Koha Digest # 23 (1994)

ASYLUM SEEKERS

ALBANIAN ASYLUM SEEKERS (NOT) TO BE EXPELLED FROM SWITZERLAND

by VISAR REKA / Geneva

B.M. is 23 years old, coming from the outskirts of Deçan. Since 1992, when he fled Kosova
evading military service, he has been living in Switzerland as an asylum seeker. Now, B.M.
and many other Kosovans are facing the possibility of being deported from Switzerland in
direction of the FRY. "I will not go back to Serbia alive, ever; if I would have wanted myself
dead, I wouldn't come here at all, but I would have joined the Serbian army", says B.M. while
waiting for juridical advise at the Social Protestant Center in Geneva.

Panic has captivated the Albanian asylum seekers and it can best be seen in this Center where
many of them come to see Ueli Loenberger, juridical adviser of the Center and member of the
Governmental Council of the Geneva Canton. Loenberger, who in the past decade has been
crusading against the Swiss emigration organs, and who is considered to be a person well
acquainted with the problem, is very much infuriated with the measures of the government of
Switzerland, but also the passiveness of the different associations of Albanians in this
country.

Loenberger says: "All this chaos was created after the visit of the Commission of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland to Kosova in March 1993, which resulted with an internal
document which states that "the situation of human rights in Kosova in the past three years
has evidently stabilized and that the danger from Kosova comes from the demographic
explosion of the Albanians". And you Albanians are doing nothing to deny such reports. It is
scandalous to have such a tragic situation as is the one in Kosova followed with such
indifference of the Western governments and the incredible passiveness of you Albanians".

With the agreement between the Swiss and Bulgarians, the moratorium on the deportation of
Albanians who were not granted refugee status, has been interrupted. It had been in force
since the implementation of the sanctions against the FRY in 1992. If we refer to the
experience of the Swedish organs who decided to repatriate Kosovan Albanians through
Bulgaria, and which because of the refusal of the Serbian authorities to let these people come
back had stopped the expulsions, then a massive return of Albanians from Switzerland
shouldn't be expected.

This is also the opinion of the Ministry of Order and Justice of Switzerland which stated that
"in the following months, we shouldn't expect a large action of repatriation". According to the
port-parole of the Bureau for Refugees of this ministry, "for the time being we can't deport the
people who have been rejected or the ones who are illegally residing in Switzerland. We

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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know that the way back home via Bulgaria is not an ideal solution and that the best solution
would be opening the Prishtina airport. If the Yugoslav authorities won't accept the refugees,
we will take them back to Switzerland - and this is what the agreement with Bulgaria
foresees."

The number of those affected with the first wave of deportations (if it occurs) is not known,
however the official stated that there is a considerable number of those in the same position
and who had gone back home without any official escort.

Some Western governments have been trying, for a long time, to find a way to repatriate the
asylum-seekers. As first solution, transit through Macedonia was imposed, and this was the
reason why in February of this year, a "secret" meeting of the ministers of internal affairs of
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries with the Minister of Internal
Affairs of Macedonia, Frckovski, was organized in Vienna, on which occasion the
Macedonian government was promised financial reward for this service. It seems as if this
offer didn't satisfy the Macedonians, and this is why the solution was sought in the other
neighboring countries of Serbia. The agreement with Bulgaria is the first concrete agreement,
because Rumania and Hungary have rejected such a possibility. From all of this it can be
concluded that the problem of Albanians is only a technical one. However, Loenberger claims
that the issue of Albanian asylum seekers is a serious political problem which should be
solved at the European level and in cooperation with the Albanian political representatives.
He mentions three conditions that must be fulfilled before any Albanian is returned home: full
guarantee of human rights, general amnesty for all deserters and the installation of
international observers. "How can people be returned to a state which expels international
observers, doesn't grant a visa to the UN special rapporteur Mazoviecki". Even more, the trip
back via Bulgaria passes right beside the recruitment center in Nish, and knowing how the
Serbs act, it would not be a surprise if the deserters would end in a military barrack instead of
back home. It should not be forgotten that even the UNHCR pronounced itself against the
return of the Albanian deserters, in December 1993.

One thing is very clear: the governments of the countries hosting Albanian asylum seekers
want to get rid of them and this they don't conceal. The pressure of the right wing public, the
high costs of support, the chronical misunderstanding of the Balkans reality and, it must be
admitted, the not so seldom excesses of a part of asylum seekers, including drugs, which is
the most serious, are doing their share. On the other hand, Belgrade is trying to profit as much
as possible materially and politically from this issue. Milosevic's diplomats, every time there
is a crisis with the asylum seekers, repeat that there are no conditions to repatriate them
because of the sanctions and the difficult economic situation, and they usually condition the
return of the Albanian asylum seekers with the lifting of the sanctions, or request that every
person which is deported is given the amount of a one year's average salary of the hosting
country!

However the crisis of the asylum seekers might end, it will solve nothing. In case the political
situation in Kosova doesn't change, the forcible emigration will not stop. The deserter from
Deçan doesn't hesitate to say: "If they take me back to Serbia, they'll take me to the army and
then I will take the first chance to come back, if not back to Switzerland, then to any other
country in Europe".

