
$he filing in the !enate of a s#)stit#te )ill in anticipation of
its receipt of the )ill fro" the 1o#se, does not contra*ene the
constit#tional re6#ire"ent that a )ill of local application sho#ld originate in
the 1o#se of %epresentati*es, for as long as the !enate does not act
there#pon #ntil it recei*es the 1o#se )ill.
SECTION 25 R APPROPRIATIONS
GARCIA VS. MATA
%5 SCRA 517, 1975
FACTS"
0etitioner was a reser*e officer on acti*e d#ty with the A(0
#ntil his re*ersion to inacti*e stat#s p#rs#ant to the pro*isions of %A 3o.
2442. 0etitioner filed a co"plaint for "anda"#s and reco*ery of a s#" of
"oney, to co"pel the for"er to reinstate hi" in the acti*e co""issioned
ser*ice of the A(0, to read-#st his ran:, and to pay all the e"ol#"ents
and allowances d#e to hi" fro" the ti"e of his re*ersion to inacti*e
stat#s.
0etitioner anchored his clai" to reinstate"ent at paragraph
11 of the !pecial 0ro*isions for the A(0 in %A 1+?? which was the
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 197+977 as reads2
$1A$ %.!.%<. '((I.%! 8I$1 A$ L.A!$ 1? D.A%!
'( AJMJLA$.D 'MMI!!I'3.D !.%<I. 81' A%. !$ILL '3
A$I<. DJ$D A$ $1. $IM. '( $1. A00%'<AL '( $1I! A$ !1ALL
3'$ B. %.<.%$.D $' I3A$I<. !$A$J! .;.0$ ('% AJ!.
A($.% 0%'0.% 'J%$9MA%$IAL 0%'..DI3,! '% J0'3 $1.I%
%.VJ.!$.
%espondent, H#dge Mata, declared paragraph 11 of the
!pecial 0ro*isions for the A(0 in %A 3o. 1+?? which was the
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 197+977 #nconstit#tional and therefore
in*alid and inoperati*e.
1ence, this petition for certiorari to re*iew the decision of the
(I.
ISSUE" Is the pro*ision *alidC
HELD"
$he ! held that the said pro*ision #sed )y the petitioner as
a )asis was a %ID.% )eca#se the onstit#tion pro*ides that no pro*ision
or enact"ent shall )e e")raced in the general appropriations )ill
J3L.!! it relates specifically to so"e partic#lar appropriation therein
@Art. <I, !ection 27@2AA.
%A 1+?? appropriated "oney for the operation of the
,o*ern"ent for the fiscal year 197+91977, the said paragraph 11 refers to
the f#nda"ental go*ern"ental policy "atters of the calling to acti*e d#ty
and the re*ersion to inacti*e stat#s of reser*e officers in the A(0. It
clearly shows that the paragraph in 6#estion does not relate to the
appropriation.
DEMETRIA VS. AL&A
148 SCRA 208, 1987
FACTS"
0aragraph 1 of !ection BB of 0D 3o. 1177 states that the
0resident shall ha*e the a#thority to transfer any f#nd, appropriated for the
different depart"ents, )#rea#s, offices and agencies of the .5ec#ti*e
depart"ent, which are incl#ded in the ,eneral Appropriations Act, to any
progra", pro-ect or acti*ity of any depart"ent, )#rea# or office in the
,eneral Appropriations Act or appro*ed after its enact"ent.
ISSUE" Is the pro*ision *alidC
HELD"
3o. $he co#rt said that s#ch was #nconstit#tional as it
e"powers the 0resident to indiscri"inately transfer f#nds fro" one
depart"ent to any progra", pro-ect, or acti*ity of any depart"ents witho#t
regard as to whether or not the f#nds to )e transferred are act#ally
sa*ings in the ite" fro" which the sa"e are to )e ta:en.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS. ENRIJUE$
235 SCRA 50%. 1994
JUIASON, !."
FACTS"
$he ,eneral Appropriation Bill of 199B was passed and
appro*ed )y )oth 1o#ses of ongress. It presented the )ill to the
president for the e5ercise of his *eto power.
'ne of the special pro*isions *etoed )y the 0resident is with
respect to the realign"ent of operating e5penses. 8hereas each "e")er
of ongress is allotted for his own operating e5pendit#res, a proportionate
share of the appropriation for the ho#se which he )elongs. If he does not
spend for one ite" of e5pense, the 6#estioned pro*ision allows hi" to
transfer his allocation in said ite" of e5pense. 0etitioners assail the
special pro*ision allowing a "e")er of ongress to realign his allocations
for operational e5penses to any other e5pense categorically clai"ing that
this practice is prohi)ited )y !ection 27 @7A, Article <I of the onstit#tion.
$hey arg#e that the !enate 0resident and !pea:er of the 1o#se, not the
indi*id#al "e")er of ongress, are the ones a#thori&ed to realign the
sa*ings as appropriated.
Another special pro*ision *etoed )y the 0resident is on the
appropriation for de)t ser*ice. It pro*ides =Jse of f#nds. $he appropriation
a#thori&ed therein shall )e #sed for pay"ent of principal and interest of
foregoing and do"estic inde)tednessG pro*ided, that any pay"ent in
e5cess of the a"o#nt therein appropriated shall )e s#)-ect to the appro*al
of the 0resident with the conc#rrence of the ongress of the 0hilippinesG
pro*ided f#rther, that in no case shall this f#nd )e #sed to pay for the
lia)ilities of the entral Ban: of Li6#idators.>
0etitioners clai" that the 0resident cannot *eto the special
pro*ision on the appropriations for de)t ser*ice witho#t *etoing the entire
a"o#nt of 08+B for said p#rpose.
In the appropriation for the A(0 0ension and ,rat#ity (#nd,
the 0resident *etoed the new pro*ision a#thori&ing the hief of !taff to
#se sa*ings in the A(0 to a#g"ent pension and grat#ity f#nds. According
to the 0resident, the grant retire"ent and separation )enefits sho#ld )e
co*ered )y direct appropriation specially appro*ed for the p#rpose
p#rs#ant to !ection 29 @1A of Article <I of the onstit#tion. Moreo*er, he
stated that the a#thority to #se sa*ings is lodged in the officials
en#"erated in !ection 27 of Article <I of the onstit#tion. 'n the contrary,
petitioners clai" that said pro*ision is a condition or li"itation, which is
intertwined with the ite" of appropriation that it co#ld not )e separated
therefro".
ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitionerKs contentions are tena)le.
HELD"
0etitionerKs contentions are witho#t "erit. Jnder the special
pro*isions applica)le to the ongress of the 0hilippines, the "e")ers of
the ongress only deter"ine the necessity of the realign"ent of the
sa*ings in the allot"ent for their operating e5penses. $hey are in the )est
position to do so )eca#se they are the one who :now whether there are
sa*ings a*aila)le in so"e ite"s and whether there are deficiencies in
other ite"s of their operating e5penses that need a#g"entation. 1owe*er,
it is the !enate 0resident and the !pea:er of the 1o#se as the case "ay
)e who shall appro*e the realign"ent. Before gi*ing their sta"p of
appro*al, those two officials will ha*e to see to it that2 @1A the f#nds to )e
aligned or transferred are act#ally sa*ings in the ite"s of e5pendit#res
fro" which the sa"e are to )e ta:en and to the transfer on realign"ent is
for the p#rpose of a#g"enting the ite"s of e5pendit#re to which said
transfer or realign"ent is to )e "ade.
It is readily apparent that the special pro*ision applica)le to
the appropriation for de)t ser*ice in so far as it refers to f#nds in e5cess of
the a"o#nt appropriated in the )ill, is an =inappropriate pro*ision> referring
to the f#nds other than 0+8B appropriated in the ,AAA of 199B.
$he *eto power while e5ercised )y the 0resident is act#ally
a part of the legislati*e process. 1ence, fo#nd in Article <I rather than
Article <II.
As the constit#tion is e5plicit that the pro*ision with the
ongress can incl#de in an appropriate to which it relates, =it follows that
any pro*ision which does not relate to any partic#lar ite" or which it
e5tends in its operation )eyond an ite" of appropriation is considered an
inappropriate pro*ision which )e *etoed separately fro" an ite". Also to
)e incl#ded in the category of inappropriate pro*ision are #nconstit#tional
pro*isions and pro*isions which are intended to a"end other laws
)eca#se clearly those :inds of laws ha*e no place in an appropriation )ill.
$he 0resident *etoed the entire paragraph, one of the
special pro*ision of the ite" on de)t ser*ices incl#ding the pro*isos that
the appropriation a#thori&ed in said ite" shall )e #sed for the pay"ent of
one principal and interest of foreign and do"estic inde)tedness and that
in no case shall this f#nd )e #sed to pay for the lia)ilities of the entral
Ban: Board of Li6#idators. $hese pro*isos are ger"ane to and ha*e
direct connection with the ite" of de)t ser*ice. Inherent in the power of the
appropriation is the power to specify how the "oney shall )e spent. !aid
pro*isos are appropriate pro*isions hence, cannot )e *etoed separately.
$he ! is s#staining the *eto of the !pecial 0ro*ision of the
ite" on de)t ser*ice can only )e with respect to the pro*iso therein
re6#iring that any pay"ent in e5cess of the a"o#nt therein, appropriated
shall )e the s#)-ect to the appro*al of the 0resident of the 0hilippines with
the conc#rrence of the ongress of the 0hilippines.
$he special pro*ision which allows the hief of !taff to #se
sa*ings to a#g"ent the pension f#nd for the A(0 )eing "anaged )y the
A(0 %etire"ent and !eparation Benefits !yste" is *iolati*e of !ection 27
and !ection 29 of Article <I of the onstit#tion.
SECTION 2% R PASSING OF A &ILL
PHILCONSA VS. GIMENE$
15 SCRA 489, 19%5
FACTS"
$he !#pre"e o#rt was called #pon in to decide the gra*e
and f#nda"ental pro)le" of the constit#tionality of %A 484+ =insofar as
the sa"e allows retire"ent grat#ity and co""#tation of *acation and sic:
lea*e to !enators and %epresentati*es and to the electi*e officials of )oth
ho#ses @of ongressA.
$he constit#tionality of the law is assailed on the gro#nd that
the pro*ision for the retire"ent of the "e")ers and certain officers of
ongress is not e5pressed in the title of the )ill, in *iolation of the
onstit#tion.
121
ISSUE" 8R3 %A 484+ *iolates the onstit#tional pro*ision that e*ery )ill
passed )y the ongress shall e")race only one s#)-ect which shall )e
e5pressed in the title thereof.
HELD"
D.!. Jnder %A 484+, a"ending A 18+, as a"ended )y
%A 3os. ++? and 4?9+, the retire"ent )enefits are granted to "e")ers of
the ,!I! who ha*e rendered at least twenty years of ser*ice regardless of
age. $his pro*ision is related and ger"ane to the s#)-ect of A 18+. 'n
the other hand, the s#cceeding paragraph of %A 484+ refers to "e")ers
of ongress and to electi*e officers thereof who are not "e")ers of the
,!I!. $o pro*ide retire"ent )enefits, therefore, for these officials wo#ld
relate to s#)-ect "atter, not ger"ane to A 18+.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATOR- &OARD
151 SCRA 204, 1987
FACTS"
0D 3' 1987 is entitled =An Act reating the <ideogra"
%eg#latory Board.> !ection 1? thereof i"poses a 4?M ta5 on gross
receipts on *ideo transactions. $he petitioner arg#ed that s#ch ta5
i"pose is a %ID.% and the sa"e is not ger"ane to the s#)-ect "atter
thereof.
ISSUE" Is section 1? a %ID.%C
HELD"
3'. $he re6#ire"ent that e*ery )ill "#st only ha*e one
s#)-ect e5pressed in the title is satisfied if the title is co"prehensi*e
eno#gh to incl#de s#)-ects related to the general p#rpose which the
stat#te see:s to achie*e. !#ch is the case here. $a5ation is s#fficiently
related to the reg#lation of the *ideo ind#stry.
$he pro*ision is allied and ger"ane to, and is reasona)ly
necessary for the acco"plish"ent of, the general o)-ect of the D.%..,
which is the reg#lation of the *ideo ind#stry thro#gh the <ideogra"
%eg#latory Board as e5pressed in its title.
$he !#pre"e o#rt th#s pro*ided the following standards
whether or not a pro*ision is e")raced in the title2
$itle )e co"prehensi*e eno#gh to incl#de the general
p#rpose which a stat#te see:s to achie*e.
If all the parts of the stat#te are related and ger"ane to the
s#)-ect "atter e5pressed in the title.
!o long as they are not inconsistent or foreign to the general
s#)-ect to the title.
%egardless of how di*erse it is so long as it "ay)e
considered in f#rtherance of s#ch s#)-ect )y pro*iding for
the "ethod and "eans of carrying o#t the general o)-ect.
!ho#ld not )e constr#ed as to cripple legislati*e power
,i*en a 0%A$IAL rather than a technical constr#ction
PHILIPPINE !UDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO
227 SCRA 703, 1993
FACTS"
$he "ain target of this petition is !ection 47 of %.A. 3o.
747B as i"ple"ented )y the 0hilippine 0ostal orporation thro#gh its
irc#lar 3o. 9228. $hese "eas#res withdraw the fran:ing pri*ilege fro"
the !#pre"e o#rt, the o#rt of Appeals, the %egional $rial o#rts, the
Metropolitan $rial o#rts, the M#nicipal $rial o#rts, and the Land
%egistration o""ission and its %egister of Deeds, along with certain
other go*ern"ent offices.
$he petitioners are "e")ers of the lower co#rts who feel
that their official f#nctions as -#dges will )e pre-#diced )y the a)o*e9
na"ed "eas#res. $he 3ational Land %egistration A#thority has ta:en
co""on ca#se with the" insofar as its own acti*ities, s#ch as the sending
of re6#isite notices in registration cases, affect -#dicial proceedings. 'n its
"otion, it has )een allowed to inter*ene.
$he petition assails the constit#tionality of %.A. 3o. 747B on
the gro#nd that its title e")races "ore than one s#)-ect and does not
e5press its p#rposes.
ISSUE" 8hether or not %A 747B *iolates the onstit#tion for it was
alleged to e")races "ore than one s#)-ect and does not e5press its
p#rpose.
HELD"
3'. $he fran:ing pri*ilege fro" so"e agencies is ger"ane
to the acco"plish"ent of the principal o)-ecti*e of %.A. 3o. 747B, which is
the creation of a "ore efficient and effecti*e postal ser*ice syste". o#rt
r#led that, )y *irt#e of its nat#re as a repealing cla#se, !ection 47 did not
ha*e to )e e5pressly incl#ded in the title of the said law.
$he title of the )ill is not re6#ired to )e an inde5 to the )ody
of the act, or to )e as co"prehensi*e as to co*er e*ery single detail of the
"eas#re. It has )een held that if the title fairly indicates the general
s#)-ect, and reasona)ly co*ers all the pro*isions of the act, and is not
calc#lated to "islead the legislat#re or the people, there is s#fficient
co"pliance with the constit#tional re6#ire"ent.
$o re6#ire e*ery end and "eans necessary for the
acco"plish"ent of the general o)-ecti*es of the stat#te to )e e5pressed in
its title wo#ld not only )e #nreasona)le )#t wo#ld act#ally render
legislation i"possi)le.
SECTION 27 R METHODS &- =HICH A &ILL MA- &ECOME A LA=
235 SCRA %30, 1994
FACTS"
It is clai"ed that the conference co""ittee incl#ded
pro*isions not fo#nd in either the 1o#se Bill or the !enate Bill [ that these
pro*isions were stealthily inserted )y the conference co""ittee.
the conference co""ittee incl#ded pro*isions not fo#nd in either the
1o#se Bill or the !enate Bill.
HELD"
A third *ersion of the )ill "ay res#lt fro" the conference
co""ittee, which is considered "ay res#lt fro" the conference
co""ittee, which is considered an =a"end"ent in the nat#re of a
s#)stit#te> the only re6#ire"ent )eing that the third *ersion )e ger"ane to
the s#)-ect of the 1o#se and !enate )ills.
As to the possi)ility of an entirely new )ill e"ergency o#t of
a onference o""ittee, it has )een e5plained2
Jnder congressional r#les of proced#re, conference
co""ittees are not e5pected to "a:e any "aterial change in the "eas#re
at iss#e, either )y deleting pro*isions to which )oth ho#ses ha*e already
agreed or )y inserting new pro*isions. B#t this is a diffic#lt pro*ision to
enforce. 3ote the pro)le" when one ho#se a"ends a proposal originating
in either ho#se )y stri:ing o#t e*erything following the enacting cla#se and
s#)stit#ting pro*isions which "a:e it an entirely new )ill. $he *ersions are
now altogether different, per"itting a conference co""ittee to draft
essentially a new )ill.
$he res#lt is a third *ersion, which is considered an
/a"end"ent in the nat#re of a s#)stit#te,/ the only re6#ire"ent for which
)eing that the third *ersion )e ger"ane to the s#)-ect of the 1o#se and
!enate )ills.
TAN VS. DEL ROSARIO
(237 SCRA 324 519946)
FACTS"
0etitioner contends that %ep#)lic Act 3o. 7B9+ is a
"isno"er or, at least deficient f?r )eing "erely entitled /!i"plified 3et
Inco"e $a5ation !che"e (or !elf ."ployed and 0rofessionals .ngaged
in the practice of their 0rofession/. It is the petitionerIs *iew that the said
law sho#ld )e considered as ha*ing now adopted a gross inco"e
sche"e, instead of ha*ing still ded#ctions fro" gross inco"e of single
proprietorships and professionals in the co"p#tation of their, ta5a)le net
inco"e, petitioner arg#ed that this *iolated the re6#ire"ent for #nifor"ity
in ta5ation and d#e process )eca#se single proprietorship and
professional were ta5ed differently fro" corporations and partnerships.
ISSUE"
8'3 %A 3o. 7B9+ is in *iolation of Art. <I !ec. 2+ and 28 of the 1987
onstit#tion.
HELD"
'n the )asis of the lang#age of the said 6#estioned law, it
wo#ld )e diffic#lt to accept the petitionerIs *iew that the a"endatory
sho#ld )e considered as now ha*ing adopted a gross inco"e, instead of
as ha*ing still retained the net inco"e, ta5ation sche"e. $he allowance of
ded#cti)le ite"s "ay ha*e )een significantly red#ced )y the 6#estioned
law in co"parison with that which has pre*ailed prior to the a"end"ent,
li"iting, howe*er, allowa)le ded#ctions fro" gross inco"e is neither
discordant with nor opposed to, the net inco"e ta5 concept.
Art. <I !ec. 2+ @IA of the onstit#tion has )een en*isioned
so as @aA to pre*ent logrolling legislation intended to #nite the "e")ers of
the legislat#re who fa*or anyone of the #nrelated s#)-ects in s#pport of
the whole actG @)A to a*oid s#rprise or e*en fra#d #pon the legislat#re and
@cA to fairly apprise the people, thro#gh s#ch p#)lications of its
proceedings are as #s#ally "ade, of the s#)-ects of legislations. $he
a)o*e o)-ecti*e of the f#nda"ental law appears to ha*e s#fficiently "et.
Anything else wo#ld )e to re6#ire a *irt#al co"pendi#" of the law which
co#ld ha*e )een the intend"ent of the constit#tional "andate.
$he contention of the petitioner that %A 3o. 7B9+ desecrates
the constit#tional re6#ire"ent that ta5ation shall )e #nifor" and e6#ita)le
is of no "erit. $he contention clearly forgets that s#ch a syste" of
ta5ation has long )een the pre*ailing r#le e*en prior to %A 7B9+.
Jnifor"ity of $a5ation "erely re6#ires that all s#)-ects or
122
o)-ects of ta5ation si"ilarly sit#ated are to )e treated )oth in pri*ileges
and lia)ilities. Jnifor" does nor forefend classification as long as 1.A $he
standards that are #sed therefore are s#)stantial and not ar)itrary. 2.A $he
categori&ation is ger"ane to achie*e legislati*e p#rpose. 4.A $he law
applies all things )eing e6#al, to )oth present and f#t#re conditions, and
B.A $he classification applies e6#ally well to all those )elonging to the
sa"e class. !hifting the inco"e ta5ation of indi*id#als to the sched#les
syste", this "a:es the inco"e ta5 depend on the :ind of ta5a)le inco"e,
and "aintaining for corporations the glo)al treat"ent which treats in
co""on all :inds of ta5a)le inco"e of the ta5payer.
TO&IAS VS. A&ALOS
(G.R. NO. L114783 DECEM&ER 8, 1994)
&IDIN, !.?
FACTS"
0rior to the enact"ent of the assailed stat#te %ep#)lic Act
3o. 7+77, the "#nicipalities of Mandal#yong and !an H#an )elonged to
only one legislati*e district. 1on. %onaldo Xa"ora, the inc#")ent
congressional representati*e of this legislati*e district, sponsored the )ill
which e*ent#ally )eca"e %.A. 3o. 7+77. 0#rs#ant to the Local
,o*ern"ent ode of 1991, a ple)iscite was held to as:ed the people
whether they appro*ed of the con*ersion of the M#nicipality of
Mandal#yong into a highly #r)ani&ed city as pro*ided in the stat#te. $he
t#rno#t at the ple)iscite was only 1B.B1M of the *oting pop#lation where
18,+21 *oted /yes/ whereas 7,911 *oted /no./ By *irt#e of these res#lts,
%.A. 3o. 7+77 was dee"ed ratified and in effect.
0etitioners now co"e )efore this o#rt, contending that %.A. 3o. 7+77,
specifically Article <III, !ection B9 thereof, is #nconstit#tional for )eing
*iolati*e of three specific pro*isions of the onstit#tion. (irst, that it
contra*enes the /one s#)-ect9one )ill/ r#le, as en#nciated in Article <I,
!ection 2+@1A of the onstit#tion, to wit2
!ec. 2+@1A. .*ery )ill passed )y the ongress shall e")race
only one s#)-ect which shall )e e5pressed in the title thereof.
0etitioners allege that the incl#sion of the assailed !ection
B9 in the s#)-ect law res#lted in the latter e")racing two principal
s#)-ects, na"ely2 @1A the con*ersion of Mandal#yong into a highly
#r)ani&ed cityG and @2A the di*ision of the congressional district of !an
H#anRMandal#yong into two separate districts.
0etitionersI second and third o)-ections in*ol*e Article <I,
!ections 7@1A and @BA of the onstit#tion. 0etitioners arg#e that the
di*ision of !an H#an and Mandal#yong into separate congressional
districts #nder !ection B9 of the assailed law has res#lted in an increase
in the co"position of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es )eyond that pro*ided
in Article <I, !ec. 7@1A of the onstit#tion. (#rther"ore, petitioners
contend that said di*ision was not "ade p#rs#ant to any cens#s showing
that the s#)-ect "#nicipalities ha*e attained the "ini"#" pop#lation
re6#ire"ents. And finally, petitioners assert that !ection B9 has the effect
of pree"pting the right of ongress to reapportion legislati*e districts
p#rs#ant to !ec. 7@BA as aforecited.
ISSUE" 8hether or not %.A. 3o. 7+77 is #nconstit#tional.
HELD"
3o.ontrary to petitionersI assertion, the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandal#yong is not a s#)-ect separate
and distinct fro" the s#)-ect of its con*ersion into a highly #r)ani&ed city
)#t is a nat#ral and logical conse6#ence of its con*ersion into a highly
#r)ani&ed city. <erily, the title of %.A. 3o. 7+77, /An Act on*erting the
M#nicipality of Mandal#yong Into a 1ighly Jr)ani&ed ity of
Mandal#yong/ necessarily incl#des and conte"plates the s#)-ect treated
#nder !ection B9 regarding the creation of a separate congressional
district for Mandal#yong.
Moreo*er, a li)eral constr#ction of the /one title9one s#)-ect/ r#le has )een
in*aria)ly adopted )y this co#rt so as not to cripple or i"pede legislation.
$h#s, in !#"#long *. o"elec @74 0hil. 288 O19B1PA, we r#led that the
constit#tional re6#ire"ent as now e5pressed in Article <I, !ection 2+@1A
/sho#ld )e gi*en a practical rather than a technical constr#ction. It sho#ld
)e s#fficient co"pliance with s#ch re6#ire"ent if the title e5presses the
general s#)-ect and all the pro*isions are ger"ane to that general
s#)-ect./
$he li)eral constr#ction of the /one title9one s#)-ect/ r#le had
)een f#rther el#cidated in Lidasan *. o"elec @21 !%A B9+ O19+7PA, to
wit2
='f co#rse, the onstit#tion does not re6#ire ongress to
e"ploy in the title of an enact"ent, lang#age of s#ch precision as to
"irror, f#lly inde5 or catalog#e all the contents and the "in#te details
therein. It s#ffices if the title sho#ld ser*e the p#rpose of the constit#tional
de"and that it infor" the legislators, the persons interested in the s#)-ect
of the )ill and the p#)lic, of the nat#re, scope and conse6#ences of the
proposed law and its operation/ @e"phasis s#ppliedA.
0roceeding now to the other constit#tional iss#es, alleging
that there is no "ention in the assailed law of any cens#s to show that
Mandal#yong and !an H#an had each attained the "ini"#" re6#ire"ent
of 27?,??? inha)itants to -#stify their separation into two legislati*e
districts, the sa"e does not s#ffice to stri:e down the *alidity of %.A. 3o.
7+77. $he said Act en-oys the pres#"ption of ha*ing passed thro#gh the
reg#lar congressional processes, incl#ding d#e consideration )y the
"e")ers of ongress of the "ini"#" re6#ire"ents for the esta)lish"ent
of separate legislati*e districts. At any rate, it is not re6#ired that all laws
e"anating fro" the legislat#re "#st contain all rele*ant data considered
)y ongress in the enact"ent of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law *iolates the
present li"it on the n#")er of representati*es as set forth in the
onstit#tion, a reading of the applica)le pro*ision, Article <I, !ection 7@1A,
as afore6#oted, shows that the present li"it of 27? "e")ers is not
a)sol#te. $he onstit#tion clearly pro*ides that the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es shall )e co"posed of not "ore than 27? "e")ers,
/#nless otherwise pro*ided )y law./ $he inescapa)le i"port of the latter
cla#se is that the present co"position of ongress "ay )e increased, if
ongress itself so "andates thro#gh a legislati*e enact"ent.
As to the contention that !ection B9 of %.A. 3o. 7+77 in
effect pree"pts the right of ongress to reapportion legislati*e districts,
the said arg#"ent )orders on the a)s#rd since petitioners o*erloo: the
glaring fact that it was ongress itself which drafted, deli)erated #pon and
enacted the assailed law, incl#ding !ection B9 thereof. ongress cannot
possi)ly pree"pt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
235 SCRA %30, 1994
FACTS"
It is clai"ed that the conference co""ittee incl#ded
pro*isions not fo#nd in either the 1o#se Bill or the !enate Bill [ that these
pro*isions were stealthily inserted )y the conference co""ittee.
the conference co""ittee incl#ded pro*isions not fo#nd in either the
1o#se Bill or the !enate Bill.
HELD"
A third *ersion of the )ill "ay res#lt fro" the conference
co""ittee, which is considered "ay res#lt fro" the conference
co""ittee, which is considered an =a"end"ent in the nat#re of a
s#)stit#te> the only re6#ire"ent )eing that the third *ersion )e ger"ane to
the s#)-ect of the 1o#se and !enate )ills.
As to the possi)ility of an entirely new )ill e"ergency o#t of
a onference o""ittee, it has )een e5plained2
Jnder congressional r#les of proced#re, conference
co""ittees are not e5pected to "a:e any "aterial change in the "eas#re
at iss#e, either )y deleting pro*isions to which )oth ho#ses ha*e already
agreed or )y inserting new pro*isions. B#t this is a diffic#lt pro*ision to
enforce. 3ote the pro)le" when one ho#se a"ends a proposal originating
in either ho#se )y stri:ing o#t e*erything following the enacting cla#se and
s#)stit#ting pro*isions which "a:e it an entirely new )ill. $he *ersions are
now altogether different, per"itting a conference co""ittee to draft
essentially a new )ill.
$he res#lt is a third *ersion, which is considered an
/a"end"ent in the nat#re of a s#)stit#te,/ the only re6#ire"ent for which
)eing that the third *ersion )e ger"ane to the s#)-ect of the 1o#se and
!enate )ills.
GON$ALES VS. MACARAIG
191 SCRA 452
FACTS"
$he *eto of a partic#lar section in the 1989 appropriations
act was assailed for )eing #nconstit#tional on gro#nds that the president
"ay not *eto pro*isions with regard to appropriation )ills and if the
president *etoes a pro*ision in an appropriation )ill that the entire )ill
sho#ld )e *etoed. (#rther, ite"9*eto power does not carry with it the
power to stri:e o#t conditions.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 0resident has the power to *eto pro*isions
with regard to appropriation )ills.
HELD"
Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt held the following2
$he 0resident can *eto an ite" or ite"s in an appropriations
)ill BJ$ nothing less than an ite" or ite"s.
o Ite" [ an indi*isi)le s#" of "oney dedicated
to a stated p#rpose that a distinct and se*era)le part of a )ill
"ay)e s#)-ect to a different *eto.
$herefore, regard to the petitionerKs contention that if a
pro*ision in an appropriations )ill is *etoed the entire )ill "#st )e *etoed
cannot )e s#stained. $he said power to *eto pro*isions has )een carried
o*er the pre*io#s constit#tions and has now )een #nderstood as
)roadened to incl#de the ite" or ite"s to which the pro*ision relates.
123
In relation still to *eto of pro*isions, the principle that distinct
and se*era)le parts of a )ill "ay)e the s#)-ect to a different *eto is
fo#nded on Art. +, !ection 27@2A wherein pro*isions are li"ited to its
operation to the appropriation to which it relatesZa distinct and se*era)le
part s#)-ect to a different *eto. $herefore it doesnKt "ean that if the
president *etoes a pro*ision in an appropriations )ill heKll need to *eto the
entire )ill.
Besides, the said pro*isions are inappropriate in the first
place )eca#se the pro*isions sho#ld relate to a partic#lar appropriation in
the general appropriations )ill.
$hat said sections of the appropriation )ill cannot )e s#)-ect
to *eto if s#ch are "ade to )e conditions on the e5pendit#re of f#nds
cannot )e s#stained )eca#se s#ch conditions =inappropriate.>
%estrictions or conditions in an appropriation )ill "#st e5hi)it a connection
with "oney ite"s in a )#dgetary sense in the sched#le of e5pendit#res.
!aid sections were in fact general law "eas#res, there was no necessary
connection with the sched#le of e5pendit#res.
$hat in any case, the sections "entioned contra*ene the
onstit#tion as it ta:es away the power of the 0resident to a#g"ent any
ite" in the appropriations law of their respecti*e offices fro" sa*ings in
other ite"s of their respecti*e appropriations, since a stat#te has already
a#thori&ed s#ch power.
&ENG$ON VS. DRILON
208 SCRA 133, 1992
FACTS"
$he case in*ol*ed the ,eneral Appropriations Act of 1992.
$he law appropriated 7??M 0esos =(or general f#nd ad-#st"ent for
operational and special re6#ire"ents as indicated here#nder.> A"ong the
se*eral a#thori&ed #ses of the f#nd was the ad-#st"ent of pension of
-#stices as a#thori&ed )y an earlier law. $he 0resident *etoed the #se of
s#ch f#nd for the ad-#st"ent of the pension of -#stices.
$he f#nds pertaining to the pay"ent of the ad-#sted
pensions of %etired H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt and A was *etoed
and assailed as )eing #nconstit#tional.
%A 1797 was the law granted these )enefits in 1977.
!ection 49A of %A 1797 was repealed )y 0D +BB.
ongress tho#ght to re*i*e %A 1797 thro#gh 1B 3o.1+297.
B#t 0D +BB ne*er )eca"e a law^ @not p#)lishedA
0resident *etoed 1B 3o. 1+297.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the *eto act of the 0resident the #se of s#ch f#nd
for the ad-#st"ent of the pension of -#stices is *alid.
HELD"
$he !#pre"e o#rt r#led2
In declaring the *eto in*alid, the o#rt said that it was not
the *eto of an ite". $he ite" was the entire 7??M peso
allocation o#t of which #na*oida)le o)ligations not
ade6#ately f#nded in separate ite"s co#ld )e "et. 8hat the
0resident had *etoed was the "ethod of "eeting
#na*oida)le o)ligations or the "anner of #sing the 7??M
0esos.
8hen the 0resident *etoed certain pro*isions of the 1992
,eneral Appropriations Act, she was act#ally *etoing %A
1797 since 0D +BB ne*er too: effect which is )eyond the
power to acco"plish.
$he ongress incl#ded in the ,eneral Appropriations Act of
1992, pro*isions identifying f#nds and sa*ings which "ay )e
#sed to pay the ad-#sted pensions p#rs#ant to the !#pre"e
o#rt %esol#tion. As long as retire"ent laws re"ain in the
stat#te )oo:, there is an e5isting o)ligation on the part of the
go*ern"ent to pay the ad-#sted pension rate p#rs#ant to %A
1797 and AM9919892279A.
3either "ay the *eto power of the 0resident )e e5ercised as
a "eans of repealing %A 1797. $his is arrogating #nto the 0residency
legislati*e powers which are )eyond its a#thority. $he 0resident has no
power to enact or a"end stat#tes pro"#lgated )y her predecessors "#ch
less to repeal e5isting laws. $he 0residentKs power is "erely to e5ec#te
the laws passed )y ongress.
SECTION 1 ARTICLE 8, 1987 CONSTITUTION
235 SCRA 50%. 1994
JUIASON, !."
FACTS"
therefro".
HELD"
Article <II.
SECTION 28 R RULE ON TA3ATION, TARIFF PO=ERS, E3EMPTIONS
7APATIRAN VS. TAN
1%3 SCRA 371, 1988
CASE"
$he <A$ law or .' 274 is )eing assailed on gro#nds a"ong
others that ta5ation shall )e #nifor" and e6#ita)le.
$he o#rt o*err#led the contention holding that s#ch was
#nifor" )eca#se it operates with the sa"e effect and force in e*ery place
where the s#)-ect "ay )e fo#nd. It is also e6#ita)le since it is i"posed
only on sales of goods or ser*ices )y persons engaged in )#siness with
an aggregate gross ann#al sale e5ceeding 2??,???.
124
A&RA VALLE- COLLEGE VS. AJUINO
1%2 SCRA 10%, 1988
FACTS"
0etitioner filed s#it to ann#l and declare *oid the /3otice of
!ei&#re/ and the /3otice of !ale/ of its lot and )#ilding for non9pay"ent of
real state ta5es and penalties.
0etitioner contends that the pri"ary #se of the lot and
)#ilding for ed#cational p#rposes, and not the incidental #se thereof,
deter"ines and e5e"ption fro" property ta5es #nder !ection 22 @4A,
Article <I of the 1947 onstit#tion. 1ence, the sei&#re and sale of s#)-ect
college lot and )#ilding, which are contrary
0ri*ate respondents co#nter that the college lot and )#ilding
in 6#estion which were s#)-ected to sei&#re and sale to answer for the
#npaid ta5 are #sed2 @IA for the ed#cational p#rposes of the r collegeG @2A
per"anent residence of the 0resident and Director thereof, and his fa"ily
incl#ding the in9laws and grandchildrenG and @4A for co""ercial p#rposes
)eca#se the gro#nd floor of the college )#ilding is )eing #sed and rented
)y a co""ercial esta)lish"ent, the 3orthern Mar:eting orporation
ISSUE" 8hether or not the lot and )#ilding is 6#estion are #sed
e5cl#si*ely for ed#cational p#rposes there)y e5e"pting petitioner fro"
property ta5es.
HELD"
3'. $he lot and )#ilding are not #sed e5cl#si*ely for
ed#cational p#rposes. It "#st )e stressed howe*er, that while this o#rt
allows a "ore li)eral and non9restricti*e interpretation of the phrase
/e5cl#si*ely #sed for ed#cational p#rposes/ as pro*ided for in Article <I,
!ection 22, paragraph 4 of the 1947 0hilippine onstit#tion, reasona)le
e"phasis has always )een "ade that e5e"ptions e5tends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasona)ly necessary for the acco"plish"ent
of the "ain p#rposes. 'therwise stated, the #se of the school )#ilding or
lot for co""ercial p#rposes is neither conte"plated )y law, nor )y
-#rispr#dence. $h#s, while the #se of the second floor of the "ain )#ilding
in the case at the )ar for residential p#rposes of the Director and his
fa"ily, "ay find -#stification #nder the concept of incidental #se, which is
co"pli"entary to the "ain or pri"ary p#rpose 9 ed#cational, the lease of
the first floor thereof to the 3orthern Mar:eting orporation cannot )y any
stretch of the i"agination )e considered incidental to the p#rpose of
ed#cation.
Jnder the 1947 onstit#tion, the trial co#rt correctly arri*ed
at the concl#sion that the school )#ilding as well as the lot where it is )#ilt,
sho#ld )e ta5ed, not )eca#se the, second floor of the sa"e is )eing #sed
)y the Director and his fa"ily for residential p#rposes, )#t )eca#se the
first floor thereof is )eing #sed for co""ercial p#rposes. 1owe*er, since
only a portion is #sed for p#rposes of co""erce, it is only fair that half of
the assessed ta5 )e ret#rned to the school in*ol*ed.
SECTION 29 R RULES ON PU&LIC MONE-
PASCUAL VS. SECRETAR- OF PU&LIC =OR7S
110 PHIL. 331, 19%0
FACTS"
$he s#" of 87,??? pesos was appropriated )y ongress for
the constr#ction of a feeder road r#nning thro#gh a pri*ate s#)di*ision and
o*er a property owned )y a pri*ate indi*id#al. !#)se6#ently, the feeder
road is donated to the go*ern"ent.
ISSUE" Is the appropriation *alidC
HELD"
$he !#pre"e o#rt ann#lled this ite", o)ser*ing that the
property so#ght to )e i"pro*ed with p#)lic f#nds was pri*ate in nat#re at
the ti"e the appropriation was "ade. $he circ#"stance that the roads
were later donated to the go*ern"ent did not c#re the )asic defect of the
appropriation as it was n#ll and *oid a) initio.
AGLIPA- VS. RUI$
%4 PHIL. 201, 1937
FACTS"
$he 0hilippine go*ern"ent a#thori&ed a special sta"p iss#e
on occasion of the o)ser*ance in Manila of the 44
rd
International
.#charistic ongress #nder the sponsorship of the atholic h#rch. $he
petitioner, as head of the 0hilippine Independent h#rch, assailed the
"eas#re and contended that it *iolated the onstit#tion inas"#ch as it
)enefited a partic#lar region. $he !#pre"e o#rt, on e5a"ining the facts,
disco*ered that the original design of the sta"p feat#red a pict#re of a
atholic chalice, )#t this was later re-ected in fa*or of a "ap of the
0hilippines #nder which appeared the caption =!eat, 44
rd
International
.#charistic ongress, (e). 497, 1947.>
ISSUE" 8hether or not the sta"p iss#e was *alid.
HELD"
Des. As the p#rpose of the sta"p iss#e were not for the
)enefit of the %o"an atholic h#rch, nor "oney was deri*ed fro" the
sale of the sta"ps gi*en to that ch#rch )#t was e*idently to foc#s attention
not on the .#charistic ongress )#t on its site, the idea )eing to attract
to#rists to o#r co#ntry and not pri"arily the religio#s e*ent, it was held that
the sta"p iss#e was not in*alid.
GUINGONA VS. CARAGUE
19% SCRA 221, 1991
FACTS"
0D 1177 is )eing assailed on its constit#tionality. It is
arg#ed that the a#to"atic reappropriation law for ser*icing foreign de)ts is
in*alid )eca#se it does not appropriate a fi5ed a"o#nt and is therefore an
#nd#e delegation of legislati*e power
ISSUE" 8hether or not 0D 1177 is constit#tional.
HELD"
Des. $he a"o#nt is fi5ed )y the para"eters of the law itself
which re6#ires the si"ple act of loo:ing into the )oo:s of the $reas#re.
OSMENA VS. OR&OS
220 SCRA 703, 1993
FACTS"
$he 'il 0rice !ta)il&ation (#nd @'0!(A was created to
"ini"i&e the fre6#ent price changes )ro#ght a)o#t )y e5change rate
ad-#st"ents andRor changes )ro#ght a)o#t )y changes in world "ar:et
prices of cr#de oil and i"ported petrole#" prod#cts. A $er"inal (#nd
Balance deficit now ai"s to resol*e the deficit )y increasing petrole#"
prices, contra*ening !ection 29@4A, Article <I where s#ch f#nd shall )e
paid only for the p#rpose for which it was created.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the increase of petrole#" prices to resol*e the
$er"inal (#nd Balance deficit is *alid.
HELD"
Des. $he o#rt held that it was a *alid e5ercise of police
power.
235 SCRA 50%. 1994
JUIASON, !."
FACTS"
therefro".
HELD"
125
Article <II.
DIA$ VS.COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. L109%98 DECEM&ER 5, 1994)
&ELLOSILLO, !."
FACTS"
'n 24 Han#ary 1991, Da*ao Light and 0ower o"pany, Inc.
@DL0A filed with the .nergy %eg#latory Board @.%BA an application for
the appro*al of the so#nd *al#e appraisal of its property in ser*ice. $he
Asian Appraisal o"pany *al#ed the property and e6#ip"ent of DL0 at
'ne Billion 'ne 1#ndred (orty 'ne Million !e*en 1#ndred !e*enty (o#r
$ho#sand 0esos @01,1B1,77B,???.??A.
'n + Dece")er 1992, .%B appro*ed the application of
DL0 after ded#cting (o#rteen Million .ight 1#ndred $ho#sand 0esos
@01B,8??,???.??A worth of property and e6#ip"ent which were not #sed
)y DL0 in its operation. 0etitioners filed a petition for re*iew on certiorari
)efore this o#rt assailing the decision of .%B on the gro#nd of lac: of
-#risdiction andRor gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: of
-#risdiction.
In !#pre"e o#rtKs resol#tion of 8 !epte")er 1992, it
referred the case for proper disposition to the o#rt of Appeals which
s#)se6#ently dis"issed the petition. A"ong the gro#nds gi*en was that
the filing of the petition for re*iew with the !#pre"e o#rt was a wrong
"ode of appeal.
0etitioners filed a "otion for reconsideration contending that
the resol#tion of 8 !epte")er 1992 was a directi*e for the o#rt of
Appeals to disregard the a)o*e circ#lar. $hey f#rther clai"ed that ..'.
3o. 172 creating the .nergy %eg#latory Board to replace the Board of
.nergy pro*ides #nder !ec. 1? thereof that /OaP party ad*ersely affected
)y a decision, order or r#ling of the Board . . . "ay file a petition to )e
:nown as petition for re*iew with the !#pre"e o#rt./
ISSUE" 8hether or not, !ec. 1? of ..'. 3o.172 is constit#tional.
HELD"
3o. $he predecessor of the .nergy %eg#latory Board was
the Board of .nergy created #nder 0.D. 3o. 12?+. $here #nder, appeals
fro" the decisions of the Board of .nergy were appeala)le to the 'ffice of
the 0resident. 1owe*er, #nder the Interi" %#les I"ple"enting the
H#diciary %eorgani&ation Act of 198?, final decisions, orders, awards or
resol#tions of the Board of .nergy were "ade appeala)le to the
Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt @!ec. 9A.
(#rther"ore, the 1987 onstit#tion, !ec. 4?, Art <I pro*ides2
/3o law shall )e passed increasing the appellate -#risdiction of the
!#pre"e o#rt as pro*ided in this onstit#tion witho#t its ad*ice and
conc#rrence./
It is *ery patent that since !ec. 1? of ..'. 3o. 172 was
enacted witho#t the ad*ice and conc#rrence of this o#rt, this pro*ision
ne*er )eca"e effecti*e, with the res#lt that it cannot )e dee"ed to ha*e
a"ended the H#diciary %eorgani&ation Act of 198?. onse6#ently, the
a#thority of the o#rt of Appeals to decide cases fro" the Board of
.nergy, now .%B, re"ains @f. (irst Lepanto era"ics, Inc. *. o#rt of
Appeals, ,.%. 3o. 11?771, 7 'cto)er 199BA.
'n 27 (e)r#ary 1991, the !#pre"e o#rt pro"#lgated
irc#lar 3o.1991, par. @1A of which specifically pro*ides that the proper
"ode of appeal fro" any 6#asi9-#dicial agency, incl#ding .%B, is )y way
of a petition for re*iew with the o#rt of Appeals. If the appeal is )ro#ght
to either o#rt @!#pre"e o#rt or o#rt of AppealsA )y the wrong
proced#re, the only co#rse of action open to it is to dis"iss the appeal.
$here is no longer any -#stification for allowing transfers of erroneo#s
appeals fro" one co#rt to another @V#esada *. o#rt of Appeals, ,.%. 3o.
948+9, 12 3o*e")er 199?A.
0rior to irc#lar 3o. 1991, the !#pre"e o#rt pro"#lgated
irc#lar 3o. 299? dated 9 March 199?, Ite" 3o. B of which states that
/OaPn appeal ta:en to either the !#pre"e o#rt or the o#rt of Appeals )y
the wrong or inappropriate "ode shall )e dis"issed/. Also, paragraph @dA
of said irc#lar 3o. 299? also pro*ides that /OnPo transfer of appeals
erroneo#sly ta:en to the !#pre"e o#rt or to the o#rt of Appeals to
whiche*er of these $ri)#nals has appropriate appellate -#risdiction will )e
allowedG contin#ed ignorance or willf#l disregard of the law on appeals will
not )e tolerated./
onse6#ently, the o#rt of Appeals was correct when it held E
ontrary to petitionersI stand, the !#pre"e o#rtIs %esol#tion dated
!epte")er 8, 1992, referring /this case to the o#rt of Appeals for f#rther
disposition/ was not a directi*e for this co#rt to disregard the a)o*e
circ#lars and precedents. %ather the said ! resol#tion co#ld "ean only
that this co#rt sho#ld dispose of the s#)-ect petition in confor"ity with, and
not in *iolation of, those circ#lars and precedents @%ollo, p. 2+A.
81.%.('%., the instant petition is DI!MI!!.D.
SU&IC &A- METROPOLITAN AUTHORIT- VS. COMMISION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 12541% SEPTEM&ER 2%, 199%
FACTS"
$he !angg#niang Bayan of Morong, Bataan @!angg#niang
BayanA passed 0a")ayang Lapasyahan Bilang 1?, !erye 1994,
e5pressing therein its a)sol#te conc#rrence to -oin the !#)ic !pecial
.cono"ic Xone.
%espondents ,arcia, et al. filed a petition with the
!angg#niang Bayan to ann#l 0a")ayang Lapasyahan Bilang 1?, !erye
1994. $he !angg#niang Bayan pro"#lgated 0a")ayang Lapasyahan
Bilang 18, !erye 1994, re6#esting ongress to a"end certain pro*isions
of %.A. 3o.7227, partic#larly those concerning the "atters cited in ite"s of
pri*ate respondentsK petition.
3ot satisfied, pri*ate respondents resorted to their power of
initiati*e. %espondent 'M.L. denied the petition for local initiati*e on
the gro#nd that the s#)-ect thereof was "erely a resol#tion @pa")ayang
:apasyahanA and not an ordinance. $hereafter, 'M.L. iss#ed a
%esol#tion directing its 0ro*incial .lection !#per*isor to hold action on
a#thentication of signat#res )eing solicited )y pri*ate respondent.
'M.L. also iss#ed %esol#tion 3o. 28B7, adopting a
=alendar of Acti*ities for local referend#" on certain "#nicipal ordinance
passed )y the !angg#niang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.> It then
pro"#lgated said %esol#tion, pro*iding for =the r#les and g#idelines to
go*ern the cond#ct of the referend#" proposing to ann#l or repeal
Lapasyahan Blg. 1?, !erye 1994 of the !angg#niang Bayan of Morong,
Bataan.
ontesting the *alidity of %esol#tion 3o. 2B28, petitioner
instit#ted a petition for certiorari and prohi)ition.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 'M.L. co""itted gra*e a)#se of
discretion in pro"#lgating and i"ple"enting its %esol#tion 3o. 28B8
which go*ern the cond#ct of the referend#" proposing to ann#l or repeal
Lapasyahan Blg. 1?, !erye 1994 of the !angg#niang Bayan of Morong,
BataanC

HELD"
Des. 'M.L. co""it gra*e a)#se of discretion in
pro"#lgating and i"ple"enting %esol#tion 3o. 28B8. $he process started
)y pri*ate respondents was an I3I$IA$I<. )#t respondent 'M.L.
"ade preparations for a %.(.%.3DJM only.
Based on the definitions gi*en )y the Local ,o*ern"ent
ode @%.A. 71+?A2 Local Initiati*e is the legal process where)y the
registered *oters of a local go*ern"ent #nit "ay directly propose, enact,
or a"end any ordinanceG while Local %eferend#" is the legal process
where)y the registered *oters of the local go*ern"ent #nits "ay appro*e,
a"end or re-ect any ordinance enacted )y the !angg#nian.
In other words, while initiati*e is entirely the wor: of the
electorate, referend#" is )eg#n and consented to )y the law9"a:ing
)ody. Initiati*e is a process of law9"a:ing )y the people the"sel*es
witho#t the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representati*es, while referend#" consists "erely of the electorate
appro*ing or re-ecting what has )een drawn #p or enacted )y a legislati*e
)ody. 1ence, the process and the *oting in an initiati*e are
#nderstanda)ly "ore co"ple5 than in a referend#" where e5pectedly the
*oters will si"ply answer =yes> or =no> in the )allot.
126
In the case at )ar, the e5ercise cond#cted is #n6#estiona)ly
an Initiati*e.
ARTICLE VII E3ECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
(177 SCRA %%8)
FACTS"
In (e)r#ary 198+, (erdinand Marcos was deposed fro" the
presidency *ia the non9*iolent =people power> re*ol#tion and forced into
e5ile. ora&on . A6#ino was declared 0resident of the 0hilippines #nder
a re*ol#tionary go*ern"ent.
After three years, Mr. Marcos, in his death)ed, has signified
his wish to ret#rn to the 0hilippines to die. B#t 0resident A6#ino has
stood fir"ly in the decision to )ar the ret#rn of Mr. Marcos and his fa"ily 9
considering the dire conse6#ences to the nation of his ret#rn at a ti"e
when the sta)ility of the go*ern"ent is threatened fro" *ario#s directions
and the econo"y is -#st )eginning to rise and "o*e forward.
ISSUE" 8hether or not in the e5ercise of the powers granted )y the
onstit#tion, the 0resident "ay prohi)it the Marcoses fro" ret#rning to
the 0hilippines.
HELD"
Des, the 0resident has the 0ower #nder the onstit#tion to
)ar the Marcoses fro" ret#rning to o#r co#ntry.
$he onstit#tion says that the e5ec#ti*e power shall )e
*ested in the 0resident. It also en#"erates certain specific powers. $he
en#"eration, howe*er, does not e5ha#st the totality of e5ec#ti*e powers.
$radition recogni&es that the powers of the 0resident are "ore than the
s#" of en#"erated e5ec#ti*e powers. $he d#ty of the go*ern"ent =to
ser*e and protect the people> as well as to see to the ="aintenance of
peace and order, the protection of life, li)erty, and property, and the
pro"otion of the general welfare> arg#e towards the e5istence of =resid#al
instated powers.>
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS
(178 SCRA 7%0)
FACTS"
'n 'cto)er 1989, "otion for reconsideration was filed )y
petitioners raising the following "a-or arg#"ents a"ong others2
1. $he 0resident has no power to )ar a (ilipino fro" his own
co#ntry.
2. $here is no )asis for )arring the ret#rn of the fa"ily of for"er
0resident Marcos.
ISSUE"
8R3 the 0resident has the power to )ar the Marcoses fro" ret#rning to
the 0hilippines.
HELD"
D.!. $he !#pre"e o#rt held that it cannot )e denied that
the 0resident, #pon who" e5ec#ti*e power is *ested, has #nstated
resid#al powers which are i"plied fro" the grant of e5ec#ti*e power and
which are necessary for her to co"ply with her d#ties #nder the
onstit#tion. $he powers of the 0resident are not li"ited to what are
e5pressly en#"erated in the article on the .5ec#ti*e Depart"ent and in
scattered pro*isions of the onstit#tion. $his is so, notwithstanding the
a*owed intent of the "e")ers of the onstit#tional o""ission of 198+
to li"it the powers of the 0resident as a reaction to the a)#ses #nder the
regi"e of Mr. Marcos, for the res#lt was a li"itation of specific powers of
the 0resident, partic#larly those relating to the co""ander9in9chief cla#se,
)#t not a di"in#tion of the general grant of e5ec#ti*e power.
ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
(G.R. NO. 14%71015, MARCH 2, 2001)

PUNO, !."
FACTS"
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Hoseph .-ercito
.strada was elected 0resident while respondent ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo
was elected <ice90resident. Both petitioner and the respondent were to
ser*e a si59year ter" co""encing on H#ne 4?, 1998.D#ring his ter", the
petitioner e5perienced a sharp descent fro" power started on 'cto)er B,
2??? when Ilocos !#r ,o*ernor, L#is /ha*it/ !ingson, a longti"e friend
of the petitioner, went on air and acc#sed the petitioner, his fa"ily and
friends of recei*ing "illions of pesos fro" -#eteng lords. $he e5posa
i""ediately ignited reactions of rage. 3#"ero#s in*estigations
co""enced )oth fro" the !enate and the 1o#se of %epresentati*es.
alls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air that on 'cto)er 11,
Arch)ishop Hai"e ardinal !in iss#ed a pastoral letter as:ing the
petitioner to step down fro" the presidency as he had lost the "oral
a#thority to go*ern.
0olitical tensions contin#ed to heat #p as :ey econo"ic
ad*isers and "e")ers of the ca)inet defected. 'n 3o*e")er 14, in a
t#"#lt#o#s session, the ho#se of representati*es finally trans"itted the
articles of i"peach"ent to the senate signed )y 117 represenatati*es or
"ore than 1R4 of all the "e")ers of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es. 'n
3o*e")er 2?, the !enate for"ally opened the i"peach"ent trial of the
petitioner. $wenty9one @21A senators too: their oath as -#dges with
!#pre"e o#rt hief H#stice 1ilario ,. Da*ide, Hr., presiding. $he political
tension rose d#ring the i"peach"ent trial partic#larly d#ring the
Dece")er hearings when larissa 'ca"po, senior *ice president of
.6#ita)le90I Ban: testified on the e5istence of the Hose <elarde acco#nt.
$he i"peach"ent trial reached its t#rning point when on the fatef#l day of
Han#ary 1+, )y a *ote of 1191?

the senator9-#dges r#led against the
opening of the second en*elope which allegedly contained e*idence
showing that petitioner held 04.4 )illion in a secret )an: acco#nt #nder the
na"e /Hose <elarde./ $he non9opening of the second en*elope led to the
resignation of the p#)lic and pri*ate prosec#tors and the spontaneo#s
o#t)#rst of anger )y the people in .D!A which is now referred to as the
.D!A dos.
0etitionerKs fall fro" power )eca"e "ore apparent starting
Han#ary 19 when :ey officials fro" the ar"ed forces, the 030 and his
other ca)inet "e")ers withdrew s#pport. At a)o#t 122?? noon of Han#ary
2? hief H#stice Da*ide ad"inistered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
0resident of the 0hilippines. At 224? p."., petitioner and his fa"ily
h#rriedly left MalacaNang 0alace while lea*ing a press state"ent
indicating his strong and serio#s do#)ts a)o#t the legality and
constit#tionality of the procla"ation of the respondent as 0resident and
that he is lea*ing the 0alace as he does not wish to =pre*ent the
restoration of #nity and order in o#r ci*il society.>
ISSUES"
1. 8hether or not the case at )ar is a political 6#estion and hence, are )eyond
the -#risdiction of this o#rt to decide
2. 8hether or not petitioner .strada is a 0resident on lea*e while respondent
Arroyo is an Acting 0resident.
HELD"
1.A3o the case at )ar is not a political 6#estion. Accordingly, it is within the
-#risdiction of the o#rt to decide. In the case of $anada *. #enco, the
o#rt, thro#gh for"er hief H#stice %o)erto oncepcion, held that political
6#estions refer /to those 6#estions which, #nder the onstit#tion, are to
)e decided )y the people in their so*ereign capacity, or in regard to which
f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the legislati*e or
e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the go*ern"ent. It is concerned with iss#es
dependent #pon the wisdo", not legality of a partic#lar "eas#re./ $o a
great degree, the 1987 onstit#tion has narrowed the reach of the political
6#estion doctrine when it e5panded the power of -#dicial re*iew of this
co#rt not only to settle act#al contro*ersies in*ol*ing rights which are
legally de"anda)le and enforcea)le )#t also to deter"ine whether or not
there has )een a gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of
-#risdiction on the part of any )ranch or instr#"entality of go*ern"ent.
1eretofore, the -#diciary has foc#sed on the /tho# shalt
notIs/ of the onstit#tion directed against the e5ercise of its -#risdiction.
8ith the new pro*ision, howe*er, co#rts are gi*en a greater prerogati*e to
deter"ine what it can do to pre*ent gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting
to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on the part of any )ranch or instr#"entality
of go*ern"ent. learly, the new pro*ision did not -#st grant the o#rt
power of doing nothing. In fine, the legal distinction )etween .D!A 0eople
0ower I .D!A 0eople 0ower II is clear. .D!A I in*ol*es the e5ercise of
the people power of re*ol#tion which o*erthrew the whole go*ern"ent.
.D!A II is an e5ercise of people power of freedo" of speech and freedo"
of asse")ly to petition the go*ern"ent for redress of grie*ances which
only affected the office of the 0resident. .D!A I is e5tra constit#tional and
the legiti"acy of the new go*ern"ent that res#lted fro" it cannot )e the
s#)-ect of -#dicial re*iew, )#t .D!A II is intra constit#tional and the
resignation of the sitting 0resident that it ca#sed and the s#ccession of the
<ice 0resident as 0resident are s#)-ect to -#dicial re*iew. .D!A I
presented a political 6#estionG .D!A II in*ol*es legal 6#estions.
2. A 3o. 0resident .strada is not on lea*e, he resigned fro" office.
%esignation is not a high le*el legal a)straction. It is a fact#al 6#estion
and its ele"ents are )eyond 6#i))le2 there "#st )e an intent to resign and
the intent "#st )e co#pled )y acts of relin6#ish"ent.

$he *alidity of a
resignation is not go*erned )y any for"al re6#ire"ent as to for". It can )e
oral. It can )e written. It can )e e5press. It can )e i"plied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it "#st )e gi*en legal effect.
In the cases at )ar, the facts show that petitioner did not
write any for"al letter of resignation )efore he e*ac#ated MalacaNang
0alace. onse6#ently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to )e
deter"ined fro" his act and o"issions )efore, d#ring and after Han#ary
2?, 2??1 or )y the totality of prior, conte"poraneo#s and posterior facts
and circ#"stantial e*idence )earing a "aterial rele*ance on the iss#e.
Jsing this totality test, the o#rt holds that petitioner resigned as
0resident. $he petitionerKs resignation is shown in the following instances2
a. he left MalacaNang
). he ac:nowledged the oath9ta:ing of the respondent as 0resident
of the %ep#)lic al)eit with reser*ation a)o#t its legality
c. he e"phasi&ed he was lea*ing the 0alace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sa:e of peace and in order to )egin the healing
process of o#r nation. 1e did not say he was lea*ing the 0alace d#e to
any :ind ina)ility and that he was going to re9ass#"e the presidency as
soon as the disa)ility disappears
d. he e5pressed his gratit#de to the people for the opport#nity to
ser*e the".
e. he ass#red that he will not shir: fro" any f#t#re challenge that
"ay co"e ahead in the sa"e ser*ice of o#r co#ntry. 0etitionerIs reference
127
is to a f#t#re challenge after occ#pying the office of the president which he
has gi*en #pG
f. he called on his s#pporters to -oin hi" in the pro"otion of a
constr#cti*e national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. ertainly, the
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity co#ld not )e attained if he did
not gi*e #p the presidency.

ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO
(G.R. NO. 14%71015, MARCH 2, 2001)

PUNO, !."
FACTS"
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Hoseph .-ercito
.strada was elected 0resident while respondent ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo
was elected <ice90resident. Both petitioner and the respondent were to
ser*e a si59year ter" co""encing on H#ne 4?, 1998.D#ring his ter", the
petitioner e5perienced a sharp descent fro" power started on 'cto)er B,
2??? when Ilocos !#r ,o*ernor, L#is /ha*it/ !ingson, a longti"e friend
of the petitioner, went on air and acc#sed the petitioner, his fa"ily and
friends of recei*ing "illions of pesos fro" -#eteng lords. $he e5posa
i""ediately ignited reactions of rage.
'n 3o*e")er 14, in a t#"#lt#o#s session, the ho#se of
representati*es trans"itted the articles of i"peach"ent to the senate. 'n
3o*e")er 2?, the !enate for"ally opened the i"peach"ent trial of the
petitioner. $he i"peach"ent trial reached its t#rning point when on the
fatef#l day of Han#ary 1+, )y a *ote of 1191?

the senator9-#dges r#led
against the opening of the second en*elope which allegedly contained
e*idence showing that petitioner held 04.4 )illion in a secret )an: acco#nt
#nder the na"e /Hose <elarde./ $he non9opening of the second en*elope
led to the resignation of the p#)lic and pri*ate prosec#tors and the
spontaneo#s o#t)#rst of anger )y the people in .D!A which is now
referred to as the .D!A dos.
'n Han#ary 2?, 2??1, petitioner sent a letter to the !enate
and the 1o#se of %epresentati*es clai"ing his ina)ility to perfor" his
f#nctions as a president. Jnaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo too:
her oath of office as 0resident on Han#ary 2?, 2??1 at a)o#t 1224? p.".
Despite receipt of the letter, the 1o#se of %epresentati*es as well as the
!enate iss#ed 1o#se %esol#tion 3os. 177, 17+ and 178 as well as
!enate %esol#tion nos. 82, 84 and 8B recogni&ing and confir"ing the
ass#"ption of the respondent of the presidency.
After respondent has ta:en her oath of office, petitioner
post#lated that respondent Arroyo as <ice 0resident has no power to
ad-#dge the ina)ility of the petitioner to discharge the powers and d#ties of
the presidency. 1is significant s#)"ittal is that /ongress has the #lti"ate
a#thority #nder the onstit#tion to deter"ine whether the 0resident is
incapa)le of perfor"ing his f#nctions in the "anner pro*ided for in section
11 of article <II./$his contention is the centerpiece of petitionerIs stance
that he is a 0resident on lea*e and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting
0resident.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether or not the petitioner Is only te"porarily #na)le to Act as 0resident
2. 8hether con*iction in the i"peach"ent proceedings is a condition precedent
for the cri"inal prosec#tion of petitioner .strada
4. 8hether or not the petitioner is i""#ne fro" the charges filed against
HELD"
1. 3o, petitioner is not only te"porarily #na)le to act as president. 1o#se
%esol#tion 3os. 177,17+, and 178, as well as !enate %esol#tions 3o.
82, 84 and 8B show that )oth ho#ses of ongress ha*e recogni&ed
respondent Arroyo as the 0resident. I"plicitly clear in that recognition is
the pre"ise that the ina)ility of petitioner .strada is no longer te"porary.
ongress has clearly re-ected petitionerIs clai" of ina)ility.
2.A 3o. on*iction in the i"peach"ent proceedings is not a condition
precedent for the cri"inal prosec#tion of the petitioner. $he i"peach"ent
trial of petitioner .strada was a)orted )y the wal:o#t of the prosec#tors
and )y the e*ents that led to his loss of the presidency. !ince, the
I"peach"ent o#rt is now f#nct#s officio, it is #ntena)le for petitioner to
de"and that he sho#ld first )e i"peached and then con*icted )efore he
can )e prosec#ted. $he plea if granted, wo#ld p#t a perpet#al )ar against
his prosec#tion. !#ch a s#)"ission has nothing to co""end itself for it
will place hi" in a )etter sit#ation than a non9sitting 0resident who has not
)een s#)-ected to i"peach"ent proceedings and yet can )e the o)-ect of
a cri"inal prosec#tion. $o )e s#re, the de)ates in the onstit#tional
o""ission "a:e it clear that when i"peach"ent proceedings ha*e
)eco"e "oot d#e to the resignation of the 0resident, the proper cri"inal
and ci*il cases "ay already )e filed against hi"
4.A 3o. $he petitioner is not i""#ned fro" the cases filed against hi" )y
*irt#e of hi" )eing an #nsitting president. $he cases filed against
petitioner .strada are cri"inal in character. $hey in*ol*e pl#nder, )ri)ery
and graft and corr#ption. By no stretch of the i"agination can these
cri"es, especially pl#nder which carries the death penalty, )e co*ered )y
the alleged "antle of i""#nity of a non9sitting president. 0etitioner cannot
cite any decision of this o#rt licensing the 0resident to co""it cri"inal
acts and wrapping hi" with post9ten#re i""#nity fro" lia)ility. It will )e
ano"alo#s to hold that i""#nity is an inoc#lation fro" lia)ility for #nlawf#l
acts and conditions. $he r#le is that #nlawf#l acts of p#)lic officials are not
acts of the !tate and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as s#ch )#t
stands in the sa"e footing as any trespasser.

