Horn XXV II

http://hornofafrica.newark.rutgers.
edu
VOLUME XXV 2007
HORN OF
AFRICA
AN INDEPENDENT JOURNAL
_________________________________________
The Horn of Africa as a Democratic Project:
Some Conceptual Issues
Maimire Mennasemay
An Americans View of the Horn of Africa
From World War II to the Present
Theodore M. Vestal
Ethiopia on the Fire of Competing Nationalisms:
The Oromo Peoples Movement, the State, and the West
Asafa J alata
The Islamic Courts, Ethiopias Intervention in Somalia, and Its
Implications for Regional Stability
Hassan Mahadallah
Local and Global Norms: Challenges to Somalilands
Unilateral Secession
Faisal Roble
Cultural Contexts and Bilateral Aid in the Horn of Africa:
USAID Education Funding in Somalia and Somaliland
Mary Faith Mount-Cors
The Islamic Courts and Ethiopias Intervention in Somalia:
Redemption or Adventurism?
Said S. Samatar
Plus
Hussein Adam:
How an Ordinary Boy Became an Extraordinary Man

HORN OF AFRICA


Volume XXV 2007

Maimire Mennasemay
An Americans View of the Horn of Africa
From World War II to the Present
Theodore M. Vestal
Asafa J alata
The Islamic Courts, Ethiopias Intervention in Somalia, and Its
Implications for Regional Stability
Hassan Mahadallah
Local and Global Norms: Challenges to Somalilands
Faisal Roble
Said S. Samatar
Plus
Hussein Adam:
The Horn of Africa http://hornorafrica.newark.rutgers.edu
ii
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iii

HORN OF AFRICA VOLUME XXV 2007

Founder/Proprietor Osman S. Ali

Editor Said S. Samatar
Managing Editor Maureen ORourke
Associate Editors Paulos Milkias
Maimire Mennasemay
Hamdesa Tuso

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Mahamed Dahir Afrah
Director of Somali PEN

Mohammad H. Ali
Professor of African History
Georgia State University

Edmond Keller
Professor of Political Science
University of California--Los
Angeles

David Laitin
Professor of Political Science
Stanford University
Stanford, CA

Muddathir Abdel-Rahim
Professor of Political Science and
Islamic Studies
International Institute of Islamic
Thought & Civilization, Malaysia

Alberto Sbacchi
Professor of History
Atlantic Union College
South Lancaster, MA

Mohamed K. S. Takar
Poet and Freelance Writer

Gebru Tareke
Professor of History,
Hobart and William Smith
Colleges
Geneva, NY

HORN OF AFRICA VOLUME XXV 2007

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Richard Hayward
Emeritus Professor of Ethiopian Linguistic Studies
School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London

Bernd Heine
Emeritus Professor of Cushitic Studies and
Director of African Studies,
University of Cologne,
Federal Republic of Germany

Asmarom Legesse
Professor Emeritus of Anthropology,
Asmara University
Asmara, Eritrea

I.M. Lewis
Professor Emeritus of Anthropology,
London School of Economics and Political Science,
London, England

Berekett Hapte Selassie
Professor of African Studies
Department of African and Afro-American Studies
Professor of Law
School of Law
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

v
HORN OF AFRICA
VOLUME 25 2007

Table of CONTENTS
Horn of Africa Editorial Policy ii
Format and Submission Guidelines ii
Editorial vi
Note on Contributors xi
ARTICLES
Maimire Mennasemay 1
An Americans View of the Horn of Africa from
World War II to the Present
Theodore M. Vestal 71
Asafa Jalata 90
The Islamic Courts, Ethiopias Intervention in Somalia,
And Its Implications for Regional Stability
Hassan Mahadallah 135
Local and Global Norms: Challenges to Somalilands Unilateral
Secession
Faisal Roble 165
Mary Faith Mount-Cors 197
Said Samatar 222
Hussein Adam:
Hassan MahadallahIntroduction
Said SamatarTribute Speech
Hussein AdamResponse 235

vi
EDITORIAL

MAY YOU LIVE IN INTERESTING TIMES, says a classical
Chinese curse. Lately, the Horn of Africa in general, and Somalia in
particular, has been in the grip of interesting times. Consider the
concatenation of these calamities: in Mogadishu, Somalias capital, an
insurgency rages on that pits an Islamic-clan alliance against an Ethiopian
intervention force in support of the fledgling Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) of Somalia, headed by President Abdullahi Yusuf.
Embroiled in a savage fighting against ruthless insurgents, the beleaguered
Ethiopian troops are alleged to have committed massive atrocities on the
civilian population. A cycle of massacres and counter-massacres has left
an estimated 400,000 displaced persons, now huddled in plastic-sheet
hovels just outside of Mogadishu. Malnutrition, starvation and disease
haunt the hapless Somalis. More alarming, there is a growing risk of
cholera and other opportunist epidemics breaking out in this vast human
wastage.
In an equally savage insurgency in the Somali-inhabited Ethiopias
eastern region of the Ogaadeen, government forces are locked up in a no-
prisoners-taken conflict with the self-styled Ogaadeen National Liberation
Front (ONLF). Once again reports of gross human violations keep
trickling out.
For his part, Mr. Yusuf has finally managed to sack his incompetent,
reputedly penny-grabbing prime Minister, Ali M. Geddi. Geddi, who is
said to have driven a hard bargain for an asylum sanctuary and a cushy
pocket for family and self in return for agreeing to resign, is now about to
settle comfortably in the United States. And there is no guarantee that the
new Prime Minister, Muhammad Hussein Nuur, better known by the
nickname of Nuur Cadde, or Nuur the White, an ex-police officer, will do

vii
better by unhappy Somalia. No doubt he has the approval nod of the prime
minister of Ethiopia, strongman Meles Zenawi. There is no need here to
remind the reader that nothing gets done in the TFG that does not have the
express blessing and support of the dour Zenawi, a circumstance that raises
an awkward question: did anyone ever dream that a leader of Ethiopia,
Somalias putative foe, would one day come to have a veto power over the
appointment of a Somali prime minister? Who knew!? For his part, the
wily Zenawi has positioned himself as the Pervez Musharraf of the Horn,
thereby milking the al-Qaeda-paranoid American cash cow. Having
triumphantly deployed himself as an indispensable ally of the West in the
War on Islamo-Fascist Terrorism, he has forced into silence erstwhile
European and American critics of his increasingly undemocratic regime.
Meanwhile, dictator Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea, a man with a small
country and a large ego, who presides over a terrorized starving populace
and whose mental stability is the subject of debate among Eritrean
intellectuals, is hosting an assortment of Somali mullahs and malcontents,
in a bid to fish in the troubled waters of Somalia. He has entered into the
Somalia action to play the game of proxy war with his bte noir, Mr.
Zenawi. Meantime, the feckless Somalis pay in blood and treasure.
And, on another front, as a sideshow to the generalized Somali
miseries, nearly every other month a boatload of Somali emigrants, trying
to cross over to Yemen in search of a better life, perish over the sultry
waters of the Indian Ocean, as the rickety overcrowded dhows of Arab
smugglers capsize in the violent storms of the deservedly-named Bab al-
Mandeb, or the Gate of Tears, that separates the Somali peninsula from
southern Arabia. As well, for good measure, nuclear-waste containing
canteens litter the Somali coast, spewed out into the open by the quakes of
the recent tsunami that devastated Indonesia. These demon bottles are
alleged to have been buried in there as a result of business deals involving
viii
a Somali warlord and the Italian mafia. Additionally, the Somali coast
crawls with homespun pirates, indiscriminately kidnapping men and
materiel. In a weird comedy of errors, occasionally, an American patrol
boat shows up to, literally, blow these rascal-thugs out of the water. May
you live in interesting times, a la Chinese, indeed.
Thus, in the words of the wise Solomon, Without a vision the people
perish. While by no means a dues ex machine, the material in this 2007
volume of the Horn seeks to serve as a guidepost to a better future for the
Horn region. Rigorous in method, meticulous in research, underpinned by
a wealth of documentation and penned in elegant prose, Professor
Maimaire Mennasemays lead article surely sets the bar high in Horn-of-
Africa studies. In The Horn of Africa as a Democratic Project,
Mennasemays delightfully unorthodox scholarly tour de force invokes the
ghosts of the various familiar orthodoxies of governance, exposes their
weaknesses by brilliantly dissecting them, only to discard them. He, for
example, by turns trashes Electoral Democracy, Liberal Democracy,
the Global Millennium Initiative, etc. Even Civil Society, beloved of
pundits and policy makers, does not escape his wrathful censure.
According to Mennasemay, these gods of governance have one fatal flaw
in common: they all foster dependencypolitically, economically,
sociallyand hence inevitably lead to poverty and hopelessness.
Furthermore, in Mennasemays contention, the political, economic and
social elites of the Horn, having been corrupted beyond redemption by the
sleazy outlook of the above panaceas, are hopelessly incapable of
providing the political leadership and socio-economic programs that are
sound enough to lift the region out of its abject poverty. Instead, the true
heroes of Mennasemays conceptualization are those classes that are
untainted by the corrupting influences of effete elitism, namely the
peasants, pastoralists and the urban poor. Thus, he calls for the creation of

ix
capability-driven participation on the part of the latter groups,
institutionalized in a widening circle of political parties beginning with
district councils, then the provincial associations, and, ultimately, regional
political parties.
While one marvels at this vision of a political society of Somali
camel herders, Djibouti goat tenders and Ethiopian Teff tillers along with
the urban downtrodden of all three countries, one is confronted with a
question Mennasemay raises but stops short of delving into, notably
whether these lower class categories have the expert knowledge to
take center stage in a democratic, prosperous Horn of Africa. Still,
unorthodox new insights and fresh perspectives are surely deserving of a
vigorous debate. More than this, throughout Mennasemys lapidary prose,
one senses the sure hand of an expert deploying with philosophic precision
the various techniques of his trade in order to dispatch a host of fatuous
conventionalities.
Professor Theodore Vestal, a seasoned senior in Horn-of-Africa
studies, pulls off a scholarly tour de force by capturing in a modes-sized
essay the contours of the principal events in the region from 1945 to the
present. As such, one savors the panoramic vistas of the Horn that he
paints as he, seemingly effortlessly, journeys from Haile Selassies
Ethiopia to the rise of the notion of Greater Somalia, culminating in the
collapse of Somalia as a state, to Eritreas birth pangs and present misery.
By contrast, Professor Asafa J alatas Ethiopia On The Fire Of Competing
Nationalisms mounts a withering attack on the sins committed against the
long-suffering Oromo people by successive Abyssinian regimesfrom
that of Minilik II to the benighted rule of the late Haile Selassie, followed
by Mengistu Haile-Mariams socialist tyrannies, and most grievously, the
atrocities currently being perpetuated against the Oromo by the present
x
Woyane establishment. Needless to say that, though scholarly, J alatas
piece bristles with rage.
Professor Hassan Mahadallahs The Islamic Courts, Ethiopias
Intervention in Somalia, And Its Implications For Regional Stability is an
incisive study of three recent inter-related developments in troubled
Somalia: a. the 2006 rise of the so-called Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in
South-central Somalia b. Ethiopias intervention on behalf of the rickety
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and c. Americas
active supportfinancially, logistically, militarilyfor Ethiopias
adventurism in Somalia.
Fresh and uncontaminated by academese, the essay is the first to trace
carefullyand competentlythe origins, growth and ultimate grab for
political power of the Somali religionists. Professor Mahadallah, a native
of Mogadishu, who was also a resident of the city during much of the
period of the events in question, deploys his eye-witness opportunity, his
academic discipline and polished prose to offer a brief but vivid portrait of
the evolution, organizational structure and decision-making methods of the
mullahs during the six months (June-December, 2006) of their tenure in
southern Somalia. As well along the way he brings in, for good measure,
globalizations disruptive effects on undeveloped Somalia, Americas
over-zealous encouragement of Ethiopias Meles Zenawi to invade
Somalia in order to eject the Islamists, and the latters impatient eagerness
to oblige, thereby artfully positioning himself as the Pervez Musharraf of
the Horn of Africa. But could Mr. Zenawi also be positioning himself,
unwittingly, for the kind of troubles that are swirling around Musharraf
these days!?
Faisal Robles contribution makes the case against Somalilands
secession without, admirably, falling into the acrimonious polemics that
usually typify discussions on this subject. This is quite an achievement,

xi
given that past discourses on the issue of secession have been characterized
by bitter disputations framed, more often than not, in abusive language.
Roble avoids that trap. Instead, employing a rather sedate style, he
marshals arguments from the charters of the UN, AU and the Arab League,
to show why the northern breakaway regions unilateral decision to secede
constitutes an illegal act that violates all the principles enshrined in the
laws and procedures of the above international bodies. For its part, Horn
Of Africa is delighted to give the reader Robles anti-secession piece so as
to balance the pro-secession entries in volume XXIV of the journal.
The current collection presents Said Samatars chat at Chatham
House, the British Foreign Policy forum in London. It covers some of the
same ground that Mahadallah breaks. Hussein Adam: How An Ordinary
Boy Became An Extraordinary Man contains Said Samatars tribute
speech at a dinner held in honor of Professor Hussein Adam (August 17,
2007) at the tenth convention of the Somali Studies International
Association (SSIA) in Columbus, Ohio. This is followed by Adams
companion response, along with Mahadallahs brief introduction.
xii

Note on Contributors

Hussein Adam, who teaches at the
College of the Holy Cross, is a student
of Somali politics.

Asafa Jalata, who teaches at the
University of Tennessee, is a student of
Ethiopian politics.

Hassan Mahadallah, who teaches
political science at Southern
University, specializes in the Somali
Islamic Courts.

Maimire Mennasemay, a philosopher
at McGill University, writes widely on
Ethiopia.

Mary Faith Mount-Cors is on the
faculty of the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Faisal Roble, an independent scholar,
resides in Los Angeles

Our own Said Samatar needs no
introduction.