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MACEDONIA

QUIET START - ROUGH FINISH

by ISO RUSI / Shkup

The announcement made by Stojan Andov, speaker of the Macedonian Parliament, on the
occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of independence, about the organization of
Presidential and Parliamentarian elections on the third week of October, was a surprise to the
majority, even though they had it clear that the elections had to be held this autumn. As if
everybody were expecting the elections in November. After the announcement, first reactions
appeared, and it seemed as if the parties woke up immediately. The ruling coalition wanted
the elections to be celebrated as quietly as possible, so they could win again, and on the other
hand, the opposition wanted to prevent this from happening. For both, if this is not possible to
be achieved institutionally, then it can be done in another fashion.

The reactions of the political parties are different, of course. The ruling coalition is taking
advantage of all constitutional and legal provisions which suit it. The second man of the
Liberal Party Ace Kostovski, even though he admits that the time for the pre-electoral
campaign is short, is of the opinion that "the current composition of the Parliament is such
that it is in no position to make any decision and even less adopt a legal act, therefore it is
much better to take advantage of the Constitutional provision and not to organize
extraordinary elections, but have them now instead and until the end of the year constitute a
new Parliament and Government".

The largest ruling party didn't haste with any statements regarding the elections, but it
announced the initiation of the pre-electoral campaign during the next week.

The Democratic Party, whose positions are rising among the people, stated that the
announcement on the next elections is a "sabotage against the interests of Macedonia", and
this opinion is shared by VMRO-DPMNE which in all this "sees not only the privileges for
those who by all means want to keep the power, but also the proof that they are fully
controlling the opposition parties and are even informed about the tactic and strategic secrets
of each party".

The chairman of the MAAK considers that the announcement is a premeditated act of the
political parties which have made good preparations beforehand, whilst the chairman of the
Democratic Party of the Serbs considers that the aim of the announcement about the elections,
was to create a confusion among small parties, and this is in the interest of the ruling
coalition. The leaders of the smallest parties, Labor and Civil-Liberal respectively, share the
opinion that the problem is not the short period for the pre-electoral campaign, but the fact
that the electoral laws have not been adopted.

On the other hand, the chairman of the PPD, Adburrahman Haliti declared that "the
anticipated announcement about the elections created an unnecessary space for speculations
that these elections favor the ruling coalition and that this is the most convenient time for it to
win the elections. But this is not true, because the elections will not be won because of the
time, but because of the convincing political programs". Menduh Thaçi, Haliti's biggest
opponent, considers that there is nothing wrong with the timing. He announces that during the
next week he will decide whether he participates in the elections or not, "...because we as a

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party and as a people are handicapped with the existing Law on Electoral Units", even though
in Tetovë there are rumors that Thaçi's fraction will participate in the elections with 20
candidates for MP's, mainly "returnees" from Kosova. However, Thaçi and his followers must
find a "catch 22" in order to participate in the elections. The trial regarding the succession of
the PPD and which is being celebrated now, will most probably not end before the elections,
therefore if this fraction decides to participate, its members will have to do it as independent
candidates. Unless a new party is registered under the name of the New PPD. Therefore, the
joint evaluation of all Albanian political parties is that in these elections, Albanians will have
more MP's, maybe even 26 seats, regardless of the electoral units which are not suitable for
Albanians.

According to a survey made by the Brima agency, the most popular parties are the
Social-Democratic League, the PPD, the Democratic Party and finally VMRO-DPMNE.
Despite the rumors on the certain coalitions, for the time being there are no informations on
any coalitions between parties. The largest Social-Democratic League is yet not interested to
pull behind the Liberals and the Socialists (present partners of coalition), for their rating is
falling. The Democratic Party has given up on the coalition with VMRO-DPMNE fearing that
it would lose its image of a center party and because of the internal problems that might cause
the breakdown of the party. The Albanian parties face a similar situation. The imagined
coalition between Thaçi's fraction with the People's Democratic Party (PDP) was declared by
him an "ordinary speculation". Haliti's PPD won't create a coalition with PDP either, even
though experts claim that the two parties have reached an agreement to support the candidates
who have gained more votes in the second round, regardless of their political appertaining.
Another rumor states that PPD will gain the support of the Democratic Party of the Turks and
the Party of Democratic Action - the Islamic Path, which consider that in coalition with the
PPD, they could gain a seat or two in the parliament.

It is clear that having the present Macedonian and Albanian partners of the coalition in a joint
campaign would be counter-productive for both parties, however there are informations that
the conversations between the sides have started, regarding the continuation of the coalition
after the elections.

When it comes to the Presidential elections, the things are clear. The popularity of Kiro
Gligorov makes his election secure in the first round. For the time being his only
counter-candidate is a businessman of American origin, George Atanaskovski, who in order
to participate in the electoral game has to present 30 signatures of MP's or 10 thousand voters.
On the other hand, VMRO-DPMNE, the Christian-Democratic Party and PPD and PDP have
announced that they too, will have candidates for President.

Even though the time for the campaign is short, it seems as if all the parties have prepared
their strategy and will soon start the race with all their forces. According to the first signs,
they have a lot of money at their disposal. The origin of the money - it is another story. There
are many rumors about party and governmental racketeering...

The media war has also started. The governmental media are under the control of the
coalition - the new management of the Radio and Television of Macedonia was appointed and
Nova Makedonija depends exclusively on the Macedonian budget. The others will provide
their space for money or sympathy.

But, when it comes to the elections in Macedonia, the only thing which is sure is that nothing

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is sure! The experience from the first elections is that the disposition of the voters could
change rapidly. Then, VMRO-DPMNE had won the elections thanks to the Albanophobia
propagated by the media. Now the campaign has started, however until October 16 the
disposition of the voters can change, and there are plenty of reasons for that, starting from
social unrest up to the international relations.