DOROMAL VS. SANDIGAN&A-AN
(177 SCRA 354)
FACTS"
$he special prosec#tor officer filed in the !andigan)ayan an
infor"ation against petitioner Doro"al, alleging2
/$hat the a)o*e9na"ed acc#sed, a p#)lic officer, )eing then
o""issioner of the 0residential o""ission on ,ood ,o*ern"ent, did
then and there wilf#lly and #nlawf#lly ha*e direct or indirect financial
interest in the Doro"al International $rading orporation, an entity which
transacted or entered into a )#siness transaction or contract with the
Depart"ent of .d#cation, #lt#re and !ports and the 3ational Manpower
and Do#th o#ncil, )oth agencies of the go*ern"ent which )#siness,
contracts or transactions he is prohi)ited )y law and the constit#tion fro"
ha*ing any interest./
$he infor"ation was initially ann#lled for the reason that the
=$anodBayan> has no right to file infor"ation witho#t the appro*al of the
'")#ds"an. $he !pecial 0rosec#tor so#ght clearance fro" the
'")#ds"an to refile it. $he '")#ds"an granted clearance )#t ad*ised
that /so"e changes )e "ade in the infor"ation./ A new infor"ation, d#ly
appro*ed )y the '")#ds"an, was filed, alleging that2
/. . . , the a)o*e9na"ed acc#sed @Doro"alA, a p#)lic officer,
)eing then a o""issioner of the 0residential o""ission on ,ood
,o*ern"ent, did then and there willf#lly and #nlawf#lly, participate in a
)#siness thro#gh the Doro"al International $rading orporation, a fa"ily
corporation of which he is the 0resident, and which co"pany participated
in the )iddings cond#cted )y the Depart"ent of .d#cation, #lt#re and
!ports and the 3ational Manpower Y Do#th o#ncil, which act or
participation is prohi)ited )y law and the constit#tion./
0etitioner "o*ed to 6#ash the infor"ation on the gro#nd that
he, a 0,, o""issioner, has not signed any doc#"ent, )id of the
fa"ily corporation of which he is "e")er, s#)"itted to D.!.
!andigan)ayn denied the "otion to 6#ash, hence this
petition.
ISSUE" 8R3 the prohi)ition #nder !ection 14 of Article <II of the
onstit#tion sho#ld not apply if an acc#sed has not signed any doc#"ent
of any )id of the fa"ily corporation of which he is "e")er, s#)"itted to
any go*ern"ent depart"ents.
HELD"
3o, the pro*ision shall still apply )eca#se the DI$
re"ained a fa"ily corporation in which Doro"al has at least an indirect
interest.
!ection 14, Article <II of the 1987 onstit#tion pro*ides that
/the 0resident, <ice90resident, the "e")ers of the a)inet and their
dep#ties or assistants shall not . . . d#ring @theirA ten#re, . . . directly or
indirectly . . . participate in any )#siness./ $he constit#tional )an is si"ilar
to the prohi)ition in the i*il !er*ice Law that /p#rs#it of pri*ate )#siness .
. . witho#t the per"ission re6#ired )y i*il !er*ice %#les and %eg#lations/
shall )e a gro#nd for disciplinary action against any officer or e"ployee in
the ci*il ser*ice.
CIVIL LI&ERTIES UNION VS. E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR-
(194 SCRA 317)
FACTS"
0resident A6#ino iss#ed .' 3o. 28B, which allows "e")ers
of the a)inet, their #ndersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold
other go*ern"ent offices or positions in addition to their pri"ary positions.
It was assailed for it *iolates the onstit#tion.
0etitioners challenge the constit#tionality of .' 3o. 28B on
the principal s#)"ission that it adds e5ceptions to !ection 14, Article <II
other than those pro*ided in the onstit#tion. According to petitioners, )y
*irt#e of the phrase /#nless otherwise pro*ided in this onstit#tion,/ the
only e5ceptions against holding any other office or e"ploy"ent in
,o*ern"ent are those pro*ided in the onstit#tion, na"ely2 @1A $he <ice9
0resident "ay )e appointed as a Me")er of the a)inet #nder !ection 4,
par. @2A, Article <II thereofG and @2A the !ecretary of H#stice is an e59officio
"e")er of the H#dicial and Bar o#ncil )y *irt#e of !ection 8 @1A, Article
<III.
ISSUE" 8hether or not an e5ec#ti*e order allowing "e")ers of the
a)inet, their #ndersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
go*ern"ent offices in addition to their pri"ary positions is *alid.
HELD"
In*alid. In the light of the constr#ction gi*en to !ection 14,
Article <II in relation to !ection 7, par. @2A, Article I;9B of the 1987
onstit#tion, .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 28B dated H#ly 24, 1987 is
#nconstit#tional. 'stensi)ly restricting the n#")er of positions that
a)inet "e")ers, #ndersecretaries or assistant secretaries "ay hold in
addition to their pri"ary position to not "ore than two @2A positions in the
go*ern"ent and go*ern"ent corporations, .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 28B
act#ally allows the" to hold "#ltiple offices or e"ploy"ent in direct
contra*ention of the e5press "andate of !ection 14, Article <II of the 1987
128
onstit#tion prohi)iting the" fro" doing so, #nless otherwise pro*ided in
the 1987 onstit#tion itself.
IN RE APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30,1998 OF
HON. M. A. VALEN$UELA AND HON. P. &. VILLARTA AS RTC
!UDGES
(298 SCRA 408 5NOVEM&ER 9, 19986)
NARVASA, C.!."
FACTS"
1on. Mateo A. <alen&#ela and 1on. 0lacido B. <allarta were
appointed )y the then 0resident on March 4?, 1998 as H#dges of the %$,
Branch +2, Bago ity and of Branch 2B, a)anat#an ity, respecti*ely.
'n May 12, 1998, the hief H#stice recei*ed fro" Malacanang the
appoint"ents of two @2A H#dge of the %$ "entioned a)o*e. $he
appoint"ents were 6#estioned on the *iew that they were "ade d#ring
the period of the )an on appoint"ents i"posed )y !ection 17, Article <II
of the onstit#tion.
$he iss#e was already *entilated at the "eeting of the
H#dicial and Bar o#ncil on March 9, 1998 regarding the constit#tionality
of appoint"ents of eight @8A Associate H#stices to the o#rt of Appeals,
specifically, in light of the forthco"ing presidential elections. Attention was
drawn to !ection 17, Article <II of the onstit#tion reading as follows2
!ec. 17. $wo "onths i""ediately )efore the ne5t
presidential elections and #p to the end of his, ter", a 0resident or Acting
0resident shall not "a:e appoint"ents, e5cept te"porary appoint"ents to
e5ec#ti*e positions when contin#ed *acancies therein will pre-#dice p#)lic
ser*ice or endanger p#)lic safety.
'n the other hand, appoint"ents to fill *acancies in the
!#pre"e o#rt d#ring the period "entioned in the pro*ision -#st 6#oted
co#ld )e -#stified )y !ection B@1A of Article <II of the onstit#tion which
states2
!ec. B @1A $he !#pre"e o#rt shall )e co"posed of a hief
H#stice and fo#rteen Associate H#stices. WW WW. Any *acancy shall )e filled
within ninety days fro" the occ#rrence thereof.
Also pertinent altho#gh not specifically disc#ssed is !ection
9 of the sa"e Article <III which pro*ides that for the lower co#rts, the
0resident shall iss#e the appoint"ents E fro" a list of at least three
no"inees prepared )y the o#ncil for e*ery *acancy E within ninety days
fro" the s#)"ission of the list.
$he o#rt iss#ed a %esol#tion which states that >pending
the foregoing proceedings and the deli)eration )y the o#rt on the "ater,
and #ntil f#rther orders, no action )e ta:en on the appoint"ents of 1on.
<alen&#ela and 1on. <allarta which in the "eanti"e shall )e held in
a)eyance.
In co"pliance with the foregoing %esol#tion, 1on.
<alen&#ela and 1on. <allarta filed )efore the o#rt the re6#ired pleadings
and other doc#"ents. It is noted that 1on. <alen&#ela had already ta:en
his 'ath of 'ffice a H#dge on May 1B, 1998 and e5plained that he did so
)eca#se on May 7, 1998, he =recei*ed fro" Malacanang copy of his
appoint"ent WWW which contained the following direction =By *irt#e hereof,
yo# "ay 6#alify and enter #pon the perfor"ance of the d#ties of the office.
$he o#rt then deli)erated on the pleadings and doc#"ents
a)o*e "entioned, in relation to the facts and circ#"stances on record and
thereafter resol*ed to pro"#lgate the following opinion.
ISSUE" 8hether, d#ring the period of the )an on appoint"ents i"posed
)y !ection 17, Article <II of the onstit#tion, the 0resident is nonetheless
re6#ired to fill *acancies in the -#diciary, in *iew of !ections B@1A and 9 of
Article <III.
8hether the 0resident can "a:e appoint"ents to the
-#diciary d#ring the period of the )an in the interest of p#)lic ser*ice.
HELD"
3'. $he o#rtIs *iew is that d#ring the period stated in
!ection 17. Article <II of the onstit#tion E /@tAwo "onths i""ediatey
)efore the ne5t presidential elections and #p to the end his ter"/ E the
0resident is neither re6#ired to "a:e appoint"ents to the co#rts nor
allowed to do soG and that !ections B@1A and 9 of Article <III si"ply "ean
that the 0resident is re6#ired to fill *acancies in the co#rts within the ti"e
fra"es pro*ided therein #nless prohi)ited )y !ection 17 of Article <II. It is
not noteworthy that the prohi)ition on appoint"ents co"es into effect only
once e*ery si5 years.
In this connection, it "ay )e pointed o#t that that instr#ction
that any /*acany shall )e filled within ninety days/ @in the last sentence of
!ection B @1A of Article <IIIA contrasts with the prohi)ition !ection 17,
Article <II, which is co#ched in stronger negati*e lang#age E that /a
0resident or Acting 0resident shall not "a:e appoint"ents. . ./
3ow, it appears that !ection 17, Article <I is directed against
two types of appoint"ents2 @1A those "ade for )#ying *otes and @2A those
"ade for partisan considerations. $he first refers to those appoint"ents
"ade within the two "onths preceding a 0residential election and are
si"ilar to those which are declared elections offenses in the '"ni)#s
.lection ode. $he second type of appoint"ents prohi)ited )y !ection 17,
Article <II consist of the so9called /"idnight/ appoint"ents.
onsidering the respecti*e reasons for the ti"e fra"es for
filling *acancies in the co#rts and the restriction on the 0residentIs power
of appoint"ents, it is this o#rtIs *iew that, as a general proposition, in
case of conflict, the for"er sho#ld yield to the latter. !#rely, the pre*ention
of *ote9)#ying and si"ilar e*ils o#tweighs the need for a*oiding delays in
filling #p of co#rt *acancies or the disposition of so"e cases. $e"porary
*acancies can a)ide the period of the )an which, incidentally and as
earlier pointed o#t, co"es to e5ist only once in e*ery si5 years. Moreo*er,
those occ#rring in the lower co#rts can )e filled te"porarily )y
designation. B#t prohi)ited appoint"ents are long9lasting and per"anent
in their effects. $hey "ay, as earlier pointed o#t, their "a:ing is
considered an election offense.
$o )e s#re, instances "ay )e concei*ed of the i"perati*e
need for an appoint"ent, d#ring the period of the )an, not only in the
e5ec#ti*e )#t also in the !#pre"e o#rt. $his "ay )e the case sho#ld the
"e")ership of the o#rt )e so red#ced that it will ha*e no 6#or#", or
sho#ld the *oting on a partic#larly i"portant 6#estion re6#iring e5peditio#s
resol#tion )e e*enly di*ided. !#ch a case, howe*er, is co*ered )y neither
!ection 17 of Article <II nor !ections B @1A and 9 of Article <III.
oncerning <alen&#elaKs oath9ta:ing and =reporting for d#ty>
as 0residing H#dge of %$ Branch +2, Bago ity, on May 1B, 1998, it
"#st )e noted that it is a standing practice on the appoint"ents to the
H#diciary [ fro" the highest to the lowest co#rt [ to )e sent )y the 'ffice
of the 0resident to the 'ffice of the hief H#stice, the appoint"ents )eing
addressed to the appointees. It is the ler: of o#rt of the !#pre"e o#rt
in the hiefKs H#stice )ehalf, who thereafter ad*ises the indi*id#al
appointees of their appoint"ents and also the date co""ence"ent of the
pre9re6#isite orientation se"inar to )e cond#cted )y the 0hilippine H#dicial
Acade"y for new H#dges. $he proced#re ens#res the a#thenticity of the
appoint"ents, ena)les the o#rt, partic#larly the 'ffice of the o#rt
Ad"inistrator, to enter in the appropriate records all appoint"ents to the
H#diciary a well as other rele*ant data s#ch as the dates of 6#alification,
the co"pletion )y the appointees of their pre9re6#isite orientation
se"inars, their ass#"ption of d#ty, etc. $he proced#re also precl#des the
possi)ility, howe*er re"ote of H#dges acting on sp#rio#s or otherwise
defecti*e appoint"ents.
$he appoint"ents of Messrs. <alen&#ela and <allarta on
March 4?, 1998 @trans"itted to the 'ffice of the hief H#stice on May 1B,
998A were #n6#estiona)ly "ade d#ring the period of the )an.
onse6#ently, they co"e within the operation of the first prohi)ition
relating to appoint"ents which are considered to )e for the p#rpose of
)#ying *otes or infl#encing the election. 8hile the filling of *acancies in
the -#diciary is #ndo#)tedly in the p#)lic interest, there is no showing in
this case of any co"pelling reason to -#stify the "a:ing of the
appoint"ents d#ring the period of the )an. 'n the other hand, as already
disc#ssed, there is a strong p#)lic policy for the prohi)ition against
appoint"ents "ade within the period of the )an.
In *iew of the foregoing considerations, the o#rt %esol*ed
to D.LA%. <'ID the appoint"ents signed )y 1is .5cellency the
0resident #nder date of March 4?, 1998 of 1on. Mateo A. <alen&#ela and
1on. 0lacido B. <allarta as H#dges of the %egional $rial o#rt of Branch
+2, Bago ity and of Branch 2B, a)anat#an ity, respecti*ely and to
order the", forthwith on )eing ser*ed with notice of this decision, to
forthwith .A!. A3D D.!I!$ fro" discharging the office of H#dge of the
o#rts to which they were respecti*ely appointed on March 4?, 1998.
&INAMIRA VS. GARRUCHO
(188 SCRA 154 519906)
FACTS"
$he petitioner, Bina"ira, was the for"er ,eneral Manager of
the 0hilippine $o#ris" A#thority )y *irt#e of the designation of the Minister
of $o#ris" with the appro*al of 0resident A6#ino. !#)se6#ently,
,arr#cho was delegated )y the 0resident as the new !ecretary of the
Ministry. ,ar#cho then had ta:en o*er the position of Bina"ira as the
,eneral Manager of 0hilippine $o#ris" A#thority. 1ence, this petition.
ISSUES"
1. 8R3 a person designated to a position )y a "e")er of the
ca)inet sho#ld step down to a person newly designated )y
the 0resident to that sa"e position.
2. Disting#ished designation fro" appoint"ent
HELD"
1. D.!. $he designation of the petitioner cannot s#stain his
clai" that he has )een illegally re"o*ed. $he reason is that
the decree clearly pro*ides that the appoint"ent of the
,eneral Manager of the 0hilippine $o#ris" A#thority shall
)e "ade )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines, not )y any
other officer. Appoint"ent in*ol*es the e5ercise of discretion,
which )eca#se of its nat#re cannot )e delegated. Legally
spea:ing, it was not possi)le for Minister ,on&ales to
ass#"e the e5ercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the
0resident.
1is designation )eing an #nlawf#l encroach"ent on a
presidential prerogati*e, he did not ac6#ire *alid title there#nder to the
position in 6#estion. .*en if it )e ass#"ed that it co#ld )e and was
a#thori&ed, the designation signified "erely a te"porary or acting
appoint"ent that co#ld )e legally withdrawn at pleas#re, as in fact it was
@al)eit for a different reasonA.
2. Designation "ay also )e loosely defined as an appoint"ent
)eca#se it li:ewise in*ol*es the na"ing of a partic#lar
person to a specified p#)lic office.
$hat is the co""on #nderstanding of the ter". 1owe*er,
where the person is "erely designated and not appointed, the i"plication
is that he shall hold the office only in a te"porary capacity and "ay )e
129
replaced at will )y the appointing a#thority. In this sense, the designation
is considered only an acting or te"porary appoint"ent, which does not
confer sec#rity of ten#re on the person na"ed.
SARMIENTO VS. MISON
(15% SCRA 154, 1987)
FACTS"
$he petitioners, who are ta5payers, lawyers, "e")ers of the
Integrated Bar of the 0hilippines and professors of onstit#tional Law,
see: to en-oin the respondent !al*ador Mison fro" perfor"ing the
f#nctions of the 'ffice of o""issioner of the B#rea# of #sto"s and the
respondent ,#iller"o arag#e, as !ecretary of the Depart"ent of B#dget,
fro" effecting dis)#rse"ents in pay"ent of MisonIs salaries and
e"ol#"ents, on the gro#nd that MisonIs appoint"ent as o""issioner of
the B#rea# of #sto"s is #nconstit#tional )y reason of its not ha*ing )een
confir"ed )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents. $he respondents, on the
other hand, "aintain the constit#tionality of respondent MisonIs
appoint"ent witho#t the confir"ation of the o""ission on Appoint"ents.
ISSUES"
1. 8hat are the gro#ps of officers who" the 0resident shall
appointC
2. 8R3 confir"ation of the appoint"ents of o""issioners of
the B#rea# of #sto"s )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents
re6#ired.
HELD"
1. Jnder the pro*isions of the 1987 onstit#tion, -#st 6#oted,
there are fo#r @BA gro#ps of officers who" the 0resident shall
appoint. $hese fo#r @BA gro#ps, to which we will hereafter
refer fro" ti"e to ti"e, are2
(irst, the heads of the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, a")assadors,
other p#)lic "inisters and cons#ls, officers of the ar"ed forces fro" the
ran: of colonel or na*al captain, and other officers whose appoint"ents
are *ested in hi" in this onstit#tionG
!econd, all other officers of the ,o*ern"ent whose
appoint"ents are not otherwise pro*ided for )y lawG
$hird, those who" the 0resident "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law
to appointG
(o#rth, officers lower in ran: whose appoint"ents the
ongress "ay )y law *est in the 0resident alone.
$he first gro#p of officers is clearly appointed with the
consent of the o""ission on Appoint"ents. Appoint"ents of s#ch
officers are initiated )y no"ination and, if the no"ination is confir"ed )y
the o""ission on Appoint"ents, the 0resident appoints.
$hose )elonging to second, third and fo#rth gro#ps "ay )e
appointed )y the 0resident witho#t s#ch confir"ation with 'A.
2. 3'. It is e*ident that the position of o""issioner of the
B#rea# of #sto"s @a )#rea# headA is not one of those
within the first gro#p of appoint"ents where the consent of
the o""ission on Appoint"ents is re6#ired. As a "atter of
fact, as already pointed o#t, while the 1947 onstit#tion
incl#des /heads of )#rea#s/ a"ong those officers whose
appoint"ents need the consent of the o""ission on
Appoint"ents, the 1987 onstit#tion, on the other hand,
deli)erately e5cl#ded the position of /heads of )#rea#s/ fro"
appoint"ents that need the consent @confir"ationA of the
o""ission on Appoint"ents.
&AUTISTA VS. SALONGA
(172 SCRA 1%0, 1989)
FACTS"
0resident A6#ino designated Mary Ba#tista as Acting
hair"an of the 1%. Later on, the 0resident e5tended to Ba#tista a
per"anent appoint"ent as hair"an of the o""ission. !he too: her
oath of office )y *irt#e of her appoint"ent as hair"an of the 1%.
Ba#tista recei*ed letters fro" the 'A !ecretary re6#esting
her to s#)"it certain infor"ation and doc#"ents and to )e present at a
"eeting of the 'A o""ittee on H#stice and H#dicial and Bar o#ncil
and 1#"an %ights, in connection with her confir"ation as hair"an of
1%. 1owe*er, she ref#sed to s#)"it herself to the 'A arg#ing that the
latter has no -#risdiction to re*iew her appoint"ent as 1% hair"an.
$he 'AIs secretary sent a letter to the e5ec#ti*e secretary
infor"ing the latter that 'A disappro*ed Ba#tistaIs /ad interi"
appoint"ent/ as hair"an of the 1%, in *iew of her ref#sal to s#)"it to
the -#risdiction of the 'A. It is the 'AIs s#)"ission that the 0resident
decides to the e5tent another appoint"ent to Ba#tista, this ti"e,
s#)"itting s#ch appoint"entRno"ination to the 'A for confir"ation.
ISSUE" 8hether or not confir"ation of the appoint"ents of the hair"an
of the o""ission on 1#"an %ights re6#ires the consent of the 'A.
HELD"
3o, since the office is not one of those "entioned in the first
sentence of Article <II, !ection 1+, nor is it specified elsewhere that s#ch
appoint"ents needs consent of the o""ission, it follows that the
appoint"ent )y the 0resident of the hair"an of the 1% is to )e "ade
witho#t the re*iew or participation of the o""ission on Appoint"ents.
$o )e "ore precise, the appoint"ent of the hair"an and
Me")ers of the o""ission on 1#"an %ights is not specifically pro*ided
for in the onstit#tion itself, #nli:e the hair"en and Me")ers of the i*il
!er*ice o""ission, the o""ission on .lections and the o""ission
on A#dit, whose appoint"ents are e5pressly *ested )y the onstit#tion in
the 0resident with the consent of the o""ission on Appoint"ent.
$he 0resident appoints the hair"an and Me")ers of the
o""ission on 1#"an %ights p#rs#ant to the second sentence in !ection
1+, Art. <II, that is, witho#t the confir"ation of the o""ission on
Appoint"ents )eca#se they are a"ong the officers of go*ern"ent /who"
he @the 0residentA "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law to appoint./ And !ection 2@cA,
.5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 1+4, 7 May 1987, a#thori&es the 0resident to appoint
the hair"an and Me")ers of the o""ission on 1#"an %ights. It
pro*ides2
/@cA $he hair"an and the Me")ers of the o""ission on
1#"an %ights shall )e appointed )y the 0resident for a ter" of se*en
years witho#t re9appoint"ent. Appoint"ent to any *acancy shall )e only
for the #ne5pired ter" of the predecessor./
JUINTOSDELES VS. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
(177 SCRA 259, 1989)
FACTS"
0etitioner and three others were appointed !ectoral
%epresentati*es )y the 0resident p#rs#ant to Article <II, !ection 1+,
paragraph 2 and Article ;<III, !ection 7 of the onstit#tion. 1owe*er, the
appointees were not a)le to ta:e their oaths and discharge their d#ties as
"e")ers of ongress d#e to the opposition of so"e congress"en9
"e")ers of the o""ission on Appoint"ents, who insisted that sectoral
representati*es "#st first )e confir"ed )y the respondent o""ission
)efore they co#ld ta:e their oaths andRor ass#"e office as "e")ers of the
1o#se of %epresentati*es.
ISSUE" 8R3 appoint"ent of !ectoral %epresentati*es re6#ires
confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents.
HELD"
D.!. !ince the seats reser*ed for sectoral representati*es
in paragraph 2, !ection 7, Art. <I "ay )e filled )y appoint"ent )y the
0resident )y e5press pro*ision of !ection 7, Art. ;<III of the onstit#tion,
it is #nd#)ita)le that sectoral representati*es to the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es are a"ong the /other officers whose appoint"ents are
*ested in the 0resident in this onstit#tion,/ referred to in the first
sentence of !ection 1+, Art. <II whose appoint"ents are9s#)-ect to
confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents.
$here are appoint"ents *ested in the 0resident in the
onstit#tion which, )y e5press "andate of the onstit#tion, re6#ire no
confir"ation s#ch as appoint"ents of "e")ers of the !#pre"e o#rt and
-#dges of lower co#rts @!ec. 9, Art. <IIIA and the '")#ds"an and his
dep#ties @!ec. 9, Art. ;IA. 3o s#ch e5e"ption fro" confir"ation had )een
e5tended to appoint"ents of sectoral representati*es in the onstit#tion.
CALDERON VS. CARALE
(208 SCRA 254, 1992)
FACTS"
!o"eti"e in March 1989, %A +717 a"ending the La)or
ode was appro*ed. !ec 14 thereof pro*ides that the hair"an, the
Di*ision 0residing o""issioners and other o""issioners shall all )e
appointed )y the 0resident s#)-ect to the confir"ation )y the o""ission
on Appoint"ent.
0#rs#ant to said law, 0resident A6#ino appointed the
hair"an and o""issioners of the 3L% representing the p#)lic
wor:ers and e"ployees sectors. $he appoint"ent stated that the
appointees "ay 6#alify and enter #pon the perfor"ance of the d#ties of
the office.
$his petition for prohi)ition 6#estions the constit#tionality of
the per"anent appoint"ent e5tended )y the 0resident witho#t s#)"itting
the sa"e to the o""ission on Appoint"ent for confir"ation p#rs#ant to
%A +717.
$he !olicitor ,eneral contends that %A +717 transgresses
!ec 1+ Art <II )y e5panding the confir"ation power of the o""ission on
Appoint"ents witho#t onstit#tional )asis.
ISSUES"
1. May the ongress e5pand the list of those whose
appoint"ent needs confir"ation )y the o""ission on
Appoint"entsC
2. 8hen is confir"ation )y 'A can )e said to )e re6#ired and
notC
HELD"
1. 3', the o#rt held that the ongress "ay not e5pand the
list of appoint"ents needing confir"ation.
$he 3L% hair"an and o""issioners fall within the
second sentence of !ection 1+, Article <II of the onstit#tion, "ore
specifically #nder the /third gro#ps/ of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e.
those who" the 0resident "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law to appoint.
130
Jndenia)ly, the hair"an and Me")ers of the 3L% are not a"ong the
officers "entioned in the first sentence of !ection 1+, Article <II whose
appoint"ents re6#ires confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents.
$o the e5tent that %A +717 re6#ires confir"ation )y the o""ission on
Appoint"ents of the appoint"ents of respondents hair"an and
Me")ers of the 3ational La)or %elations o""ission, it is
#nconstit#tional )eca#se2
a. it a"ends )y legislation, the first sentence of !ec. 1+,
Art. <II of the onstit#tion )y adding thereto
appoint"ents re6#iring confir"ation )y the
o""ission on Appoint"entsG and
). it a"ends )y legislation the second sentence of !ec.
1+, Art. <II of the onstit#tion, )y i"posing the
confir"ation of the o""ission on Appoint"ents on
appoint"ents which are otherwise entr#sted only with
the 0resident
2. onfir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents is
re6#ired only for presidential appointees "entioned in
the first sentence of !ection 1+, Article <II, incl#ding,
those officers whose appoint"ents are e5pressly
*ested )y the onstit#tion itself in the president @li:e
sectoral representati*es to ongress and "e")ers of
the constit#tional co""issions of A#dit, i*il !er*ice
and .lectionA.
onfir"ation is not re6#ired when the 0resident appoints
other go*ern"ent officers whose appoint"ents are not otherwise pro*ided
for )y law or those officers who" he "ay )e a#thori&ed )y law to appoint
@li:e the hair"an and Me")ers of the o""ission on 1#"an %ightsA.
Also, as o)ser*ed in Mison, when ongress creates inferior offices )#t
o"its to pro*ide for appoint"ent thereto, or pro*ides in an #nconstit#tional
"anner for s#ch appoint"ents, the officers are considered as a"ong
those whose appoint"ents are not otherwise pro*ided for )y law.
TARROSA VS. SINGSON
(232 SCRA 553, 1994)
FACTS"
0resident %a"os appointed respondent !ingson as
,o*ernor of the Bang:o !entral. 0etitioner arg#es that this appoint"ent is
n#ll and *oid since it was not s#)"itted for confir"ation to the 'A. $he
petition is anchored on the pro*isions of !ection + of %.A. 3o. 7+74, which
esta)lished the Bang:o !entral as the entral Monetary A#thority of the
0hilippines. !ection +, Article II of %.A. 3o. 7+74 pro*ides2
/!ec. +. o"position of the Monetary Board. $he powers
and f#nctions of the Bang:o !entral shall )e e5ercised )y the Bang:o
!entral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board,
co"posed of se*en @7A "e")ers appointed )y the 0resident of the
0hilippines for a ter" of si5 @+A years.
$he se*en @7A "e")ers are2
@aA $he ,o*ernor of the Bang:o !entral, who shall )e the hair"an of the
Monetary Board. $he ,o*ernor of the Bang:o !entral shall )e head of a
depart"ent and his appoint"ent shall )e s#)-ect to confir"ation )y the
o""ission on Appoint"ents. 8hene*er the ,o*ernor is #na)le to attend
a "eeting of the Board, he shall designate a Dep#ty ,o*ernor to act as
his alternate2 0ro*ided, $hat in s#ch e*ent, the Monetary Board shall
designate one of its "e")ers as acting hair"an . . ./ @Jnderlining
s#ppliedA.
In their co""ent, respondents clai" that ongress
e5ceeded its legislati*e powers in re6#iring the confir"ation )y the
o""ission on Appoint"ents of the appoint"ent of the ,o*ernor of the
Bang:o !entral. $hey contend that an appoint"ent to the said position is
not a"ong the appoint"ents which ha*e to )e confir"ed )y the
o""ission on Appoint"ents, citing !ection 1+ of Article <II of the
onstit#tion.
ISSUE" May the ongress e5pand the confir"ation powers of the
o""ission on Appoint"ents and re6#ire appoint"ent of other
go*ern"ent officials not e5pressly "entioned in the first sentence of !ec.
1+ of Article 7 of the onstit#tionC
HELD"
3'. In this case the o#rt #sed the sa"e r#ling as what
was held in the case of alderon *s. orale, where the r#led was that
ongress cannot )y law e5pand the confir"ation powers of the 'A and
re6#ire confir"ation of appoint"ents of other go*ern"ent officials not
e5pressly "entioned in the first sentence of !ection 1+ of Article <II of the
onstit#tion.
FLORES VS. DRILON
(223 SCRA 5%8, 1993)
FACTS"
Mayor ,ordon of 'longapo ity was appointed hair"an of
!BMA on acco#nt of %A 7227. Jnder said law, for the first year of its
effecti*eness, the "ayor of 'longapo shall )e appointed as chair"an of
the !BMA.
It was arg#ed that said pro*ision *iolates !ec. 7 Art I;29B
which pro*ides2 that no electi*e official shall )e eligi)le for appoint"ent in
any capacity to any p#)lic officer or position d#ring his ten#re.
It was contended that the prohi)ition cannot )e applied d#e
to the presence of a law a#thori&ing the appoint"ent. $he Local
,o*ern"ent ode per"its the appoint"ent of local electi*e official to
another position or post.
ISSUE" 8hether the pro*iso in !ec. 14, par. @dA, of %.A. 7227 which
states, /0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat for the first year of its operations fro" the
effecti*ity of this Act, the "ayor of the ity of 'longapo shall )e appointed
as the chair"an and chief e5ec#ti*e officer of the !#)ic A#thority,/
*iolates the constit#tional proscription against appoint"ent or designation
of electi*e officials to other go*ern"ent posts.
HELD"
D.!. In the case )efore #s, the s#)-ect pro*iso directs the
0resident to appoint an electi*e official, i.e., the Mayor of 'longapo ity,
to other go*ern"ent posts @as hair"an of the Board and hief .5ec#ti*e
'fficer of !BMAA. !ince this is precisely what the constit#tional
proscription see:s to pre*ent, it needs no stretching of the i"agination to
concl#de that the pro*iso contra*enes !ec. 7, first part., Art. I;9B, of the
onstit#tion. 1ere, the fact that the e5pertise of an electi*e official "ay )e
"ost )eneficial to the higher interest of the )ody politic is of no "o"ent.
It is arg#ed that !ec. 9B of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode
@L,A per"its the appoint"ent of a local electi*e official to another post if
so allowed )y law or )y the pri"ary f#nctions of his office. 8 B#t, the
contention is fallacio#s. !ection 9B of the L, is not deter"inati*e of the
constit#tionality of !ec. 14, par. @dA, of %.A. 7227, for no legislati*e act can
pre*ail o*er the f#nda"ental law of the land.
LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(143 SCRA 327, 198%)
FACTS"
$he petitioner was appointed Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer II )y the
city "ayor, Mayor !olon. $he appoint"ent was descri)ed as =per"anent>
)#t the i*il !er*ice !er*ice o""ission appro*ed it as =te"porary>
s#)-ect to the o#tco"e of the protest of the respondent.
$he i*il !er*ice o""ission decided that respondent was
)etter 6#alified, re*o:ed the appoint"ent of petitioner and ordered the
appoint"ent of respondent in his place. $he pri*ate responded was so
appointed )y the new "ayor, Mayor D#terte.
$he petitioner, in*o:ing his earlier =per"anent> appoint"ent,
is now )efore the o#rt to 6#estion that order and the pri*ate respondentKs
title.
ISSUES"
1. Is the i*il !er*ice o""ission a#thori&ed to disappro*e a
per"anent appoint"ent on the gro#nd that another person is )etter
6#alified than the appointee and, on the )asis of this finding, order
his replace"ent )y the latterC
2. 8R3 the i*il !er*ice o""ission has the power to "a:e a
per"anent appoint"ent into a te"porary one.
HELD"
1. 3'. $he i*il !er*ice o""ission is witho#t a#thority to
re*o:e an appoint"ent )eca#se of its )elief that another person
was )etter 6#alified, which is an encroach"ent on the discretion
*ested solely in the city "ayor.
2. 3'. 8hile the principle is correct, and we ha*e applied it
"any ti"es, it is not correctly applied in this case. $he arg#"ent
)egs the 6#estion. $he appoint"ent of the petitioner was not
te"porary )#t per"anent and was therefore protected )y
onstit#tion. $he appointing a#thority indicated that it was
per"anent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the
respondent i*il !er*ice o""ission to re*erse hi" and call it
te"porary.
PO&RE VS. MENDIETA
(224 SCRA 738, 1993)
FACTS"
$his contro*ersy )egan when the ter" of office of 1onora)le
(rancia as 0% o""issionerRhair"an e5pired. At that ti"e, Mendieta
was the senior associate o""issioner and 0o)re was the second
associate o""issioner of the 0%.
$hen the e5ec#ti*e secretary so#ght the opinion of acting
secretary of -#stice on whether the 0resident "ay appoint as
o""issionerRhair"an of the 0% any person other than the !enior
Associate o""issioner. Acting secretary of -#stice answered that !ec. 2
of 0D 224 does not li"it or restrict the appointing power of the 0resident.
0resident A6#ino then appointed the petitioner, then an
Associate o""issioner, as the 0% o""issionerRhair"an.
Mendieta filed a petition for declaratory relief contesting
0o)reKs appoint"ent as hair"an of the 0% )eca#se he allegedly
131
s#cceeded (rancia as 0% hair"an )y operation of law. $he trial co#rt
r#led in fa*or of Mendieta. 1ence, this petition.
ISSUE"
8R3 the *acancy in the co""ission shall )e filled )y =s#ccession> or
=operation of law.
HELD"
3'. $he o#rt finds #naccepta)le the *iew that e*ery
*acancy in the o""ission @e5cept the position of /-#nior/ Associate
o""issionerA shall )e filled )y /s#ccession/ or )y /operation of law/ for
that wo#ld depri*e the 0resident of his power to appoint a new 0%
o""issioner and Associate o""issioners 99 /all to )e appointed )y the
0resident/ #nder 0.D. 3o. 224. $he a)s#rd res#lt wo#ld )e that the only
occasion for the 0resident to e5ercise his appointing power wo#ld )e
when the position of -#nior @or secondA Associate o""issioner )eco"es
*acant. 8e "ay not pres#"e that when the 0resident iss#ed 0.D. 3o.
224, he deli)erately clipped his prerogati*e to choose and appoint the
head of the 0% and li"ited hi"self to the selection and appoint"ent of
only the associate co""issioner occ#pying the lowest r#ng of the ladder
in that agency.
DRILON VS. LIM
(235 SCRA 135, 1994)
FACTS"
0#rs#ant to section 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode
@0roced#re for appro*al and effecti*ity of $a5 'rdianance and %e*en#e
Meas#resA, the !ecretary of H#stice had, on appeal to hi" of fo#r oil
co"panies and ta5payer, declared Manila %e*en#e ode n#ll and *oid for
non9co"pliance with the prescri)ed proced#re in the enact"ent of ta5
ordianance @there were no written notices of p#)lic hearings nor were
copies of the proposed ordinance p#)lishedA.
In a petition for certiorari, %$ re*o:ed !ecretaryKs
resol#tion and s#stained ordinance holding that all the proced#ral
re6#ire"ents had )een o)ser*ed in the enact"ent of the Manila %e*en#e
ode and that the ity of Manila had not )een a)le to pro*e s#ch
co"pliance )efore the !ecretary only )eca#se he had gi*en it only fi*e
days within which to gather and present to hi" all the e*idence later
s#)"itted to the trial co#rt. More i"portantly, it declared !ection 187 of
the L, as #nconstit#tional insofar as it e"powered the !ecretary of
H#stice to re*iew ta5 ordinance and inferentially to ann#l the". 1is
concl#sion was that the challenged section ga*e the !ecretary the power
of control and not of s#per*ision only. $he 1987 onstit#tion pro*ides that
0resident shall e5ercise general s#per*ision o*er local go*ern"ents.
ISSUES"
1. Disting#ish control fro" s#per*ision.
2. 8R3 !ection 187 of the L, ga*e the !ecretary the power
of control and not s#per*ision only.
HELD"
1. An officer in control lays down the r#les in the doing of an
act. It they are not followed, he "ay, in his discretion, order the act
#ndone or re9done )y his s#)ordinate or he "ay e*en decide to do
it hi"self. !#per*ision does not co*er s#ch a#thority. $he
s#per*isor or s#perintendent "erely sees to it that the r#les are
followed, )#t he hi"self does not lay down s#ch r#les, nor does he
ha*e the discretion to "odify or replace the". If the r#les are not
o)ser*ed, he "ay order the wor: done or re9done )#t only to
confor" to the prescri)ed r#les. 1e "ay not prescri)e his own
"anner for the doing of the act. 1e has no -#dg"ent on this "atter
e5cept to see to it that the r#les are followed.
2. 3'. In the opinion of the o#rt, !ecretary Drilon did
precisely this @!ee 3o.1A, and no "ore nor less than this, and so
perfor"ed an act not of control )#t of "ere s#per*ision.
!ecretary Drilon did set aside the Manila %e*en#e ode, )#t
he did not replace it with his own *ersion of what the ode sho#ld
)e. 1e did not prono#nce the ordinance #nwise or #nreasona)le as
a )asis for its ann#l"ent. 1e did not say that in his -#dg"ent it was
a )ad law. 8hat he fo#nd only was that it was illegal. All he did in
re*iewing the said "eas#re was deter"ine if the petitioners were
perfor"ing their f#nctions is accordance with law, that is, with the
prescri)ed proced#re for the enact"ent of ta5 ordinances and the
grant of powers to the city go*ern"ent #nder the Local ,o*ern"ent
ode. As we see it, that was an act not of control )#t of "ere
s#per*ision
81.%.('%., the -#dg"ent is here)y rendered
%.<.%!I3, the challenged decision of the %egional $rial o#rt insofar
as it declared !ection 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode #nconstit#tional
)#t A((I%MI3, its finding that the proced#ral re6#ire"ents in the
enact"ent of the Manila %e*en#e ode ha*e )een o)ser*ed.
REMEDIOS T. &LAJUERA, ET AL. VS. ANGEL C. ALCALA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 10940%, SEPTEM&ER 11, 1998
FACTS"
0etitioners were paid incenti*e )enefits for the year 1992,
p#rs#ant to ..'. 292 and the '"ni)#s %#les I"ple"enting Boo: < of .'
292. 0resident %a"os iss#ed A.'. 29, a#thori&ing the grant of prod#cti*ity
incenti*e )enefits for the year 1992 in the "a5i"#" a"o#nt of 01,???.??
and reiterating the prohi)ition B #nder !ection 7 7 of A.'. 2+8, en-oining
the grant of prod#cti*ity incenti*e )enefits witho#t the 0residentKs prior
appro*al. !ection B of A' 29 directed /all depart"ents, offices and
agencies which a#thori&ed pay"ent of D 1992 0rod#cti*ity Incenti*e
Bon#s in e5cess of the a"o#nt a#thori&ed #nder !ection 1 hereof Oare
here)y directedP to i""ediately ca#se the ret#rnRref#nd of the e5cess
within a period of si5 "onths to co""ence fifteen @17A days after the
iss#ance of this 'rder./ In co"pliance therewith, the heads of the
depart"ents or agencies of the go*ern"ent concerned, who are the
herein respondents, ca#sed the ded#ction fro" petitionersI salaries or
allowances of the a"o#nts needed to co*er the alleged o*erpay"ents.
$h#s, petitioners see: relief fro" this.
0etitioners theori&e that A' 29 and A' 2+8 *iolate .' 292
and since the latter is a law, it pre*ails o*er e5ec#ti*e iss#ances.
0etitioners li:ewise assert that A' 29 and A' 2+8 encroach #pon the
constit#tional a#thority of the i*il !er*ice o""ission to adopt "eas#res
to strengthen the "erit and rewards syste" and to pro"#lgate r#les,
reg#lations and standards go*erning the incenti*e awards syste" of the
ci*il ser*ice.
ISSUE" 8hether or not A' 29 and A' 2+8 were iss#ed in the *alid
e5ercise of presidential control o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"entsC
HELD"
Des. A' 29 and A' 2+8 were iss#ed in the *alid e5ercise of
presidential control o*er the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. $he 0resident is the
head of the go*ern"ent. ,o*ern"ental power and a#thority are e5ercised
and i"ple"ented thro#gh hi". 1is power incl#des the control e5ec#ti*e
depart"ents. ontrol "eans /the power of an officer to alter or "odify or
set aside what a s#)ordinate officer had done in the perfor"ance of his
d#ties and to s#)stit#te the -#dg"ent of the for"er for that of the latter./ It
has )een held that /the 0resident can, )y *irt#e of his power of control,
re*iew, "odify, alter or n#llify any action, or decision, of his s#)ordinate in
the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s, or offices #nder hi". 1e can e5ercise
this power "ot# proprio witho#t need of any appeal fro" any party./
8hen the 0resident iss#ed A' 29 li"iting the a"o#nt of
incenti*e )enefits, en-oining heads of go*ern"ent agencies fro" granting
incenti*e )enefits witho#t prior appro*al fro" hi", and directing the ref#nd
of the e5cess o*er the prescri)ed a"o#nt, the 0resident was -#st
e5ercising his power of control o*er e5ec#ti*e depart"ents. $he 0resident
iss#ed s#)-ect Ad"inistrati*e 'rders to reg#late the grant of prod#cti*ity
incenti*e )enefits and to pre*ent discontent"ent, dissatisfaction and
de"orali&ation a"ong go*ern"ent personnel )y co""itting li"ited
reso#rces of go*ern"ent for the e6#al pay"ent of incenti*es and awards.
$he 0resident was only e5ercising his power of control )y "odifying the
acts of the respondents who granted incenti*e )enefits to their e"ployees
witho#t appropriate clearance fro" the 'ffice of the 0resident, there)y
res#lting in the #ne*en distri)#tion of go*ern"ent reso#rces. In the *iew of
the 0resident, respondents did a "ista:e which had to )e corrected.
VILLENA VS. SECRETAR- OF INTERIOR
(%7 PHIL 451)
FACTS"
It appears that the Di*ision of In*estigation of the
Depart"ent of H#stice, #pon the re6#est of the !ecretary of the Interior,
cond#cted an in6#iry into the cond#ct of the petitioner, as a res#lt of which
the latter was fo#nd to ha*e co""itted )ri)ery, e5tortion, "alicio#s a)#se
of a#thority and #na#thori&ed practice of the law profession. $he
respondent reco""ended to the 0resident of the 0hilippines the
s#spension of the petitioner to pre*ent possi)le coercion of witnesses,
which reco""endation was granted. $he !ecretary of the Interior
s#spended the petitioner fro" office, and then and thereafter wired the
0ro*incial ,o*ernor of %i&al with instr#ction that the petitioner )e ad*ised
accordingly. $he respondent wrote the petitioner a letter, specifying the
"any charges against hi" and notifying hi" of the designation of a
special in*estigator to in*estigate the charges. $he special in*estigator
forthwith notified the petitioner that the for"al in*estigation wo#ld )e
co""enced on March 28, 1949. 1ence, the petition for preli"inary
in-#nction against the !ecretary of Interior to restrain hi" and his agents
fro" preceding with the in*estigation of petitioner which was sched#led to
ta:e place on March 28, 1949.
ISSUES"
1. 8R3 the !ecretary of Interior has the power to order an
in*estigation.
2. 8R3 the !ecretary of Interior has the power to s#spend.
HELD"
1. D.!. !#per*ision is not a "eaningless thing.
It is an acti*e power. It is certainly not witho#t li"itation, )#t it at
least i"plies a#thority to in6#ire into facts and conditions in order to
render the power real and effecti*e. If s#per*ision is to )e
conscientio#s and rational, and not a#to"atic and )r#tal, it "#st )e
fo#nded #pon :nowledge of act#al facts and conditions disclosed
after caref#l st#dy and in*estigation. $he principle there
en#nciated is applica)le with e6#al force to the present case.
132
$he !ecretary of the Interior is in*ested with a#thority to
order the in*estigation of the charges against the petitioner and to
appoint a special in*estigator for that p#rpose.
2. D.!. $he !ecretary of Interior is e"powered
to in*estigate the charges against the pwtitioner and to appoint a
special in*estigator for that p#rpose, pre*enti*e s#spension "ay )e
a "eans )y which to carry into effect a fair and i"partial
in*estigation.
LACSONMAGALLANES CO., INC. VS. PANO
(21 SCRA 395, 19%7)
FACTS"
Hose Magallanes, a per"ittee and act#al occ#pant of a
1,1?49hectare past#re land, ceded his rights and interests to a portion
thereof to plaintiff. !#)se6#ently, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff
was officially released fro" the forest &one as past#re land and declared
agric#lt#ral land.
Hose 0aNo and nineteen other clai"ants applied for the
p#rchase of 9? hectares of the released area. 0laintiff corporation in t#rn
filed its own sales application co*ering the entire released area. $his was
protested )y 0aNo and his co"panions, clai"ing that they are act#al
occ#pants of the part thereof co*ered )y their own sales application.
$he Director of Lands rendered -#dg"ent, gi*ing d#e co#rse
to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dis"issing the clai" of Hose
0aNo and his co"panions. A "o*e to reconsider failed. An appeal was
"ade )#t the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces dis"issed
the sa"e.
8hen the case was ele*ated to the 0resident of the
0hilippines, .5ec#ti*e !ecretary H#an 0a-o, )y a#thority of the 0resident,
"odified the decision of the Director of Lands as affir"ed )y the !ecretary
of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces.
0laintiff corporation too: this decision to the trial co#rt,
praying that -#dg"ent )e rendered declaring that the decision of the
!ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces has f#ll force and effect.
0laintiffIs "ainstay is !ection B of o""onwealth Act 1B1. $he precept
there is that decisions of the Director of Lands /as to 6#estions of fact
shall )e concl#si*e when appro*ed/ )y the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and
3at#ral %eso#rces. 0laintiffIs trenchant clai" is that this stat#te is
controlling not only #pon co#rts )#t also #pon the 0resident.
ISSUE" May the 0resident thro#gh his e5ec#ti*e secretary #ndo an act of
the Director of Lands, which a law pro*ides that s#ch act will )e
concl#si*e when affir"ed )y the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral
%eso#rces '% 8R3 the ad"inistrati*e decision co#ld still )e appealed to
the 0residentC
HELD"
D.!. $he 0residentIs d#ty to e5ec#te the law is of
constit#tional origin. !o, too, is his control of all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents.
$h#s it is, that depart"ent heads are "en of his confidence. 1is is the
power to appoint the"G his, too, is the pri*ilege to dis"iss the" at
pleas#re. 3at#rally, he controls and directs their acts. I"plicit then is his
a#thority to go o*er, confir", "odify or re*erse the action ta:en )y his
depart"ent secretaries. In this conte5t, it "ay not )e said that the
0resident cannot r#le on the correctness of a decision of a depart"ent
secretary.
It "ay )e stated that the right to appeal to the 0resident
reposes #pon the 0residentIs power of control o*er the e5ec#ti*e
depart"ents. And control si"ply "eans the power of an officer to alter or
"odify or n#llify or set aside what a s#)ordinate officer had done in the
perfor"ance of his d#ties and to s#)stit#te the -#dg"ent of the for"er for
that of the latter.
CIT- OF ILIGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
(158 SCRA 158 519886)
FACTS"
0rocla"ation 3o. 447 was iss#ed, withdrawing fro" sale or
settle"ent and reser*ed for the #se of the 30 certain parcels of the
p#)lic do"ain.
Meanwhile, the 30 constr#cted Maria ristina (ertili&er
0lant, which was sold, ceded, transferred and con*eyed to Marcelo $ire
and %#))er orporation, incl#ding the right of occ#pancy and #se of the
land descri)ed in 0rocla"ation 447, !eries of 1972.
0rocla"ation 3o. 2?, !eries of 19+2, and 0rocla"ation 198,
!eries of 19+B, were s#)se6#ently iss#ed, e5cl#ding fro" the operation of
0rocla"ation 3o. 447, !eries of 1972, certain areas occ#pied )y the
Maria ristina (ertili&er 0lant, and declaring the sa"e open to disposition
#nder the pro*isions of 0#)lic Land.
$he Marcelo !teel orporation andRor the Maria ristina
(ertili&er 0lant, thro#gh the 0resident, Hose 0. Marcelo filed in the B#rea#
of Lands a Miscellaneo#s !ales Application for tracts of lands for ind#strial
p#rposes. Director of Lands ad*ised the p#)lic that the B#rea# of Lands
will sell to the highest 6#alified )idder the tract of land co*ered )y
Miscellaneo#s !ales application.
0rocla"ation 3o. B+9 was later iss#ed, which e5cl#de fro"
the reser*ation "ade in fa*or of the 30, e5isting #nder 0rocla"ation 3o.
447, !eries of 1972, and 0rocla"ation 3o. 2?, !eries of 19+2, certain
parcels of land e")raced therein./ Lots 1,19a, 4 and B, containing
appro5i"ately an area of 29,+81 s6#are "eters are descri)ed therein. $he
0rocla"ation f#rther stated /that #pon the reco""endation of the
!ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces and p#rs#ant to !ection
+? of .A. 3o. 1B1, I do here)y grant, donate and transfer the
afore"entioned parcels of land incl#ding the foreshores thereof, in fa*or of
Iligan ity./
$he Mayor of Iligan ity wrote the Director of Lands to
infor" hi" that the ity of Iligan is the owner in fee si"ple of Lots 1, 19a, 4
and B incl#ding the foreshores thereof )y *irt#e of 0rocla"ation 3o. B+9,
!eries of 19+7, and re6#esting that the said property )e e5cl#ded fro" the
proposed a#ction sale./ 3o action was ta:en on this re6#est for e5cl#sion.
1ence, the ity of Iligan filed a co"plaint for in-#nction with
preli"inary in-#nction against the Director of Lands, District Land 'fficer of
Lanao del 3orte and the Marcelo !teel orporation to en-oin and stop the
sale andRor disposition of the afore descri)ed parcels of land.
0resident Marcos iss#ed 0rocla"ation 3o. 9B e5cl#ding
fro" the operation of 0rocla"ation 3o. B+9 certain portions of the land
e")raced therein, sit#ated in Iligan ity and declaring the sa"e open to
disposition. !aid portions of land, as descri)ed therein are Lots 19a, 29a
and 4 of the parcels of land in 6#estion.
After the trial on the "erits, the co#rt dis"issed the
co"plaint and dissol*ed the writ of preli"inary in-#nction. 'n appeal, the
records of the case were certified to this o#rt as the iss#e of the *alidity
of any e5ec#ti*e order and the errors or the 6#estions
of the law raised are within the e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of this o#rt.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 0resident has the power to grant portions of
p#)lic do"ain to any go*ern"ent entity li:e the city of Iligan.
HELD"
D.!. the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces is
the e5ec#ti*e officer9in9charged with the d#ty of carrying o#t the pro*ision
of the 0#)lic Land Act thr# the Director of Lands who acts #nder his
i""ediate control.
!ection B thereof, also pro*ides2
/!ec. B. !#)-ect to said control, the Director of Lands shall
ha*e direct e5ec#ti*e control of the s#r*ey, classification, lease, sale or
any other for" of concession or disposition and "anage"ent of the lands
of the p#)lic do"ain, and his decisions as to 6#estions of fact shall )e
concl#si*e when appro*ed )y the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral
%eso#rces./
!ince it is the Director of Lands who has direct e5ec#ti*e
control a"ong others in the lease, sale or any for" of concession or
disposition of the land of the p#)lic do"ain s#)-ect to the i""ediate
control of the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral %eso#rces, and
considering that #nder the onstit#tion the 0resident of the 0hilippines
has control o*er all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s, and offices, etc., 17
the 0resident of the 0hilippines has therefore the sa"e a#thority to
dispose of portions of the p#)lic do"ain as his s#)ordinates, the Director
of Lands, and his alter ego the !ecretary of Agric#lt#re and 3at#ral
%eso#rces.
GASCON VS. ARRO-O
(178 SCRA 582, 1989)
FACTS"
$he Lope& fa"ily is the owner of two tele*ision stations,
na"ely2 hannels 2 and B which they ha*e operated thro#gh the AB!9
B3 Broadcasting orporation.
8hen "artial law was declared, $< hannel B was closed
)y the "ilitaryG thereafter, its facilities were ta:en o*er )y the Lanlaon
Broadcasting !yste" which operated it as a co""ercial $< station.
In 1978, the said $< station and its facilities were ta:en o*er
)y the 3ational Media 0rod#ction enter @3M0A, which operated it as
the Maharli:a Broadcasting !yste" $< B @MB!9BA.
After the 198+ .D!A re*ol#tion, the 0,, se6#estered the
afore"entioned $< !tations, and, thereafter, the 'ffice of Media Affairs
too: o*er the operation of $< hannel B.
$he Lope& fa"ily, thro#gh co#nsel, re6#ested 0resident
A6#ino to order the ret#rn to the Lope& fa"ily of $< !tations 2 and B.
$hey "ade a written re6#est to the 0,, for the ret#rn of $< !tation
hannel 2. $he 0,, appro*ed the ret#rn of $< !tation hannel 2 to the
Lope& fa"ily. $he ret#rn was "ade on 18 'cto)er 198+.
$hereafter, the Lope& fa"ily re6#ested for the ret#rn of $<
!tation hannel B. Acting #pon the re6#est, respondent .5ec#ti*e
!ecretary, )y a#thority of the 0resident, entered into with the AB!9B3
Broadcasting orporation, represented )y its 0resident, .#genio Lope&,
Hr., an /Agree"ent to Ar)itrate/, 4 p#rs#ant to which an Ar)itration
o""ittee was created, co"posed of Atty. atalino Macaraig, Hr., for the
%ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, Atty. 0astor del %osario, for AB!9B3, and
retired H#stice <icente A)ad !antos, as hair"an.
$here#pon, petitioners, as ta5payers, filed the instant
petition.
133
ISSUE" 8R3 the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary has the power and a#thority to enter
into an Agree"ent to Ar)itrate.
HELD"
D.!. %espondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary has the power and
a#thority to enter into the Agree"ent to ar)itrate with the AB!9B3
Broadcasting orporation as he acted for and in )ehalf of the 0resident
when he signed it.
Jnder the 0ro*isional onstit#tion of the %ep#)lic of the
0hilippines @also :nown as the (reedo" onstit#tionA, which was in force
and effect when the /Agree"ent to Ar)itrate/ was signed )y the parties
thereto on + Han#ary 1987, the 0resident e5ercised )oth the legislati*e
and e5ec#ti*e powers of the ,o*ern"ent. As hief .5ec#ti*e, the
0resident was @and e*en nowA /assisted )y a a)inet/ co"posed of
Ministers @now !ecretariesA, who were appointed )y and acco#nta)le to
the 0resident. In other words, the Me")ers of the ca)inet, as heads of
the *ario#s depart"ents, are the assistants and agents of the hief
.5ec#ti*e, and, e5cept in cases where the hief .5ec#ti*e is re6#ired )y
the onstit#tion or the law to act in person, or where the e5igencies of the
sit#ation de"and that he act personally, the "#ltifario#s e5ec#ti*e and
ad"inistrati*e f#nctions of the hief .5ec#ti*e are perfor"ed )y and
thro#gh the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, and the acts of the heads of s#ch
depart"ents, perfor"ed in the reg#lar co#rse of )#siness, are, #nless
disappro*ed or repro)ated )y the hief .5ec#ti*e, pres#"pti*ely the acts
of the hief .5ec#ti*e.
%espondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary had, therefore, the power
and a#thority to enter into the /Agree"ent to Ar)itrate/ with the AB!9B3
Broadcasting orporation, as he acted for and in )ehalf of the 0resident
when he signed itG hence, the aforesaid agree"ent is *alid and )inding
#pon the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, as a party thereto.
7ILUSANG &A-AN VS. DOMINGUE$
(205 SCRA 92, 1992)
FACTS"
$he M#nicipal ,o*ern"ent of M#ntinl#pa entered into a
contract with the Lil#sang Bayan sa 0agliling:od ng "ga 3agtitinda sa
Bagong 0a"ilihang Bayan ng M#ntinl#pa @:il#sanA for the latterIs
"anage"ent and operation of the M#ntinl#pa 0#)lic Mar:et. 8hen
Ignacio B#nye @petitioner in ,% 91927A )eca"e Mayor of M#ntinl#pa, he
directed a re*iew of s#ch contract, clai"ing that the *irt#al, 7?9year ter"
agree"ent was contrary to !ec. 1B4 @4A of B0 447. 1e so#ght opinions
fro" the 'A and the Metro Manila o""ission after which the latter
granted the M#nicipality the a#thority to ta:e the necessary legal steps for
the cancellation of the a)o*e contract.
onse6#ently, #pon the presentation "ade )y B#nye with
the M#nicipal o#ncil, the latter appro*ed %esol#tion 3o. B7 a)rogating
the contract. B#nye, together with "en fro" the 0, proceeded to the
p#)lic "ar:et and anno#nced to the general p#)lic that the M#nicipality
was ta:ing o*er the "anage"ent and operation of the facility therein. $he
officers of the Lil#san filed s#it for )reach of contract and da"ages, and
contin#ed holding office in the LB B#ilding #nder their respecti*e official
capacities.
B#nye, together with so"e hea*ily ar"ed "en, forci)ly
opened the doors of the offices of petitioners p#rportedly to ser*e the"
the 'rder of then !ec. of Agric#lt#re arlos Do"ing#e&, ordering 1A the
ta:e o*er )y the Depart"ent of Agric#lt#re of the "anage"ent o*er the
p#)lic "ar:et p#rs#ant to the Depart"ent %eg#latory and !#per*isory
0ower #nder !ec. 8 of 0D 177 and !ec. B of .' 3o.4G 2A the creation of a
Manage"ent o""ittee which shall ass#"e the "anage"ent of Lil#sanG
and 4A the dis)and, of the Board of Directors and BA the t#rn o*er of all
assets, properties and records to the Manage"ent o""ittee. 0etitioners
filed this petition praying that the 'rder to )e declared n#ll and *oid as the
respondent !ecretary acted witho#t or in e5cess of -#risdiction in iss#ing
the order.
ISSUE" 8R3 28 'cto)er 1988 'rder of respondent !ecretary of
Agric#lt#re is witho#t or in e5cess of -#risdictionC
HELD"
D.!. 0.D. 3o. 177 and the )y9laws of the LBMB0M
e5plicitly "andate the "anner )y which directors and officers are to )e
re"o*ed. $he !ecretary sho#ld ha*e :nown )etter than to disregard these
proced#res and rely on a "ere petition )y the general "e")ership of the
LBMB0M and an on9going a#dit )y Depart"ent of Agric#lt#re a#ditors in
e5ercising a power which he does not ha*e, e5pressly or i"pliedly.
An ad"inistrati*e officer has only s#ch powers as are
e5pressly granted to hi" and those necessarily i"plied in the e5ercise
thereof. $hese powers sho#ld not )e e5tended )y i"plication )eyond what
"ay )e necessary for their -#st and reasona)le e5ec#tion.
!#per*ision and control incl#de only the a#thority to2 @aA act
directly whene*er a specific f#nction is entr#sted )y law or reg#lation to a
s#)ordinateG @)A direct the perfor"ance of d#tyG restrain the co""ission of
actsG @cA re*iew, appro*e, re*erse or "odify acts and decisions of
s#)ordinate officials or #nitsG @dA deter"ine priorities in the e5ec#tion of
plans and progra"sG and @eA prescri)e standards, g#idelines, plans and
progra"s. !pecifically, ad"inistrati*e s#per*ision is li"ited to the a#thority
of the depart"ent or its e6#i*alent to2 @1A generally o*ersee the operations
of s#ch agencies and ins#re that they are "anaged effecti*ely, efficiently
and econo"ically )#t witho#t interference with day9to9day acti*itiesG @2A
re6#ire the s#)"ission of reports and ca#se the cond#ct of "anage"ent
a#dit, perfor"ance e*al#ation and inspection to deter"ine co"pliance
with policies, standards and g#idelines of the depart"entG @4A ta:e s#ch
action as "ay )e necessary for the proper perfor"ance of official
f#nctions, incl#ding rectification of *iolations, a)#ses and other for"s of
"al9ad"inistrationG @BA re*iew and pass #pon )#dget proposals of s#ch
agencies )#t "ay not increase or add to the".
ANGANGCO VS. CASTILLO
9 SCRA %19 519%36
FACTS"
$he 0epsi9ola (ar .ast $rade re6#ested for special per"it
to withdraw 0epsi ola concentrates fro" the c#sto"s ho#se. 0etitioner
ollector of #sto"s Isidro Ang9angco ad*ised the co#nsel for 0epsi9ola
to try to sec#re the necessary release certificate fro" the 3o9dollar I"port
'ffice. A6#iles Lope& of said office wrote petitioner, stating that it co#ld
not ta:e action on the re6#est, as the sa"e is not within the -#risdiction of
the 'ffice. (ollowing !ecretary of (inance 1ernande&Ks appro*al of the
release, petitioner a#thori&ed release of the concentrates.
8hen #sto"s o""issioner Manahan learned of said
release, he ordered the sei&#re of the goods )#t only a portion thereof
re"ained in the wareho#se. $h#s, he filed an ad"inistrati*e s#it against
petitioner.
After an in*estigation, respondent .5ec#ti*e !ecretary
3atalio astillo fo#nd petitioner g#ilty of cond#ct pre-#dicial to the )est
interest of the ser*ice and considering hi" resigned, with pre-#dice to
reinstate"ent in the B#rea# of #sto"s. 0etitioner wrote 0res. ,arcia,
asserting that the action ta:en )y respondent had the effect of depri*ing
hi" of his stat#tory right to ha*e his case originally decided )y the !,
as well as of his right or appeal to the i*il !er*ice Board of Appeals,
whose decision #nder %A 22+? is final. By a#thority of the 0resident,
respondent denied reconsideration, as well as the appeal. 1ence, this
present petition.
ISSUE" 8hether the 0resident has the power to "a:e direct action on the
case of petitioner e*en if he )elongs to the classified ser*ice in spite of the
pro*ision now in the i*il !er*ice Act of 1979.
HELD"
$he action ta:en )y respondent e5ec#ti*e !ecretary, e*en
with the a#thority of the 0resident in ta:ing direct action on the
ad"inistrati*e case, petitioner, witho#t s#)"itting the sa"e to the
o""ission of i*il !er*ice is contrary to law and sho#ld )e set aside.
$he following are the reasons2
1. Jnder sec 1+ of the i*il !er*ice Act of 1979, it is the
o""issioner of i*il !er*ice who has original and e5cl#si*e -#risdiction
to decide ad"inistrati*e cases of all officers and e"ployees in the
classified ser*ice. $he only li"itation to this power is the decision of the
o""issioner "ay )e appealed to the i*il ser*ice Board of Appeals, in
which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 9? days
after the sa"e has )een s#)"itted for decision, whose decision in s#ch
cases shall )e final. It is therefore clear that #nder the present pro*ision of
the i*il !er*ice act of 1979, the case of petitioner co"es #nder the
e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of the o""issioner of i*il !er*ice, and ha*ing
)een depri*ed of the proced#re and down therein in connection with the
in*estigation and disposition of this case, it "ay )e said that he has )een
depri*ed of d#e process g#aranteed )y said law.
2. Let #s now ta:e #p the power of control gi*en to the
0resident )y the onstit#tion o*er all offices and e"ployees in the
e5ec#ti*e depart"ent which is not in*o:ed )y respondents as -#stification
to o*erride the specific pro*ision of the i*il !er*ice Act. $he power
"erely applies to the e5ercise of control o*er the acts of the s#)ordinate
and not o*er the actor or agent hi"self of the act. It only "eans that the
0resident "ay set aside the -#dg"ent of action ta:en )y the s#)ordinate
in the perfor"ance of d#ties.
4. 3ot the strongest arg#"ent against the theory of
respondents is that it wo#ld entirely n#llify and set aside at na#ght the
)eneficent p#rpose of the whole i*il !er*ice syste" as i"planted in this
-#risdiction which is to gi*e sta)ility to the ten#re of office of those who
)elong to the classified ser*ice, in derogation of the pro*ision of o#r
onstit#tion which pro*ides the =3o officer or e"ployee in the ci*il ser*ice
shall )e re"o*ed or s#spended e5cept for ca#se as pro*ided )y law.> $he
power of control of the 0resident "ay e5tend to the power to in*estigate,
s#spend or re"o*e officers and e"ployees who )elong to the e5ec#ti*e
depart"ent if they are presidential appointee or do not )elong to the
classified ser*ice for to the" that inherent power cannot )e e5ercised.
$his is in line with the pro*ision of o#r constit#tional which saysG =$he
ongress "ay )y law *est the appoint"ent of the inferior officers in the
0resident alone
in the co#rts or in the heads of depart"ent> and with regards to these
officers pro*ided )y law for a proced#re for their re"o*al precisely in *iew
of this constit#tional a#thority. 'ne s#ch law is the i*il !er*ice Act of
179.
NATIONAL MAR7ET CORP. (NAMARCO) VS. ARCA
(29 SCRA %48 5SEPTEM&ER 30, 19%96)
FACTS"
134
%espodent Ari*e was the Manager of the $raffic9!torage
Depart"ent of the 3AMA%'. 0#rs#ant to the ,eneral ManagerKs
Ad"inistrati*e 'rder, he was in*estigated )y a co""ittee for *iolating
Manage"ent Me"orand#" 'rder [ declaring =that the allocation and
deli*eries of "erchansdise i"ported to its designated )eneficiaries )e
stopped> and ca#sing the i"proper release of ship"ents intended for
deli*ery.
After d#e hearing, the in*estigating co""ittee fo#nd Ari*e
g#ilty of charges and he was dis"issed. Ari*e appealed fro" the decision
of the 3AMA%' to the 0resident. $he 3AMA%' was ad*ised )y the
'ffice of the 0resident of the appeal, and was as:ed to forward the
records of the Ad"inistrati*e case. $he .5ec#ti*e !ecretary, pres#"a)ly
acting for the 0resident, handed down a decision setting aside the
resol#tion of the )oard of directors and reinstating Ari*e.
3AMA%', thro#gh its ,eneral Manager, so#ght
reconsideration, contended that the 'ffice of the 0resident had no
-#risdiction to re*iew any decision of the 3AMA%' Board of Directors
re"o*ing s#spending or otherwise disciplining any of its s#)ordinate
e"ployees, )eca#se %A 14B7 @the 3AMA%' harterA, which grants that
power to the ,eneral Manager and to the Board of Directors, does not
pro*ide for an appeal to any go*ern"ental )ody. $his "otion for
reconsideration was denied twice )y the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary on the
gro#nd that the 0resident had -#risdiction #nder his constit#tional power of
control o*er all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s and offices.
$he 'ffice of the 0resident, acting on co"plaints of Ari*e
that he had not )een reinstated in spite of the denial of the 3AMA%'Is
two "otions for reconsideration, sent a telegra" to the ,eneral Manager
re6#esting hi" to act on the case and to co""ent within forty9eight ho#rsG
)#t the said ,eneral Manager neither acted on the case nor co""ented.
%espondent H#an $. Ari*e filed against the 3AMA%' and
the "e")ers of its Board of Directors an action for reinstate"ent. H#dge
Arca r#led in his fa*or, ordering 3AMA%' to reinstate Ari*e. DefendantsK
"otion for reconsideration was denied. 1ence, the present petition.
ISSUE" 8.$1.% '% 3'$ the preident has the power to re*iew and
re*erse decisions of go*ern"ent corporations.
HELD"
D.!. $he o#rt hold that the 0resident of the 0hilippinesI
a#thority to re*iew and re*erse the decision of the 3AMA%' Board of
Directors dis"issing H#an $. Ari*e fro" his position in the 3AMA%' and
to order his reinstate"ent falls within the constit#tional power of the
0resident o*er all e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s and offices. Jnder o#r
go*ern"ental set#p, corporations owned or controlled )y the go*ern"ent,
s#ch as the 3AMA%', parta:e of the nat#re of go*ern"ent )#rea#s or
offices, which are ad"inistrati*ely s#per*ised )y the Ad"inistrator of the
'ffice of .cono"ic oordination, /whose co"pensation and ran: shall )e
that of a head of an .5ec#ti*e Depart"ent/ and who /shall )e responsi)le
to the 0resident of the 0hilippines #nder whose control his f#nctions . . .
shall )e e5ercised./
GUA$ON VS. DE VILLA
(181 SCRA %23, 1990)
FACTS"
$his is a petition for prohi)ition with preli"inary in-#nction to
prohi)it the "ilitary and police officers represented )y p#)lic respondents
fro" cond#cting /Areal $arget Xonings/ or /!at#ration Dri*es/ in Metro
Manila.
$he petitioners co"plains that police and "ilitary #nits
witho#t any search warrant or warrant of arrest goes to an area of "ore
than one residence and so"eti"es whole )arangay or areas of )arangay
in Metro Manila to search for e*idence of offenses that "ay ha*e )een
co""itted. $he petitioners clai" that the sat#ration dri*es follow a
co""on pattern of h#"an rights a)#ses.
!olicitor ,eneral arg#es -#st the contrary, that it had )een
cond#cted with d#e regard to h#"an rights.
ISSUE" 8R3 the 0resident has the power to order sat#ration dri*es.
HELD"
D.!. $here is, of co#rse, nothing in the onstit#tion which
denies the a#thority of the hief .5ec#ti*e, in*o:ed )y the !olicitor
,eneral, to order police actions to stop #na)ated cri"inality, rising
lawlessness, and alar"ing co""#nist acti*ities. $he onstit#tion grants to
,o*ern"ent the power to see: and cripple s#)*ersi*e "o*e"ents which
wo#ld )ring down constit#ted a#thority and s#)stit#te a regi"e where
indi*id#al li)erties are s#ppressed as a "atter of policy in the na"e of
sec#rity of the !tate. 1owe*er, all police actions are go*erned )y the
li"itations of the Bill of %ights.
RAMON RUFF- VS. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, PHILIPPINE ARM-
(G.R. NO. L533, AUGUST 20, 194%)
TUASON !.
FACTS"
It appears that at the o#t)rea: of war in 19B1, %a"on %#ffy
was the 0ro*incial o""ander, 0r#dente M. (rancisco, a -#nior officer,
and Andres (ort#s, a corporal, all of the 0hilippine onsta)#lary garrison
stationed in Mindoro. 8hen the Hapanese forces landed in Mindoro, Ma-or
%#ffy retreated to the "o#ntains instead of s#rrendering to the ene"y,
dis)anded his co"pany, and organi&ed and led a g#errilla o#tfit :nown as
Bolo o")at tea" of Bolo Area.
D#ring the occ#pation of the 0hilippines )y the Hapanese
forces, the Bolo Area in Mindoro was a contingent of the +th Military
District, which had )een recogni&ed )y and placed #nder the operational
control of the J! Ar"y in the !o#thwest 0acific.
A change in the co""and in the Bolo Area was effected )y
ol. H#rado, the then o""anding 'fficer of the Bolo o")at $ea" in
Mindoro. Ma-or %#ffy was relie*ed of his assign"ent as o""anding
'fficer of the Bolo Area. ol. H#rado was slain allegedly )y the petitioners.
After the co""ission of this cri"e, it is alleged that the petitioners
seceded fro" the +th Military District. It was this "#rder which ga*e rise to
petitionerIs trial, the legality of which is now )eing contested.
A trial )y the ,eneral o#rt Martial ens#ed and which
res#lted to the ac6#ittal of %a"on %#ffy and dis"issal of the case as to
<ictoriano Dinglasan and the con*iction of Hose ,arcia, 0r#dente
(rancisco, Do"inador Ade*a and Andres (ort#s.
$he petitioners who were con*icted filed s#it )efore this
o#rt, assailing the constit#tionality of 94rd Article of 8ar. It ordains /that
any person s#)-ect to "ilitary law who co""its "#rder in ti"e of war
sho#ld s#ffer death or i"prison"ent for life, as the co#rt "artial "ay
direct/ It is arg#ed that since /no re*iew is pro*ided )y that law to )e "ade
)y the !#pre"e o#rt, irrespecti*e of whether the p#nish"ent is for life
i"prison"ent or death/ it *iolated Art. <III !ee 2 par B of the onstit#tion.
It pro*ides that /the 3ational Asse")ly "ay not depri*e the !#pre"e
o#rt of its original -#risdiction o*er all cri"inal cases in which the penalty
i"posed is death or life i"prison"ent.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 94rd of Article of 8ar #nconstit#tionalC
HELD"
3'. $he petitioners are in error. $his error arose fro" fail#re
to percei*e the nat#re of co#rts "artial and the so#rces of the a#thority for
their creation. o#rt Martial are agencies of e5ec#ti*e character and one
of the a#thorities for ordering of co#rt "artial has )een held to )e attached
to the constit#tional f#nctions of the 0resident as o""ander in hief,
independently of legislation.
Jnli:e co#rt of law, they are not a portion of -#diciary. $hey
are in fact si"ply instr#"entalities of the e5ec#ti*e power, pro*ided )y
ongress for the 0resident as o""ander in chief to aid hi" in properly
co""anding the ar"y and na*y and enforcing discipline therein and
#tili&ed #nder his order 'r those of his a#thori&ed "ilitary representati*es.
$he petition is therefore has no "erit and that it sho#ld )e
dis"issed with costs.
OLAGUER VS. MILITAR- COMMISSION NO. 34
(150 SCRA 144, 1987)
FACTS"
$he petitioners were charged for s#)*ersion.
$he respondent hief of !taff of the A(0 created the
respondent Military o""ission 3o. 4B to try the cri"inal case filed
against the petitioners. An a"ended charge sheet was filed for se*en
offenses, na"ely2 @1A #nlawf#l possession of e5plosi*es and incendiary
de*icesG @2A conspiracy to assassinate 0resident and Mrs. MarcosG @4A
conspiracy to assassinate ca)inet "e")ers H#an 0once .nrile, (rancisco
$atad and <icente 0aternoG @BA conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Art#ro
$angco, Hose %oNo and 'nofre orp#sG @7A arson of nine )#ildingsG @+A
atte"pted "#rder of Messrs. Leonardo 0ere&, $eodoro <alencia and
,enerals %o"eo .spino and (a)ian <erG and @7A conspiracy and proposal
to co""it re)ellion, and inciting to re)ellion. !o"eti"e thereafter, trial
ens#ed.
In the co#rse of the proceedings the petitioners went to this
o#rt and filed the instant 0etition for prohi)ition and ha)eas corp#s.
$hey so#ght to en-oin the respondent Military o""ission 3o. 4B fro"
proceeding with the trial of their case. $hey li:ewise so#ght their release
fro" detention )y way of a writ of ha)eas corp#s. $he thr#st of their
arg#"ents is that "ilitary co""issions ha*e no -#risdiction to try ci*ilians
for offenses alleged to ha*e )een co""itted d#ring the period of "artial
law.
ISSUE" 8R3 "ilitary co""issions ha*e no -#risdiction to try ci*ilians for
offenses alleged to ha*e )een co""itted d#ring the period of "artial law.
HELD"
Military co""ission has no -#risdiction to try ci*ilians when
the ci*il co#rts are open.
D#e process of law de"ands that in all cri"inal prosec#tions
@where the acc#sed stands to lose either his life or his li)ertyA, the
acc#sed shall )e entitled to, a"ong others, a trial. $he trial conte"plated
)y the d#e process cla#se of the onstit#tion, in relation to the harter as
a whole, is a trial )y -#dicial process, not )y e5ec#ti*e or "ilitary process.
Military co""issions or tri)#nals, )y whate*er na"e they are called, are
not co#rts within the 0hilippine -#dicial syste".
JUILONA VS. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL
(20% SCRA 821, 1992)
135
FACTS"
$he petitioner is a police"en assigned at the 80D. 1e was
charged with "#rder )efore the respondent general co#rt "artial.
At the sched#led arraign"ent on Dece")er 17, 199?,
petitionerIs co#nsel "anifested to the ,eneral I o#rt Martial his clientIs
desire to )e arraigned and to )e tried instead )y a ci*ilian co#rt.
Arraign"ent was reset.
At the ne5t arraign"ent on Dece")er 21, 199?, petitioner
filed a "otion as:ing that the co#rt "al1ial inhi)it itself front p#rs#ing the
arraign"ent of the acc#sed and to ha*e his case in*estigated )y the
ci*ilian prosec#tor or at least tried )y a ci*ilian co#rt.
Altho#gh set or oral arg#"ent of Han#ary 4, 1991,
respondent co#rt decided to ha*e the "otion arg#ed on the day it was
filed. $he "otion was denied, the sa"e with the "otion for
reconsideration.
0etitioner ref#sed to enter a plea and said that he wo#ld
ele*ate the case to the !. 3e*ertheless, a plea of not g#ilty was entered
#pon co#rt order.
1ence, this petition for certiorari and prohi)ition.
ISSUE" 8hether or not respondent co#rt "artial acted with gra*e a)#se of
discretion.
HELD"
D.! the respondent co#rt "artial acted with gra*e a)#se of
discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction in proceeding with
the arraign"ent of the petitioner.
%ep#)lic Act 3o. +977, 1? creating the 0hilippine 3ational
0olice @030A, which too: effect on 1 Han#ary 1991, pro*ides2 /!.. B+.
H#risdiction in ri"inal ases. Any pro*ision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, cri"inal cases in*ol*ing 030 "e")ers shall )e within
the e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of the reg#lar co#rts2 5 5 5. 0ro*ided, f#rther,
that cri"inal cases against 09I30 "e")ers who "ay ha*e not yet )een
arraigned #pon the effecti*ity of this it shall )e transferred to the proper
city or pro*incial prosec#tor or "#nicipal trial co#rt -#dge./
Altho#gh %ep#)lic Act 3o. +977 was not yet in effect when
petitioner was arraigned on 28 Dece")er 199?, ne*ertheless, respondent
co#rt "artial :new or sho#ld ha*e :nown that the said Act had already
)een signed or appro*ed )y the 0resident on 14 Dece")er 199? and that
the sa"e was p#)lished in two @2A national newspapers of general
circ#lation on 17 Dece")er 199? and that it wo#ld ta:e effect on 1
Han#ary 1991. It is precisely for this reason that respondent co#rt "artial
decided to ha*e the petitionerIs "otion to inhi)it arg#ed on 28 Dece")er
199? and thereafter arraigned the petitioner on the sa"e day despite his
*ehe"ent ref#sal to enter a plea.
learly, #nder the circ#"stances o)taining in the present
case, respondent co#rt "artial acted with gra*e a)#se of discretion
a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction in proceeding with the
arraign"ent of the petitioner.
TORRES VS. GON$ALES
(152 SCRA 272, 1987)
FACTS"
0etitioner was con*icted )y the trial co#rt of the cri"e of
estafa and was sentenced to prison ter". 0etitioner was later granted a
conditional pardon on condition that petitioner wo#ld /not again *iolate any
of the penal laws of the 0hilippines. !ho#ld this condition )e *iolated, he
will )e proceeded against in the "anner prescri)ed )y law./ 0etitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was conse6#ently released fro"
confine"ent.
$he Board of 0ardons and 0arole @the /Board/A resol*ed to
reco""end to the 0resident the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to the petitioner. $he e*idence )efore the Board showed that on
22 March 1982 and 2B H#ne 1982, petitioner had )een charged with
twenty co#nts of estafa, which cases were then pending trial )efore the
%egional $rial o#rt of %i&al. $he record also showed that petitioner had
)een con*icted )y the trial co#rt of the cri"e of sedition2 this con*iction
was then pending appeal )efore the Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt.
%espondent Minister of H#stice wrote to the 0resident of the
0hilippines infor"ing her of the %esol#tion of the Board reco""ending
cancellation of the conditional pardon pre*io#sly granted to petitioner.
$hereafter, the 0resident cancelled the conditional pardon of the
petitioner.
%espondent Minister iss#ed /)y a#thority of the 0resident/
an 'rder of Arrest and %eco""it"ent against petitioner. $he petitioner
was accordingly arrested and confined in M#ntinl#pa to ser*e the
#ne5pired portion of his sentence.
0etitioner now i"p#gns the *alidity of the 'rder of Arrest
and %eco""it"ent. 1e clai"s that he did not *iolate his conditional
pardon since he has not )een con*icted )y final -#dg"ent of the estafa
nor of the cri"e of sedition.
ISSUE" 8hether or not con*iction of a cri"e )y final -#dg"ent of a co#rt is
necessary )efore the petitioner can )e *alidly rearrested and reco""itted
for *iolation of the ter"s of his conditional pardon.
HELD"
It depends.
$he deter"ination of the occ#rrence of a )reach of a
condition of a pardon, and the proper conse6#ences of s#ch )reach, "ay
)e either a p#rely e5ec#ti*e act, not s#)-ect to -#dicial scr#tiny #nder
!ection +B @iA of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e odeG or it "ay )e a -#dicial
act consisting of trial for and con*iction of *iolation of a conditional pardon
#nder Article 179 of the %e*ised 0enal ode. 8here the 0resident opts to
proceed #nder !ection +B @iA of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode, no
-#dicial prono#nce"ent of g#ilt of a s#)se6#ent cri"e is necessary, "#ch
less con*iction therefor )y final -#dg"ent of a co#rt, in order that a con*ict
"ay )e reco""ended for the *iolation of his conditional pardon.
1ere, the 0resident has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner #nder !ection +B @iA of the %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e ode. $hat
choice is an e5ercise of the 0residentIs e5ec#ti*e prerogati*e and is not
s#)-ect to -#dicial scr#tiny.
MONSANTO VS. FACTORAN, !R.
(170 SCRA 190, 1989)
FACTS"
$he !andigan)ayan con*icted petitioner Monsanto and
three acc#sed of the co"ple5 cri"e of estafa thr# falsification of p#)lic
doc#"ents.
0etitioner Monsanto appealed her con*iction to this o#rt
which s#)se6#ently affir"ed the sa"e. !he then filed a "otion for
reconsideration )#t while said "otion was pending, she was e5tended )y
then 0residen Marcos a)sol#te pardon which she accepted.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the al)ayog ity
$reas#rer re6#esting that she )e restored to her for"er post as assistant
city treas#rer since the sa"e was still *acant.
0etitionerKs letter9re6#est was referred to the Ministry of
(inance for resol#tion. $he (inance Ministry r#led that petitioner "ay )e
reinstated to her position witho#t the necessity of a new appoint"ent not
earlier than the date she was e5tended the a)sol#te pardon. It also
directed the city treas#rer to see to it that the a"o#nt of 0B,892.7? which
the !andigan)ayan had re6#ired to )e inde"nified in fa*or of the
go*ern"ent.
!ee:ing reconsideration of the foregoing r#ling, petitioner
wrote the Ministry stressing that the f#ll pardon )estowed on her has
wiped p#t the cri"e which i"plies that her ser*ice in the go*ern"ent has
ne*er )een interr#pted and therefore the date of reinstate"ent sho#ld
correspond to the date of her pre*enti*e s#spensionG that she is entitled to
)ac:pay for the entire period of her s#spensionG and that she sho#ld not
)e re6#ired to pay the proportionate share of the a"o#nt of 0B892.7?.
$he Ministry of (inance referred petitionerKs letter to the
'ffice of the 0resident for f#rther re*iew and action.
$he respondent Dep#ty .5ec#ti*e !ecretary (actoran
denied the petitionerKs re6#est and holds that Monsanto is not entitled to
an a#to"atic reinstate"ent on the )asis of the a)sol#te pardon granted
her, )#t "#st sec#re an appoint"ent to her for"er position and that she is
lia)le for the ci*il lia)ility to her pre*io#s con*iction.
0etitioner filed a "otion for reconsideration which was
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE" 8R3 a p#)lic officer who had )een granted an a)sol#te pardon )y
the hief .5ec#ti*e is entitled to reinstate"ent to her for"er position
witho#t need of a new appoint"ent.
HELD"
3'. 1a*ing accepted the pardon, petitioner is dee"ed to
ha*e a)andoned her appeal and her con*iction )y the !andigan)ayan
and has ass#"ed the character of finality.
$he essence of pardon is the re"ission of g#ilt. $h#s pardon
i"plies g#ilt. 0ardon does not ipso facto reinstate a con*icted felon to
p#)lic office which was forfeited )y reason of the con*iction. It sho#ld )e
noted that p#)lic office is intended pri"arily for collecti*e protection, safety
and )enefit of the co""on good. $h#s, it cannot )e co"pro"ised to fa*or
pri*ate interests. A pardon does not *irt#ally ac6#it the acc#sed of the
offense charged.
B#t the pardon restores the petitioner eligi)ility for
appoint"ent to the said office. $h#s, to regain her for"er post, she "#st
reapply and #ndergo the #s#al proced#re re6#ired for a new appoint"ent.
PEOPLE VS. SALLE
(250 SCRA 581, 1995)
FACTS"
Acc#sed9appellants (rancisco !alle, Hr. and %ic:ey Mengote
were fo#nd g#ilty )eyond reasona)le, do#)t as co9principals of the
co"po#nd cri"e of "#rder and destr#cti*e arson. Appellants seasona)ly
filed their notice of appeal. 1owe*er, !alle filed an #rgent "otion to
withdraw his appeal in *iew of his acceptance of the grant of conditional
pardon )y the 0resident. Mengote was also granted a conditional pardon
and was released fro" confine"ent, )#t the latter did not file a "otion to
withdraw his appeal.
$he co#rt granted !alleIs "otion to withdraw his appeal and
his case is considered closed and ter"inated, insofar as he is concerned.
Mengote, on the other hand, has not filed any "otion to withdraw his
appeal.
ISSUE"
8R3 appeal of the case "#st )e withdrawn for the effecti*ity of a pardon
136
granted.
HELD"
D.!. $he /con*iction )y final -#dg"ent/ li"itation #nder
!ection 19 of Art.<II of the present constit#tion prohi)its the grant of
pardon, whether f#ll or conditional, to an acc#sed d#ring the pending of
his appeal fro" his con*iction )y the trial co#rt. Any application therefore,
if one is "ade, sho#ld no )e acted #pon or the process towards its grant
sho#ld no )eg#n #nless the appeal is withdrawn or the con*iction is final.
A -#dg"ent of con*iction )eco"e final @aA when no appeal is
seasona)ly perfected/ @)A when the acc#se co""ences to ser*e the
sentence, @cA when the right to appeal is e5pressly wai*ed in writing,
e5cept where the death penalty was i"posed )y the trial co#rt, and @dA
then the acc#sed applies for pro)ation, there)y wai*ing his right to appeal.
$h#s, where the -#dg"ent of con*iction is still pending appeal and has not
yet therefore attained finality as in the case of Mengote, e5ec#ti*e
cle"ency "ay not )e granted to appellant
$he reason is that, the doctrine of separation of powers of
de"ands that s#ch e5cl#si*e a#thority of the appellate co#rt )e f#lly
respected and :ept #ni"paired.
GARCIA VS. COA
(22% SCRA 35%, 1993)
FACTS"
0etitioner <icente ,arcia was a s#per*ising line"an of the
B#rea# of $eleco""#nication in L#cena ity )efore he was s#""arily
dis"issed on April I, 1977 on the gro#nd of dishonesty in accordance with
the decision of the Ministry of 0#)lic 8or:s in Ad"inistrati*e ase 3o.
977 for the loss of se*eral telegraphs poles. 0etitioner did not appeal the
decision.
Based on the sa"e facts, a cri"inal case for 6#alified theft
was filed against petitioner, which was resol*ed ac6#itting petitioner. In
*iew of his ac6#ittal ,arcia so#ght reinstate"ent to his for"er position
which was denied )y the B#rea# of $eleco""#nications. 0etitioner
pleaded to the 0resident of the 0hilippines for e5ec#ti*e cle"ency which
was granted.
$hereafter, ,arcia filed with the respondent 'A a clai" for
pay"ent of )ac: salaries effecti*e April 1977. $his was denied )y 'A on
the gro#nd that the e5ec#ti*e cle"ency granted to hi" did not pro*ide for
the pay"ent of )ac: salaries and that he had not )een reinstated in the
ser*ice. 0etitioner then appealed the 'A decision to the 'ffice of the
0resident. Based on the reco""endation of the Dep#ty !ecretary
(actoran, petitioner filed this petition for re*iew on certiorari.
ISSUE" 8R3 petitioner is entitled to pay"ent of )ac: wages after ha*ing
)een reinstated p#rs#ant to the grant of e5ec#ti*e cle"ency.
HELD"
D.!. 0etitionerIs a#to"atic reinstate"ent to the go*ern"ent
ser*ice entitles hi" to )ac: wages. $his is "eant to afford relief to
petitioner who is innocent fro" the start and to "a:e reparation for what
he has s#ffered as a res#lt of his #n-#st dis"issal fro" the ser*ice. $o r#le
otherwise wo#ld defeat the *ery intention of the e5ec#ti*e cle"ency, i.e.,
to gi*e -#stice to petitioner. Moreo*er, the right to )ac: wages is afforded
to those who ha*e )een illegally dis"issed and were th#s ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise ac6#itted of the charges against the".
$here is no do#)t that petitionerIs case falls within the sit#ations
afore"entioned to entitle hi" to )ac: wages.
$he )estowal of e5ec#ti*e cle"ency on petitioner in effect
co"pletely o)literated the ad*erse effects of the ad"inistrati*e decision
which fo#nd hi" g#ilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation fro" the
ser*ice. $his can )e inferred fro" the e5ec#ti*e cle"ency itself
e5c#lpating petitioner fro" the ad"inistrati*e charge and there)y directing
his reinstate"ent, which is rendered a#to"atic )y the grant of the pardon.
$his signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to )e reinstated to his
for"er e"ploy"entG he is restored to his office ipso facto #pon the
iss#ance of the cle"ency.
ISA&ELO T. SA&ELLO, VS. DECS
(G.R. NO. 87%87, DECEM&ER 2%, 1989)
GANCA-CO, !.
FACTS"
0etitioner, was the .le"entary !chool 0rincipal of $alisay
and also the Assistant 0rincipal of the $alisay Barangay 1igh !chool of
the Di*ision of ,ingoog ity. $he )arangay high school was in deficit at
that ti"e. !ince at that ti"e also, the 0resident of the 0hilippines who was
earnestly ca"paigning was gi*ing aid in the a"o#nt of 02,???.?? for each
)arrio, the )arrio co#ncil thro#gh proper resol#tions allotted the a"o#nt of
08B?.?? to co*er #p for the salaries of the high school teachers, with the
honest tho#ght in "ind that the )arrio high school was a )arrio pro-ect and
as s#ch therefore, was entitled to its share of the %ID f#nd in 6#estion.
$he only part that the petitioner played was his )eing a#thori&ed )y the
said )arrio co#ncil to withdraw the a)o*e a"o#nt and which was
s#)se6#ently deposited in the ity $reas#rerIs 'ffice in the na"e of the
$alisay Barrio 1igh !chool.
$h#s, petitioner, together with the )arrio captain, were
charged with the *iolation of %A 4?19, and )oth were con*icted. 'n
appeal, the appellate co#rt "odified the decision )y eli"inating the
s#)sidiary i"prison"ent in case of insol*ency in the pay"ent of one9half
of the a"o#nt )eing in*ol*ed.
(inally, petitioner was granted an AB!'LJ$. 0A%D'3 )y
the 0resident, restoring hi" to If#ll ci*il and political rights.I 8ith this
instr#"ent on hand, petitioner applied for reinstate"ent to the go*ern"ent
ser*ice, only to )e reinstated to the wrong position of a "ere classroo"
teacher and not to his for"er position as .le"entary !chool 0rincipal I.
0etitioner now prays to this o#rt for the following relief2
1. @that he )eA %einstated to his for"er position as
.le"entary !chool 0rincipal IG
2. 1is go*ern"ent ser*ices )e "ade contin#o#s since
!epte")er 1?, 19B8 which is his original appoint"ent #ntil the present
ti"eG
4. @that he )eA ,i*en his )ac: salaries corresponding to the
period fro" !epte")er 1, 1971 to 3o*e")er 24,1982G
B. $hat all his ser*ice credits d#ly earned )e restoredG
7. And, that all other rights and pri*ileges not "entioned
herein shall also )e granted.
$he !olicitor ,eneral co""ents that there is no -#sticia)le
contro*ersy in this case )eca#se the iss#e in*ol*ed is whether or not
petitioner "erits reappoint"ent to the position he held prior to his
con*iction.
ISSUE" Is there a -#stifia)le contro*ersy in this case where the petitioner
so#ght his reinstate"ent to his for"er position after gi*en a pardon )y the
0residentC
HELD"
Des. $here is here a -#sticia)le contro*ersy. 0etitioner
clai"s he "#st )e restored to the sa"e position he was in )efore he was
con*icted on a "ere technical error and for which he was gi*en an
a)sol#te pardon.
$his is not a hypothetical or a)stract disp#te. It is not
acade"ic or "oot for, to o#r "ind, there is a definite and concrete
contro*ersy to#ching the legal relations of parties ha*ing ad*erse legal
relations. $his is a real and s#)stantial contro*ersy ad"itting of specific
relief thro#gh a co#rt decree that is concl#si*e in character. $he case
does not call for a "ere opinion or ad*ise, )#t for affir"ati*e relief.
$his o#rt held that the a)sol#te dis6#alification fro" office
or ineligi)ility fro" p#)lic office for"s part of the p#nish"ent prescri)ed
#nder the penal code and that pardon frees the indi*id#al fro" all the
penalties and legal disa)ilities and restores hi" to all his ci*il rights.
Altho#gh s#ch pardon restores his eligi)ility to a p#)lic office it does not
entitle hi" to a#to"atic reinstate"ent. 1e sho#ld apply for reappoint"ent
to said office.
1owe*er, the o#rt cannot grant his prayer for )ac:wages
fro" !epte")er 1, 1971 to 3o*e")er 24, 1982 for he is not entitled to
a#to"atic reinstate"ent. 0etitioner was lawf#lly separated fro" the
go*ern"ent ser*ice #pon his con*iction for an offense. $h#s, altho#gh his
reinstate"ent had )een d#ly a#thori&ed, it did not there)y entitle hi" to
)ac:wages. !#ch right is afforded only to those who ha*e )een illegally
dis"issed and were th#s ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
ac6#itted of the charge against the".
In the sa"e light, the o#rt cannot decree that his
go*ern"ent ser*ice )e "ade contin#o#s fro" !epte")er 1?, 19B8 to the
present when it is not. At any rate when he reaches the co"p#lsory age of
retire"ent, he shall get the appropriate retire"ent )enefits as an
.le"entary !chool 0rincipal I and not as a "ere classroo" teacher.
LLAMAS VS. OR&OS
(202 SCRA 844, 1991)
FACTS"
0etitioner %odolfo Lla"as is the inc#")ent <ice ,o*ernor of
the 0ro*ince of $arlac. 1e ass#"ed the position )y *irt#e of a decision of
the office of the 0resident, the go*ernorship. 0ri*ate respondent Mariano
'ca"po III is the inc#")ent ,o*ernor of the 0ro*ince of $arlac and was
s#spended fro" office for a period of 9? days d#e to a *erified co"plaint
filed )y petitioner against respondent ,o*ernor )efore the Depart"ent of
Local ,o*ern"ent charging hi" with the alleged *iolation of the Local
,o*ern"ent ode and the Anti9graft and orr#pt 0ractices Law. 0#)lic
respondent 'scar 'r)os was the .5ec#ti*e !ecretary at the ti"e of the
filing of this petition and is )eing i"pleaded herein in that official capacity
for ha*ing iss#ed, )y a#thority of the 0resident, the assailed %esol#tion
granting e5ec#ti*e cle"ency to respondent go*ernor.
0etitionerIs "ain arg#"ent is that the 0resident "ay grant
e5ec#ti*e cle"ency only in cri"inal cases )ased on Art. <II, !ec. 19 of the
onstit#tion. According to the petitioner, the 6#alifying phrase /after
con*iction )y final -#dg"ent applies solely to cri"inal cases and no other
law allows the grant of e5ec#ti*e cle"ency or pardon to anyone who has
)een con*icted in an ad"inistrati*e case./
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 0resident of the 0hilippines has the power to
grant e5ec#ti*e cle"ency in ad"inistrati*e cases.
HELD"
D.!. $he 0resident has the power to grant e5ec#ti*e
cle"ency in ad"inistrati*e case )eca#se the onstit#tion does not
disting#ish )etween which cases e5ec#ti*e cle"ency "ay )e e5ercised )y
the 0resident, with the sole e5cl#sion of i"peach"ent cases. ! also
137
held that there are no *alid and con*incing reasons why the 0resident
cannot grant e5ec#ti*e cle"ency in ad"inistrati*e cases, which are clearly
less serio#s than cri"inal offense.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN SEA TRADING
3 SCRA 351519%16
FACTS"
$he respondent was the consignee of se*eral ship"ents of
onion and garlic. !ince none of the ship"ents had the re6#ired certificate
)y the entral Ban: irc#lar 3os. BB and B7 for the release of goods th#s
i"ported were sei&ed and s#)-ected to forfeit#re proceedings. $he
ollector of #sto"s of Manila ha*ing )een in the "eanti"e released to
the consignees on s#rety )onds directed the sa"e and its s#rety that the
a"o#nt of the )onds )e paid, -ointly and se*erally to the B#rea# of
#sto"s. $he onsignee thereafter so#ght a re*iew with the o#rt of $a5
Appeal which re*ersed the decision and ordered that the )ond )e
withdrawn and cancelled. 1ence, the present petition.
$he petition is )ased #pon the facts that insofar as the
license and a certificate a#thori&ing the i"portation release of the goods
#nder the consideration are re6#ired )y the entral Ban: irc#lars 3os.
BB and B7, the latter are n#ll and *oid and the sei&#re and the forfeit#re of
the goods i"ported fro" Hapan cannot i"ple"ent an e5ec#ti*e
agree"ent9e5tending the effecti*ity of o#r $rade and (inancial agree"ent
with Hapan9which is d#)io#s *alidity, )eca#se there is no go*ern"ent
agency a#thori&ed to iss#e the i"port license re6#ired )y the
afore"entioned e5ec#ti*e order.
ISSUE" 8hether the e5ec#ti*e agree"ent is *alid e*en witho#t the 2R4
conc#rrence of the !enate.
HELD"
D.!. $he conc#rrence of the 1o#se of ongress is re6#ired
)y o#r f#nda"ental law in the "a:ing of treaties which are howe*er
distinct and different fro" e5ec#ti*e agree"ents which "ay *alidly
entered into witho#t s#ch occ#rrence.
$he *alidity of the e5ec#ti*e agree"ent in 6#estion is th#s
present. In fact, the so9called parity right pro*ided for in the ordinance
appended to o#r onstit#tion were prior thereto, the s#)-ect of an
e5ec#ti*e agree"ent, "ade witho#t the conc#rrence of2R4s of the !enate
of the Jnited !tates.
ARTICLE VIII !UDICIAL DEPARTMENT
DA$A VS. SINGSON
(G.R. NO. 8%344, DECEM&ER 21, 1989)
CRU$, !."
FACTS"
After the May 11, 1987 congressional elections, the 1o#se
of %epresentati*es proportionally apportioned its twel*e seats in the 'A
a"ong the se*eral political parties represented in that cha")er. 0etitioner
%a#l A. Da&a was a"ong those chosen and was listed as a representati*e
of the Li)eral 0arty.
$he La)an ng De"o:rati:ong 0ilipino was reorgani&ed,
res#lting in a political realign"ent in the 1o#se of %epresentati*es.
$wenty fo#r "e")ers of the Li)eral 0arty for"ally resigned and -oined the
LD0, there)y swelling its n#")er to 179 and correspondingly red#cing
their for"er party to only 17 "e")ers.
'n the )asis of this de*elop"ent, the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es re*ised its representation in the 'A )y withdrawing the
seat occ#pied )y the petitioner and gi*ing this to the newly9for"ed LD0.
$he cha")er elected a new set of representati*es consisting of the
original "e")ers e5cept the petitioner and incl#ding therein respondent
L#is . !ingson as the additional "e")er fro" the LD0.
0etitioner ca"e to this o#rt to challenge his re"o*al fro"
the 'A and the ass#"ption of his seat )y the respondent. %espondent
co#nters that the 6#estion raised )y the petitioner is political in nat#re and
so )eyond the -#risdiction of this o#rt.
ISSUE" Does the instant case fall on the -#risdiction of the o#rtC
HELD"
Des. ontrary to the respondentIs assertion, the o#rt has
the co"petence to act on the "atter at )ar. 8hat is )efore #s is not a
discretionary act of the 1o#se of %epresentati*es that "ay not )e
re*iewed )y the o#rt )eca#se it is political in nat#re. 8hat is in*ol*ed
here is the legality, not the wisdo", of the act of that cha")er in re"o*ing
the petitioner fro" the o""ission on Appoint"ents. $hat is not a political
6#estion )eca#se, as hief H#stice oncepcion e5plained in $anada *.
#enco.
... the ter" /political 6#estion/ connotes, in legal parlance,
what it "eans in ordinary parlance, na"ely, a 6#estion of policy. In other
words, ... it refers /to those 6#estions which, #nder the onstit#tion, are to
)e decided )y the people in their so*ereign capacity, or in regard to which
f#ll discretionary a#thority has )een delegated to the Legislat#re or
e5ec#ti*e )ranch of the ,o*ern"ent./ It is concerned with iss#es
dependent #pon the wisdo", not legality, of a partic#lar "eas#re.
In the case now )efore #s, the -#risdictional o)-ection
)eco"es e*en less tena)le and decisi*e. $he reason is that, e*en if we
were to ass#"e that the iss#e presented )efore #s was political in nat#re,
we wo#ld still not )e precl#ded fro" resol*ing it #nder the e5panded
-#risdiction conferred #pon #s that now co*ers, in proper cases, e*en the
political 6#estion. Article <II, !ection 1, of the onstit#tion clearly
pro*ides2
!ection 1. $he -#dicial power shall )e *ested in one
!#pre"e o#rt and in s#ch lower co#rts as "ay )e esta)lished )y law.
H#dicial power incl#des the d#ty of the co#rts of -#stice to
settle act#al contro*ersies in*ol*ing rights which are legally de"anda)le
and enforcea)le, and to deter"ine whether or not there has )een a gra*e
a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on the part
of any )ranch or instr#"entality of the ,o*ern"ent.
Lastly, we resol*e that iss#e in fa*or of the a#thority of the
1o#se of %epresentati*es to change its representation in the o""ission
on Appoint"ents to reflect at any ti"e the changes that "ay transpire in
the political align"ents of its "e")ership. It is #nderstood that s#ch
changes "#st )e per"anent and do not incl#de the te"porary alliances or
factional di*isions not in*ol*ing se*erance of political loyalties or for"al
disaffiliation and per"anent shifts of allegiance fro" one political party to
another.
$he instant petition is therefore dis"issed.
MANTRUSTE S-STEMS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NOS. 8%54041, NOVEM&ER %, 1989)
GRISOAJUINO, !."
FACTS"
$he 0resident in the e5ercise of her legislati*e power #nder
the (reedo" onstit#tion iss#ed 0rocla"ation 3o. 7'9A prohi)iting the
co#rts fro" iss#ing restraining orders and writ of in-#nction against Asset
0ri*ati&ation $r#st @A0$A and the p#rchases of any assets sold )y it, to
pre*ent co#rts fro" interfering in the discharge, )y this instr#"entality of
the e5ec#ti*e )ranch of go*ern"ent, of its tas: of carrying o#t the
e5peditio#s dispositions and pri*ati&ation of certain go*ern"ent
corporations and or the assets thereof. $he enforce"ent of s#ch
0rocla"ation was 6#estioned )y the petitioner arg#ing that the o#rt was
depri*ed of its -#risdiction to hear the cases in*ol*ed therein.