Theodore Vestal, who teaches at the
State University of Oklahoma, is a
student of Ethiopian history and
politics.
1
THE HORN OF AFRICA AS A
DEMOCRATIC PROJECT:
SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
Maimire Mennasemay

ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the constitution of a democratic Horn as the solution
for solving the regions political, economic, social and cultural crises. It
points out the inadequacies of objections to this proposal. It discusses how
the practice of concept stretching of democracy, nation and civil society
prevents a conceptualization of democracy that makes the life world of the
Horn its center of gravity. Finally, it proposes an alternative approach
based on an interpretation of democracy as a form of society, of
development as freedom, of freedoms as capabilities, and of political
society as the mediator for realizing this democratic project.
1

The Horn in Crisis
The majority of the inhabitants of the Horn Ethiopia, Somalia,
Eritrea, and Djibouti are among the most impoverished people on earth,
dispossessed and marginalized, without the power to choose and lead a life
free from endemic poverty and oppression. Will the Horns inhabitants still
live in similar or even worse conditions in the twenty first century? No one
who is concerned about the blighted existence of the Horns inhabitants
could avoid raising this question.
Every country in the Horn is in crisis. In Ethiopia a political party
based on ethnicity came to power in 1991, established a minority regime,
and sowed the seeds of ethnic conflicts. It ran tightly scripted elections in
1995, 2000, and 2005, which it won. Despite these victories, the crisis
continued unabated and erupted into massive violence during the general
elections of 2005. In response, the regime imprisoned the leaders and
supporters of the opposition, cracked down on pro-democracy and human
2
rights activists and the press (Ethiopian Human Rights Council 2005,
2006; Human Rights Watch 2005, 2006). In addition, the minority regime
is engaged in a scorched-earth policy and a wanton destruction of human
life in the Ogaadeen region in its futile attempt to impose its interests as the
interests of the inhabitants of Ogaadeen (The Guardian, September 5,
2007).
In Somalia, the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991 created a
power vacuum that clan warlords filled. While the international community
was mediating between the factions, an effort that culminated with the
formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004, in
Mbagathi (Kenya), groups inspired by Islamic principles formed the Union
of Islamic Courts (UIC). The UIC evicted the warlords and brought a
modicum of peace and stability to Somalia. However, in December 2006,
an American-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia ousted the UIC and
brought to power the TFG led by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. And yet, as the
continuing armed conflicts indicate, the invasion has not resolved the
Somali crisis. Moreover, there is the issue of Somaliland whose obscure
legal status harbors potentials for fratricide.
Nor is the situation in Eritrea any better. Eritreans, who
enthusiastically welcomed their independence in 1993, now find
themselves living under a liberation leader who has morphed into a
dictator and ruined the economy. Shortly after coming to power, Isayas
Afewerki went to war against Yemen, made territorial claims on Djibouti,
and tried to seize territory from Ethiopia, triggering the Badme conflict
(1998-2000). The crisis in Eritrea is profound and how it plays out will
have serious consequences for the Horn countries.
Djibouti, the fourth country in the Horn, has an extraverted economy.
It depends on serving as the sea outlet for land-locked Ethiopia and on the
rent derived from French and American military bases. A change of venue
Maimire Mennasemay

3
for Ethiopian imports and exports, and the vagaries of the imperial policies
of France and America, could throw Djibouti into an economic and
political tailspin, creating a dangerous tension in the Horn. In addition,
behind the faade of electoral democracy, there is a simmering political
crisis due to the stranglehold on power that the Rassemblement Populaire
pour le Progrs maintains. Symptoms of this simmering are the arrests of
journalists and opposition politicians (Reporters Sans Frontires,
February, J uly, 2007).
Border disputes compound these internal crises. The Ethiopian and
Eritrean border dispute could re-erupt into war, since both sides are
unwilling to settle the issue through negotiations. The long-running
territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, rooted in irreconcilable
territorial claims, is far from resolved; and Meles Zenawis decision to
intervene militarily in the internal affairs of Somalia is likely to give a
bitter edge to this long-standing conflict.
In addition, a profound economic underdevelopment, with no solution
in sight under current circumstances, afflicts the region. The Horn
countries depend on external sources for essential commodities such as
food, medical supplies, educational material, agricultural inputs, transport
and communication equipments, and so on. Unemployment is high, the
economy is decrepit, and direct foreign investment, generally considered
an indicator of economic vitality, is low (UNICTAD 2005) and the
regions participation in world trade is insignificant (World Trade Report
2006). Not surprisingly, mired in political and economic crises, the Horn
countries have become a cultural wasteland: there is scant research and
development in the natural, social, health, and applied sciences. If
knowledge is power, as modernity posits, the inhabitants of the Horn are
among the most powerless and the least ready to be full participants in
humanitys adventure of modernity. Endemic poverty, unemployment,
4
illiteracy, preventable morbidity, premature mortality, and wars have
transformed the Horn into a permanent recipient of international aid and
charity. This need not be the Horns fate in the twenty first century.
There is no denying that the Horn is trapped in multiple political,
economic and cultural crises. A crisis is not only the expression of danger;
it also represents opportunities for a new solution. However, a new
solution will not emerge if we do not break out from the paralysing cycle
of thinking and acting that is absorbed by and limited to current problems.
Not that immediate responses to ongoing events are unnecessary; rather,
such responses could become part of the building material of a better Horn
if we were to extend our vision and reflect on the kind of future that could
become a light on the horizon that guides our thoughts and actions in the
present. And the only beacon on the horizon that could pierce the darkness
that blankets the Horn is a project of the Horn as a Democratic
Community.
The historical imbrications of the Horn inhabitants are so complex
and deep that it is unlikely that a divided Horn could overcome the present
crises. The rational solution is for the Horn countries to transform
themselves into a common democratic space. They could then tackle their
problems with their combined human and natural resources instead of
wasting these in pursuit of chimerical objectives, such as regional
hegemony over one another, ethnic separatism, or secession from each
other. In the present state of neo-liberal globalization, such objectives
make sense only to those who profit from the internal divisions and
conflicts of the Horn. At first blush, the Horn as a Democratic Community
sounds a reasonable idea. But the crucial question is how to make it
possible. The traditional inter-state approach will not work, for, as past
experience shows, each state remains locked in the logic of its ruling elites
interests camouflaged as national interests. A shift from the logic of
Maimire Mennasemay

5
national interests to that of the interests of the inhabitants of the Horn as
a whole is necessary if the crises that affect the Horn are to be resolved
successfully and if the Horn is to emerge as a unified democratic
community. Since this sounds utopian, I will first clear the ground for the
subsequent arguments by tackling some possible objections to such a
project, and by examining three concepts-democracy, nation, and civil
society-whose stretching frustrates thinking about the Horn as a democratic
project. I will then interpret, from the perspective of the Horn, the idea of
democracy as a form of society from Claude Lefort (1988), a political
philosopher, and the ideas of development as freedom and of freedoms
as capabilities from Amartya Sen (1992, 1993, 2000, 2002), the Nobel
Laureate economist and philosopher, and enucleate from this interpretation
an approach that could facilitate the generation of ideas and practices that
could lead to a democratic, just and prosperous Horn.
Some Preliminary Objections
One may object that the idea of a unified democratic Horn succumbs
to a geographical determinism that conflates physical unity - the fact that
the four countries form a compact territory in the Horn of Africa - with
non-physical unity and underestimates the resistance to unity that the
diversity of the Horns population generates. The objection here would
stand if it were the case that diversity forms an insurmountable barrier to
such a project. It is true that the Western epistemic gaze on the Horn has
weighed heavily on the side that sharpens differences among the Horns
inhabitants. The regions ruling elites have made their own the Wests
anamorphically distorted view of the Horn and hardened these differences
by using them as political tools of divide-and-rule, as one could see from
Meless ethnic politics, Barres clan politics, and the Isayas-Sebhat-Meles
trios assiduous cultivation of Eritreas Italian-created colonial identity.
6
However, were we to make what we could become - a democratic, just and
prosperous community the center of gravity of our reflection, we would
not be trapped in this distorted image of irreconcilable differences. What
the West says about us might be meaningful, but it does not mean it is true.
Winston Churchill, confronted with the overwhelming cultural, linguistic
and religious diversity in India, declared, India is an abstraction India is
a geographical term. It is no more a united nation than the Equator
(Coote and Bachelor 1949: 110). However, Indians, whose self-
understandings, as manifested in Gandhis actions, were rooted in their
own interpretations of who they are and what they could become, proved
Churchill to be wrong. In spite of its population of over one billion and its
bewildering diversity- a diversity that by far outstrips the diversity in the
Horn- India is a united democratic community.
What the example of India shows is that diversity is, like all historical
phenomena, a contingent social fact that is open to interpretations that
could buttress conflict or cooperation, oppression or emancipation.
Apartheid used diversity as a tool of oppression, whereas the African
National Congress mobilized it for the purpose of emancipation. If the
Horns inhabitants are now captives of endemic poverty, fragmentation and
oppression, it is not because of diversity. The causes are the forces that
harness diversity to maintain exploitation, fragmentation and oppression.
If these forces are vanquished, the Horn can manifest itself as a symphony
wherein each diversity necessarily needs the other for the full development
of its self-expression. The idea that the Horns inhabitants cannot
overcome ethnic and clan diversities rests on the untenable assumption that
the people of the Horn are forever stuck with immutable, frozen self-
understandings. Something similar to this assumption informs Lewiss
claim about Somalia: Whether conserved orally or in writing, the
genealogies embodying the invisible force of clanship are, therefore, in
Maimire Mennasemay

7
effect genetic guidelines for the social and political interactions whose
descent they record (2004: 491). Such statements are rooted in an
epistemic fallacy that reduces the realities of the Horn to the empirical
observations of these realities. This kind of reductionism is also what fans
ethnic and clan politics in Ethiopia and Somalia.
That there are clans and ethnies in the Horn is true. However, being a
Darrood, an Afar, a Welayita, an Oromo, an Anuak, an Issa, or a
Hamassein, and so forth, is neither natural nor unnatural. Given our
inherited shared background - part of which is admittedly a history of
conquest and oppression that needs to be recognized so that we could cure
the historical wounds that still fester in our current politics - these identities
are historical, not only descriptively, but also affectively. There are, in the
Horn, cultural and social practices that have, despite our differences,
family resemblances in fundamental respects. Thus, to say a Darrood is
only a Darrood, a Hamassein is only a Hamassein, an Oromo is only an
Oromo, or an Anuak is only an Anuak, a Tigre is only a Tigre, and so on,
is to succumb to a hermetically sealed conception of ethnic / clan
identities. Such a conception castrates the present from the history that
constitutes it and excludes the richness of the Horns history that makes
each identity non-identical with itself and, therefore, more than what it is.
Indeed, given our intertwined historical legacy, there is hardly a
homogeneous cultural self in the Horn. An extra dimension, historical in
its origin, overflows every identity and cashes into the history of the other
ethnic and clan identities, thus becoming a shared dimension. It is this
shared dimension that, to adapt the Kierkegaardian expression, is in us
more than us, thus in excess of every ethnic and clan identity, that the
ruling elites of the Horn repress and demonize, for its recognition
undermines their interests. In it, gestate possibilities for forging a coalition
of memories and aspirations for a better world that could facilitate the birth
8
of the Horn as a shared democratic space. Only by refracting democracy
and development through the prism of this shared dimension could the
Horn transcend its divisions, overcome the inequalities that modernization
brings in its wake, and become the master of its destiny.
One could buttress the argument above with some significant
historical events. Since at least the reign of Amde Tsion (circa 1314-
1344), there have been interactions between the various populations of the
Horn mediated by wars, commerce, and religious expansions. These
relations have deeply reworked major aspects of the demographic and
cultural relations of the region (Lewis 2002; Marcus 1994; 1999; Laitin
and Samatar 1987; Hassen 1990; Abir 1968). The changes triggered by the
war of the charismatic Imam Ahmad Ibrahim al-Ghazi (1506-43), or
Gragn, as the Ethiopians call him, wrecked the Ethiopian state and
reconfigured the distribution of power, population and cultures, leading to
new articulations of elites, ethnies and cultures. One of the unintended
consequences of Imam Ahmads campaigns was the increased porousness
of the demographic, economic, political and cultural boundaries between
the highlands and the lowlands of the Horn on a scale that did not exist
before his rise to power. From this perspective, Imam Ahmad or Gragn is
as much an Ethiopian as he is a Somali. He is a symbol of the possible
unity of the Horn in that his effort to unify the Horn, even if it has a
religious motivation, expresses the recognition of the existence of the Horn
as a community of shared fate. This is one of the exceptional cases where
one has to discard received wisdom and throw out the baby - Imam
Ahmads goal of the religious unification of the Horn - and keep the
historical bathwater, which brought to an end the isolation of clans,
ethnies, regions and cultures, and made possible the birth of mutually
binding antagonistic and non-antagonistic relations between them. The
centuries of interactions between the Horns inhabitants that emerged from
Maimire Mennasemay

9
this new historical context have replaced the preexisting sporadic relations
with long-range interests that have matured into pan-ethnic, pan-clan, and
pan-regional issues amenable to approaches in terms of universal
principles such as freedom, equality, fraternity and justice. Despite
appearances to the contrary, the inherited historical conditions thus gestate
possibilities of Horn-wide solutions to the present crises. However, these
solutions could find their expressions only in a democratic Horn.
Another possible objection is the one that refers to the physical
environment of the Horn. Markakis (1998) argues that the Horns
environment is poor, increasing the likelihood of conflicts over scare
resources. There is a soupon of Darwinian argument in this objection
that, given the scarcity of resources, a violent struggle for survival pitting
ethnie against ethnie, clan against clan, country against country, is
unavoidable. However, this objection is not persuasive. First, resources
are a function of the productive forces at hand: the weaker the productive
forces, the less efficiently resources are identified and transformed to meet
human needs. One could argue, in light of countries that have modernized
despite scarce resources, that there is no environment in-itself, and that
knowledge and labor establish the degree of its resource-richness. The
scarcity of resources in the Horn has more to do with the weakness of
productive forces than with the nature of the regions environment.
Moreover, one must recognize that there are built-in complementarities
between the four zones that characterize the Horn: the highlands, the
lowlands, the temperate regions in-between, and the littoral regions of the
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Indeed, these complementarities provide a
strong material basis for a unity of the Horn.
Indeed, an objection to the Horn as a democratic project betrays a
pessimism that occludes those moments of the Horns history when its
inhabitants have risen to challenges that at the time also seemed beyond
10
their means. One could, inter alia, refer to Meniliks defeat of the colonial
designs of Italy, France and Great Britain; to Sayyid Muhammad Abdille
Hasans inspiring struggles (1903 to 1920) against foreign domination; and
to the Ethiopian Patriotic Resistance, which drew its members from
various areas of the Horn, against Fascist occupation (1936-1941). One
can thus see that, despite the unfulfilled hopes of a better future gestating
in these struggles, the inhabitants of the Horn have shown that they have
the will and the capacity to be the authors of their own destinies. Buried in
such events are collective memories of aspirations for a better world that
could serve as foundations for building a democratic, just and prosperous
Horn.
One may object that the inhabitants of the Horn have conflicting
collective memories, and that such memories are obstacles for the creation
of a unified democratic community. But such an objection suffers from a
monochromic conception of collective memories. Collective memories are
not homogeneous (Le Goff 1992). They carry within themselves
contradictory webs of meanings within which we could discern not only
conflicting narratives but also shared aspirations for justice, freedom and
prosperity that could serve as the foundation for a coalition of memories
for a better future. The multiple crises the new century inherits from the
last one could be seen, then, as challenges, indeed, as pressing invitations,
to build a coalition of memories for a better world and to unveil and
actualize the Horns shared aspirations for democracy, social justice and
prosperity. To be sure, there are obstacles that stand against such a project.
They are the internal forces that generate the present crises; and
overcoming these internal enemies is more demanding than defeating
external ones. Nevertheless, this difficulty cannot be a sufficient reason for
giving up on the task to create a better future. What is at stake is our
Maimire Mennasemay