There are many indicators that the relations in Macedonia could become rougher, especially
after listening to announcements of different parties, that they will fight for their cause with
all means at their disposal if they are institutionally stopped by the government.

KOSOVA

CROATS MASSIVELY ABANDON KOSOVA?

by SHEFKI UKAJ / Prishtina

The visit of the delegation of the Bureau of the Republic of Croatia in Belgrade composed by
the Head of Office Zvonimir Markovic, and his aides Dusan Bilandzic and Davor Vidis to
Kosova, incited the curiosity not only the of Albanian, but also the Serbian media. This
Croatian delegation was the first high ranked grouping coming from any part of the Former
Yugoslavia, and which did not meet the local Serbian officials. The Head of the Office said
that they were not interested to meet with the local Serb authorities, because they have been
informed about the official Serbian posture in Belgrade, where the office has been
functioning since six months ago.

The purpose of this visit was to get acquainted with the situation in Kosova and especially
with the problems of the Croats of this region.

In the first day of this "trip of good will" the delegation was accompanied by the Croatian
correspondents in Kosova to several locations inhabited by ethnic Croats in Janjevë, Letnicë
and Vrnavo-Kolo.

The priests of the Catholic churches in Janjevë and Letnica Josip and Nikola Doncic informed
the delegation about the difficult situation of the Ethnic Croatian Community in these areas.
The delegation was told that the number of Croats has been reduced by half and that the
majority of Croats were leaving because of fear, but also because of the serious economic
problems. They mentioned the number of 4000 emigrated Croats. They also stressed that in
Janjevë alone, there used to be 3500 Croats and that 2400 had already left. The ones
remaining have nowhere to go to, and depend exclusively on the assistance provided by
Caritas and Mother Theresa Association. Finally it was said that because of the political
situation, many Croats had been dismissed from their jobs not only in Kosova, but also in
Serbia and Macedonia and that were not even allowed to settle the documents for retirement.

When asked the reasons why the Croats are leaving Janjevë, Doncic replied: "...the Serbian
aggression during the war in Croatia has intimidated this population; about 40 Seselj's
Chetnik vojvodas had marched down the streets in Janjevë and Seselj proper had threatened
that he would liquidate all Croats; the positioning of a police platoon in the area; serious
social problems and summons for forcible recruitment of young Croats in the Serbian army..."

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The other priest informed the delegation that there are no prospects whatsoever in Kosova
and that if the borders would open, all of them would move out and go to Croatia. He also
denied the speculations of the Serbian press about the alleged return of the Croats to Kosova.

The delegation promised the Croats still remaining in Kosova material and moral support,
telling them that they wouldn't be forgotten and promising that a part of the labor force from
this area would find a job at the Croatian coast. However, the main problem is how to stop
the emigration of the Croats from Kosova, because the dimensions it has reached, are
upsetting. Because as one of them said: "Maybe the relations between two countries will
improve, but the tense relations between people will not be emended soon. Everyday we hear
the same provocations: Go back to Tudjman's army, Let Tudjman feed you, etc...."

The delegation also contacted with the Albanian leadership. They met Rugova and Agani and
discussed about the serious situation in Kosova and in particular about the status of the Croat
Ethnic Community. On this occasion Rugova promised the delegation that the Albanians,
within their means, will take care of the interests of the Croatian community in Kosova.

The delegation also visited the University of Kosova and received a thorough briefing from
the Rector, Ejup Statovci, who asked the delegation to inform their authorities about the fact
that many professors of the University of Prishtina couldn't finish their Master's or PhD
degrees, because of the outbreak of war, and urge them to do something to directly assist
these cadres.

The delegation finalized the visit by meeting two former Albanian politicians, Mahmut
Bakalli and Fadil Hoxha, and the leadership of the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of
Kosova.

Markovic concluded the briefing for the journalists by saying: "The Albanians have best
proven through the Albanian Christian Democratic Party, that they belong to the European
civilization. And the fact that the majority of the members of this party are of the Islamic
confession proves that any claims about the existence of Islamic fundamentalism in Kosova
are not grounded.

Regarding the issue of Kosova, I see this as a primary and not secondary problem, however I
also see the solution of this problem as a complicated process, closely linked to the general
development of the processes in the rest of the Former Yugoslavia. I am optimistic that the
issue of Kosova will be solved on the grounds of sane visions. The international community
is closely following the situation in Kosova".

INTERVIEW

MAHMUT BAKALLI, former Kosovan politician

A NEED: REALIGNMENT

Interviewed by BATON HAXHIU / Prishtina

KOHA: The hesitation of the international community to solve the problems in the former

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Yugoslavia is making a new question arise. Are there chances for the borders to change for
the first time after WW II, and create a new border precedent?