ISSUE" 8hether 0rocla"ation 3o. 7?9A i"pair the inherent power of
co#rts as defined in !ee I Art <III of the onstit#tion.
HELD"
3o. !ection 41 of 0rocla"ation 3o. 7?9A does not infringe
any pro*ision of the onstit#tion. It does not i"pair the inherent power of
co#rts /to settle act#al contro*ersies which are legally de"anda)le and
enforcea)le and to deter"ine whether or not there has )een a gra*e
a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction on the part
of any )ranch or instr#"entality of the go*ern"ent/ @!ec. 1, Art. <III, 1987
onstit#tionA. $he power to define, prescri)e and apportion the -#risdiction
of the *ario#s co#rts )elongs to the legislat#re, e5cept that it "ay not
depri*e the !#pre"e o#rt of its -#risdiction o*er cases en#"erated in
!ection 7, Article <III of the onstit#tion @!ec. 2, Art. <III, 1987
onstit#tionA.
8hile the -#dicial power "ay appear to )e per*asi*e, the
tr#th is that #nder the syste" of separation of powers set #p in the
onstit#tion, the power of the co#rts o*er the other )ranches and
instr#"entalities of the ,o*ern"ent is li"ited only to the deter"ination of
/whether or not there has )een a gra*e a)#se of discretion @)y the"A
a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction/ in the e5ercise of their
a#thority and in the perfor"ance of their assigned tas:s @!ec. 1, Art. <III,
1987 onstit#tionA.
o#rts "ay not s#)stit#te their -#dg"ent for that of the A0$,
nor )loc:, )y any in-#nction, the discharge of its f#nction and the
i"ple"entation of its decision in connection with the ac6#isition, sale or
disposition of assets transferred to it. $here can )e no -#stification for
-#dicial interference in the )#siness of an ad"inistrati*e agency e5cept
when it *iolated a citi&enIs rights, or co""it a gra*e a)#se of discretion, or
acts in e5cess of, or witho#t -#risdiction.
PACU VS. SECRETAR- OF EDUCATION
97 PH1LS 80% 519556
FACTS"
$he petitioning colleges and #ni*ersities re6#est that Act 3o.
27?+ as a"ended, )e declared #nconstit#tional. $his act is entitled /An
Act Ma:ing the Inspection and %ecognition of 0ri*ate !chools and
olleges ')ligatory for the !ecretary of 0#)lic Instr#ction./
0etitioners contend that the right of a citi&en to own and
operate a school is g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion, and any law re6#iring
to own and operate a school is g#aranteed )y the onstit#tion, and any
law re6#iring pre*io#s go*ern"ental appro*al or per"it )efore s#ch
person co#ld e5ercise said right, a"o#nts to censorship, a practice
a)horrent to o#r syste" of laws and go*ern"ent. 0etitioners, o)*io#sly
refer !ec. 4e of the Act which pro*ides that )efore a pri*ate school "ay)e
opened to the p#)lic it "#st first o)tain a per"it fro" the !ecretary of
.d#cation.
$he !olicitor ,eneral on the other hand pints o#t that none
of petitioners has ca#sed to present this iss#e )eca#se all of the" ha*e
per"its to operate and are act#ally operating )y *irt#e of their per"its.
And they do not assert the !ecretary has threatened to re*o:e their
per"its.
138
ISSUE" 8hether there e5ists an act#al case or contro*ersy.
HELD"
$here is no act#al case or contro*ersy. Mere apprehension
that the !ecretary of .d#cation "ight #nder the law withdraw per"it of
one the petitioners does not constit#te a -#dicial contro*ersy.
/o#rts will not pass #pon the constit#tionality of a law #pon
the co"plaint of one who fails to show that he is in-#red )y its operation./
/$he power of the co#rts to declare a law #nconstit#tional
arises only when the interest of litigants the #se of that -#dicial a#thority for
their protection against act#al interference, a hypothetical threat )eing
ins#fficient/.
An action, li:e this, is )ro#ght for a positi*e p#rpose, nay, to
o)tain act#al and positi*e relief. o#rts do not sit to ad-#dicate "ere
acade"ic 6#estions to satisfy scholarly interest therein, howe*er,
intellect#ally solid the pro)le" "ay)e. $his is
especially tr#e when the iss#es reach constit#tional di"ensions, for the"
co"es into play regard for the co#rts d#ty to a*oid decision of
constit#tional iss#es #nless a*oidance )eco"es e*asion.
!O-A VS. PCGG
225 SCRA 58%, 1993
FACTS"
$he 0residential o""ission on ,ood ,o*ern"ent @0,,A
ordered the sale at p#)lic a#ction of paintings )y old "asters and
sil*erware alleged to )e ill9gotten wealth of 0resident Marcos, his relati*es
and cronies. 0etitioners, as citi&ens and ta5payers, filed a petition to stop
the a#ction fro" proceeding.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitioners are the proper party to file the
instant case.
HELD"
3o. 0etitioners failed to show ownership of the artwor:s,
they are not proper parties to en-oin the 0,, for" proceeding with the
a#ction sale. $hey do not stand to )e in-#red )y the action of the 0,,.
$he o#rt will e5ercise its power of -#dicial re*iew only if the
case is )ro#ght )efore it )y a prty who has the legal standing to raise the
constit#tional or legal 6#estion. =Legal standing> "eans a personal and
s#)stantial interest in the case s#ch that the party has s#stained or will
s#stain direct in-#ry as a res#lt of the go*ern"ental act that is )eing
challenged.
TELE&AP VS. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337, 1998
FACTS"
0etitioner $eleco""#nications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the 0hilippines, Inc. is an organi&ation of lawyers of radio and tele*ision
)roadcasting co"panies. $hey are s#ing as citi&ens, ta5payers, and
registered *oters. $he other petitioner, ,MA 3etwor:, Inc., operates radio
and tele*ision )roadcasting stations thro#gho#t the 0hilippines #nder a
franchise granted )y ongress. 0etitioners assail the *alidity of !ection 92
of B.0. Blg. 3o. 881 against clai"s that the re6#ire"ent that radio and
tele*ision ti"e )e gi*en free ta:es property witho#t d#e process of lawG
that it *iolates the e"inent do"ain cla#se of the onstit#tion which
pro*ides for the pay"ent of -#st co"pensationG that it denies )roadcast
"edia the e6#al protection of the lawsG and that, in any e*ent, it *iolates
the ter"s of the franchise of petitioner ,MA 3etwor:, Inc.
ISSUE" 8hether or not petitioners ha*e legal standing.
HELD"
0etitioner $.L.BA0 is witho#t legal standing. In cases in
which citi&ens were a#thori&ed to s#e, this o#rt #pheld their standing in
*iew of the /transcendental i"portance/ of the constit#tional 6#estion
raised which -#stified the granting of relief. In contrast, in the case at )ar,
as will presently )e shown, petitionersI s#)stanti*e clai" is witho#t "erit.
$o the e5tent, therefore, that a partyIs standing is deter"ined )y the
s#)stanti*e "erit of his case or a preli"inary esti"ate thereof, petitioner
$.L.BA0 "#st )e held to )e witho#t standing. Indeed, a citi&en will )e
allowed to raise a constit#tional 6#estion only when he can show that he
has personally s#ffered so"e act#al or threatened in-#ry as a res#lt of the
allegedly illegal cond#ct of the go*ern"entG the in-#ry is fairly tracea)le to
the challenged actionG and the in-#ry is li:ely to )e redressed )y a
fa*ora)le action. Me")ers of petitioner ha*e not shown that they ha*e
s#ffered har" as a res#lt of the operation of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881. 3or do
"e")ers of petitioner $.L.BA0 ha*e an interest as registered *oters
since this case does not concern their right of s#ffrage. $heir interest in
\92 of B.0. Blg. 881 sho#ld )e precisely in #pholding its *alidity. M#ch
less do they ha*e an interest as ta5payers since this case does not
in*ol*e the e5ercise )y ongress of its ta5ing or spending power. A party
s#ing as a ta5payer "#st specifically show that he has a s#fficient interest
in pre*enting the illegal e5pendit#re of "oney raised )y ta5ation and that
he will s#stain a direct in-#ry as a res#lt of the enforce"ent of the
6#estioned stat#te.
$he other petitioner, ,MA 3etwor:, Inc., appears to ha*e
the re6#isite standing to )ring this constit#tional challenge. 0etitioner
operates radio and tele*ision )roadcast stations in the 0hilippines affected
)y the enforce"ent of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 re6#iring radio and tele*ision
)roadcast co"panies to pro*ide free air ti"e to the 'M.L. for the #se
of candidates for ca"paign and other political p#rposes. 0etitioner clai"s
that it s#ffered losses r#nning to se*eral "illion pesos in pro*iding
'M.L. $i"e in connection with the 1992 presidential election and the
1997 senatorial election and that it stands to s#ffer e*en "ore sho#ld it )e
re6#ired to do so again this year. 0etitionerIs
allegation that it will s#ffer losses again )eca#se it is re6#ired to pro*ide
free air ti"e is s#fficient to gi*e it standing to 6#estion the *alidity of \92.
LEGASPI V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. NO. L72119. MA- 29, 1987
CORTES, !.
FACTS"
$he f#nda"ental right of the people to infor"ation on
"atters of p#)lic concern is in*o:ed in this special ci*il action for
"anda"#s instit#ted )y petitioner <alentin L. Legaspi against the i*il
!er*ice o""ission. $he respondent had earlier denied LegaspiIs
re6#est for infor"ation on the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ilities of certain persons
e"ployed as sanitarians in the 1ealth Depart"ent of e)# ity. $hese
go*ern"ent e"ployees, H#lian !i)onghanoy and Mariano Agas, had
allegedly represented the"sel*es as ci*il ser*ice eligi)les who passed the
ci*il ser*ice e5a"inations for sanitarians.
!olicitor ,eneral challenges the petitionerIs standing to s#e
#pon the gro#nd that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to )e
infor"ed of the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ilities of the go*ern"ent e"ployees
concerned. 1e calls attention to the alleged fail#re of the petitioner to
show his =act#al interest> in sec#ring this partic#lar infor"ation. 1e f#rther
arg#es that there is no "inisterial d#ty on the part of the o""ission to
f#rnish the petitioner with the infor"ation he see:s.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether or not petitioner possesses the legal standing to )ring the
present s#it.
2. 8hether or not the infor"ation so#ght )y the petitioner is within the
a")it of the constit#tional g#arantee of the right of the people to
infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern.
HELD"
1. D.!. 8hen a "anda"#s proceeding in*ol*es the assertion of a p#)lic
right, the re6#ire"ent of personal interest is satisfied )y the "ere fact that
the petitioner is a citi&en, and therefore, part of the general /p#)lic/ which
possesses the right.
$he petitioner, )eing a citi&en who, as s#ch is clothed with
personality to see: redress for the alleged o)str#ction of the e5ercise of
the p#)lic right. 8e find no cogent reason to deny his standing to )ring the
present s#it.
2. D.!. Article III, !ec. 7 of the 1987 onstit#tion reads2 $he right of the
people to infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern shall )e recogni&ed.
Access to official records, and to doc#"ents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to go*ern"ent research
data #sed as )asis. for policy de*elop"ent, shall )e afforded the citi&en,
s#)-ect to s#ch stations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law.
B#t the constit#tional g#arantee to infor"ation on "atters of
p#)lic concern is not a)sol#te. It does not open e*ery door to any and all
infor"ation. Jnder the onstit#tion, access to official records, papers,
etc., are /s#)-ect to li"itations as "ay )e pro*ided )y law/ @Art. III, !ec. 7,
second sentenceA. $he law "ay therefore e5e"pt certain types of
infor"ation fro" p#)lic scr#tiny, s#ch as those affecting national sec#rity.
$he threshold 6#estion is, therefore, whether or not the infor"ation so#ght
is of p#)lic interest or p#)lic concern. B#t then, it is not eno#gh that the
infor"ation so#ght is of p#)lic interest. (or "anda"#s to lie in a gi*en
case, the infor"ation "#st not )e a"ong the species e5e"pted )y law
fro" the operation of the constit#tional g#arantee.
$he ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility of a sanitarian )eing of p#)lic
concern, and in the a)sence of e5press li"itations #nder the law #pon
access to the register of ci*il ser*ice eligi)les for said position, the d#ty of
the respondent o""ission to confir" or deny the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility of
any person occ#pying the position )eco"es i"perati*e. Manda"#s,
therefore lies.
81.%.('%., the i*il !er*ice o""ission is ordered to
open its register of eligi)les for the position of sanitarian, and to confir" or
deny, the ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility of H#lian !i)onghanoy and Mariano Agas,
for said position in the 1ealth Depart"ent of e)# ity, as re6#ested )y
the petitioner <alentin L. Legaspi.
DUMLAO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. L52245. !ANUAR- 22, 1980
MELENCIOHERRERA, !"
FACTS"
0etitioners 6#estion the constit#tionality of section B of Batas
0a")ansa Blg. 72 as discri"inatory and contrary to the e6#al protection
and d#e process g#arantees of the onstit#tion. !aid !ection B pro*ides2
!.. B. !pecial dis6#alification. E In addition
to *iolation of !ection 1? of Article ;II@A of the onstit#tion
and dis6#alifications "entioned in e5isting laws which are
139
here)y declared as dis6#alification for any of the electi*e
officials en#"erated in !ection 1 hereof, any retired electi*e
pro*incial, city or "#nicipal official, who has recei*ed
pay"ent of the retire"ent )enefits to which he is entitled
#nder the law and who shall ha*e )een +7 years of age at
the co""ence"ent of the ter" of office to which he see:s to
)e elected, shall not )e 6#alified to r#n for the sa"e electi*e
local office fro" which he has retired.
2A /... the filing of charges for the co""ission of s#ch cri"es
)efore a ci*il co#rt or "ilitary tri)#nal after preli"inary
in*estigation shall )e pri"a facie e*idence of s#ch fact/.
ISSUES" 1. 8hether or not the first paragraph of !ection B, B0 Blg. 72 is
*alid.
2. 8hether or not the second paragraph of !ection B, B0
Blg. 72 is *alid.
HELD"
1. D.!. %etire"ent fro" go*ern"ent ser*ice "ay or "ay not )e a
reasona)le dis6#alification for electi*e local officials. (or one thing, there
can also )e retirees fro" go*ern"ent ser*ice at ages, say )elow +7. It
"ay neither )e reasona)le to dis6#alify retirees, aged +7, for a +7 year old
retiree co#ld )e a good local official -#st li:e one, aged +7, who is not a
retiree.
B#t, in the case of a +79year old electi*e local official, who
has retired fro" a pro*incial, city or "#nicipal office, there is reason to
dis6#alify hi" fro" r#nning for the sa"e office fro" which he had retired,
as pro*ided for in the challenged pro*ision. $he need for new )lood
ass#"es rele*ance. $he tiredness of the retiree for go*ern"ent wor: is
present, and what is e"phatically significant is that the retired e"ployee
has already declared hi"self tired and #na*aila)le for the sa"e
go*ern"ent wor:, )#t, which, )y *irt#e of a change of "ind, he wo#ld li:e
to ass#"e again. It is for this *ery reason that ine6#ality will neither res#lt
fro" the application of the challenged pro*ision. H#st as that pro*ision
does not deny e6#al protection neither does it per"it of s#ch denial @see
0eople *s. <era, +7 0hil. 7+ O1944PA. 0ersons si"ilarly sit#ated are
si"ilarly treated.
In fine, it )ears reiteration that the e6#al protection cla#se
does not for)id all legal classification. 8hat is proscri)es is a classification
which is ar)itrary and #nreasona)le. $hat constit#tional g#arantee is not
*iolated )y a reasona)le classification )ased #pon s#)stantial distinctions,
where the classification is ger"ane to the p#rpose of the law and applies
to all hose )elonging to the sa"e class @0eralta *s. o"elec, 82 !%A
4? O1978P citing (elwa *s. !alas, 18 !%A +?+ O19++PG %afael *.
.")roidery and Apparel ontrol and Inspection Board, 21 !%A 44+
O19+7PG Inchong etc., et al. *s. 1ernande& 1?1 0hil. 1177 O1977PA. $he
p#rpose of the law is to allow the e"ergence of yo#nger )lood in local
go*ern"ents. $he classification in 6#estion )eing p#rs#ant to that
p#rpose, it cannot )e considered in*alid /e*en it at ti"es, it "ay )e
s#scepti)le to the o)-ection that it is "arred )y theoretical inconsistencies/
@hief H#stice (ernando, $he onstit#tion of the 0hilippines, 1977 ed., p.
7B7A.
2. 3'. .5plicit is the constit#tional pro*ision that, in all cri"inal
prosec#tions, the acc#sed shall )e pres#"ed innocent #ntil the contrary is
pro*ed, and shall en-oy the right to )e heard )y hi"self and co#nsel
@Article I<, section 19, 1974 onstit#tionA. An acc#sation, according to the
f#nda"ental law, is not synony"o#s with g#ilt. $he challenged pro*iso
contra*enes the constit#tional pres#"ption of innocence, as a candidate
is dis6#alified fro" r#nning for p#)lic office on the gro#nd alone that
charges ha*e )een filed against hi" )efore a ci*il or "ilitary tri)#nal. It
conde"ns )efore one is f#lly heard. In #lti"ate effect, e5cept as to the
degree of proof, no distinction is "ade )etween a person con*icted of acts
of disloyalty and one against who" charges ha*e )een filed for s#ch acts,
as )oth of the" wo#ld )e ineligi)le to r#n for p#)lic office. A person
dis6#alified to r#n for p#)lic office on the gro#nd that charges ha*e )een
filed against hi" is *irt#ally placed in the sa"e category as a person
already con*icted of a cri"e with the penalty of arresto, which carries with
it the accessory penalty of s#spension of the right to hold office d#ring the
ter" of the sentence @Art. BB, %e*ised 0enal odeA.
And altho#gh the filing of charges is considered as )#t pri"a
facie e*idence, and therefore, "ay )e re)#tted, yet. there is /clear and
present danger/ that )eca#se of the pro5i"ity of the elections, ti"e
constraints will pre*ent one charged with acts of disloyalty fro" offering
contrary proof to o*erco"e the pri"a facie e*idence against hi".
Additionally, it is )est that e*idence pro and con of acts of
disloyalty )e aired )efore the o#rts rather than )efore an ad"inistrati*e
)ody s#ch as the 'M.L.. A highly possi)le conflict of findings
)etween two go*ern"ent )odies, to the e5tre"e detri"ent of a person
charged, will there)y )e a*oided. (#rther"ore, a legislati*eRad"inistrati*e
deter"ination of g#ilt sho#ld not )e allowed to )e s#)stit#ted for a -#dicial
deter"ination.
8herefore, paragraph 1 )eing consistent with the e6#al
protection cla#se is declared *alidG while paragraph 2 is declared n#ll and
*oid for )eing *iolati*e of the constit#tional pres#"ption of innocence
g#aranteed to an acc#sed.
7ILOS&A-AN VS. GUINGONA, !R.
G.R. NO. 113375, 5 MA- 1994
DAVIDE, !R., !.
FACTS"
$his is a special ci*il action for prohi)ition and in-#nction,
with a prayer for a te"porary restraining order and preli"inary in-#nction,
which see:s to prohi)it and restrain the i"ple"entation of the /ontract of
Lease/ e5ec#ted )y the 0hilippine harity !weepsta:es 'ffice @0!'A
and the 0hilippine ,a"ing Manage"ent orporation @0,MA in
connection with the on9 line lottery syste", also :nown as /lotto./
0#rs#ant to !ection 1 of its charter, the 0!' decided to
esta)lish an on9 line lottery syste" for the p#rpose of increasing its
re*en#e )ase and di*ersifying its so#rces of f#nds. $he 'ffice of the
0resident appro*ed the award of the contract to, and entered into the so9
called /ontract 'f Lease/ with, respondent 0,M for the installation,
esta)lish"ent and operation of the on9line lottery and teleco""#nication
syste"s re6#ired andRor a#thori&ed #nder the said contract.
0etitioners, 6#estion the legality and *alidity of the ontract
of Lease in the light of !ection 1 of %.A. 3o. 11+9, as a"ended )y B.0.
Blg. B2, which prohi)its the 0!' fro" holding and cond#cting lotteries
/in colla)oration, association or -oint *ent#re with any person, association,
co"pany or entity, whether do"estic or foreign./
$he petitioners also point o#t that paragraph 1? of the
ontract of Lease re6#ires or a#thori&es 0,M to esta)lish a
teleco""#nications networ: that will connect all the "#nicipalities and
cities in the territory. 1owe*er, 0,M cannot do that )eca#se it has no
franchise fro" ongress to constr#ct, install, esta)lish, or operate the
networ: p#rs#ant to !ection 1 of Act 3o. 48B+, as a"ended. Moreo*er,
0,M is a 77M foreign9owned or controlled corporation and cannot,
therefore, )e granted a franchise for that p#rpose )eca#se of !ection 11,
Article ;II of the 1987 onstit#tion, which re6#ires that for a corporation to
operate a p#)lic #tility, at least +?M of its capital "#st )e owned )y
(ilipino citi&ens. (#rther"ore, since /the s#)scri)ed foreign capital/ of the
0,M /co"es to a)o#t 77M, as shown )y paragraph .I,1$ of its Articles
of Incorporation,/ it cannot lawf#lly enter into the contract in 6#estion
)eca#se all for"s of ga")ling E and lottery is one of the" E are
incl#ded in the so9called foreign in*est"ents negati*e list #nder the
(oreign In*est"ents Act @%.A. 3o. 7?B2A where only #p to B?M foreign
capital is allowed.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether or not petitioners ha*e the Loc#s standi to file the petition at
)ench. 2. 8hether or not the challenged ontract of
Lease *iolates or contra*enes the e5ception in !ection 1 of %.A. 3o. 11+9,
as a"ended )y B.0. Blg. B2, which prohi)its the 0!' fro" holding and
cond#cting lotteries /in colla)oration, association or -oint *ent#re with/
another.
HELD"
1. D.!. In line with the li)eral policy of this o#rt on loc#s standi, ordinary
ta5payers, "e")ers of ongress, and e*en association of planters, and
non9profit ci*ic organi&ations were allowed to initiate and prosec#te
actions )efore this o#rt to 6#estion the constit#tionality or *alidity of laws,
acts, decisions, r#lings, or orders of *ario#s go*ern"ent agencies or
instr#"entalities.
8e find the instant petition to )e of transcendental
i"portance to the p#)lic. $he iss#es it raised are of para"o#nt p#)lic
interest and of a category e*en higher than those in*ol*ed in "any of the
aforecited cases.
2.D.!. A caref#l analysis and e*al#ation of the pro*isions of the contract
and a consideration of the conte"poraneo#s acts of the 0!' and
0,M ind#)ita)ly disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of
lease #nder which the 0,M is "erely an independent contractor for a
piece of wor:, )#t one where the stat#torily proscri)ed colla)oration or
association , in the least, or -oint *ent#re , at the "ost, e5ists )etween the
contracting parties.
$he only contri)#tion the 0!' wo#ld ha*e is its franchise
or a#thority to operate the on9line lottery syste"G with the rest, incl#ding
the ris:s of the )#siness, )eing )orne )y the proponent or )idder 0,M
@which represents and warrants that it has access to =all "anagerial and
technical e5pertise> to pro"ptly and effecti*ely carry o#t the ter"s of the
contract..
ertain pro*isions of the contract confir" the indispensa)le
role of the 0,M in the p#rs#it, operation, cond#ct, and "anage"ent of
the 'n9Line Lottery !yste". $hey e5hi)it and de"onstrate the partiesI
indi*isi)le co""#nity of interest in the conception, )irth and growth of the
on9line lottery, and, a)o*e all, in its profits, with each ha*ing a right in the
for"#lation and i"ple"entation of policies related to the )#siness and
sharing, as well, in the losses E with the 0,M )earing the greatest
)#rden )eca#se of its ass#"ption of e5penses and ris:s, and the 0!'
the least, )eca#se of its confessed #nwillingness to )ear e5penses and
ris:s. In a "anner of spea:ing, each is wed to the other for )etter or for
worse. In the final analysis, howe*er, in the light of the 0!'Is %(0 and
the a)o*e highlighted pro*isions, as well as the /1old 1ar"less la#se/ of
the ontract of Lease, it is e*en safe to concl#de that the act#al lessor in
this case is the 0!' and the s#)-ect "atter thereof is its franchise to
hold and cond#ct lotteries since it is, in reality, the 0,M which operates
and "anages the on9line lottery syste" for a period of eight years. @In
effect, the 0!' leased o#t its franchise to 0,M which act#ally
operated and "anaged the sa"e.A
81.%.('%., the instant petition is here)y ,%A3$.D and
the challenged ontract of Lease is here)y D.LA%.D contrary to law
and in*alid.
140
3ote2 $he separate opinions of H#stices foc#sed on the iss#e of Loc#s
standi of herein petitioners, in relation to the fo#r @BA re6#ire"ents that
"#st )e satisfied )efore one can co"e to co#rt to litigate a constit#tional
iss#e, na"ely2 @1A there "#st )e an act#al case or contro*ersyG @2A the
6#estion of constit#tionality "#st )e raised )y the proper partyG @4A the
constit#tional 6#estion "#st )e raised at the earliest possi)le opport#nityG
and @BA the decision of the constit#tional 6#estion "#st )e necessary to
the deter"ination of the case itself.
$he o#rt did not resol*e the iss#e on whether or not the
ontract of Lease is in *iolation of section 11, Article ;II of the
onstit#tion. 1owe*er, in the dissenting opinion penned )y H#stice 0#no,
he e5plained that2 =(or e*en ass#"ing arg#endo that 0,M is a p#)lic
#tility, still, the records do not at the "o"ent )ear o#t the clai" of
petitioners that 0,M is a foreign owned and controlled corporation. $his
fact#al iss#e re"ains #nsettled and is still the s#)-ect of litigation )y the
parties in the !ec#rities and .5change o""ission>.
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIJUE$
(GR. NO. 113105 AUGUST 19, 1994)
JUIASON, !."
FACTS"
1o#se Bill 3o. 1?9??, the ,eneral Appropriation Bill of 199B
@,AB of 199BA, was passed and appro*ed )y )oth ho#ses of ongress on
Dece")er 17, 1994. As passed, it i"posed conditions and li"itations on
certain ite"s of appropriations in the proposed )#dget pre*io#sly
s#)"itted )y the 0resident. It also a#thori&ed "e")ers of ongress to
propose and identify pro-ects in the /por: )arrels/ allotted to the" and to
realign their respecti*e operating )#dgets.
0#rs#ant to the proced#re on the passage and enact"ent of
)ills as prescri)ed )y the onstit#tion, ongress presented the said )ill to
the 0resident for consideration and appro*al. 'n Dece")er 4?, 1994, the
0resident signed the )ill into law, and declared the sa"e to ha*e )eco"e
%ep#)lic Act 3o. 7++4. 'n the sa"e day, the 0resident deli*ered his
0residential <eto Message, specifying the pro*isions of the )ill he *etoed
and on which he i"posed certain conditions.
!i5teen "e")ers of the !enate led )y !enate 0resident
.dgardo H. Angara, !enator 3eptali A. ,on&ales, the hair"an of the
o""ittee on (inance, and !enator %a#l !. %oco, so#ght the iss#ance of
the writs of certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s against the .5ec#ti*e
!ecretary, the !ecretary of the Depart"ent of B#dget and Manage"ent,
and the 3ational $reas#rer. !#ing as "e")ers of the !enate and
ta5payers, petitioners 6#estion2 @1A the constit#tionality of the conditions
i"posed )y the 0resident in the ite"s of the ,AA of 199B2 @aA for the
!#pre"e o#rt, @)A o""ission on A#dit @'AA, @cA '")#ds"an, @dA
o""ission on 1#"an %ights @1%A, @eA iti&en Ar"ed (orces
,eographical Jnits @A(,JI!A and @fA !tate Jni*ersities and olleges
@!JIsAG and @2A the constit#tionality of the *eto of the special pro*ision in
the appropriation for de)t ser*ice.
$he !olicitor ,eneral clai"ed that the re"edy of the
!enators is political @i.e., to o*erride the *etoesA in effect saying that they
do not ha*e the re6#isite legal standing to )ring the s#its.
ISSUE" Do petitioner9senators ha*e legal standing to assail the
constit#tionality of conditions i"posed )y the 0resident in the ite"s of the
,AA of 199BC
HELD"
D.! a "e")er of the !enate, and of the 1o#se of
%epresentati*es for that "atter, has the legal standing to 6#estion the
*alidity of a presidential *eto or a condition i"posed on an ite" in an
appropriation )ill. 8here the *eto is clai"ed to ha*e )een "ade witho#t or
in e5cess of the a#thority *ested on the 0resident )y the onstit#tion, the
iss#e of an i"per"issi)le intr#sion of the .5ec#ti*e into the do"ain of the
Legislat#re arises. $o the e5tent the power of ongress are i"paired, so
is the power of each "e")er thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the e5ercise of the powers of that instit#tion
An act of the .5ec#ti*e which in-#res the instit#tion of
ongress ca#ses a deri*ati*e )#t nonetheless s#)stantial in-#ry, which
can )e 6#estioned )y a "e")er of ongress. In s#ch a case, any
"e")er of ongress can ha*e a resort to the co#rts.
(or"er hief H#stice .nri6#e M. (ernando, as A"ic#s
#riae, noted2
$his is, then, the clearest case of the !enate as a whole or
indi*id#al !enators as s#ch ha*ing a s#)stantial interest in the 6#estion at
iss#e. It co#ld li:ewise )e said that there was the re6#isite in-#ry to their
rights as !enators. It wo#ld then )e f#tile to raise any loc#s standi iss#e.
Any intr#sion into the do"ain appertaining to the !enate is to )e resisted.
!i"ilarly, if the sit#ation were re*ersed, and it is the .5ec#ti*e Branch that
co#ld allege a transgression, its officials co#ld li:ewise file the
corresponding action. 8hat cannot )e denied is that a !enator has
standing to "aintain in*iolate the prerogati*es, powers and pri*ileges
*ested )y the onstit#tion in his office
It is tr#e that the onstit#tion pro*ides a "echanis" for
o*erriding a *eto @Art. <I, !ec. 27 O1PA. !aid re"edy, howe*er, is a*aila)le
only when the presidential *eto is )ased on policy or political
considerations )#t not when the *eto is clai"ed to )e #ltra *ires. In the
latter case, it )eco"es the d#ty of the o#rt to draw the di*iding line
where the e5ercise of e5ec#ti*e power ends and the )o#nds of legislati*e
-#risdiction )egin.
TATAD VS GARCIA, !R
(GR NO. 114222, APRIL %,1995)
JUIASON, !.
FACTS"
$he D'$ planned to constr#ct the .D!A L%$ III. %A +977
was enacted, pro*iding for two sche"es for the financing, constr#ction
and operation of go*ern"ent pro-ects thro#gh pri*ate initiati*e and
in*est"ent2 B#ild9'perate9$ransfer @B'$A or B#ild9$ransfer @B$A.
$he notice, ad*ertising the pre6#alification of )idders, was
thereafter p#)lished. (i*e gro#ps responded to the in*itation na"ely, ABB
$ra&ione of Italy, 1opewell 1oldings Ltd. of 1ong:ong, Mansteel
International of Manda#e, e)#, Mits#i Y o., Ltd. of Hapan, and .D!A
L%$ onsorti#".
After e*al#ating the pre6#alification )ids, the 0BA declared
that only the .D!A L%$ onsorti#" /"et the re6#ire"ents of garnering at
least 21 points per criteria, e5cept for Legal Aspects, and o)taining an
o*er9all passing "ar: of at least 82 points/.
$he .D!A L%$ onsorti#" s#)"itted its )id proposal to
D'$. (inding this proposal to )e in co"pliance with the )id
re6#ire"ents, D'$ and respondent .D!A L%$ orporation, Ltd., in
s#)stit#tion of the .D!A L%$ onsorti#", entered into an /Agree"ent to
B#ild, Lease and $ransfer a Light %ail $ransit !yste" for .D!A/ #nder the
ter"s of the B'$ Law. !ecretary 0rado, thereafter, re6#ested presidential
appro*al of the contract.
.5ec#ti*e !ecretary (ran:lin Drilon, 'r)osK replace"ent,
infor"ed !ecretary 0rado that the 0resident co#ld not grant the re6#ested
appro*al for the following reasons2 @1A that D'$ failed to cond#ct act#al
p#)lic )idding in co"pliance with !ection 7 of the B'$ LawG @2A that the
law a#thori&ed p#)lic )idding as the only "ode to award B'$ pro-ects,
and the pre6#alification proceedings was not the p#)lic )idding
conte"plated #nder the lawG @4A that Ite" 1B of the I"ple"enting %#les
and %eg#lations of the B'$ Law which a#thori&ed negotiated award of
contract in addition to p#)lic )idding was of do#)tf#l legalityG and @BA that
congressional appro*al of the list of priority pro-ects #nder the B'$ or B$
!che"e pro*ided in the law had not yet )een granted at the ti"e the
contract was awarded. In *iew of the co""ents of .5ec#ti*e !ecretary
Drilon, the D'$ and pri*ate respondents re9negotiated the agree"ent.
$he parties entered into a /%e*ised and %estated
Agree"ent to B#ild, Lease and $ransfer a Light %ail $ransit !yste" for
.D!A/ inas"#ch as /the parties OareP cogni&ant of the fact the D'$ has
f#ll a#thority to sign the Agree"ent witho#t need of appro*al )y the
0resident p#rs#ant to the pro*isions of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 48? and that
certain e*ents OhadP s#per*ened since 3o*e")er 7, 1991 which
necessitateOdP the re*ision of the Agree"ent/. $he D'$, represented )y
!ecretary Hes#s ,arcia *ice !ecretary 0rado, and pri*ate respondent
entered into a /!#pple"ental Agree"ent to the 22 April 1992 %e*ised and
%estated Agree"ent to B#ild, Lease and $ransfer a Light %ail $ransit
!yste" for .D!A/ so as to /clarify their respecti*e rights and
responsi)ilities/ and to s#)"it OtheP !#pple"ental Agree"ent to the
0resident, of the 0hilippines for his appro*al/. !ecretary ,arcia s#)"itted
to 0resident %a"os the two agree"ents, which were appro*ed. According
to the agree"ents, the .D!A L%$ III will #se light rail *ehicles fro" the
&ech and !lo*a: (ederal %ep#)lics and will ha*e a "a5i"#" carrying
capacity of B7?,??? passengers a day, or 17?M a year to )e achie*ed9
thro#gh 7B s#ch *ehicles operating si"#ltaneo#sly. $he .D!A L%$ III will
r#n at grade, or street le*el, on the "id9section of .D!A for a distance of
17.8 :ilo"eters fro" (.B. 1arrison, 0asay ity to 3orth A*en#e, V#e&on
ity. $he syste" will ha*e its own power facility. It will also ha*e 14
passenger stations and one depot in 1+9hectare go*ern"ent property at
3orth A*en#e. 0ri*ate respondents shall #nderta:e and finance the entire
pro-ect re6#ired for a co"plete operational light rail transit syste". $arget
co"pletion date is 1,?8? days or appro5i"ately three years fro" the
i"ple"entation date of the contract incl#si*e of "o)ili&ation, site wor:s,
initial and final testing of the syste". Jpon f#ll or partial co"pletion and
*ia)ility thereof, pri*ate respondent shall deli*er the #se and possession of
the co"pleted portion to D'$ which shall operate the sa"e. D'$ shall
pay pri*ate respondent rentals on a "onthly )asis thro#gh an Irre*oca)le
Letter of redit. $he rentals shall )e deter"ined )y an independent and
internationally accredited inspection fir" to )e appointed )y the parties. As
agreed #pon, pri*ate respondentIs capital shall )e reco*ered fro" the
rentals to )e paid )y the D'$ which, in t#rn, shall co"e fro" the
earnings of the .D!A L%$ III. After 27 years and D'$ shall ha*e
co"pleted pay"ent of the rentals, ownership of the pro-ect shall )e
transferred to the latter for a consideration of only J.!. Q1.??.
%.A. 3o. 7718, an /Act A"ending ertain !ections of
%ep#)lic Act 3o. +977, .ntitled /An Act A#thori&ing the (inancing,
onstr#ction, 'peration and Maintenance of Infrastr#ct#re 0ro-ects )y the
0ri*ate !ector, and for 'ther 0#rposes/ was signed into law )y the
0resident. $he law e5pressly recogni&es BL$ sche"e and allows direct
negotiation of BL$ contracts.
ISSUES"
@1A 8hether or not petitionersK as ta5payers ha*e the legal standing to
instit#te the action.
@2A 8hether or not .D!A L%$ orp, a foreign corporation own .D!A L%$
III, a p#)lic #tility.
HELD"
@1A D.!. $he petitioners ha*e the legal standing to instit#te the action.
141
%espondents clai"ed that petitioners had no legal standing
to initiate the instant action. 0etitioners, howe*er, co#ntered that the
action was filed )y the" in their capacity as !enators and as ta5payers.
$he pre*ailing doctrines in ta5payerIs s#its are to allow
ta5payers to 6#estion contracts entered into )y the national go*ern"ent or
go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporations allegedly in contra*ention of
the law @Lilos)ayan, Inc. *. ,#ingona, 242 !%A 11? O199BPA and to
disallow the sa"e when only "#nicipal contracts are in*ol*ed @B#gnay
onstr#ction and De*elop"ent orporation *. Laron, 17+ !%A. 2B?
O1989PA.
(or as long as the r#ling in Lilos)ayan on loc#s standi is not
re*ersed, we ha*e no choice )#t to follow it and #phold the legal standing
of petitioners as ta5payers to instit#te the present action.
@2A $he onstit#tion, in no #ncertain ter"s, re6#ires a franchise for the
operation of a p#)lic #tility. 1owe*er, it does not re6#ire a franchise )efore
one can own the facilities needed to operate a p#)lic #tility so long as it
does not operate the" to ser*e the p#)lic.
$he right to operate a p#)lic #tility "ay e5ist independently
and separately fro" the ownership of the facilities thereof. 'ne can own
said facilities witho#t operating the" as a p#)lic #tility, or con*ersely, one
"ay operate a p#)lic #tility witho#t owning the facilities #sed to ser*e the
p#)lic. $he de*otion of property to ser*e the p#)lic "ay )e done )y the
owner or )y the person in control thereof who "ay not necessarily )e the
owner thereof.
8hile pri*ate respondent is the owner of the facilities
necessary to operate the .D!A. L%$ III, it ad"its that it is not
enfranchised to operate a p#)lic #tility.
In s#", pri*ate respondent will not r#n the light rail *ehicles
and collect fees fro" the riding p#)lic. It will ha*e no dealings with the
p#)lic and the p#)lic will ha*e no right to de"and any ser*ices fro" it.
OPOSA VS FACTORAN, !R
(GR NO 101083, !UL- 30,1993)
DAVIDE, !R., !.
FACTS"
0etitioners instit#ted a ta5payersK class s#it against the
1onora)le (#lgencio !. (actoran, Hr., then D.3% !ecretary, alleging that
as citi&ens and ta5payers of the %ep#)lic of the 0hilippines, they are
=entitled to the f#ll )enefit, #se and en-oy"ent of the nat#ral reso#rce
treas#re that is the co#ntryIs *irgin tropical forests./
$he co"plaint starts off with the general a*er"ents that the
0hilippine archipelago of 7,1?? islands has a land area of 4?M hectares
and is endowed with rich, l#sh and *erdant rainforests in which *aried,
rare and #ni6#e species of flora and fa#na "ay )e fo#ndG these
rainforests contain a genetic, )iological and che"ical pool which is
irreplacea)leG they are also the ha)itat of indigeno#s 0hilippine c#lt#res
which ha*e e5isted, end#red and flo#rished since ti"e i""e"orialG
scientific e*idence re*eals that in order to "aintain a )alanced and
healthf#l ecology, the co#ntryIs land area sho#ld )e #tili&ed on the )asis of
a ratio of 7BM for forest co*er and B+M for agric#lt#ral, residential,
ind#strial, co""ercial and other #sesG the distortion and dist#r)ance of
this )alance as a conse6#ence of deforestation ha*e res#lted in a host of
en*iron"ental tragedies.
(actoran "o*ed to Dis"iss the co"plaint )ased on two
gro#nds, na"ely2 @1A the plaintiffs ha*e no ca#se of action against hi" and
@2A the iss#e raised )y the plaintiffs is a political 6#estion which properly
pertains to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranches of ,o*ern"ent.
%espondent granted the "otion. 1ence, the instant petition.
ISSUES"
@1A 8hether or not the petitioners ha*e a ca#se of action against the
respondentG and
@2A 8hether or not the iss#e raised is a political 6#estion which properly
pertains to the legislati*e or e5ec#ti*e )ranches of ,o*ern"ent.
HELD"
@1A 0etitioners "inors assert that they represent their generation as well
as generations yet #n)orn. 8e find no diffic#lty in r#ling that they can, for
the"sel*es, for others of their generation and for the s#cceeding
generations, file a class s#it. $heir personality to s#e in )ehalf of the
s#cceeding generations can only )e )ased on the concept of
intergenerational responsi)ility insofar as the right to a )alanced and
healthf#l ecology is concerned. !#ch a right, as hereinafter e5po#nded,
considers the /rhyth" and har"ony of nat#re./ 3at#re "eans the created
world in its entirety.

