Achacoso v.

Macaraig
Facts:
Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration on October 16, 1987, and
assumed office on October 27, 1987. On January 2, 1990, in
compliance with a request addressed by the President of the
Philippines to "all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant
Secretaries, Bureau Heads," and other government officials, he filed
a courtesy resignation. This was accepted by the President on April
3, 1990, "with deep regrets."

On April 10, 1990, the Secretary of Labor requested him to turn
over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer in-charge. In
a letter dated April 19, 1990, he protested his replacement and
declared he was not surrendering his office because his resignation
was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's
directive. On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was
appointed Administrator of the POEA, in place of Achacoso.

Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again
asked to vacate his office. He filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. He filed this petition for prohibition and mandamus to
annul the appointment of Sarmiento and to prohibit the
respondents from preventing the petitioner from discharging his
duties as Administrator of the POEA. Achacoso contends that he is
a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys
security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career
Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. Claiming to
have the rank of undersecretary, he says he comes under Article IV,
Section 5 of P.D. 807

Issue:
Whether the President erred in replacing Achacoso

Held:
No. It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only
"to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to
which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed." Achacoso did not qualify. At best, therefore, his
appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it
could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a
moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence.

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does
not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if
he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will
have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn
depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have
the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to
it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of
appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be
regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a
hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person
to discharge the same pending the selection of a permanent or
another appointee. The person named in an acting capacity accepts
the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office
once he is called upon to do so by the appointing authority.

In these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a
method of terminating official relations known in the law of public
officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood at the
outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. When required to relinquish his office, he
cannot complain that he is being removed in violation of his security
of tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent
before the expiration of his term. This is allowed by the Constitution
only when it is for cause as provided by law. The acting appointee is
separated precisely because his term has expired. Expiration of the
term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of
tenure.

Santiago v. CSC
Facts:
Then Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada extended a
permanent promotional appointment, as Customs Collector III, to
petitioner Santiago, Jr. The said appointment was approved by the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), NCR. Prior thereto, Santiago held
the position of Customs Collector I. Respondent Jose, a Customs
Collector II, filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion
Board against Santiago's promotional appointment mainly on the
ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of
Customs III. The Board referred the protest to Commisioner Tanada
for appropriate action.

Commmissioner Tanada upheld Santiago's promotional
appointment. Respondent Jose then appealed to the Board, which,
decided to revoke the petitioner Santiago's appointment and
directed that respondent Jose be appointed in his stead. The Board
denied Santiago's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Respondent Commission affirmed the Board Resolutions on its
own Resolution No. 87-554 saying that although both Santiago and
Jose are qualified for the position of Customs Collector III,
respondent Jose has far better qualifications in terms of
educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars
and training courses taken, and holding as he does by permanent
appointment a position which is higher in rank and salary range.
Hence, this Certiorari Petition filed by Santiago.

Respondent argued that since he is next-in-rank, he should be
appointed to the position of Collector of Customs III. On the other
hand, Commisioner Tanada, upholding Santiago's promotional
appointment, argued that: (1) The next-in-rank rule is no longer
mandatory; (2) the protestee is competent and qualified for the
position and such fact was not questioned by the protestant; (3)
existing laws and jurisprudence give wide latitude of discretion to
the appointing authority provided there is no clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion or fraud.

Issue:
Whether or not Santiagos promotional appointment should be
upheld.

Held:
Yes. Previous ruling in Taduran vs. Civil Service Commission states
that there is no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the
(Civil Service Law) that persons next-in-rank are entitled to
preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they would
be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and
if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by
transfer or other modes of appointment.

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration
for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does not necessarily
follow that he and no one else can be appointed as provided for in
Section 4

CSC Resolution No. 83-343 which states that: an
employee who holds a next-in-rank position who is deemed the
most competent and qualified, possesses an appropriate civil
service eligibility, and meets the other conditions for promotion
shall be promoted to the higher position when it becomes vacant.
However, the appointing authority may promote an employee
who is not next-in-rank but who possesses superior qualifications
and competence compared to a next-in-rank employee who
merely meets the minimum requirements for the position.