11
responsibility in the face of the meaningless wasting of the lives of
millions of human beings.
Prima facie, then, objections to the idea of the Horn as a democratic
project are not strong enough to justify rejecting it. Indeed, there is already
a negative unity of the Horn, based on a shared history of conflicts,
exploitation and oppression. We, the inhabitants of the Horn, feel
somewhat part of it without feeling fully part of it, as if we were vaguely
conscious of an unfinished task - the creation of the Horn as a shared space
of freedom, justice and prosperity. The alternative to this negative unity is
not fragmentation, but rather the creation of a positive unity of the Horn
based on democracy. However, the possibility of such an evolution could
have purchase only if we clarify what we mean by democracy in the
context of the Horn. I will consider the issue in two steps. First, I will
discuss the epistemic and political obstacles that arise from the stretching
of three key concepts current in the Horn -democracy, nation, and civil
society - and prevent us from thinking about and acting upon the
possibility of the Horn as a democratic project. In a second step, I will
argue that only a democracy conceived as a form of society (Lefort
1988) based on the elimination of unfreedoms and committed to the
enhancement of capabilities (Sen 1992, 1993, 2000, 2002; Drze and
Sen 2002) could effectively prepare the ground for the constitution of the
Horn as a democratic community.
Democracy and the Horn: Some Conceptual Bottlenecks
Albert Camus writes that Mal nommer les choses, cest contribuer
au malheur du monde (quoted in Boulouque 2004: 46); that is, to name
things wrongly is to add to the misery of the world. Critical theory also
points out the importance of the proper naming of social practices and of
the ethical dimension of the application of concepts, an idea that Theodor
12
Adorno expresses as the hope of the name (1973: 53). In the study of the
Horn, indeed in the study of Africa, not much attention is paid to the
ethical dimension of the use of concepts. The misnaming of social
phenomena is not only misleading, it has also destructive consequences
insofar as it leads to practices that augment human suffering. One of the
most common ways of misnaming in the study of the Horn is what Sartori
calls conceptual stretching (1970: 1034) or concept stretching (1991:
249).
According to Sartori, concept stretching is the practice of discarding
elements constitutive of the original meaning of the concept in order to
make it cover more cases than the original meaning allows. The result is a
thin conceptualization that provides gains in extensional coverage but
generates losses in connotative precision (1970: 1035). In the Horn,
concept stretching involves thinning out a concept such that one could
classify authoritarian regimes as democracies, novel historical formations
as nations, and social organizations with qualitatively different
organizational principles as civil society. The practice of concept
stretching transforms differences of kind into differences of degree. Thus,
it reduces democracy to electoral democracy, and the difference between
an authoritarian regime that uses multiparty elections as a faade to stay in
power - the EPRDF regime in Ethiopia, for example, - and a democratic
regime of multiparty elections where the rulers are actually accountable to
the electorate becomes a difference of degree rather than of kind. Sartori
points out that such a procedure amounts to pure and simple
terminological camouflage: things are declared alike by making them
verbally identical (1052). Concept stretching hides qualitative differences
and prevents us to see when a regime is not democratic, when a group is
not a nation, and when a social organization is not civil society. By
minimizing the properties covered by these concepts, concept stretching
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13
increases the number of cases to which each of these concepts applies,
making the concepts vague and porous.
Sartoris critique of concept stretching is, however, from an
empiricist perspective and is a call for developing comparative empirical
concepts through a ladder of abstraction (1970:1940). He fails to see the
ethical point Camus and critical theory raise: that concept stretching adds
to the miseries of the world and is therefore morally wrong. Stretching
concepts detaches them from the history from which they emerge and
extends them to name social practices in the Horn that exist against
background meanings and practices that are different. The result is
epistemic violence - the power of naming that doubles up as the power
of silencing and negating (Spivak 1994: 76). Epistemic violence
contributes to the discursive conditions that breed political and socio-
economic violence. Of the many places where this is true, the Horn is one
of them.
The Concept stretching of Democracy in the Horn
If there ever has been an idea that has inspired political struggles in
the Horn since the 1960s, it is democracy. It is also an idea that has
suffered from the contradictory ways different political movements have
appropriated it. Groups who claim to struggle for democracy have often
massacred each other. In 1974, there were at least three major groups in
Ethiopia that were claiming to act in the name of democracy: the Mela
Ethiopia Socialist Neqenaqe (MEISON), the yItyop'ya Hzbawi Abyotawi
Party (IHAPA), and the Derg (Tiruneh 1993; Tesfaye 1985). The first two
engaged in reciprocal assassinations, and by the end of 1978, the Derg, a
military dictatorship claiming to institute socialist democracy, decimated
both MEISON and IHAPA. In Eritrea, two movements, the ELF (Eritrean
Liberation Front) and the EPLF (Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front), both
14
claiming to struggle for a democratic order engaged in a veritable civil
war, with the EPLF eliminating the ELF in 1974. In Somalia, the Somali
Youth League (SYL) adopted a democratic form of government at
independence in 1960. But it was short-lived, one of the reasons being a
profusion of political parties with non-reconcilable conceptions of
democracy.
2
A body called the Supreme Revolutionary Council took
power in 1969. A year later, Siyad Barre, the strongman of the Council,
claimed to found a socialist democratic regime. He was overthrown in
1991 (Lewis 2002). The same year, a new regime, engineered by the
Tigrai Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), came to power in Ethiopia, also
claiming to implement democracy. Yet, opposition parties condemn it as
an ethnic dictatorship. In response, the regime accuses the opposition of
being enemies of democracy and regularly arrests and throws its leaders
and militants in jail.
One may be tempted to look at these disagreements regarding
democracy in the Horn in terms of Gallies analysis of an essentially
contested concept (1968:157-191). According to Gallie, such a concept
must be openended, refer to an essentially complex activity, be appraisive
and subject to important modifications in light of changing circumstances
(161). The various parties use it differently in that they give primacy to
different elements of the concept and appeal to different criteria in
applying it. However, in order to ensure that the debate between the
protagonists deals with a single concept, without which condition there are
no genuine disputes (183), Gallie holds that the essentially contested
concept is derived from an original exemplar acknowledged by all the
parties (165). He gives the concept of democracy in the West as an
example of an essentially contested concept rooted in an original exemplar
acknowledged by the protagonists (180). As a result, the competing uses of
the concept enables the original exemplars achievement to be sustained
Maimire Mennasemay

15
or developed (168). This is a crucial point, for it shows why democracy
in the Horn is not an essentially contested concept but rather a motley of
non-shared borrowed concepts, and why the struggles over it neither
develop nor sustain it but, on the contrary, lead to parallel monologues that
end up with violence and tyranny.
In saying that there must be an original exemplar of democracy
acknowledged by all the parties, Gallie assumes the existence of a shared
background of historically generated meanings and practices regarding
democracy (180). There is no such shared background of meanings and
practices about democracy in the Horn. This does not mean, however, that
democracy cannot exist in the Horn, but that it cannot be simply borrowed.
What the Horn has experienced since the 70s is a variety of imported
exemplars of democracy. The Derg borrowed its exemplar of democracy
from the Soviet model. Opposition parties such as MEISON and IHAPA
borrowed theirs from either the Soviet or the Maoist model; and the TPLF
(the core of the current regime in Ethiopia) borrowed its exemplar, before
its conversion to electoral democracy, from Enver Xoxhas Albania. Siyad
Barre borrowed his from the Soviet Union, and Isayas Afewerki from the
Baath party. Indeed, these borrowed exemplars are themselves the result
of concept stretching that has made democracy so thin that it covers
totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union, China, and Albania. Even with
the demise of these exemplars, concept stretching has not ended. On the
contrary, it is now applied to liberal democracy and is called
democratization. Liberal democracy is stretched to become electoral
democracy - the thin understanding of representative, liberal democracy
that can travel across sociocultural contexts (Lindberg 2006: 21).
Djibouti since 1992 and Ethiopia since 1995 practice electoral democracy.
3

The conundrum is that, though the formal requirements of concept-
stretched liberal democracy competitive multiparty elections, universal
16
suffrage, right to vote and to run for office are fulffilled, electoral
democracy leaves the people as politically, socially and economically
powerless as they were before its introduction.
The concept stretching of democracy commits an epistemic violence
that negates the historicity of social practices in the Horn and leads, as a
result, to an impoverishment in thinking which reduces disagreements
between parties into irreconcilable dichotomies and magnifies the
ideological distance between them. Thus, political differences between
adversaries that claim to be pro-democracy take the fundamentalist
characteristics of the struggle between good and evil. Demonization,
persecution, torture and the physical liquidation of opponents thus become
the main methods of settling political disagreements. Since the 1960s,
such practices have become a permanent fixture of modern politics in the
Horn, with or without electoral democracy.
The proliferation of pseudo-concepts such as virtual democracy,
tutelary democracy, authoritarian democracy, illiberal democracy
(J oseph 1998; Diamond 2002; Diamond and Plattner 1999; Zakaria 1996)
to describe regimes such as the ones that now exist in Ethiopia and
Djibouti testifies to the theoretical and political cul-de-sac that concept
stretching creates.

Instead of recognizing the reality that such regimes are
not democratic, ad hoc concepts are developed in a way that is reminiscent
of Ptolemys method of using epicycles to save theory in the face of
recalcitrant facts to classify these regimes as democratic. Concept
stretching opens the door to conceptual tourism and allows liberal
democracy to travel across sociocultural contexts as electoral democracy.
In the process, it reduces democracy to elections, fudges the frontiers
between authoritarianism and democracy, and provides dictators such as
Barre in Somalia and Meles in Ethiopia a dubious democratic legitimacy
(Pausewang, Tronvoll, Aalen 2002). Concept stretching has also made
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17
possible a democracy that is divorced from social and economic justice by
reducing democracy to a procedure of choosing the personnel that controls
the levers of a state stripped of its economic and social responsibilities.
Electoral democracy cannot facilitate the democratic unity of the Horn,
because it cannot cope with and, therefore, perpetuates political and socio-
economic exclusions that foster internal and regional political and socio-
economic crises.
The Concept Stretching of Nation
The concept stretching of democracy in the Horn is intertwined with
the stretching of two other concepts: nation and civl society. The so-called
nationality question has dominated political debates in the Horn since the
1960s. Are Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti nations? Are the
Oromos, the Amharas, the Tigres, the Gurages, and so forth, nations?
These questions have become the source of divisions and destructive
diversions of the resources and talents of the Horn, blocking the way to the
development of a free, just and prosperous Horn community.
The concept of nation developed as Europes mode of self-
understanding of its history of socio-political transformations. The
historical specificity of the issues these transformations raised can be
imagined from the fact that The members of political units in Europe went
from some 500 in the year 1500 to some dozens by the beginning of the
ninteenth century (Schnapper 30), and that during this period, Europe
went through the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Thirty Years War, the
Enlightenment, the French Revolution (1789), the Napoleanic wars,
colonial expansion, the transition from mercantalism to capitalism, and
industrialization. Whether one understands the concept of nation in the
J acobin sense as an aggregate of citizens or in the Herderian sense as Volk,
it is a historically loaded concept that cannot be used innocently to grasp
18
the political identities of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti or Eritrea; or of the
Amharas, Oromos, Tigres, and so forth. The people of the Horn emerge
from a history whose trajectory is radically different from the one that led
to the emergence of the concept of nation as Europes way of self-
understanding. Unless we consider the historical trajectories and self-
interpretations of Europe as natural processes that are inevitably replicable
everywhere, none of the countries and communities of the Horn are
nations in the same sense that France and Germany are nations, because
the meanings and practices constitutive of the Horns history are radically
different from those of Europe. A telling example of the historicity of the
concept of nation is the case of Somalia. The Somali word Qaran means
nation and meets the stretched concept of nation as a people having a
common language, culture, religion, and territory.
4
But the historical
trajectory of Somalia has not led to the formation of a nation-state in the
European sense. And there is no reason why it should, for there is no
natural law that dictates that every people should have the form and
content of nation in the European sense. The same could be said of
Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Unlike democracy, the nation does not
have a universalistic moral foundation. There is nothing wrong in not being
a nation.
Yet, since the 1960s, the idea of nation has been the source of violent
conflicts in the Horn. Since the historicity of the concept of nation does
not accord with the historicity of the societies of the Horn, the use of the
concept of nation in the Horn is based on thinning out the European
concept of nation and keeping its minimal description in terms of its
mechanical dimensions such as common language, customs, and territory.
Inevitably, concept-stretched nation gains in extensional coverage, but its
historical content is impoverished, opening it to wild interpretations and
violent political conflicts in its application. One of the pernicious
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19
outcomes of the concept stretching of nation is the transformation of group
identities in the Horn into impermeable moral and psychological
boundaries, as if to compensate for the amorphousness of the stretched
concept, spelling the fragmentation of the inhabitants of the Horn into
antagonistic groups fighting each other in the name of national self-
determination. Thus, the stretched concept of nation creates barriers to the
organization of a shared democratic and prosperous Horn.
There is no doubt that the idea of self-determination is crucial in the
Horn. Hunger, endemic poverty, pandemic diseases, illiteracy,
unemployment, homelessness and powerlessness have mercilessly
colonized the lives of the Horns inhabitants. If self-determination means
being able to choose and act freely, the majority of the Horns inhabitants
are indeed deprived of the social, economic and political conditions
necessary to live as self-determining individuals. The concept stretching
of nation represses this problematic and displaces the question of the
individuals self-determination to that of an abstract entity the nation
whose conceptual currency in the Horn is the effect of the epistemic
violence that makes the Wests history of nation the center of gravity of the
interpretation of the Horns historical experiences. Transplanted in the
Horn, this concept generates a distorted self-understanding that, instead of
mobilizing the Horns inhabitants for overcoming the colonialism of
endemic poverty and oppression, diverts ressources and talents to a
meaningless struggle for national self-determination that morphs into a
conveyor belt that transports poverty and oppression into the new nation.
Eritreas secession from Ethiopia and its descent into tyranny and the
implosion of its economy illustrate the point. In preventing the Horns
inhabitants from conceiving a collective project of social and economic
transformations, the stretched concept of nation deepens their poverty and
oppression. Clearly, the concept stretching of nation demonstrates the
20
truth of Camuss claim that misnaming things is to add to the miseries of
the world.
The Concept stretching of civil society
The third conceptual bottle-neck to thinking about the Horn as a
democratic project is the stretched concept of civil society. Civil society
emerged in the West as part of the conceptual self-clarification of the
historically intricate relations between society, the state, and the capitalist
market. The meanings given to civil society within the West itself are so
varied that they make sense primarily in the historical contexts that gave
rise to these differing meanings. The Lockean understanding of civil
society as preceding the state, Montesquieus understanding of civil society
as internal to the political community, Hegels understanding as a realm of
universal egoism that needs to be guided by the state to protect the public
good, the Marxian understanding as the sphere of bourgeois hegemony,
and Tocquevilles understanding as associational life that serves as a
bulwarck against tyranny, are all reflections of Europes struggle to throw
light on its own historical development involving the rise of burghers and
autonomous commerical cities, the separation of church and state, the
emergence of the capitalist market, the development of class conflicts, and
the changing role of the state (Seligman 1995; Taylor 1990). If we
consider that social concepts are not like the concepts of physics in that
social concepts arise from a societys reflection on itself in its quest for
self-clarity, then it is unlikely that the concept of civil society could
illuminate social phenomena in the Horn where the majority of the
inhabitants are peasants and pastoralists. The societies of the Horn are the
outcomes of a different historical trajectory.
Is there civil society in the Horn? Not certainly in the Western sense,
for, the historicity of the concept does not have much to do with the
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21
historicity of the Horn. Indeed, a number of scholars contest the usefulness
of the concept of civil society. Mamdani considers its use in Africa as
having neither historical nor analytical value (1996: 13). Ekeh (1992) and
Ndegwa (1996) question the usefulness of the concept of civil society for
understanding and studying the issues of democracy in Africa. In
Callaghys words, civil society isa metaphor masquerading as a
player, for it cannot do more than labelvaguely important processes
in contemporary Africa (1994: 235). In the Horn, the concept is stretched
to refer to a multitude of disparate local, national, and internationally
affiliated organizations engaged in development schemes, poverty
alleviation, income generation, health and education, helping the homeless
and street children, HIV prevention, as well as to professional associations,
trade unions, human rights advocates, religious based organizations, and
branches of foreign NGOs (AFRILINE Civil Society Directory 2007). The
amorphousness of the stretched concept of civil society is so striking that
one has to ask why civil society is so popular in the discourse on
democracy in the Horn.
The popularity of the stretched concept of civil society owes more to
the current neo-liberal hegemony than to the pursuit of democracy. For
decades, Western countries and private international institutions have been
promoting civil society in African countries. A case in point is the
World Bank. It has a policy on working with what it calls civil society,
that is, local, national and international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), community groups, labor unions, professional associations,
educational institutions, and faith-based organizations (World Bank Civil
Society Engagement 2006). The goal is to foster the emergence of a
market-friendly state. The stretched concept of civil society legitimates the
occlusion of the social question and facilitates the shifting of social
responsibility from the state to non-governmental organizations and
22
individuals. As Seckinelgin points out, civil society is a metaphor for
Western liberalism and is about the entrenchment of an international
liberal agenda based on a particular form of life in market economy social
relations (2002: 375). Civil society in the Horn is primarily a site of
palliative social care to the underprivileged and not a space of resistance of
the underprivileged. It veils the political and economic roots of social and
economic injustices and contributes to the depoliticization of social
contradictions. Commenting on the current vogue for civil society
among foreign donors in Ethiopia, Dessalegn Rahmato writes that
The link between civil society and democratization that donor
agencies insist upon converges, conveniently, with the goals of
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) supported by the
agencies themselves and imposed on the countries concerned by
the IMF and the World Bank. In brief, the end product of
donor concern with civil society is not so much greater
democratization and development as greater dependency of
African countries on donor powers and institutions (2002: 103-
104).
That there are some organizations that struggle for democracy and
human rights in the Horn does not mean that there is a civil society
engaged in promoting democracy. On the contrary, since the majority of
civil society is engaged in providing services, it occludes the demands
for a state that is responsible for social justice. Indeed, civil society in the
Horn is not antithetical to authoritarianism. Since most of its members are
engaged in palliative social care and not in challenging the anti-democratic
economic and social policies of those in power, they could function
comfortably under any authoritarian regime. This kind of civil society
makes the struggle of the few for political, socio-economic, and human
rights even more isolated.
One can indeed identify some shared elements between the stretched
versions of democracy and civil society. The elites of the Horn control
both the state and civil society. Both electoral democracy and civil society
Maimire Mennasemay