BAKALLI: What today is seen as a hesitation of the international community is first of all its
surprise by the events and movements in the post-Communist period which it hadn't expected
and which have caught it unprepared. However, this hesitation also contains different
interests of Great Powers. The destruction of Yugoslavia and the Communist system - which
was the core which kept the balance of a compound society, created by an anti-Fascist war
and a Socialist revolution- its should have its dismantlement and division done according to
the borders of the federal units that composed the Federation, satisfying as much as possible
and simultaneously the right to self-determination of all the people. In conditions when the
Yugoslav federation was very much centralized, those borders really resembled
administrative borders, however the decentralization of the Federation, especially after the
1974 Constitution (which contained the confederation "virus"), the borders of its eight
constituents were state borders par excellence. If all Yugoslav constitutions, political,
legislative and governmental practices are analyzed, it clearly comes out then that these
borders were state borders, including those of the autonomy of Kosova, which as such, with
its defined borders was part of the Yugoslav federation and within the Republic of Serbia, as
a transitory solution to prevent the destabilization of that Yugoslavia. The same thing goes for
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regardless of how was B&H established, as a state and association
of three equal people in one separate republic after WW II (almost the same thing happened
in the case of Montenegro and Macedonia) it was and it should remain being one republic
with its territory and defined borders as a association of three people that compose it, but also
respecting the right to self-determination of these three people. The Contact Group, in its
peace plan on Bosnia has set a compromise, by safeguarding the territory of B&H it allows a
specific relationship, a sort of restricted self-determination, allowing the Serbian and Croatian
people the right to have confederative links with Serbia and Croatia respectively, as long as it
doesn't endanger the territorial integrity of B&H. Therefore this is more a pragmatic, than a
solution of principle with the aim at stopping the dangerous and filthy war in Bosnia.

Therefore, not even in the case of Bosnia has Europe broken the principle of not changing the
borders by force, and this is not a case when a border precedent has been created. Thus, I
don't think that after the adoption of this plan, we should, by simple analogy, request the same
solution for the status of Kosova, but we must firmly remain behind our requests for
independence from Serbia, within the Kosovan borders defined by the Constitution of 1974.
Our political, ethnic, historic and constitutional arguments to get independent from Serbia, as
an independent state are "stronger" than the arguments of the Serb and Croat people in
Bosnia. If we insist on the analogy, then it could be implied that we accept to remain part of
Serbia proper, which is not acceptable for us, today nor tomorrow.

KOHA: The case of Bosnia can stimulate other countries that have territorial pretensions
towards other neighboring countries. Is Greece after this purpose or is its posture really only
trying to amortize the Albanian problem?

BAKALLI: For the time being Europe and the world are not ready to accept the forcible
alteration of the borders, they even pathologically fear from border precedents. The case of
the unification of the Germanies, symbolized by the fall of the Berlin wall, which we
sometimes use as an expression of the wish for national unification, is something totally
different. Germany was not unified because of the massive demonstrations or the wish of the
German people. It was unified because of the agreement reached between the Great Powers

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composing the anti-Hitler coalition that had divided Germany after WW II. The Great Powers
divided it because that was their interest then, and united it after 45 years because again, it
was their interest now, because they were aiming at creating a united Europe, and for that
they needed a strong united Germany, not only economically, but also in every other sense in
order to stabilize and integrate Europe. Therefore, the change of the German border was not a
unilateral and forcible act.

The case of the pretensions of Greece towards the territories of the Republic of Albania, by
revitalizing the myth on the "Northern Epirus", and which would mean usurping more than
half of the territories in Southern Albania, is an aim and objective of the Greek expansionist
and chauvinist forces and not part of a European strategy. However, the extremely harsh
official communique of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry regarding the punishment of the five
accused ethnic Greeks in Tirana and regarding the deterioration of the relations between
Greece and Albania prove that there is a Greek-Serbian alliance in their anti-Albanian policy
and that this alliance is making efforts to amortize the issue of Kosova and the aims of the
Albanians. All the Albanians should be prepared to properly react against this expansionist
challenge. This is a legal right of the Albanian state but also an obligation to stop the Greek
chauvinists. However, it must stand strong in its position of trying to solve the problems of
the Greek minority in Albania, Albanian minority in Greece, the position of Çamëria, etc., by
dialogue.

KOHA: The territorial conquers of Serbia gave the right to its president to declare that the
Serbian people is the biggest people and as such has obligations towards smaller people.
Political analysts claim that this speech has promoted him into a new Balkan's leader?

BAKALLI: Milosevic's last speech in Vranje contains many other politically indicative
elements. This speech was dedicated to the international public in times when the Contact
Group has to decide regarding the Bosnia peace program and the gradual lifting of the
sanctions and it meant to be a presentation of the orientations of possible changes of the
internal political relations in Serbia (and this also implies Yugoslavia).

First, by proclaiming that "peace is a Serbian national interest", the admits that his warring
program of the solution of Serbian national issue to create the unique state of "Greater
Serbia", and that he is satisfied with what he has achieved, forgetting all those human victims
and material destructions he has caused not only the other people, but his people too. For all
these crimes, Milosevic will blame the others, washing his hands. Milosevic is trying to
transform from the "Butcher of the Balkans" into a peacemaker.

The other indicative element is the one regarding the statement that the Serbian people is the
largest and the strongest in the Balkans therefore it should take care of the other surrounding
people. I think that Milosevic is trying to announce that Serbia under his rule should become
leader of the Balkans and is expecting the world to inaugurate him as such and thus accept his
as "the Balkans' gendarme".

These are Milosevic's political tricks. Even though some political forces in the world would
accept this wish of Milosevic for the sake of their own interests, I am convinced that the
world would not support this aim of his because Milosevic is not characterized by peace, but
by expansionism and the rule over the others. Serbia must be free, independent and
democratic as all other people and states in the Balkans and be equal to them. But if it is
allowed a "mission" or any chance to accomplish its expansionist purposes or get a leading

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role in the region, it will transform it in the ruling role, in other words become "Balkan's
gendarme".