!#ch rhyth" and har"ony indispensa)ly incl#de, inter
alia, the -#dicio#s disposition, #tili&ation, "anage"ent, renewal and
conser*ation of the co#ntryIs forest, "ineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off9shore areas and other nat#ral reso#rces to the end that their
e5ploration, de*elop"ent and #tili&ation )e e6#ita)ly accessi)le to the
present as well as f#t#re generations. 3eedless to say, e*ery generation
has a responsi)ility to the ne5t to preser*e that rhyth" and har"ony for
the f#ll en-oy"ent of a )alanced and healthf#l ecology. 0#t a little
differently, the "inorsI assertion of their right to a so#nd en*iron"ent
constit#tes, at the sa"e ti"e, the perfor"ance of their o)ligation to ens#re
the protection of that right for the generations to co"e.
@2A After caref#l e5a"ination of the petitionersI co"plaint, 8e find the
state"ents #nder the introd#ctory affir"ati*e allegations, as well as the
specific a*er"ents #nder the s#)9heading AJ!. '( A$I'3, to )e
ade6#ate eno#gh to show, pri"a facie, the clai"ed *iolation of their rights.
'n the )asis thereof, they "ay th#s )e granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs
prayed for. It )ears stressing, howe*er, that insofar as the cancellation of
the $LAs is concerned, there is the need to i"plead, as party defendants,
the grantees thereof for they are indispensa)le parties. $he foregoing
considered, i*il ase 3o. 9?9777 )e said to raise a political 6#estion.
0olicy for"#lation or deter"ination )y the e5ec#ti*e or legislati*e
)ranches of ,o*ern"ent is not s6#arely p#t in iss#e. 8hat is principally
in*ol*ed is the enforce"ent of a right *is9a9*is policies already for"#lated
and e5pressed in legislation. It "#st, nonetheless, )e e"phasi&ed that the
political 6#estion doctrine is no longer, the ins#r"o#nta)le o)stacle to the
e5ercise of -#dicial power or the i"penetra)le shield that protects
e5ec#ti*e and legislati*e actions fro" -#dicial in6#iry or re*iew.
7ILOS&A-AN, INC VS MORATO
(GR NO 118910, !UL- 17,1995)
MENDO$A,!.
FACTS"
As a res#lt of o#r decision in ,.%. 3o. 114477 @Lilos)ayan,
Incorporated *. ,#ingona, 242 !%A 11? @199BAA in*alidating the
ontract of Lease )etween the 0!' and the 0hilippine ,a"ing
Manage"ent orp. @0,MA on the gro#nd that it had )een "ade in
*iolation of 0!'Ks charter, the parties entered into negotiations for a new
agree"ent.
$he parties signed an .6#ip"ent Lease Agree"ent @.LAA
where)y the 0,M leased on9line lottery e6#ip"ent and accessories to
the 0!' in consideration of a rental e6#i*alent to B.4M of the gross
a"o#nt of tic:et sales deri*ed )y the 0!' fro" the operation of the
lottery which in no case shall )e less than an ann#al rental co"p#ted at
047,???.?? per ter"inal in co""ercial operation. $he rental is to )e
co"p#ted and paid )i9wee:ly. In the e*ent the )i9wee:ly rentals in any
year fall short of the ann#al "ini"#" fi5ed rental th#s co"p#ted, the
0!' agrees to pay the deficiency o#t of the proceeds of its c#rrent tic:et
sales.
Jnder the law, 4?M of the net receipts fro" the sale of
tic:ets is allotted to charity. $he ter" of the lease is 8 years, co""encing
fro" the start of co""ercial operation of the lottery e6#ip"ent first
deli*ered to the lessee p#rs#ant to the agreed sched#le.
In the operation of the lottery, the 0!' is to e"ploy its own
personnel. It is responsi)le for the loss of, or da"age to, the e6#ip"ent
arising fro" any ca#se and for the cost of their "aintenance and repair.
Jpon the e5piration of the lease, the 0!' has the option to p#rchase the
e6#ip"ent for the s#" of 027M. A copy of the .LA was s#)"itted to the
o#rt )y the 0,M in accordance with its "anifestation in the prior case.
$his s#it was filed see:ing to declare the .LA in*alid on the
gro#nd that it is s#)stantially the sa"e as the ontract of Lease n#llified in
the first case.
ISSUE" 8hether or not petitioners ha*e a legal right which has )een
*iolated.
HELD"
In actions for the ann#l"ent of contracts, s#ch as this action,
the real parties are those who are parties to the agree"ent or are )o#nd
either principally or s#)sidiarily or are pre-#diced in their rights with
respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detri"ent which
wo#ld positi*ely res#lt to the" fro" the contract e*en tho#gh they did not
inter*ene in it, or who clai" a right to ta:e part in a p#)lic )idding )#t ha*e
)een illegally e5cl#ded fro" it.
$hese are parties with /a present s#)stantial interest, as
disting#ished fro" a "ere e5pectancy or f#t#re, contingent, s#)ordinate,
or conse6#ential interest. . . . $he phrase Ipresent s#)stantial interestI
"ore concretely is "eant s#ch interest of a party in the s#)-ect "atter of
action as will entitle hi", #nder the s#)stanti*e law, to reco*er if the
e*idence is s#fficient, or that he has the legal title to de"and and the
defendant will )e protected in a pay"ent to or reco*ery )y hi".
B#t petitioners do not ha*e s#ch present s#)stantial interest
in the .LA as wo#ld entitle the" to )ring this s#it. Denying to the" the
right to inter*ene will not lea*e witho#t re"edy any percei*ed illegality in
the e5ec#tion of go*ern"ent contracts. V#estions as to the nat#re or
*alidity of p#)lic contracts or the necessity for a p#)lic )idding )efore they
"ay )e "ade can )e raised in an appropriate case )efore the
o""ission on A#dit or )efore the '")#ds"an. $he onstit#tion
re6#ires that the '")#ds"an and his dep#ties, /as protectors of the
people shall act pro"ptly on co"plaints filed in any for" or "anner
against p#)lic officials or e"ployees of the go*ern"ent, or any
s#)di*ision, agency or instr#"entality thereof incl#ding go*ern"ent9
owned or controlled corporations./ @Art. ;I, \12A In addition, the !olicitor
,eneral is a#thori&ed to )ring an action for 6#o warranto if it sho#ld )e
tho#ght that a go*ern"ent corporation, li:e the 0!', has offended
against its corporate charter or "is#sed its franchise.
&ENG$ON VS DRILON
(GR NO 103524, APRIL 15,1992)
GUTIERRE$, !R., !.
FACTS"
142
%A 91? was enacted to pro*ide the retire"ent pensions of
H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt and of the o#rt of Appeals who ha*e
rendered at least 2? years ser*ice either in the H#diciary or in any other
)ranch of the ,o*ern"ent or in )oth, ha*ing attained the age of 7? years
or who resign )y reason of incapacity to discharge the d#ties of the office.
$he retired H#stice shall recei*e d#ring the resid#e of his nat#ral life the
salary which he was recei*ing at the ti"e of his retire"ent or resignation.
Identical retire"ent )enefits were also gi*en to the "e")ers
of the onstit#tional o""issions #nder %A. 17+8, as a"ended )y %A
4797. !#)se6#ently, 0resident Marcos signed 0D 778 which e5tended
si"ilar retire"ent )enefits to the "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces gi*ing
the" also the a#to"atic read-#st"ent feat#res of %A 1797 and %A 4797.
1owe*er, 0D +BB was iss#ed, repealing !ection 49A of %A 1797 and %A
4797 @a"ending %A 17+8 and 0D 778A which a#thori&ed the ad-#st"ent
of the pension of the retired H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt, o#rt of
Appeals, hair"an and "e")ers of the onstit#tional o""issions and
the officers and enlisted "e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces to the pre*ailing
rates of salaries.
!ignificantly, #nder 0D 1+48 the a#to"atic read-#st"ent of
the retire"ent pension of officers and enlisted "en was s#)se6#ently
restored )y 0resident Marcos. A later decree 0D 19?9 was also iss#ed
pro*iding for the a#to"atic read-#st"ent of the pensions of "e")ers of
the Ar"ed (orces who ha*e retired prior to !epte")er 1?, 1979.
8hile the ad-#st"ent of the retire"ent pensions for
"e")ers of the Ar"ed (orces who n#")er in the tens of tho#sands was
restored, that of the retired H#stices of the !#pre"e o#rt and o#rt of
Appeals who are only a handf#l and fairly ad*anced in years, was not.
%eali&ing the #nfairness of the discri"ination against the
"e")ers of the H#diciary and the onstit#tional o""issions, ongress
appro*ed in 199? a )ill for the reenact"ent of the repealed pro*isions of
%A 1797 and %A 4797. ongress was #nder the i"pression that 0D +BB
)eca"e law after it was p#)lished in the 'fficial ,a&ette on April 7, 1977.
In the e5planatory note of 1o#se Bill 3o. 1+297 and !enate Bill 3o. 7B?,
the legislat#re saw the need to reenact %A 1797 and 4797 to restore said
retire"ent pensions and pri*ileges of the retired H#stices and "e")ers of
the onstit#tional o""issions, in order to ass#re those ser*ing in the
!#pre"e o#rt, o#rt of Appeals and onstit#tional o""issions
ade6#ate old age pensions e*en d#ring the ti"e when the p#rchasing
power of the peso has )een di"inished s#)stantially )y worldwide
recession or inflation. 0resident A6#ino, howe*er *etoed 1o#se Bill 3o.
1+297 on H#ly 11, 199? on the gro#nd that according to her /it wo#ld
erode the *ery fo#ndation of the ,o*ern"entIs collecti*e effort to adhere
faithf#lly to and enforce strictly the policy on standardi&ation of
co"pensation as artic#lated in %A +778 :nown as o"pensation and
0osition lassification Act of 1989./ !he f#rther said that /the ,o*ern"ent
sho#ld not grant distinct pri*ileges to select gro#p of officials whose
retire"ent )enefits #nder e5isting laws already en-oy preferential
treat"ent o*er those of the *ast "a-ority of o#r ci*il ser*ice ser*ants./
0rior to the instant petition, howe*er, %etired o#rt of
Appeals H#stices Man#el 0. Barcelona, H#an 0. .nri6#e&, H#an '. %eyes,
Hr. and ,#ardson %. Lood filed a letterRpetition as:ing this o#rt far a
read-#st"ent of their "onthly pensions in accordance with %A. 1797. $hey
reasoned o#t that 0D +BB repealing %ep#)lic Act 3o. 1797 did not
)eco"e law as there was no *alid p#)lication. 0D +BB appeared for the
first ti"e only in the s#pple"ental iss#e of the 'fficial ,a&ette, @<ol. 7B,
3o. 1BA p#rportedly dated April B, 1977 )#t p#)lished only on !epte")er
7, 1984. !ince 0D +BB has no )inding force and effect of law, it therefore
did not repeal %A 1797.
$he o#rt acted fa*ora)ly on the re6#est. 0#rs#ant to the
a)o*e resol#tion, ongress incl#ded in the ,eneral Appropriations Bill for
(iscal Dear 1992 certain appropriations for the H#diciary intended for the
pay"ent of the ad-#sted pension rates d#e the retired H#stices of the
!#pre"e o#rt and o#rt of Appeals.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the atte"pt of the 0resident to #se the *eto power
to set aside a %esol#tion of this o#rt and to depri*e retirees of )enefits
gi*en the" )y %ep. Act 3o. 1797 trenches #pon the constit#tional grant of
fiscal a#tono"y to the H#diciary.
HELD"
D.!. $he H#diciary, the onstit#tional o""issions, and the
'")#ds"an "#st ha*e the independence end fle5i)ility needed in the
discharge of their constit#tional d#ties. $he i"position of restrictions and
constraints on the "anner the independent constit#tional offices allocate
and #tili&e the f#nds appropriated for their operations is anathe"a to fiscal
a#tono"y and *iolati*e not only of the e5press "andate of the
onstit#tion )#t especially as regards the !#pre"e o#rt, of the
independence and separation of powers #pon which the entire fa)ric of
o#r constit#tional syste" is )ased. In the interest of co"ity and
cooperation, the !#pre"e o#rt, onstit#tional o""issions, and the
'")#ds"an ha*e so far li"ited their o)-ections to constant re"inders.
8e now agree with the petitioners that this grant of a#tono"y sho#ld
cease to )e a "eaningless pro*ision.
In the case at )ar, the *eto of these specific pro*isions in the
,eneral Appropriations Act is tanta"o#nt to dictating to the H#diciary how
its f#nds sho#ld )e #tili&ed, which is clearly rep#gnant to fiscal a#tono"y.
$he freedo" of the hief H#stice to "a:e ad-#st"ents in the #tili&ation of
the f#nds appropriated for the e5pendit#res of the -#diciary, incl#ding the
#se of any sa*ings fro" any partic#lar ite" to co*er deficits or shortages
in other ite"s of the H#diciary is withheld. 0#rs#ant to the onstit#tional
"andate, the H#diciary "#st en-oy freedo" in the disposition of the f#nds
allocated to it in the appropriations law. It :nows its priorities -#st as it is
aware of the fiscal restraints. $he hief H#stice "#st )e gi*en a free hand
on how to a#g"ent appropriations where a#g"entation is needed.
LIM7ET7AI SONS MILLING, INC. >(. COURT OF APPEALS
(GR. NO. 118509 S)E0)D8)2 5, 199%)
FRANCISCO, !."
FACTS"
In*ol*ed in the instant case is the Motion of petitioner
Li":et:ai !ons Milling, Inc., for reconsideration of the o#rtIs resol#tion of
March 29, 199+, which set aside the o#rtIs Dece")er 1, 1997 decision
and affir"ed in toto the o#rt of AppealsI decision dated A#g#st 12, 199B.
It is arg#ed, al)eit erroneo#sly, that the case sho#ld )e
referred to the o#rt .n Banc as the doctrines laid down in A)renica *.
,onda and De ,arcia, 4B 0hil. 749, $alosig *. <da. de 3ie)a, B4 !%A
B74, and <illonco %ealty o. *. Bor"aheco, Inc., et al., +7 !%A 472,
ha*e )een "odified or re*ersed. A "ore circ#"spect analysis of these
cases *is9a9*is the case at )ench wo#ld ine*ita)ly lead petitioner to the
concl#sion that there was neither re*ersal nor "odification of the doctrines
laid down in the A)renica, $alosig and <illonco cases.
8hat petitioner )ewails the "ost is the present co"position
of the $hird Di*ision which deli)erated on pri*ate respondentsI "otions for
reconsideration and )y a "a-ority *ote re*ersed the #nani"o#s decision of
Dece")er 1, 1997. More specifically, petitioner 6#estions the ass#"ption
of hief H#stice 3ar*asa of the chair"anship of the $hird Di*ision and
arrogantly ra"s its idea on how each Di*ision sho#ld )e chaired, i.e., the
(irst Di*ision sho#ld ha*e )een chaired )y hief H#stice 3ar*asa, the
!econd Di*ision )y Mr. H#stice 0adilla, the ne5t senior H#stice, and the
$hird Di*ision )y Mr. H#stice %egalado, the third in line.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the contention of petitioner as to the co"position
of the third di*ision "eritorio#s.
HELD"
3'. 8e need only to stress that the change in the
"e")ership of the three di*isions of the o#rt was ine*ita)le )y reason of
Mr. H#stice (elicianoIs retire"ent. !#ch reorgani&ation is p#rely an internal
"atter of the o#rt to which petitioner certainly has no )#siness at all. In
fact, the c#rrent /staggered/ set9#p in the chair"anships of the Di*isions is
si"ilar to that adopted in 1988. In that year, the o#rtIs $hird Di*ision was
li:ewise chaired )y then hief H#stice (ernan, while the (irst and !econd
Di*isions were headed )y the ne5t senior H#stices E H#stices 3ar*asa
and Melencio91errera, respecti*ely.
!#ffice it to say that the o#rt with its new "e")ership is
not o)liged to follow )lindly a decision #pholding a partyIs case when, after
its re9e5a"ination, the sa"e calls for a rectification. /Indeed/, said the
o#rt in Lilos)ayan, Inc. *s. Morato, et al., 27? !%A 14?, 14+, /a change
in the co"position of the o#rt co#ld pro*e the "eans of #ndoing an
erroneo#s decision/.
DRILON VS. LIM
(GR. NO. 112497 AUGUST 4, 1994)
CRU$, !."
FACTS"
$he principal iss#e in this case is the constit#tionality of
!ection 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode reading as follows2
0roced#re (or Appro*al And .ffecti*ity 'f $a5 'rdinances And %e*en#e
Meas#resG Mandatory 0#)lic 1earings. E $he proced#re for appro*al of
local ta5 ordinances and re*en#e "eas#res shall )e in accordance with
the pro*isions of this ode2 0ro*ided, $hat p#)lic hearings shall )e
cond#cted for the p#rpose prior to the enact"ent thereofG 0ro*ided,
f#rther, $hat any 6#estion on the constit#tionality or legality of ta5
ordinances or re*en#e "eas#res "ay )e raised on appeal within thirty
@4?A days fro" the effecti*ity thereof to the !ecretary of H#stice who shall
render a decision within si5ty @+?A days fro" the date of receipt of the
appeal2 0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat s#ch appeal shall not ha*e the effect of
s#spending the effecti*ity of the ordinance and the accr#al and pay"ent of
the ta5, fee, or charge le*ied therein2 0ro*ided, finally, $hat within thirty
@4?A days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the si5ty9day period
witho#t the !ecretary of H#stice acting #pon the appeal, the aggrie*ed
party "ay file appropriate proceedings with a co#rt of co"petent
-#risdiction.
0#rs#ant thereto, the !ecretary of H#stice had, on appeal to
hi" of fo#r oil co"panies and a ta5payer, declared 'rdinance 3o. 779B,
otherwise :nown as the Manila %e*en#e ode, n#ll and *oid for non9
co"pliance with the prescri)ed proced#re in the enact"ent of ta5
ordinances and for containing certain pro*isions contrary to law and p#)lic
policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed )y the ity of Manila, the
%egional $rial o#rt of Manila re*o:ed the !ecretaryIs resol#tion and
s#stained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the proced#ral
re6#ire"ents had )een o)ser*ed. More i"portantly, it declared !ection
187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode as #nconstit#tional )eca#se of its
*est#re in the !ecretary of H#stice of the power of control o*er local
go*ern"ents in *iolation of the policy of local a#tono"y "andated in the
onstit#tion and of the specific pro*ision therein conferring on the
0resident of the 0hilippines only the power of s#per*ision o*er local
go*ern"ents. $he !ecretary arg#es that the ann#lled !ection 187 is
143
constit#tional and that the proced#ral re6#ire"ents for the enact"ent of
ta5 ordinances as specified in the Local ,o*ern"ent ode had indeed not
)een o)ser*ed.
0arenthetically, this petition was originally dis"issed )y the
o#rt for non9co"pliance with irc#lar 1988, the !olicitor ,eneral ha*ing
failed to s#)"it a certified tr#e copy of the challenged decision. 1owe*er,
on "otion for reconsideration with the re6#ired certified tr#e copy of the
decision attached, the petition was reinstated in *iew of the i"portance of
the iss#es raised therein.
ISSUES"
@1A 8hether or not the %$ of Manila has -#risdiction to consider the
constit#tionality of !ection 187 of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode.
@2A 8hether or not the !#pre"e o#rt has appellate -#risdiction o*er final
-#dg"ents and orders of lower co#rts.
HELD"
Des to )oth. 8e stress at the o#tset that the lower co#rt had
-#risdiction to consider the constit#tionality of !ection 187, this a#thority
)eing e")raced in the general definition of the -#dicial power to deter"ine
what are the *alid and )inding laws )y the criterion of their confor"ity to
the f#nda"ental law. !pecifically, B0 129 *ests in the regional trial co#rts
-#risdiction o*er all ci*il cases in which the s#)-ect of the litigation is
incapa)le of pec#niary esti"ation, e*en as the acc#sed in a cri"inal
action has the right to 6#estion in his defense the constit#tionality of a law
he is charged with *iolating and of the proceedings ta:en against hi",
partic#larly as they contra*ene the Bill of %ights. Moreo*er, Article
<III, !ection 7@2A, of the onstit#tion *ests in the !#pre"e o#rt appellate
-#risdiction o*er final -#dg"ents and orders of lower co#rts in all cases in
which the constit#tionality or *alidity of any treaty, international or
e5ec#ti*e agree"ent, law, presidential decree, procla"ation, order,
instr#ction, ordinance, or reg#lation is in 6#estion.
In the e5ercise of this -#risdiction, lower co#rts are ad*ised to
act with the #t"ost circ#"spection, )earing in "ind the conse6#ences of
a declaration of #nconstit#tionality #pon the sta)ility of laws, no less than
on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the 6#estioned act is #s#ally
the handiwor: of the legislati*e or the e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, or )oth, it
will )e pr#dent for s#ch co#rts, if only o#t of a )eco"ing "odesty, to defer
to the higher -#dg"ent of this o#rt in the consideration of its *alidity,
which is )etter deter"ined after a thoro#gh deli)eration )y a collegiate
)ody and with the conc#rrence of the "a-ority of those who participated in
its disc#ssion.
&USTOS VS. LUCERO
(GR. NO. L20%8, M'2/; 8, 1949)
TUASON, !."
FACTS"
0etitioner, an acc#sed in a cri"inal case, filed a "otion with
trial co#rt, praying that the record of the case )e re"anded to the -#stice
of the peace co#rt of Masantol, the co#rt of origin, in order that he "ight
cross9e5a"ine the co"plainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testi"ony, on the strength of which warrant was iss#ed for the arrest of
the acc#sed. $he "otion was denied.
According to the "e"orand#" s#)"itted )y the petitionerIs
co#nsel in s#pport of his "otion, the acc#sed, assisted )y co#nsel,
appeared at the preli"inary in*estigation. $he -#stice of the peace
infor"ed hi" of the charges and as:ed hi" if he pleaded g#ilty or not
g#ilty, #pon which he entered the plea of not g#ilty. /$hen his co#nsel
"o*ed that the co"plainant present her e*idence so that she and her
witnesses co#ld )e e5a"ined and cross9e5a"ined in the "anner and for"
pro*ided )y law./ $he fiscal and the pri*ate prosec#tor o)-ected, in*o:ing
section 11 of r#le 1?8, and the o)-ection was s#stained. /In *iew thereof,
the acc#sedIs co#nsel anno#nced his intention to reno#nce his right to
present e*idence,/ and the -#stice of the peace forwarded the case to the
trial co#rt.
$he !#pre"e o#rt #pheld the assailed denial, saying that
respondent -#dge did not act in e5cess of his -#risdiction or in a)#se of
discretion in ref#sing to grant the acc#sedIs "otion to ret#rn the record for
the p#rpose set o#t therein. 1ence, the "otion for reconsideration.
ISSUES" 8hether or not !ection 11 of %#le 1?8 of the %#les of o#rt
infringes section 14, Article <III of the 1947 onstit#tion. @ now !ection
7@7A, Article 8, 1987 onstit#tionA
HELD"
3o. $he !#pre"e o#rt, in its %esol#tion dated March 8,
19B9 opined that !ection 11 of %#le 1?8, li:e its predecessors, is an
ad-ecti*e law and not a s#)stanti*e law or s#)stanti*e right. !#)stanti*e
law creates s#)stanti*e rights and the two ter"s in this respect "ay )e
said to )e synony"o#s. !#)stanti*e rights is a ter" which incl#des those
rights which one en-oys #nder the legal syste" prior to the dist#r)ance of
nor"al relations. @+? .H., 98?.A !#)stanti*e law is that part of the law
which creates, defines and reg#lates rights, or which reg#lates the rights
and d#ties which gi*e rise to a ca#se of actionG that part of the law which
co#rts are esta)lished to ad"inisterG as opposed to ad-ecti*e or re"edial
law, which prescri)es the "ethod of enforcing rights or o)tains redress for
their in*asion. @4+ . H., 27G 72 . H. !., 1?2+.A
8hile section 11 of %#le 1?8 denies to the defendant the
right to cross9e5a"ine witnesses in a preli"inary in*estigation, his right to
present his witnesses re"ains #naffected, and his constit#tional right to )e
infor"ed of the charges against hi" )oth at s#ch in*estigation and at the
trial is #nchanged. In the latter stage of the proceedings, the only stage
where the g#aranty of d#e process co"es into play, he still en-oys to the
f#ll e5tent the right to )e confronted )y and to cross9e5a"ine the
witnesses against hi". $he degree of i"portance of a preli"inary
in*estigation to an acc#sed "ay )e ga#ged )y the fact that this for"ality is
fre6#ently wai*ed.
$he distinction )etween /re"edy/ and /s#)stanti*e right/ is
incapa)le of e5act definition. $he difference is so"ewhat a 6#estion of
degree. @De5ter *s. .d"ands, 89 (., B+7G Bea&ell *s. 'hio, s#pra.A It is
diffic#lt to draw a line in any partic#lar case )eyond which legislati*e
power o*er re"edy and proced#re can pass witho#t to#ching #pon the
s#)stanti*e rights of parties affected, as it is i"possi)le to fi5 that
)o#ndary )y general condition. @!tate *s. 0a*elic:, 279 0., 11?2.A $his
)eing so, it is ine*ita)le that the !#pre"e o#rt in "a:ing r#les sho#ld
step on s#)stanti*e rights, and the onstit#tion "#st )e pres#"ed to
tolerate if not to e5pect s#ch inc#rsion as does not affect the acc#sed in a
harsh and ar)itrary "anner or depri*e hi" of a defense, )#t operates only
in a li"ited and #ns#)stantial "anner to his disad*antage. (or the o#rtIs
power is not "erely to co"pile, re*ise or codify the r#les of proced#re
e5isting at the ti"e of the onstit#tionIs appro*al. $his power is /to
pro"#lgate r#les concerning pleading, practice, and proced#re in all
co#rts,/ which is a power to adopt a general, co"plete and co"prehensi*e
syste" of proced#re, adding new and different r#les witho#t regard to their
so#rce and discarding old ones.
&P 129 (SECTION 9(3)), EO22% (ART. 82), AND SUPREME COURT
CIRCULAR 191
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(GR. NO. 110571 MARCH 10, 1994)
NOCON, !."
FACTS"
B'I granted petitioner (irst Lepanto era"ics, Inc.Is
application to a"end its B'I certificate of registration )y changing the
scope of its registered prod#ct fro" /gla&ed floor tiles/ to /cera"ic tiles./
'positor Mariwasa "o*ed for reconsideration of said B'I decision. $his
"otion ha*ing )een denied, Mariwasa filed a petition for re*iew with
respondent co#rt.
$he A te"porarily restrained the B'I fro" i"ple"enting its
decision. $his $%' lapsed )y its own ter"s 2? days after its iss#ance,
witho#t respondent co#rt iss#ing any preli"inary in-#nction. 0etitioner filed
a /Motion to Dis"iss 0etition and to Lift %estraining 'rder/ on the gro#nd
that the A has no appellate -#risdiction o*er B'I ase 3o. 929??7, the
sa"e )eing e5cl#si*ely *ested with the !#pre"e o#rt p#rs#ant to Article
82 of the '"ni)#s In*est"ents ode of 1987. $he appellate co#rt denied
the "otion to dis"iss. $h#s, a petition for certiorari and prohi)ition was
filed )efore this o#rt.
0etitioner clai"s that the A acted witho#t or in e5cess of its
-#risdiction in iss#ing the 6#estioned resol#tion. 0etitioner arg#es that the
H#diciary %eorgani&ation Act of 198? or Batas 0a")ansa Bilang 129 and
irc#lar 1991, /0rescri)ing the %#les ,o*erning Appeals to the o#rt of
Appeals fro" a (inal 'rder or Decision of the o#rt of $a5 Appeals and
V#asi9H#dicial Agencies/ cannot )e the )asis of MariwasaIs appeal to
respondent co#rt )eca#se the proced#re for appeal laid down therein r#ns
contrary to Article 82 of ..'. 22+, which pro*ides that appeals fro"
decisions or orders of the B'I shall )e filed directly with this o#rt.
Mariwasa co#nters that whate*er /o)*io#s inconsistency/ or
/irreconcila)le rep#gnancy/ there "ay ha*e )een )etween B.0. 129 and
Article 82 of ..'. 22+ on the 6#estion of *en#e for appeal has already
)een resol*ed )y irc#lar 1991 of the !#pre"e o#rt, which was
pro"#lgated fo#r years after ..'. 22+ was enacted.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the !#pre"e o#rt has the power to prescri)e
r#les to eli"inate #nnecessary contradictions and conf#sing r#les of
proced#re.
HELD"
Des. $he !#pre"e o#rt, p#rs#ant to its onstit#tional
power #nder !ection 7@7A, Article <III of the 1987 onstit#tion to
pro"#lgate r#les concerning pleading, practice and proced#re in all
co#rts, and )y way of i"ple"entation of B.0. 129, iss#ed irc#lar 1991
prescri)ing the r#les go*erning appeals to the o#rt of Appeals fro" final
orders or decisions of the o#rt of $a5 Appeals and 6#asi9-#dicial
agencies to eli"inate #nnecessary contradictions and conf#sing r#les of
proced#re.
ontrary to petitionerIs contention, altho#gh a circ#lar is not
strictly a stat#te or law, it has, howe*er, the force and effect of law
according to settled -#rispr#dence.

In Inciong *. de ,#ia,

a circ#lar of this
o#rt was treated as law. In adopting the reco""endation of the
In*estigating H#dge to i"pose a sanction on a -#dge who *iolated irc#lar
3o. 7 of this o#rt dated !epte")er 24, 197B, as a"ended )y irc#lar
3o. 4 dated April 2B, 1977 and irc#lar 3o. 2? dated 'cto)er B, 1979,
re6#iring raffling of cases, this o#rt 6#oted the ratiocination of the
In*estigating H#dge, )r#shing aside the contention of respondent -#dge
that assigning cases instead of raffling is a co""on practice and holding
that respondent co#ld not go against the circ#lar of this o#rt #ntil it is
repealed or otherwise "odified, as /Laws are repealed only )y
s#)se6#ent ones, and their *iolation or non9o)ser*ance shall not )e
e5c#sed )y dis#se, or c#sto"s or practice to the contrary./

144
$he arg#"ent that Article 82 of ..'. 22+ cannot )e *alidly
repealed )y irc#lar 1991 )eca#se the for"er grants a s#)stanti*e right
which, #nder the onstit#tion cannot )e "odified, di"inished or increased
)y this o#rt in the e5ercise of its r#le9"a:ing powers is not entirely
defensi)le as it see"s. %espondent correctly arg#ed that Article 82 of
..'. 22+ grants the right of appeal fro" decisions or final orders of the
B'I and in granting s#ch right, it also pro*ided where and in what "anner
s#ch appeal can )e )ro#ght. $hese latter portions si"ply deal with
proced#ral aspects which this o#rt has the power to reg#late )y *irt#e of
its constit#tional r#le9"a:ing powers.
learly, irc#lar 1991 effecti*ely repealed or s#perseded
Article 82 of ..'. 22+ insofar as the "anner and "ethod of enforcing the
right to appeal fro" decisions of the B'I are concerned. Appeals fro"
decisions of the B'I, which )y stat#te was pre*io#sly allowed to )e filed
directly with the !#pre"e o#rt, sho#ld now )e )ro#ght to the o#rt of
Appeal.
ARUELO VS. CA
GR NO. 107852. OCTO&ER 20, 1993
FACTS"
Ar#elo and ,atchalian were <ice9Mayoralty candidates in
Balagtas, B#lacan in the May 1992 elections. ,atchalian was proclai"ed
as the d#ly elected *ice9"ayor. Ar#elo filed with the 'M.L. a petition
see:ing to ann#l ,atchalianIs procla"ation on the gro#nd of /fra#d#lent
alteration and ta"pering/ of *otes. Ar#elo also filed with the %$ a petition
protesting the sa"e election.
,atchalian "o*ed to dis"iss, clai"ing that2 @aA the petition
was filed o#t of ti"eG @)A there was a pending protest case )efore the
'M.L.G and @)A Ar#elo failed to pay the prescri)ed filing fees and cash
deposit on the petition.
$he 'M.L. denied Ar#eloIs petition. 1owe*er, the trial
co#rt denied ,atchalianIs Motion to Dis"iss and ordered hi" to file his
answer to the petition.
Ar#elo prayed )efore the A for the iss#ance of a te"porary
restraining order or a writ of preli"inary in-#nction to restrain the trial co#rt
fro" i"ple"enting the 'rder of A#g#st 11 1992, regarding the re*ision of
)allots. $he A )elatedly iss#ed a te"porary restraining order.
Meanwhile, ,atchalian filed with the A another petition for certiorari @A9
,.%. !0 3o. 28977A, again alleging gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part
of the trial co#rt in iss#ing the 'rder, which denied his Motion for Bill of
0artic#lars. $he A dis"issed this petition for lac: of "erit.
$he A rendered -#dg"ent, denying ,atchalianIs petition,
)#t declaring, at the sa"e ti"e, that ,atchalianIs Answer 8ith o#nter9
0rotest and o#nterclai" was ti"ely filed. $he appellate co#rt also lifted
the te"porary restraining order and ordered the trial co#rt to /proceed with
dispatch in the proceedings )elow. 1ence this petition.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the filing of "otions to dis"iss and "otions for )ill
of partic#lars is prohi)ited )y !ection 1, %#le 14, 0art III of the 'M.L.
%#les of 0roced#reG hence, the filing of said pleadings did not s#spend the
r#nning of the fi*e9day period, or gi*e ,atchalian a new fi*e9day period to
file his answer.
HELD"
3'. 0etitioner filed the election protest @i*il ase 3o. 4B49
M992A with the %$, whose proceedings are go*erned )y the %e*ised
%#les of o#rt. !ection 1, %#le 14, 0art III of the 'M.L. %#les of
0roced#re is not applica)le to proceedings )efore the reg#lar co#rts. As
e5pressly "andated )y !ection 2, %#le 1, 0art I of the 'M.L. %#les
of 0roced#re, the filing of "otions to dis"iss and )ill of 0artic#lars, shall
apply only to proceedings )ro#ght )efore the 'M.L.. !ection 2, %#le
1, 0art I pro*ides2
/!.. 2. Applica)ility. $hese r#les, e5cept 0art <I, shall apply to all
actions and proceedings )ro#ght )efore the o""ission. 0art <I shall
apply to election contests and 6#o warranto cases cogni&a)le )y co#rts of
general or li"ited -#risdiction It "#st )e noted that nowhere in 0art <I of
the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is it pro*ided that "otions to dis"iss
and )ill of partic#lars are not allowed in election protest or 6#o warranto
cases pending )efore the reg#lar co#rts.
onstit#tionally spea:ing, the 'M.L. cannot adopt a
r#le prohi)iting the filing of certain pleadings in the reg#lar co#rts. $he
power to pro"#lgate r#les concerning pleadings, practice and proced#re
in all co#rts is *ested on the !#pre"e o#rt @onstit#tion, Art <III, !ec. +
O7PA.
0ri*ate respondent recei*ed a copy of the order of the %$
denying his "otion for a )ill of partic#lars on A#g#st +, 1992. Jnder
!ection l@)A, %#le 12 of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt, a party has at least
fi*e days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his "otion for
a )ill of partic#lars. 0ri*ate respondent, therefore, had #ntil A#g#st 11,
1992 within which to file his answer. $he Answer with o#nter90rotest and
o#nterclai" filed )y hi" on A#g#st 11, 1992 was filed ti"ely.
$he instant case is different fro" a pre9procla"ation
contro*ersy which the law e5pressly "andates to )e resol*ed in a
s#""ary proceeding @B.0. Blg. 881, Art. ;;, !ec. 2B+G 'M.L. %#les
of 0roced#re, 0art <, %#le 27, !ec. 2A. 0re9procla"ation contro*ersies
sho#ld )e s#""arily decided, consistent with the legislatorsI desire that
the can*ass of the *otes and the procla"ation of the winning candidate )e
done with dispatch and witho#t #nnecessary delay. An election protest
does not "erely concern the personal interests of ri*al candidates for an
office. '*er and, a)o*e the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep
p#)lic interest to deter"ine the tr#e choice of he people. (or this reason, it
is a well9esta)lished principle that laws go*erning election protests "#st
)e li)erally constr#ed to the end that the pop#lar will e5pressed in the
election or p#)lic officers, will not, )y p#rely technical reasons, )e
defeated
8e find no gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the o#rt
of Appeals.
81.%.('%., the petition is here)y DI!MI!!.D.
!AVELLANA VS. DILG
GRN 102549, AUGUST 10, 1992