23
ignore the states responsibility to social justice. In both spheres,
leadership is personalized and centralized and the majority of the
inhabitants peasants, pastoralists, and the urban poor are reduced to
being extras in the ritual of electoral democracy and recipients of aid from
civil society. The political domain of the Horn elites has thus two sites: the
state and civil society; and there is little democracy in both. Electoral
democracy and civil society operate in the Horn as mechanisms of
exclusion of precisely those the peasants, the pastoralists, and the urban
poor who embody the universality and the condition of possibility of
democracy.
Taking the People of the Horn and Democracy Seriously
As long as we practice concept stretching, democracy, civil
society and nation will remain homeless ideas without appropriate
concepts, incapable of illuminating and activating the aspirations of the
Horns inhabitants. Concept stretching makes the history out of which the
borrowed concepts emerge the Archimedean point from which the Horns
social, economic and political processes are observed. Inevitably, concept
stretching leads to the castration of political thought (Lefort 1988: 12)
and creates a historical vacuum that is automatically filled since history
like nature abhors vacuum, to rephrase the Aristotelian dictum with the
ethnic/clan fantasy that things would be better if ethnicity/clan becomes the
principle of political organization. Concept stretching is to historical
understanding what Daltonism is to seeing: it impoverishes our perception
of the Horns realities and contributes to the miseries of the inhabitants of
the Horn. However, the critique of concept stretching does not mean that
the practices of democracy in the West are irrelevant to us. On the
contrary, they are instructive. Nevertheless, to recognize their
instructiveness does not mean that they are directly transposable to our
24
circumstances. Rather, it means that democracy has to be reinvented in
terms of the Horns history and conditions, for the knowledge of
democracy that emerges from the history of the West does not sufficiently
respond to the universal truth of the Horns historythe unremitting
oppression, exploitation and poverty that are the daily lot of its inhabitants
since the nineteenth century. A democracy that does not make this
experience of political, social and economic powerlessness central to its
concerns misses the universal truth of the Horns history and becomes a
simulacrum of democracy oblivious to the destitution of the great majority
of its inhabitants. To reinvent democracy in the context of the Horn thus
means to transform the borrowed ideas and practices of democracy into
ideas and practices that can overcome the endemic poverty, exploitation
and oppression that have made the majority of the Horns inhabitants
surnumeraries. Thus, the lived experience of the Horns inhabitants calls
for an approach that takes individuals and democracy seriously. The
working understanding of democracy that I adopt in this paper takes this
lived experience as the locus of its concern. Consequently, I understand
democracy as a form of society that empowers men and women politically,
economically and socially so that they can freely deploy their potentials
and freely choose the kind of living they have reasons to value as a life of
dignity.
5

According to the UNDP (2005), the Horn countries are among the
poorest in the World. Life expectancy in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia is
47, 53, 47, respectively. 46% of Ethiopians and 73% of Eritreans suffer
from malnutrition, 47% of Ethiopians and 40% of Eritreans under the age
of five are underweight. Expenditure for education and health is 4.6% and
2.6% of GDP for Ethiopia, and 4.1% and 3.2% for Eritrea. Only 22%of
Ethiopians have access to safe water. Adult literacy in Ethiopia and Eritrea
is 58.9% and 56.9%, respectively. Among the 15 to 49 years old, 4.4% in
Maimire Mennasemay

25
Ethiopia and 2.7% in Eritrea are HIV-positive. When it comes to priority
of spending, both Ethiopia and Eritrea spend more on defense, 4.3% and
19.4% respectively, than on health, 2.6% and 3.2%, respectively. Gender
inequality in education, employment, and income is high. In Somalia, 43%
live in extreme poverty, 80% are illiterate, only 17% of school age
children go to school, and only 21% have access to safe water (World
Bank 2007). Human rights abuses are rampant in all the Horn countries
(Human Rights Watch 2006). The poverty on the cultural front is as
staggering as in the economic and social fronts. Research and
development in the social and natural sciences, agriculture, husbandry,
medicine, and so forth are quasi-inexistent. The question then is: what
does democracy mean under these conditions? One cannot speak of
democracy in the Horn as if it were merely a mechanism for choosing
representatives, as electoral democracy conveys. In the inhuman
conditions that prevail in the Horn, to take democracy seriously means to
go beyond the ritual of elections and tackle the totality political, social
and economic of the inhabitants experience of destitution. If we believe
that democracy is the only way for extricating the Horns inhabitants from
the present abyss without inflicting more calamities on them, then
democracy, social justice and development cannot be divorced from each
other.
In liberal democracy, a political order is democratic if it meets the
following conditions: free and fair elections, universal suffrage, right to
vote and to run for office, freedom of expression and freedom of
association, and alternative sources of information (Lindberg 2006,
Diamond 1993, 1999; Huntington 1991). It does not encompass economic
and social justice. On the contrary, according to Diamond, democracy in
developing countries demands that citizens care about politics, but not too
much (1993: 103), and that there must be guarantees for capital on the
26
part of the democratic regime so that privileged economic actors will have
a lot to lose by turning against it (105). Thus the demands for food and
clean water, health services and schools, jobs and homes, arising from the
life conditions in the Horn, are subordinated to the interests of privileged
economic actors. To accept this idea in the context of the Horns
conditions is to empty democracy of its relevance to the Horn. If the
Horns inhabitants are to overcome deprivation and oppression and enjoy a
life of dignity, an alternative conception of democracy that articulates
freedom, social justice and development internally is necessary.
Democracy: a) A form of society where power is an empty place
According to Lefort (1988), democracy is a form of society and not
just a collection of discrete institutions (2). It is a historically unique
shapingof human existence that gives novel meaningsto social
relations, staging them in a way that creates a new space of
intelligibility (217-219, 11), with its own norms for distinguishing
between the true and false, the just and unjust, the permissible and the
forbidden, the normal and the pathological (11-12). It is a new manner
of being in society (216) whose constitutive principle is freedom and
whose core is the right to have rights (37). It goes beyond the thin
conception of rights that reduces them to individual rights, for such a
reduction confines them to a relationship between two terms: state and
individual (30) and conceives rights as if they were private properties; but
rights are relational, an integral part of a common world (33, 49).
Contrary to the practice of electoral democracy, democracy is not a
machine that a society imports with technicians (elections observers) to
supervise its operation. It is a way of life, a historical society par
excellence (16), characterized by its recognition of the individual as a free
agent (21-44).
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27
The nature of democracy as a form of society lies in the fact that
power is an empty place (17). Even though the people are the source of
legitimate power, who the people are, who represents them, and who
speaks in their name are questions whose answers are neither definite nor
uncontested. Power belongs to no one and those who exercise it neither
possess nor embody it (225). Consequently, democracy is a theater of
conflicts, an arena of public reasoning and contestation, and as such, a
regime founded on thelegitimacy of a debate as to what is legitimate and
what is illegitimate (5, 39). Democracy is instituted by the dissolution of
the markers of certainty; consequently, a process of questioning is
implicit in social practices (19).
Although Leforts conception of democracy as a form of society
needs to be reworked to respond to the questions that arise from the Horns
conditions, as we shall see further on, it allows us to explore new avenues
for rethinking the question of democracy in the Horn. First, the political
changes that have taken place in the Horn over the last decades are not
changes in form of society. In Ethiopia, the passages from the Imperial
regime to the Derg and then to the EPRDF (Ethiopian Peoples
Revolutionary Democratic Front) regime have not been transitions from
forms of society with no rights to forms of society expressive of the right
to have rights. The difference between the Derg, which did not practice
electoral democracy, and the EPRDF, which practices electoral democracy,
is not a difference of form of society but of rhetoric and of the masks that
arbitrary power wears. The Derg used the rhetoric of class and the mask
of socialist democracy, and the EPRDF uses the mask of ethnic self-
determination and the rhetoric of revolutionary democracy. In both
regimes, hunger, malnutrition, illiteracy, lack of health care, ethnic
conflicts, endemic poverty, unemployment, homelessness, and violations
of rights thrive as the tools and effects of arbitrary power. The same is true
28
for Eritreas transition from an Ethiopian province to an independent state,
as it is true for Somalias transitions from electoral democracy to socialism
and to clan politics. In all these regimes, there is no space for public
reasoning and contestation. And the site of power is not empty. It is the
person in power the Emperor, Mengestu, Siyad Barre, Meles, and Isayas.
Second, Leforts characterization of democracy as a form of society
founded on the legitimacy of a debate as to what is legitimate and what is
illegitimate shows the authoritarian content of electoral democracy in the
Horn. With electoral democracy designed to ensure the victory of the
governing party elections in Ethiopia and Djibouti are instructive in this
respect the victors consider their victory as having established markers
of certainty, embodied in the victors policies and actions, which render
illegitimate any questioning of these policies and actions. Electoral
democracy is thus used as a political mechanism that imposes consent to
ones own oppression and puts an end to the process of questioning and
debate. For example, the EPRDF imposed the Structural Adjustment
Program in 1995 without any public discussion, though it threatened the
livelihood of millions of Ethiopians. Indeed, it persecuted those who dared
to question this policy. (Ethiopian Human Rights Council Reports 1995 to
1997).
Third, from the considerations that rights are relations that create a
democratic common world whose core is the right to have rights, one
could enucleate the idea that the first right in the right to have rights
points to a form of society wherein the rights in to have rights are
effective. In a democracy, rights are a manner of being in society and
have political and socio-economic efficiency; they do not exist only on
paper. Individuals who have no choice but to starve, to die prematurely, to
be illiterate, to be unemployed, to be homeless cannot meaningfully be said
to have the right to have rights, for they do not have the rights to choose
Maimire Mennasemay

29
effectively a life where they have the freedom to avoid starvation,
premature death, ignorance, unemployment, and so forth. Individuals may
have rights on paper, as in the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution whose list of
rights is as impressive and as fictitious as the list of rights in the Soviet
Constitution under Stalin. If the right to have rights is the core of
democracy, then, democracy in the Horn cannot be dissociated from the
removal of the conditions that prevent one from effectively enjoying
his/her right to be free from hunger, premature death, ignorance,
unemployment, homelessness, arbitrary arrests and persecutions. That is,
one cannot dissociate democracy from development and social justice
without transforming democracy into a faade for authoritarian rule.
Without the right to have effective rights, one cannot enjoy a life of
dignity.
However, Leforts conception of democracy as a form of society
needs to be reworked in order to grasp adequately the economic and social
questions that are central to social existence in the Horn.
6
Leforts
interpretative and critical perspective on the dialectical relationship
between the experience and the study of society makes it possible to
rework the conception of a form of society in a way that shows the
relevance of democracy to economic and social experiences. Lefort
criticizes political sociologists and scientists for forgetting that the
experience of society is prior to the identification of the elements of society
and that any system of thought that is bound up with any form of social
life is grappling with a subject-matter which contains within it its own
interpretation (10, 12). From this interpretative approach, an individual
experiences society primarily as a meaningful whole and not as a disparate
collection of disconnected facts, events and individuals. This means that
the inhabitants of the Horn experience society as a totality characterized by
hunger, morbidity, premature mortality, illiteracy, homelessness,
30
joblessness and grinding poverty, prior to the disaggregation of this lived
experience into political, economic, and social components. Nor is their
lived experience mute. It articulates its own web of meanings rooted in the
experience of society as a totality before it is broken down into political,
economic and social aspects. This experience has to be apprehended
comprehensively in order to grasp the questions and aspirations that inform
the Horns lived experience. An interpretative approach anchored in this
lived experience allows us to see that democracy cannot be limited to
electoral practices. When it is so limited, the experiences of social and
economic deprivations that are integral to the peoples lived experience are
torn out and recast as technical issues for experts, or as problems for the
market. The interpretative approach overcomes such a fragmentation of
lived experience and opens the door to a conceptualization of democracy
that makes sense of the experience of the Horns inhabitants to the
inhabitants themselves. Such a reworking is possible through a cross-
fertilization of Leforts conceptualization of democracy as a form of
society with Sens capabilities as freedoms approach, mediated
through the life conditions and aspirations of the Horns inhabitants. The
cross-fertilization between these two approaches is possible, because both
approaches are rooted in the notion of freedom, providing a common
ground for their mutual articulation.
Democracy: b) A form of society rooted in capabilities
When conjugated with the idea of democracy as a form of society,
Sens capabilities as freedoms (1992, 1993, 2000, 2002) approach
offers a way that fruitfully articulates democracy with development and
social justice. Despite the fact that, unlike modernization theories that
reflect a teleological reading of the Wests history, Sens elaboration of the
capabilities approach is rooted in the concrete issues of development,
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31
inequality and freedom in poor countries, not much reflection has been
devoted to it in the Horn and, indeed, in African studies. I will present the
main ideas of the approach and interpret them at the same time from the
perspective of the Horn and of the conception of democracy as a form of
society.