KOHA: Once you had declared that Serbia will become a Latin American dictatorship. What
did you mean?

BAKALLI: I believe that the chances of having a type of dictatorship in Serbia are bigger
than those of establishing a democracy. This I see not only from the real political movements
in Serbia but also the most recent speech he delivered. He claims that his political program is
the same as the one adopted three years ago: peace, economic stability and war against
criminality. In no place does he mention democracy which is in deep crisis in Serbia, neither
does he mention the blocked Serbian parliament, the free market economy, the confusions in
the issue of property in Serbia, etc. I have the feeling that thus Milosevic is announcing that
he will develop a specific form of dictatorship, not maybe of the Stalinist or fascist type, but
all means will it deny political pluralism, the role of the parliament, the role of the citizen in
decision-making, the role of the free-market economy, etc. To do this, he will probably take
measures to eliminate the extremist parties (not because they are extremist, but because they
may bother him) and even other political parties, including, of course, all political parties of
Albanians in Kosova, Hungarians in Vojvodina, and Muslims in Sandzak. He would disable
the parliament and the opposition parties, because anyways he has converted the parliament in
a circus which he rules, and the Serbian opposition is characterized by the lack of invention
and political consistency. In order to accomplish the purpose of a long rule by a dictatorship,
Milosevic could start the elimination of the opposition by diminishing the role of his own
party, by converting it into a movement which would also include all leftist movements of
Serbia, he will eliminate the right extremists while the other opposition will simply fade away
from the political scene. I am afraid that the reaction of Europe and the world to these
eventual dictatorial movements in Serbia would not be harsh, and even there would be some
"quiet blessing" by helping the stabilization of the local currency, the economic development,
lifting the sanctions with the pragmatic aim of "pacifying" Serbia, to stop it from starting new
wars, evading social unrest, etc. Even more, I am fearing that the West and Russia will not
react to any dictatorial measures in Serbia hoping that this state would create a "model" of
post-Communist transition, a model which then they would implement in the independent
states of the former Soviet Union, other Balkan's states, etc.

All of this I said is hypothetical and i believe that your readers will understand it as such.
However, such a development of events can be predicted based on the present processes and
political developments in Serbia.

KOHA: The Albanian-Serb relations are the only dilemma of the politics in the Balkans
which requests a concrete solution. Based on the situation and the political references we
have, the impression is that Serbia has immunized very well the situation in Kosova. Why?

BAKALLI: This issue is maybe not the only open issue and dilemma in the Balkans, but is
one of the most important and unsolved matters of the Former Yugoslavia and the Balkans.
This is why now and in the future, the issue will be imposed for solution. Without the just
solution of Kosova's problem and the issue of the Albanians in the former Yugoslavia (half of
the Albanian people and territory, which means almost the whole Albanian issue!), the
problems and conflicts in the former Yugoslavia can't be solved; there can be no guarantee for
the peace in the Balkans, for democracy and European integrations. Thanks to the
organization and action of the Albanian political movement in Kosova, Macedonia and

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Montenegro, three or four years ago, an action which was characterized by enthusiasm and
massiveness, as well as the support of the democratic forces in Albania, we affirmed the
Albanian unsolved issue, and in this context, the issue of the Republic of Kosova. I don't
believe that the Albanian issue has been immunized, but it can be immunized and ignored in
the worlds if the organized Albanian political forces of Kosova, and those in the whole
Albanian space do not improve their organization, if a realignment for more inventive and
successful action is not done. In political history, the clear strategy and the clear declaration
have never been the most important thing, but the tactics and the practice of inventive action
for the realization of the strategy were of great importance. The tactics and the wrong or
non-inventive practice could easily swallow the strategy proper. Therefore, everything what is
happening around us, imposes the need to get ourselves in a state of extraordinary
mobilization, a political realignment which would take our political declarations to a
successful end. I hope that we can do that and that the world will increase its support to the
Republic of Kosova, as the key issue of the Albanian question, because of our efforts and
determination. But this will depend on our intelligence and ability to reorganize and
capacitate, to overcome the divisions, the monopolies and fractions, to reject all
self-satisfactions and the creation of deceiving verbal hopes and finally reject all idiotic
political indifference. Whatever the solution for Bosnia might be, however the circumstances
might change, however the things might evolve in Serbia and what posture will the world
take towards Serbia or make any concession to Serbia for the sake of the peace in Bosnia:
nothing shouldn't and can't shake our expressed will for the independence of Kosova from
Serbia. This is why we need this realignment, a new political offensive, understanding and a
more decisive support of the other states in the world.

KOHA: Several colleagues from the Belgrade media were convinced by your analyses that
Serbs and Albanians should definitely separate. What was your most convincing thesis?

BAKALLI: I am glad to hear that my conversations in Prishtina have convinced someone in

Belgrade, that Kosova's detachment from Serbia is inevitable. I would be even more happy if
the ones "I have convinced" would come out in public stating their convictions, as we are
expressing our convictions in public and openly. My arguments in essence are the same as
those of all others when requesting support for the expressed political will of the Albanian
people for the Republic of Kosova. I even think and stress that Serbia, in essence, is not even
exercising any legal rule over Kosova and Albanians. Serbia is here only as a occupier with
large police and army forces, and present with very well premeditated systematic and
sophisticated repression, and not a legal constitutional system. It is another issue and it
belongs to us, why do we stand this repression and how long can we endure. As any state of
occupation, the occupation of Kosova can't last forever neither can it be converted into a legal
system of rule of the "pacified" or adopted Albanians. For many years in a row, Serbia is not
able to organize the production in the enormous economic giants ("Trepça", "Ferronikel" and
other enterprises, excluding the production of electric energy where the process resembles
more the police-military organization), meaning that it has caused the collapse of the whole
economy and reproduction, it has destroyed the educational system, and also the health care
system, radio-television broadcasting system, scientific, informative, cultural, etc. systems.