FACTS"
0etitioner Atty. .rwin B. Ha*ellana was an elected ity
o#ncilor of Bago ity, 3egros 'ccidental. In 1989, ity .ngineer .rnesto
. Di*inagracia s#ed Ha*ellana for2 @1A *iolation of Depart"ent of Local
,o*ern"ent @DL,A Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 8?948 in relation to DL,
Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 7B978 and of !ection 7, paragraph ), 3o. 2 of
%ep#)lic Act 3o. +714,/ and @2A for oppression, "iscond#ct and a)#se of
a#thority.
Di*inagraciaIs co"plaint alleged that Ha*ellana has
contin#o#sly engaged in the practice of law witho#t sec#ring a#thority for
that p#rpose, as re6#iredG that petitioner, as co#nsel for Antonio Ha*iero
and %olando atapang, s#ed Di*inagracia for /Illegal Dis"issal and
%einstate"ent with Da"ages/ p#tting hi" in p#)lic ridic#leG and that
Ha*ellana also appeared as co#nsel in se*eral cases witho#t prior
a#thority of the DL, %egional Director.
0etitioner filed this petition for certiorari praying that DL,
Me"ora"d#" irc#lars 3os. 8?948 and 9?981 and !ection 9? of the
new Local ,o*ern"ent ode @%A 71+?A )e declared #nconstit#tional and
n#ll and *oid )eca#se2
@1A they *iolate Article <III, !ection 7 of the 1987 onstit#tion
and @2A $hey constit#te class legislation, )eing discri"inatory against the
legal and "edical professions for only sangg#nian "e")ers who are
lawyers and doctors are restricted in the e5ercise of their profession while
dentists, engineers, architects, teachers, opticians, "orticians and others
are not so restricted @%A 71+?, !ec. 9? @)9lPA.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the 6#estioned "e"orand#" circ#lars and
!ection 9? of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode #nconstit#tional.
HELD"
3'. As a "atter of policy, this o#rt accords great respect to
the decisions andRor actions of ad"inistrati*e a#thorities not only )eca#se
of the doctrine of separation of powers )#t also for their pres#"ed
:nowledgea)ility and e5pertise in the enforce"ent of laws and reg#lations
entr#sted to their -#risdiction 8ith respect to the present case, we find no
gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the respondent, Depart"ent of
Interior and Local ,o*ern"ent @DIL,A, in iss#ing the 6#estioned DL,
irc#lars 3os. 8?948 and 9?981 and in denying petitionerIs "otion to
dis"iss the ad"inistrati*e charge against hi".
In the first place, co"plaints against p#)lic officers and
e"ployees relating or incidental to the perfor"ance of their d#ties are
necessarily i"pressed with p#)lic interest for )y e5press constit#tional
"andate, a p#)lic office is a p#)lic tr#st. $he co"plaint for illegal
dis"issal filed )y Ha*iero and atapang against ity .ngineer
Di*inagracia is in effect a co"plaint against the ity ,o*ern"ent of Bago
ity, their real e"ployer, of which petitioner Ha*ellana is a co#ncil"an.
1ence, -#dg"ent against ity .ngineer Di*inagracia wo#ld act#ally )e a
-#dg"ent against the ity ,o*ern"ent. By ser*ing as co#nsel for the
co"plaining e"ployees and assisting the" to prosec#te their clai"s
against ity .ngineer Di*inagracia, the petitioner *iolated Me"orand#"
irc#lar 3o. 7B978 @in relation to .lection 7O)92A of %A +714A prohi)iting a
go*ern"ent official fro" engaging in the pri*ate practice of his profession,
if s#ch practice wo#ld represent interests ad*erse to the go*ern"ent.
0etitionerIs contention that !ection 9? of the Local
,o*ern"ent ode of 1991 and DL, Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 9?981
*iolate Article <III, !ection 7 of the onstit#tion is co"pletely off tangent.
3either the stat#te nor the circ#lar trenches #pon the !#pre"e o#rtIs
power and a#thority to prescri)e r#les on the practice of law. $he Local
,o*ern"ent ode and DL, Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. 9?981 si"ply
prescri)e r#les of cond#ct for p#)lic officials to a*oid conflicts of interest
)etween the discharge of their p#)lic d#ties and the pri*ate practice of
their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
!ection 9? of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode does not
discri"inate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all pro*incial and
"#nicipal officials in the professions or engaged in any occ#pation.
!ection 9? e5plicitly pro*ides that sangg#nian "e")ers ."ay practice
their professions, engage in any occ#pation, or teach in schools e5cept
d#ring session ho#rs. / If there are so"e prohi)itions that apply
partic#larly to lawyers, it is )eca#se of all the professions, the practice of
145
law is "ore li:ely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of p#)lic
ser*ice.
81.%.('%., the petition is D.3I.D for lac: of "erit.
MACEDA VS. VASJUE$
221 SCRA 4%4 519936
FACTS"
0etitioner H#dge Bonifacio !an& Maceda see:s the re*iew of
the following orders of the office of the '")#ds"an2
1.A $he order dated !epte")er 18, 1991 denying e5 parte "otion refer to
the ! filed )y the 0etitioner and
2.A $he order dated 3o*e")er 22, 1971 denying the petitionerIs "otion for
reconsideration and directing petitioners to file his co#nter affida*it and
other contro*erting e*idences.
In his affida*it9co"plaint, respondent 3apoleon A)iera
asserts that petitioner falsely certified that all ci*il and cri"inal cases
which ha*e )een s#)"itted for decision or deter"ination for a period of 9?
days ha*e )een deter"ined and decided on or )efore Han#ary 41, 1998
where in tr#th and in fact, petitioner :new that no decision had )een
rendered in the cases that ha*e )een s#)"itted for decision. %espondent
A)iera f#rther alleged that petitioner si"ilarly falsified his certificate of
ser*ice.
0etitioner co#nters that he had )een granted )y this co#rt an
e5tension of 9? days to decide said cases, and that the '")#ds"an has
no -#risdiction o*er the case since the offense charged arose fro" the
-#dgeIs perfor"ance of his official d#ties, which is #nder control of this
o#rt.
ISSUE" 8hether the 'ffice of the '")#ds"an co#ld entertain cri"inal
co"plaints for the alleged falsification of a -#dgeIs certification s#)"itted
to the s#pre"e co#rt to the !, and ass#"ing that it can, whether a
referral sho#ld )e "ade first to the !.
HELD"
$he o#rt disagrees with the first part if the petitioners )asic
arg#"ent, there is nothing in the decision in 'rap that wo#ld restrict it only
to offenses co""itted )y a -#dge #nrelated to his official d#ties. A -#dge
who falsifies his certificate is ad"inistrati*ely lia)le to the ! for serio#s
"iscond#ct and inefficiency #nder !ec. 1 %#le 1B? of the r#les of o#rt
and cri"inally lia)le to the state #nder the re*ised 0enal ode for his
felonio#s Act.
1owe*er, we agree with petitioner that in the a)sence of any
ad"inistrati*e action ta:en against hi" )y this o#rt with regard to his
certificate of ser*ice, the in*estigation )eing cond#cted )y the
'")#ds"an o*er all co#rts and its personnel, in *iolation of the doctrine
of separation of powers.
Articles <III, !ec. + of the 1987 onstit#tion e5cl#si*ely
*ests in the ! ad"inistrati*e s#per*ision o*er all co#rts and co#rt
personnel, fro" the presiding H#stice of the A that can o*ersee the
-#dgeIs and co#rt personnelIs co"pliance co""it any *iolation thereof. 3o
other )ranch of go*ern"ent "ay intr#de into this power, witho#t r#nning
afo#l of the doctrine separation of power.
$he '")#ds"an cannot -#stify itIs in*estigation of petitioner
on the powers granted to it )y onstit#tion, for s#ch a -#stification not only
r#ns co#nter to the specific "andate of the constit#tion grating s#per*isory
powers to ! o*erall co#rts and their personnel, )#t li:ewise #nder"ines
the independence of the -#diciary.
$h#s, the '")#ds"an sho#ld first refer the "atter of
petitionerIs certificate of ser*ice to this co#rt for deter"ination of whether
said certificate reflected the tr#e stat#s of his pending case load, as the
o#rt has the necessary records to "a:e s#ch deter"ination. $he
'")#ds"an cannot co"pel this co#rt, as one of the three )ranches of
go*ern"ent, to s#)"it its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on
this "atter, as s#ggested )y p#)lic respondent A)iera in his affida*it9
co"plaint.
$he rationale for the foregoing prono#nce"ent is e*ident in
this case. Ad"inistrati*ely, the 6#estion )efore #s is this, sho#ld a -#dge,
ha*ing )een granted )y this co#rt an e5tension of ti"e to decide )efore
hi", report these cases in his certificate of ser*ice. As this 6#estion had
not yet )een raised these cases less resol*ed )y, this o#rt how co#ld )e
the '")#ds"an resol*e the present cri"inal co"plaint that re6#ires the
resol#tion of this 6#estion.
In fine, where the cri"inal co"plaint against a -#dge or other
co#rt e"ployees arises fro" their ad"inistrati*e d#ties, the o")#ds"an
"#st defer action on said co"plaints and refer the sa"e to this o#rt for
deter"ination whether said -#dge or co#rt e"ployee had acted within the
scope of their ad"inistrati*e d#ties.
8herefore, the instant petition is here)y granted. $he
'")#ds"an is here)y directed to dis"iss the co"plaint filed )y the p#)lic
respondent Atty. 3apoleon A)iera and to refer the sa"e to this co#rt for
appropriate action.
NITAFAN VS. COMMISSION OF INTERNAL REVENUE
152 SCRA 284 519876
FACTS"
0etitioners Da*id 3itafan 8enceslao 0olo and Ma5i"o
!a*ellano are d#ly appointed and 6#alified H#dges of the %$, 3%
Manila. $hey so#ght to prohi)it andRor
perpet#ally en-oin respondent o""ission of Internal %e*en#e and
(inance 'ffice of the ! fro" "a:ing any ded#ctions of withholding ta5es
fro" their salaries. $hey s#)"it that a ta5 withheld fro" their
co"pensation as -#dicial officers constit#te a decrease or di"in#tion of
their salaries contrary to the pro*ision of !ec.1? of Art.<III of the
onstit#tion "andating that /d#ring their contin#ance in office, their salary
shall not )e decreased.
ISSUE" Is the ded#ction in the said salaries in *iolation of !ec.1? of
Art.<IIIC
HELD"
D.!. $he draft proposal of !ec 1? Art <III reads as /their
salary shall not )e decreased/ and the words /not s#)-ected to inco"e
ta5/ was deleted so as to gi*e s#)stance to e6#ality a"ong the three
)ranches of go*ern"ent.
$h#s, the clear intent of the onstit#tional o""ission was
to delete the proposed e5press grant of e5e"ption fro" pay"ent of
inco"e ta5 to "e")ers of the H#diciary. In the co#rse of deli)erations, it
was "ade clear that the salaries of "e")ers of the H#diciary wo#ld )e
s#)-ect to general inco"e ta5 does not fall within their contin#ance in
office.
$he co#rt disregarded the r#ling in 0erfecto *s. Meer that
declared the salaries of "e")ers of the H#diciary e5e"pt fro" pay"ent of
inco"e ta5 and considered s#ch pay"ent as di"in#tion of their salaries
d#ring their contin#ance in office.
(#rther"ore, in constr#cting !ec 1? Art <III of the 1987
onstit#tion, it is plain that the onstit#tion a#thori&es ongress to pass a
law fi5ing another rate of co"pensation of H#stice and H#dges )#t s#ch
rate "#st )e higher than that which they are recei*ing at the ti"e of the
enact"ent, of if lower, it wo#ld )e applica)le only to the appointed after its
appro*al. It wo#ld )e strained constr#ction to read into the pro*ision an
e5e"ption fro" ta5ation when the tr#e intent of the fra"ers was to "a:e
the salaries of the H#diciary ta5a)le.
DE LA LLANA >(. AL&A
(G.R. N+. L57883 M'2/; 12, 1982)
FERNANDO, C.!."
FACTS"
0etitioners assailed the constit#tionality of Batas 0a")ansa
Blg. 129 entitled /An Act %eorgani&ing the H#diciary, Appropriating (#nds
$herefore and for other 0#rposes,/ the sa"e )eing contrary to the sec#rity
of ten#re pro*ision of the onstit#tion as it separates fro" the -#diciary
H#stices and -#dges of inferior co#rts fro" the o#rt of Appeals to
"#nicipal circ#it co#rts e5cept the occ#pants of the !andigan)ayan and
the o#rt of $a5 Appeals, #nless appointed to the inferior co#rts
esta)lished )y s#ch Act. $hey li:ewise i"p#te lac: of good faith in its
enact"ent and characteri&e as #nd#e delegation of legislati*e power to
the 0resident his a#thority to fi5 the co"pensation and allowances of the
H#stices and -#dges thereafter appointed and the deter"ination of the date
when the reorgani&ation shall )e dee"ed co"pleted. $he !olicitor
,eneral "aintains that there is no *alid -#stification for the attac: on the
constit#tionality of the stat#te, it )eing a legiti"ate e5ercise of the power
*ested in the Batasang 0a")ansa to reorgani&e the -#diciary, the
allegations of a)sence of good faith as well as the attac: on the
independence of the -#diciary )eing #nwarranted and de*oid of any
s#pport in law.
ISSUE" 8hether or not B0 Blg. 129 is #nconstit#tional.
HELD"
Des. It is constit#tional. After an intensi*e and rigoro#s
st#dy of all the legal aspects of the case, the !#pre"e o#rt dis"issed
the petition, the #nconstit#tionality of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 129 not ha*ing
)een shown. It held that the enact"ent thereof was in answer to a
pressing and #rgent need for a "a-or reorgani&ation of the -#diciaryG that
the attendant a)olition of the inferior co#rts which shall ca#se their
inc#")ents to cease fro" holding office does not i"pair the independence
of the -#diciary and the sec#rity of ten#re g#arantee as inc#")ent -#stices
and -#dges with good perfor"ance and clean records can )e na"ed anew
in legal conte"plation witho#t interr#ption in the contin#ity of their ser*iceG
that the pro*ision granting the 0resident a#thority to fi5 the co"pensation
and allowances of the H#stices and -#dges s#r*i*es the test of #nd#e
delegation of legislati*e power, a standard ha*ing )een clearly adopted
thereforG that the reorgani&ation pro*ided )y the challenged Act will )e
carried o#t in accordance with the 0residentIs constit#tional d#ty to ta:e
care that the laws )e faithf#lly e5ec#ted, and the -#diciaryIs co""it"ent to
g#ard constit#tional rights.
PEOPLE VS. HON. ESTAJUIO GACOTT
(G.R. N+. 11%049 M'2/; 20, 1995)
&IDIN, !."
FACTS"
%espondents !tro" and %eyes were charged with *iolation
of the Anti9D#""y Law. $he acc#sed filed a Motion to V#ashRDis"iss,
arg#ing that since the power to prosec#te is *ested e5cl#si*ely in the Anti9
D#""y Board #nder %A 114?, the ity 0rosec#tor of 0#erto 0rincesa has
146
no power or a#thority to file the sa"e. $he prosec#tion filed an opposition
pointing o#t that the Anti9D#""y Board has already )een a)olished )y
Letter of I"ple"entation 3o. 2, !eries of 1972.
%espondent -#dge granted the "otion. $he prosec#tion
"o*ed for reconsideration )#t respondent -#dge denied the sa"e in an
order, the pertinent portions of which are 6#oted here#nder2
=. . . . It "ay )e ignorance of the law to insist that the law,
%ep#)lic Act 114? was repealed or a"ended )y Letter of Instr#ction @sicA
3o. 2, !eries of 1972 as what the ity 0rosec#tor has harped all along. A
Letter of Instr#ction @sicA is not law )y any standard and neither has it the
force and effect of law. A contrary contention wo#ld )e *iolati*e of Article 7
of the 3ew i*il ode which pro*ides that laws are repealed only )y
s#)se6#ent ones and of the %#les of !tat#tory onstr#ction.
Besides, penal stat#tes are strictly constr#ed against the
!tate and li)erally in fa*or of the acc#sed. $he r#les in all cri"inal
prosec#tions is that all co#nts are resol*ed in fa*or of the acc#sed. In the
case at )ar, the co#rt serio#sly do#)ts that the ity 0rosec#tor has the
power or the a#thority to in*estigate *iolations of the Anti9D#""y Law and
to file and to prosec#te cases of this :ind )efore o#r co#rts, as that is
lodged with the Anti9D#""y Board #nder %. A. 114?.>
ISSUE" 8hether or not respondent -#dge in granting the Motion to V#ash
gra*ely a)#sed his discretion as to warrant the iss#ance of a writ of
certiorari.
HELD"
')*io#sly, respondent -#dge did not e*en )other to read the
te5t of the cited L'IG otherwise, he wo#ld ha*e readily ac:nowledged the
*alidity of the arg#"ent ad*anced )y the prosec#tion. As correctly
o)ser*ed )y the !olicitor ,eneral, 0residential Decrees, s#ch as 0.D 3o.
1, iss#ed )y the for"er 0resident Marcos #nder his "artial law powers
ha*e the sa"e force and effect as the laws enacted )y ongress. As held
)y the !#pre"e o#rt in the case of A6#ino *s. o"elec, @+2 !%A 277
O1977PA, all procla"ations, orders, decrees, instr#ctions and acts
pro"#lgated, iss#ed, or done )y the for"er 0resident are part of the law
of the land, and shall re"ain *alid, legal, )inding, and effecti*e, #nless
"odified, re*o:ed or s#perseded )y s#)se6#ent procla"ations, orders,
decrees, instr#ctions, or other acts of the 0resident. L'I 3o. 2 is one s#ch
legal order iss#ed )y for"er 0resident Marcos in the e5ercise of his
"artial law powers to i"ple"ent 0.D. 3o. 1. Inas"#ch as neither 0.D. 3o.
1 nor L'I 3o. 2 has )een e5pressly i"pliedly re*ised, re*o:ed, or
repealed, )oth contin#e to ha*e the force and effect of law. @%ollo, pp. 79
8A.
Indeed, !ection 4, Article ;<II of the onstit#tion e5plicitly
ordains2
!ec. 4. All e5isting laws, decrees, e5ec#ti*e orders,
procla"ations, letters of instr#ctions, and other e5ec#ti*e iss#ances not
inconsistent with this onstit#tion shall re"ain operati*e #ntil a"ended,
repealed, or re*o:ed.
B#t e*en "ore glaring than respondent -#dgeIs #tter
ine5c#sa)le neglect to chec: the citations of the prosec#tion is the
"ista:en )elief that the d#ty to infor" the co#rt on the applica)le law to a
partic#lar case de*ol*es solely #pon the 0rosec#tion or whoe*er "ay )e
the ad*ocate )efore the co#rt. %espondent -#dge sho#ld )e re"inded that
co#rts are d#ty )o#nd to ta:e -#dicial notice of all the laws of the 1 and
@!ec. 1, %#le 129 %#les of o#rtA. Being the trier of facts, -#dges are
pres#"ed to )e well9infor"ed of the e5isting laws, recent enact"ents and
-#rispr#dence, in :eeping with their sworn d#ty as "e")ers of the )ar
@and )enchA to :eep a)reast of legal de*elop"ents
$he o#rt is f#lly aware that not e*ery error or "ista:e of a
-#dge in the perfor"ance of his d#ties is s#)-ect to cens#re. B#t where, as
in the present case, the error co#ld ha*e )een entirely a*oided were it not
for p#)lic respondentIs irresponsi)ility in the perfor"ance of his d#ties, it is
)#t proper that respondent -#dge )e repri"anded and his order of
dis"issal set aside for gra*e ignorance of the law. (or, respondent -#dgeIs
error is not a si"ple error in -#dg"ent )#t one a"o#nting to gross
ignorance of the law which co#ld easily #nder"ine the p#)licIs perception
of the co#rtIs co"petence.
IN RE" MAN$ANO
5A.M. NO. 88718%1RTC. OCTO&ER 5, 1988.6
PADILLA, !"
FACTS"
'n B H#ly 1988, H#dge %odolfo J. Man&ano, .5ec#ti*e
H#dge, %$, Bang#i, Ilocos 3orte, Branch 19, sent this o#rt a letter
which reads2
=By .5ec#ti*e 'rder %(+9?B iss#ed on H#ne 21, 1988 )y the 1onora)le
0ro*incial ,o*ernor of Ilocos 3orte, 1on. %odolfo . (ariNas, I was
designated as a "e")er of the Ilocos 3orte 0ro*incial o""ittee on
H#stice created p#rs#ant to 0residential .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 87+ of 12
Dece")er 198+, as a"ended )y .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 42+ of H#ne 1,
1988. In consonance with .5ec#ti*e 'rder %(+9?B, the 1onora)le
0ro*incial ,o*ernor of Ilocos 3orte iss#ed "y appoint"ent as a "e")er
of the o""ittee. (or yo#r ready reference, I a" enclosing herewith
"achine copies of .5ec#ti*e 'rder %(+9?B and the appoint"ent.
Before I "ay accept the appoint"ent and enter in the
discharge of the powers and d#ties of the position as "e")er of the Ilocos
@3orteA 0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice, "ay I ha*e the honor to re6#est
for the iss#ance )y the 1onora)le !#pre"e o#rt of a %esol#tion, as
follows2
@1A A#thori&ing "e to accept the appoint"ent and to ass#"e
and discharge the powers and d#ties attached to the said positionG
@2A onsidering "y "e")ership in the o""ittee as neither
*iolati*e of the Independence of the H#diciary nor a *iolation of !ection 12,
Article <III, or of the second paragraph of !ection 7, Article I; @BA, )oth of
the onstit#tion, and will not in any way a"o#nt to an a)andon"ent of "y
present position as .5ec#ti*e H#dge of Branch ;I;, %egional $rial o#rt,
(irst H#dicial %egion, and as a "e")er of the H#diciaryG 5 5 5>
ISSUE" 8hether or not the designation of H#dge Man&ano as "e")er of
the 0ro*incial o""itteee on H#stice *iolates the onstit#tion.
HELD"
Des. Jnder the onstit#tion, the "e")ers of the !#pre"e
o#rt and other co#rts esta)lished )y law shall not )e designated to any
agency perfor"ing 6#asi9-#dicial or ad"inistrati*e f#nctions @!ection 12,
Art. <III, onstit#tionA.
onsidering that "e")ership of H#dge Man&ano in the
Ilocos 3orte 0ro*incial o""ittee on H#stice, which discharges
ad"inistrati*e f#nctions, will )e in *iolation of the onstit#tion, the o#rt is
constrained to deny his re6#est.
(or"er hief H#stice .nri6#e M. (ernando in his conc#rring
opinion in the case of ,arcia *s. Macaraig @49 !%A 1?+A a)ly sets forth2
=8hile the doctrine of separation of powers is a relati*e
theory not to )e enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical de"ands of
go*ern"ent precl#ding its doctrinaire application, it cannot -#stify a
"e")er of the -#diciary )eing re6#ired to ass#"e a position or perfor" a
d#ty non9-#dicial in character. $hat is i"plicit in the principle. 'therwise
there is a plain depart#re fro" its co""and. $he essence of the tr#st
reposed in hi" is to decide. 'nly a higher co#rt, as was e"phasi&ed )y
H#stice Barredo, can pass on his act#ation. 1e is not a s#)ordinate of an
e5ec#ti*e or legislati*e official, howe*er e"inent. It is indispensa)le that
there )e no e5ception to the rigidity of s#ch a nor" if he is, as e5pected, to
)e confined to the tas: of ad-#dication. (idelity to his sworn responsi)ility
no leas than the "aintenance of respect for the -#diciary can )e satisfied
with nothing less./
$his declaration does not "ean that %$ H#dges sho#ld
adopt an attit#de of "onastic insensi)ility or #n)eco"ing indifference to
0ro*inceRity o""ittee on H#stice. As inc#")ent %$ H#dges, they for"
part of the str#ct#re of go*ern"ent. $heir integrity and perfor"ance in the
ad-#dication of cases contri)#te to the solidity of s#ch str#ct#re. As p#)lic
officials, they are tr#stees of an orderly society. .*en as non9"e")ers of
0ro*incialRity o""ittees on H#stice, %$ -#dges sho#ld render
assistance to said o""ittees to help pro"ote the landa)le p#rposes for
which they e5ist, )#t only when s#ch assistance "ay )e reasona)ly
incidental to the f#lfill"ent of their -#dicial d#ties.
A'%DI3,LD, the aforesaid re6#est of H#dge %odolfo J. Man&ano is
D.3I.D.
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. 88709, FE&RUAR- 11, 1992)
CRU$, !."
FACTS"
In its co"plaint, petitioners alleged that on Han#ary 2B, 198?,
3I'! Ind#strial orporation o)tained a 02M loan fro" pri*ate
respondent Jnited ocon#t 0lanters Ban: @J0BA and to sec#re pay"ent
thereof, e5ec#ted a real estate "ortgage on two parcels of land. $he
"ortgage was foreclosed for alleged non9pay"ent of the loan, and the
sheriffIs sale was held witho#t re9p#)lication of the re6#ired notices after
the original date for the a#ction was changed witho#t the :nowledge or
consent of the "ortgagor. J0B was the highest and lone )idder and the
"ortgaged lands were sold to it.
J0B sold all its rights to the properties to pri*ate
respondent Man#el o, who transferred the" to ,olden !tar Ind#strial
orporation, another pri*ate respondent, #pon whose petition a writ of
possession was iss#ed to it. 3I'! and the other petitioners filed s#it for
/ann#l"ent of sheriffIs sale, reco*ery of possession, and da"ages, with
prayer for the iss#ance of a preli"inary prohi)itory and "andatory
in-#nction./
,olden !tar and .*angelista filed a 79page de"#rrer to the
e*idence where they arg#ed that the action was a deri*ati*e s#it that
ca"e #nder the -#risdiction of the !ec#rities and .5change o""issionG
that the "ortgage had )een *alidly foreclosedG that the sheriffIs sale had
)een held in accordance with Act 4147G that the notices had )een d#ly
p#)lished in a newspaper of general circ#lationG and that the opposition to
the writ of possession had not )een filed on ti"e. 3o opposition to the
de"#rrer ha*ing )een s#)"itted despite notice thereof to the parties,
H#dge 3estor (. Dantes considered it s#)"itted for resol#tion and on H#ne
+, 198+, iss#ed the following E
' % D . %
Acting on the /De"#rrer to .*idence/ dated April 4?, 198+
filed )y defendants <ictorino 0. .*angelista and ,olden !tar Ind#strial
orporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their
co""entRopposition and it appearing fro" the *ery e*idence add#ced )y
the plaintiff that the !heriffIs A#ction !ale cond#cted on H#ly 11, 1984 was
147
in co"plete accord with the re6#ire"ents of !ection 4, Act 4147 #nder
which the a#ction sale was appropriately held and cond#cted and it
appearing fro" the allegations in paragraph 14 of the plaintiffIs pleading
and li:ewise fro" plaintiff arlos o6#incoIs own testi"ony that his ca#se
is act#ally9against the other officers and stoc:holders of the plaintiff 3icos
Ind#strial orporation /. . . for the p#rpose of protecting the corporation
and its stoc:holders, as well as their own rights and interests in the
corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fra#d#lent ants and
de*ices of the responsi)le officials of the corporation, in )reach of the tr#st
reposed #pon the" )y the stoc:holders . . ./ a s#)-ect "atter not within
the co"petent -#risdiction of the o#rt, the co#rt finds the sa"e to )e
i"pressed with "erit.
81.%.('%., plaintiffIs co"plaint is here)y dis"issed. $he
DefendantsI respecti*e co#nterclai"s are li:ewise dis"issed.
$he 8rit of 0reli"inary In-#nction heretofore iss#ed is
dissol*ed and set aside.
It is this order that is now assailed )y the petitioners on the
principal gro#nd that it *iolates the afore"entioned constit#tional
re6#ire"ent. $he petitioners clai" that it is not a reasoned decision and
does not clearly and distinctly e5plain how it was reached )y the trial
co#rt.
ISSUE" 8hether or not there is a fail#re to state clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law in which the order of dis"issal is )ased.
HELD"
Des.$he 6#estioned order is an o*er9si"plification of the
iss#es, and *iolates )oth the letter and spirit of Article <III, !ection 1B, of
the onstit#tion.It is a re6#ire"ent of d#e process that the parties to a
litigation )e infor"ed of how it was decided, with an e5planation of the
fact#al and legal reasons that led to the concl#sions of the co#rt. $he
co#rt cannot si"ply say that -#dg"ent is rendered in fa*or of ; and
against D and -#st lea*e it at that witho#t any -#stification whatsoe*er for
its action. $he losing party is entitled to :now why he lost, so he "ay
appeal to a higher co#rt, if per"itted, sho#ld he )elie*e that the decision
sho#ld )e re*ersed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state
the facts and the law on which it is )ased lea*es the parties in the dar: as
to how it was reached and is especially pre-#dicial to the losing party, who
is #na)le to pinpoint the possi)le errors of the co#rt for re*iew )y a higher
tri)#nal.
It is i"portant to o)ser*e at this point that the constit#tional pro*ision does
not apply to interloc#tory orders, s#ch as one granting a "otion for
postpone"ent or 6#ashing a s#)poena, )eca#se it /refers only to
decisions on the "erits and not to orders of the trial co#rt resol*ing
incidental "atters./
As for the "in#te resol#tions of this o#rt, we ha*e already
o)ser*ed in Borro"eo *. o#rt of Appeals that E
$he !#pre"e o#rt disposes of the )#l: of its cases )y
"in#te resol#tions and decrees the" as final and e5ec#tory, as where a
case is patently witho#t "erit, where the iss#es raised are fact#al in
nat#re, where the decision appealed fro" is s#pported )y s#)stantial
e*idence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applica)le
laws, where it is clear fro" the records that the petitions were filed "erely
to forestall the early e5ec#tion of -#dg"ent and for non9co"pliance with
the r#les. $he resol#tion denying d#e co#rse or dis"issing a petition
always gi*es the legal )asis.
555 555 555
$he o#rt is not d#ty )o#nd to render signed decisions all
the ti"e. It has a"ple discretion to for"#late decisions andRor "in#te
resol#tions, pro*ided a legal )asis is gi*en, depending on its e*al#ation of
a case.
$he order in the case at )ar does not co"e #nder either of
the a)o*e e5ceptions. As it is settled that an order dis"issing a case for
ins#fficient e*idence is a -#dg"ent on the "erits, it is i"perati*e that it )e
a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the
law on which it is )ased.
MENDO$A VS. CFI
G.R. NO. L35%1214 !UNE 27, 1973
FERNANDO, !.
FACTS"
0etitioner filed a petition for ha)eas corp#s, certiorari and
"anda"#s. !aid petitions were dis"issed )y the co#rt for lac: of "erit
d#e to the fact that petitioner failed to s#stain the )#rden of showing that
his confine"ent was "ar:ed )y illegality or that the order cancelling the
)ail pre*io#sly iss#ed was tainted with gra*e a)#se of discretion. 1ence,
this petition for reconsideration.
ISSUES"
8'3 the petitioner can in*o:e the ha)eas corp#s r#le.
,ranted that petitioner "ay not )e released on a ha)eas corp#s
proceeding, is he, howe*er, entitled to )ailC
HELD"
1. 3'. 1a)eas corp#s co#ld )e in*o:ed )y petitioner if he were a)le to
show the illegality of his detention. $here is aptness and acc#racy in the
characteri&ation of the writ of ha)eas corp#s as the writ of li)erty.
%ightf#lly it is latit#dinarian in scope. It is wide9ranging and all e")racing
in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to ass#re that there )e no
toleration of illegal restraint. Detention "#st )e for a ca#se recogni&ed )y
law. $he writ i"poses on the -#diciary the gra*e responsi)ility of
ascertaining whether a depri*ation of physical freedo" is warranted. $his
it has to discharge witho#t loss of ti"e. $he party who is :eeping a person
in c#stody has to prod#ce hi" in co#rt as soon as possi)le. 8hat is "ore,
he "#st -#stify the action ta:en. 'nly if it can )e de"onstrated that there
has )een no *iolation of oneIs right to li)erty will he )e a)sol*ed fro"
responsi)ility. Jnless there )e s#ch a showing, the confine"ent "#st
there)y cease.
$he a)o*e for"#lation of what is settled law finds no
application to the present sit#ation. 0etitionerIs depri*ation of li)erty is in
accordance with a warrant of arrest properly iss#ed after a deter"ination
)y the -#dge in co"pliance with the constit#tional pro*ision re6#iring the
e5a"ination #nder oath or affir"ation of the co"plainant and the
witnesses prod#ced. 3o allegation to the contrary "ay )e entertained.
$here was no 6#estion, howe*er, as to the legality of the warrants of
arrest pre*io#sly iss#ed to petitioner. 1a)eas corp#s, #nder the
circ#"stances, wo#ld not therefore lie.
2. 3'. BAIL is the re"edy )y which, notwithstanding the a)sence of any
flaw in oneIs confine"ent, pro*isional li)erty "ay still )e had. !#ch a
re"edy, as a "atter of fact, was granted hi" in accordance with an order
of the "#nicipal co#rt of M#lanay. $hereafter, howe*er, the )ail was
re*o:ed )y the o#rt of (irst Instance in the order now challenged. !#ch
act#ation he wo#ld now conde"n as a gra*e a)#se of discretion.
Before con*iction, e*ery person is )aila)le e5cept if charged
with capital offense when the e*idence of g#ilt is strong. !#ch a right flows
fro" the pres#"ption of innocence in fa*or of e*ery acc#sed who sho#ld
not )e s#)-ected to the loss of freedo" as thereafter he wo#ld )e entitled
to ac6#ittal, #nless his g#ilt )e pro*ed )eyond reasona)le do#)t. $here)y
a regi"e of li)erty is honored in the o)ser*ance and not in the )reach. It is
not )eyond the real" of pro)a)ility, howe*er, that a person charged with a
cri"e, especially so where his defense is wea:, wo#ld -#st si"ply "a:e
hi"self scarce and th#s fr#strate the hearing of his cage. A )ail is
intended as a g#arantee that s#ch an intent wo#ld )e thwarted. It is, in the
lang#age of ooley, a "ode short of confine"ent which wo#ld, with
reasona)le certainty, ins#re the attendance of the acc#sed for the
s#)se6#ent trial. 3or is there anything #nreasona)le in denying this right
to one charged with a capital offense when e*idence of g#ilt is strong, as
the li:elihood is, rather than await the o#tco"e of the proceeding against
hi" with a death sentence, an e*er9present threat, te"ptation to flee the
-#risdiction wo#ld )e too great to )e resisted.
$he precise 6#estion howe*er, is whether once the pro*isional li)erty has
)een th#s o)tained, it co#ld )e ter"inated )y the cancellation of the )ail.
$he two )asic o)-ections are2
'ne was that petitioner, when the )ail was granted, was still
at large. $he "#nicipal co#rt, therefore, co#ld not ha*e granted )ail in
accordance with o#r r#ling in (eliciano *. 0asicolan. $h#s2 /I$he
constit#tional "andate that all persons shall )efore con*iction )e )aila)le
e5cept those charged with capital offenses when e*idence of g#ilt is
strong, is s#)-ect to the li"itation that the person applying for )ail sho#ld
)e in c#stody of the law, or otherwise depri*ed of his li)erty. $he p#rpose
of )ail is to sec#re oneIs release and it wo#ld )e incongr#o#s as to grant
)ail to one who is free.I/
!econdly, and what is worse, the prosec#tion was ne*er
gi*en a chance to present its e*idence. $he a#thoritati*e doctrine in
0eople *. !an Diego is th#s s6#arely in point2 /8hether the "otion for )ail
of a defendant who is in c#stody for a capital offense )e resol*ed in
s#""ary proceeding or in the co#rse of a reg#lar trial, the prosec#tion
"#st )e gi*en an opport#nity to present, within a reasona)le ti"e, all the
e*idence that it "ay desire to introd#ce )efore the o#rt sho#ld resol*e
the "otion for )ail. If, as in the cri"inal case in*ol*ed in the instant special
ci*il action, the prosec#tion sho#ld )e denied s#ch an opport#nity, there
wo#ld )e a *iolation of proced#ral d#e process, and order of the o#rt
granting )ail sho#ld )e considered *oid./
3o gra*e a)#se of discretion to -#stify the grant of the writ certiorari prayed
for has )een shown. $hat is why o#r resol#tion so#ght to )e reconsidered
sho#ld stand.
&ORROMEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. L82273, !UNE 1, 1990)
PER CURIAM
FACTS"
0etitioner Hoa6#in $. Borro"eo charges Attys. H#lieta D.
arreon and Alfredo 0. Marasigan, Di*ision ler: of o#rt and Asst.
Di*ision ler: of o#rt, respecti*ely, of the $hird Di*ision, and Atty. Hose I.
Il#stre, hief of the H#dicial %ecords 'ffice of this o#rt, with #s#rpation of
-#dicial f#nctions, for allegedly /"alicio#sly and de*io#sly iss#ing )iased,
fa:e, )aseless and #nconstit#tional I%esol#tionI and I.ntry of H#dg"entI in
,.%. 3o. 82274.
$his is not the first ti"e that Mr. Borro"eo has filed
chargesRco"plaints against officials of the o#rt. In se*eral letter9
co"plaints filed with the co#rts and the '")#ds"an Borro"eo had
repeatedly alleged that he /s#ffered in-#stices,/ )eca#se of the disposition
of the fo#r @BA cases he separately appealed to this o#rt which were
resol*ed )y "in#te resol#tions, allegedly in *iolation of !ections B @4A,14
and 1B of Article <III of the 1987 onstit#tion. 1is in*aria)le co"plaint is
that the resol#tions which disposed of his cases do not )ear the
148
signat#res of the H#stices who participated in the deli)erations and
resol#tions and do not show that they *oted therein. 1e li:ewise
co"plained that the resol#tions )ear no certification of the hief H#stice
and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were )ased
and were signed only )y the ler:s of o#rt and therefore
/#nconstit#tional, n#ll and *oid./
$he !#pre"e o#rt thro#gh its $hird Di*ision disposed of
Borro"eoIs petition in a fo#r9page resol#tion which "ore than ade6#ately
co"plies with the constit#tional re6#ire"ents go*erning resol#tions
ref#sing to gi*e d#e co#rse to petitions for re*iew. $he petition and its
incidents were disc#ssed and deli)erated #pon )y the H#stices of the
$hird Di*ision. $he o#rt re"inds all lower co#rts, lawyers, and litigants
that it disposes of the )#l: of its cases )y "in#te resol#tions and decrees
the" as final and e5ec#tory, as where a case is patently witho#t "erits
where the iss#es raised are fact#al in nat#re, where the decision appealed
fro" is s#pported )y2 s#)stantial e*idence and, is in accord with the facts
of the case and the applica)le laws, where it is clear fro" the records that
the petition is filed "erely to forestall the early e5ec#tion of -#dg"ent and
for non9co"pliance with the r#les.
ISSUES"
1. 8'3 the certification of the hief H#stice is i"perati*e in
"in#te resol#tions.
2. 8'3 the resol#tion in 6#estion lac:ed necessary facts
and law on which they are )ased.
HELD"
1. 3'. Min#te resol#tions need not )e signed )y the "e")ers of the
o#rt who too: part in the deli)erations of a case nor do they re6#ire the
certification of the hief H#stice. (or to re6#ire "e")ers of the co#rt to
sign all resol#tions iss#ed wo#ld not only #nd#ly delay the iss#ance of its
resol#tions )#t a great a"o#nt of their ti"e wo#ld )e spent on f#nctions
"ore properly perfor"ed )y the ler: of co#rt and which ti"e co#ld )e
"ore profita)ly #sed in the analysis of cases and the for"#lation of
decisions and orders of i"portant nat#re and character. .*en with the #se
of this proced#re, the o#rt is still str#ggling to wipe o#t the )ac:logs
acc#"#lated o*er the years and "eet the e*er increasing n#")er of
cases co"ing to it. %e"edial9legislation to "eet this pro)le" is also
pending in ongress.
In discharging its constit#tional d#ties, the o#rt needs the
f#n ti"e and attention of its ler:s of o#rt and other :ey officials. Its
officers do not ha*e the ti"e to answer fri*olo#s co"plaints filed )y
disgr#ntled litigants 6#estioning decisions and resol#tions of the o#rt and
in*ol*ing cases deli)erated #pon and resol*ed )y the o#rt itself. As
earlier stated, all resol#tions and decisions are actions of the o#rt, not its
s#)ordinate personnel. $he o#rt ass#"es f#ll responsi)ility2 for all its
acts. Its personnel cannot answer and sho#ld not )e "ade to answer for
acts of the o#rt.
2. 3'. In Macario $aya"#ra, et al. *. Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt, et al.
@May 21, 1987A, the o#rt clarified the constit#tional re6#ire"ent that a
decision "#st e5press clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is
)ased as referring only to decisions. %esol#tions disposing of petitions fall
#nder the constit#tional pro*ision which states that, /3o petition for
re*iew ... shall )e ref#sed d#e co#rse ...witho#t stating the legal )asis
therefor/ @!ection 1B, Article <III, onstit#tionA. 8hen the o#rt, after
deli)erating on a petition and any s#)se6#ent pleadings, "anifestations,
co""ents, or "otions decides to deny d#e co#rse to the petition and
states that the 6#estions raised are fact#al or no re*ersi)le error in the
respondent co#rtIs decision is shown or for so"e other legal )asis stated
in the resol#tion, there is s#fficient co"pliance with the constit#tional
re6#ire"ent.
7OMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.) INC., VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. 127%82, APRIL 4, 1998)
REGALADO, !.
FACTS"
3ID granted petitioner LI0I a direct loan of 08M and a 02M
g#arantee to sec#re 03B. As sec#rity thereof, LI0I e5ec#ted in fa*or of
3ID a Deed of %eal .state Mortgage, co*ering, a"ong others, a parcel
of land with all its i"pro*e"ents. Jpon f#ll pay"ent of LI0IIs acco#nt with
3ID and the 02.? M redit Line with %espondent 03B, 3ID e5ec#ted a
Deed of %elease and ancellation of Mortgage, which pro*ided that2
/8hereas, the credit acco""odations had )een f#lly paid )y the Borrower
to the 0hilippine 3ational Ban: @03BA and 3ID which s#)se6#ently
ret#rned the ownerIs copy of the $$ 3o. B+9747 of the petitioner and
accordingly the Deed of %elease and ancellation of Mortgage was
registered with the %egistry of Deed. 1owe*er, it appeared that there were
so"e acco#nts chargea)le to LI0I on deferred letters of credit opened
which ca"e to the :nowledge of 03B only in 1981 and 1982. 1ence, 03B
re6#ested for the ret#rn of the ownerIs copy of $$ 3o. B+9747 and the
said title was ret#rned to 03B.
03B filed a /0etition for orrection of .ntry and Ad*erse
lai"/ with the office of the %egistry of Deeds of Ma:ati, and was a)le to
ha*e the sa"e annotated. It then filed a 0etition of !ale to e5tra9-#dicially
foreclose *ario#s properties )elonging to LI0I. LI0I recei*ed an #ndated
3otice of !heriffIs !ale to the effect that the land co*ered )y $$ 3o.
B+9747 wo#ld )e foreclosed e5tra9-#dicially on Dece")er 19, 1984 at 92??
a.".
0etitioner challenged the foreclos#re sale saying that it was
n#ll and *oid )eca#se the Deed of %elease necessarily incl#des the
"ortgage to the 03B. $he o#rt did not agree that the e5tra-#dicial
foreclos#re of the "ortgage on the whole property is n#ll and *oid. And
d#e to the #nfa*ora)le decision 0etitioner filed a pleading deno"inated as
a Motion for Lea*e to file Incorporated !econd Motion for %econsideration
of the %esol#tion sayi)g that the /"in#te resol#tions/ it assails are
s#pposedly in *iolation of !ection 1B, Article <III of the present
onstit#tion. It insin#ates that s#ch proced#re adopted )y this o#rt is a
c#lpa)le constit#tional *iolation and can )e s#)-ect of i"peach"ent
proceedings.
ISSUE" 8'3 the "in#te resol#tions of the co#rt are in *iolation of !ection
1B, Article <III of the onstit#tion.
HELD"
3'. It has )een stressed that these /resol#tions/ are not
/decisions/ within the a)o*e constit#tional re6#ire"entsG they "erely hold
that the petition for re*iew sho#ld not )e entertained and e*en ordinary
lawyers ha*e all this ti"e so #nderstood itG and the petition to re*iew the
decision of the o#rt of Appeals is not a "atter of right )#t of so#nd
-#dicial discretion, hence there is no need to f#lly e5plain the o#rtIs denial
since, for one thing, the facts and the law are already "entioned in the
o#rt of AppealsI decision.
$he constit#tional "andate is applica)le only in cases
/s#)"itted for decision,/ i.e., gi*en d#e co#rse and after the filing of )riefs
or "e"oranda andRor other pleadings, )#t not where the petition is
ref#sed d#e co#rse, with the resol#tion therefor stating the legal )asis
thereof. $h#s, when the o#rt, after deli)erating on a petition and
s#)se6#ent pleadings, decides to deny d#e co#rse to the petition and
states that the 6#estions raised are fact#al or there is no re*ersi)le error in
the respondent co#rtIs decision, there is s#fficient co"pliance with the
constit#tional re6#ire"ent.
$he o#rt re"inds all lower co#rts, lawyers, and litigants
that it disposes of the )#l: of its cases )y "in#te resol#tions and decrees
the" as final and e5ec#tory, as where a case is patently witho#t "erit,
where the iss#es raised are fact#al in nat#re, where the decision appealed
fro" is s#pported )y s#)stantial e*idence and is in accord with the facts of
the case and the applica)le laws, where it is clear fro" the records that
the petition is filed "erely to forestall the early e5ec#tion of -#dg"ent and
for non9co"pliance with the r#les. $he resol#tion denying d#e co#rse or
dis"issing the petition always gi*es the legal )asis.
PRUDENTIAL &AN7 VS. CASTRO
(A.M. NO. 275%, MARCH 15, 1988)
PER CURIAM
FACTS"
%espondent ,recia filed a /0etition for %edress and
.5oneration and for <ol#ntary Inhi)ition/, praying that the decision of
3o*e")er 12,1987, and the resol#tion of the denial of the "otion for
reconsideration of the said decision )e set aside and a new one entered
)y this o#rt dis"issing the ad"inistrati*e co"plaint and e5onerating the
respondent. %espondentKs ire res#lts fro" an ad"inistrati*e case filed
against hi" and the s#)se6#ent collecti*e decision of the o#rt to dis)ar
hi".
%espondent 6#estions the *alidity of o#rtKs decision d#e to
the fact that the said decision is *iolati*e of the 1987 onstit#tion d#e to
lac: of certification )y the hief H#stice and that the concl#sions of the
o#rt were reached in cons#ltation )efore the case was assigned to a
"e")er for the writing of the opinion of the o#rt.
ISSUE" 8'3 the certification of the hief H#stice is re6#ired for the
*alidity of the assailed decision.
HELD"
3'. $he certification re6#ire"ent refers to decisions in
-#dicial, not ad"inistrati*e cases. (ro" the *ery )eginning,
resol#tionsRdecisions of the o#rt in ad"inistrati*e cases ha*e not )een
acco"panied )y any for"al certification. In fact, s#ch a certification wo#ld
)e a s#perfl#ity in ad"inistrati*e cases, which )y their *ery nat#re, ha*e to
)e deli)erated #pon considering the collegiate co"position of this o#rt.
B#t e*en if s#ch a certification were re6#ired, it is )eyond
do#)t that the concl#sions of the o#rt in its decision were arri*ed at after
cons#ltation and deli)eration. $he signat#res of the "e")ers who act#ally
too: part in the deli)erations and *oted attest to that. Besides, )eing a per
c#ria" decision, or an opinion of the o#rt as a whole, there is no ponente
altho#gh any "e")er of the o#rt "ay )e assigned to write the draft. In
s#ch cases, a for"al certification is o)*io#sly not re6#ired.
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION >(. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. N+. 114323. !1.: 23, 1998
MARTINE$, !."
149
FACTS"
$he disp#te )etween the parties had its origin in the non9
deli*ery of the B,4?? "etric tons of oil well ce"ent to the petitioner. $he
petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled )y the
,o*ern"ent of India while the pri*ate respondent is a pri*ate corporation
d#ly organi&ed and e5isting #nder the laws of the 0hilippines. A contract
was entered into )etween the two parties where)y the pri*ate respondent
#ndertoo: to s#pply the petitioner B,4?? "etric tons of oil well ce"ent for a
consideration of J!QB77,4??.??. 3otwithstanding the fact that the pri*ate
respondent had already recei*ed pay"ent and despite se*eral de"ands
"ade )y the petitioner, the pri*ate respondent failed to deli*er the oil well
ce"ent. $hereafter, negotiations ens#ed )etween the parties and they
agreed that the pri*ate respondent will replace the entire B,4?? "etric tons
of oil well ce"ent with lass /,/ ce"ent cost free at the petitionerIs
designated port. 1owe*er, #pon inspection, the lass /,/ ce"ent did not
confor" to the petitionerIs specifications. $he petitioner then infor"ed the
pri*ate respondent that it was referring its clai" to an ar)itrator p#rs#ant
to la#se 1+ of their contract.
$he chosen ar)itrator, one !hri 3.3. Malhotra, resol*ed the
disp#te in petitionerIs fa*or. $o ena)le the petitioner to e5ec#te the award
in its fa*or, it filed a 0etition )efore the o#rt of the i*il H#dge in Dehra
D#n. India @foreign co#rtA, praying that the decision of the ar)itrator )e
"ade /the %#le of o#rt/ in India. $he foreign co#rt ref#sed to ad"it the
pri*ate respondentKs o)-ections for fail#re to pay the re6#ired filing fees.
$h#s, an order was iss#ed ordering pri*are respondent to pay petitioner.
Despite notice sent to the pri*ate respondent of the
foregoing order and se*eral de"ands )y the petitioner for co"pliance
therewith, the pri*ate respondent ref#sed to pay the a"o#nt ad-#dged )y
the foreign co#rt as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner filed
a co"plaint with Branch 4? of the %egional $rial o#rt @%$A of !#rigao
ity for the enforce"ent of the afore"entioned -#dg"ent of the foreign
co#rt. $he pri*ate respondent "o*ed to dis"iss the co"plaint on the
following gro#nds2 @1A plaintiffs lac: of legal capacity to s#eG @2A lac: of
ca#se of actionG and @4A plaintiffs clai" or de"and has )een wai*ed,
a)andoned, or otherwise e5ting#ished. $he %$ dis"issed pri*ate
respondentKs co"plaint for lac: of a *alid ca#se of action. Anent the iss#e
of the s#fficiency of the petitionerIs ca#se of action, howe*er, the %$
fo#nd the referral of the disp#te )etween the parties to the ar)itrator #nder
la#se 1+ of their contract erroneo#s. $he %$ characteri&ed the
erroneo#s s#)"ission of the disp#te to the ar)itrator as a ="ista:e of law
or fact a"o#nting to want of -#risdiction>. onse6#ently, the proceedings
had )efore the ar)itrator were n#ll and *oid and the foreign co#rt had
therefore, adopted no legal award which co#ld )e the so#rce of an
enforcea)le right.
$he petitioner then appealed to the respondent o#rt of
Appeals which affir"ed the dis"issal of the co"plaint. In its decision, the
appellate co#rt conc#rred with the %$Is r#ling that the ar)itrator did not
ha*e -#risdiction o*er the disp#te )etween the parties, th#s, the foreign
co#rt co#ld not *alidly adopt the ar)itratorIs award. In addition, the
appellate co#rt o)ser*ed that the f#ll te5t of the -#dg"ent of the foreign
co#rt contains the dispositi*e portion only and indicates no findings of fact
and law as )asis for the award. 1ence, the said -#dg"ent cannot )e
enforced )y any 0hilippine co#rt as it wo#ld *iolate the constit#tional
pro*ision that no decision shall )e rendered )y any co#rt witho#t
e5pressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
)ased. Jpon denial of the "otion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the
present petition.
ISSUES"
@1A 8hether or not the ar)itrator had -#risdiction o*er the disp#te )etween
the petitioner and the pri*ate respondent #nder la#se 1+ of the contract.
@2A 8hether or not the -#dg"ent of the foreign co#rt is enforcea)le in this
-#risdiction in *iew of the pri*ate respondentIs allegation that it is )ereft of
any state"ent of facts and law #pon which the award in fa*or of the
petitioner was )ased.
HELD"
1. It is noted that the non9deli*ery of the oil well ce"ent is not in the nat#re
of a disp#te arising fro" the fail#re to e5ec#te the s#pply orderRcontract
design, drawing, instr#ctions, specifications or 6#ality of the "aterials as
pro*ided for in the la#se 1+ of their ontract. $hat la#se 1+ sho#ld
pertain only to "atters in*ol*ing the technical aspects of the contract is )#t
a logical inference considering that the #nderlying p#rpose of a referral to
ar)itration is for s#ch technical "atters to )e deli)erated #pon )y a person
possessed with the re6#ired s:ill and e5pertise which "ay )e otherwise
a)sent in the reg#lar co#rts.
$his o#rt agrees with the appellate co#rt in its r#ling that
the non9deli*ery of the oil well ce"ent is a "atter properly cogni&a)le )y
the reg#lar co#rts as stip#lated )y the parties in la#se 17 of their
contract2
All 6#estions, disp#tes and differences, arising #nder o#t of
or in connection with this s#pply order, shall )e s#)-ect to the e5cl#si*e
-#risdiction of the co#rt, within the local li"its of whose -#risdiction and the
place fro" which this s#pply order is sit#ated.
8e )elie*e that the correct interpretation to gi*e effect to
)oth stip#lations in the contract is for la#se 1+ to )e confined to all
clai"s or disp#tes arising fro" or relating to the design, drawing,
instr#ctions, specifications or 6#ality of the "aterials of the s#pply
orderRcontract, and for la#se 17 to co*er all other clai"s or disp#tes.
B#t the o#rt finds "erit on the contention that the fail#re of
the replace"ent ce"ent to confor" to the specifications of the contract is
a "atter clearly falling within the a")it of la#se 1+. Jndo#)tedly, what
was referred to ar)itration was no longer the "ere non9deli*ery of the
cargo at the first instance )#t also the fail#re of the replace"ent cargo to
confor" to the specifications of the contract, a "atter clearly within the
co*erage of la#se 1+.
2. As specified in the order of the i*il H#dge of Dehra D#n, /Award 0aper
3o. 4RB91 shall )e a part of the decree/. $his is a categorical declaration
that the foreign co#rt adopted the findings of facts and law of the ar)itrator
as contained in the latterIs Award 0aper. Award 0aper 3o. 4RB91, contains
an e5ha#sti*e disc#ssion of the respecti*e clai"s and defenses of the
parties, and the ar)itratorIs e*al#ation of the sa"e. Inas"#ch as the
foregoing is dee"ed to ha*e )een incorporated into the foreign co#rtIs
-#dg"ent the appellate co#rt was in error when it descri)ed the latter to )e
a /si"plistic decision containing literally, only the dispositi*e portion/.
$he constit#tional "andate that no decision shall )e
rendered )y any co#rt witho#t e5pressing therein dearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is )ased does not precl#de the *alidity of
/"e"orand#" decisions/ which adopt )y reference the findings of fact
and concl#sions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tri)#nals.
1ence, e*en in this -#risdiction, incorporation )y reference is allowed if
only to a*oid the c#")erso"e reprod#ction of the decision of the lower
co#rts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher co#rt. $his is
partic#larly tr#e when the decision so#ght to )e incorporated is a lengthy
and thoro#gh disc#ssion of the facts and concl#sions arri*ed at, as in this
case, where Award 0aper 3o. 4RB91 consists of eighteen @18A single
spaced pages.
(#rther"ore, the recognition to )e accorded a foreign
-#dg"ent is not necessarily affected )y the fact that the proced#re in the
co#rts of the co#ntry in which s#ch -#dg"ent was rendered differs fro"
that of the co#rts of the co#ntry in which the -#dg"ent is relied on. $h#s, if
#nder the proced#ral r#les of the i*il o#rt of Dehra D#n, India, a *alid
-#dg"ent "ay )e rendered )y adopting the ar)itratorIs findings, then the
sa"e "#st )e accorded respect. In the sa"e *ein, if the proced#re in the
foreign co#rt "andates that an 'rder of the o#rt )eco"es final and
e5ec#tory #pon fail#re to pay the necessary doc:et fees, then the co#rts in
this -#risdiction cannot in*alidate the order of the foreign co#rt si"ply
)eca#se o#r r#les pro*ide otherwise.
$he foreign -#dg"ent )eing *alid, there is nothing else left to
)e done than to order its enforce"ent, despite the fact that the petitioner
"erely prays for the re"and of the case to the %$ for f#rther
proceedings. As this o#rt has r#led on the *alidity and enforcea)ility of
the said foreign -#dg"ent in this -#risdiction, f#rther proceedings in the
%$ for the reception of e*idence to pro*e otherwise are no longer
necessary.
ARTICLE I3 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
A. COMMON PROVISIONS
ARULEO VS. CA
227 SCRA 311 519936
FACTS"
Batangas, B#laean. ,atchalian was declared the winner. $here#pon,
Ar#elo filed with the %$ a ci*il case protest in the sa"e elections. Ar#elo
clai"s that in elections contests, the 'M.L. %#les gi*e the
respondent only 7 days fro" s#""ons to file his answer and that this 79
day period has lapsed. According to hi", the tiling of Motions to Dis"iss
and Motion to Bill of partic#lars is prohi)ited )y !ec. 1 %#le 14 of
'M.L.. %#les of 0roced#res, hence, the filling )y ,atchalian of said
pleadings did not s#spend the r#nning of the 79day period.
ISSUE" Is Ar#eloKs contention correctC
HELD"
3'. 0art <I of the o"e lee %#les does not pro*ide that
M$D. and Bill of partic#lars are not allowed in election contest pending
)efore the reg#lar co#rts constit#tionally spea:ing. o"elec cannot adopt
a r#le prohi)iting the filing of certain pleadings in the reg#lar co#rts. $he
in all co#rts is *ested on the !.
,atchalian recei*ed a copy of the %$ order denying his
"otion for Bill of 0artic#lars on A#g#st +, 1992. Jnder !ec.1 @)A %#le 12
of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt, a party has at least fi*e days to file his
answer I after receipt of the order denying his "otion for a )ill of
partic#lars. 1is answer was filed right on ti"e.
CUA VS. COMELEC
15% SCRA 582 519876
FACTS"
$he 'M.L. (irst Di*ision rendered a 227 decision on
A#g#st 1?, 1987 fa*oring #a as winner in the lone ongressional scat of
V#irino )#t his procla"ation was s#spended d#e to lac: of #nani"o#s
*ote re6#ired )y the proced#ral r#les in o"elec %esol#tion 3o.1++9
regarding transaction of official )#siness of a Di*ision.
150
0#rs#ant to said r#le, pri*ate respondent 0#&on filed a
"otion for reconsideration with the o"elec en )anc. 'n 'cto)er 28,
1987, three "e")ers *oted to s#stain the (irst Decision, with 2 dissenting
and one a)staining @one died earlierA. B#t respondent insists that no *alid
decision was reached )y the 'M.L. en )anc )eca#se only three
*otes were reached in fa*or of #a and theses did not constit#te a
"a-ority of the )ody.
ISSUE" Is the #aKs contention correctC
HELD"
Des. $he 291 decision rendered )y the (irst Di*ision was
*alid decision #nder Art.I;9A !ec.7 of the onstit#tion.
(#rther"ore, the three "e")ers who *oted to affir" the
(irst di*ision constit#ted a "a-ority of the fi*e "e")ers who deli)erated
and *oted thereon en )ane. $heir decision is also *alid #nder the
aforesaid onstit#tional pro*ision.
ACENA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
193 SCRA %23 519916
FACTS"
0etitioner Acena was appointed as an Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer
of %i&al $echnological olleges @%$A, a state college. 1e was appro*ed
as per"anent )y the !. Dr. 0rofets later e5tended to Acena a
pro"otional appoint"ent as Associate 0rofessor and at the sa"e ti"e
designated the latter as Acting Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer, despite the
pro"otional appoint"ent.
Dr. .stolas replaced Dr. 0rofets as %$ '$. In a
"e"orand#" Dr. .stolas re*o:ed the designation of Acena as Acting
Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer.
!#)se6#ently, petitioner Acena filed s#it with the Merit
!yste"s 0rotection Board @M!0BA against Ds. .stolas for illegal
ter"ination. M!0B initially dis"issed the co"plaint, )#t it s#)se6#ently
re*ersed itself after ha*ing )een infor"ed of the opinion of the !
hair"an ,otdalera to the effect that Acena is still Ad"inistrati*e 'fficer
of the %$ )eca#se his appoint"ent as Associate 0rofessor had )een
withdrawn.
Dr. .stolas and !al*ador @the one to replace AcenaA filed a
petition for re*iew with the 'ffice of the 0resident, which refered said
petition to the !. $he ! r#led in fa*or of !r. .stolas and !al*ador.
1ence, this petition.
ISSUE" 8hether or not esc acted witho#t in e5cess of -#risdiction or with
gra*e a)#se of discretion when it set the order of M!0B.
HELD"
It is settled r#le, that a respondent tri)#nal e5ercising -#dicial
f#nction acts witho#t -#risdiction if does not ha*e the a#thority )y law to
hear and decide the case. $here is e5cess of -#risdiction where the
respondent has the legal power to decide the case )#t o*ersteps his
a#thority. And there is ga*e a)#se of discretion where the respondent acts
in capricio#s, whi"sical, ar)itrary or despotic "anner in the e5ercise of his
-#dg"ent a"o#nting to lac: of -#risdiction.
Jnder 0D 1B?9 the ! has the -#risdiction to re*iew the
decision of the MA0B. 1owe*er, said the a#thority to re*iew can only )e
e5ercised if the party ad*ersely affected )y the decision of the M A0B had
filed an appeal with the o""ission within the I79day regle"entary
period. 1ere, it is ad"itted )y ! and not disp#ted )y the pri*ate
respondent .stolas that the petitioner for re*iew was filed o#tside the
regle"entary period. $his )eing so, the p#)lic respondents e5ceeded its
-#risdiction when it entertained the petition that was erroneo#sly filed with
the 'ffice of the 0resident. 1a*ing e5ceeded its -#risdiction the !
co""itted a re*ersi)le error when it set aside the order the M!0B which
had long )eco"e @final and e5ec#tory. (inal decision or order can no
longer )e s#)-ect to re*iew.
Moreo*er, .stolas has not e*en )othered to offer an
e5planation why she inc#rred delay and why she filed a petition with the
'ffice of the 0resident. !#ch )eing the case, the p#)lic respondent !
cannot legally in*o:e and -#stify the ass#"ption of -#risdiction on gro#nds
of e6#ality and s#)stantial -#stice.
VITALGO$ON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 101428, AUGUST 5, 1992
NARVASA, C.!."
FACTS"
0resident A6#ino reorgani&ed the *ario#s offices of the
Ministry of 1ealth. Dr. de la (#ente was de"oted )#t the ! declared
the transfer fro" hief of linics to Medical !pecialists II as illegal.
$hree "onths elapsed witho#t any word fro" Dr. <ital9
,o&on or anyone in her )ehalf, or any indication whate*er that the !
%esol#tion wo#ld )e o)eyed. Dr. de la (#ente, apprehensi*e that the
f#nds to co*er the salaries and allowances otherwise d#e hi" wo#ld re*ert
to the ,eneral (#nd, as:ed the ! to enforce its -#dg"ent. 1e was
howe*er /told to file in co#rt a petition for "anda"#s )eca#se of the )elief
that the o""ission had no coerci*e powers E #nli:e a co#rt E to
enforce its final decisionsRresol#tions.
%espondent co#rt denied it on the gro#nd that the /petitions
@for "anda"#sA are not the *ehicle nor is the o#rt the for#" for . . . @saidA
clai" of da"ages./
De la (#ente so#ght reconsideration, contending that the
Appellate o#rt had co"petence to award da"ages in a "anda"#s
action. 1e arg#ed that while s#ch a clai" for da"ages "ight not ha*e
)een proper in a "anda"#s proceeding in the Appellate o#rt /)efore the
enact"ent of B.0. Blg. 129 )eca#se the A had a#thority to iss#e s#ch
writs only Iin aid of its appellate -#risdiction,I/ the sit#ation was changed )y
said B0 129 in *irt#e of which three le*els of co#rts E the !#pre"e o#rt,
the %egional $rial o#rt, and the o#rt of Appeals E were conferred
conc#rrent original -#risdiction to iss#e said writs, and the A was gi*en
power to cond#ct hearings and recei*e e*idence to resol*e fact#al iss#es.
$o re6#ire hi" to separately litigate the "atter of da"ages he contin#ed,
wo#ld lead to that "#ltiplicity of s#its which is a)horred )y the law.
'n the other hand, in an atte"pt to n#llify the ad*erse
dispositions of the o#rt of
Appeals E and o)tain /the #lti"ate and corollary relief of dis"issing
respondent de la (#enteIs clai" for da"ages/ E the !olicitor ,eneralIs
'ffice had instit#ted the special ci*il action of certiorari at )ar. It contends
that the A is not legally co"petent to ta:e cogni&ance of and decide the
6#estion of da"ages in a "anda"#s s#it.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether or not the o#rt of Appeals has -#risdiction, in a special ci*il
action of "anda"#s against a p#)lic officer, to ta:e cogni&ance of the
"atter of da"ages so#ght to )e reco*ered fro" the defendant officer.
2. 8hether or not the !olicitor ,eneral "ay represent the defendant
p#)lic officer in the "anda"#s s#it, in so far as the clai" for da"ages is
concerned.
HELD"
1. 3o. $he !olicitor ,eneralIs 'ffice correctly identifies !ection 9, B.0.
129 as the legal pro*ision specifying the original and appellate -#risdiction
of the o#rt of Appeals. $he section pertinently declares that the
/Inter"ediate Appellate o#rt @now the o#rt of AppealsA shall
e5ercise . .,/ a"ong others2 'riginal -#risdiction to iss#e writs of
"anda"#s, prohi)ition, certiorari, ha)eas corp#s, and 6#o warranto, and
a#5iliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
-#risdiction .
!ection 19, go*erning the e5cl#si*e original -#risdiction of
%egional $rial o#rts in ci*il cases, contains no reference whate*er to
clai"s /for "oral and e5e"plary da"ages,/ and indeed does not #se the
word /da"ages/ at allG yet it is indisp#ta)le that said co#rts ha*e power to
try and decide clai"s for "oral, e5e"plary and other classes of da"ages
acco"panying any of the types or :inds of cases falling within their
specified -#risdiction.
2. 3o. As laid down in the Jr)ano and o cases2 @$Ahe 'ffice of the
!olicitor ,eneral is not a#thori&ed to represent a p#)lic official at any
stage of a cri"inal case.
$his o)ser*ation sho#ld apply as well to a p#)lic official who
is haled to co#rt on a ci*il s#it for da"ages arising fro" a felony allegedly
co""itted )y hi" @Article 1??, %e*ised 0enal odeA. Any pec#niary
lia)ility he "ay )e held to acco#nt for on the occasion of s#ch ci*il s#it is
for his own acco#nt. $he !tate is not lia)le for the sa"e. A fortiori, the
'ffice of the !olicitor ,eneral li:ewise has no a#thority to represent hi" in
s#ch a ci*il s#it for da"ages.
It )eing 6#ite e*ident that Dr. <ital9,o&on is not here
charged with a cri"e, or ci*illy prosec#ted for da"ages arising fro" a
cri"e, there is no legal o)stacle to her )eing represented )y the 'ffice of
the !olicitor ,eneral.
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP VS. !AIME N.
FERRER
G.R. NO. L31455, FE&RUAR- 28, 1985
CUEVAS, !."
FACTS"
In a )id for the "an#fact#re and deli*ery of *oting )ooths for
'M.L., respondent 'M.L. Bidding o""ittee hair"an and
Me")ers re-ected Ac"e o"panyKs )id and instead awarded it to
petitioner (ilipinas. After an oc#lar inspection of all the sa"ples s#)"itted
was cond#cted and after the o""issioners noted that Ac"e s#)"itted
the lowest )id, the 'M.L. iss#ed a %esol#tion awarding the contract
@for *oting )oothsA to Ac"e.
(ilipinas filed an In-#nction s#it with the then (I of Manila
against herein p#)lic respondents 'M.L. o""issioners, chair"an
and "e")ers of the o"elec Bidding o""ittee, and pri*ate respondent
Ac"e. (ilipinas also applied for a writ of preli"inary in-#nction. After
hearing petitionerIs said application, the respondent H#dge denied the writ
prayed for.
$hereafter the p#)lic respondents filed a "otion to Dis"iss
on the gro#nds that the lower co#rt has no -#risdiction o*er the nat#re of
s#it, and that the co"plaint states no ca#se of action.

Acting on the "otion @to dis"issA, the respondent H#dge
iss#ed the 6#estioned 'rder dis"issing i*il ase 3o. 77972. (ilipinasI
"otion for reconsideration was denied for lac: of "erit.
151
1ence, the instant appeal.
ISSUES"
1. 8hether or not the lower co#rt has -#risdiction to ta:e cogni&ance of a
s#it in*ol*ing an order of the 'M.L. dealing with an award of contract
arising fro" its in*itation to )idG
2. 8hether or not (ilipinas, the losing )idder, has a ca#se of action #nder
the pre"ises against the 'M.L. and Ac"e, the winning )idder, to
en-oin the" fro" co"plying with their contract.
HELD"
1. Des. $he o""ission on .lections shall ha*e e5cl#si*e charge of the
enforce"ent and ad"inistration of all laws relati*e to the cond#ct of
elections and shall e5ercise all other f#nctions which "ay )e conferred
#pon it )y law. It shall decide, sa*e those in*ol*ing the right to *ote, all
ad"inistrati*e 6#estions affecting elections, incl#ding the deter"ination of
the n#")er of location of 0olling places, and the appoint"ent of election
inspectors and of other election officials. ... $he decisions, orders and
r#lings of the o""ission shall )e s#)-ect to re*iew )y the !#pre"e
o#rt. @!ection 2, Article ;, 1947 0hilippine onstit#tion, which was then
in forceA
It has )een consistently held that it is the !#pre"e o#rt,
not the o#rt of (irst Instance, which has e5cl#si*e -#risdiction to re*iew
on certiorari final decisions, orders or r#lings of the 'M.L. relati*e to
the cond#ct of elections and enforce"ent of election laws.
8e are howe*er, far fro" con*ince that an order of the
'M.L. awarding a contract to a pri*ate party, as a res#lt of its choice
a"ong *ario#s proposals s#)"itted in response to its in*itation to )id
co"es within the p#r*iew of a /final order/ which is e5cl#si*ely and directly
appeala)le to this co#rt on certiorari. 8hat is conte"plated )y the ter"
/final orders, r#lings and decisions/ of the 'M.L. re*iewa)le )y
certiorari )y the !#pre"e o#rt as pro*ided )y law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings )efore the 'M.L. and ta:en cogni&ance of )y
the said )ody in the e5ercise of its ad-#dicatory or 6#asi9-#dicial powers.
It cannot )e gainsaid that the powers *ested )y the
onstit#tion and the law on the o""ission on .lections "ay either )e
classified as those pertaining to its ad-#dicatory or 6#asi9-#dicial f#nctions,
or those which are inherently ad"inistrati*e and so"eti"es "inisterial in
character.
8e agree with petitionerIs contention that the order of the
o""ission granting the award to a )idder is not an order rendered in a
legal contro*ersy )efore it wherein the parties filed their respecti*e
pleadings and presented e*idence after which the 6#estioned order was
iss#edG and that this order of the co""ission was iss#ed p#rs#ant to its
a#thority to enter into contracts in relation to election p#rposes.
In short, the 'M.L. resol#tion awarding the contract in
fa*or of Ac"e was not iss#ed p#rs#ant to its 6#asi9-#dicial f#nctions )#t
"erely as an incident of its inherent ad"inistrati*e f#nctions o*er the
cond#ct of elections, and hence, the said resol#tion "ay not )e dee"ed
as a /final order/ re*iewa)le )y certiorari )y the !#pre"e o#rt. Being
non9-#dicial in character, no conte"pt "ay )e i"posed )y the 'M.L.
fro" said order, and no direct and e5cl#si*e appeal )y certiorari to this
$ri)#nal lie fro" s#ch order. Any 6#estion arising fro" said order "ay )e
well ta:en in an ordinary ci*il action )efore the trial co#rts.
2. 3o. (ilipinas, the losing )idder, has no ca#se of action #nder the
pre"ises to en-oin the 'M.L. fro" p#rs#ing its contract with Ac"e,
the winning )idder.
8hile it "ay )e tr#e that the lower co#rt has the -#risdiction o*er
contro*ersies dealing with the 'M.L.Is award of contracts, the sa"e
)eing p#rely ad"inistrati*e and ci*il in nat#re, ne*ertheless, herein
petitioner has no ca#se of action on the )asis of the allegations of its
co"plaint.
Indeed, while the law re6#ires the e5ercise of so#nd
discretion on the part of proc#re"ent a#thorities,

and that the reser*ation
to re-ect any or all )ids "ay not )e #sed as a shield to a fra#d#lent award,
petitioner has "isera)ly failed to pro*e or s#)stantiate the e5istence of
"alice or fra#d on the part of the p#)lic respondents in the challenged
award.
0#rs#ant to 'M.L.Is In*itation to Bid 3o. 127, a )idder
"ay ha*e the right to de"and da"ages, or #nreali&ed or e5pected profits,
only when his )id was accepted )y resol#tion of the 'M.L.. (ilipinasI
)id, altho#gh reco""ended for award of contract )y the )idding
co""ittee, was not the winning )id. 3o resol#tion to that effect appeared
to ha*e )een iss#ed )y the 'M.L.. Decidedly then, (ilipinas has no
ca#se of action.
In iss#ing the resol#tion awarding the contract for *oting
)ooths in Ac"eIs fa*or, the o""issioners of the 'M.L. had ta:en
into acco#nt that Ac"eIs )id was the lowestG that Ac"e was a responsi)le
"an#fact#rerG and that #pon an oc#lar inspection of the sa"ples
s#)"itted )y the )idders, Ac"eIs sa"ple was fa*ora)le chosen s#)-ect to
certain conditions cited in the resol#tion. In fine, the p#)lic respondents
properly e5ercised its so#nd discretion in "a:ing the award.
MATEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. N+. 113219. A1A1(0 14, 1995)
PUNO, !."
FACTS"
Jpon co"plaint of so"e Morong 8ater District @M8DA
e"ployees, petitioners M8D Board Me")ers cond#cted an in*estigation
on pri*ate respondent .dgar !ta. Maria, then ,en. Manager. 1e was
placed #nder pre*enti*e s#spension and Ma5i"o !an Diego was
designated in his place as Acting ,en. Manager. 1e was later dis"issed.
hallenging his dis"issal, pri*ate respondent filed for V#o
8arranto and Manda"#s with 0reli"inary In-#nction )efore the trial co#rt.
0etitioners "o*ed to dis"iss on the gro#nd that the co#rt had no
-#risdiction o*er the disciplinary actions of go*ern"ent e"ployees which is
*ested e5cl#si*ely in the !. %espondent H#dge denied the "otion to
dis"iss and the "otion for reconsideration.
0etitioner filed a petition for certiorari )efore this co#rt, which
referred the case to respondent co#rt. $he A dis"issed the petition and
denied the "otion for reconsideration. 1ence, the petition.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the trial co#rt has -#risdiction o*er a case in*ol*ing
dis"issal of an e"ployee of 6#asi9p#)lic corporationC
HELD"
3o. $here is no 6#estion that M8D is a 6#asi9p#)lic
corporation. Indeed, the esta)lished r#le is that the hiring and firing of
e"ployees of go*ern"ent9owned and controlled corporations are
go*erned )y the pro*isions of the i*il !er*ice Law and %#les and
%eg#lations.
!o 8e held in Mancita *. Barcinas, no appeal lies fro" the
decision of the !er*ice o""ission, and that parties aggrie*ed there)y
"ay proceed to this o#rt alone on certiorari #nder %#le +7 of the %#les
of o#rt, within 4? days fro" receipt of a copy thereof, p#rs#ant to section
7, Article I; of the 1987 onstit#tion.
Mancita, howe*er, no longer go*erns for #nder the present
r#les, %e*ised irc#lar 3o. 1991 as a"ended )y %e*ised Ad"inistrati*e
irc#lar 3o. 1997 which too: effect on H#ne 1, 1997, final resol#tions of
the i*il !er*ice o""ission shall )e appeala)le to the o#rt of Appeals.
In any e*ent, whether #nder the old r#le or present r#le, %$s ha*e no
-#risdiction to entertain cases in*ol*ing dis"issal of officers and
e"ployees co*ered )y the i*il !er*ice Law.
0etition granted. Decision and resol#tion ann#lled and set
aside.
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 195 M': 1%, 1995
(REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 191)
$'2 'J%$ '( A00.AL!, 'J%$ '( $A; A00.AL!, $1.
!'LII$'% ,.3.%AL, $1. ,'<.%3M.3$ '%0'%A$. 'J3!.L,
ALL M.MB.%! '( $1. ,'<.%3M.3$ 0%'!.J$I'3 !.%<I.,
A3D ALL M.MB.%! '( $1. I3$.,%A$.D BA% '( $1.
01ILI00I3.!.
!JBH.$2 %#les ,o*erning appeals to the o#rt of Appeals fro"
H#dg"ent or (inal 'rders of the o#rt of $a5 Appeals and V#asi9H#dicial
Agencies.
1. !'0.. E $hese r#les shall apply to appeals fro" -#dg"ents or final
orders of the o#rt of $a5 Appeals and fro" awards, -#dg"ents, final
orders or resol#tions of or a#thori&ed )y any 6#asi9-#dicial agency in the
e5ercise of its 6#asi9-#dicial f#nctions. A"ong these agencies are the i*il
!er*ice o""ission, entral Board of Assess"ent Appeals, !ec#rities
and .5change o""ission, Land %egistration A#thority, !ocial !ec#rity
o""ission, 'ffice of the 0resident, i*il Aerona#tics Board, B#rea# of
0atents, $rade"ar:s and $echnology $ransfer, 3ational .lectrification
Ad"inistration, .nergy %eg#latory Board, 3ational $eleco""#nications
o""ission, Depart"ent of Agrarian %efor" #nder %ep#)lic Act ++77,
,o*ern"ent !er*ice Ins#rance !yste", ."ployees o"pensation
o""ission, Agric#lt#ral In*entions Board, Ins#rance o""ission,
0hilippine Ato"ic .nergy o""ission, Board of In*est"ents, and
onstr#ction Ind#stry Ar)itration o""ission.
2. A!.! 3'$ '<.%.D. E $hese r#les shall not apply to -#dg"ents or
final orders iss#ed #nder the La)or ode of the 0hilippines.
4. 81.%. $' A00.AL. E An appeal #nder these r#les "ay )e ta:en to
the o#rt of Appeals within the period and in the "anner herein pro*ided,
whether the appeal in*ol*es 6#estions of fact, of law, or "i5ed 6#estions
of fact and law.
B. 0.%I'D '( A00.AL. E $he appeal shall )e ta:en within fifteen @17A
days fro" notice of the award, -#dg"ent, final order or resol#tion or fro"
the date of its last p#)lication, if p#)lication is re6#ired )y law for its
effecti*ity, or of the denial of petitionerIs "otion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in accordance with the go*erning law of the co#rt or
agency a 6#o. 'nly one @1A "otion for reconsideration shall )e allowed.
Jpon proper "otion and the pay"ent of the f#ll a "o#nt of the doc:et fee
)efore the e5piration of the regle"entary period, the o#rt of Appeals "ay
grant an additional period of fifteen @17A days only within which to file the
petition for re*iew. 3o f#rther e5tension shall )e granted e5cept for the
"ost co"pelling reason and in no case to e5ceed another period of fifteen
@17A days.
7. 1'8 A00.AL $AL.3. E Appeal shall )e ta:en )y filing a *erified
petition for re*iew in se*en @7A legi)le copies with the o#rt of Appeals,
with proof of ser*ice of a copy thereof on the ad*erse party and on the
co#rt or agency a 6#o. $he original copy of the petition intended for the
o#rt of Appeals shall )e indicated as s#ch )y the petitioner.
Jpon filing the petition for re*iew, the petitioner shall pay to the ler: of
o#rt of the o#rt of Appeals the doc:eting and other lawf#l fees and
deposit the s#" of 07??.?? for costs. .5e"ption fro" pay"ent of
152
doc:eting and other lawf#l fees and the deposit for costs "ay )e granted
)y the o#rt of Appeals #pon *erified "otion setting forth the gro#nds
relied #pon. If the o#rt of Appeals denies the "otion, the petitioner shall
pay the doc:eting and other lawf#l fees and deposit for costs within fifteen
@17A days fro" notice of the denial.
+. '3$.3$! '( $1. 0.$I$I'3. E $he petition for re*iew shall @aA
state the f#ll na"es of the parties to the case, witho#t i"pleading the
co#rts or agencies either as petitioners or respondentsG @)A contain a
concise state"ent of the facts and iss#es in*ol*ed and the gro#nds relied
#pon for the re*iewG @cA )e acco"panied )y a clearly legi)le d#plicate
original or certified tr#e copy of the award, -#dg"ent, final order or
resol#tion appealed fro", together with certified tr#e copies of s#ch
"aterial portions of the record as are referred to therein and other
s#pporting papersG and @dA state all the specific "aterial dates showing
that it was filed within the regle"entary period pro*ided hereinG and @eA
contain a sworn certification against for#" shopping as re6#ired in
%e*ised irc#lar 3o. 28991.
7. .((.$ '( (AILJ%. $' 'M0LD 8I$1 %.VJI%.M.3$!. E $he
fail#re of the petitioner to co"ply with the foregoing re6#ire"ents
regarding the pay"ent of the doc:et and other lawf#l fees, the deposit for
costs, proof of ser*ice of the petition, and the contents of and the
doc#"ents which sho#ld acco"pany the petition shall )e s#fficient
gro#nds for the dis"issal thereof.
8. A$I'3 '3 $1. 0.$I$I'3. E $he o#rt of Appeals "ay re6#ire the
respondent to file a co""ent on the petition, not a "otion to dis"iss,
within ten @1?A days fro" notice. $he o#rt, howe*er, "ay dis"iss the
petition if it finds the sa"e to )e patently witho#t "erit, prosec#ted
"anifestly for delay, or that the 6#estions raised therein are too
#ns#)stantial to re6#ire consideration.
9. '3$.3$! '( 'MM.3$. E $he co""ent shall )e filed within ten
@1?A days fro" notice in se*en @7A legi)le copies and acco"panied )y
clearly legi)le certified tr#e copies of s#ch "aterial portions of the record
referred to therein together with other s#pporting papers. It shall point o#t
ins#fficiencies or inacc#racies in petitionerIs state"ent of facts and iss#es,
and state the reasons why the petition sho#ld )e denied or dis"issed. A
copy thereof shall )e ser*ed on the petitioner, and proof of s#ch ser*ice
shall )e filed with the o#rt of Appeals.
1?. DJ. 'J%!.. E If #pon the filing of the co""ent or s#ch other
pleadings or doc#"ents as "ay )e re6#ired or allowed )y the o#rt of
Appeals or #pon the e5piration of period for the filing thereof, and on the
)ases of the petition or the record the o#rt of Appeals finds pri"a facie
that the co#rt or agencies concerned has co""itted errors of fact or law
that wo#ld warrant re*ersal or "odification of the award, -#dg"ent, final
order or resol#tion so#ght to )e re*iewed, it "ay gi*e d#e co#rse to the
petitionG otherwise, it shall dis"iss the sa"e. $he findings of fact of the
co#rt or agency concerned, when s#pported )y s#)stantial e*idence, shall
)e )inding on the o#rt of Appeals.
11. $%A3!MI$$AL '( %.'%D. E 8ithin fifteen @17A days fro" notice
that the petition has )een gi*en d#e co#rse, the o#rt of Appeals "ay re9
6#ire the co#rt or agency concerned to trans"it the original or a legi)le
certified tr#e copy of the entire record of the proceeding #nder re*iew. $he
record to )e trans"itted "ay )e a)ridged )y agree"ent of all parties to
the proceeding. $he o#rt of Appeals "ay re6#ire or per"it s#)se6#ent
correction of or addition to the record.
12. .((.$ '( A00.AL. E $he appeal shall not stay the award,
-#dg"ent, final order or resol#tion so#ght to )e re*iewed #nless the o#rt
of Appeals shall direct otherwise #pon s#ch ter"s as it "ay dee" -#st.
14. !JBMI!!I'3 ('% D.I!I'3. E If the petition is gi*en d#e co#rse,
the o#rt of Appeals "ay set the case for oral arg#"ent or re6#ire the
parties to s#)"it "e"oranda within a period of fifteen @17A days fro"
notice. $he case shall )e dee"ed s#)"itted for decision #pon the filing of
the last pleading or "e"orand#" re6#ired )y these r#les or )y the o#rt
itself.
1B. $%A3!I$'%D 0%'<I!I'3!. E All petitions for certiorari against the
i*il !er*ice o""ission and $he entral Board of Assess"ent Appeals
filed and pending in the !#pre"e o#rt prior to the effecti*ity of this
%e*ised Ad"inistrati*e irc#lar shall )e treated as petitions for re*iew
here#nder and shall )e transferred to the o#rt of Appeals for appropriate
disposition. 0etitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which
"ay )e filed after the effecti*ity hereof and #p to H#ne 4?, 1997 shall
li:ewise )e considered as petitions for re*iew and shall )e referred to the
o#rt of Appeals for the sa"e p#rpose.
In )oth instances, for p#rposes of the period of appeal conte"plated in
!ection B hereof, the date of receipt )y the o#rt of Appeals of the
petitions th#s transferred or referred to it shall )e considered as the date
of the filing thereof as petitions for re*iew, and the o#rt of Appeals "ay
re6#ire the filing of a"ended or s#pple"ental pleadings and the
s#)"ission of s#ch f#rther doc#"ents or records as it "ay dee"
necessary in *iew of and conse6#ent to the change in the "ode of
appellate re*iew.
17. %.0.ALI3, LAJ!.. E %#les B4 and BB of the %#les of o#rt are
here)y
repealed and s#perseded )y this irc#lar.
1+. .((.$I<I$D. E $his irc#lar shall )e p#)lished in two @2A
newspapers of general circ#lation and shall ta:e effect on H#ne 1, 1997.
May 1+, 1997.
@!gd.A A3D%.! %. 3A%<A!A
hief H#stice
&. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
TUPAS V. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION
(G.R. NO. 49%77, MA- 4, 1989)
REGALADO, !."
FACTS"
0etitioner $J0A! filed a petition for the cond#ct of a
certification election in order to deter"ine the e5cl#si*e )argaining
representati*e of the wor:ers in 31. $he petition was dis"issed. 'n
appeal to the B#rea# of La)or %elations, the order of dis"issal was
re*ersed and the holding of the election was ordered. Jpon a "otion for
reconsideration, this order was set aside. 1ence, the instant petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE" 8'3 petitioner organi&ation can )e allowed to hold a certification
election.
HELD"
Des. $he ci*il ser*ice now co*ers only go*ern"ent owned or
controlled corporations with original or legislati*e charters, that is those
created )y an act of ongress or )y special law, and not those
incorporated #nder and p#rs#ant to a general legislation.
$he wor:ers or e"ployees of 31 #ndo#)tedly ha*e the
right to for" #nions or e"ployeesK organi&ations. $he right to #nioni&e or
to for" organi&ations is now e5plicitly recogni&ed and granted to
e"ployees in )oth the go*ern"ental and the pri*ate sectors.
$here is, therefore, no i"pedi"ent to the holding of a
certification election a"ong the wor:ers of 31 for it is clear that they are
co*ered )y the La)or ode, the 31 )eing a go*ern"ent9owned andRor
controlled corporation witho#t an original charter.
It is "eet, howe*er, to also call attention to the fact that,
insofar as certification elections are concerned, s#)se6#ent stat#tory
de*elop"ents ha*e rendered acade"ic e*en the distinction )etween the
two types of go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporations and the laws
go*erning e"ploy"ent relations therein, as herein)efore disc#ssed. (or,
whether the e"ployees of 31 are co*ered )y the La)or ode or )y the
ci*il ser*ice laws, a certification election "ay )e cond#cted.
%esol#tion ann#lled and set aside. ond#ct of a certification
election granted.
DE LOS SANTOS VS. MALLARE
97 PHIL 289 519506
FACTS"
.d#ardo de los !antos, the petitioner was appointed ity
.ngineer of Bag#io on H#ly 1+, 19B+ )y the 0resident, appoint"ent which
was confir"ed )y the A on A#g#st +. 'n H#ne I, 1?7?, ,il Mall#re was
e5tended an /ad interi"/ appoint"ent )y the 0resident to the sa"e
position, after which, on H#ne 4, the #ndersecretary of the Depart"ent of
the 0#)lic wor:s directed !antos to report to the B#rea# of 0#)lic 8or:s
for another assign"ent. !antos ref#sed to *acate the office. $he petitioner
rests his case on the onstit#tion which reads, II3o officer or e"ployee in
the i*il !er*ice shall )e re"o*ed or s#spend e5cept for ca#se as
pro*ided )y law./
ISSUE" 8hether or not the re"o*al of the petitioner was constit#tional.
HELD"
3'. $here are three classes of positions9policy9deter"ining,
pri"arily confidential and highly technical 9 as e5cl#ded fro" the "erit
syste" and dis"issal at pleas#re of officers and e"ployees appointed
herein is allowed )y the onstit#tion. $hese positions in*ol*e the highest
degree of confidence, or are, closely )o#nd with the dependent ?11 other
positions to which they are s#)ordinates or are te"porary in nat#re.
1owe*er, the office of the ity .ngineer is neither pri"arily confidential,
policy deter"ining nor highly technical. $h#s, the constit#tional pro*ision
is *ery "#ch applica)le in his case wherein he is protected fro" re"o*al
witho#t ca#se.
SALA$AR VS. MATHA-
73 SCRA 285 5197%6
FACTS"
0etitioner !ala&ar was appointed )y the A#ditor ,eneral
onfidential agent in the 'ffice of the A#ditor ,eneral, ,!I!. 1er
appoint"ent was noted )y the o""ission of i*il !er*ice.
After si5 years, petitioner recei*ed a notice fro" the A#ditor
,eneral that her ser*ice as confidential in the office of the A#ditor '!I!
has )een ter"inated.
$hereafter, the A#ditor ,eneral iss#ed an appoint"ent to the
petition as H#nior .5a"iner recei*ing a lower co"pensation. 'n the day of
the appoint"ent petitioner ass#"ed the position.
0etitioner wrote the o""ission of i*il !er*ice that she )e
reinstated to her for"er position as confidential agent in the office of the
a#ditor, ,!I!. 1owe*er, no action was ta:en.
153
ISSUE" 8hether or not the ser*ice of petitioner as confidential agent was
*alidly ter"inated on the alleged gro#nd of loss of confidence, and if not,
whether or not she co#ld still )e reinstated to said position after accepting
the position of H#nior .5a"iner in the sa"e office.
HELD"
$he ten#re of officials holding pri"arily confidential ends
#pon loss of confidence )eca#se their ter" of office lasts only as long as
confidence in the" end#res.
CORPU$ VS. CUADERNO
13 SCRA 591 519%56
FACTS"
0etitioner orp#&, then holding the position of !pecial
Assistant to the ,o*ernor in charge of the .5port Depart"ent in the
entral Ban:, a position declared )y the 0resident as highly technical in
nat#re, was ad"inistrati*ely charged )y se*eral co 9 e"ployees in the
e5port depart"ent with dishonesty, inco"petence, neglect of d#ty and
a)#se of a#thority, oppression, cond#ct #n)eco"ing of a p#)lic official
and of *iolation of the internal reg#lations of the entral Ban:.
$he Monetary Board s#spended the petitioner. After which
he filed an action for certiorari, "anda"#s, 6#o warranto and da"ages
with preli"inary in-#nction with the (I of the Manila. $he (I declared
the Board %esol#tion n#ll and *oid and ordered the reinstate"ent of the
petitioner. As aforesaid, )oth the petitioner and respondent appealed the
-#dg"ent.
$he appeal of the entral Band and Monetary Board is
planted on the proposition that officers holding highly technical positions
"ay at anyti"e for lac: of confidence )y the appointing power )e
re"o*ed. It arg#ed that for the three classes of positions @policy9
deter"ining. pri"arily confidential and highly technicalA lac: of confidence
of the one "a:ing the appoint"ent constit#te s#fficient and legiti"ate
ca#se of re"o*al.
ISSUE" 8hether or not highly technical e"ployees "ay )e re"o*ed )y
reason of lac: of confidence )y the one "a:ing the appoint"ent.
HELD"
$he ten#re of official holding pri"arily confidential positions
ends #pon 19s7 of confidence, )eca#se their ter"s of office lasts only as
long as confidence in the" end#resG and th#s their cessation in*ol*es no
re"o*al. B#t the sit#ation is different for those holding technical posts,
re6#iring special s:ills and 6#alifications. $he onstit#tion clearly
disting#ished the pri"arily confidential fro" highly technical, and to apply
the loss of confidence to the latter inc#")ents is to ignore and erase the
differentiation e5pressly "ade )y o#r f#nda"ental charter. Moreo*er, it is
illogical that while an ordinary technician, say cler:, stenographer, en-oys
sec#rity of ten#re and "ay not )e re"o*ed at any pleas#re, a highly
technical officers s#ch as an econo"ist or a scientist of a a*owed ti"e,
witho#t right to a hearing or chance to defend hi"self. 3o technical "en
worthy wo#ld )e willing to accept wor: #nder s#ch condition. Jlti"ately,
the r#leI ad*ocated )y the )an: wo#ld de"and that highly technical
positions )e filed )y persons who "#st la)or always with an eye coc:ed at
the h#"or of the s#periors. It wo#ld signify that the so9called highly
technical positions will ha*e to )e filed with inco"petents and yes9"en.
8ho "#st rely not on their own 6#alifications and s:ill )#t on their a)ility to
carry fa*or with the powerf#l. $he entire o)-ecti*e of the constit#tion in
esta)lishing and dignifying the ci*il ser*ice on the )asis on "erit sho#ld )e
th#s negated.
LUEGO VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(G.R. NO. L%9137. AUGUST 5, 198%)
CRU$, !."
FACTS"
0etitioner (eli"on L#ego was appointed Ad"inistrati*e
'fficer 11, 'ffice of the ity Mayor, e)# ity, )y Mayor (lorentino !olon
on (e)r#ary 18, 1984. $he appoint"ent was descri)ed as per"anent/ )#t
the i*il !er*ice o""ission @!A appro*ed it as /te"porary,/ s#)-ect to
the final action ta:en in the protest filed )y the pri*ate respondent and
another e"ployee, and pro*ided /there @wasA no pending ad"inistrati*e
case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appoint"ent
nor any decision )y co"petent a#thority that will ad*ersely affect the
appro*al of the appoint"ent./ $he ! then fo#nd the pri*ate respondent
)etter 6#alified than the petitioner for the contested position, and
accordingly, appointed $#o&o as ad"inistrati*e officer and re*o:ed the
appoint"ent of L#ego. $he pri*ate respondent was so appointed on H#ne
28, 198B, )y the new "ayor, Mayor %onald D#terte. $he petitioner, in the
present petition 6#estions the order and the pri*ate respondentKs title.
ISSUE" Is the ! a#thori&ed to disappro*e a per"anent appoint"ent on
the gro#nd that another person is )etter 6#alified than the appointee and,
on the )asis of this finding, order his replace"ent )y the latterC
HELD"
3'. It is noted that the appoint"ent of the petitioner was not
te"porary )#t per"anent and was therefore protected )y onstit#tion.
$he appointing a#thority indicated that it was per"anent, as he had the
right to do so, and it was not for the respondent ! to re*erse hi" and
call it te"porary.
$he sta"ping of the words /A00%'<.D as $.M0'%A%D/
did not change the character of the appoint"ent, which was clearly
descri)ed as /0er"anent/ in the space pro*ided for in i*il !er*ice (or"
3o. 44, dated (e)r#ary 18, 1984. 8hat was te"porary was the appro*al
of the appoint"ent, not the appoint"ent itself and what "ade the appro*al
te"porary was the fact that it was "ade to depend on the condition
specified therein and on the *erification of the 6#alifications of the
appointee to the position.
$he i*il !er*ice o""ission is not e"powered to
deter"ine the :ind or nat#re of the appoint"ent e5tended )y the
appointing officer, its a#thority )eing li"ited to appro*ing or re*iewing the
appoint"ent in the light of the re6#ire"ents of the i*il !er*ice Law.
8hen the appointee is 6#alified and a#thori&ing the other legal
re6#ire"ents are satisfied, the o""ission has no choice )#t to attest to
the appoint"ent in accordance with the i*il !er*ice Laws. Indeed, the
appro*al is "ore appropriately called an attestation, that is, of the fact that
the appointee is 6#alified for the position to which he has )een na"ed.
Appoint"ent is an essentially discretionary power and "#st
)e perfor"ed )y the officer in which it is *ested according to his )est
lights, the only condition )eing that the appointee sho#ld possess the
6#alifications re6#ired )y law. If he does, then the appoint"ent cannot )e
fa#lted on the gro#nd that there are others )etter 6#alified who sho#ld
ha*e )een preferred. It is different where the onstit#tion or the law
s#)-ects the appoint"ent to the appro*al of another officer or )ody, li:e
the o""ission on Appoint"ents #nder 1947 onstit#tion. Appoint"ents
"ade )y the 0resident of the 0hilippines had to )e confir"ed )y that )ody
and co#ld not )e iss#ed or were in*alidated witho#t s#ch confir"ation. In
fact, confir"ation )y the o""ission on Appoint"ents was then
considered part of the appointing process, which was held co"plete only
after s#ch confir"ation.
!ignificantly, the ! ac:nowledged that )oth the petitioner
and the pri*ate respondent were 6#alified for the position in contro*ersy.
$hat recognition alone rendered it f#nct#s officio in the case and
pre*ented it fro" acting f#rther thereon e5cept to affir" the *alidity of the
petitionerIs appoint"ent. $o )e s#re, it had no a#thority to re*o:e the said
appoint"ent si"ply )eca#se it )elie*ed that the pri*ate respondent was
)etter 6#alified for that wo#ld ha*e constit#ted an encroach"ent on the
discretion *ested solely in the city "ayor.
81.%.('%., the resol#tion of the respondent o""ission
on i*il !er*ice dated March 22, 198B, is set aside, and the petitioner is
here)y declared to )e entitled to the office in disp#te )y *irt#e of his
per"anent appoint"ent thereto dated (e)r#ary 18, 1984. 3o costs.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. CA
GR NO. 104%39. !UL- 14, 1995
FACTS"
0ri*ate respondent $ito Dato was appointed Assistant
0ro*incial 8arden )y then ,o*. (eli5 Alfelor, !r. !ince he had no ci*il
ser*ice eligi)ility for the position he was appointed to, what was e5tended
to hi" was a te"porary appoint"ent which was renewed ann#ally.
,o*. Alfelor appro*ed the change in DatoKs e"ploy"ent
stat#s fro" te"porary to per"anent #pon the latterKs representation that
he passed the necessary ci*il ser*ice e5a". 1owe*er, the ! did not
fa*ora)ly act #pon this change of stat#s.
After cri"inal charges were filed against hi" and a prison
g#ard, Dato was indefinitely s#spended. Lope %a"a, head of the
a"arines !#r Jnit of the !, wrote the ,o*ernor of a"arines !#r,
infor"ing hi" that the stat#s of Dato has )een changed fro" te"porary to
per"anent, the latter ha*ing passed the re6#ired e5a"ination. $he
change of stat#s was to )e "ade retroacti*e to H#ne 11, 197B, the date of
release of said e5a"ination.
Dato was ac6#itted of the charges. $h#s, he as:ed for
reinstate"ent and )ac:wages. 8hen his re6#est was not heeded, Dato
s#ed for "anda"#s )efore the %$ which r#led in his fa*or. 'n appeal,
the A affir"ed the assailed decision. 1ence this present petition.
ISSUE" 8hether or not pri*ate respondent $ito Dato was a per"anent
e"ployee of petitioner 0ro*ince of a"arines !#r at the ti"e he was
s#spended.
HELD"
3'. 0ri*ate respondent does not disp#te the fact that at the
ti"e he was appointed Assistant 0ro*incial 8asrden in 197B, he had not
6#alified in an appropriate e5a"ination for the afore"entioned position.
!#ch lac: of a ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility "ade his appoint"ent te"porary and
witho#t a fi5ed and definite ter" and is dependent entirely #pon the
pleas#re of the appointing power. $he fact that pri*ate respondent
o)tained ci*il ser*ice eligi)ility later on is of no "o"ent as his ha*ing
passed the s#per*ising sec#rity g#ard e5a"ination, did not ipso facto
con*ert his te"porary appoint"ent into a per"anent one. In cases s#ch
as the one at )ench, what is re6#ired is a new appoint"ent since a
per"anent appoint"ent is not a contin#ation of the te"porary
appoint"ent [ these are two distinct acts of the appointing a#thority.
154
It is worthy to note that pri*ate respondent rests his case
entirely on the letter dated March 19, 197+ co""#nicated )y Mr. %a"a to
the ,o*ernor of a"arines !#r. $he foregoing is a clear arrogation of
power properly )elonging to the appointing a#thority. It was already held
)efore @L#ego *. !A that the ! has the power to appro*e or
disappro*e an appoint"ent set )efore it. It does not ha*e the power to
"a:e the appoint"ent itself or to direct the appointing a#thority to change
the e"ploy"ent stat#s of an e"ployee. $he ! can only in6#ire into the
eligi)ility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person
6#alified it "#st attest. If not, the appoint"ent "#st )e disappro*ed. $he
d#ty of the ! is to attest appoint"ents and after that f#nction is
discharged, its participation in the appoint"ent process ceases. In the
case at )ench, ! sho#ld ha*e ended its participation in the
appoint"ent of pri*ate respondent on Han#ary 1, 197B when it confir"ed
the te"porary stat#s of the latter who lac:ed the proper ci*il ser*ice
eligi)ility.
Moreo*er, the o#rt is not prepared to accord said letter any
pro)ati*e *al#e the sa"e )eing "erely a p#rported photocopy of the
alleged letter, initialed and not e*en signed )y the proper officer of the
!. Based on the foregoing, pri*ate respondent $ito Dato, )eing "erely
a te"porary e"ployee, is not entitled to the relief he see:s, incl#ding his
clai" for )ac:wages for the entire period of his s#spension.
8herefore, pre"ises considered, the appealed decision is
here)y %.<.%!.D and the petition for "anda"#s instit#ted )y herein
pri*ate respondent $ito Dato is here)y DI!MI!!.D.
DE LOS SANTOS V. -ATCO
GR NO. L13932. DECEM&ER 24, 1959
FACTS"
A co"pro"ise agree"ent was s#)"itted referring to the
sale )y install"ent of a parcel of land "ade )y plaintiffs therein 0acita de
los !antos and Hose de los !antos to (ranicsco Mendone&. $he
agree"ent was s#)se6#ently appro*ed.
0laintiffs "o*ed for e5ec#tion )eca#se defendant had
allegedly neglected to pay "onthly install"ents since Han#ary 1978.
Defendant so#ght postpone"ent of the hearing for the "otion which was
granted )y respondent H#dge. %espondent then iss#ed a "otion for
e5ec#tion )#t the defendant "o*ed to 6#ash the writ of e5ec#tion. $he
parties were heard and in *iew of a possi)le a"ica)le settle"ent, the
"otion to 6#ash was held in a)eyance for two wee:s d#ring which period
they can settle the case.
After the pre9trial conferences, respondent 6#ashed the writ
of e5ec#tion. 1ence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE" 8hether or not there was gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of
the respondent H#dge.
HELD"
3'. In the first place, there )eing opposition on the part of
the defendant, who alleged and pro*ed a s#)se6#ent *er)al agree"ent
a"ending the co"pro"ise, e5ec#tion co#ld not *alidly )e decreed witho#t
a hearing.
In the second place, the allegations pro*ed )y Mendone&
a)o#t their *er)al agree"ent, his ha*ing sec#red a loan fro" the ,!I!
and his conse6#ent a)ility to discharge his o)ligation see"ingly -#stified
the co#rtKs ref#sal to e-ect defendant fro" the pre"ises @on e5ec#tionA
with the conse6#ent forfeit#re in fa*or of the plaintiffs of "ore than 12,???
already paid )y defendant as pre*io#s install"ents of the p#rchase price
not to "ention the loss of defendantKs #se of the ho#se and theater
erected on that parcel of land. Jpon the other hand, the respondent
-#dgeKs action ca#sed no irrepara)le or #nd#e har" to plaintiffs, )eca#se
the latter still ha*e the -#dg"ent that "ay )e enforced #pon any f#rther
defa#lt of defendant Mendone&.
8herefore, as the co#rt had -#risdiction and has co""itted
no gra*e a)#se of discretion, the writ of certiorari "ay not )e iss#ed.
0etition denied, with costs against petitioners.
SSS EMPLO-EES ASSOCIATION VS. CA
175 SCRA %8% 519896
FACTS"
8hen the !!! failed to act on the !!.AIs de"ands, the
latter went to stri:e. $he !!! filed with the %$ co"plaint for da"ages
and as:ed for a writ of preli"inary in-#nctions to stop the stri:e. $he trial
o#rt iss#ed a $%' while the Jnion filed a Motion of Dis"iss alleging the
trial co#rtIs lac: of -#risdiction o*er the s#)-ect "atter.
$he position of the #nion is that the %$ had no -#risdiction
to hear the case initiated )y the !!! and to iss#e the restraining order
and the writ of preli"inary in-#nction, as -#risdiction lay with the D'L. of
the 3L%, since the case in*ol*es a la)or disp#te
ISSUE" 8hether or not the !!! ."ployees ha*e the right to stri:e