Sen starts his book Development as Freedom with the observation
that Development consists of the removal of the various types of
unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of
exercising their reasoned agency (2000: xii). Importantly, he argues,
The removal of substantial unfreedomsis constitutive of development
(xii). The internal connection between development and freedoms made in
this definition opens the door for articulating development, democracy and
social justice in a way that is relevant to the kind of changes that the
oppressive and poverty-ridden conditions of the Horn call for. Sen
articulates the internal relations between freedoms and development in
terms of the quasi-Aristotelian concepts of capabilities and
functionings.
7
Functionings, he writes, reflects (sic) the various things
a person may value doing or being, whereas A persons capability
refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for
her to achieve. Capability is thusthe substantive freedom to achieve
alternative functioning combinations (2000: 75). That is, functionings
refer to what a person actually does and is keeping oneself healthy,
nourished, educated, active in the community, and so forth. Capabilities
refer to the various combinations of functionings or the actual positive
opportunities that a person actually can choose from to be and to do in
terms of what he or she has reasons to value most in order to lead a
dignified life. The current functionings and the ensemble of alternative
functionings from which a person could choose make up the persons
capability set, that is the persons freedom to choose from possible
32
livings (1992: 40). Capability is thus the effective freedom, as opposed to
formal freedom, to achieve well-being; it identifies the real alternatives
we have (1992: 49). To adapt Sens example, the Somali or the Ethiopian
or the Eritrean who is on a hunger strike to protest the human rights
violations of his/her government and the Somali or the Ethiopian or the
Eritrean who is dying from starvation have different capability sets, for
those who are on a hunger strike can choose to eat well and be well
nourished in a way the second cannot (2000: 75).
Capability is an internally complex normative concept that refers to
both agency and well-being each of which is articulated in terms of
achievement and freedom. According to Sen, a person is an agent in the
sense that he/she is someone who acts and brings about change (2000:
19). Agency achievement refers to the realization of goals and values [a
person] has reasons to pursue and agency freedom is ones freedom to
bring about the achievements one values and which one attempts to
produce (Sen 1992: 57). Likewise, well-being has an achievement and
freedom dimension. Well-being achievements are the achieved
functionings such as being well- nourished, being adequately clothed and
sheltered, avoiding preventable morbidity taking part in the life of the
community, being able to appear in public without shame, and so on
(110). Well-being freedoms are substantive freedoms that include the
capabilities to avoid deprivations such as starvation, undernourishment,
escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that
are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying political
participation (2000: 36). Development involves expansion of these and
other freedoms. Sen gives two reasons to justify the conception of
development as freedom: (a) the evaluative reason: assessing progress
primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are enhanced;
(b) the effectiveness reason: the effective exercise of the free agency of
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33
people in the achievement of development (2000: 4). Thus, he views the
expansion of freedom as boththe primary end andthe principal
means of development (36). The effective freedoms available to
individuals are the primary criteria for evaluating social, economic and
political arrangements (1992: 49-53).
From the capabilities perspective, it is misleading to consider poverty,
hunger, lack of health care, illiteracy and poor education, unemployment,
homelessness, economic and social insecurity, morbidity and premature
mortality, and so forth, in terms of lack of income, resources, or goods
1992: 29-33, 81-110).True, these are part of the problem. But as Lefort
points out, an authoritarian government could also see these afflictions in
the same terms, i.e., as lack of income, resources or goods, and take
countless measures concerning employment, public health, education,
housing and leisure to respond to these lacks without increasing the
freedom of individuals (Lefort 37). To avoid authoritarian routes to the
resolution of these problems, one must conceive them as capabilities
deprivations, that is, as unfreedoms (Sen 2000: 15). From a democratic
perspective, then, the issue is not only providing means and resources.
Rather, it is to make individual agency central to addressing these
deprivations and thus recognize the role of freedoms of different kinds in
countering these deprivations (18-19, 38-41). That is, the removal of
substantial unfreedoms constitutes development only when it is achieved
through the activation of the agency freedom of the very persons who
suffer from capabilities deprivations.
Sen has a thick conception of freedom. Unlike the liberal idea of
negative liberty that reduces freedom to non-interference, he considers
freedom as the positive power to create conditions that enhance effectively
agency and well-being freedoms. Sen makes the point that a
counterfactual choice what one would have chosen if one had the choice
34
is relevant to ones freedom (1992: 67). Thus, to borrow Sens
example, if a government eradicates malaria, something one would have
chosen if one had the choice, it enhances the individuals effective
freedom to live as he/she would choose. According to Sen, our "freedom
of agency is qualified and constrained by the social, political and
economic opportunities that are available to us and there is a deep
connection between individual agency and social arrangements" (2000: xi-
xii). Consequently, individual freedom is a social commitment and the
state has a positive role in creating real opportunities and options that
enhance capabilities (282-298). This positive conception of the state
does not lead to a state that overwhelms the individual, a concern of those
who espouse the idea of negative liberty, if it is articulated with Leforts
idea of the emptiness of the place of power that makes public reasoning
and contestation the core of democracy. As we have already seen, the
stretched conceptions of democracy and civil society have no place and
cannot account for such a positive conception of the state.
An articulation of Leforts conception of democracy as a form of
society and Sens conceptions of development as freedom and
freedoms as capabilities throws a new light on the issue of poverty in the
Horn. In pursuing a form of society that overcomes unfreedoms, we
cannot simply look at culmination outcomes outcomes that concentrate
only on results for in doing so we would be discounting the central issue
the exercise of agency freedom in overcoming unfreedoms. We should
go beyond culmination outcomes and consider comprehensive outcomes,
i.e., outcomes that take into account the agency freedoms through which
they are reached (Sen 2000: 27). An aspect of unfreedoms in the Horn is
poverty, and the way we tackle it differs greatly depending on whether we
approach it from the perspective of either the culmination or the
comprehensive outcomes. The present policy, which espouses poverty
Maimire Mennasemay

35
reduction, represents the culmination outcomes approach. And its
paradigmatic example is the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The
MDG does not conceive poverty as an aspect of capabilities deprivation
but rather as a lack of income, goods, or resources. The solution it
proposes is rectifying this lack, which it conceives from a technocratic
perspective as poverty reduction. The capabilities approach, which is
based on agency freedom and the enhancement of the capability set of the
agent, exposes the poverty of the poverty reduction approach. As one
could see in J effery Sachs The End of Poverty (2005), poverty is accepted
as the unsurpassable horizon of the poverty reduction approach espoused
by the MDG. Sachs, an influential economist, an advocate of the MDG
project, and a champion of the poverty reduction approach writes that
This book is about ending poverty in our time (1), but he hastens to
interpret his statement minimally. According to him, the goal of poverty
reduction is to end extreme poverty, not to end all poverty, and still less to
equalize world incomes or to close the gap between the rich and the poor
(289, authors emphasis). Nowhere in the MDG (listed in Sachs 211-213)
or in his discussion of these goals does one find poverty reduction as an
element of development conceived as the construction of a free, just,
prosperous society through the agency freedom of the poor themselves.
Rather, poverty reduction is conceived as a technical matter,
conceptualized by experts, and implemented by those in power (74-89,
244-287). The poor are primarily treated as creatures of needs, not as
agents who could transform society and their manner of being in society.
Indeed, the MDG, as a culmination outcomes approach, is compatible with
authoritarian regimes, for the latter also define development in terms of
culmination outcomes and discount the importance of freedom as a means
to and an end of development.
36
From the perspective of comprehensive outcomes, the fundamental
problematic in the Horn is not poverty but poor living (Sen 2000b: 4) a
manner of being in society so distorted by the unfreedoms that structure
and articulate society that individuals do not have the capabilities to
undertake activities that they have reasons to choose in order to lead a life
of dignity. Poor living expresses the absence of democracy, even where
there is electoral democracy. In light of comprehensive outcomes, which
considers freedom as both a means and an end, the MDG is a means-
oriented approach that depoliticizes poverty and fails to take into account
the ends that people have reason to pursue, and, correspondingly the
freedoms to be able to satisfy these ends (90). The point is that since
poverty reduction is not premised on agency freedom, it cannot lead to
well-being freedoms and well-being achievements, which means that it
is possible to reduce poverty and still be trapped in poor living. Thus,
the standpoint of comprehensive outcomes requires that we shift our
attention from poverty reduction to poor living, from a technical to a
political conception of poverty. Poverty reduction, the core of the MDG
and of the discourse of civil society in the Horn, is a means oriented,
pessimistic response to one consequence of poor living. It does not tackle
the fundamental issue of unfreedoms and capabilities and thus abandons
the goal of building a form of society that articulates internally freedom,
development and justice. The MDG project is the expression of the refusal
to conceive poverty as a phenomenon rooted in social, economic and
political capabilities deprivations that perpetuate poor living.
From the capabilities perspective, considering poverty reduction
outside the problematic of poor living is no more effective than treating a
fever while neglecting the disease that causes it. There is indeed an
elective affinity between the stretched conceptions of democracy and civil
society, on the one hand, and the poverty reduction approach, on the other:
Maimire Mennasemay

37
they all exclude the issues of social justice, substantive freedoms, and
prosperity. To avoid the entrenchment of unfreedoms, a shift of focus
from poverty reduction to poor living is indispensable. Such a shift
recognizes the inhabitants of the Horn as active agents, as the midwives of
their own freedoms, social justice and prosperity. As we shall see further
on, overcoming poor living demands the full participation of the poor in
socio-economic and political decisions as well as their self-organization for
eliminating unfreedoms, enhancing capabilities, and creating a democratic,
just and prosperous Horn.
Capabilities, Structural Injustice, and the Horn as a Democratic
Project
The radical changes that have taken place in the Horn in 1970
(socialism in Somalia), 1974 (socialism in Ethiopia), 1991 (ethnic
federalism in Ethiopia, clanism in Somalia), 1993 (the secession of Eritrea)
are predicated on the notion of structural injustice. However, the
replacement of the structures of injustice with new structures has not led to
more freedom, social justice and prosperity. On the contrary, these new
structures have created poverty, violent conflicts, and ethnic/clan
fragmentation on a scale rarely encountered in the history of the Horn. The
articulation of the conceptions of democracy as a form of society and of
development as freedom suggests an approach for rethinking structural
injustice from the perspective of the Horn as a democratic project.
To start with, one may object that the capabilities approach, which
focuses on the agency freedom of individuals, cannot deal with structural
injustice (Stewart and Deneulin 2002: 61-70).

However, such an objection
loses its force if one articulates capabilities enhancement as a practice
constitutive of a form of society that tackles unfreedoms without creating
structures that strip the individual of his/her agency freedom. The
capabilities approach suggests that a top-down approach that considers
38
individuals as raw material for building a democratic society cannot offer
an alternative solution to structural injustice, because such an approach
leads to the objectification of individuals. In the process of being
liberated, the individual loses his/her freedom, as in 1974 and 1991 in
Ethiopia, in 1993 in Eritrea, and in 1970 in Somalia. The strength of the
capabilities approach lies in its recognition of agency freedom and the
diversity of human beings and circumstances (Sen 1992: 19-21, 2000: 35-
53). Thus, it considers the structural contexts of injustice from a
perspective that recognizes the primacy of agency freedom but weaves at
the same time dialectical relations between individual freedoms and social
arrangements (Sen 2000: 31, 282-298). Thus, Drze and Sen (2002:6)
write that
The word social in the expression social opportunity.is a
useful reminder not to view individuals and their opportunities
in isolated terms. The options that a person has depend greatly
on relations with others and on what the state and other
institutions do. We shall be particularly concerned with those
opportunities that are strongly influenced by social
circumstances and social policies, especially those relating to
education, health, nutrition, social equity, civil liberties, and
other basic aspects of the quality of life.
Implicit in the role attributed to social opportunity, social
circumstances, institutions, and social arrangements is the idea that
structures matter. However, Sen believes that actions against structural
injustice should not be carried out at the expense of the individual, for what
is characteristic of structural injustice is precisely denying the individuals
free agency, something that should not be reproduced in the name of
development and social justice. He quotes Marx to make his point, that
What has to be avoided above all is the reestablishing of Society as an
abstraction vis--vis the individual (2002: 81). Such an abstraction
involves reducing individuals to a single dimension say, only as
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39
workers, and nothing more is seen in them, everything else being ignored
(Sen quoting Marx 2002: 81). This abstraction deprives individuals of
their agency freedom and objectifies them.
This kind of abstraction characterizes the history of reforms and
revolutions in the Horn. Those in power reduce peasants, pastoralists, the
poor, ethnies, clans, and workers to a single dimension and treat them
only as such, and use them as material for building socialist democracy
(the Derg in Ethiopia, Siyad Barre in Somalia), ethnic democracy (The
EPRDF in Ethiopia), and Eritrean identity (under the dictatorship of
Isayas Afewerki). The so-called struggle against structural injustice that
these regimes claim to pursue is based primarily on creating alternative
structures that replicate the essence the denial of individual freedoms of
the oppressive regimes they pretend to replace. There is no change in the
form of society. Sens writings are sensitive to the fact that structural
injustice is not immediately amenable to individual actions. However, this
is not a sufficient reason, as Lefort (21-44) also argues, for imposing
freedom from above, for such a measure will reproduce oppression
disguised as freedom.
The alternative is to see structural injustice in terms of inequality of
opportunities resulting from capabilities deprivation (Drze and Sen 8-9).
It is important to see inequality in very broad terms as unfreedoms and not
only, as liberal democracy does, in terms of income or resource inequality
(323). Indeed, equalizing resources does not mean equality in the
substantive freedoms enjoyed by different persons, for resource equality
could coexist with inequalities in actual freedoms due to differing
conversion factors, such as differences in personal, social, and
environmental characteristics (Sen 1992: 81-82, 149; 2000: 70-74). A
pastoralist in Galguduud, a pregnant woman in J imma, a child in Asmara, a
docker in Djibouti, a housewife in Gondar, a widow in Mogadishu, a
40
farmer in Gojam, or a worker in Addis Abeba could convert equal
resources differently and in ways that could lead to inequalities. Thus,
Economic inequality is a more inclusive far larger concept
than mere income inequality, and inequality in the fuller sense
goes beyond economic inequality, no matter how broadly the
latter may be defined. There are many economic determinants,
other than income, of well-being, freedom and power, and there
are social factors distinct from purely economic ones that
influence inequality between persons and groups. (Drze and
Sen 353. Emphasis added).
From this perspective, social justice means going beyond the
problematic of economic inequality and fostering social arrangements that
overcome poor living in order to usher a new form of society. These
arrangements cannot enhance capabilities without the active involvement
from their inception to their application of the Horns poor, a point I will
develop in the next section. From the perspective of the capabilities
approach, the eradication of structural injustice is premised on the primacy
of the agency freedom of those who suffer from capabilities deprivations.
It offers an alternative to the top-down structural approaches that the Horn
has experienced for decades, with disastrous results.
A related issue here is what La Botie, a sixteenth century humanist,
calls voluntary servitudethe behavior of a person who gives consent
to [his/her] own misery, or, rather, apparently welcomes it (1975: 50). In
the Horn, many individuals participate in their own oppression in the name
of ethnic and clan solidarities and tradition. It is thus important to raise the
question of whether voluntary servitude undermines the notion of
agency freedom, central to the capabilities approach. Not necessarily.
Actions that reinforce ones own oppression are outcomes, at least in part,
of decades of oppression. Unlike the stretched versions of liberal
democracy, nation and civil society, which hardly take into account the
deleterious effects of past oppression and exploitation and consider
Maimire Mennasemay