The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing
power has a wide-latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for
the position. To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would
impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the
policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the
appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice
of the one he deems fit for appointment. Given this, there is no
reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The
minimum qualifications and the standard of merit and fitness have
been adequately satisfied as found by the appointing authority. The
latter has not been shown to have committed any grave abuse of
discretion.

Hernandez v. Villegas
Facts:
Epifanio Villegas, a lawyer and civil service eligible, was appointed
Director for Security of the Bureau of Customs. After a year, he was
sent to the US to study enforcement techniques and customs
practices. When he returned to the Philippines, he was temporarily
detailed to the Arrastre Service vice Eleazar Manikin and, in his
stead, James Keefe was designated Acting Director for Security.

Secretary of Finance Jaime Hernandez proposed to the Office of the
President the permanent appointment of Villegas as Arrastre
Superintendent, stating in his letter that this involves a change of
designation and status from Director for Security which is
confidential in nature to Arrastre Superintendent, a classified
position. (demotion) A few days later, the appointment of James
Keefe to the position of Director for Security was likewise proposed.
This was approved by the President.

Villegas served notice on Customs Commissioner Eleuterio Capapas
that he was resuming the duties and functions of his office as
Director for Security. Villegas filed action for quo warranto in CFI of
Manila. The court gave judgment for Villegas. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Villegas' removal from office is without cause or
illegal

HELD:
Yes. Villegas' removal from the Office of Director for Security is
without cause and is therefore illegal. Even though the position
involved in this case is primarily confidential, it is nevertheless
subject to the Constitutional provision that No officer or employee
in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause. Villegas' removal is, therefore, concededly without cause.

Officials and employees holding primarily confidential positions
continue only for so long as confidence in them endures. The
termination of their official relation can be justified on the ground
of loss of confidence because in that case their cessation from
office involves no removal but merely the expiration of the term of
office. But the point is that as long as confidence in them endures
(and it has been shown that it has been lost in this case) the
incumbent is entitled to continue in office.

Note: Na-confuse ako kasi diba the statement na: and it has been shown
that it has been lost in this case means that there is no longer confidence.
Therefore, legal yung dismissal sakanya? Try to consult the orig.

Santos v. Yatco
Facts:
In a petition for prohibition filed before the SC, then Secretary of
Defense Alejo Santos was disallowed for campaigning personally for
Governor Tomas Martin in the province of Bulacan.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition should be granted.

Ratio:
No. The position of department secretaries is not embraced and
included within the terms officers and employees in the Civil
Service. When he campaigned for Gov. Martin, he was then acting
as a member of the Cabinet in discussing the issues before the
electorate and defending the actuations of the administration to
which he belongs;

The question of impropriety as distinct from illegality of such
campaign because of its deleterious influence upon the members of
the armed forces, who are administratively subordinate to the
Secretary of National Defense and who are often called upon by the
COMELEC to aid in the conduct of election, is not justiciable by the
court.

Arroyo v. DOJ
Facts:
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing
of new witnesses indicating occurrence of massive electoral fraud
and manipulation of election results in 2004 and 2007, COMELEC
issued a Resolution approving the creation of a committee jointly
with the DOJ which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during 2004 and
2007.

Thereafter, petitioners filed petitions for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the creation of the fact finding committee and joint panel
on the ground that DOJ has no jurisdiction over prosecution of
election offenses.

Issue:
Whether or not there is factual basis for the creation of a fact-
finding committee and joint panel.

Ratio:
Yes. Although it is embodied in Section 2, Article IX-C and the
Omnibus Election Code that the prosecution of election fraud,
offenses and malpractices is lodged within the COMELEC, the latter
was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself
of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, under Section 2 Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants are given
continuing authority as deputies to conduct preliminary
investigation of complaints involving election offenses under
election laws and to prosecute the same.

Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged
with the COMELEC, the prosecutors had been conducting
preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated
authority given by the COMELEC. The deputation of the Provincial
and City Prosecutors is necessitated by the need for prompt
investigation and dispensation of election cases as an indispensable
part of the task of securing fine, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. Enfeebled by lack of funds and the magnitude of
its workload, the petitioner does not have a sufficient number of
legal officers to conduct such investigation and to prosecute such
cases.