HELD"
$here is no 6#estion that the constit#tion recogni&es the
right of go*ern"ent e"ployees to organi&e as shown in the following
articles2 ;III !ec. 4, Art.;I @BA !ec. 2 @1A and @7A Art. III !ec. 8.
1owe*er, those articles are silent as to whether s#ch
recognition also incl#des the right to stri:e. %esort of the intent of the
fra"ers of the organic law )eco"es helpf#l in #nderstanding the "eaning
of these pro*isions. A reading of the proceedings of the onstit#tion
o""ission that drafted the 1987 onstit#tion wo#ld show that in
recogni&ing the right go*ern"ent e"ployees to organi&e, the associations
only, witho#t incl#ding the right to stri:e.
$he La)or ode is silent as to whether or not go*ern"ent
e"ployees "ay stri:e, for s#ch are e5cl#ded fro" its co*erage, )#t then
the i*il !er*ice Decree is e6#ally silent on the "atter.
'n H#ly 1, 1987, to i"ple"ent the constit#tion g#arantee of
the rights of go*ern"ent e"ployees to organi&e, the 0resident iss#ed .'
3o. t 8? which pro*ides g#idelines for the e5ercise of the right to organi&e
go*ern"ent e"ployees. In !ec. B thereof, it is pro*ided that /the i*il
!er*ice law and %#les go*erning concerted acti*ities and stri:es in the
go*ern"ent ser*ices shall )e o)ser*ed, s#)-ect to "any legislation that
"ay )e enacted )y congress )y ongress./ $he 0resident was apparently
referring to Me"orand#" irc#lar 3o. + of the i*il !er*ice o""ission
which /prior to the enact"ent )y ongress of applica)le laws concerning
stri:e )y go*ern"ent e"ployees en-oying #nder pain of ad"inistrati*e
sanctions all go*ern"ent de"onstration, "ass lea*es, wal:o#ts and other
for"s of "ass action which will res#lt in te"porary stoppage or disr#ption
of p#)lic ser*ice/ the air was th#s cleared Iof the conf#sion. At present, in
the a)sence of any legislation allowing go*ern"ent e"ployees to stri:e
recogni&e their right to do so, or reg#lating the e5ercise of the right, they
are prohi)ited fro" stri:ing. $his )eing the case, the stri:e staged )y
e"ployees of the !!! was illegal.
CIVIL LI&ERTIES UNION VS. E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR-
194 SCRA 317 519916

FACTS"
0etitioner contends that !ection 14 r#n co#nter to !ee 14
Art. <II of the 1987 onstit#tion 9$he 0resident, <ice9" 0resident and the
"e")ers of the a)inet and their dep#ties or assistants shall not, #nless
otherwise pro*ided in this constit#tion, hold any office of e"ploy"ent
d#ring their ten#re.
By *irt#e of the opinion rendered )y then !ecretary of
H#stice !edfrey 'rdone&, constr#ing !ection 14 Art. <II in relation to
!ection 7, par.2 Art.I;9B that ca)inet "e")ers, their dep#ties and
assistants "ay hold other office incl#ding "e")ership in the )oard of
,'Is when aA directly pro*ided )y the constit#tion as in case of !ec of
H#stice which is "ade an e59officio "e")er of the H#dicial and Bar
o#ncilG )A if allowed )y lawG cA if allowed )y the pri"ary f#nctions of their
respecti*e positions, the 0resident of the 0hilippines iss#ed .' 28B two
days )efore ongress con*ened.
0etitioners arg#e that the e5ception to the prohi)ition in !ee
7 0ar 2 Art I; applies to the officers and e"ployees of the i*il !er*ice
o""ission in general and do not or cannot )e e5tended to !ec.14 Art.<II
which applies specifically to 0resident, <ice9 0resiednt and "e")ers of
the a)inet, their dep#ties and assistants. $he difference in the contention
of the parties therefore lies in the interpretation of the phrase I#nless
otherwise pro*ided in the onstit#tionI #sed in !ec.14 of Art.<II which has
petitioner clai"s to refer only to those e5pressly pro*ided )y the
onstit#tion s#ch as the <ice 0resident )eing allowed to )eco"e "e")er
of the a)inet or !ecretary of H#stice to )eco"e an e59officio "e")er of
the H#diciary and Bar o#ncil, while respondents insists it "a:e reference
to !ec 7 of Art I;9B in so far as the appointi*e official "entioned therein is
concerned.
ISSUE" Does the prohi)ition in !ec.14 Art.<II insofar as ca)inet "e")ers,
their dep#ties and assistants are concerned ad"it of the )road e5ceptions
"ade for appointi*e officials in general #nder !ec 7 par 2 Art I;B #nless
otherwise allowed )y law or the pri"ary f#nctions of his position, no
appointi*e officials shall hold any other office or e"ploy"ent in the
go*ern"ent.
HELD"
8e r#le in the negati*e. In constr#ing the onstit#tion, it
sho#ld )e )orne in "ind the o)-ects it so#ght to acco"plish )y its
adoption, and the e*ils if any, it so#ght to pre*ent or re"edy.
$he practice of holding "#ltiple offices or positions in the
go*ern"ent led to a)#ses )y #nscr#p#lo#s p#)lic officials who too:
ad*antage of this sche"e for the p#rposes of self9enrich"ent. $he )latant
)etrayal of p#)lic tr#st e*ol*ed into one of the serio#s ca#ses of
discontent with the Marcos regi"e.
A co"parison of !ec 14 Art <II with other pro*isions of the
onstit#tion on the dis6#alification of the p#)lic official s#ch as !ec. 14 Art
<I on "e")ers of ongress, !ec 7 par B Art ;<I on "e")ers of the
Ar"ed (orces and e*en !ec I7 pro*isions on dis6#alification pertains to
an office or position in the go*ern"ent and ,'Is. Jnli:e !ec 14 Art. <I
155
the prohi)ition is all9e")racing and co*ers )oth p#)lic and pri*ate office
and position in the go*ern"ent.
$h#s, while all the other appointi*e officials in the ci*il
ser*ice are allowed to hold other office or e"ploy"ent in the go*ern"ent
d#ring their ten#re when s#ch is allowed )y law and the pri"ary f#nction
of their office, "e")ers of the ca)inet, their dep#ties and assistants "ay
do so only when e5pressly a#thori&ed )y the onstit#tion itself. In other
words, !ec., Art I;9 B is "eant to officials while sec 14 Art <II is "eant to
the e5ception applica)le only to the 0resident, <ice90resident, "e")ers
of the ca)inet and their dep#ties and assistants.
$his )eing the case, the 6#alifying phrase I#nless otherwise
pro*ided in this onstit#tionI in see 14 Art <II cannot possi)ly refers to the
)road e5ceptions pro*ided #nder !ec.7 Art.I;9B of the 1987 onstit#tion.
$he position #nder !ee 14 Art <II is not to )e interpreted as co*ering
positions held witho#t co"pensation in e59officio capacities as pro*ided )y
law or as re6#ires )y the pri"ary f#nctions of their office.
Mandating additional d#ties and f#nctions of the 0resident,
<ice90resident, a)inet "e")ers and their dep#ties and assistants which
are not inconsistent with those already prescri)ed )y their offices or
e"ploy"ent )y *irt#e of their special :nowledge, e5pertise and s:ill in
their respecti*e offices is a practice long9recogni&ed in "any -#risdictions.
It )ears repeating thro#gh that s#ch additional d#ties or f#nctions "ay not
transgress the prohi)ition "#st )e re6#ired )y the pri"ary f#nctions of the
official co*ered, who is to perfor" the sa"e in an e5 officio capacity as
pro*ided )y law, witho#t recei*ing any additional co"pensation therefore.
FLORES VS. DRILON
(G.R. NO. 104732, !UNE 22, 1993)
&ELLOSILLO, !."
FACTS"
$he constit#tionality of !ec. 14, par. @dA, of %.A. 7227, 1
otherwise :nown as the /Bases on*ersion and De*elop"ent Act of
1992,/ #nder which respondent Mayor %ichard H. ,ordon of 'longapo ity
was appointed hair"an and hief .5ec#ti*e 'fficer of the !#)ic Bay
Metropolitan A#thority @!BMAA, is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohi)ition, preli"inary in-#nction and te"porary restraining
order /to pre*ent #seless and #nnecessary e5pendit#res of p#)lic f#nds
)y way of salaries and other operational e5penses attached to the office . .
. ./
0etitioners, who clai" to )e ta5payers, e"ployees of the
J.!. (acility at the !#)ic, Xa")ales, and officers and "e")ers of the
(ilipino i*ilian ."ployees Association in J.!. (acilities in the 0hilippines,
"aintain that the pro*iso in par. @dA of !ec. 14 of the said law infringes the
constit#tional pro*ision set forth in !ec. 7, first par., Art. I;9B, of the
onstit#tion, which states that /OnPo electi*e official shall )e eligi)le for
appoint"ent or designation in any capacity to any p#)lic officer or position
d#ring his ten#re,/ )eca#se the ity Mayor of 'longapo ity is an electi*e
official and the s#)-ect posts are p#)lic offices.
ISSUE" Does the pro*iso in !ec.14, par. @dA of %.A. 7227 which states,
/0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat for the first year of its operations fro" the
effecti*ity of this Act, the "ayor of the ity of 'longapo shall )e appointed
as the chair"an and chief e5ec#ti*e officer of the !#)ic A#thority,/ *iolate
the constit#tional proscription against appoint"ent or designation of
electi*e officials to other go*ern"ent postsC
HELD"
D.!. $he s#)-ect pro*iso directs the 0resident to appoint an
electi*e official, i.e., the Mayor of 'longapo ity, to other go*ern"ent
posts @as hair"an of the Board and hief .5ec#ti*e 'fficer of !BMAA.
!ince this is precisely what the constit#tional proscription see:s to
pre*ent, it needs no stretching of the i"agination to concl#de that the
pro*iso contra*enes !ec. 7, first par., Art. I;9B, of the onstit#tion. 1ere,
the fact that the e5pertise of an electi*e official "ay )e "ost )eneficial to
the higher interest of the )ody politic is of no "o"ent.
It is arg#ed that !ec. 9B of the Local ,o*ern"ent ode
@L,A per"its the appoint"ent of a local electi*e official to another post if
so allowed )y law or )y the pri"ary f#nctions of his office. 8 B#t, the
contention is fallacio#s. !ection 9B of the L, is not deter"inati*e of the
constit#tionality of !ec. 14, par. @dA, of %.A. 7227, for no legislati*e act can
pre*ail o*er the f#nda"ental law of the land. Moreo*er, since the
constit#tionality of !ec. 9B of L, is not the iss#e here nor is that section
so#ght to )e declared #nconstit#tional, we need not r#le on its *alidity.
3either can we in*o:e a practice otherwise #nconstit#tional as a#thority
for its *alidity.
In any case, the *iew that an electi*e official "ay )e
appointed to another post if allowed )y law or )y the pri"ary f#nctions of
his office, ignores the clear9c#t difference in the wording of the two @2A
paragraphs of !ec. 7, Art. I;9B, of the onstit#tion. 8hile the second
paragraph a#thori&es holding of "#ltiple offices )y an appointi*e official
when allowed )y law or )y the pri"ary f#nctions of his position, the first
paragraph appears to )e "ore stringent )y not pro*iding any e5ception to
the r#le against appoint"ent or designation of an electi*e official to the
go*ern"ent post, e5cept as are partic#larly recogni&ed in the onstit#tion
itself, e.g., the 0resident as head of the econo"ic and planning agencyG
the <ice90resident, who "ay )e appointed Me")er of the a)inetG and, a
"e")er of ongress who "ay )e designated e5 officio "e")er of the
H#dicial and Bar o#ncil.
$he distinction )eing clear, the e5e"ption allowed to
appointi*e officials in the second paragraph cannot )e e5tended to
electi*e officials who are go*erned )y the first paragraph.
81.%.('%., the pro*iso in par. @dA, !ec. 14, of %.A. 7227,
which states2 /. . . 0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat for the first year of its
operations fro" the effecti*ity of this Act, the Mayor of the ity of
'longapo shall )e appointed as the chair"an and chief e5ec#ti*e officer
of the !#)ic A#thority,/ is declared #nconstit#tionalG conse6#ently, the
appoint"ent p#rs#ant thereto of the Mayor of 'longapo ity, respondent
%ichard H. ,ordon, is I3<ALID, hence 3JLL and <'ID.
JUINTOS VS. O$AETA
98 PHIL 705 5195%6
FACTS"
Appellants Bra#lio V#i"son was a dep#ty 0ro*incial
$reas#rer and M#nicipal $reas#rer of aloocan, %i&al. In addition fro"
)eing treas#rer, he was appointed as Agent ollector of %#ral 0rogress
Ad"inistration, a p#)lic corporation. 1e ass#"ed the office witho#t waiting
for the appro*al of the 0resident.
ISSUE" 8hether the appoint"ent as agent is constit#tional and if it is,
whether he is entitled to additional co"pensation.
HELD"
D.!. $he e"ploy"ent of appellant as agent collector is not
in itself #nlawf#l )eca#se there is no inco"pati)ility )etween said
appoint"ent and his e"ploy"ent as Dep#ty 0ro*incial $reas#rer and
M#nicipal $reas#rer. $here is no legal o)-ection to go*ern"ent official
occ#pying two go*ern"ent offices and perfor"ing f#nctions to )oth as
long as there is no inco"pati)ility. $he onstit#tional prohi)ition refers to
do#)le appoint"ents and perfor"ance of f#nctions of "ore than one
office.
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CA-ETANO VS. MONSOD
(G.R. NO. 100113 SEPTEM&ER 3, 1991)
PARAS, !."
FACTS"
%espondent hristian Monsod was no"inated )y 0resident
A6#ino to the position of hair"an of the 'M.L.. 0etitioner opposed
the no"ination )eca#se allegedly Monsod does not possess the re6#ired
6#alification of ha*ing )een engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years p#rs#ant to Article I;9, !ection 1 @1A of the 1987 onstit#tion.
$he o""ission on Appoint"ents confir"ed the
no"ination. !#)se6#ently, respondent too: his oath and ass#"ed office
as hair"an of the 'M.L..
hallenging the *alidity of the confir"ation )y the
o""ission on Appoint"ents of MonsodIs no"ination, petitioner, as a
citi&en and ta5payer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and 0rohi)ition
praying that said confir"ation and the conse6#ent appoint"ent of Monsod
as hair"an of the o""ission on .lections )e declared n#ll and *oid.
I!!J.2 8hether or not hristian Monsod has )een engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years as re6#ired )y the onstit#tionC
HELD"
D.!. =0ractice of law "eans any acti*ity, in or o#t of co#rt,
which re6#ires the application of law, legal proced#re, :nowledge, training
and e5perience. $o engage in the practice of law is to perfor" those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. ,enerally, to practice law is to
gi*e notice or render any :ind of ser*ice which de*ice or ser*ice re6#ires
the #se in any degree of legal :nowledge or s:ill @III AL% 24A.>
Interpreted in the light of the *ario#s definitions of the ter"
=practice of law,/ partic#larly the "odern concept of law practice, and
ta:ing into consideration the li)eral constr#ction intended )y the fra"ers of
the onstit#tion, Atty. MonsodIs past wor: e5periences as a lawyer9
econo"ist, a lawyer9"anager, a lawyer9entreprene#r of ind#stry, a lawyer9
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer9legislator of )oth the rich and the
poor E *erily "ore than satisfy the constit#tional re6#ire"ent E that he
has )een engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
$he o""ission on the )asis of e*idence s#)"itted doling
the p#)lic hearings on MonsodIs confir"ation, i"plicitly deter"ined that he
possessed the necessary 6#alifications as re6#ired )y law. $he -#dg"ent
rendered )y the o""ission in the e5ercise of s#ch an ac:nowledged
power is )eyond -#dicial interference e5cept only #pon a clear showing of
a gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction.
@Art. <III, !ec. 1 onstit#tionA. $h#s, only where s#ch gra*e a)#se of
discretion is clearly shown shall the o#rt interfere with the o""issionIs
-#dg"ent. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the e5ercise of the
o#rtIs correcti*e power, since no a)#se, "#ch less a gra*e a)#se of
discretion, that wo#ld a"o#nt to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction and wo#ld
warrant the iss#ance of the writs prayed, for has )een clearly shown.
156
&RILLANTES VS. -ORAC
192 SCRA 358519906
FACTS"
0resident A6#ino designated Associate o""issioner
1aydee B. Dorac as Acting hair"an of the 'M.L., in place of
hair"an 1ilario B. Da*ide, who had )een na"ed chair"an of the fact9
finding co""ission to in*estigate the Dece")er 1989 co#p dIetat atte"pt.
0etitioner challenged the designation contending that the
0resident has no power to "a:e s#ch designation in *iew of the following
reasons2
1. $he stat#s of the o""ission on .lections as an
independent constit#tional )ody, andG
2. $he specific pro*ision of Art I;9 !ection 1@2A of the
onstit#tion that @1A no case shall any "e")er of the
'M.L. )e appointed or designated in a te"porary or
acting capacity.
0etitioner in*o:es 3acionalista 0arty *. Ba#tista, where
0resident V#irino designated the !olicitor ,eneral as acting "e")er of
the 'M.L. and the o#rt re*o:ed the designation as contrary to the
onstit#tion. It is also alleged that the respondent is not e*en the senior
"e")er of the 'M.L., )eing o#tran:ed )y Associate o""issioner
Alfredo .. A)#eg, Hr.
$he !olicitor ,eneral co#nters that the designation sho#ld
)e s#stained for reasons of Iad"inistrati*ely e5pediency,I to pre*ent
disr#ption of the f#nctions of the 'M.L. in the a)sence of legal
pro*isions for te"porary s#ccession si"ilar to the !#pre"e o#rtIs @!ec
12 H#diciary Act of 19B8A as well as the A @!ec 7 B0 129A.
ISSUE" Does the 0resident of the 0hilippines ha*e the power to "a:e
designation of a 'M.L. hair"an in an acting apacityC
HELD"
3o. 0resident has no s#ch a#thority and e5pediency is a
d#)io#s -#stification. Art I;9A. !ec.1 of the onstit#tion e5pressly
descri)es all the onstit#tional o""issions as Iindependent.I Altho#gh
essentially e5ec#ti*e in nat#re, they are not #nder the control of the
0resident in the discharge of their respecti*e f#nctions. .ach of these
o""issions cond#cts in own proceedings #nder the applica)le laws and
its own r#les and the e5ercise of its discretion. $he choice of a te"porary
chair"an in the a)sence of the reg#lar chair"an co"es #nder that
discretion. $hat discretion cannot )e e5ercised for it, e*en with its consent,
)y the 0resident of the 0hilippines.
A designation as Acting hair"an is )y its *ery ter"s
essentially te"porary and therefore re*oca)le at will. 3o ca#se need )e
esta)lished to -#stify its re*ocation. Ass#"ing its *alidity, the designation
of the respondent as Acting hair"an of the o""ission on .lections
"ay )e withdrawn )y the 0resident at any ti"e and for whate*er reason
she sees fit and the respondent, ha*ing accepted s#ch designation, will )e
stopped fro" challenging its withdrawal. @3ote2 $his ill#strates how the
independence pf the onstit#tional o""issions "ay )e #nder"ined.A
$he lac: of a stat#tory r#le co*ering the sit#ation at )ar is no
-#stification for the 0resident of the 0hilippines to fill the *oid )y e5tending
the te"porary designation in fa*or of the respondent. $he "e")ers of the
'M.L. co#ld ha*e handled the sit#ation the"sel*es witho#t the
participation of the 0resident, howe*er well9"eaning.
In the choice of the Acting hair"an, the "e")ers of the
o""ission on .lections wo#ld "ost li:ely ha*e )een g#ided )y the
seniority r#le as they the"sel*es wo#ld ha*e appreciated it. In any e*ent,
that choice and the )asis thereof were for the" and not the 0resident to
"a:e.
LINDO VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. NO. 127311 !UNE 19, 1997
PUNO, !.
FACTS"
0etitioner onrado Lindo and pri*ate respondent %osario
<elasco @inc#")ent "ayor of $ernate, a*iteA were "ayoralty candidates.
8hen petitioner was declared as the winner, <elasco filed an election
protest with the trial co#rt.
%espondent H#dge 3apoleon Dilag too: o*er the protest
case. <elasco "o*ed for e5ec#tion pending appeal, which "otion was
granted. Dilag th#s iss#ed the writ of e5ec#tion. 0etitioner filed a petition
for certiorari and prohi)ition with the 'M.L., with prayer for the
iss#ance of a preli"inary in-#nction to pre*ent the i"ple"entation of the
'rder and writ of e5ec#tion.
'M.L. denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the
preli"inary in-#nction. It r#led that the trial co#rt did not co""it gra*e
a)#se of discretion in granting the "otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal
since on the )asis alone of the physical co#nt of )allots, pri*ate
respondent wo#ld still )e ahead of petitioner )y 9? *otes. It also held that
the e5a"ination of original )allots shall )e "ade at the appeal proper to
dispose of all the iss#es relati*e to the "erits of the case.
1ence, the petition for certiorari and prohi)ition.
ISSUE" Is the petition properC
HELD"
3'. 'M.L.Is state"ent that fa:e and sp#rio#s )allots
"ay ha*e )een introd#ced to increase the *otes of protestant was ta:en
o#t of conte5t. $h#s, it cannot )e "ade as )asis for denying the e5ec#tion
pending appeal. $o )e precise, the 'M.L. "erely said that there is a
possi)ility that fa:e sp#rio#s )allots were placed in the )allot )o5 to
increase pri*ate respondentIs *otes, )#t the 'M.L. correctly r#led
that an e5a"ination of the )allots to resol*e that petition for certiorari is
not proper at said ti"e for the only iss#e it resol*ed was whether there
was a gra*e a)#se of discretion in granting the e5ec#tion pending appeal.
In his petition for certiorari )efore the 'M.L., petitioner
"ainly anchored his opposition to the order of e5ec#tion pending appeal
on his allegation that the trial -#dge did not e5a"ine the original )allots,
)#t relied only on the 5ero5 copy of the )allots in deciding the protest
case. 1owe*er, this contention raises a fact#al iss#e and its deter"ination
in )est left in the appeal pending )efore the 'M.L.. Its resol#tion will
in*ol*e the "erit of the case. 8e are only concerned with the iss#e of
whether gra*e a)#se of discretion was co""itted in ordering e5ec#tion
pending appeal. And there was a good reason for ordering e5ec#tion
pending appeal.
$h#s, petitionerIs reco#rse wo#ld )e to p#rs#e his appeal
with the 'M.L., where the opening of the )allot )o5es and the
e5a"ination of original )allots "ay )e "ade so that the tr#e will of the
electorate can )e finally ascertained.
It also )ears e"phasis that %#le 1B4 of the %#les of o#rt
allows e5ec#tion pending appeal in election cases #pon good reasons
stated in the special order.In its 'rder of e5ec#tion, respondent %$
H#dge Dilag cited two reasons to -#stify e5ec#tion of his decision pending
appeal, *i&2 @1A the grant of e5ec#tion wo#ld gi*e s#)stance and "eaning
to the peopleIs "andate, especially since the %$ has esta)lished pri*ate
respondentIs right to office, andG @2A )arely 18 "onths is left on the ten#re
of the $ernate "ayor and the people ha*e the right to )e go*erned )y
their chosen official. In the recent case of ,#tierre& *. 'M.L., the
sa"e gro#nds for e5ec#tion pending appeal of the decision in the protest
case were relied #pon )y the trial co#rt and we fo#nd the" to )e *alid
reasons for e5ec#tion.
GALLARDO V. !UDGE TA&AMO
(G.R. NO. 104848, !ANUAR- 29, 1993)
DAVIDE, !R., !.
FACTS"
0etitioners see: to prohi)it the enforce"ent of the $%'
iss#ed )y respondent H#dge on 1? April 1992, on the gro#nd that the latter
acted whi"sically, capricio#sly and witho#t -#risdiction when he too:
cogni&ance of the case and iss#ed the said order. It is the petitionersI
thesis that the said caseEthe hiring of h#ndreds of la)orers in the
different pro-ects contin#es #na)ated in flagrant *iolation of paragraphs
@aA, @)A, @*A and @wA, !ection 2+1 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode, a"ong
othersEprincipally in*ol*es an alleged *iolation of the pro*isions of the
'"ni)#s .lection ode the -#risdiction o*er which is e5cl#si*ely *ested in
the 'M.L..
ISSUE" Does respondent -#dge ha*e -#risdiction to ta:e cogni&ance of the
co"plaint or petition )ased on election offenses prior to the cond#ct of
preli"inary in*estigation )y the o""ission on .lections.
HELD"
3o. $he "aterial operati*e facts alleged in the petition
therein ine5ora)ly lin: the pri*ate respondentIs principal grie*ance to
alleged *iolations of paragraphs @aA, @)A, @*A and @wA, !ection 2+1 of the
'"ni)#s .lection ode @Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 881A. $here is partic#lar
e"phasis on the last two @2A paragraphs which read2
!ec. 2+1. 0rohi)ited Acts. E $he following shall )e g#ilty of
an election offense2
@*A 0rohi)ition against release, dis)#rse"ent or e5pendit#re of p#)lic
f#nds. Any p#)lic official or e"ployee incl#ding )arangay officials and
those of go*ern"ent9owned or controlled corporations and their
s#)sidiaries, who, d#ring forty9fi*e days )efore a reg#lar election and thirty
days )efore a special election, releases, dis)#rses or e5pends any p#)lic
f#nds for2
@1A Any and all :inds of p#)lic wor:s, e5cept the following2
555 555 555
@wA 0rohi)ition against constr#ction of p#)lic wor:s, deli*ery of "aterials
for p#)lic wor:s and iss#ance of treas#ry warrants and si"ilar de*ices. E
D#ring the period of forty9fi*e days preceding a reg#lar election and thirty
days )efore a special election, any person who @aA #nderta:es the
constr#ction of any p#)lic wor:s, e5cept for pro-ects or wor:s e5e"pted in
the preceding paragraphG or @)A iss#es, #ses or a*ails of treas#ry warrants
or any de*ice #nderta:ing f#t#re deli*ery of "oney, goods or other things
of *al#e chargea)le against p#)lic f#nds.
.ssentially, therefore, i*il ase 3o. B+7 )efore the trial
co#rt is for the enforce"ent of laws in*ol*ing the cond#ct of elections the
present onstit#tion #pgraded to a constit#tional stat#s the aforesaid
stat#tory a#thority to grant the o""ission )roader and "ore fle5i)le
powers to effecti*ely perfor" its d#ties and to ins#late it f#rther fro"
legislati*e intr#sions. Do#)tless, if its r#le9"a:ing power is "ade to
depend on stat#tes, ongress "ay withdraw the sa"e at any ti"e.
Indeed, the present onstit#tion en*isions a tr#ly independent
o""ission on .lections co""itted to ens#re free, orderly, honest,
157
peacef#l and credi)le elections,

and to ser*e as the g#ardian of the
peopleIs sacred right of s#ffrage E the citi&enryIs *ital weapon in effecting
a peacef#l change of go*ern"ent and in achie*ing and pro"oting political
sta)ility.
$he present onstit#tion, howe*er, i"plicitly grants the
o""ission the power to pro"#lgate s#ch r#les and reg#lations. $he
pertinent portion of !ection 2 of Article I;9 thereof reads as follows2
!ec. 2. $he o""ission on .lections shall e5ercise the following powers
and f#nctions2
@1A .nforce and ad"inister all laws and reg#lations relati*e to the cond#ct
of an election, ple)iscite, initiati*e, referend#", and recall. @."phasis
s#ppliedA.
$he word reg#lations is not fo#nd in either the 1947 or 1974 onstit#tions.
It is th#s clear that its incorporation into the present onstit#tion too: into
acco#nt the o""issionIs power #nder the '"ni)#s .lection ode
@Batas 0a")ansa Blg. 881A, which was already in force when the said
onstit#tion was drafted and ratified, to2
555 555 555
0ro"#lgate r#les and reg#lations i"ple"enting the
pro*isions of this ode or other laws which the o""ission is re6#ired to
enforce and ad"inister, . . . .
1+
3eedless to say, the acts so#ght to )e restrained in !pecial
i*il Action 3o. B+7 )efore the co#rt a 6#o are "atters falling within the
e5cl#si*e -#risdiction of the o""ission. It is not tr#e that, as contended
)y the petitioners, the -#risdiction of the %egional $rial o#rt #nder the
election laws is li"ited to cri"inal actions for *iolations of the '"ni)#s
.lection ode. $he onstit#tion itself grants to it e5cl#si*e original
-#risdiction o*er contests in*ol*ing electi*e "#nicipal officials.
27
3either it
is tena)le that the petitionersI assertion that the !pecial i*il Action filed in
the co#rt )elow in*ol*es the prosec#tion of election offensesG the said
action see:s so"e reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election
offensesG specifically, what is so#ght is the pre*ention of the f#rther
co""ission of these offenses which, )y their alleged nat#re, are
contin#ing.
$he petition is granted.
RELAMPAGOS V. CUM&A
(G.R. NO. 1188%1, APRIL 27, 1995)
DAVIDE, !R., !.
FACTS"
0etitioner and pri*ate respondent %osita #")a were
candidates for the position of Mayor in the "#nicipality of Magallanes,
Ag#san del 3orte. 8hen #")a was proclai"ed the winner, petitioner
filed an election protest with the trial co#rt, which fo#nd the latter to ha*e
won with a "argin of si5 *otes o*er the pri*ate respondent.
#")a appealed to the 'M.L.. $he trial co#rt ga*e d#e
co#rse to the appeal. 0etitioner "o*ed for e5ec#tion pending appeal,
which was granted. $he corresponding writ of e5ec#tion was th#s iss#ed.
!ince her "otion for reconsideration was denied, #")a filed with the
'M.L. a petition for certiorari to ann#l the assailed order of the trial
co#rt.
'M.L. pro"#lgated its resol#tion, declaring n#ll and
*oid the order and the writ of e5ec#tion iss#ed )y the lower co#rt.
Accordingly, petitioner was ordered restored to her position as M#nicipality
Mayor.
%espondents contend that !ec. 7? of B0 Blg. +97 was
repealed )y the '"ni)#s .lection ode @B0 Blg. 881A, citing -#rispr#dent
where it was declared that, indeed, the 'M.L. has no -#risdiction to
iss#e special writs of certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s in aid of its
appellate -#risdiction.
ISSUE" 8hether the o""ission has the a#thority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari in election cases.
HELD"
Des. !ince the 'M.L., in discharging its appellate
-#risdiction p#rs#ant to !ec. 2 @2A, Art. I;9, acts as a co#rt of -#stice
perfor"ing -#dicial power and said power incl#des the deter"ination of
whether or not there has )een gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac:
or e5cess of -#risdiction, it necessarily follows that the o"elec, )y
constit#tional "andate, is *ested with -#risdiction to iss#e writs of certiorari
in aid of its appellate -#risdiction.
In a)andoning the r#ling in the ,arcia and Jy and <eloria
cases, the o#rt held that the last paragraph of !ection 7? of B.0. Blg.
+97 pro*iding as follows2 $he o""ission is here)y *ested with e5cl#si*e
a#thority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohi)ition and
"anda"#s in*ol*ing election cases, re"ains in f#ll force and effect )#t
only in s#ch cases where, #nder paragraph @2A, !ection 1, Article I;9 of
the onstit#tion, it has e5cl#si*e appellate -#risdiction. !i"ply p#t, the
'M.L. has the a#thority to iss#e the e5traordinary writs of certiorari,
prohi)ition, and "anda"#s only in aid of its appellate -#risdiction.
$hat the trial co#rt acted with palpa)le and whi"sical a)#se
of discretion in granting the petitionerIs "otion for e5ec#tion pending
appeal and in iss#ing the writ of e5ec#tion is all too o)*io#s. !ince )oth
the petitioner and the pri*ate respondent recei*ed copies of the decision
on 1 H#ly 199B, an appeal therefro" "ay )e filed within fi*e days fro" 1
H#ly 199B, or on or )efore + H#ly 199B. Any "otion for e5ec#tion pending
appeal "#st )e filed )efore the period for the perfection of the appeal.
0#rs#ant to !ection 24 of the Interi" %#les I"ple"enting B.0. Blg. 129,
which is dee"ed to ha*e s#pple"entary effect to the 'M.L. %#les of
0roced#res p#rs#ant to %#le B4 of the latter, an appeal wo#ld )e dee"ed
perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal,

or on + H#ly
199B.
'n B H#ly 199B, the pri*ate respondent filed her notice of
appeal and paid the appeal fee. 'n 8 H#ly 199B, the trial co#rt ga*e d#e
co#rse to the appeal and ordered the ele*ation of the records of the case
to the 'M.L.. Jpon the perfection of the appeal, the trial co#rt was
di*ested of its -#risdiction o*er the case. !ince the "otion for e5ec#tion
pending appeal was filed only on 12 H#ly 199B, or after the perfection of
the appeal, the trial co#rt co#ld no longer *alidly act thereon. It co#ld ha*e
)een otherwise if the "otion was filed )efore the perfection of the appeal.
Accordingly, since the respondent 'M.L. has the
-#risdiction to iss#e the e5traordinary writs of certiorari, prohi)ition, and
"anda"#s, then it correctly set aside the challenged order granting the
"otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal and writ of e5ec#tion iss#ed )y the
trial co#rt.
EDDING V. COMELEC
(G.R. NO. 1120%0 !UL- 17, 1995)
FRANCISCO, !.
FACTS"
D#ring the May 1992 elections, petitioner 3or)i 1. .dding
and respondent 0a)lo !. Bernardo were a"ong the candidates for the
office of the "#nicipal "ayor of !i)#co Xa")oanga del 3orte. 8hen
respondent was declared the winner, petitioner filed an election protest
with the trial co#rt, which proclai"ed the latter as the winner and declared
n#ll and *oid the election of respondent.
%espondent appealed while petitioner "o*ed for the
i""ediate e5ec#tion of the decision.

Bernardo opposed .ddingIs "otion,
clai"ing that the %$ has no -#risdiction to order e5ec#tion pending
appeal, and in*o:ed !ection 17 of %#le 47 of the 'M.L. %#les of
0roced#re which allows e5ec#tion only if the -#dg"ent has )eco"e final.

$he %$ appro*ed BernardoIs 3otice of Appeal )#t later
granted .ddingIs Motion, and ordered the records of the case to )e
forwarded to the 'M.L.. $hereafter, .dding replaced Bernardo and
ass#"ed office. Bernardo filed with the 'M.L. a 0etition for
ertiorari with Application for 0reli"inary In-#nction and for Iss#ance of a
$e"porary %estraining 'rder, see:ing to en-oin the 'rder of the %$
granting e5ec#tion pending appeal. $he 'M.L. ga*e d#e co#rse to
the petition, and iss#ed a te"porary restraining order. (inally, the
'M.L. iss#ed the assailed 'rder, ordering respondent H#dge to
cease and desist fro" enforcing the assailed %esol#tion.
0etitioner arg#es that the 'M.L. lac:s -#risdiction to
iss#e writs of certiorariG and that the power of the %$ to grant e5ec#tion
pending appeal in election cases has already )een confir"ed in the case
of $o)on9Jy *s. 'M.L. where it was held that /the 'M.L. is
)ereft of a#thority to depri*e %egional $rial o#rts of the co"petence to
order e5ec#tion pending appeal./
%espondents co#nter that the 'M.L. has the power to
iss#e writs of certiorari, prohi)ition and "anda"#s, in*o:ing !ections 2@2A
and 4 of Article I; of the 1987 onstit#tion, which pro*ides in part2
!ec. 2. $he o""ission on .lections shall e5ercise the
following powers and f#nctions2 @2A ZAppellate -#risdiction o*er all
contests in*ol*ing electi*e "#nicipal officials decided )y trial co#rts of
general -#risdiction, or in*ol*ing electi*e )arangay officials decided )y trial
co#rts of li"ited -#risdiction.
!ec. 4. $he o""ission on .lections "ay sit en )anc or in
two di*isions, and shall pro"#lgate its r#le of proced#re in order to
e5pedite disposition of election case, incl#ding pre9procla"ation
contro*ersiesZ
ISSUE" 8hether the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A has
-#risdiction to iss#e 8rits of ertiorari against the interloc#tory order of the
%egional $rial o#rt @%$A in election cases.
HELD"
3one. $he co#rt decided to a)andon the r#le laid down in
the aforecited cases. In %ela"pagos *s. #")a and the 'M.L.,

the
o#rt #pheld the -#risdiction of the 'M.L. to iss#e writs of certiorari,
prohi)ition and "anda"#s o*er election cases where it has appellate
-#risdiction )y *irt#e of !ection 7? of Batas 0a")ansa Blg. +97, which
pro*ides as follows2
!ec. 7?. Definition. E
$he co""ission is here)y *ested with the e5cl#si*e
a#thority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohi)ition and
"anda"#s in*ol*ing election cases.
B#t notwithstanding the decision in %ela"pagos *s. #")a,
the 'M.L. co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion in the instant case
when it en-oined the order of the %$, dated H#ly 14, 1994, granting
petitionerIs "otion for i""ediate e5ec#tion. 0ri*ate respondentIs petition
for certiorari with application for a writ of preli"inary in-#nction )efore the
'M.L. is anchored on the for"erIs clai" that the trial co#rt acted
witho#t or in e5cess of -#risdiction and with gra*e a)#se of discretion in
granting e5ec#tion despite the filling of a notice of appeal )y pri*ate
respondent within the regle"entary period.

It appears howe*er that on
H#ly 8, 1994, the sa"e day when pri*ate respondent filed his notice of
appeal with the %$, petitioner in t#rn filed his "otion for i""ediate
e5ec#tion. Both actions were therefore seasona)ly filed within the fi*e9day
158
regle"entary period for filling an appeal since the decision of the %$ was
pro"#lgated in open co#rt on H#ly 8, 1994.
$he settled r#le is that the "ere filing of a notice of appeal
does not di*est the trial co#rt of its -#risdiction o*er a case and resol*e
pending incidents.

8here the "otion for e5ec#tion pending appeal was
filed within the regle"entary period for perfecting an appeal, as in the
case at )ench, the filing of a notice of appeal )y the opposing party is of
no "o"ent and does not di*est the trial co#rt of its -#risdiction to resol*e
the "otion for i""ediate e5ec#tion of the -#dg"ent pending appeal
)eca#se the co#rt "#st hear and resol*e it for it wo#ld )eco"e part of the
records to )e ele*ated on appeal. !ince the co#rt has -#risdiction to act on
the "otion at the ti"e it was filed, that -#risdiction contin#ed #ntil the
"atter was resol*ed and was not lost )y the s#)se6#ent action of the
opposing party.

onsidering howe*er that the ter" of office for the disp#ted
"ayoralty seat will already e5pire on H#ne 4?, 1997, in addition to the fact
that the election for the ne5t ter" of office for the contested post has
recently )een concl#ded, the instant petition has therefore )eco"e "oot.
GAUDO VS COMELEC
193 SCRA 78 519916
FACTS"
0etitioner and pri*ate respondent were candidates for the
position of "ayor in the ,arcia 1erna.nde&, Bohol. 0etitioner was
proclai"ed d#ly9elected Mayor.
In an election protest )y pri*ate respondent )efore the %$,
the co#rt #pheld the procla"ation of petitioner as the d#ly9elected Mayor
of ,arcia91ernande&, )y a "a-ority of ele*en @11A *otes.
0ri*ate respondent appealed the %$ decision to the
'M.L.. $hro#gh its (irst Di*ision, affir"ed )y 'M.L. en )ane,
re*ersed the trial co#rtIs decision and declared pri*ate respondent the
d#ly9e-ected "ayor )y a pl#rality of fi*e @7A *otes. $he 'M.L. held
that the fifteen @17A )allots in the sa"e precinct containing the initial //
after the na"e /,alido/ @petitioner hereinA were "ar:ed )allots and,
therefore in*alid.
0etitioner filed )efore the !#pre"e co#rt a petition for
certiorari and in-#nction. 0ri*ate respondent "o*es for the dis"issal of the
petition contending the following2
1. (inal decisions, orders or r#ling of the 'M.L. in election
contests in*ol*ing electi*e "#nicipal offices are final and
e5ec#tory and not appeala)le citing Art:le I; @A, !ection 2
@2A, paragraph 2 of the 1987 onstit#tion, which is
i"ple"ented in the %#les of 0roced#re pro"#lgated )y the
'M.L. , partic#larly 0art <II, %#le 49, !ection 2 thereof,
which reads2
/!ection 2 3on9re*iewa)le decisions9Decisions in appeals
fro" co#rts of general or li"ited -#risdiction in election cases relating to
the e-ections, ret#rns, and 6#alifications of "#nicipal and )arangay
officials are not appeala)le./
2. $he petition in*ol*es p#re 6#estions of fat as they relate to
appreciation of e*idence @)allotsA which is )eyond the power
of re*iew of this o#rt. $he 'M.L. fo#nd that the writing
of the letter // after the word /,alido/ in the fifteen @17A
)allots of 0recinct 1B is a clear and con*incing proof of a
pattern or design to identify the )allots andRor *oters. $his
finding sho#ld )y concl#si*e on the o#rt.
0etitioner, on the other hand, cites Article I; @AA, !ection 7 of
the onstit#tion, to s#pport his petition. It states2 /Jnless otherwise
pro*ided )y this onstit#tion or )y law, any decision, order, or r#ling of
each @onstit#tionalA o""ission "ay )e )ro#ght to the !#pre"e o#rt
on certiorari )y the aggrie*ed party within thirty days fro" receipt of a
copy thereof./
ISSUE" May the decision )y the 'M.L. in election contest in*ol*ing
"#nicipal officials )e )ro#ght to the !#pre"e o#rt )y a petition for
certiorari )y the petitionerC
HELD"
D.!. $he fact that decision, final orders or r#ling of the
o""ission on .lections in contests in*ol*ing electi*e "#nicipal and
)arangay offices are final, e5ec#tory and not appeala)le, does not
precl#de a reco#rse to this o#rt )y way of a special ci*il action of
certiorari. $he proceedings in the onstit#tional o""ission on this
"atter are enlightening. $h#s9
/M%. %.,ALAD'2 It is #nderstood, howe*er, that while
these decisions with respect to )arangay and "#nicipal
officials are final and i""ediately e5ec#tory and
therefore not appeala)le, that does not r#le o#t the
possi)ility of an original special ci*il action for certiorari,
prohi)ition, or "anda"#s, as the case "ay )e, #nder
%#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt/
8e do not, howe*er, )elie*e that the respondent 'M.L.
co""itted gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of
-#risdiction in rendering the 6#estioned decision. It is settled that the
f#nction f a writ of certiorari is toe :eep an inferior co#rt or tri)#nal within
the )o#nds of its -#risdiction or to pre*ent it fro" co""itting a gra*e
a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction.
'M.L. has the inherent power to decide an election
contest on physical e*idence, e6#ity, law and -#stice, and apply
esta)lished -#rispr#dence in s#pport of its findings and concl#sionG and
that the e5tent to which s#ch precedents apply rests on its discretion, the
e5ercise of which sho#ld not )e controlled #nless s#ch discretion has
)een a)#sed to the pre-#dice of either party. 0etition is therefore
dis"issed.
O3ote2 A short lesson in %e"edial Law. Do# "#st disting#ish the nat#re of
the special ci*il action of certiorari #nder %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt,
which is not a "ode of appeal, )#t rather an original action.P
PEOPLE VS !UDGE INTING
187 SCRA 788 519906
FACTS"
Mrs. .ditha Bar)a filed letter9co"plaint against 'I Mayor
Do"inador %egalado of $an-ay, 3egros 'riental with the 'M.L., for
allegedly transferring her, a per"anent 3#rsing Attendant, ,rade I, in the
office of the M#nicipal Mayor to a *ery re"ote )arangay and witho#t
o)taining prior pennission or clearance fro" 'M.L. as re6#ired )y
law.
Acting on the co"plaint, 'M.L. directed Atty. ,erardo
Lit#anas, 0ro*incial .lection !#per*ision of D#"ag#ete ity to cond#ct
the preli"inary in*estigation of the case to file the necessary infor"ation
in co#rt and prosec#te, if warranted.
After a preli"inary in*estigation, Atty. Lit#anas filed a
cri"inal case with the respondent trial co#rt which in t#rn iss#ed a warrant
of arrest against the 'le9Mayor.
!#)se6#ently, howe*er, the trial co#rt set aside its order of
arrest on the gro#nd that Atty. Lit#anas is not a#thori&ed to deter"ine
pro)a)le ca#se p#rs#ant to !ec 2, Art. III of the 1987 onstit#tion and
f#rther re6#ired Atty. Lit#anas to sec#re the written appro*al of the
pro*incial (iscal after which the prosec#tion of the case shall )e #nder the
s#per*ision and control of the latter. Atty. Lit#anas failed to co"ply so the
case was dis"issed.
ISSUE" Does a preli"inary in*estigation cond#cted )y a 0ro*incial
.lection !#per*isor in*ol*ing election offenses ha*e to )e co#rsed
thro#gh the 0ro*incial (iscal, )efore the %egional $rial o#rt "ay ta:e
cogni&ance of the in*estigation and deter"ine whether or not pro)a)le
ca#se e5istsC
HELD"
3'. $he 0ro*incial (iscal, as s#ch, ass#"es no role in the
prosec#tion of election offenses. If e*er the (iscal or 0rosec#tor files
infor"ation charging an election offense or prosec#tes a *iolation or
election law, it is )eca#se he has )een dep#ti&ed )y the 'M.L.. 1e
does not do so #nder the sole a#thority of his office @0eople *s. Basilla, et
al ,.%. 3os. 849489B?, 3o*e")er +, P 989A. In the instant case, there is no
a*er"ent or allegation that the respondent H#dge is )ringing in the
0ro*incial (iscal as a dep#ty of 'M.L.. 1e wants the (iscal to
/appro*e/ the 'M.L.Is preli"inary in*estigation, which is not proper.
Article I; !ection 2 of the onstit#tion pro*ides2
/!ec. 2 $he o""ission on .lection shall e5ercise the
following powers and f#nctions2
1. .nforce and ad"inister all laws and
reg#lations relati*e to the cond#ct of an election, ple)iscite,
initiati*e. referend#", and recall.
555 555
555
2. (ile #pon a *erified co"plaint, or on its
own initiati*e, petitions in co#rt for incl#sion or e5cl#sion of *otes,
in*estigate and, where appropriate, prosec#te cases of *iolation of
election laws, incl#ding acts or o"ission constit#ting election
fra#ds. offenses, and "alpractices/ @."phasis s#ppliedA
In effect, the 1987 onstit#tion "andates the 'M.L. not
only to in*estigate )#t also to prosec#te cases of *iolation of election laws.
$his "eans that the 'M.L. is e"powered to cond#ct preli"inary
in*estigations in cases in*ol*ing election offenses for the p#rpose of
helping the H#dge deter"ine pro)a)le ca#se and for filing infor"ation in
co#rt. $his power is e5cl#si*e with 'M.L..
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. &ASILLA
(G.R. NOS. 8393840, NOVEM&ER %, 1989)
FELICIANO, !."
FACTS"
As an after"ath of the May 1987 congressional elections in
Mas)ate, co"plaints for *iolations of !ection 2+1, par.a91 @*ote )#yingA
and par. p @carrying of deadly weaponA of the '"ni)#s .lection ode @B0
Blg. 881A were filed with the 'ffice of the 0ro*incial (iscal of Mas)ate
against the pri*ate respondents. After preli"inary in*estigation of the
foregoing co"plaints, the 0ro*incial (iscal of Mas)ate filed in the %egional
$rial o#rt of Mas)ate the said cri"inal co"plaints. In three @4A separate
159
orders, acc#sed respondent H#dge 1enry Basilla "ot# proprio dis"issed
the three @4A infor"ations gi*ing the following -#stification2 =Z.. $he record
shows that the co"plainant filed the co"plaint with the fiscal and not with
the 'M.L.. $he 'M.L. did not in*estigate the case.>
$he 0etition arg#es principally that the o""ission on
.lections @/o"elec/A has a#thority to dep#ti&e the chief state
prosec#tors, pro*incial and city fiscals and their assistants, #nder !ections
2 @BA and @8A, Article I;9 of the 1987 onstit#tion, and that the o"elec
did dep#ti&e s#ch prosec#tion officers to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigation
of co"plaints for alleged *iolation of election laws and to instit#te cri"inal
infor"ation therefore. $he respondent -#dge therefore co""itted gra*e
a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to lac: of -#risdiction in dis"issing the case.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the respondent -#dge erred in deciding that
'M.L. in the case at )ar failed to perfor" its f#nction as pro*ided in
the 1987 onstit#tion.
HELD"
Des. $here is no disp#te that the o"elec is *ested with
power and a#thority to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigation of all election
offenses p#nisha)le #nder the '"ni)#s .lection ode and to prosec#te
s#ch offenses in co#rt. !ec. 2@+A of Art. I; @A of 1987 onstit#tion
pro*idesZ>in*estigate and, when appropriate prosec#te cases of *iolation
of election laws, incl#ding acts or o"issions, constit#ting election fra#ds
offenses, "alpractices./
It "#st )e noted that while !ection 2+7 of the '"ni)#s
.lection ode *ests /e5cl#si*e power/ to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigation
of election offenses and to prosec#te the sa"e #pon the o"elec, it at the
sa"e ti"e a#thori&es the o"elec to a*ail itself of the assistance of other
prosec#ting ar"s of the ,o*ern"ent. !ection 2 of Article I;9 of the 1987
onstit#tion clearly en*isage that the o"elec wo#ld not )e co"pelled to
carry o#t all its f#nctions directly and )y itself alone2
!ection 2. $he o""ission on .lections shall e5ercise the
following powers and f#nctions2
@1A .nforce and ad"inister all laws and reg#lations relati*e to the cond#ct
of an election, ple)iscite, initiati*e, referend#", and recall.
555 555 555
@BA Dep#ti&e, with the conc#rrence of the 0resident, law enforce"enti
agencies and instr#"antalities of the ,o*ern"ent, incl#ding the Ar"ed
(orces of the 0hilippines, for the e5cl#si*e p#rpose of ens#ring free
orderly, honest, peacef#l, and credi)le elections.
555 555 555
@+A (ile, #pon a *erified co"plaint, or on its own initiati*e, petitions in co#rt
for incl#sion or e5cl#sion of *otersG in*estigate and, where appropriate,
prosec#te cases of *iolation of election laws, incl#ding acts or o"issions
constit#ting election fra#ds, offenses, and "alpractices.
555 555 555
@8A %eco""end to the 0resident the re"o*al of any officer or e"ployee it
has dep#ti&ed, or the i"position of any other disciplinary action, for
*iolation or disregard of, or diso)edience to its directi*e, order, or decision.
555 555 555
$he contention of pri*ate respondents that the dep#tation )y
the o"elec of the prosec#ting ar"s of the ,o*ern"ent wo#ld )e
warranted only )efore the elections and only to ens#re tree, honest,
orderly, peacef#l and credi)le elections, that is, to perfor" the peace9
:eeping f#nctions of police"en, lac: s#)stance. $here is nothing in
!ection 2 @BA of Article I;9 of the onstit#tion which re6#ires s#ch a
pinched niggardly interpretation of the a#thority of the o"elec to appoint
as its dep#ties, officials or e"ployees of other agencies and
instr#"entalities of the go*ern"ent. $he pro"pt in*estigation and
prosec#tion and disposition of election offenses constit#te an
indispensa)le part of the tas: of sec#ring free, orderly, honest, peacef#l
and credi)le elections. $he in*estigation and prosec#tion of election
offenses are, in an i"portant sense, "ore i"portant than the "aintenance
of physical order in election precinct. I
All this the respondent H#dge disregarded when he "ot# proprio
dis"issed the cri"inal infor"ations filed in this case. $he cases he cited in
his identical orders can offer hi" no co"fort at allG for these cases do not
relate to the a#thority of the o"elec to dep#ti&e the reg#lar prosec#tion
ar"s of the ,o*ern"ent for the in*estigation and prosec#tion of election
offenses and those cases are not in conflict with o#r r#ling here.
PEOPLE VS. DELGADO
(GR. NO. 9341932, SEPTEM&ER 18, 1990)
GANCA-CO, !."
FACTS"
o"elec filed an infor"ation against each of the pri*ate
respondents for *iolation of !ection 2+1 @yA @2A and @7A of the '"ni)#s
.lection ode. In three separate "anifestations, the %egional .lection
Director of %egion <II was designated )y the 'M.L. to handle the
prosec#tion with the a#thority to assign another 'M.L. prosec#tor.
0ri*ate respondents, thro#gh co#nsels, then filed "otions for
reconsiderations and the s#spension of the warrant of arrest with the
respondent co#rt on the gro#nd that no preli"inary in*estigation was
cond#cted. An order was then iss#ed )y respondent co#rt directing the
'M.L. thro#gh the %egional .lection Director of %egion <II to
cond#ct a rein*estigation of said cases and to s#)"it his report within ten
@1?A days after ter"ination thereof.
In its petition, the 'M.L. contends that as an
independent constit#tional )ody, its actions on election "atters "ay )e
re*iewed only on certiorari )y the !#pre"e o#rt. 'n the other hand, the
respondents contend that since the cases were filed in co#rt )y the
'M.L. as a p#)lic prosec#tor, and not in the e5ercise of its power to
decide election contests, the trial co#rt has a#thority to order a
rein*estigation.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the respondent o#rt has the power or a#thority to
order the o""ission on .lections thro#gh its %egional .lection Director
of %egion <II or its Law Depart"ent to cond#ct a rein*estigation
HELD"
D.!. $he ref#sal of the 'M.L. or its agents to co"ply
with the order of the trial co#rt re6#iring the" to cond#ct a rein*estigation
in this case and to s#)"it to the co#rt the record of the preli"inary
in*estigation on the gro#nd that only this o#rt "ay re*iew its actions is
certainly #ntena)le.
It is clear that aside fro" the ad-#dicatory or 6#asi9-#dicial
power of the 'M.L. to decide election contests and ad"inistrati*e
6#estions, it is also *ested the power of a p#)lic prosec#tor with the
e5cl#si*e a#thority to cond#ct the preli"inary in*estigation and the
prosec#tion of election offenses p#nisha)le #nder the ode )efore the
co"petent co#rt. $h#s, when the 'M.L., thro#gh its d#ly a#thori&ed
law officer, cond#cts the preli"inary in*estigation of an election offense
and #pon a pri"a facie finding of a pro)a)le ca#se, files the infor"ation in
the proper co#rt, said co#rt there)y ac6#ires -#risdiction o*er the case.
onse6#ently, all the s#)se6#ent disposition of said case "#st )e s#)-ect
to the appro*al of the co#rt. $he 'M.L. cannot cond#ct a
rein*estigation of the case witho#t the a#thority of the co#rt or #nless so
ordered )y the co#rt.
$he records of the preli"inary in*estigation re6#ired to )e
prod#ced )y the co#rt "#st )e s#)"itted )y the 'M.L.. $he trial
co#rt "ay rely on the resol#tion of the 'M.L. to file the infor"ation,
)y the sa"e to:en that it "ay rely on the certification "ade )y the
prosec#tor who cond#cted the preli"inary in*estigation, in the iss#ance of
the warrant of arrest. 3e*ertheless the co#rt "ay re6#ire that the record of
the preli"inary in*estigation )e s#)"itted to it to satisfy itself that there is
pro)a)le ca#se which will warrant the iss#ance of a warrant of arrest.
. $he petition is )ro#ght in the na"e of the 0eople of the
0hilippines. 'nly the !olicitor ,eneral can represent the 0eople of the
0hilippines in this proceeding. In the least, the consent of the 'ffice of the
!olicitor ,eneral sho#ld ha*e )een sec#red )y the 'M.L. )efore the
filing of this petition. 'n this acco#nt alone, the petition sho#ld )e
dis"issed.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS VS. SILVA, !R
(GR. NO. 129417 FE&RUAR- 10, 1998)
MENDO$A, !."
FACTS"
$he 'M.L. charged pri*ate respondents .rasto
$anciongco and 3or"a astillo with *iolations of \27 of %.A. 3o. ++B+,
together with Xenon Jy, in twel*e separate infor"ations filed with the
%egional $rial o#rt of Bataan. $anciongco and astillo then filed a -oint
/'"ni)#s Motion for .5a"ination of .*idence to Deter"ine the .5istence
of 0ro)a)le a#seG !#spension of Iss#ance of 8arrant of ArrestG and
Dis"issal of the ases./ hief !tate 0rosec#tor Ho*encito X#No, who had
)een designated )y the o""ission on .lections to prosec#te the cases,
filed a co""ent -oining in pri*ate respondentsI re6#est. In *iew thereof,
respondent -#dges !il*a and <ian&on s#""arily dis"issed the cases
against pri*ate respondents.
$he 'M.L. so#ght to appeal the dis"issal of the cases
to the o#rt of Appeals,

)#t the respondent -#dges denied d#e co#rse to
its appeal. $he sole )asis for the denial was the fact that the prosec#tor,
who" the 'M.L. had dep#ti&ed to prosec#te the cases, had earlier
ta:en a contrary stand against the 'M.L.. !aid prosec#tor stated that
he cannot gi*e his confor"ity to the 3otice of Appeal filed )y the o"elec
as it wo#ld not )e consistent with his position that he wo#ld a)ide )y
whate*er finding the co#rt "ay co"e #p with on the e5istence of pro)a)le
ca#se as against the acc#sed .rasto $anciongco and 3or"a astillo.
ISSUES"
@1A Is the order denying d#e co#rse to the 3otice of Appeal of the
'M.L. correctC
@2A 8ho has a#thority to decide whether or not to appeal fro" the orders
of dis"issal E the 'M.L. or its designated prosec#torC
HELD"
3'. $her order of the respondent -#dges denying d#e
co#rse to the 3otice of Appeal of the 'M.L. is not correct. . $he
a#thority to decide whether or not to appeal the dis"issal )elongs to the
'M.L.. Art. I;9, \ 2@+A of the onstit#tion e5pressly *ests in it the
power and f#nction to /in*estigate and, where appropriate, prosec#te
cases of *iolations of election laws, incl#ding acts or o"issions
constit#ting election fra#ds, offenses, and "alpractices./ As this o#rt has
held2
In effect the 1987 onstit#tion "andates the 'M.L. not
only to in*estigate )#t also to prosec#te cases of *iolation of election laws.
$his "eans that the 'M.L. is e"powered to cond#ct preli"inary
160
in*estigations in cases in*ol*ing election offenses for the p#rpose of
helping the H#dge deter"ine pro)a)le ca#se and for filing an infor"ation
in co#rt. $his power is e5cl#si*e with 'M.L..