In fact, Serbia is not ruling Kosova, it is not able, as a state, to organize the life and
reproduction in Kosova without the Albanians who don't acknowledge the rule. The only
"argument" that Serbia has is its power and the mythical history about the "cradle of Serbia"!
And this historic "argument" is not enough politically valid to rule over Kosova, and the
"argument" of the force can't live forever! The historic "argument" of Serbia to rule over

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Kosova has been used many times in the world, because in any slogans of the ruling and
opposition parties Kosova has always been stressed as "an internal affair of Serbia". If this is
said by Milosevic, or Jovic former chairman of the Socialist Party or that minister Margit
which not only by her image but with the logic of a parrot resembles Hajrije the broadcaster
(the only local Albanian working in TV Prishtina) -it doesn't surprise me at all. But I am
surprised if the same thing is said by the democratic part of the Serbian opposition, and
recently even the chairman of the Serbian Civil League did it, the same person who was
awarded a decoration for democracy in the USA! As if they don't understand a thing of the
contemporary international law, which based on the UN Charter, the Helsinki and Paris
Declarations, clarifies that when a people of two million living in its own territory finds itself
under so tragic repression of the genocidal rule of Serbia, it can't be an internal affair of any
state, but it is an issue of international concern and responsibility. But such a posture of the
democratic parties of Serbia are not a big surprise, because this is the best proof that there is
no more future and any chances to have Albanians and Kosova under the jurisdiction of
Serbia in any future form of state organization. To us Albanians it is difficult, and more and
more difficult with many more victims, many more emigrants, however Serbia can't legalize
its rule in Kosova and have democracy and prosperity for itself. Serbia is degenerating and
destroying itself with its conquer of Kosova. Therefore, for the good of both parties, it is
much better if negotiations on the future of Kosova, on its independence start, and this in the
interest of both people in Kosova and in the interest of Serbia proper. The sooner the better.

It is not late to say that the expressed will of the Albanians for the independent Kosova is not
an anti-Serbian position. We aim at the independence of Kosova because historically neither
the present generations nor the future ones can imagine a long rule of the Serbian regime.
These Albanian belong to the generations of liberty and don't stand any slavery. Kosova will
be a Republic because of the Albanians, their self-determination and self-administration,
however it will also be the Republic of the Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks, Muslims, Croats and
Gypsies as equal nations, as citizens fully equal to Albanians. The Serbian historical, cultural
and religious monuments would be under a special protection of the Republic of Kosova or
international observers or even the state of Serbia. The relations with the Republic of Serbia
would then develop on the grounds of good neighbors with good connections and cooperation
in all fields. In our interest, we could even integrate regionally to become part of the
integrating processes in Europe. However, any of these integrations would be done only as an
integration of the Republic of Kosova, equal with any of the partners it will integrate with.

KOHA: You say that Serbs and Albanians should separate as friends, on the other hand we
have Serbia in all pores of life, we have the secret infiltration of the Albanian element, we
have the functioning of some state-hood elements, and we are satisfied with consultative
meetings and statements. How to stop this trend?

BAKALLI: I don't believe Serbia has infiltrated deeply among Albanians. The
self-proclaimed movement of Basri Pllana is and will be totally unimportant to Albanians, it
will always be a branch of the Serbian Socialist Party, always alien and hostile towards the
Albanians. It will disappear and will be forgotten by Serbia proper, the same that has
established it.

I don't see that the existence of small businessmen and merchants as an infiltration of Serbia,
because the majority of them survives on this kind of work, and only a few of them are really
profiting very much on our social situation. This is a period in history where the Albanian
people have proven the highest level of conscience and determination not to be under the

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Serbian rule. Maybe the Serbian government has its spies and informers among Albanians,
but I don't believe their number is bigger than the traditional spies the Albanian people had,
and with the ones that Serbia has, it is very hard to make the Albanian people change their
heart. We must be very careful not to allow the wider infiltration of Serbian regime among
the Albanians in the army, the police and the banking system, trade with strategic goods and
participation in any of the elections that Serbia organizes. I think that it is our handicap that
we are not politically effectively organized, and that this is not an expressed tendency of
"national treason".

KOHA: How do you comment upon the recent events between the Government and the LDK,
as well as the Kolaj-Zogaj case?

BAKALLI: I was not surprised by this event. The political theory states that when a political
movement or organ has no dynamics in action, the first caused consequence is that there will
be internal divisions and misunderstandings. However isolated the case might seem to be, it
expresses the lack of sufficient organization of the LDK, the Government and the whole
Albanian political establishment. The attempts of Rugova and Bukoshi to calm the opinion by
publicly declaring that there is no conflict, are unconvincing. I don't doubt that political
parties and subjects share the strategic orientation for the independence of Kosova, but it is
also very clear that they are not well organized, they don't have the sufficient invention and
that is why they start dealing with themselves and lose the power.