41
elections, national self-determination and civil society as miraculous cures
that abolish voluntary servitude, the capabilities approach recognizes
voluntary servitude as a deprivation that is as real as hunger and disease.
Deprived people, Sen writes, tend to come to terms with their
deprivation because of the sheer necessity of survival, and they may, as a
resultadjust their desires and expectations to what theysee as feasible
(2000: 63). If social conditioning makes a person too subdued or
broken to desire much, and makes him/her develop adaptive
preferences, then it would be unjust to consider the preferences of such a
person as outcomes of a free choice (1992:149-150). Those who practice
the concept stretching of liberal democracy and civil society espouse a
utilitarian stand and equate well-being with a state of satisfaction that in
many cases reflects adaptive preferences. They thus reinforce adaptive
preferences rather than liberate the Horns inhabitants from them. From
the capabilities perspective, the cure for adaptive preferences is neither
neglect nor paternalism, but rather more freedom through, as we shall see,
self-organization and active participation.
This leads us to the question: What kind of democracy is adequate to
overcome endemic poverty, social injustice and fragmentation in the Horn?
In order to clear the ground for an answer to this question, I will refer to
Sens instructive example on the limitations of a democracy that is strong
on means such as poverty reduction but short on capabilities. Sen draws
our attention to the deprivation in health care, education, and social
environment of African Americans that makes their mortality rates
exceptionally high, compared to inhabitants in Sri Lanka, and parts of
India and China, who have lower rates of premature mortality, though the
latter have lower incomes and less resources than African-Americans
(2000: 6, 21-4, 96, 108). But they have more freedom not to die
prematurely than African-Americans do. The lesson is that social justice is
42
feasible only by shifting attention away from the means (and one
particular means that is usually given exclusive attention, viz., income) to
ends that people have reason to pursue, and, correspondingly, to the
freedoms to be able to satisfy these ends (90). Sen observes, Democracy
does not serve as an automatic remedy of ailments as quinine works to
remedy malaria (155).
Sens observations allow us to make a distinction between a
democracy of means and a democracy of ends. The former is best
represented by liberal democracy which puts more emphasis on the
justness of procedures than on the justness of outcomes. The latter is a
form of society rooted in the overcoming of unfreedoms and the
enhancement of capabilities; it articulates freedom, social justice and
economic development as constitutive practices of democracy. The
advocates of conceptual stretching seem to assume that electoral
democracy, which, at best, is a democracy of means, can remedy social,
political and economic ailments as quinine works to remedy malaria. If
the richest liberal democracy in the world cannot solve the problem of
social injustice, it can be argued plausibly that electoral democracy can
never solve the incomparably wider and deeper issues of social injustice
the Horn. A satisfactory response to the questions that arise from the
conditions that prevail in the Horn is more likely to come from a
democracy of ends than from a democracy of means. From the
perspective of the Horn, the form of society that responds to the aspirations
of its inhabitants is the one that articulates internally democracy,
development, and social justice, i.e., the democracy of ends. The only way
that leads to such a form of society is a comprehensive participation in
political, economic and social issues.
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43
Comprehensive Participation: The Horn Route to Democracy
The overwhelming hegemony of liberal democracy makes the search
for an alternative democratic order quite difficult. As Craig Browne points
out, what is surprising about the so-called third wave transition to
democracy is its subordination to a single model, that of liberal
democracy, as compared to the wealth of political experimentation that
charcterized the development of democracy in the late ninteenth and early
twentieth centuries (2006: 46-47). The question we confront is: How can
we rescue our political imagination from the stifling hegemony of liberal
democracy in order to see an alternative democratic order responsive to the
aspirations of the Horn? Practically, this means asking: Who are the people
in the Horn who have least assimilated the hegemonic values of liberal
democracy and are thus open to an alternative democratic vision? Without
doubt, it is the peasants, the pastoralists, the urban poor, and, in general,
the people who suffer from capabilities deprivations. The quest for a
democracy of ends must then include the active participation of these
groups. The key term here is participation, and its fruitfulness will depend
on whether or not we conceptualise it in a way that is consistent with the
capabilities approach, which founds participation on something similar to
the Spinozist axiom that people think, people are capable of truth
(Badiou 1998: 111).
From the perspective of capabilities, the freedom to participate in
critical evaluation and in the process of value formation is among the most
crucial freedoms of social existence. The conceptualization of needs and
social values cannot be settled merely by the pronouncements of those in
authority (Sen 2000: 287). Indeed, the intensity of economic needs,
such as the one we find in the Horn, adds to the urgency of participation
(148). To be consistent with the capabilities approach, participation must
be a bottom-up, deep and wide process that involves peasants, pastoralists,
44
and the urban poor, both women and men, and that institutionalizes public
reasoning and contestation for formulating policies and making decisions
about political, economic, and social issues. It establishes a bottom-up
flow in (a) identifying problems, (b) setting the agenda for discussion, (c)
determining the rules of decision-making, (d) formulating policies, (e)
making decisions, and (f) distributing tasks and responsibilities. This
bottom-up approach is the only one that is consistent with the core idea of
capabilitiesthat well-being freedom and achievement are actualized only
when the underprivileged choose freely the policies and actions that
contribute to the enhancement of their capability set. Participation thus
becomes the quilting point of new social, political, economic and cultural
coordinates of meanings and actions. It thus establishes a new space of
intelligibility articulated through mutual recognition, mutual
accountability, self-assertion and solidarity. Its goal is finding ways for
overcoming the unfreedoms that affect individuals and the community
through a process of public reasoning and contestation that critically
considers all the various options and evaluates how far the decisions the
participants take contribute to the reduction of unfreedoms and the
enhancement of capabilities. Unlike liberal democracy that splits
outcomes, conceived as aggregates of preferences, from the procedures that
generate them and cannot go beyond culmination outcomes, capabilities-
driven participation is inseparable from comprehensive outcomes. That is,
the inclusion of the freedoms constitutive of the process of decision-
making in the outcome and the interaction between this process and the
issues under debate overcome the split between procedure and outcome
and eliminate the risk of concept stretching and its deleterious effects.
8