Indeed, e*en )efore the present onstit#tion, the '"ni)#s
.lection ode @B.0. Blg. 881A and, )efore it, the 1971 .lection ode @%.A.
3o. +488A and the 1978 .lection ode @0.D. 3o. 129+A already ga*e the
'M.L. the e5cl#si*e power to cond#ct preli"inary in*estigation of all
election offenses and to prosec#te the" in co#rt.

$he p#rpose is to place
in the hands of an independent prosec#tor the in*estigation and
prosec#tion of election offenses.

0rosec#tors designated )y the 'M.L. to prosec#te the
cases act as its dep#ties. $hey deri*e their a#thority fro" it and not fro"
their offices.

onse6#ently, it was )eyond the power of hief !tate
0rosec#tor X#No to oppose the appeal of the 'M.L.. (or that "atter,
it was )eyond his power, as 'M.L.9designated prosec#tor, to lea*e to
the trial co#rts the deter"ination of whether there was pro)a)le ca#se for
the filing of the cases and, if it fo#nd none, whether the cases sho#ld )e
dis"issed. $hose cases were filed )y the 'M.L. after appropriate
preli"inary in*estigation. If the hief !tate 0rosec#tor tho#ght there was
no pro)a)le ca#se for proceeding against pri*ate respondents, he sho#ld
ha*e disc#ssed the "atter with the 'M.L. and awaited its instr#ction.
If he disagreed with the 'M.L.Is findings, he sho#ld ha*e so#ght
per"ission to withdraw fro" the cases. B#t he co#ld not lea*e the
deter"ination of pro)a)le ca#se to the co#rts and agree in ad*ance to the
dis"issal of the cases sho#ld the co#rts find no pro)a)le ca#se for
proceeding with the trial of the acc#sed. It was, therefore, gra*e a)#se of
discretion on the part of the respondent -#dges to rely on the "anifestation
of hief !tate 0rosec#tor X#No as )asis for denying d#e co#rse to the
notices of appeal filed )y the 'M.L..
ARUELO VS. CA
GR NO. 107852. OCTO&ER 20, 1993
FACTS"
Balagtas, B#lacan in the May 1992 elections. ,atchalian was proclai"ed
as the d#ly elected *ice9"ayor. Ar#elo filed with the 'M.L. a petition
see:ing to ann#l ,atchalianIs procla"ation on the gro#nd of /fra#d#lent
alteration and ta"pering/ of *otes. Ar#elo also filed with the %$ a petition
protesting the sa"e election.
,atchalian "o*ed to dis"iss, clai"ing that2 @aA the petition
was filed o#t of ti"eG @)A there was a pending protest case )efore the
'M.L.G and @)A Ar#elo failed to pay the prescri)ed filing fees and cash
deposit on the petition.
$he 'M.L. denied Ar#eloIs petition. 1owe*er, the trial
co#rt denied ,atchalianIs Motion to Dis"iss and ordered hi" to file his
answer to the petition.
Ar#elo prayed )efore the A for the iss#ance of a te"porary
restraining order or a writ of preli"inary in-#nction to restrain the trial co#rt
fro" i"ple"enting the 'rder of A#g#st 11 1992, regarding the re*ision of
)allots. $he A )elatedly iss#ed a te"porary restraining order.
Meanwhile, ,atchalian filed with the A another petition for certiorari @A9
,.%. !0 3o. 28977A, again alleging gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part
of the trial co#rt in iss#ing the 'rder, which denied his Motion for Bill of
0artic#lars. $he A dis"issed this petition for lac: of "erit.
$he A rendered -#dg"ent, denying ,atchalianIs petition,
)#t declaring, at the sa"e ti"e, that ,atchalianIs Answer 8ith o#nter9
0rotest and o#nterclai" was ti"ely filed. $he appellate co#rt also lifted
the te"porary restraining order and ordered the trial co#rt to /proceed with
dispatch in the proceedings )elow. 1ence this petition.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the filing of "otions to dis"iss and "otions for )ill
of partic#lars is prohi)ited )y !ection 1, %#le 14, 0art III of the 'M.L.
%#les of 0roced#reG hence, the filing of said pleadings did not s#spend the
r#nning of the fi*e9day period, or gi*e ,atchalian a new fi*e9day period to
file his answer.
HELD"
3'. 0etitioner filed the election protest @i*il ase 3o. 4B49
M992A with the %$, whose proceedings are go*erned )y the %e*ised
%#les of o#rt. !ection 1, %#le 14, 0art III of the 'M.L. %#les of
0roced#re is not applica)le to proceedings )efore the reg#lar co#rts. As
e5pressly "andated )y !ection 2, %#le 1, 0art I of the 'M.L. %#les
of 0roced#re, the filing of "otions to dis"iss and )ill of 0artic#lars, shall
apply only to proceedings )ro#ght )efore the 'M.L.. !ection 2, %#le
1, 0art I pro*ides2
/!.. 2. Applica)ility. $hese r#les, e5cept 0art <I, shall
apply to all actions and proceedings )ro#ght )efore the o""ission. 0art
<I shall apply to election contests and 6#o warranto cases cogni&a)le )y
co#rts of general or li"ited -#risdiction It "#st )e noted that nowhere in
0art <I of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is it pro*ided that "otions to
dis"iss and )ill of partic#lars are not allowed in election protest or 6#o
warranto cases pending )efore the reg#lar co#rts.
onstit#tionally spea:ing, the 'M.L. cannot adopt a
r#le prohi)iting the filing of certain pleadings in the reg#lar co#rts. $he
in all co#rts is *ested on the !#pre"e o#rt @onstit#tion, Art <III, !ec. +
O7PA.
0ri*ate respondent recei*ed a copy of the order of the %$
denying his "otion for a )ill of partic#lars on A#g#st +, 1992. Jnder
!ection l@)A, %#le 12 of the %e*ised %#les of o#rt, a party has at least
fi*e days to file his answer after receipt of the order denying his "otion for
a )ill of partic#lars. 0ri*ate respondent, therefore, had #ntil A#g#st 11,
1992 within which to file his answer. $he Answer with o#nter90rotest and
o#nterclai" filed )y hi" on A#g#st 11, 1992 was filed ti"ely.
$he instant case is different fro" a pre9procla"ation
contro*ersy which the law e5pressly "andates to )e resol*ed in a
s#""ary proceeding @B.0. Blg. 881, Art. ;;, !ec. 2B+G 'M.L. %#les
of 0roced#re, 0art <, %#le 27, !ec. 2A. 0re9procla"ation contro*ersies
sho#ld )e s#""arily decided, consistent with the legislatorsI desire that
the can*ass of the *otes and the procla"ation of the winning candidate )e
done with dispatch and witho#t #nnecessary delay. An election protest
does not "erely concern the personal interests of ri*al candidates for an
office. '*er and, a)o*e the desire of the candidate to win, is the deep
p#)lic interest to deter"ine the tr#e choice of he people. (or this reason, it
is a well9esta)lished principle that laws go*erning election protests "#st
)e li)erally constr#ed to the end that the pop#lar will e5pressed in the
election or p#)lic officers, will not, )y p#rely technical reasons, )e
defeated
8e find no gra*e a)#se of discretion on the part of the o#rt
of Appeals.
81.%.('%., the petition is here)y DI!MI!!.D.
ANTONIO VS. COMELEC
GR NO. 1358%9, SEPTEM&ER 22, 1999
FACTS"
$he parties in this case were ri*al candidates for the 0#nong
Barangay of Barangay Ilaya, Las 0iNas ity, Metro Manila. 0rotestee
%#stico Antonio was proclai"ed as the winner. 0rotestant <icente
Miranda, Hr. then filed an election protest )efore the Las 0iNas Me$,
which declared Miranda as the d#ly elected Barangay hair"an.
Antonio appealed fro" this -#dg"ent. Meanwhile, Miranda
"o*ed to e5ec#te the co#rtIs decision )#t s#ch was denied and records
were forwarded to the 'M.L. !econd Di*ision.
$he 'M.L. dis"issed the appeal for lac: of -#risdiction.
It was stated therein that petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the
prescri)ed period. $he 0eriod aforestated is -#risdictional and fail#re of the
protestee to perfect his appeal within the said period depri*es the
o""ission of its appellate -#risdiction.
1ence, this "otion for reconsideration.
ISSUE" Is the period to appeal a decision of a "#nicipal trial co#rt to the
'M.L. in an election protest in*ol*ing a )arangay position fi*e @7A
days per 'M.L. %#les of
0roced#re or ten @1?A days as pro*ided for in %ep#)lic Act
++791 and the '"ni)#s .lection odeC
HELD"
In dis"issing the appeal, the 'M.L. relied on !ection
21, %#le 47 of the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re which reads2
/!.. 21. Appeal 9 (ro" any
decision rendered )y the co#rt, the aggrie*ed
party "ay appeal to the o""ission on
.lections within fi*e @7A days after the
pro"#lgation of the decision./
'n the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of
appeal fro" decisions of the M#nicipal $rial o#rts or Metropolitan $rial
o#rts in*ol*ing )arangay officials is go*erned )y !ection 9 of %ep#)lic
Act ++79 and !ection 272 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode. !ection 9 of
%ep#)lic Act ++79 reads2
/!.. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a
)arangay official "ay )e filed with the proper "#nicipal or "etropolitan
trial co#rt )y any candidate who has d#ly filed a certificate of candidacy
and has )een *oted for a )arangay office within ten @1?A days after the
procla"ation of the res#lts of the election. $he trial co#rt shall decide the
election protest within thirty @4?A days after the filing thereof. $he decision
of the "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt "ay )e appealed within ten @1?A
days fro" receipt of a copy thereof )y the aggrie*ed party to the regional
trial co#rt which shall decide the iss#e within thirty @4?A days fro" receipt
of the appeal and whose decision on 6#estions of fact shall )e final and
non9appeala)le. (or p#rposes of the )arangay elections, no pre9
procla"ation cases shall )e allowed./
!i"ilarly, !ection 272 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode
pro*ides2
/!.. 272. .lection contest for )arangay offices. 9 A sworn
petition contesting the election of a )arangay officer shall )e filed with the
proper "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt )y any candidate who has d#ly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has )een *oted for the sa"e office
within ten days after the procla"ation of the res#lts of the election. $he
trial co#rt shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing
thereof. $he decision of the "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt "ay )e
appealed within ten days fro" receipt of a copy thereof )y the aggrie*ed
party to the regional trial co#rt which shall decide the case within thirty
days fro" its s#)"ission, and whose decisions shall )e final./
3o less than the 1987 onstit#tion @Article I;9A, !ection +
and Article I;9, !ection 4A grants and a#thori&es this o""ission to
pro"#lgate its own r#les of proced#re as long as s#ch r#les concerning
pleadings and practice do not di"inish, increase or "odify s#)stanti*e
rights. 1ence, the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re pro"#lgated in 1994 as
161
a"ended in 199B is no ordinary interpretati*e or ad"inistrati*e r#ling. It is
pro"#lgated )y this o""ission p#rs#ant to a constit#tionally "andated
a#thority which no legislati*e enact"ent can a"end, re*ise or repeal.
$he 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re @%#le 47 !ection 21A
pro*ides that fro" the decision rendered )y the co#rt, the aggrie*ed party
"ay appeal to the o""ission on .lections within fi*e @7A days after the
pro"#lgation of the decision. %#le 22 !ection 9 @dA of '#r %#les of
0roced#re f#rther pro*ides that an appeal fro" decisions of co#rts in
election protest cases "ay )e dis"issed at the instance of the
o""ission for fail#re to file the re6#ired notice of appeal within the
prescri)ed period.
In case at )ar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal )efore the
trial co#rt on the ninth @9A day fro" receipt of the decision appealed fro"
or fo#r @BA days after the fi*e9day prescri)ed period to appeal lapsed.
$herefore, the present appeal "#st )e dis"issed. (or it is a5io"atic that
the perfection of an appeal in the "anner and within the period laid down
)y the 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re is not only "andatory )#t also
-#risdictional. As a conse6#ence, the fail#re to perfect an appeal within the
prescri)ed period as re6#ired )y the %#les has the effect of defeating the
right of appeal of a party and precl#ding the appellate co#rt fro" ac6#iring
-#risdiction o*er the case.
0etitionerIs arg#"ent raises the pres#"ption that the period
to appeal can )e se*ered fro" the re"edy or the appeal itself which is
pro*ided in !ection 9, %ep#)lic Act ++79 and s#r*i*e on its own. $he
pres#"ption cannot )e s#stained )eca#se the period to appeal is an
essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the re"edy. 0etitioner
also cites the case of (lores *. 'M.L.. 1owe*er, when this o#rt
stated in the afore"entioned case that /!ection 9 of %ep. Act 3o. ++79 is
declared #nconstit#tional insofar as it pro*ides that )arangay election
contests decided )y the "#nicipal or "etropolitan trial co#rt shall )e
appeala)le to the regional trial co#rt/, it "eant to preser*e the first two
sentences on the original -#risdiction of "#nicipal and "etropolitan trial
co#rts to try )arangay election protests cases )#t not, as ad*anced )y the
petitioner, the ten9day period to appeal to the %egional $rial o#rt. $his is
the logical and so#nd interpretation of s#)-ect portion of the (lores case.
8e cannot ind#lge in the ass#"ption that ongress still
intended, )y the said laws, to "aintain the ten @1?A day period to appeal
despite the declaration of #nconstit#tionality of the appellate -#risdiction of
the regional trial co#rt, %ep#)lic Act 3o. 71++ a"ending the '"ni)#s
.lection ode, e*inces the intent of o#r law"a:ers to e5pedite the
re"edial aspect of election contro*ersies. $he law was appro*ed on
3o*e")er 2+, 1991, after the (lores case which was pro"#lgated on April
2?,199?, and pres#"a)ly, the legislat#re in enacting the sa"e was
cogni&ant of the r#ling in (lores. !aid law pro*ides the sa"e fi*e @7A day
period to appeal decisions of the trial co#rt in election contests for
"#nicipal officers to the 'M.L.. !ection 22 thereof reads2
/!ec. 22. .lection ontests for M#nicipal 'fficers. 9All
election contests in*ol*ing "#nicipal offices filed with the %egional $rial
o#rt shall )e decided e5peditio#sly. $he decision "ay )e appealed to the
o""ission within fi*e @7A days fro" pro"#lgation or receipt of a copy
thereof )y the aggrie*ed party. $he o""ission shall decide the appeal
within si5ty @+?A days after it is s#)"itted for decision, )#t not later than si5
@+A "onths after the filing of the appeal, which decision shall )e final,
#nappeala)le and e5ec#tory./
$here wo#ld )e no logic nor reason in r#ling that a longer
period to appeal to the 'M.L. sho#ld apply to election contests for
)arangay officials.
And since the whole re"edy was in*alidated, a *oid was
created. $h#s, the 'M.L. had to co"e in and pro*ide for a new
appeal in accordance with the "andate of the onstit#tion. As correctly
pointed o#t )y the 'M.L., !ection +, Article I;9A1B of the 1987
onstit#tion grants and a#thori&es the 'M.L. to pro"#lgate its own
r#les of proced#re. $he 1994 'M.L. %#les of 0roced#re ha*e
pro*ided a #nifor" fi*e @7A day period for ta:ing an appeal consistent with
the e5peditio#s resol#tion of election9related cases. It wo#ld )e a)s#rd
and therefore not clearly intended, to "aintain the 1?9day period for
)arangay election contests. 1ence, !ection 4, %#le 22 of the 'M.L.
%#les of 0roced#re is not in conflict with any e5isting law. $o adopt a
contrary *iew wo#ld defeat the la#da)le o)-ecti*e of pro*iding a #nifor"
period of appeal and defy the 'M.L.Is constit#tional "andate to enact
r#les of proced#re to e5pedite disposition of election cases.
$he 'M.L., therefore, did not co""it an a)#se of
discretion in dis"issing the appeal.
SARMIENTO VS. COMELEC
212 SCRA 519926
FACTS"
0etitioner i"p#gn the resol#tion of the o"elec as ha*ing
)een iss#ed with gra*e a)#se of discretion in the, inter alias, the
o""ission sitting en )ane, too: cogni&ance and decided the appeals
witho#t first referring the" to any of its di*ision.
ISSUE"
8hether or not the o"elec en )anc has the -#risdiction o*er the said
resol#tion.
HELD"
!ec. 4 Art I;9 of the 1987 onstit#tion e5pressly pro*ides2
I$he o"elec "ay sit en )anc or in two di*isions, and shall pro"#lgate its
r#le of proced#re in order to e5pedite disposition of election cases,
incl#ding pre procla"ation contro*ersies. All s#ch election cases shall )e
heard and decided in di*ision, pro*ided that the "otions for
reconsideration of decisions shall )e decided )y the o""ission en
)ane.I
It is clear that election cases incl#de pre procla"ation
contro*ersies and all. s#ch cases "#st first )e heard and decided )y a
Di*ision of the o""ission. $he o""ission sitting en )ane does not
ha*e the a#thority to hear and decide the sa"e at the first instance. In the
o"elec %#les of 0roced#res, pre procla"ations are classified as special
cases and in co"pliance with the pro*ision of the constit#tion, the two
di*isions of the o""issions are *ested with the a#thority to hear and
decide these special cases. %#le 127 thereof go*erns special cases,
especially !ee 9 of the said %#le pro*ides that appeals fro" r#ling of the
assigned and not )y the o""ission en )ane.
Indisp#ta)ly then, the o"elec en )anc acted witho#t
-#risdiction or with gra*e a)#se of discretion, when it resol*ed the appeals
of petitioners ion the special cases witho#t first referring the" to any of its
di*isions.
Accordingly, the instant petitions are dis"issed witho#t
pre-#dice to the filing )y petitioners of reg#lar election protests.
RE-ES VS. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ORIENTAL MINDORO
(G.R. NO. 10888%, MA- 5, 1995)
MENDO$A, !."
FACTS"
0etitioner A6#iles %eyes and pri*ate respondent Adolfo
o"ia were candidates for the position of "e")er of the !angg#niang
Bayan of 3a#-an, 'riental Mindoro in the May 11, 1992 synchroni&ed
elections. 'n May 14, 1992, d#ring the proceedings of the M#nicipal
Board of an*assers, pri*ate respondent "o*ed for the e5cl#sion of
certain election ret#rns, on the gro#nd of serio#s irreg#larity in co#nting in
fa*or of petitioner A6#iles %eyes *otes cast for /%eyes/ only, considering
that there was another candidate @.pitacio %eyesA )earing the sa"e
s#rna"e. 1owe*er, witho#t resol*ing his petition, the M#nicipal Board of
an*assers proclai"ed on the sa"e day petitioner as the eighth winning
candidate with 7,2?7 *otes. 'n May 27, 1992 petitioner too: his oath of
office. 0ri*ate respondent later filed an election protest )efore the trial
co#rt. 1e alleged that /a *ital "ista:e Ohad )eenP co""itted )y the Board
of an*assers in the "athe"atical co"p#tation of the total n#")er of
*otes garnered )y petitioner Onow pri*ate respondentP. 0etitioner filed a
"otion to dis"iss pri*ate respondentIs petition on the gro#nd that it was
filed )eyond the regle"entary period of ten days fro" procla"ation, which
petition was denied )y the trial co#rt.
'n H#ne 24, 1992, the trial co#rt rendered its decision
ann#ling the procla"ation of petitioner and declaring pri*ate respondent
as the eighth winning candidate for the position of co#ncilor of the
!angg#niang Bayan of 3a#-an, 'riental Mindoro. A copy of the decision
was ser*ed on petitioner on H#ne 2+, 1992.
0etitioner filed a notice of appeal to the 'M.L.. In
addition, he filed a petition for "anda"#s and prohi)ition in the o#rt of
Appeals, to co"pel the !angg#niang Bayan to recogni&e hi" as the d#ly
proclai"ed "e")er of that )ody and prohi)it it fro" f#rther recogni&ing
pri*ate respondent. $he o#rt of Appeals dis"issed the petition )eca#se
of petitionerIs pending appeal in the 'M.L.. $he appellate co#rt cited
!#pre"e o#rt irc#lar 28991 which prohi)its the filing of "#ltiple
petitions in*ol*ing the sa"e iss#es. 0etitioner filed a "otion for
reconsideration )#t his "otion was denied. $he appellate co#rtIs decision
)eca"e final and e5ec#tory on Dece")er 1?, 1992.
Meanwhile, the !angg#niang Bayan "et in ina#g#ral
session on H#ly 4, 1992, d#ring which pri*ate respondent was recogni&ed
as the eighth "e")er of the )ody and thereafter allowed to ass#"e office
and discharge its f#nctions.
'n the other hand, the 'M.L.Is (irst Di*ision dis"issed
on Han#ary 22, 1994 petitionerIs appeal on the gro#nd that he had failed to
pay the appeal fee within the prescri)ed period.
0etitioner then )ro#ght the present action. 0etitioner
contends that )oth the trial co#rt and the 'M.L.Is (irst Di*ision
co""itted a gra*e a)#se of discretion, the first, )y ass#"ing -#risdiction
o*er the election contest filed )y pri*ate respondent despite the fact that
the case was filed "ore than ten days after petitionerIs procla"ation, and
the second i.e., the 'M.L.Is (irst Di*ision, )y dis"issing petitionerIs
appeal fro" the decision of the trial co#rt for late pay"ent of the appeal
fee.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the petitioner *iolated Article I; A of the
onstit#tion.
HELD"
Des, petitioner *iolated Article I; A of the onstit#tion which
pro*ides that only decisions of the 'M.L. en )anc "ay )e )ro#ght to
the !#pre"e o#rt on certiorari. In the present case, he filed the present
petition witho#t first filing a "otion for reconsideration )efore the
'M.L. en )anc.
It is now settled that in pro*iding that the decisions, orders
and r#lings of 'M.L. /"ay )e )ro#ght to the !#pre"e o#rt on
certiorari/ the onstit#tion in its Art. I;, A, \7 "eans the special ci*il action
of certiorari #nder %#le +7, \1. !ince a )asic condition for )ringing s#ch
action is that the petitioner first file a "otion for reconsideration, it follows
162
that petitionerIs fail#re to file a "otion for reconsideration of the decision of
the (irst Di*ision of the 'M.L. is fatal to his present action.
0etitioner arg#es that this re6#ire"ent "ay )e dispensed
with )eca#se the only 6#estion raised in his petition is a 6#estion of law.
$his is not correct. $he 6#estions raised )y petitioner in*ol*e the
interpretation of constit#tional and stat#tory pro*isions in light of the facts
of this case. $he 6#estions tendered are, therefore, not p#re 6#estions of
law.
Moreo*er, that a "otion for reconsideration )efore the
'M.L. en )anc is re6#ired for the filing of a petition for certiorari is
clear fro" Article 9 pars. 2 Y 4 of the onstit#tion2
onfor"a)ly to these pro*isions of the onstit#tion all
election cases, incl#ding pre9procla"ation contro*ersies, "#st )e decided
)y the 'M.L. in di*ision. !ho#ld a party )e dissatisfied with the
decision, he "ay file a "otion for reconsideration )efore the 'M.L.
en )anc. It is, therefore, the decision, order or r#ling of the 'M.L. en
)anc that, in accordance with Art. I;, A, \7, /"ay )e )ro#ght to the
!#pre"e o#rt on certiorari./
NATIONAL PRESS CLU& VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. NO. 102925 MARCH 5, 1992)
FELICIANO, !."
FACTS"
$his is a consolidation of three cases filed )efore the
!#pre"e o#rt which in*ol*es the sa"e iss#e. 0etitioners in these cases
consist of representati*es of the "ass "edia which are pre*ented fro"
selling or donating space and ti"e for political ad*ertise"entsG two @2A
indi*id#als who are candidates for office @one for national and the other for
pro*incial officeA in the May 1992 electionsG and ta5payers and *oters who
clai" that their right to )e infor"ed of election iss#es and of credentials of
the candidates is )eing c#rtailed. It is principally arg#ed )y petitioners that
!ection 11 @)A of %ep#)lic Act 3o. ++B+ in*ades and *iolates the
constit#tional g#arantees co"prising freedo" of e5pression. 0etitioners
"aintain that the prohi)ition i"posed )y !ection 11 @)A a"o#nts to
censorship, )eca#se it selects and singles o#t for s#ppression and
repression with cri"inal sanctions, only p#)lications of a partic#lar
content, na"ely, "edia9)ased election or political propaganda d#ring the
election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohi)ition is in derogation
of "ediaIs role, f#nction and d#ty to pro*ide ade6#ate channels of p#)lic
infor"ation and p#)lic opinion rele*ant to election iss#es. (#rther,
petitioners contend that !ection 11 @)A a)ridges the freedo" of speech of
candidates, and that the s#ppression of "edia9)ased ca"paign or political
propaganda e5cept those appearing in the o"elec space of the
newspapers and on o"elec ti"e of radio and tele*ision )roadcasts,
wo#ld )ring a)o#t a s#)stantial red#ction in the 6#antity or *ol#"e of
infor"ation concerning candidates and iss#es in the election there)y
c#rtailing and li"iting the right of *oters to infor"ation and opinion.
ISSUE" 8hether or not !ection 11@)A of %ep#)lic Act 3o. ++B+ r#ns
contradictory to Articles III OBP and I; @A @BA of the onstit#tion.
HELD"
$he o)-ecti*e which ani"ates !ection 11 @)A is the
e6#ali&ing, as far as practica)le, the sit#ations of rich and poor candidates
)y pre*enting the for"er fro" en-oying the #nd#e ad*antage offered )y
h#ge ca"paign /war chests./ !ection 11 @)A prohi)its the sale or donation
of print space and air ti"e /for ca"paign or other political p#rposes/
e5cept to the o""ission on .lections @/o"elec/A. Jpon the other hand,
!ections 9? and 92 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode re6#ire the o"elec to
proc#re /o"elec space/ in newspapers of general circ#lation in e*ery
pro*ince or city and /o"elec ti"e/ on radio and tele*ision stations.
(#rther, the o"elec is stat#torily co""anded to allocate /o"elec
space/ and /o"elec ti"e/ on a free of charge, e6#al and i"partial )asis
a"ong all candidates within the area ser*ed )y the newspaper or radio
and tele*ision station in*ol*ed.
It see"s a "odest proposition that the pro*ision of the Bill of
%ights which enshrines freedo" of speech, freedo" of e5pression and
freedo" of the press @Article III OBP, onstit#tionA has to )e ta:en in
con-#nction with Article I; @A @BA which "ay )e seen to )e a special
pro*ision applica)le d#ring a specific li"ited period E i.e., /d#ring the
election period./
It is i"portant to note that the restricti*e i"pact #pon
freedo" of speech and freedo" of the press of !ection 11 @)A is
circ#"scri)ed )y certain i"portant li"itations2 O1P !ection 11 @)A is li"ited
in the d#ration of its applica)ility and enforcea)ility. By *irt#e of the
operation of Article I; @A @BA of the onstit#tion, !ection 11 @)A is li"ited
in its applica)ility in ti"e to election periods. By its %esol#tion 3o. 2428
dated 2 Han#ary 1992, the o"elec, acting #nder another specific grant of
a#thority )y the onstit#tion @Article I; OP O9PA, has defined the period
fro" 12 Han#ary 1992 #ntil 1? H#ne 1992 as the rele*ant election periodG
O2P !ection 11 @)A is li"ited in its scope of application. Analysis of !ection
11 @)A shows that it p#rports to apply only to the p#rchase and sale,
incl#ding p#rchase and sale disg#ised as a donation,
B
of print space and
air ti"e for /ca"paign or other political p#rposes./ !ection 11 @)A does not
p#rport in any way to restrict the reporting )y newspapers or radio or
tele*ision stations of news or news9worthy e*ents relating to candidates,
their 6#alifications, political parties and progra"s of go*ern"entG O4P
!ection 11 @)A e5e"pts fro" its prohi)ition the p#rchase )y or donation to
the o"elec of print space or air ti"e, which space and ti"e o"elec is
then affir"ati*ely re6#ired to allocate on a fair and e6#al )asis, free of
charge, a"ong the indi*id#al candidates for electi*e p#)lic offices in the
pro*ince or city ser*ed )y the newspaper or radio or tele*ision station.
!o"e of the petitioners are apparently apprehensi*e that o"elec "ight
not allocate /o"elec ti"e/ or /o"elec space/ on a fair and e6#al )asis
a"ong the se*eral candidates. !ho#ld s#ch apprehensions "ateriali&e,
candidates who are in fact pre-#diced )y #ne6#al or #nfair allocations
effected )y o"elec will ha*e appropriate -#dicial re"edies a*aila)le, so
long at least as this o#rt sits. Jntil s#ch ti"e, howe*er, the o"elec is
entitled to the )enefit of the pres#"ption that official d#ty will )e or is
)eing reg#larly carried o#t. It see"s appropriate here to recall what
H#stice La#rel ta#ght in Angara *. .lectoral o""ission
7
that the
possi)ility of a)#se is no arg#"ent against the concession of the power or
a#thority in*ol*ed, for there is no power or a#thority in h#"an society that
is not s#scepti)le of )eing a)#sed. !ho#ld it )e o)-ected that the o"elec
"ight refrain fro" proc#ring /o"elec ti"e/ and /o"elec space,/ "#ch
the sa"e considerations sho#ld )e )orne in "ind. As earlier noted, the
o"elec is co""anded )y stat#te to )#y or /proc#re/ /o"elec ti"e/ and
/o"elec space/ in "ass "edia, and it "#st )e pres#"ed that o"elec
will carry o#t that stat#tory d#ty in this connection, and if it does fail to do
so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrie*ed ha*e
-#dicial re"edies at their disposal.
$he technical effect of Article I; @A @BA of the onstit#tion
"ay )e seen to )e that no pres#"ption of in*alidity arises in respect of
e5ercises of s#per*isory or reg#latory a#thority on the part of the o"elec
for the p#rpose of sec#ring e6#al opport#nity a"ong candidates for
political office, altho#gh s#ch s#per*ision or reg#lation "ay res#lt in so"e
li"itation of the rights of free speech and free press. (or s#per*ision or
reg#lation of the operations of "edia enterprises is scarcely concei*a)le
witho#t s#ch acco"panying li"itation. $h#s, the applica)le r#le is the
general, ti"e9honored one E that a stat#te is pres#"ed to )e
constit#tional and that the party asserting its #nconstit#tionality "#st
discharge the )#rden of clearly and con*incingly pro*ing that assertion.
0etition denied for lac: of "erit.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND &ROADCAST ATTORNE-S
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.. VS. COMELEC
(G.R. NO. 132922. APRIL 21, 1998)
MENDO$A, !."
FACTS"
0etitioner $eleco""#nications and Broadcast Attorneys of
the 0hilippines, Inc. @$.L.BA0A is an organi&ation of lawyers of radio and
tele*ision )roadcasting co"panies. $hey are s#ing as citi&ens, ta5payers,
and registered *oters. $he other petitioner, ,MA 3etwor:, Inc., operates
radio and tele*ision )roadcasting stations thro#gho#t the 0hilippines
#nder a franchise granted )y ongress. $he !#pre"e o#rt e5plained
that $.L.BA0 has no legal standing to file the case. A citi&en will )e
allowed to raise a constit#tional 6#estion only when he can show that he
has personally s#ffered so"e act#al or threatened in-#ry as a res#lt of the
allegedly illegal cond#ct of the go*ern"entG the in-#ry is fairly tracea)le to
the challenged actionG and the in-#ry is li:ely to )e redressed )y a
fa*ora)le action. Me")ers of petitioner ha*e not shown that they ha*e
s#ffered har" as a res#lt of the operation of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881. $he
1igh o#rt, howe*er, recogni&ed the legal standing of 0etitioner ,MA to
)ring the constit#tional challenge. ,MA clai"s that it s#ffered losses
r#nning to se*eral "illion pesos in pro*iding 'M.L. $i"e in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and the 1997 senatorial
election and that it stands to s#ffer e*en "ore sho#ld it )e re6#ired to do
so. 0etitionerKs allegation that it will s#ffer losses again )eca#se it is
re6#ired to pro*ide free air ti"e is s#fficient to gi*e it standing to 6#estion
the *alidity of \92 of B0 881 @'"ni)#s .lection odeA.
As pointed o#t in 's"eNa *. 'M.L., \11@)A of %.A. 3o.
++B+ and \9? and \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 are part and parcel of a reg#latory
sche"e designed to e6#ali&e the opport#nity of candidates in an election
in regard to the #se of "ass "edia for political ca"paigns. $hese
stat#tory pro*isions state in rele*ant parts2
B.0. Blg. 881, @'"ni)#s .lection odeA
!.. 9?. o"elec space. 9 $he o""ission shall proc#re
space in at least one newspaper of general circ#lation in e*ery
pro*ince or city2 0ro*ided, howe*er, $hat in the a)sence of said
newspaper, p#)lication shall )e done in any other "aga&ine or
periodical in said pro*ince or city, which shall )e :nown as
=o"elec !pace> wherein candidates can anno#nce their
candidacy. !aid space shall )e allocated, free of charge,
e6#ally and i"partially )y the o""ission a"ong all candidates
within the area in which the newspaper is circ#lated. @!ec. B7,
1978 .A.
!.. 92. o"elec ti"e. 9 $he o""ission shall proc#re radio
and tele*ision ti"e to )e :nown as =o"elec $i"e> which shall
)e allocated e6#ally and i"partially a"ong the candidates
within the area of co*erage of all radio and tele*ision stations.
(or this p#rpose, the franchise of all radio )roadcasting and
tele*ision stations are here)y a"ended so as to pro*ide radio or
tele*ision ti"e, free of charge, d#ring the period of the
ca"paign. @!ec. B+, 1978 .A
163
$h#s, the law prohi)its "ass "edia fro" selling or donating
print space and air ti"e to the candidates and re6#ires the 'M.L.
instead to proc#re print space and air ti"e for allocation to the
candidates. It will )e noted that while \9? of B.0. Blg. 881 re6#ires the
'M.L. to proc#re print space which, as we ha*e held, sho#ld )e paid
for, \92 states that air ti"e shall )e proc#red )y the 'M.L. free of
charge.
0etitioners contend that \92 of B0 Blg. 881 *iolates the d#e
process cla#se and the e"inent do"ain pro*ision of the onstit#tion )y
ta:ing air ti"e fro" radio and tele*ision )roadcasting stations witho#t
pay"ent of -#st co"pensation. 0etitioners clai" that the pri"ary so#rce
of re*en#e of the radio and tele*ision stations is the sale of air ti"e to
ad*ertisers and that to re6#ire these stations to pro*ide free air ti"e is to
a#thori&e a ta:ing which is not =a de "ini"is te"porary li"itation or
restraint #pon the #se of pri*ate property.> According to petitioners, in
1992, the ,MA 3etwor:, Inc. lost 022,B98,7+?.?? in pro*iding free air ti"e
of one @1A ho#r e*ery "orning fro" Mondays to (ridays and one @1A ho#r
on $#esdays and $h#rsdays fro" 72?? to 82?? p.". @pri"e ti"eA and,
f#rther, it stands to lose in the 1998 .lections, 078,98?,87?.?? in *iew of
'M.L.Ks re6#ire"ent that radio and tele*ision stations pro*ide at least
4? "in#tes of pri"e ti"e daily for the 'M.L. $i"e.
ISSUE" 8hether or not !ection 92 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode is *alid.
HELD"
Des, !ection 92 of B0 881 is *alid.
All )roadcasting, whether )y radio or )y tele*ision stations,
is licensed )y the go*ern"ent. Airwa*e fre6#encies ha*e to )e allocated
as there are "ore indi*id#als who want to )roadcast than there are
fre6#encies to assign. A franchise is th#s a pri*ilege s#)-ect, a"ong other
things, to a"end"ent )y ongress in accordance with the constit#tional
pro*ision that =any s#ch franchise or right granted . . . shall )e s#)-ect to
a"end"ent, alteration or repeal )y the ongress when the co""on good
so re6#ires.> Indeed, pro*isions for 'M.L. $i"e ha*e )een "ade )y
a"end"ent of the franchises of radio and tele*ision )roadcast stations
and, #ntil the present case was )ro#ght, s#ch pro*isions had not )een
tho#ght of as ta:ing property witho#t -#st co"pensation. Art. ;II, \11 of
the onstit#tion a#thori&es the a"end"ent of franchises for =the co""on
good.>
In tr#th, radio and tele*ision )roadcasting co"panies, which
are gi*en franchises, do not own the airwa*es and fre6#encies thro#gh
which they trans"it )roadcast signals and i"ages. $hey are "erely gi*en
the te"porary pri*ilege of #sing the". !ince a franchise is a "ere
pri*ilege, the e5ercise of the pri*ilege "ay reasona)ly )e )#rdened with
the perfor"ance )y the grantee of so"e for" of p#)lic ser*ice. $h#s, in
De <illata *. !tanley, a reg#lation re6#iring interisland *essels licensed to
engage in the interisland trade to carry "ail and, for this p#rpose, to gi*e
ad*ance notice to postal a#thorities of date and ho#r of sailings of *essels
and of changes of sailing ho#rs to ena)le the" to tender "ail for
transportation at the last practica)le ho#r prior to the *esselKs depart#re,
was held to )e a reasona)le condition for the state grant of license.
Altho#gh the 6#estion of co"pensation for the carriage of "ail was not in
iss#e, the o#rt strongly i"plied that s#ch ser*ice co#ld )e witho#t
co"pensation, as in fact #nder !panish so*ereignty the "ail was carried
free.

In the granting of the pri*ilege to operate )roadcast stations
and thereafter s#per*ising radio and tele*ision stations, the state spends
considera)le p#)lic f#nds in licensing and s#per*ising s#ch stations. It
wo#ld )e strange if it cannot e*en re6#ire the licensees to render p#)lic
ser*ice )y gi*ing free air ti"e.
0etitioners clai" that \92 is an in*alid a"end"ent of %.A.
3o. 7272 which granted ,MA 3etwor:, Inc. a franchise for the operation
of radio and tele*ision )roadcasting stations. $hey arg#e that altho#gh \7
of %.A. 3o. 7272 gi*es the go*ern"ent the power to te"porarily #se and
operate the stations of petitioner ,MA 3etwor: or to a#thori&e s#ch #se
and operation, the e5ercise of this right "#st )e co"pensated. $he )asic
flaw in petitionerKs arg#"ent is that it ass#"es that the pro*ision for
'M.L. $i"e constit#tes the #se and operation of the stations of the
,MA 3etwor:, Inc. $his is not so. Jnder \92 of B.0. Blg. 881, the
'M.L. does not ta:e o*er the operation of radio and tele*ision
stations )#t only the allocation of air ti"e to the candidates for the p#rpose
of ens#ring, a"ong other things, e6#al opport#nity, ti"e, and the right to
reply as "andated )y the onstit#tion. Indeed, it is wrong to clai" an
a"end"ent of petitionerKs franchise for the reason that B.0. Blg. 881,
which is said to ha*e a"ended %.A. 3o. 7272, act#ally antedated it. $he
pro*ision of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 "#st )e dee"ed instead to )e
incorporated in %.A. 3o. 7272. And, indeed, \B of the latter stat#te does.
(or the fact is that the d#ty i"posed on the ,MA 3etwor:, Inc. )y its
franchise to render =ade6#ate p#)lic ser*ice ti"e> i"ple"ents \92 of B.0.
Blg. 881. Jndo#)tedly, its p#rpose is to ena)le the go*ern"ent to
co""#nicate with the people on "atters of p#)lic interest.
0etitioners co"plain that B.0. Blg. 881, \92 singles o#t radio
and tele*ision stations to pro*ide free air ti"e. $hey contend that
newspapers and "aga&ines are not si"ilarly re6#ired as, in fact, in
0hilippine 0ress Instit#te *. 'M.L. we #pheld their right to the
pay"ent of -#st co"pensation for the print space they "ay pro*ide #nder
\9?. In the allocation of li"ited reso#rces, rele*ant conditions "ay *alidly
)e i"posed on the grantees or licensees. $he reason for this is that, as
already noted, the go*ern"ent spends p#)lic f#nds for the allocation and
reg#lation of the )roadcast ind#stry, which it does not do in the case of the
print "edia. $o re6#ire the radio and tele*ision )roadcast ind#stry to
pro*ide free air ti"e for the 'M.L. $i"e is a fair e5change for what
the ind#stry gets. (ro" another point of *iew, this o#rt has also held that
)eca#se of the #ni6#e and per*asi*e infl#ence of the )roadcast "edia,
=OnPecessarily . . . the freedo" of tele*ision and radio )roadcasting is
so"ewhat lesser in scope than the freedo" accorded to newspaper and
print "edia.>
$o affir" the *alidity of \92 of B.0. Blg. 881 is to hold p#)lic
)roadcasters to their o)ligation to see to it that the *ariety and *igor of
p#)lic de)ate on iss#es in an election is "aintained. (or while )roadcast
"edia are not "ere co""on carriers )#t entities with free speech rights,
they are also p#)lic tr#stees charged with the d#ty of ens#ring that the
people ha*e access to the di*ersity of *iews on political iss#es. $his right
of the people is para"o#nt to the a#tono"y of )roadcast "edia. $o affir"
the *alidity of \92, therefore, is li:ewise to #phold the peopleKs right to
infor"ation on "atters of p#)lic concern. $he #se of property )ears a
social f#nction and is s#)-ect to the stateKs d#ty to inter*ene for the
co""on good. Broadcast "edia can find their -#st and highest reward in
the fact that whate*er altr#istic ser*ice they "ay render in connection with
the holding of elections is for that co""on good.
&LO UMPAR ADIONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. NO. 10395% MARCH 31, 1992)
GUTIERRE$, !R., !."
FACTS"
'n Han#ary 14, 1992, the 'M.L. pro"#lgated
%esol#tion 3o. 24B7 p#rs#ant to its powers granted )y the onstit#tion,
the '"ni)#s .lection ode, %ep#)lic Acts 3os. ++B+ and 71++ and other
election laws. !ection 17 of the said %esol#tion pro*ides for lawf#l election
propaganda while !ection 21@fA thereof pro*ides for what is #nlawf#l. It
states2
@fA $o draw, paint, inscri)e, post, display or p#)licly e5hi)it
any election propaganda in any place, whether p#)lic or pri*ate, "o)ile or
stationary, e5cept in the 'M.L. co""on posted areas andRor
)ill)oards, at the ca"paign head6#arters of the candidate or political
party, organi&ation or coalition, or at the candidateIs own residential ho#se
or one of his residential ho#ses, if he has "ore than one2 0ro*ided, that
s#ch posters or election propaganda shall not e5ceed two @2A feet )y three
@4A feet in si&e. @."phasis s#ppliedA
$he stat#tory pro*isions so#ght to )e enforced )y
'M.L. are !ection 82 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode on lawf#l
election propaganda and !ection 11@aA of %ep#)lic Act 3o. ++B+ on
prohi)ited for"s of election propaganda.
0etitioner Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the 1992
elections assails the 'M.L.Is %esol#tion insofar as it prohi)its the
posting of decals and stic:ers in /"o)ile/ places li:e cars and other
"o*ing *ehicles. According to hi" s#ch prohi)ition is *iolati*e of !ection
82 of the '"ni)#s .lection ode and !ection 11@aA of %ep#)lic Act 3o.
++B+. In addition, the petitioner )elie*es that with the )an on radio,
tele*ision and print political ad*ertise"ents, he, )eing a neophyte in the
field of politics stands to s#ffer gra*e and irrepara)le in-#ry with this
prohi)ition. $he posting of decals and stic:ers on cars and other "o*ing
*ehicles wo#ld )e his last "edi#" to infor" the electorate that he is a
senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. (inally, the petitioner
states that as of (e)r#ary 22, 1992 @the date of the petitionA he has not
recei*ed any notice fro" any of the .lection %egistrars in the entire
co#ntry as to the location of the s#pposed /o"elec 0oster Areas./
ISSUE" 8hether or not the o""ission on .lections @'M.L.A "ay
prohi)it the posting of decals and stic:ers on /"o)ile/ places, p#)lic or
pri*ate, and li"it their location or p#)lication to the a#thori&ed posting
areas that it fi5es.
HELD"
3o. $he 'M.L.Is prohi)ition on posting of decals and
stic:ers on /"o)ile/ places whether p#)lic or pri*ate e5cept in designated
areas pro*ided for )y the 'M.L. itself is n#ll and *oid on
constit#tional gro#nds.
$he constit#tional o)-ecti*e to gi*e a rich candidate and a
poor candidate e6#al opport#nity to infor" the electorate as regards their
candidacies, "andated )y Article II, !ection 2+ and Article ;III, section 1
in relation to Article I; @cA !ection B of the onstit#tion, is not i"paired )y
posting decals and stic:ers on cars and other pri*ate *ehicles. o"pared
to the para"o#nt interest of the !tate in g#aranteeing freedo" of
e5pression, any financial considerations )ehind the reg#lation are of
"arginal significance. It is to )e reiterated that the posting of decals and
stic:ers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedica)s and other "o*ing *ehicles
needs the consent of the owner of the *ehicle. 1ence, the preference of
the citi&en )eco"es cr#cial in this :ind of election propaganda not the
financial reso#rces of the candidate. 8hether the candidate is rich and,
therefore, can afford to doleo#t "ore decals and stic:ers or poor and
witho#t the "eans to spread o#t the sa"e n#")er of decals and stic:ers
is not as i"portant as the right of the owner to freely e5press his choice
and e5ercise his right of free speech. $he owner can e*en prepare his
own decals or stic:ers for posting on his personal property. $o stri:e down
this right and en-oin it is i"per"issi)le encroach"ent of his li)erties.
In s#", the prohi)ition on posting of decals and stic:ers on
/"o)ile/ places whether p#)lic or pri*ate e5cept in the a#thori&ed areas
designated )y the 'M.L. )eco"es censorship which cannot )e
-#stified )y the onstit#tion2
. . . $he concept of the onstit#tion as the f#nda"ental law,
setting forth the criterion for the *alidity of any p#)lic act whether
164
proceeding fro" the highest official or the lowest f#nctionary, is a
post#late of o#r syste" of go*ern"ent. $hat is to "anifest fealty to the
r#le of law, with priority accorded to that which occ#pies the top"ost r#ng
in the legal hierarchy. $he three depart"ents of go*ern"ent in the
discharge of the f#nctions with which it is entr#sted ha*e no choice )#t to
yield o)edience to its co""ands. 8hate*er li"its it i"poses "#st )e
o)ser*ed. ongress in the enact"ent of stat#tes "#st e*er )e on g#ard
lest the restrictions on its a#thority, either s#)stanti*e or for"al, )e
transcended. $he 0residency in the e5ec#tion of the laws cannot ignore or
disregard what it ordains. In its tas: of applying the law to the facts as
fo#nd in deciding cases, the -#diciary is called #pon to "aintain in*iolate
what is decreed )y the f#nda"ental law. .*en its power of -#dicial re*iew
to pass #pon the *alidity of the acts of the coordinate )ranches in the
co#rse of ad-#dication is a logical. corollary of this )asic principle that the
onstit#tion is para"o#nt. It o*errides any go*ern"ental "eas#re that
fails to li*e #p to its "andates. $here)y there is a recognition of its )eing
the s#pre"e law. @M#t#c *. o""ission on .lections, s#praA
0etition is granted. $he portion of !ection 17 @aA of
%esol#tion 3o. 24B7 of the o""ission on .lections pro*iding that
/decals and stic:ers "ay )e posted only in any of the a#thori&ed posting
areas pro*ided in paragraph @fA of !ection 21 hereof/ is D.LA%.D 3JLL
and <'ID.
SANIDAD VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. NO. 90878 !ANUAR- 29, 1990)
MEDIALDEA, !."
FACTS"
%A +7++, entitled /A3 A$ 0%'<IDI3, ('% A3 '%,A3I
A$ ('% $1. '%DILL.%A AJ$'3'M'J! %.,I'3/ was enacted
into law, p#rs#ant to which pro*inces incl#ded therein shall ta:e part in a
ple)iscite for the ratification of said 'rganic Act. $he 'M.L.
pro"#lgated %esol#tion 3o. 21+7, to go*ern the cond#ct of the ple)iscite
on the said 'rganic Act for the ordillera A#tono"o#s %egion.
0etitioner 0a)lito <. !anidad, a newspaper col#"nist of the
/'<.%<I.8/ for the BA,JI' MIDLA3D 'J%I.%, assailed the
constit#tionality of !ection 19 of o"elec %esol#tion 3o. 21+7, which
pro*ides2
!ection 19. 0rohi)ition on col#"nists, co""entators or
anno#ncers. E D#ring the ple)iscite ca"paign period, on the day )efore
and on the ple)iscite day, no "ass "edia col#"nist, co""entator,
anno#ncer or personality shall #se his col#"n or radio or tele*ision ti"e to
ca"paign for or against the ple)iscite iss#es.
0etitioner "aintains that if "edia practitioners were to
e5press their *iews, )eliefs and opinions on the iss#e s#)"itted to a
ple)iscite, it wo#ld in fact help in the go*ern"ent dri*e and desire to
disse"inate infor"ation, and hear, as well as *entilate, all sides of the
iss#e.
'M.L. co#nters that the %eso#ltion is not *iolati*e of
the constit#tion and it is a *alid i"ple"entation of its power to s#per*ise
and reg#late "edia d#ring election or ple)iscite periods as en#nciated in
the onstit#tion. It stated that it does not a)sol#tely )ar petitioner fro"
e5pressing his *iews andRor fro" ca"paigning for or against the 'rganic
Act. 1e "ay still e5press his *iews or ca"paign for or against the act
thro#gh the o"elec space and airti"e.
ISSUE" $he constit#tionality of !ection 19 of o"elec %esol#tion 3o.
21+7 on the gro#nd that it *iolates the constit#tional g#arantees of the
freedo" of e5pression and of the press d#ring the cond#ct of a ple)iscite.
HELD"
!ection 19 of o"elec %esol#tion 3o. 21+7 is declared n#ll
and *oid and #nconstit#tional.
It is clear in the onstit#tion that what was granted to the
o"elec was the power to s#per*ise and reg#late the #se and en-oy"ent
of franchises, per"its or other grants iss#ed for the operation of
transportation or other p#)lic #tilities, "edia of co""#nication or
infor"ation to the end that e6#al opport#nity, ti"e and space, and the
right to reply, incl#ding reasona)le, e6#al rates therefore, for p#)lic
infor"ation ca"paigns and for#"s a"ong candidates are ens#red.
1owe*er, neither Article I;9 of the onstit#tion nor !ection
11 @)A, 2nd par. of %.A. ++B+ can )e constr#ed to "ean that the o"elec
has also )een granted the right to s#per*ise and reg#late the e5ercise )y
"edia practitioners the"sel*es of their right to e5pression d#ring
ple)iscite periods. Media practitioners e5ercising their freedo" of
e5pression d#ring ple)iscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor
the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in*ol*ed in a ple)iscite.
$herefore, !ection 19 of o"elec %esol#tion 3o. 21+7 has no stat#tory
)asis.
8hile the li"itation does not a)sol#tely )ar petitionerIs
freedo" of e5pression, it is still a restriction on his choice of the for#"
where he "ay e5press his *iew.
0le)iscite iss#es are "atters of p#)lic concern and i"portance. $he
peopleIs right to )e infor"ed and to )e a)le to freely and intelligently "a:e
a decision wo#ld )e )etter ser*ed )y access to an #na)ridged disc#ssion
of the iss#es, incl#ding the for#". $he people affected )y the iss#es
presented in a ple)iscite sho#ld not )e #nd#ly )#rdened )y restrictions on
the for#" where the right to e5pression "ay )e e5ercised. o"elec
spaces and o"elec radio ti"e "ay pro*ide a for#" for e5pression )#t
they do not g#arantee f#ll disse"ination of infor"ation to the p#)lic
concerned )eca#se they are li"ited to either specific portions in
newspapers or to specific radio or tele*ision ti"es.
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
GUEVARA VS. GIMENE$
(G.R. NO. L17115, NOVEM&ER 30, 19%2)
CONCEPCION, !."
FACTS"
Mig#el #aderno, the then ,o*ernor of the entral Ban: of
the 0hilippines, acting for and in )ehalf thereof, as:ed petitioner to
cooperate with the legal co#nsel of the entral Ban: in defending the
sa"e and its Monetary Board in a ci*il case. Accordingly petitioner
entered his appearance as co#nsel for the respondents in said case and
arg#ed therein, *er)ally and in writing.
$he ,o*ernor presented to the Board and the latter
appro*ed )y #nani"o#s *ote, the designation of H#dge ,#iller"o ,#e*ara
as co#nsel to colla)orate with the Legal o#nsel of the entral Ban:. $he
Board also a#thori&ed the ,o*ernor to arrange with H#dge ,#e*era the
a"o#nt of fee which the latter will charge the entral Ban: for handling
the said cases. 0rior thereto the latter had sent to the entral Ban: his )ill
for the retainerIs fee of 01?, ???. $he Ban: A#ditor so#ght ad*ice thereon
fro" the A#ditor ,eneral, who stated that he wo#ld not o)-ect to the
retainerIs fees, pro*ided that its pay"ent was "ade in install"ents.
8ith the #nderstanding that, /in case there is no appeal fro"
the (I decision, the )alance will )e paid in f#ll/, once, pres#"a)ly, the
decision has )eco"e final. As regards the 04?? per die", the A#ditor
,eneral e5press howe*er, the )elief that it is /e5cessi*e and "ay )e
allowed in a#dit/. 1ence, the present action for "anda"#s to co"pel
respondent to appro*e pay"ent of petitionerIs retainer fee and his per
die" aggregating 04,4??, for the 11 hearings attended )y hi".
I!!J.2 8hether or not the A#ditor ,eneral has the a#thority to
disappro*e the e5pendit#res he dee"ed #nwise or that the a"o#nt
stip#lated thereon is #nreasona)leC
HELD"
$he A#ditor ,eneral has no "andate to disappro*e
e5pendit#res which in his opinion e5cessi*e and e5tra*agant.
Jnder o#r onstit#tion, the a#thority of the A#ditor ,eneral,
in connection with e5pendit#res of the ,o*ern"ent is li"ited to the
a#diting of e5pendit#res of f#nds or property pertaining to, or held in tr#st
)y the ,o*ern"ent or the pro*inces or "#nicipalities thereof @Article ;I,
section 2, of the onstit#tionA. !#ch f#nction is li"ited to a deter"ination
of whether there is a law appropriating f#nds for a gi*en p#rposeG whether
a contract, "ade )y the proper officer, has )een entered into in confor"ity
with said appropriation lawG whether the goods or ser*ices co*ered )y said
contract ha*e )een deli*ered or rendered in p#rs#ance of the pro*isions
thereof, as attested to )y the proper officerG and whether pay"ent
therefore has )een a#thori&ed )y the officials of the corresponding
depart"ent or )#rea#. If these re6#ire"ents ha*e )een f#lfilled, it is the
"inisterial d#ty of the A#ditor ,eneral to appro*e and pass in a#dit the
*o#cher and treas#ry warrant for said pay"ent. 1e has no discretion or
a#thority to disappro*e said pay"ent #pon the gro#nd that the
afore"entioned contract was #nwise or that the a"o#nt stip#lated thereon
is #nreasona)le. If he entertains s#ch )elief, he "ay do so "ore than
discharge the d#ty i"posed #pon hi" )y the onstit#tion @Article ;I,
section 2A, /to )ring to the attention of the proper ad"inistrati*e officer
e5pendit#res of f#nds or 0roperty which, in his opinion, are irreg#lar,
#nnecessary, e5cessi*e or e5tra*agant/. $his d#ty i"plies a negation of
the power to ref#se and disappro*e pay"ent of s#ch e5pendit#res, for its
disappro*al, if he had a#thority therefore, wo#ld )ring to the attention of
the afore"entioned ad"inistrati*e officer the reasons for the ad*erse
action th#s ta:en )y the ,eneral A#diting office, and, hence, render the
i"position of said d#ty #nnecessary.
OROCIO VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(G.R. NO. 75959 AUGUST 31, 1992)
FACTS"
An accident occ#rred at the Malaya $her"al 0lant of the
3ational 0ower orporation @30A, when the pl#g fro" the lea:ing t#)e
ga*e way, there)y releasing stea" and hot water which hit two of the
e"ployees wor:ing on the t#)e lea:.
$he 30 initially ad*anced this a"o#nt )y setting it #p as an
acco#nt recei*a)le fro" '0L,! @e"ployeesK agencyA and ded#cted on a
staggered )asis fro" the latterIs )illings against 30 #ntil the sa"e was
f#lly satisfied. '0L,! re6#ested for a ref#nd of the total a"o#nt ded#cted
fro" their )illings representing pay"ent of the ad*ances "ade )y the
30. 0etitioner, as officer9in9charge, reco""ended fa*ora)le action on
'0L,!I re6#est.
$h#s, the a"o#nt for the hospitali&ation e5penses was
ref#nded to the contractor '0L,!. In ertificate of !ettle"ent and
Balances @!BA 3o. ?19?B984 prepared )y respondent Hose M. Ag#stin,
Jnit A#ditor of the 'A assigned to the 309M%%, the ref#nd of the
hospitali&ation e5penses was disallowed for /O#Pnder the 309'.0.
Landrito contract, there is no e"ployer9e"ployee relationship )etween the
165
orporation and the latterIs e"ployees./ 1ence, the 30 is not
answera)le for s#ch e5penses.
A De)it Me"orand#" was iss#ed in petitionerIs na"e
de)iting his acco#nt with the 30 for the a"o#nt of the hospitali&ation
e5penses. 0etitioner clai"s that he prepared the 6#estioned legal opinion
in the perfor"ance of his official f#nctions as "andated )y law. At the ti"e
he rendered it, he was the officer9in9charge of the 30Is 'ffice of the
,eneral o#nsel. !ection 179A of its charter pro*ides that all legal "atters
shall )e handled )y the ,eneral o#nsel of the orporation. As s#ch, he
pro*ides legal ad*ice andRor renders legal opinions on legal "atters
in*ol*ing the 30. !ince this f#nction is 6#asi9-#dicial in nat#re, the
discretion e5ercised in the discharge thereof is not s#)-ect to re9
e5a"ination or contro*ersion )y the respondentsG when the latter did what
was proscri)ed, they in effect #s#rped the stat#tory f#nction of the
,eneral o#nsel of the 30. $here is no law which e5pressly a#thori&es
the respondents to re9e5a"ine or contro*ert the ,eneral o#nselIs
opinion. 0etitioner additionally stresses that he is not personally lia)le for
the a"o#nt disallowed as he was "erely perfor"ing his official f#nctions.
Besides, his 6#estioned opinion is not alleged to ha*e )een rendered with
"alice and )ad faith.
ISSUES"
@1A Does the legal opinion of petitioner, which was relied #pon for the
dis)#rse"ent in 6#estion, precl#de or )ar the 'A fro" disallowing in
post9a#dit s#ch dis)#rse"entC
@2A 1as the ,eneral o#nsel of the 'A the a#thority to decide a "otion
to reconsider the disallowance in 6#estionC
@4A Is the petitioner personally lia)le for the disallowance on the theory that
the dis)#rse"ent was "ade on the )asis thereofC
HELD"
1. Both the 1974 and 1987 onstit#tions conferred #pon the 'A a "ore
acti*e role and in*ested it with )roader and "ore e5tensi*e powers. $hese
were not "eant to "a:e it a toothless tiger, )#t a dyna"ic, effecti*e,
efficient and independent watchdog of the ,o*ern"ent.
In deter"ining whether an e5pendit#re of a ,o*ern"ent agency or
instr#"entality s#ch as the 30 is irreg#lar, #nnecessary, e5cessi*e,
e5tra*agant or #nconsciona)le, the 'A sho#ld not )e )o#nd )y the
opinion of the legal co#nsel of said agency or instr#"entality which "ay
ha*e )een the )asis for the 6#estioned dis)#rse"entG otherwise, it wo#ld
indeed )eco"e a toothless tiger and its a#diting f#nction wo#ld )e a
"eaningless and f#tile e5ercise. Its )eacon lights then sho#ld )e nothing
"ore than the pertinent laws and its r#les and reg#lations.
2. 3o. $he ,eneral o#nsel of the 'A does not ha*e the a#thority to
decide a "otion to reconsider the disallowance in 6#estion $he 'A, )oth
#nder the 1974 and 1987 onstit#tion, is a collegial )ody. It "#st resol*e
cases presented to it as s#ch. Its ,eneral o#nsel cannot act for the
o""ission for he is not e*en a o""issioner thereof. 1e can only offer
legal ad*ice or render an opinion in order to aid the 'A in the resol#tion
of a case or a legal 6#estion.
4. .*en if we ass#"e that the disallowance was proper, there wo#ld still
)e no )asis for directly holding petitioner lia)le.
If he rendered the opinion in the -#st perfor"ance of his official d#ties and
within the scope of his assigned tas:s, he wo#ld not )e personally lia)le
for any in-#ry that "ay res#lt therefro".
o"pro"ise Agree"ent )etween the ity of e)# and
!po#ses de la erna which in*ol*es "onetary consideration was #pheld
constit#tional.
OSMESA VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(G.R. NO. 110045 NOVEM&ER 29, 1994)
FACTS"
%eynaldo de la erna, the son of the de la erna !po#ses
was sta))ed )y an #n:nown assailant. 1e was r#shed to the e)# ity
Medical enter )#t later died d#e to se*ere loss of )lood. 1is parents
clai"ed that %eynaldo wo#ld not ha*e died were it not for the /ineptit#de,
gross negligence, irresponsi)ility, st#pidity and inco"petence of the
"edical staff/ of the hospital.
$he !po#ses th#s filed s#it for da"ages against the city of
e)#, the !angg#niang 0anl#ngsod, and fi*e physicians of the e)# ity
Medical enter.

$he parties entered into a co"pro"ise agree"ent, which
incl#ded a pro*ision for the pay"ent of the s#" of 04?, ???.?? to the
plaintiffs )y defendant ity of e)#. $he agree"ent was s#)"itted to the
!angg#niang 0anl#ngsod of the ity, which ratified the sa"e. $he
sangg#nian a#thori&ed /the ity B#dget 'fficer, e)# ity, to incl#de in
!#pple"ental B#dget 3o. I< of the ity . . . for the year 1989 the a"o#nt
of $1I%$D $1'J!A3D @04?, ???.??A 0.!'! for financial assistance to
the parents of the late %eynaldo de la erna, all of e)# ity.
%espondent 'A disallowed the /financial assistance/ th#s
granted to the !po#ses, a*erring that it is not within the powers of the
!angg#niang 0anl#ngsod of e)# to pro*ide, either #nder the general
welfare cla#se or e*en on h#"anitarian gro#nds, "onetary assistance
that wo#ld pro"ote the econo"ic condition and pri*ate interests of certain
indi*id#als only.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the o"pro"ise Agree"ent )etween the ity of
e)# and !po#ses de la erna which in*ol*es "onetary consideration
constit#tionalC
HELD"
Des. $he o"pro"ise Agree"ent entered )etween the ity
of e)# and !ps. De la erna was constit#tional.
$he participation )y the ity in negotiations for an a"ica)le
settle"ent of a pending litigation and its e*ent#al e5ec#tion of a
co"pro"ise relati*e thereto, are ind#)ita)ly within its a#thority and
capacity as a p#)lic corporationG and a co"pro"ise of a ci*il s#it in which
it is in*ol*ed as a party, is a perfectly legiti"ate transaction, not only
recogni&ed )#t e*en enco#raged )y law.
$hat the ity of e)# co"plied with the rele*ant for"alities
conte"plated )y law can hardly )e do#)ted. $he co"pro"ise agree"ent
was s#)"itted to its legislati*e co#ncil, the !angg#niang 0anl#ngsod,
which appro*ed it confor"a)ly with its esta)lished r#les and proced#re,
partic#larly the stip#lation for the pay"ent of 04?, ???.?? to the de la
erna fa"ily. 3either "ay it )e disp#ted that since, as a "#nicipal
corporation, e)# ity has the power to s#e and )e s#ed, it has the
a#thority to settle or co"pro"ise s#its, as well as the o)ligation to pay -#st
and *alid clai"s against it.
SAM&ELI V. PROVINCE OF ISA&ELA
G.R. NO. 92279 !UNE 18, 1992
FACTS"
An agree"ent was entered into )y and )etween the 0ro*ince of
Isa)ela and .! .nterprises for the p#rchase of 4?? #nits of
wheel)arrows, 847 pieces of sho*els and 1 set of radio co""#nication
e6#ip"ent. '#t of the ite"s deli*ered, a partial deli*ery was "ade. $he
0ro*incial A#ditor allowed the pay"ent of only 7?M =pending receipt of
reply to the 6#ery to 0rice .*al#ation Di*ision of 'A.>
A second deli*ery was "ade and pay"ent of 7?M was allowed )y
the 0ro*incial A#ditor. Based on the findings of the 0rice .*al#ation
Di*ision of 'A, there has )een an o*erpricing. $he 0residentR,M of .!
.nterprises "ade no co""ent on the o*erpricing )#t instead proposed a
1?M ded#ction on the #npaid )alance. $he 0ro*incial A#ditor forwarded
the "atter to the 'A %egional Director who for"ally endorsed the stand
of the 0ro*incial A#ditor.
.! .nterprises appealed to 'A, which denied the appeal.
1ence the present petition.