KOHA: Is the political neutrality and the trusteeship of Kosova accomplishable?

BAKALLI: The qualification "neutral" in the case of the Republic of Kosova is being used
lately, not to define a classic international neutrality, but to express an equidistance of the
Republic of Kosova from Serbia and Albania, and that this doesn't mean that the borders
would be expanding towards Albania. This is the only way to understand this expression.

International trusteeship is seldom applied in practice. We use this term to express our
determination for separation from Serbia even with conditions, as the last instance, have
Kosova under the rule of an international organ which would supervise Kosova until its
independence.

KOHA: Albania and its role in Kosova?

BAKALLI: The role of Albania was and will remain important for the successful solution of
the position of the Albanians in the Former Yugoslavia, and based not on political
conjunctures or political concessions, but on the expressed will of that part of the Albanian
people of Kosova for the Republic of Kosova. Albania is itself facing some transitory
difficulties which slow down its engagement in favor of our cause, and we must understand
this. However, the task and responsibility of Albania to act in the political and diplomatic
fields for the affirmation of the aims of the Albanian people in the former Yugoslavia.

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MILOSEVIC

THE WEST: MILOSEVIC AS TARGET

by VETON SURROI

One year ago, in a meeting in Washington, dedicated to the solution of the crises in Kosova
and Macedonia, a former American diplomatic official had proposed that secret operations
aiming at bringing down Milosevic's regime should be undertaken. His explanation was that
all the diplomatic attempts to stop this regime in its bloody role in the destruction of the
former Yugoslavia had been proven non effective and that there was only one more phase
left, usually reserved for the dictatorial regimes in Middle East, Africa or Latin America.
Such operations would imply anything: starting from the propaganda pressure and up to,
eventually, different forms of special war.

One month ago, and without any coincidence, Belgrade's news-magazine "Telegraf"
published an article about the rumors regarding an attempt against Milosevic's life, as a test of
the public opinion, and it showed that there are people of the opinion, or rather that speculate
claiming one of the options for the solution of the present crisis, would be Milosevic's
farewell from the world of the living.

The evolution of the past twelve months, nevertheless, proves the contrary. Even though at
the beginning of the bloody dismantlement of Yugoslavia, the West calculated with the
pressure factor to oust the Serbian president from his post, and in this direction, sometimes,
the implementation of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro were explained thus, the
present political attitude of the West is totally different. Last year, not very many people in
the West would express their sorrow for the political or physical, its the same, disappearance
of Milosevic, whilst today there are not many countries, especially the Great Powers that
would want to see changes happening in Serbia, in the sense of the leadership crisis. In fact,
the new policy towards the Serbian president, that of Milosevic's cooperativeness, has been
elaborated by pressure through the sanctions, and the promises for their gradual lifting. This
was evident on the occasion of the publication of the proposals of the Contact Group, when
the Serbian president passed on the side of the Great Powers, leaving the Bosnian Serbs, for
the time being, isolated with their negative decisions.

Why this new posture towards Milosevic? First of all, empirically, because for the time being,
there is no one who could replace him and that he, with his authority, is the only one who
could make changes, positive or negative. What's more, remarks that if he left his post, he
would leave behind a chaotic political life in Serbia, which would mean that there would be
no collocutor on which future negotiators could rely, are often heard. Milosevic proper has
masterly contributed to this conviction by occasionally exposing Seselj or Arkan as samples
of politicians of Serbian future. On the other hand, the Serbian parliamentarian opposition has
also contributed in creating this conviction. It is more critical towards Milosevic's regime in
diplomatic cocktails in Belgrade, than in real life.

Secondly, all the attempts so far to oust Milosevic from power, starting from the 1991
demonstrations and up to the series of parliamentarian and presidential elections, have
strengthened his position. Even, in a way, with the international isolation of Serbia and the
criminal-police-military organization to break the sanctions, has brutalized his rule even
more.

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Thirdly, thanks to the bloody dismantlement of Yugoslavia to which he has contributed
mostly, Serbian nationalism remains the dominating ideology in Serbia.

All of these lead to the inversion of the old pragmatic ascertainment of the anglo-saxon
world: "If you can't beat them, join them". Translated into contemporary language, the logic
of the diplomacy of the big actually is: "...since we couldn't beat him, let's try and bring him
closer."

The change in the attitude is, however, the result of mutual interests. Milosevic's has an
enormous need to use his new role as peace-maker, not only to forget his role as the main
guilty of the war in Yugoslavia, but also to get a new position in the future. In this sense, he
has set as new goals the lifting of the sanctions, the creation of international legitimacy for
himself and the legitimation of Greater Serbia through the confederation net with the Bosnian
Serbs and those of Krajina. And one more thing, as he announced last week in Vranje, the
engagement towards the new/old regional role (Balkan's policeman).

For some of the goals he has set to himself, he will have international support. For example,
many analysts of the Great Powers have not yet overcome the idea that the Balkans as a
region has a permanent need for a policeman. Serbia, the children of which when asked what
they want to become when they grow up usually reply soldier or policeman, is a permanent
candidate for this role. Especially when there is a full lack of any vision what should be done
with Balkan, as it is, after the downfall of Communism.