Moreover, the Horn is not a historical tabula rasa. Therefore, public
reasoning and contestation take place in the participants social-cultural
space. Given that the capabilities approach targets the specific unfreedoms
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45
that prevent the inhabitants of the Horn from exercising their agency
freedoms in their specific contexts, public reasoning and contestation have
to be rooted in the intersubjective and common meanings (Taylor
1988:15-57), values and social practices of the participants. This excludes
the process of abstract deliberation associated with liberal democracy and
whose core principle of operation is best caught in the procedural idea of
a veil of ignorance that strips participants of their characteristics (Rawls
1971: 136-142). Capabilities-driven participation is incompatible with the
idea of non-contextual deliberation, for the goal of such participation is to
overcome the unfreedoms that articulate the specific context within which
the participants live.
At least one question and one objection arise here. One may raise the
question: How wide and deep is the participation, given that the majority
of the inhabitants of the Horn the peasants, pastoralists, the urban poor
and the excluded lack the kind of expert knowledge necessary to find
effective solutions to economic and social problems? One may also object
that the traditional culture of the participants will limit the scope and depth
of such participation given that tradition may be, in certain cases,
incompatible with the demands of modernity in the areas of development,
social justice and democracy.
In order to deal with this question and objection in a satisfactory
manner, it is important to remember that, in light of the capabilities
approach, democracy is a universal value (Sen 1999). However, this does
not mean that the same kind of democracy should be universal. British
democracy expresses British aspirations, culture and history; Indian
democracy expresses Indian aspirations, culture and history; and J apanese
democracy expresses J apanese aspirations, culture and history. Each is a
concrete manifestation of the universal ideal of democracy, but none is an
imitation of the other. In a sense, democracy is like language. Language is
46
a universal human capability, but it exists only as languages or tongues,
each tongue developing expressions that grasp the particular social
practices, history and environment of a particular society. Similarly,
democracy is also universal, but it can exist only as a particular democracy
that cashes into the historical specificity, tasks, challenges and aspirations
of a given people. It is certain that democracy rooted in a deep and wide
participation of the inhabitants of the Horn will give rise to a democracy as
a form of society that expresses the cultures, aspirations and history of the
Horn in the same way that American, Indian, Swedish, J apanese
democracies express their own.
How wide and deep should the participation be? A partial answer has
already been proposed earlier. Given the historical circumstances of the
Horn, an alternative to the stretched version of liberal democracy can exist
only with the active participation of those who are least blinded by the
hegemonic values and ideas of liberal democracy. These people are, in the
Horn, peasants, pastoralists, and the urban poor. As to the age requirement
for participation, we can take a hint from Oromo culture that recognizes the
right of the young to participate in productive work at 16 (the Gadda stage
of Qondaala) and generalize it to suggest that all men and women, above
the age of 16, be involved in public reasoning and contestation on all
social, political, economic, and cultural issues. This age threshold in fact
concords with the modern experience of youth in the Horn, which has seen
high school students actively involved in political actions.
An objection to a bottom-up, deep and wide participation arises from
the tradition-modernity dichotomy of modernization theory. This
dichotomy presents tradition as a backward-looking homogeneous entity.
However, tradition is lived as social practices and, as such, is riddled with
internal variations, differences, and even contradictions. No living
tradition is homogeneous and entirely backward looking; nor is it wholly
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47
opposed to reason. Every living tradition bears within itself conflicting
possibilities that lead to divergent interpretations and even conflicts within
the community that practices it, thus bearing within itself the potential,
however faint its voice might be to our westernized ears, for something
new. The notion of debate, contestation and reasoning are not alien to the
traditions of the Horn, as one could see in the wide-spread practice of
muget (litigation) and hateta (argumentation) among Northern Ethiopians,
the prevalence of poetic interpretations of events and actions among the
Somalis (Samatar 1982), and the practice of yaa Arbora (governing
councils) among the Oromo (Legesse 2006: 104). Are there elements in
Horn traditions that contribute to unfreedom? Yes, there are, such as the
oppression of women. However, from the perspective of capabilities, if the
removal of unfreedom is imposed from above, it does not free the person.
Rather, it substitutes one unfreedom for another. The only way one
enhances the agency freedom of individuals is for those who live the
unfreedoms that arise from tradition have the effective opportunity to
participate in deciding what parts of tradition are valuable parts of
living giving them reason to treasure them, and what parts are not. (Sen
2000: 31-32). The coordinates of meanings and values constitutive of
tradition are thus changed through the active participation of those who
live the tradition. The question then is how to institutionalize this kind of
participation. The answer is in the creation of a political society.
From Civil Society to Political Society
Capabilities-driven participation requires the self-organization of
those who suffer from capabilities deprivations. Without self-organization,
the capabilities approach, the institutionalization of participation, and the
necessary changes in ones manner of being in society will fail and,
consequently, a democracy that makes freedom, development, social
48
justice and the unity of the Horn internal to its practice will be
unattainable. To achieve the goals inherent in the capabilities approach
and make capabilities-driven participation the incubator of a democratic
Horn community, the creation of local associations around specific
unfreedoms, the promotion of the capabilties to be enhanced, and the
widening of such associations are indispensable. This means the
progressive creation of networks of local, sub-regional, regional and Horn-
wide associations of peasants, pastoralists, women, the urban poor, youth,
and the underpiveleged in general, around shared issues such as
agriculture, manufacturing, husbandry, industry, nutrition, health,
education, employment, housing, communication and transportation, the
environment, technology, research and development, and so forth.
The nature and purpose of these associations are radically different
from those of civil society. As we have already seen, civil society in the
Horn is one of the sites of the elite, the other being the state, and its
primary concern is providing services rather than enhancing the capability
set of the poor. The associations proposed here are neither part of the state
nor of civil society. They constitute a political society multiple networks
of associations active in reducing unfreedoms and enhancing capabilties,
resisting the depoliticization of poverty, development and social justice,
and bypassing the instruments of exclusion deployed by the state and civil
society. We could consider the actions of these associations in terms of
what Max Weber calls politically oriented action as opposed to political
action that he identifies with the action of the state (1978: 54-55). A
politically oriented action aims at exerting influence on the government
in order to bring about change in the appropriation, expropriation,
redistribution or allocation of the powers of government (55), forcing the
state to establish new relations with the people. Such associations form a
political rather than a civil society for two reasons. First, they formulate
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49
policies and take decisions on social, economic and political issues and
shape political action, constituting a political site autonomous from the
state. They thus go beyond poverty reduction, the fetishization of elections
and the fixation on international aid, and aim at eliminating poor living.
Second, the policies and decisions they adopt constitute the participants as
political actors and generate a local democracy that overcomes the
uncoupling of democracy from socio-economic justice and development.
Unlike civil society in the Horn, which is a site of dependency that
renders invisible the political and socio-economic mechanisms that
produce poverty and occludes peoples understanding of their position in
relation to society as a whole, political society is a site of resistance that
transforms its participants into subjects of universal rights to whom power
is a contingent relationship that could be transformed to overcome poor
living. It generates a new cognitive mapping (J ameson 1988b) of social
relations and practices that announce a democratic, just and prosperous
Horn community. It creates a shared space of visibility and responsibility
wherein the poor constitute themselves as self-determining subjects of
discourse and action.
9
A shared space of visibility and responsibility does
not mean consensus or the abolition of antagonisms. On the contrary,
political society brings out the political dimensions of issues and the
antagonisms that characterise them, making them inseparable from public
reasoning, contestation and negotiations, and thus leading to the emergence
of decisions always open to revisions that serve a common aim.
Consequently, it ensures that solutions to problems do not deprive the
participants and others of their freedoms. Its very operation posits the
legitimacy of a debate as to what is legitimate and what is illegitimate
and secretes a new form of society that institutionalizes the emptiness of
the place of power a crucial development without which regression to an
authoritarian regime cannot be discounted. Whereas civil society in the
50
Horn depoliticizes inequality and reinforces adaptive preferences, political
society considers equality not as a goal but as an axiom of its operation and
constitutes the participants as active agents of development, social justice
and democracy.
Given the magnitude of unfreedoms in the Horn, the process of self-
organization based on capabilities-driven participation amounts to
discovering unknown paths to a political society that does not yet exist.
Nevertheless, the constitution of political society is an indispensable
condition for the Horn as a democratic project, because the birth of
political society brings about a qualitative change in the manner of being in
society that has Horn-wide emancipatory values intrinsically,
instrumentally, and constructively. It has an intrinsic value, for the mode
of operation of capabilities-driven political society and its bottom-up, deep
and wide participation expresses the self-determination of the participants.
It activates the agency freedom of the Horns inhabitants that has been
stifled for decades and creates a space of freedom, equality, collective
action, and shared responsibilities. It has an instrumental value in that it
makes possible the overcoming of the voicelessness of the
underprivileged in the definition of socio-economic needs by providing a
common world wherein the people determine, through a process of public
reasoning and contestation, their goals rather than have these imposed on
them externally by market forces and technocrats. Finally, it has a
constructive role, for capabilities-driven participation plays a crucial role
in the formation of values and in generating social understanding (Drze
and Sen, 2002: 10, 24-25; Sen 2000: 148). The importance of this
constructive role is impossible to overestimate. Therefore, I will unpack
some of its crucial contributions.
First, the birth of a participation-driven political society will enable
the flowering of the Horns intersubjective and common meanings related
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51
to democracy, socio-economic justice and development. The dispossessed
identify, from within their own life-world, their unfreedoms, needs,
aspirations, and the valued functionings they want to pursue, which
engages them to develop the discourses and modes of communication
necessary to express new possibilities, opportunities, and the kind of
futures open to them. One cannot overestimate the importance of such a
development for a democracy of ends, for the existence of democratic
ideals and institutions does not in itself guarantee democratic practice
(Drze and Sen, 2002). Participation-driven political society makes
possible the emergence of democratic practices as routine activities
encompassing political relations, social justice and socio-economic issues,
thus making local democracy a way of life. Where there is local
democracy, there develops a culture of self-assertion, mutual recognition
and mutual accountability that provides a solid ground for sub-regional,
regional, and Horn-wide democratic practices and institutions. Political
society thus offers the possibility of the development of an internally
generated practice of democracy that the Horns inhabitants could
recognize as a qualitatively new form of society that emerges from their
own actions as the solution to the triple riddles poverty, injustice, and
oppression of their history. The Horn could thus engage in its own
historically specific democratic journey in a way that reflects its values and
aspirations as authentically as British, Swedish, Indian, or J apanese
democracies reflect their own values and aspirations. Democracy is not
something one imitates and follows, as electoral democracy and its
globe-trotting observers assume, but a way of life that one identifies
with.
Second, capabilities-driven participation, constitutive of political
society, creates new quilting points of social meanings and practices that
generate new self-understandings. One of the consequences is the
52
emergence of universality-for-itself out of and within ethnic life-worlds
in that, the contestations and deliberations in which the participants are
engaged create a political dynamics that enables them to overcome the
insular constraints of ethnicity and clan and adopt a standpoint of
universality, engendering the secularization of ethnic relations.
Secularization is commonly understood in terms of the separation of
religion and state. However, the primordial dimensions of ethnic and clan
relations that are now dominant in the Horn express a quasi-religious kind
of attachment to ones ethnie or clan. This is not because ethnicism and
clanism are archaic remnants of the past. Rather, They are the pathological
effect of the loss of the sense of history brought about by decades of
homeless modernization and oppressive regimes, transforming ethnicity
and clanism into meta-narratives that desperately try to give sense to
peoples senseless daily sufferings by identifying an outsider the
malevolent Other Ethnie or Clan as the cause of their miseries.
10
At the
same time, this meta-narrative retroactively posits a homogeneous ethnic
or clan community that could be recovered by removing the malevolent
Other Ethnie or Clan. This quest for a homogeneous community as an
answer to modern oppression and exploitation leads down a destructive
path that demands ones quasi-religious attachment to ones ethnie or clan
as an indispensable requirement for exorcizing the assumed malevolent
Other Ethnie or Clan. The resulting ethnic and clan fundamentalism is
spurs calamitous transgressions of human solidarity: the new phenomenon
of ethnic killings in the Horn, as in Arba Gugu, Assosa, Bodeno,
Gambella, the Ogaadeen, Mogadishu, to name a few.
Such an attachment to ethnicity and clan cannot be legislated away
nor could it be maintained without defeating the quest for a just,
prosperous and democratic Horn. The focus on unfreedoms and on
enhancing capabilities, and the political society through which these issues
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53
are articulated, offers a way out of this predicament. The functionings of
political society, rooted in capabilities-driven participation, cannot fail to
expose that there are, within each ethnie and clan, inequalities that breed
oppression and exploitation, and that, therefore, an ethnic or clan
perspective on capabilities deprivations cannot offer effective solutions,
and that ones conditions are better understood in terms of ones status as a
peasant, a pastoralist, a worker rather than as a member of an ethnie or a
clan. This cannot but lead to the recognition that ethnicism and clanism
are adaptive preferences to oppression and exploitation that repress and
distort the implicit principles of fraternity and justice that inhabit ethnicity
and clan but whose concretization as universal and active principles that
cut across ethnic and clan antagonisms presupposes the overcoming of
ethnicism and clanism. The recognition of ethnicism and clanism as
adaptive preferences triggers the eventual withering away of the primordial
dimensions of ethnic and clan relations. The secularization of ethnic and
clan relations creates thus the condition for ethnic cultures to overcome the
stifling forces of nostalgia and parochialism, to rise to the challenges of
modernity and to flourish as universal cultures; that is, as cultures that
recognize the humanity of individuals as more fundamental than their
ethnic or clan identity. It establishes the grounds for accepting the right of
individuals to enjoy their ethnic and clan cultures without transforming the
latter into psychological, social and political identity-straightjackets that
undermine the solidarity that is indispensable to eliminate the unfreedoms
that afflict all the inhabitants of the Horn.
In addition, there is the important question of how non-ethnic/non-
clan identities, democracy, prosperity and unity could arise from within the
wombs of ethnic/clan identities, oppression, endemic poverty and the
fragmentation that characterise the Horn. Those who apply the stretched
conceptions of democracy, nation and civil society have no answer to this
54
question except to consider these concepts as automatic remedies of
ailments as quinine works to remedy malaria. But no direct passage is
possible from the present oppressive, impoverished and fragmented Horn
to a democratic, prosperous and united Horn without a mediating
institution. This is the issue of what J ameson (1988: 3) calls, the
vanishing mediator, referring to the role the protestant ethics played,
according to Weber, in the birth of capitalism from the wombs of a non-
capitalist world. Neither imported institutions nor technocracy can play
this mediating role in the Horn. Civil society cannot play this role either,
for, in the Horn, it is primarily an institution of palliative social care. Only
political society could assume this mediating role. As a new space of
intelligibility constituted through capabilities-driven participation and the
culture of self-assertion, mutual recognition and mutual accountability it
fosters political society has the potential to mediate the emergence of
non-ethnic identities, democracy, prosperity and unity from within the
wombs of the ethnic fragmentation, political oppression and endemic
poverty that characterise the Horn. Moreover, as a new space of
intelligibility, political society fulfills an emancipatory role that goes well
beyond changing the existing Horn realities in terms of the current
aspirations of the people. It brings about the indispensable qualitative
transformations of the aspirations themselves, expanding the democratic
horizon. Thus, the birth of the Horn as a community of a democracy of
ends necessitates the mediation of political society.
Unlike civil society in the Horn, which fragments issues, naturalizes
dependency and depoliticizes inequalities, political society introduces a
new cognitive mapping that looks at the total picture of inequality
economic, social, political and makes the overcoming of unfreedoms and
the enhancement of the capability set of every Horn inhabitant, irrespective
of his/her identity, the goal of collective action. Whereas electoral
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55
democracy and civil society keep the people absent from politics through
the ritual of elections and the privatization of the issues of social justice,
political society puts flesh on the idea that democracy is a way of keeping
the people present in their absence (Rancire 93). Political society thus
brings about a mutation of [the] symbolic order (Lefort 16) in the Horn
and a new cognitive mapping of social reality that announce a common
world of freedom, development and social justice. It erodes the adaptive
preferences that keep the powerless shackled to low expectations. It is this
kind of mutation of the symbolic order that conceptual stretching has failed
to achieve in the Horn, a failure that reflects the sterility of conceptual
stretching for understanding the conditions and aspirations of the Horns
inhabitants.
One may ask how self-organization, i.e., the institutionalization of
capabilities-driven participation, could come about. The starting point for
an answer to this question is the recognition of the existence of traditional
skills of self-organization in Horn societies expressed in local institutions
that cover issues ranging from conflict resolution to sharing work and other
activities (Mequanent, 1996; Legesse 2006; Abdillahi 2001). These
traditional skills constitute a fund of cultural knowledge whose critical and
emancipatory elements could be educed and rethought in terms of the
exigencies of the present to tackle the issues of self-organization.
11
Awra
Amba, a successful egalitarian community created by traditional people
as a response to the challenges of modernization is a living proof of the
emancipatory and self-organizing potentials that throb in the interstices of
the Horn traditions (Halpern 2007). A legitimate question arises at this
juncture regarding the role of intellectuals in capabilities-driven
participation, in the self-organization necessary to institutionalize it, and in
the political society that emerges from it. Though the agents of
capabilities-driven participation are those who suffer from capabilities
56
deprivations, the participation of intellectuals is indispensable. However,
from the perspective of capabilities-driven participation, intellectuals
cannot enjoy place-holder" functions for the underprivileged under the
claim that intellectuals know better and therefore represent better the
interests of the underprivileged. The authority of intellectuals is not rooted
in their knowledge-claim but rather in the fact that they have reasons that
speak to the interests and aspirations of the participants in a way that
persuades them that the intellectuals proposals enhance the capabilities of
the participants. The participation of intellectuals is thus democratized and
their indispensability recognized. However, the question of intellectuals
raises a number of other issues that need to be tackled to clarify their role
in participatory social practices, in political society, and in the advent of
the Horn as a democratic community. I will briefly discuss these issues in
terms of knowledge production and communication, which, in the Horn,
have been co-opted to serve the interests of the ruling elites, who have
embraced concept-stretched democracy, nation and civil society to
legitimate the new forms of oppression and exploitation that characterize
the Horns induction into the global economy.
Knowledge Production and the Horn as a Democratic project
Since action without knowledge is blind, and since action guided by
wrong knowledge is even worse, as the experience of the Horn amply
demonstrates, we have to raise the issue of the role of knowledge in the
Horn as a democratic project. When knowledge about the Horn is based
on concept stretching, the issues that arise from the Horns life conditions
are circumscribed as technical problems solvable with imported solutions
or by experts. Such solutions, as we can see from the experience of the
concept stretching of democracy, nation and civil society, as well as from
the MDG programs of poverty reduction, fail to overcome poor living, for
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57
they are based on the miscognition of Horn conditions as a set of self-
evident problems waiting for ready-made solutions. But the Horn is a
historical reality, necessarily incomplete and complex, making its problems
invariably in excess of its solutions. As a result, imported or merely
technical solutions fail to latch onto the Horns realities and work through
them. Indeed, the Horns problems are not waiting for external solutions,
for the signs of possible solutions are already incubating in the problems
themselves as their surplus meanings or surplus history (Mennasemay
2005). Deciphering these surplus meanings, the questions and the signs of
possible solutions that gestate in them, is a crucial aspect of the production
of emancipatory knowledge necessary for the realization of the Horn as a
democratic project. It is the exclusion of these surplus meanings an
effect of the exclusion of the people from the process of knowledge
production and communication that has confined the production and
communication of knowledge to a sort of a doctor-patient relationship
between intellectuals and the Horns inhabitants wherein the latter are
treated as passive recipients of economic, social and political medication,
as it were, from all-knowing experts. This is a relationship that generates
homeless knowledge that treats the people as a tabula rasa
(Mennasemay 2006). It is incompatible with capabilities-driven
participation and the political society that emerges from it.
Moreover, as Ali Moussa Iye (2005) points out, there are at least
four patterns or mindsets that have bedevilled the modern production and
communication of knowledge in the Horn; namely, (a) uncritical
acceptance of mythologies of origins that hark back to foundational stories
that create divisions and justify relations of domination; (b) obsession with
territory in a way that reduces inhabitants to disposable items; (c)
acquiescence to a top-down process of political, economic and social
development, thus legitimating the practice of assuming that the source of
58
power is prior to the existence of the people and independnent of its will;
and, (d) a fundamentalist conceptionof each other that leads to view
cultural, religious and ethnic differences in terms of primordial differences
or contradictions impervious to compromise (40). As a result, there are
many irreconcilable modern narratives produced and disseminated in the
Horn the Ethiopian narrative, the Eritrean narrative, the Somali
narrative, and so forth. They all have two characteristics in common:
indifference to the issues of freedom, social justice and the well-being of
the inhabitants of the Horn, and the use of force to impose these narratives.
The current mode of production and communication of knowledge in
the Horn is a serious obstacle to freedom, development, social justice and
democratic unity. Indeed, the articulation of ethnology and politics in the
Horn ethnic federalism in Ethiopia, clan politics in Somalia, the
secession of Eritrea and the current ethnicization of the Horns history
lend credence to the claim that there is an internal relation between the
economy of power and the production of knowledge.
12
The implication is
that a paradigm shift in the production and communication of knowledge is
imperative. This paradigm shift has to encompass the emancipatory and
critical elements of the production and communication of knowledge that
are already present, even if as repressed elements, in the cultures and
traditions of the Horn. The production and communication of modern
knowledge would then be able to draw on the creative potentials of
traditional and cultural resources and the aspirations of the Horns
inhabitants. Only cross-fertilization between new and old knowledge
could ensure a production and communication of knowledge that fosters
agency freedom, democracy, development and social justice. Such a cross-
fertilization is already prefigured in the works of the two great novelists of
the region: Haddis Alemayhu and Nuruddin Farah.
13

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59
Do the intellectuals of the Horn have an obligation to the inhabitants
of the Horn to (a) engage in this transformation of the mode of production
and communication of knowledge, (b) be active in capabilities-driven
participation, and (c) facilitate the emergence and functioning of a political
society? Are these obligations, to use the Kantian distinction, perfect or
imperfect? The current consensus seems to be that helping others to attain
freedom is an imperfect obligation (Sen 2000: 230). This means that
participating in the above activities is a non-binding obligation to Horn
intellectuals, though they may perform them, like any foreign intellectual,
out of humanistic considerations. In light of the enormous deprivations
that afflict the Horns inhabitants, this answer is disconcerting.
14
To avoid
such a conclusion, we should perhaps make a distinction between a moral
obligation (an ought) and a must or what one has to do to complete a
task successfully (Williams 1981: 125).
15
This allows us to raise the above
question, not from the angle of a moral obligation, which does not seem to
lead us far, but from the perspective of practical necessity; that is, a task
the elimination of the unnecessary sufferings that have become the daily
lot for the majority of the Horns inhabitants that cannot otherwise be
completed.
However, there is still an unanswered moral question that needs to be
addressed. Objectivism, the dominant ideology in modernization and
democratization studies, absolves us from responsibility for the concepts
we apply in the study of the Horn. However, the political, social,
economic and cultural crises of the past decades have demonstrated that
such an approach is intellectually and morally corrupting. It is thus
incumbent on us to reflect on Camus and critical theorys claims
regarding the ethical implications of the use of concepts and to raise the
issue of the responsibility of intellectuals in their use of concepts. Do Horn
intellectuals have a duty not to engage in concept stretching? We cannot
60
avoid asking this question in light of the history of the Horns
intelligentsias catastrophic stretching of Marxist concepts in the 70s and
80s and the current practices discussed in this paper. If it is the case that
concept stretching is misnaming things whose consequences add more
misery to the ones the Horns inhabitants already suffer, then one cannot
escape the moral responsibility incurred by such an intellectual practice.
This means that, though Horn intellectuals might be obliged to borrow
social and political concepts from others, they have the moral duty not to
use such concepts in ways that do violence to the aspirations of the Horns
inhabitants for freedom, justice and prosperity.
Claims based on concept stretching may be meaningful, but they are
far from the truth embodied in the life conditions of the Horns inhabitants.
Concept stretching limits comprehension as deafness limits hearing. It
prevents us from grasping the historical dynamics of the Horns social
practices and from coming to terms with the nature of the tasks we must
accomplish in order to bring about a democracy of ends. Not surprisingly,
the understanding we have gained from concept stretching has not given us
the commitment needed to translate knowledge into emancipatory practice;
it has not grasped us body and soul, rationally and affectively, morally and
intellectually, and compelled us to work together to emancipate the Horn
from the present destitution. Something seems to be missing. And what is
missing is the universal truth that comes from a concrete self-
understanding rooted in our own reflection on both the bright and dark
sides of our histories and cultures as well as on our failures, aspirations and
tasks. One can borrow and stretch knowledge since knowledge is external
to the knower and the known object, but one cannot borrow truth,
because for knowledge to be truth to the knower, it must grasp and
change the knower and the known from within (Badiou: 361-377). To
grasp the truth of the Horns destitution and aspirations, we have to go
Maimire Mennasemay