ISSUE" Did the 'A co""it gra*e a)#se of discretion in affir"ing the
decision of the 0ro*incial A#ditor and the %egional DirectorC

HELD"
3o. In the e5ercise of its reg#latory power *ested #pon it )y the
onstit#tion, 'A adheres to the policy that go*ern"ent f#nds and
property sho#ld )e f#ll protected and conser*ed and that irreg#lar,
#nnecessary, e5cessi*e or e5tra*agant e5pendit#res or #ses of f#nds
owned )y, or pertaining to, the ,o*ern"ent or any of its s#)di*isions,
agencies and instr#"entalities @Article I; @D91A !ection 2@1A, 1987
onstit#tionA . $hat a#thority e5tends to the acco#nts of all persons
respecting f#nds or properties recei*ed or held )y the" in any
acco#nta)le capacity. @!ection 2+, 0.D. 3o. 1BB7A. In the e5ercise of its
-#risdiction, it deter"ines whether or not the fiscal responsi)ility that rests
directly with the head and whether or not there has )een loss or wastage
of go*ern"ent reso#rces.
8herefore, for lac: of "erit, the petition is dis"issed.

&USTAMANTE VS. COMMISSIONER ON AUDIT
(G.R. NO. 103309, NOVEM&ER 27, 1992)
CAMPOS, !R. !."
FACTS"
0etitioner is the %egional Legal o#nsel of the 3ational
0ower orporation @30A for the 3orthern L#&on %egional enter
co*ering the pro*inces of %i&al #p to Batanes. As s#ch he was iss#ed a
go*ern"ent *ehicle. 0#rs#ant to 30 policy as reflected in the Board
%esol#tion 3o. 81997 a#thori&ing the "onthly dis)#rse"ent of
transportation allowance, the petitioner, in addition to the #se of
go*ern"ent *ehicle, clai"ed his transportation allowance for the "onth of
Han#ary 1989. 0petitioner recei*ed an A#ditorIs 3otice to 0erson Lia)le
fro" respondent %egional A#ditor Martha %o5ana a)#rian disallowing
01,27?.?? representing aforesaid transportation allowance.
0etitioner "o*ed for reconsideration, which the %egional
A#ditor denied. 0etitioner appealed to 'A, which denied the appeal.
1ence, this petition.

ISSUE" Did the 'A gra*e a)#se of discretion in its denial to gi*e d#e
co#rse to the petitionerKs appealC Did the 'A, in the e5ercise of its
constit#tional powers, #s#rp the stat#tory f#nctions of the 30 Board of
DirectorsC

HELD"
3o. It is )eyond disp#te that the discretion e5ercised in the denial
of the appeal is within the power of the o""ission on A#dit as it is
pro*ided in the onstit#tion2
166
!ec. 2. $he o""ission on A#dit shall ha*e the following powers and
f#nctions2
@1A .5a"ine, a#dit, and settle, in accordance with law and reg#lations, and
receipts of, and e5pendit#res or #ses of f#nds and property, owned or held
in tr#st )y, or pertaining to, the ,o*ern"ent, or any of its s#)di*isions,
agencies, or instr#"entalities, incl#ding go*ern"ent9owned or controlled
corporationsG :eep the general acco#nts of the ,o*ern"ent and, for s#ch
period *o#chers pertaining theretoG and pro"#lgate acco#nting and
a#diting r#les and reg#lations incl#ding those for the pre*ention of
irreg#lar, #nnecessary, e5cessi*e, or e5tra*agant e5pendit#res or #ses of
f#nds and property. . . . @Article ;II9D, 1974 onstit#tionA

8e li:ewise cannot s#stain petitionerIs contention that the
o""ission, in the e5ercise of its power granted )y the onstit#tion,
#s#rped the stat#tory f#nctions of the 30 Board of Directors for its leads
to the a)s#rd concl#sion that a "ere Board of Directors of a go*ern"ent9
owned and controlled corporation, )y iss#ing a resol#tion, can p#t to
na#ght a constit#tional pro*ision which has )een ratified )y the "a-ority of
the (ilipino people. If 8e will not s#stain the o""issionIs power and
d#ty to e5a"ine, a#dit and settle acco#nts pertaining to this partic#lar
e5pendit#res or #se of f#nds and property, owned or held in tr#st )y this
go*ern"ent9owned and controlled corporation, the 30, 8e will )e
rendering in#tile this onstit#tional Body which has )een tas:ed to )e
*igilant and conscientio#s in safeg#arding the proper #se of the
go*ern"entIs, and #lti"ately, the peopleIs property.
81.%.'(, the instant petition is here)y DI!MI!!.D for
lac: of "erit.
SALIGUM&A
VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(G.R. NO. L%1%7%, OCTO&ER 18, 1982)
A&AD SANTOS, !."
FACTS"
'n the )asis of the sworn co"plaint of .ditha !alig#")a,
the 'A instit#ted the ad"inistrati*e case against Leonardo .stella,
A#diting .5a"iner III, in the A#ditorIs 'ffice of Misa"is 'ccidental. $he
charge was that the respondent raped .ditha !alig#")a on se*eral
occasions.
'n April 12, 1982, the 'A rendered a decision with the
following -#dg"ent2
8herefore, for ins#fficiency of e*idence, the instant charge
is here)y dropped. %espondent is, howe*er, warned to co"port hi"self
henceforth in s#ch a "anner as wo#ld forestall the filing of si"ilar
co"plaints in the f#t#re.
.ditha !alig#")a now wants $he o#rt to re*iew the 'A
decision. !he insists that the decision of the 'A is contrary to the
e*idence.
ISSUE" an the !#pre"e o#rt re*iew 'A decisions on ad"inistrati*e
"attersC
HELD"
3o. $he petition has to )e dis"issed for the following
reasons2
1. '#r power to re*iew 'A decisions refers to "oney "atters and not to
ad"inistrati*e cases in*ol*ing the discipline of its personnel.
2. .*en ass#"ing that 8e ha*e -#risdiction to re*iew decisions on
ad"inistrati*e "atters as "entioned a)o*e, 8e can not do so on fact#al
iss#esG '#r power to re*iew is li"ited to legal iss#es.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINESVS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(G.R. NO. 91890 !UNE 9, 1995)
ROMERO, !."
FACTS"
At the ti"e of the filing of the petition, "a-ority of 0ALKs
shares of stoc: was owned )y the ,!I!. $o ass#re itself of contin#o#s,
relia)le and cost9efficient s#pply of f#el, 0AL adopted a syste" of )idding
o#t its f#el re6#ire"ents #nder a "#ltiple s#pplier set9#p where)y 0AL
awarded to the lowest )idder +?M of its f#el re6#ire"ents and to the
second lowest )idder the re"aining B?M, pro*ided it "atched the price of
the lowest )idder.
'A wrote 0AL a letter stating2
It has co"e to o#r attention that 0AL international f#el
s#pply contracts are e5piring this A#g#st 41, 1989. In this connection, yo#
are ad*ised to desist fro" )idding the co"panyIs f#el s#pply contracts,
considering that e5isting reg#lations re6#ire go*ern"ent9owned or
controlled corporations and other agencies of go*ern"ent to proc#re their
petrole#" prod#ct re6#ire"ents fro" 0.$%'3 orporation.
0AL so#ght reconsideration )#t was denied )y 'A. A final
appeal for reconsideration was also denied in the now assailed 'A
Decision 3o. 1127.
ISSUE" Did respondent co""it gra*e a)#se of discretion a"o#nting to
lac: or e5cess of -#risdiction in ordering 0AL to desist fro" )idding the
co"panyKs f#el s#pply contractsC
HELD"
3o. $he 'A is clothed #nder !ection 2@2A, Article I;9D of
the 1987 onstit#tion with the /e5cl#si*e a#thority, s#)-ect to the
li"itations in this Article, to define the scope of its a#dit and e5a"ination,
esta)lish the techni6#es and "ethods re6#ired therefor, and pro"#lgate
acco#nting and a#diting r#les, and reg#lations incl#ding those for the
pre*ention and disallowance of irreg#lar, #nnecessary, e5cessi*e,
e5tra*agant or #nconsciona)le e5pendit#res, or #ses of go*ern"ent f#nds
and properties./ $he a#thority granted #nder this constit#tional pro*ision,
)eing )road and co"prehensi*e eno#gh, ena)les 'A to adopt as its
own, si"ply )y reiteration or )y reference, witho#t the necessity of
repro"#lgation, already e5isting r#les and reg#lations. It "ay also e5pand
the co*erage thereof to agencies or instr#"entalities #nder its a#dit
-#risdiction. It is in this light that we *iew 'A Me"orand#" 3o. 8897+7
iss#ed on A#g#st 1, 1988.
81.%.('%., the petition is here)y DI!MI!!.D for )eing
"oot and acade"ic.
&AGATSING VS. COMMITTEE ON PRIVATI$ATION
(G.R. NO. 112399 !UL- 14, 1995)
JUIASON, !."
FACTS"
0etron is a go*ern"ent ac6#ired co"pany ai"ed to pro*ide
for a )#ffer against the *agaries of oil prices in the international "ar:et )y
ser*ing as a co#nterfoil against price "anip#lation that "ay go #nchec: if
all oil co"panies were foreign9owned. It owns the largest, "ost "odern
co"ple5 refinery in the 0hilippines and is also the co#ntryIs )iggest
co")ined retail and wholesale "ar:et of refined petrole#" prod#cts.
(ollowing 0resident ora&on A6#inoKs desire to raise re*en#e for the
go*ern"ent and the ideal of lea*ing )#siness to pri*ate sector, the
pri*ati&ation of 0etron was initiated. $his pri*ati&ation was s#)se6#ently
appro*ed )y 0resident (idel <. %a"os as reco""ended )y 03' and
the o""ittee on 0ri*ati&ation. B? M was to )e sold to a strategic
partner, B?M was to )e retained )y the go*ern"ent and the re"aining
2?M was to )e offered to the p#)lic. $he floor )id price was finally set at
#sQBB? "illion
$he )idding for the B?M )loc: share was participated )y
0.$%'3A!, A%AM' and 8.!$M'3$. 8.!$M'3$Ks proposal was
re-ected for not ha*ing "et the pre96#alification criteria of financial
capa)ility and lac: of technical and "anage"ent e5pertise. $he )id of
A%AM' was for J!Q7?2 "illion while the )id of 0.$%'3A! was for
J!QB21 "illion. A%AM' was declared the winning )idder.
0etitioner arg#es that there was a failed )idding as pro*ided
for in 'A circ#lar 3o. 89929+. It pro*ides that there is a fail#re of p#)lic
a#ction when2 1A there is only one offerorG or @2A when all the offers are
non9co"plying or #naccepta)le.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the p#)lic )idding was tainted with haste and
ar)itrariness )eca#se there was a failed )idding for ha*ing only one
offerorC
HELD"
3o. 8hile two offerors were dis6#alified, 0.$%'3A! for
s#)"itting a )id )elow the floor price and 8.!$M'3$ for technical
reasons, not all the offerors were dis6#alified. $o constit#te a failed
)idding #nder the 'A irc#lar, all the offerors "#st )e dis6#alified.
0etitioners #rge that in effect there was only one )idder and
that it can not )e said that there was a co"petition on /an e6#al footing.
B#t the 'A irc#lar does not spea: of accepted )ids )#t of offerors,
witho#t distinction as to whether they were dis6#alified.
$he 'A itself, the agency that adopted the r#les on )idding
proced#re to )e followed )y go*ern"ent offices and corporations, had
#pheld the *alidity and legality of the 6#estioned )idding. $he
interpretation of an agency of its own r#les sho#ld )e gi*en "ore weight
than the interpretation )y that agency of the law it is "erely tas:ed to
ad"inister.
ARTICLE 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT
&OR!A VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(G.R. NO. 133495 SEPTEM&ER 3, 1998)
MENDO$A, !.
FACTS"
0ri*ate respondent Hose $. apco, Hr. was elected *ice9
"ayor of 0ateros on Han#ary 18, 1988 for a ter" ending H#ne 4?, 1992. In
1989, he )eca"e "ayor, )y operation of law, #pon the death of the
inc#")ent. In 1992, he ran and was elected "ayor for a 49year ter". 'n
May 8, 1997, he was reelected "ayor for another ter".
apco filed a certificate of candidacy for "ayor of 0ateros
relati*e to the May 11, 1998 elections. 0etitioner Ben-a"in J. Bor-a Hr.,
also a "ayoralty candidate, so#ght apcoIs dis6#alification, arg#ing that
the latter wo#ld ha*e already ser*ed as "ayor for three consec#ti*e ter"s
)y H#ne 4?, 1998 and wo#ld therefore )e ineligi)le to ser*e for another
ter" after that.
$he 'M.L. r#led petitionerKs fa*or and declared
apcoKs dis6#alification. 1owe*er, on "otion of pri*ate respondent, the
167
'M.L. re*ersed the decision and declared apco eligi)le to r#n for
"ayor.
ISSUE" 8hether or not a *ice9"ayor who s#cceeds to the office of "ayor
)y operation of law and ser*es the re"ainder of the ter" is considered to
ha*e ser*ed a ter" in that office for the p#rpose of the three9ter" li"itC
HELD"
3o. Article ;, \8 of the onstit#tion pro*ides, that the ter" of
office of electi*e local officials, e5cept )arangay officials, which shall )e
deter"ined )y law, shall )e three years and no s#ch official shall ser*e for
"ore than three consec#ti*e ter"s. <ol#ntary ren#nciation of the office for
any length of ti"e shall not )e considered as an interr#ption in the
contin#ity of his ser*ice for the f#ll ter" for which he was elected.
$he ter" li"it for electi*e local officials "#st )e ta:en to
refer to the right to )e elected as well as the right to ser*e in the sa"e
electi*e position. onse6#ently, it is not eno#gh that an indi*id#al has
ser*ed three consec#ti*e ter"s in an electi*e local office, he "#st also
ha*e )een elected to the sa"e position for the sa"e n#")er of ti"es
)efore the dis6#alification can apply. $his point can )e "ade clearer )y
considering the following cases or sit#ations2
ase 3o. 1. !#ppose A is a *ice9"ayor who )eco"es "ayor
)y reason of the death of the inc#")ent. !i5 "onths )efore the ne5t
election, he resigns and is twice elected thereafter. an he r#n again for
"ayor in the ne5t electionC
Des, )eca#se altho#gh he has already first ser*ed as "ayor
)y s#ccession and s#)se6#ently resigned fro" office )efore the f#ll ter"
e5pired, he has not act#ally ser*ed three f#ll ter"s in all for the p#rpose of
applying the ter" li"it. Jnder Art. ;, \8, *ol#ntary ren#nciation of the
office is not considered as an interr#ption in the contin#ity of his ser*ice
for the f#ll ter" only if the ter" is one /for which he was elected./ !ince A
is only co"pleting the ser*ice of the ter" for which the deceased and not
he was elected, A cannot )e considered to ha*e co"pleted one ter". 1is
resignation constit#tes an interr#ption of the f#ll ter".
ase 3o. 2. !#ppose B is elected "ayor and, d#ring his first
ter", he is twice s#spended for "iscond#ct for a total of 1 year. If he is
twice reelected after that, can he r#n for one "ore ter" in the ne5t
electionC
Des, )eca#se he has ser*ed only two f#ll ter"s
s#ccessi*ely.
In )oth cases, the "ayor is entitled to r#n for reelection
)eca#se the two conditions for the application of the dis6#alification
pro*isions ha*e not conc#rred, na"ely, that the local official concerned
has )een elected three consec#ti*e ti"es and that he has f#lly ser*ed
three consec#ti*e ter"s. In the first case, e*en if the local official is
considered to ha*e ser*ed three f#ll ter"s notwithstanding his resignation
)efore the end of the first ter", the fact re"ains that he has not )een
elected three ti"es. In the second case, the local official has )een elected
three consec#ti*e ti"es, )#t he has not f#lly ser*ed three consec#ti*e
ter"s.
ase 3o. 4. $he case of *ice9"ayor who )eco"es "ayor
)y s#ccession in*ol*es a total fail#re of the two conditions to conc#r for
the p#rpose of applying Art. ;, \8. !#ppose he is twice elected after that
ter", is he 6#alified to r#n again in the ne5t electionC
Des, )eca#se he was not elected to the office of "ayor in
the first ter" )#t si"ply fo#nd hi"self thr#st into it )y operation of law.
3either had he ser*ed the f#ll ter" )eca#se he only contin#ed the ser*ice,
interr#pted )y the death, of the deceased "ayor.
$o consider in the third case to ha*e ser*ed the first ter"
in f#ll and therefore ineligi)le to r#n a third ti"e for reelection wo#ld )e not
only to falsify reality )#t also to #nd#ly restrict the right of the people to
choose who" they wish to go*ern the". If the *ice9"ayor t#rns o#t to )e
a )ad "ayor, the people can re"edy the sit#ation )y si"ply not reelecting
hi" for another ter". B#t if, on the other hand, he pro*es to )e a good
"ayor, there will )e no way the people can ret#rn hi" to office @e*en if it is
-#st the third ti"e he is standing for reelectionA if his ser*ice of the first
ter" is co#nted as one for the p#rpose of applying the ter" li"it.
$o consider as eligi)le for reelection wo#ld )e in accord
with the #nderstanding of the onstit#tional o""ission that while the
people sho#ld )e protected fro" the e*ils that a "onopoly of political
power "ay )ring a)o#t, care sho#ld )e ta:en that their freedo" of choice
is not #nd#ly c#rtailed.
(#rther, resort to historical e5a"ination wo#ld show
adherence to the f#nda"ental tenet of representati*e de"ocracy wherein
the people sho#ld )e allowed to choose those who" they please to
go*ern the". $o )ar the election of a local official )eca#se he has already
ser*ed three ter"s, altho#gh the first as a res#lt of s#ccession )y
operation of law rather than election, wo#ld therefore )e to *iolate this
principle.
200% CASES
5G.R. NO. 1%7798. APRIL 19, 200%.6
7ILUSANG MA-O UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LA&OR
UNIONS7ILUSANG MA-O UNO (NAFLU7MU), !OSELITO V.
USTARE$, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRAN$A,
MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, !R. ',* ROJUE M. TAN, E)0909+,)2(, >(. THE
DIRECTORGENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORIT-, ',* THE SECRETAR-, DEPARTMENT OF &UDGET ',*
MANAGEMENT, 2)(E+,*),0(.
5G.R. NO. 1%7930. APRIL 19, 200%.6
&A-AN MUNA R)E2)(),0'09>)( SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A.
CASISO, ',* !OEL G. VIRADOR, GA&RIELA =OMENQS PART-
R)E2)(),0'09>) LI$A L. MA$A, ANA7PA=IS R)E2)(),0'09>)(
RAFAEL V. MARIANO ',* CRISPIN &. &ELTRAN, R)E. FRANCIS G.
ESCUDERO, R)E. EDUARDO C. $IALCITA, R)E. LOREN$O R.
TASADA III, DR. CAROL PAGADUANARAULLO ',* RENATO M.
RE-ES, !R. +< &A-AN, MARIE HILAOENRIJUE$ +< 7ARAPATAN,
ANTONIO L. TINIO +< ACT, FERDINAND GAITE +< COURAGE,
GIOVANNI A. TAPANG +< AGHAM, =ILFREDO MAR&ELLA +< 7MP,
LANA LINA&AN +< GA&RIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, !R., DEAN PACIFICO H. AGA&IN, SHARON R.
DUREMDES +< 0;) NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE
PHILIPPINES, ',* &RO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDE$ (FSC) +< 0;)
ASSOCIATION OF MA!OR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), E)0909+,)2(, >(. EDUARDO ERMITA, 9, ;9(
/'E'/90: '( EC)/109>) S)/2)0'2:, ROMULO NERI, 9, ;9( /'E'/90: '(
D92)/0+2G),)2'. +< 0;) NATIONAL ECONOMIC ',* DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORIT- (NEDA) ',* 0;) A*D9,9(02'0+2 +< 0;) NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), 2)(E+,*),0(.
FACTS"
$his case in*ol*es two consolidated petitions for certiorari,
prohi)ition, and "anda"#s #nder %#le +7 of the %#les of o#rt, see:ing
the n#llification of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. B2? @.' B2?A on the gro#nd that it
is #nconstit#tional. .' B2?, iss#ed )y 0resident ,loria Macapagal9
Arroyo on 14 April 2??7, reads2
%.VJI%I3, ALL ,'<.%3M.3$ A,.3I.! A3D
,'<.%3M.3$9'83.D A3D '3$%'LL.D '%0'%A$I'3! $'
!$%.AMLI3. A3D 1A%M'3IX. $1.I% ID.3$I(IA$I'3 @IDA
!D!$.M!, A3D AJ$1'%IXI3, ('% !J1 0J%0'!. $1.
DI%.$'%9,.3.%AL, 3A$I'3AL .'3'MI A3D D.<.L'0M.3$
AJ$1'%I$D $' IM0L.M.3$ $1. !AM., A3D ('% '$1.%
0J%0'!.!
Jnder .' B2?, the 0resident directs all go*ern"ent
agencies and go*ern"ent9owned and controlled corporations to adopt a
#nifor" data collection and for"at for their e5isting identification @IDA
syste"s. $he p#rposes of the #nifor" ID data collection and ID for"at
are to red#ce costs, achie*e efficiency and relia)ility, ins#re co"pati)ility,
and pro*ide con*enience to the people ser*ed )y go*ern"ent entities.
!ection 4 of .' B2? li"its the data to )e collected and recorded #nder the
#nifor" ID syste" to only 1B specific ite"s, na"ely2 @1A 3a"eG @2A 1o"e
AddressG @4A !e5G @BA 0ict#reG @7A !ignat#reG @+A Date of BirthG @7A 0lace of
BirthG @8A Marital !tat#sG @9A 3a"e of 0arentsG @1?A 1eightG @11A 8eightG
@12A $wo inde5 fingers and two th#")"ar:sG @14A Any pro"inent
disting#ishing feat#res li:e "oles or othersG and @1BA $a5 Identification
3#")er. !ection 7 of .' B2? prescri)es the safeg#ards on the collection,
recording, and disclos#re of personal identification data to protect the right
to pri*acy. $he following safeg#ards are instit#ted2
a. $he data to )e recorded and stored, which shall )e #sed
only for p#rposes of esta)lishing the identity of a person, shall )e li"ited
to those specified in !ection 4 of this e5ec#ti*e orderG a.AID1
). In no case shall the collection or co"pilation of other data in
*iolation of a personIs right to pri*acy )e allowed or tolerated #nder this
orderG
c. !tringent syste"s of access control to data in the
identification syste" shall )e instit#tedG
d. Data collected and stored for this p#rpose shall )e :ept and
treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written a#thori&ation of the
'wner shall )e re6#ired for access and disclos#re of dataG
e. $he identification card to )e iss#ed shall )e protected )y
ad*anced sec#rity feat#res and cryptographic technologyG
f. A written re6#est )y the 'wner of the identification card shall
)e re6#ired for any correction or re*ision of rele*ant data, or #nder s#ch
conditions as the participating agency iss#ing the identification card shall
prescri)e.
ISSUES"
@1A 8hether or not .' B2? is a #s#rpation of legislati*e power )y the
0resident.
@2A 8hether or not .' B2? infringes on the citi&enIs right to pri*acy.
HELD"
@1A 3o, .' B2? is not a #s#rpation of legislati*e power )y the 0resident.
!ection 2 of .' B2? pro*ides, /o*erage. E All go*ern"ent agencies and
go*ern"ent9owned and controlled corporations iss#ing ID cards to their
"e")ers or constit#ents shall )e co*ered )y this e5ec#ti*e order./ .'
B2? applies only to go*ern"ent entities that iss#e ID cards as part of their
f#nctions #nder e5isting laws. $hese go*ern"ent entities ha*e already
)een iss#ing ID cards e*en prior to .' B2?. .5a"ples of these
go*ern"ent entities are the ,!I!, !!!, 0hilhealth, MayorIs 'ffice, L$',
0% and si"ilar go*ern"ent entities. !ection 1 of .' B2? directs these
go*ern"ent entities to /adopt a #nified "#lti9p#rpose ID syste"./ $h#s, all
go*ern"ent entities that iss#e IDs as part of their f#nctions #nder e5isting
laws are re6#ired to adopt a #nifor" data collection and for"at for their
IDs.
!econd, the 0resident "ay )y e5ec#ti*e or ad"inistrati*e
order direct the go*ern"ent entities #nder the .5ec#ti*e depart"ent to
adopt a #nifor" ID data collection and for"at. !ection 17, Article <II of the
1987 onstit#tion pro*ides that the /0resident shall ha*e control of all
e5ec#ti*e depart"ents, )#rea#s and offices./ $he sa"e !ection also
"andates the 0resident to /ens#re that the laws )e faithf#lly e5ec#ted./
ertainly, #nder this constit#tional power of control the
0resident can direct all go*ern"ent entities, in the e5ercise of their
168
f#nctions #nder e5isting laws, to adopt a #nifor" ID data collection and ID
for"at to achie*e sa*ings, efficiency, relia)ility, co"pati)ility, and
con*enience to the p#)lic. $he 0residentIs constit#tional power of control
is self9e5ec#ting and does not need any i"ple"enting legislation.
'f co#rse, the 0residentIs power of control is li"ited to the
.5ec#ti*e )ranch of go*ern"ent and does not e5tend to the H#diciary or to
the independent constit#tional co""issions. $h#s, .' B2? does not apply
to the H#diciary, or to the 'M.L. which #nder e5isting laws is also
a#thori&ed to iss#e *oterIs ID cards. $his only shows that .' B2? does not
esta)lish a national ID syste" )eca#se legislation is needed to esta)lish a
single ID syste" that is co"p#lsory for all )ranches of go*ern"ent.
onstit#tion also "andates the 0resident to ens#re that the
laws are faithf#lly e5ec#ted. $here are se*eral laws "andating
go*ern"ent entities to red#ce costs, increase efficiency, and in general,
i"pro*e p#)lic ser*ices.
$he adoption of a #nifor" ID data collection and for"at
#nder .' B2? is designed to red#ce costs, increase efficiency, and in
general, i"pro*e p#)lic ser*ices. $h#s, in iss#ing .' B2?, the 0resident is
si"ply perfor"ing the constit#tional d#ty to ens#re that the laws are
faithf#lly e5ec#ted.
@2A 3o, .' B2? does not infringe on the citi&enKs right to pri*acy. !ection
4 of .' B2? li"its the data to )e collected and recorded #nder the #nifor"
ID syste" to only 1B specific ite"s, na"ely2 @1A 3a"eG @2A 1o"e AddressG
@4A !e5G @BA 0ict#reG @7A !ignat#reG @+A Date of BirthG @7A 0lace of BirthG @8A
Marital !tat#sG @9A 3a"e of 0arentsG @1?A 1eightG @11A 8eightG @12A $wo
inde5 fingers and two th#")"ar:sG @14A Any pro"inent disting#ishing
feat#res li:e "oles or othersG and @1BA $a5 Identification 3#")er.
$hese li"ited and specific data are the #s#al data re6#ired
for personal identification )y go*ern"ent entities, and e*en )y the pri*ate
sector. Any one who applies for or renews a dri*erIs license pro*ides to
the L$' all these 1B specific data.
$he data collected and stored for the #nified ID syste"
#nder .' B2? will )e li"ited to only 1B specific data, and the ID card itself
will show only eight specific data. $he data collection, recording and ID
card syste" #nder .' B2? will e*en re6#ire less data collected, stored
and re*ealed than #nder the disparate syste"s prior to .' B2?.
0rior to .' B2?, go*ern"ent entities had a free hand in
deter"ining the :ind, nat#re and e5tent of data to )e collected and stored
for their ID syste"s. Jnder .' B2?, go*ern"ent entities can collect and
record only the 1B specific data "entioned in !ection 4 of .' B2?. In
addition, go*ern"ent entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these
specific data, se*en less data than what the !#pre"e o#rtIs ID shows.
Also, prior to .' B2?, there was no e5ec#ti*e iss#ance to
go*ern"ent entities prescri)ing safeg#ards on the collection, recording,
and disclos#re of personal identification data to protect the right to pri*acy.
3ow, #nder !ection 7 of .' B2?, the following safeg#ards are instit#ted2
a. $he data to )e recorded and stored, which shall )e #sed
only for p#rposes of esta)lishing the identity of a person, shall )e li"ited
to those specified in !ection 4 of this e5ec#ti*e orderG
). In no case shall the collection or co"pilation of other data in
*iolation of a personIs right to pri*acy )e allowed or tolerated #nder this
orderG
c. !tringent syste"s of access control to data in the
identification syste" shall )e instit#tedG
d. Data collected and stored for this p#rpose shall )e :ept and
treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written a#thori&ation of the
'wner shall )e re6#ired for access and disclos#re of dataG
e. $he identification card to )e iss#ed shall )e protected )y
ad*anced sec#rity feat#res and cryptographic technologyG
f. A written re6#est )y the 'wner of the identification card shall
)e re6#ired for any correction or re*ision of rele*ant data, or #nder s#ch
conditions as the participating agency iss#ing the identification card shall
prescri)e.
In the present case, .' B2? does not esta)lish a national ID
syste" )#t "a:es the e5isting sectoral card syste"s of go*ern"ent
entities li:e ,!I!, !!!, 0hilhealth and L$' less costly, "ore efficient,
relia)le and #ser9friendly to the p#)lic. 1ence, .' B2? is a proper s#)-ect
of e5ec#ti*e iss#ance #nder the 0residentIs constit#tional power of control
o*er go*ern"ent entities in the .5ec#ti*e depart"ent, as well as #nder
the 0residentIs constit#tional d#ty to ens#re that laws are faithf#lly
e5ec#ted.
81.%.('%., the petitions are DI!MI!!.D. .5ec#ti*e
'rder 3o. B2? is declared <ALID.
5G.R. NO. 1423%2. MA- 3, 200%.6
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. ',* MICHAEL C. U. DE
GU$MAN, /+DE.'9,',0(, >(. !OSEFINA TRINIDADLICHAUCO
U,*)2()/2)0'2: <+2 C+DD1,9/'09+,(, D)E'20D),0 +< T2',(E+20'09+,
',* C+DD1,9/'09+, (DOTC), 2)(E+,*),0.
FACTS"
0etitioner 0hilippine Agila !atellite Inc. @0A!IA is a d#ly
organi&ed corporation, whose 0resident and hief .5ec#ti*e 'fficer is co9
petitioner Michael .J. De ,#&"an. 0A!I was esta)lished )y a
consorti#" of pri*ate teleco""#nications carriers which in 199B had
entered into a Me"orand#" of Jnderstanding @M'JA with the D'$,
thro#gh its then !ecretary Hes#s ,arcia, concerning the planned la#nch of
a 0hilippine9owned satellite into o#ter space. Jnder the M'J, the la#nch
of the satellite was to )e an endea*or of the pri*ate sector, and the
satellite itself to )e owned )y the (ilipino9owned consorti#" @s#)se6#ently
organi&ed as 0A!IA. $he consorti#" was to grant the 0hilippine
go*ern"ent one @1A transponder free of charge for the go*ern"entIs
e5cl#si*e #se for non9co""ercial p#rpose, as well as the right of first
ref#sal to another one @1A transponder in the 0hilippine satellite, if
a*aila)le. B $he 0hilippine go*ern"ent, thro#gh the D'$, was tas:ed
#nder the M'J to sec#re fro" the International$eleco""#nication Jnion
the re6#ired or)ital slot@sA and fre6#ency assign"ent@sA for the 0hilippine
satellite.
0A!I itself was organi&ed )y the consorti#" in 199+. $he
go*ern"ent, together with 0A!I, coordinated thro#gh the International
$eleco""#nication Jnion two @2A or)ital slots, designated as 1+1b .ast
Longit#de and 174b .ast Longit#de, for 0hilippine satellites. 'n 28 H#ne
199+, 0A!I wrote then D'$ !ecretary A"ado !. Lagda"eo, Hr.,
see:ing for official 0hilippine go*ern"ent confir"ation on the assign"ent
of the two afore"entioned 0hilippine or)ital slots to 0A!I for its satellites,
which 0A!I had designated as the Agila satellites. !ecretary Lagda"eo,
Hr. replied in a letter dated 4 H#ly 199+, confir"ing /the 0hilippine
,o*ern"entIs assign"ent of 0hilippine or)ital slots 1+1. and 174. to
O0A!IP for its OAgilaP satellites./
0A!I a*ers that after ha*ing sec#red the confir"ation fro"
the 0hilippine go*ern"ent, it proceeded with preparations for the
la#nching, operation and "anage"ent of its satellites, incl#ding the
a*ail"ent of loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with )#siness
partners, and an initial pay"ent of J!Q4.7 Million to the (rench satellite
"an#fact#rer. 1owe*er, respondent Licha#co, then D'$ Jndersecretary
for o""#nications, allegedly /e")ar:ed on a cr#sade to "align the
na"e of Michael de ,#&"an and sa)otage the )#siness of 0A!I./
Licha#coIs p#rported efforts against 0A!I c#l"inated allegedly in her
offering or)ital slot 174b .ast Longit#de for )idding to other parties
so"eti"e in Dece")er 1997, despite the prior assign"ent to 0A!I of the
said slot. It was later clai"ed )y 0A!I that Licha#co s#)se6#ently
awarded the or)ital slot to an entity whose indentity was #n:nown to 0A!I.
$h#s, a co"plaint was filed against Licha#co for da"ages. A
Motion to Dis"iss was then filed )y Licha#co. !he rooted her prayer for
the dis"issal of the co"plaint pri"arily on the gro#nds that the s#it is a
s#it against the !tate which "ay not )e s#ed witho#t its consentG that the
co"plaint stated no ca#se of actionG and that the petitioners had failed to
e5ha#st ad"inistrati*e re"edies )y failing to see: reco#rse with the 'ffice
of the 0resident.
In an order 14 dated 1B A#g#st 1998, the %$ denied the
"otion to dis"iss. Licha#co assailed the %$ order thro#gh a 0etition for
ertiorari #nder %#le +7 )efore the o#rt of Appeals, which s#)se6#ently
n#llified the %$ order.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the s#it against Licha#co, the #ndersecretary of
D'$, is a s#it against the !tate.
HELD"
As was clearly set forth )y H#stice Xaldi*ar in Director of the
B#rea# of $eleco""#nications, et al. *s. Aligaen, etc., et al. IInas"#ch as
the !tate a#thori&es only legal acts )y its officers, #na#thori&ed acts of
go*ern"ent officials or officers are not acts of the !tate, and an action
against the officials or officers )y one whose rights ha*e )een in*aded or
*iolated )y s#ch acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a s#it against
the !tate within the r#le of i""#nity of the !tate fro" s#it. In the sa"e
tenor, it has )een said that an action at law or s#it in e6#ity against a !tate
officer or the director of a !tate depart"ent on the gro#nd that, while
clai"ing to act for the !tate, he *iolates or in*ades the personal and
property rights or the plaintiff, #nder an #nconstit#tional act or #nder an
ass#"ption of a#thority which he does not ha*e, is not a s#it against the
!tate within the constit#tional pro*ision that the !tate "ay not )e s#ed
witho#t its consent.I $he rationale for this r#ling is that the doctrine of state
i""#nity cannot )e #sed as an instr#"ent for perpetrating an in-#stice.
$h#s, Licha#co, in alleging in her Motion to Dis"iss that she is shielded )y
the !tateIs i""#nity fro" s#it, to hypothetically ad"itted the tr#th of the
allegations in the co"plaint. !#ch hypothetical ad"ission has to )e
dee"ed a concession on her part that she had perfor"ed the tortio#s or
da"aging acts against the petitioners, which if tr#e, wo#ld hold her lia)le
for da"ages.
$he decision of the o#rt of Appeals is set aside and the %$ is ordered
to try the case on its "erits.
5G.R. NO. 17139%. MA- 3, 200%.6
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LOREN$O TASADA III, RONALD
LLAMAS, H. HARR- L. ROJUE, !R., !OEL RUI$ &UTU-AN, ROGER
R. RA-EL, GAR- S. MALLARI, ROMEL REGALADO &AGARES,
CHRISTOPHER F.C. &OLASTIG, E)0909+,)2(, >(. GLORIA
MACAPAGALARRO-O, AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDERIN
CHIEF, E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR- EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO
CRU$ II, SECRETAR- OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL
GENEROSO SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMI&AO, CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, 2)(E+,*),0(.
5G.R. NO. 171409. MA- 3, 200%.6
NISE$ CACHOOLIVARES AND TRI&UNE PU&LISHING CO., INC.,
E)0909+,)2(, >(. HONORA&LE SECRETAR- EDUARDO ERMITA AND
HONORA&LE DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMI&AO,
2)(E+,*),0(.
5G.R. NO. 171485. MA- 3, 200%.6
FRANCIS !OSEPH G. ESCUDERO, !OSEPH A. SANTIAGO,
TEODORO A. CASINO, AGAPITO A. AJUINO, MARIO !. AGU!A,
169
SATUR C. OCAMPO, MU!IV S. HATAMAN, !UAN EDGARDO
ANGARA, TEOFISTO DL. GUINGONA III, EMMANUEL !OSEL !.
VILLANUEVA, LI$A L. MA$A, IMEE R. MARCOS, RENATO &.
MAGTU&O, !USTIN MARC S&. CHIPECO, ROILO GOLE$, DARLENE
ANTONINOCUSTODIO, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, !OSEL G.
VIRADOR, RAFAEL V. MARIANO, GIL&ERT C. REMULLA,
FLORENCIO G. NOEL, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS&ARAJUEL,
IMELDA C. NICOLAS, MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN, NERI !AVIER
COLMENARES, MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITI$ENS FOR CIVIL
LI&ERTIES REPRESENTED &- AMADO GAT INCIONG, E)0909+,)2(,
>(. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR-, AVELINO !.
CRU$, !R., SECRETAR-, DND RONALDO V. PUNO, SECRETAR-,
DILG, GENEROSO SENGA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF, ARTURO
LOMI&AO, CHIEF PNP, 2)(E+,*),0(.
5G.R. NO. 171483. MA- 3, 200%.6
7ILUSANG MA-O UNO, REPRESENTED &- ITS CHAIRPERSON
ELMER C. LA&OG AND SECRETAR- GENERAL !OEL MAGLUNSOD,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LA&OR UNIONS7ILUSANG MA-O UNO
(NAFLU7MU), REPRESENTED &- ITS NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
!OSELITO V. USTARE$, ANTONIO C. PASCUAL, SALVADOR T.
CARRAN$A, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, MARTIN CUSTODIO, !R., AND
ROJUE M. TAN, E)0909+,)2(, >(. HER E3CELLENC-, PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGALARRO-O, THE HONORA&LE E3ECUTIVE
SECRETAR-, EDUARDO ERMITA, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENEROSO SENGA, AND THE PNP
DIRECTOR GENERAL, ARTURO LOMI&AO, 2)(E+,*),0(.
5G.R. NO. 171400. MA- 3, 200%.6
ALTERNATIVE LA= GROUPS, INC. (ALG), E)0909+,)2, >(. E3ECUTIVE
SECRETAR- EDUARDO R. ERMITA, LT. GEN. GENEROSO SENGA,
AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMI&AO, 2)(E+,*),0(.
5G.R. NO. 171489. MA- 3, 200%.6
!OSE ANSELMO I. CADI$, FELICIANO M. &AUTISTA, ROMULO R.
RIVERA, !OSE AMOR M. AMORADO, ALICIA A. RISOSVIDAL,
FELIMON C. A&ELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, !.&. !OV- C.
&ERNA&E, &ERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA AND
INTEGRATED &AR OF THE PHILIPPINES (I&P), E)0909+,)2(, >(. HON.
E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR- EDUARDO ERMITA, GENERAL
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS AFP CHIEF OF STAFF,
AND DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMI&AO, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS
PNP CHIEF, 2)(E+,*),0(.
5G.R. NO. 171424. MA- 3, 200%.6
LOREN &. LEGARDA, E)0909+,)2, >(. GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARRO-O, IN HER CAPACIT- AS PRESIDENT AND COMMANDERIN
CHIEF? ARTURO LOMI&AO, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP)?
GENEROSO SENGA, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP)? AND EDUARDO
ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACIT- AS E3ECUTIVE SECRETAR-,
2)(E+,*),0(.
FACTS"
'n (e)r#ary 2B, 2??+, as the nation cele)rated the 2?th
Anni*ersary of the .dsa 0eople 0ower I, 0resident Arroyo iss#ed 00 1?17
declaring a state of national e"ergency, th#s2
3'8, $1.%.('%., I, ,loria Macapagal9Arroyo, 0resident of the
%ep#)lic of the 0hilippines and o""ander9in9hief of the Ar"ed (orces
of the 0hilippines, )y *irt#e of the powers *ested #pon "e )y !ection 18,
Article 7 of the 0hilippine onstit#tion which states that2 /$he 0resident. . .
whene*er it )eco"es necessary, . . . "ay call o#t @theA ar"ed forces to
pre*ent or s#ppress . . . re)ellion. . . ,/ and in "y capacity as their
o""ander9in9hief, do here)y co""and the Ar"ed (orces of the
0hilippines, to "aintain law and order thro#gho#t the 0hilippines, pre*ent
or s#ppress all for"s of lawless *iolence as well as any act of ins#rrection
or re)ellion and to enforce o)edience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and reg#lations pro"#lgated )y "e personally or #pon "y
directionG and as pro*ided in !ection 17, Article 12 of the onstit#tion do
here)y declare a !tate of 3ational ."ergency.
$hereafter, the 0resident iss#ed ,.'. 3o. 7 i"ple"enting
001?17. It called #pon the hief of !taff of the A(0 and the hief of the
030, as well as the officers and "en of the A(0 and 030, to i""ediately
carry o#t the necessary and appropriate actions and "eas#res to
s#ppress and pre*ent acts of terroris" and lawless *iolence.
I""ediately after the iss#ance of 001?17 and ,.'. 3o. 7,
the 'ffice of the 0resident anno#nced the cancellation of all progra"s and
acti*ities related to the 2?th anni*ersary cele)ration of .dsa 0eople 0ower
IG and re*o:ed the per"its to hold rallies iss#ed earlier )y the local
go*ern"ents. H#stice !ecretary %a#l ,on&ales stated that political rallies,
which to the 0residentIs "ind were organi&ed for p#rposes of
desta)ili&ation, are cancelled. 0residential hief of !taff Michael Defensor
anno#nced that /warrantless arrests and ta:e9o*er of facilities, incl#ding
"edia, can already )e i"ple"ented>.
$hose who staged rallies and p#)lic asse")lies were
*iolently dispersed )y h#ge cl#sters of anti9riot police. $he well9trained
police"en #sed tr#ncheons, )ig fi)er glass shields, water cannons, and
tear gas to stop and )rea: #p the "arching gro#ps, and scatter the
"assed participants.
'n the )asis of 00 1?17 and ,.'. 3o. 7, operati*es of the
ID, and 030 raided the Daily $ri)#ne offices in Manila. $he raiding
tea" confiscated news stories )y reporters, doc#"ents, pict#res, and
"oc:9#ps of the !at#rday iss#e. 0olice"en fro" a"p ra"e in V#e&on
ity were stationed inside the editorial and )#siness offices of the
newspaperG while police"en fro" the Manila 0olice District were stationed
o#tside the )#ilding.
A few "in#tes after the search and sei&#re at the Daily
$ri)#ne offices, the police s#rro#nded the pre"ises of another pro9
opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister p#)lication, the ta)loid A)ante.
ISSUE" 8hether or not 001?17 and ,.'. 7 are constit#tional.
HELD"
$he o#rt finds and so holds that 00 1?17 is constit#tional
insofar as it constit#tes a call )y the 0resident for the A(0 to pre*ent or
s#ppress lawless *iolence. $he procla"ation is s#stained )y !ection 18,
Article <II of the onstit#tion and the rele*ant -#rispr#dence disc#ssed
earlier. 1owe*er, 00 1?17Is e5traneo#s pro*isions gi*ing the 0resident
e5press or i"plied power @1A to iss#e decreesG @2A to direct the A(0 to
enforce o)edience to all laws e*en those not related to lawless *iolence
as well as decrees pro"#lgated )y the 0residentG and @4A to i"pose
standards on "edia or any for" of prior restraint on the press, are #ltra
*ires and #nconstit#tional. $he o#rt also r#les that #nder !ection 17,
Article ;II of the onstit#tion, the 0resident, in the a)sence of a
legislation, cannot ta:e o*er pri*ately9owned p#)lic #tility and pri*ate
)#siness affected with p#)lic interest.
In the sa"e *ein, the o#rt finds ,.'. 3o. 7 *alid. It is an 'rder iss#ed )y
the 0resident E acting as o""ander9in9hief E addressed to
s#)alterns in the A(0 to carry o#t the pro*isions of 00 1?17. !ignificantly,
it also pro*ides a *alid standard E that the "ilitary and the police sho#ld
ta:e only the /necessary and appropriate actions and "eas#res to
s#ppress and pre*ent acts of lawless *iolence./ B#t the words /acts of
terroris"/ fo#nd in ,.'. 3o. 7 ha*e not )een legally defined and "ade
p#nisha)le )y ongress and sho#ld th#s )e dee"ed deleted fro" the said
,.'. 8hile /terroris"/ has )een deno#nced generally in "edia, no law
has )een enacted to g#ide the "ilitary, and e*ent#ally the co#rts, to
deter"ine the li"its of the A(0Is a#thority in carrying o#t this portion of
,.'. 3o. 7.
REASONS FOR THE RULING (IMPORTANT POINTS TO REMEM&ER)"
1A $he 0resident is granted an 'rdinance 0ower #nder
hapter 2, Boo: III of .5ec#ti*e 'rder 3o. 292 @Ad"inistrati*e ode of
1987A. !he "ay iss#e any of the following2
!ec. 2. .5ec#ti*e 'rders. E Acts of the 0resident pro*iding for r#les
of a general or per"anent character in i"ple"entation or e5ec#tion of
constit#tional or stat#tory powers shall )e pro"#lgated in e5ec#ti*e
orders.
!ec. 4. Ad"inistrati*e 'rders. E Acts of the 0resident which relate
to partic#lar aspect of go*ern"ental operations in p#rs#ance of his d#ties
as ad"inistrati*e head shall )e pro"#lgated in ad"inistrati*e orders.
!ec. B. 0rocla"ations. E Acts of the 0resident fi5ing a date or
declaring a stat#s or condition of p#)lic "o"ent or interest, #pon the
e5istence of which the operation of a specific law or reg#lation is "ade to
depend, shall )e pro"#lgated in procla"ations which shall ha*e the force
of an e5ec#ti*e order.
!ec. 7. Me"orand#" 'rders. E Acts of the 0resident on "atters of
ad"inistrati*e detail or of s#)ordinate or te"porary interest which only
concern a partic#lar officer or office of the ,o*ern"ent shall )e e")odied
in "e"orand#" orders.
!ec. +. Me"orand#" irc#lars. E Acts of the 0resident on "atters
relating to internal ad"inistration, which the 0resident desires to )ring to
the attention of all or so"e of the depart"ents, agencies, )#rea#s or
offices of the ,o*ern"ent, for infor"ation or co"pliance, shall )e
e")odied in "e"orand#" circ#lars.
!ec. 7. ,eneral or !pecial 'rders. E Acts and co""ands of the
0resident in his capacity as o""ander9in9hief of the Ar"ed (orces of
the 0hilippines shall )e iss#ed as general or special orders.
0resident ArroyoIs ordinance power is li"ited to the foregoing iss#ances.
!he cannot iss#e decrees si"ilar to those iss#ed )y (or"er 0resident
Marcos #nder 00 1?81. 0residential Decrees are laws which are of the
sa"e category and )inding force as stat#tes )eca#se they were iss#ed )y
the 0resident in the e5ercise of his legislati*e power d#ring the period of
Martial Law #nder the 1974 onstit#tion.
$his o#rt r#les that the assailed 00 1?17 is #nconstit#tional insofar as it
grants 0resident Arroyo the a#thority to pro"#lgate /decrees./ Legislati*e
power is pec#liarly within the pro*ince of the Legislat#re. !ection 1, Article
<I categorically states that /OtPhe legislati*e power shall )e *ested in the
ongress of the 0hilippines which shall consist of a !enate and a 1o#se
of %epresentati*es./ $o )e s#re, neither Martial Law nor a state of
re)ellion nor a state of e"ergency can -#stify 0resident ArroyoIs e5ercise
of legislati*e power )y iss#ing decrees.
0resident Arroyo has no a#thority to enact decrees. It follows
that these decrees are *oid and, therefore, cannot )e enforced. 8ith
respect to /laws,/ she cannot call the "ilitary to enforce or i"ple"ent
certain laws, s#ch as c#sto"s laws, laws go*erning fa"ily and property
relations, laws on o)ligations and contracts and the li:e. !he can only
order the "ilitary, #nder 00 1?17, to enforce laws pertinent to its d#ty to
s#ppress lawless *iolence.
2A A distinction "#st )e drawn )etween the 0residentIs
a#thority to declare /a state of national e"ergency/ and to e5ercise
e"ergency powers. $o the first, as el#cidated )y the o#rt, !ection 18,
Article <II grants the 0resident s#ch power, hence, no legiti"ate
constit#tional o)-ection can )e raised. B#t to the second, "anifold
constit#tional iss#es arise.
!ection 24, Article <I of the onstit#tion reads2
170
!.. 24. @1A $he ongress, )y a *ote of two9thirds of )oth 1o#ses in
-oint session asse")led, *oting separately, shall ha*e the sole power to
declare the e5istence of a state of war.
@2A In ti"es of war or other national e"ergency, the ongress
"ay, )y law, a#thori&e the 0resident, for a li"ited period and s#)-ect to
s#ch restrictions as it "ay prescri)e, to e5ercise powers necessary and
proper to carry o#t a declared national policy. Jnless sooner withdrawn )y
resol#tion of the ongress, s#ch powers shall cease #pon the ne5t
ad-o#rn"ent thereof.
It "ay )e pointed o#t that the second paragraph of the a)o*e pro*ision
refers not only to war )#t also to /other national e"ergency./ If the
intention of the (ra"ers of o#r onstit#tion was to withhold fro" the
0resident the a#thority to declare a /state of national e"ergency/ p#rs#ant
to !ection 18, Article <II @calling9o#t powerA and grant it to ongress @li:e
the declaration of the e5istence of a state of warA, then the (ra"ers co#ld
ha*e pro*ided so. learly, they did not intend that ongress sho#ld first
a#thori&e the 0resident )efore he can declare a /state of national
e"ergency./ $he logical concl#sion then is that 0resident Arroyo co#ld
*alidly declare the e5istence of a state of national e"ergency e*en in the
a)sence of a ongressional enact"ent.
B#t the e5ercise of e"ergency powers, s#ch as the ta:ing
o*er of pri*ately owned p#)lic #tility or )#siness affected with p#)lic
interest, is a different "atter. $his re6#ires a delegation fro" ongress.
o#rts ha*e often said that constit#tional pro*isions in pari
"ateria are to )e constr#ed together. 'therwise stated, different cla#ses,
sections, and pro*isions of a constit#tion which relate to the sa"e s#)-ect
"atter will )e constr#ed together and considered in the light of each other.
onsidering that !ection 17 of Article ;II and !ection 24 of Article <I,
pre*io#sly 6#oted, relate to national e"ergencies, they "#st )e read
together to deter"ine the li"itation of the e5ercise of e"ergency powers.
,enerally, ongress is the repository of e"ergency powers.
$his is e*ident in the tenor of !ection 24 @2A, Article <I a#thori&ing it to
delegate s#ch powers to the 0resident. ertainly, a )ody cannot delegate
a power not reposed #pon it. 1owe*er, :nowing that d#ring gra*e
e"ergencies, it "ay not )e possi)le or practica)le for ongress to "eet
and e5ercise its powers, the (ra"ers of o#r onstit#tion dee"ed it wise to
allow ongress to grant e"ergency powers to the 0resident, s#)-ect to
certain conditions, th#s2
@1A $here "#st )e a war or other e"ergency.
@2A $he delegation "#st )e for a li"ited period only.
@4A $he delegation "#st )e s#)-ect to s#ch restrictions as the
ongress "ay prescri)e.
@BA $he e"ergency powers "#st )e e5ercised to carry o#t a
national policy declared )y ongress. 12B
!ection 17, Article ;II "#st )e #nderstood as an aspect of
the e"ergency powers cla#se. $he ta:ing o*er of pri*ate )#siness
affected with p#)lic interest is -#st another facet of the e"ergency powers
generally reposed #pon ongress. $h#s, when !ection 17 states that the
/the !tate "ay, d#ring the e"ergency and #nder reasona)le ter"s
prescri)ed )y it, te"porarily ta:e o*er or direct the operation of any
pri*ately owned p#)lic #tility or )#siness affected with p#)lic interest,/ it
refers to ongress, not the 0resident. 3ow, whether or not the 0resident
"ay e5ercise s#ch power is dependent on whether ongress "ay
delegate it to hi" p#rs#ant to a law prescri)ing the reasona)le ter"s
thereof.
It is clear that if the 0resident had a#thority to iss#e the order
he did, it "#st )e fo#nd in so"e pro*ision of the onstit#tion. And it is not
clai"ed that e5press constit#tional lang#age grants this power to the
0resident. $he contention is that presidential power sho#ld )e i"plied
fro" the aggregate of his powers #nder the onstit#tion. 0artic#lar
reliance is placed on pro*isions in Article II which say that /$he e5ec#ti*e
0ower shall )e *ested in a 0resident . . . . G/ that /he shall ta:e are that
the Laws )e faithf#lly e5ec#tedG/ and that he /shall )e o""ander9in9
hief of the Ar"y and 3a*y of the Jnited !tates.
4A !ince there is no law defining /acts of terroris",/ it is
0resident Arroyo alone, #nder ,.'. 3o. 7, who has the discretion to
deter"ine what acts constit#te terroris". 1er -#dg"ent on this aspect is
a)sol#te, witho#t restrictions. onse6#ently, there can )e indiscri"inate
arrest witho#t warrants, )rea:ing into offices and residences, ta:ing o*er
the "edia enterprises, prohi)ition and dispersal of all asse")lies and
gatherings #nfriendly to the ad"inistration. All these can )e effected in the
na"e of ,.'. 3o. 7. $hese acts go far )eyond the calling9o#t power of the
0resident. ertainly, they *iolate the d#e process cla#se of the
onstit#tion. $h#s, this o#rt declares that the /acts of terroris"/ portion
of ,.'. 3o. 7 is #nconstit#tional.
!ignificantly, there is nothing in ,.'. 3o. 7 a#thori&ing the
"ilitary or police to co""it acts )eyond what are necessary and
appropriate to s#ppress and pre*ent lawless *iolence, the li"itation of
their a#thority in p#rs#ing the 'rder. 'therwise, s#ch acts are considered
illegal.
5G.R. NO. 1398%8. !UNE 8, 200%.6
ALON$O J. ANCHETA, E)0909+,)2, >(. CANDELARIA GUERSE-
DALA-GON, 2)(E+,*),0.
FACTS"
!po#ses A#drey 'K3eill and 8. %ichard ,#ersey were
A"erican citi&ens. $hey resided in the 0hilippines for thirty years. $hey
adopted Lyle ,#ersey. 8hen A#drey died she left a will. 1er estate
consisted of a real estate property in Ma:ati ity, a )an: acco#nt and
shares of stoc:s in AR, Interiors. !he left her entire estate to %ichard.
1er will was ad"itted to pro)ate in Maryland, J.!.A and in the 0hilippines.
$hereafter, %ichard "arried the respondent, andelaria
,#ersey9Dalaygon, a (ilipino citi&en. $hey had two children Li")erly and
Le*in. 1e died with a will. 1e left his entire estate to his second wife,
andelaria, e5cept his shares of stoc:s with AR, Interiors. $he latter was
)e6#eathed to Lyle ,#ersey. 1is will was also pro)ated in the J.!.A and
in the 0hilippines.
$he ancilliary ad"inistrator in the pro)ate of the will of
%ichard here in the 0hilippines filed a pro-ect of partition with the pro)ate
co#rt wherein 2R7 of %ichardIs 4RB #ndi*ided interest in the Ma:ati property
was allocated to respondent, while 4R7 thereof were allocated to %ichardIs
three children. $his was opposed )y respondent on the gro#nd that #nder
the law of the !tate of Maryland, /a legacy passes to the legatee the entire
interest of the testator in the property s#)-ect of the legacy./ !ince
%ichard left his entire estate to respondent, e5cept for his rights and
interests o*er the AR, Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire 4RB #ndi*ided
interest in the Ma:ati property sho#ld )e gi*en to respondent. $he
respondentKs opposition was s#stained )y the pro)ate co#rt.
$he respondent also filed with the o#rt of Appeals a
petition for the ann#l"ent of the -#dg"ent of the pro)ate co#rt with
regards to the pro)ate of the will of A#drey here in the 0hilippines.
%espondent contended that petitioner willf#lly )reached his fid#ciary d#ty
when he disregarded the laws of the !tate of Maryland on the distri)#tion
of A#dreyIs estate in accordance with her will. %espondent arg#ed that
since A#drey de*ised her entire estate to %ichard, then the Ma:ati
property sho#ld )e wholly ad-#dicated to hi", and not "erely 4RB thereof,
and since %ichard left his entire estate, e5cept for his rights and interests
o*er the AR, Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Ma:ati property
sho#ld now pertain to respondent. $he o#rt of Appeals s#stained the
respondent and ordered the ann#l"ent of the decisions of the pro)ate
co#rt.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the passing of the land to respondent is *alid
despite the fact that records do not show when and how the ,#erseys
ac6#ired the Ma:ati property.
HELD"
Des, the passing of the land to respondent is *alid. $he
o#rt notes the fact that A#drey and %ichard ,#ersey were A"erican
citi&ens who owned real property in the 0hilippines, altho#gh records do
not show when and how the ,#erseys ac6#ired the Ma:ati property.
Jnder Article ;III, !ections 1 and B of the 1947 onstit#tion,
the pri*ilege to ac6#ire and e5ploit lands of the p#)lic do"ain, and other
nat#ral reso#rces of the 0hilippines, and to operate p#)lic #tilities, were
reser*ed to (ilipinos and entities owned or controlled )y the". In %ep#)lic
*. V#asha, the o#rt clarified that the 0arity %ights A"end"ent of 19B+,
which re9opened to A"erican citi&ens and )#siness enterprises the right in
the ac6#isition of lands of the p#)lic do"ain, the disposition, e5ploitation,
de*elop"ent and #tili&ation of nat#ral reso#rces of the 0hilippines, does
not incl#de the ac6#isition or e5ploitation of pri*ate agric#lt#ral lands. $he
prohi)ition against ac6#isition of pri*ate lands )y aliens was carried on to
the 1974 onstit#tion #nder Article ;I<, !ection 1B, with the e5ception of
pri*ate lands ac6#ired )y hereditary s#ccession and when the transfer
was "ade to a for"er nat#ral9)orn citi&en, as pro*ided in !ection 17,
Article ;I<. As it now stands, Article ;II, !ections 7 and 8 of the 198+
onstit#tion e5plicitly prohi)its non9(ilipinos fro" ac6#iring or holding title
to pri*ate lands or to lands of the p#)lic do"ain, e5cept only )y way of
legal s#ccession or if the ac6#isition was "ade )y a for"er nat#ral9)orn
citi&en.
In any case, the o#rt has also r#led that if land is in*alidly
transferred to an alien who s#)se6#ently )eco"es a citi&en or transfers it
to a citi&en, the flaw in the original transaction is considered c#red and the
title of the transferee is rendered *alid. In this case, since the Ma:ati
property had already passed on to respondent who is a (ilipino, then
whate*er flaw, if any, that attended the ac6#isition )y the ,#erseys of the
Ma:ati property is now inconse6#ential, as the o)-ecti*e of the
constit#tional pro*ision to :eep o#r lands in (ilipino hands has )een
achie*ed.
5G.R. NO. 14%459. !UNE 8, 200%.6
HEIRS OF DICMAN, ,'D).:" ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL DICMAN,
FLORENCE DICMAN FELICIANO TORRES, EMIL- TORRES,
TOMASITO TORRES ',* HEIRS OF CRISTINA ALA=AS ',* &A&ING
COSIL, E)0909+,)2(, >(. !OSE CARISO ',* COURT OF APPEALS,
2)(E+,*),0(.
FACTS"
'n ad*ice of his lawyer and )eca#se there were already
"any parcels of land recorded in his na"e, !ioco ariNo ca#sed the
s#r*ey of the land in contro*ersy in the na"e of $ing9el Dic"an. $he
latter e5ec#ted a p#)lic instr#"ent entitled Deed of on*eyance of 0art
%ights and Interests in Agric#lt#ral Land with !ioco ariNo. It stated that
he is an applicant for a patent o*er a parcel of land. $hat Mr. !ioco
ariNo has ad*anced all e5penses for said s#r*ey for "e and in "y na"e,
and also all other e5penses for the i"pro*e"ent of said land, to dateG that
for and in consideration of said ad*ance e5penses, to "e "ade and
deli*ered )y said Mr. !ioco ariNo, I here)y pledge and pro"ise to
con*ey, deli*er and transfer #nto said !ioco ariNo, of legal age, "arried
to ,#ilata Acop, and resident of Bag#io, 0.I., his heirs and assigns, one
half @1R2A of "y title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of
landG sa"e to )e deli*ered, con*eyed and transferred in a final for",
according to law, to hi", his heirs and assigns, )y "e, "y heirs, and
171
assigns, as soon as title for the sa"e is iss#ed to "e )y proper
a#thorities.
$hereafter, !ico ariNo sold the said land to his son
,#&"an ariNo thro#gh an A)sol#te Deed of !ale. $hereafter, ,#&"an
perfor"ed all acts of ownership o*er the land. 1e filed an opposition to
the petition of the heirs of $ing9el Dic"an esta)lishing ownership o*er the
6#estioned land. It was fo#nd )y the co#rt that Lot 7+9A )elongs to the
Dic"ans. B#t there are still ad*erse clai"s o*er Lot 7+9B. $h#s, hearings
sho#ld still )e held.
Meanwhile, on Han#ary 8, 19+?, while the foregoing petition
was pending in the trial co#rt, 0resident arlos 0. ,arcia iss#ed
0rocla"ation 3o. +28 /e5cl#ding fro" the operation of the Bag#io
$ownsite %eser*ation certain parcels of p#)lic land :nown as IIgorot
lai"sI sit#ated in the ity of Bag#io and declaring the sa"e open to
disposition #nder the pro*isions of hapter <II of the 0#)lic Land Act./
$he 0rocla"ation f#rther pro*ided that the /Igorot lai"s/ en#"erated
therein shall )e /s#)-ect to the condition that e5cept in fa*or of the
go*ern"ent or any of its )ranches, #nits, or instit#tions, lands ac6#ired )y
*irt#e of this procla"ation shall not )e enc#")ered or alienated within a
period of fifteen years fro" and after the date of iss#ance of patent./ 'ne
s#ch clai" pertained to the /1eirs of Dic"an,/
Before the trial co#rt co#ld dispose of the case, the !#pre"e
o#rt pro"#lgated %ep#)lic *. Marcos which held that o#rts of (irst
Instance of Bag#io ha*e no -#risdiction to reopen -#dicial proceedings on
the )asis of %ep#)lic Act 3o. 941. As a conse6#ence, on H#ly 28, 1978,
the trial co#rt dis"issed the petition to reopen i*il %eser*ation ase 3o.
1, ,.L.%.'. 211 insofar as Lot 7+9B was concerned, and the certificate of
title iss#ed p#rs#ant to the partial decision in*ol*ing Lot 7+9A was
in*alidated. $he trial co#rt stated that the re"edy for those who were
iss#ed titles was to file a petition for re*alidation #nder 0residential Decree
3o. 1271, as a"ended )y 0residential Decrees 3o. 1411 and 2?4B.
After the dis"issal of the case, ,#&"an ariNo was left
#ndist#r)ed in his possession of the s#)-ect property #ntil his death on
A#g#st 19, 1982.
'n April 2?, 1984, petitioners, s#ing as co"p#lsory heirs of
$ing9el Dic"an, re*i*ed the foregoing case )y filing a co"plaint for
reco*ery of possession with da"ages in*ol*ing the s#)-ect property with
the %$, doc:eted as i*il ase 3o. 799%. $he %$ rendered a decision
in fa*or of the pri*ate respondent. $he %$Ks decision was appealed to
the A. $he latter affir"ed in toto the %$Ks decision.
ISSUE" 8hether or not the Dic"ans as indigeno#s people are entitled to
the land in contro*ersy.
HELD"
3o, the Dic"ans as indigeno#s people are entitled to the
land in contro*ersy. 0etitioners arg#e that 0rocla"ation 3o. +28 iss#ed
)y then 0resident arlos 0. ,arcia on Han#ary 8, 19+? had the effect of
/segregating/ and /reser*ing/ certain Igorot clai"s identified therein,
incl#ding one p#rportedly )elonging to the /1eirs of Dic"an,/ and
prohi)iting any enc#")rance or alienation of these clai"s for a period of
17 years fro" ac6#isition of patent. B#t )y the ti"e the 0rocla"ation had
)een iss#ed, all rights o*er the property in 6#estion had already )een
*ested in pri*ate respondent. $he e5ec#ti*e iss#ance can only go so far
as to classify p#)lic land, )#t it cannot )e constr#ed as to pre-#dice *ested
rights. Moreo*er, property rights "ay not )e altered or depri*ed )y
e5ec#ti*e fiat alone witho#t contra*ening the d#e process g#arantees of
the onstit#tion and "ay a"o#nt to #nlawf#l ta:ing of pri*ate property to
)e redistri)#ted for p#)lic #se witho#t -#st co"pensation.
$he recognition, respect, and protection of the rights of
indigeno#s peoples to preser*e and de*elop their c#lt#res, traditions, and
instit#tions are *ital concerns of the !tate and constit#te i"portant p#)lic
policies which )ear #pon this case. $o gi*e life and "eaning #nto these
policies the legislat#re saw it fit to enact %ep#)lic Act 3o. 8471, otherwise
:nown as $he Indigeno#s 0eoples %ights Act of 1997, as a c#l"inating
"eas#re to affir" the *iews and opinions of indigeno#s peoples and
ethnic "inorities on "atters that affect their life and c#lt#re. $he pro*isions
of that law #nify an otherwise frag"ented acco#nt of constit#tional,
-#rispr#dential and stat#tory doctrine which en-oins the organs of
go*ern"ent to )e *igilant for the protection of indigeno#s c#lt#ral
co""#nities as a "arginali&ed sector, to protect their ancestral do"ain
and ancestral lands and ens#re their econo"ic, social, and c#lt#ral well9
)eing, and to g#ard their patri"ony fro" those inclined to prey #pon their
ignorance or d#ctility. As the final ar)iter of disp#tes and the last )#lwar:
of the %#le of Law this o#rt has always )een "indf#l of the highest
edicts of social -#stice especially where do#)ts arise in the interpretation
and application of the law. B#t when in the p#rs#it of the loftiest ends
ordained )y the onstit#tion this o#rt finds that the law is clear and
lea*es no roo" for do#)t, it shall decide according to the principles of right
and -#stice as all people concei*e the" to )e, and with d#e appreciation of
the rights of all persons concerned.
172

Adonis Notes 2011

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Adonis Notes 2011

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Alliance for Alternative Action

THE ADONIS CASES 2011

Anda mungkin juga menyukai