Naturally, even in this role-offer, the component of fear is of great importance: Serbia, in a
near future will have to face the Albanian issue as a whole; without the consent of Serbia (and
Greece) there is no place for long term conversations on the stability of Macedonia. The Great
Powers calculate that it is much better to talk to Milosevic now, when he has entered the
phase of cooperation, regarding the issue of Kosova, and indirectly Macedonia, than to wait
the raise and the strengthening of a new Serbian leader, to whom the system of the "stick and
the carrot" has to be played on.

The future of the relations Milosevic-Great Powers? As many times before, no bet should be
set on the consistency of Milosevic's acts. For example, the present attitude of the Bosnian
Serbs is necessary to Milosevic so he could prove himself as peace-loving, but also to get
greater concessions. As it could be noticed in the past two months, without the Bosnian Serb
"no", the Great Powers had it hard to understand that full guarantees for the so called Serbian
Republic to have confederation links with the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia were necessary.
Even though the Western general interpretation is that the Bosnian Serb leadership and
Milosevic have fully split, it would be a great challenge to put the hand in fire to defend this
interpretation.

On the other hand, Great Powers need Milosevic in their urge to, by as less concessions as
possible (as could be the opening of the Belgrade airport or allow the "Kolo" ensemble dance
for the Helsinki students) gain as much as possible. And this, from the start, has nothing to do
with Former Yugoslavia, but rather with the recomposition of the world after the destruction
of Communism. Since the beginning of the new affair between Milosevic and the big, the one
most to gain was the new American-Russian love affair, by introducing the Russian
diplomacy on Western rails. By all means, the others to gain were also the
Western-Europeans, first of all Germany, which has started its long path of conversion into a
great political force, including in this path its Eastern policy of partnership with Russia.

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What could the repercussions be in a near future? If Milosevic remains in this path, he will
have many sticks with carrots hanging in front of him. He will be requested to settle the
relations with Croatia, he will be pressured to install an institutional life (autonomy) in
Kosova, models of autonomy for Vojvodina and Sandzak will be sought, the respect of the
integrity of Macedonia and its recognition as a new state will be requested. In fact, he will be
requested to be president of Serbia, a state which is supposed to have good relations with
other states.

He will be offered on the other hand, the possibility to continue with his political model, as
Milovan Djilas had defined it to a Western diplomat: "a dictatorial democracy or democratic
dictatorship", not to be prosecuted for war crimes, as well as a series of smaller concessions
towards lifting up the sanctions.

In all this game, the new lovers, Milosevic and the Great Powers, are planning to reach a
balance in time. The Great Powers, waiting for Milosevic to concentrate so much on the game
of the carrot, which would make him forget his warring appetite. Milosevic, on the other
hand, expecting the Great Powers, in a mixture of interests, often contradictory, to reach a
consensus to give up fully the slow tempo of eliminating Milosevic's isolation and him to be
taken as the most serious partner in the Balkans' circus.

Some Milosevic's biographers claim that with his behavior he has infatuated only his wife.
The biographers of the Great Powers, historians, have never mentioned the factor of love in
the behavior of their objects of study.

EDITORIAL

ESCAPING THE FEELING

by VETON SURROI

A woman, expert on the area told me: "Your posture towards violence is imposing". Data on
mortal victims in demonstrations, arrests and beatings were evidenced in her northern
country.

"We must take note of the fact that we are forgetting to cry", I told her. When you forget to
cry, I thought, while we continued talking while walking in her town in the North, you forget
a part of your nature. When this happens to a community, it as a whole, loses a part of its
nature. Happiness, anger and sadness are children of one womb and you can't separate them.

So are fear and courage.

Last week I remembered the stroll in that town in the North, while reading the Serbian and
Albanian interpretations of the murder of Violeta Dervishaj in Deçan.

According to the Serbs, several bullets in the air, and the news was composed in such a way
that it could be implied that the shooting could have been done also by Albanians, caused the
death of a young mother. One standard evasion of the Serbian authorities, which usually
blame the others. The lack of the basic feeling for the loss of one life has become almost

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understandable for a regime which has brought hundreds and thousands of deaths in the
territories of the Former Yugoslavia.

According to Albanians, this was a death caused by an action of the Serbian police, which
was evaluated as a provocation. Even more, the information further on emphasized, that the
"citizens of Deçan didn't fall to the provocation". Another evasion, once again a common
evasion on the part of the Albanians. An incident is evaluated as a provocation, as a
premeditated organization with the aim to cause the negative reaction of the Albanians,
negative in the sense of the physical reaction to repression. This phase lead to the second,
stating that the citizens didn't let themselves be provoked. In fact, it comes out that they came
out winners. Forgetting a death. And forgetting the feelings.

It is not the first time that something of the kind happens, that an alibi is sought to forget the
feelings. Not even a month passed since the murder of the six years' old Fidan Brestovci in
his father's car. In that occasion too, the Serbian authorities gave a semi-explanation which
implied that the state had done wrong: it had killed a six years' old child instead of a
grown-up Albanian. The difference was only in the age, and not in the act of depriving
someone from his life. To the Albanians, on the other hand, this was another reason to state
that they should not be captivated by such provocations.

These are not provocations. If there is a stirring motive behind the killings, then this is the
comfortableness of action of the violently imposed Serbian regime, its will to keep the level
of violence on constant temperature in order to still wish for its presence and intimidate the
population. Who does not provoke here.

The only thing that should provoke everybody who is being cooked in Kosova's pot, is the
conscience. A conscience which should tell us that we can't escape the feeling of pain for the
loss of human lives by stating that thus we escaped another provocation.

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