It is, therefore, not only the power but the duty of both the
COMELEC and the DOJ to perform any act necessary to ensure the
prompt and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
Pursuant to the above constitutional and statutory provisions, and
as will be explained further below, we find no impediment for the
COMELEC and the DOJ to create the Joint Committee and Fact-
Finding Team for the purpose of conducting a thorough
investigation of the alleged massive electoral fraud and the
manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 national
elections relating in particular to the presidential and senatorial
elections.

Mison v. COA
Facts:
Mison was the Commissioner of Customs. He declared the seizure
of a Japanese vessel, MV Hyojin as invalid. He thus ordered the
release of said vessel. However, the vessel was not released. It sank
while in the custody of the Bureau of Customs

Chan then filed a claim with the COA for the value of the sunken
vessel. ($50,000). By authority of the Acting Chair, Mr. Espiritu (who
was the Manager of the Technical Services), denied the claim. The
claimants thus questioned the authority of Mr. Espiritu in denying
the claim.

Thru their lawyer Atty David, moved for the reconsideration, writing
a letter to the Acting COA Chair Tantuico. He argued that the
decision in the case was rendered only by the Manager, and not by
the Acting Chairman, much less the COA itself. He contends that
the decision is void because the matter should be acted upon only
by the COA duly constituted (ie, by the Chair and the 2 Comm.) (at
this time, the COA is not yet fully constituted).

Acting COA Chair Tantuico denied the claim as well. Tantuico
adopted the Espiritu decision. Again, Atty David moved for
reconsideration, now arguing that Acting Chair Tantuico also had no
authority to act on the case. He requested that the same be
submitted for resolution by the COA itself, after the appointment of
2 commissioners.

Later, the COA was finally fully constituted. Atty David still wrote
another letter, for the payment of their claims. In a 4
th

Indorsement, Chairman Domingo, acting for the Commission,
reconsidered the decision of Acting Chairman Tantuico. Chairman
Domingo granted the claim. He forwarded the decision to grant the
claim to Mison. Mison now sought clarification on the legal
implication of the 4
th
Indorsement. He contends that the first COA
decision, although signed only by a Manger Espiritu, was ratified
or made valid because it was adopted in toto as a decision of the
COA in the subsequent letters.

Issue:
Whether or not the decision is valid.
What would happen to all decisions signed by Acting Chair Tantuico
alone (since at that time, he was the only one designated and no
other commissioner has been appointed).
Whether or not the 4
th
indorsement is valid.

Ratio:
INVALID. In the first place, the decision by the Manager Espiritu was
void ab initio. As Manager of the Technical Services, Mr. Espiritu
obviously had no power to render or promulgate a decision of or for
the Commission. Even the Chairman alone, had not that power. As
clearly set out in the Constitution, the power was lodged in the
COA, composed of a Chairman and 2 Commissioners, to decide any
case brought before it.

Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by Acting
Chair Tantuico was inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an
act void ab initio because it was done absolutely without authority.
The act has to be done anew by the person or entity duly endowed
with authority to do so.

Further, no proper ratification or validation could have been
effected by Acting Chair Tantuico, since he was not the Commission,
and he himself had no power to decide any case brought before the
COA. That power, is lodged on the in the COA itself, a collegial body.

Also, it must be made clear that the Espiritu decision was not
merely technically invalid for lack of collegiality. IT WAS
SUBSTANTIVELY VOID AB INITIO. It was rendered without
jurisdiction, Hence, it has an essential and inherent defect which
could not have been waived.

Valid in the absence of a challenge. The principle should logically
apply only to those particular instances where there was a timely
and specific challenge to the authority of the Acting COA chair in the
exercise of adjudication. It should not affect all other cases where
the parties expressly or by implication accepted the adjudicative
authority of the Acting COA Chair.

Valid. When the 4
th
Indorsement Decision was rendered, there were
already 2 Commissioners (meaning the COA was fully constituted
already), clearly a number sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
requirement for collegial action. Even so, the 4
th
Indorsement made
it clear that it was the Decision of the Commission, when Chairman
Domingo placed FOR THE COMMISSION in the decision. Records
also show that the other commissioners concurred in the decision.