61
beyond concept stretching. If so many development schemes have come to
nought, it is not always because there is corruption and incompetence,
though these are widespread in the Horn, but it is also because even those
who have tried honestly and competently to implement these schemes
inevitably fail to reach their goal, for one cannot apply justly and
successfully a knowledge that is not captured by the truth that gestates in
ones history.
Conclusion: The Task of Democratizing the Horn
There is no natural necessity that dictates that future conditions in the
Horn will necessarily be an extension of or better than what they are now.
What circumstances will prevail in the future depends on the will and
actions of the Horns inhabitants. If our goal is the creation of a free,
prosperous, just, culturally vibrant and democratic Horn, then this goal
should be the starting point for reflecting on how it could be achieved. A
better future is possible only if the end that is pursued, the means that are
used to follow this end, and the subjects capable of implementing it are
identified, at least in their general outlines. Only we, men and women of
the Horn, can accomplish this task of reflection, for our activity of
knowing reality is embedded, as a major tradition of philosophy would
have it, in reality itself, as indeed the Horns catastrophic experiences of
moderniztion, socialism, electoral democracy all of them based on
concept stretching amply demonstrate. If we abandon to others the task
of interpreting our culture, of reflecting on our history, of analysing our
needs and of planning our development, and limit our thinking to concept
stretching, we abdicate our soul and body and hand over to others the
intellectual, moral and affective resources with which we imagine,
interrogate, understand, judge and develop ourselves. Such an abdication
displaces the center of gravity of our future from our history to the history
62
of those on whom we depend to solve our problems. This means the
perpetuation of our present conditions into the indefinite future. A telling
omen of such a desolate future relates to the Millennium Development
Goals. This project, which depoliticizes poverty and the economic forces
that generate it, expresses the non-historical and non-political conception
others have of our life conditions. Inevitably, it reduces the life conditions
of the Horn to the issues of poverty reduction and international aid. Yet,
from the perspective of the life-world of the Horn, the issue is poor living,
an entirely different matter, as we have already seen. However a century
of oppression has inflicted on the Horns inhabitants traumas so crippling
and has made reflecting on life in the Horn so daunting that the temptations
to resort to instinctive but inevitably destructive solutions such as ethnic
and clan politics, or to borrow from others pre-packaged solutions, seem
irresistible to many. Succumbing to these temptations has contributed to
making the Horn of Africa a region of needless suffering. If we are to
build a democracy of ends a society of freedom, social justice and
prosperity we must resist these temptations and rise up to the
fundamental challenges of our history oppression, poverty, social
injustice and overcome them through our own intellectual labor,
imagination, and social practices.
The handle of the axe that cuts the tree comes from the tree, runs a
Somali proverb.
16
The contemporary history of the Horn indicates that the
people of the Horn have suffered as much at the hands of their own
compatriots as they have at the hands of outside powers. If the Ethiopian
saying that tells us we are what we do were to be the measure by which
we are judged, then we share the responsibility for the senseless suffering
and destruction, the meaningless wasting of potentials and talents, the
transformation of life in the Horn into endless cycles of hunger,
oppression, and war. In considering what roads are available to lead the
Maimire Mennasemay

63
Horn towards a democratic community of fate, we have to bear in mind the
above Somali and Ethiopian sayings. They invite us to reflect on our
history and to meditate on the actions we could have taken or avoided over
the past decades that could have preempted the present calamities. Such a
meditation cannot but make us aware of how we ourselves could continue
to be the main obstacles for the creation of a just, democratic and
prosperous Horn of Africa and the main agents of the extension and
aggravation of the present inhuman conditions for another century.

Endnotes

1
For useful critical comments on a draft version of this paper, I thank
Professor Gerardo Mosquera. I would like to thank Ato Samuel Dominique
for giving me access to his collection of the works of the great Ethiopian
novelist, Haddis Alemayhu.
2
In the Somali general election of 1969, a record number of 1002
candidates, representing 62 parties contested 123 seats.(Lewis 2002: 204)
3
However, the opposition parties boycotted the 1995 and 2000 Ethiopian
elections. The first real multiparty election took place in 2005. But since
the outcome favored the democratic opposition, the government claimed
victory, arrested and jailed the leaders of the democratic opposition, and
cracked down on its militants and supporters. (Ethiopian Human Rights
Council Reports, 2005, 2006, 2007; Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia, 2005,
2006)
4
My thanks to Professor Said Samatar for information on the Somali term
for nation.
5
As it will become clear in the course of this paper, my definition of
democracy owes a lot to Sens (1992, 1993, 2000, 2002) conceptualization
of capabilities as freedoms and to Leforts concept of democracy as a
from of society (1988), though neither might agree with the way I have
reworked their conceptualizations to respond to the issues of the Horn.
6
Lefort subscribes to Hannah Arendts distinction between the political
and the economic and considers democracy only in the realm of the
political (Lefort 45-55). However, his interpretative approach, rooted partly
in Merleau Pontys phenomenology and partly in Marxism, has the
64

potential to cover socio-economic experiences as experiences internal to
ones experience of society and its self-interpretation.
7
Sens concepts are germane to Aristotles idea of human flourishing
(1993: 30-54; 2000: 73, 75, 289)
8
Sen hints that a democracy compatible with the capabilities approach
would be one based on deliberative politics and on the utilization of
moral arguments in public debates (2000: 329, fn.9). However, he does
not develop this idea.
9
Arendt (1958: 176) points out that speech and actionare the modes in
which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects,
but qua men. A life without speech and without action is literally dead to
the world; it has ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived
among men. Hence, the importance of political society, as argued in this
paper.
10
For example, according to the TPLF, the malevolent Other Ethnie is the
Amhara.
11
The possibility of this kind of modern politics oriented self-organization
is suggested by the birth of grassroots "people's parliament" (Bunge la
Mwananchi, in Swahili) in Nairobi, a practice that the Kenyan government
represses, seeing in it, the dangerous gestation of a political society
(Kimani 2007).
12
Foucault (1972:27) writes, that power and knowledge directly imply
one another; there is no power relation without the correlative constitution
of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and
constitute at the same time power relations.
13 Briefly, both novelists depict the dialectic between individuals and
society in a way that enucleates the new from the old and the old from the
new through hermeneutical interpretations of both old and new social
practices. Medinas opposition to oppression in Sardines (Farah 1982); the
priority to friendship over clan affiliation that Deeriye, the old man,
manifests in Close Sesame (1983); Misras acceptance of her dual origins,
Oromo and Somali, in Maps (1996); Sebles challenge to tradition from
within tradition itself in Fiker esk Mekaber (Haddis 1992); the interactions
between ethnic, class and traditional solidarities in the relations between
Telahun and Sofia, an educated couple, Balambaras Gudeta a Tama
traditional chief, and the illiterate Tama coffee bean pickers that leads to
the recognition of the priority of universal justice in WenjelenjawDagna
(1978); the complex process of the emergence of new self-knowledge
explored through the urban travails of the rural girl Demeketch in YeElm
Ezat (1978); all articulate the birth of something novel that is neither new
nor old but goes beyond them. In these novels, agency freedom is
contextually embedded but it is at the same time open to the demands of
Maimire Mennasemay

65

individual experiences in new contexts. Thus, we see the emergence of
new kinds of mutual recognitions that go beyond clan and ethnic criteria
and appeal to individual freedom, dignity and the universality of human
experiences. These novels anticipate an alternative future arising from the
cross-fertilization between new and old knowledge, foreign and local ideas,
novel and traditional practices, westernized and the non-westernized
values, intellectuals and non-intellectuals, and new possibilities and
inherited aspirations for a better life. They expand in new ways and in new
directions the horizons of the inherited context, not by imitating the new or
discarding the old, but by traversing the painful contradictions that arise
from the collisions of the new and the old. They thus anticipate a mode of
production and communication of knowledge that is embedded in the life
world of the Horn.
14
The risk with such a minimum obligation is that the intellectuals of
Ethiopia may become reincarnations of Tekeste Tamrat, the young man in
Haddis Alemayhus novel, YeElm Ezat (1980), who, after being
introduced to modern education, severs himself from his roots an act
symbolically represented by his departure to the West on a scholarship
without even informing his mother who bore all the pains of life to make
sure he got a modern education.
15
Williams (1981:125) writes, Ought is related to must as best is related
to only. What is characteristically expressed by telling someone that he
ought to do X if he wants Y is that X is the best or favored means to Y; if it
is the only means to Y, then he must do it if he wants Y. Must indicate a
practical necessity.
16
My thanks to Professor Said Samatar for confirming the authenticity of
this proverb.

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71
AN AMERICAN'S VIEW OF THE HORN OF
AFRICA FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE
PRESENT
Theodore M. Vestal

THE HISTORY OF THE HORN
The current turmoil in the Horn of Africa can be traced
to the history of the area, including internal tensions,
religious rivalries, the natural setting with precarious
weather and man-made disasters, and the intervention of
outside actors.
The key events in the history of the Horn and of foreign intrusions
into the area that produced the current chaos are well studied. The most
significant ancient kingdom in the area known today as Greater Ethiopia
was Axum, a civilization that became a Christian entity in the fourth
century. Succeeding rulers retained that faith well into the 20
th
century.
Since the rise of Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries, Christian
Ethiopias relationships with Muslim nations to its East have been difficult.
Somalis and other Muslims competed with the Amhara-Tigray peoples of
the Ethiopian highlands for control of the Horn. Red Sea ports often were
closed to Christian Ethiopian merchants. As a result, Ethiopia turned
inward and became a Christian island surrounded by an Islamic sea. In the
16
th
century, Ahmad ibn Ibrahim al Ghazi, known in Ethiopia as Gragne,
became the military and religious leader in the area of present day Somalia
and rallied the ethnically diverse Muslims in a jihad intended to break
Ethiopias Christian power. Gragnes forces razed churches and
monasteries, burned manuscripts, took prisoners, and collected booty
throughout the highlands. In 1543, Ethiopians, joined by a small number
of Portuguese soldiers defeated the Muslim forces and killed Gragne
whose death destroyed the unity of the Muslims in the area.
1
It took
72
centuries for Ethiopia to recover from material and moral losses, and even
today, Ethiopians remember the bitter war against Gragne.
Throughout most of its history, present-day Somalia consisted of
Arab and Indian trading ports along the coast while the interior was
populated by scores of Somali clans. During the colonial era of the 19
th

century, Egypt became the dominant foreign power in the region, but in
1886, it was replaced by Britain in northern Somalia and, in 1889, by Italy
in the South. The French occupied the strategic port of Djibouti and
surrounding lands. Ethiopia remained independent and partook in its own
scramble for Africa by conquering and annexing neighboring territories
including in abutting lands.
Independently-minded Somalis have never been welcoming to
foreigners attempting to occupy their lands, and this animosity was
demonstrated by the war of resistance against colonialists that raged from
1899 to 1920. The scourge of the colonial era to Ethiopian, British, and
Italian forces alike was the Mad Mullah, Mahammad Abdille Hasan, the
religious and military leader of the Somalis who terrorized the region.
Hasan led the dervishes in one of the longest and bloodiest conflicts in the
annals of sub-Saharan resistance to alien encroachment. The Dervish
uprising devastated the Somali Peninsula and resulted in the death of an
estimated one-third of northern Somalia's population and the near
destruction of its economy. The struggle was not quelled until 1920 with
the death of Hasan, who became a hero of Somali nationalism.
2
Italian
efforts to colonize Ethiopia had been thwarted at the Battle of Adwa in
1896,
3
but the Italians retained Eritrea as a colony until World War II.
When the Fascist leader Mussolini sought a casus belli to fight Haile
Selassie in the 1930s in order to claim Ethiopia again as a colony, it was at
Welwel, an oasis in a disputed boundary area between Ethiopia and Italian
Somaliland, that he fabricated a hostile incident.
4
And when the Fascists
Theodore M. Vestal

73
invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the two prongs of their attack were from their
colonies in Eritrea and Somalia.
5

Americans became cognizant of the Horn of Africa as a result of the
Italian conquest and occupation of Ethiopia and especially because of
Haile Selassies historic appeal in behalf of collective security at the
League of Nations in 1936. After the liberation of Ethiopia in 1941, the
first victory of the Allies in World War II, the British occupied the former
Africa Orientale Italiana that covered almost all of the Horn.
6
Ethiopia was
placed unilaterally under British military administration, an Occupied
Enemy Territory Administration run from Nairobi, a center of colonial and
white-settler rule.
7
Haile Selassie sought to consolidate his rule, often
frustrated by the short reins allowed him by the British, who were still
fighting a war in Africa. The virtual total curtailment of national
sovereignty by the British military administration was accepted by the
Emperor because he had effectively no way to object.
GREATER SOMALIA
The British military occupation of Ethiopia and neighboring areas
from 1941-1952 contributed to the start of major problems in other areas of
the Horn. In 1946, the British encouraged the idea of a "Greater Somalia"
composed of British and Italian Somaliland and the Ogaadeen area of
Ethiopia inhabited by Somali people under a British trusteeship (the
Somali areas of Northern Kenya were seldom included in such British
plans).
8
To the Americans and Soviets, the idea of a Greater Somalia
appeared as a military expansion of the British Empire. There was no way
that the British could convince the world at large, especially the Russians,
of the purity of British motives in Somalia.
9
The possibility of oil in Italian
Somaliland kept alive British interest in gaining a trusteeship of Greater
Somalia, but international circumstances would not permit the
74
establishment of a British regime.
10
Reluctantly, the British supported
Italian trusteeship of its former colony to solidify U.S., French, and Italian
backing of British ambitions in Cyrenaica (a ploy muted by Libyan
independence in 1948).
The Italian trusteeship was a relatively peaceful ten year period
leading to independence for Italian Somaliland in 1960, when it was united
with British Somaliland to form the new nation of Somalia. In 1948, the
British Military Administration was evacuated from Ethiopian territories in
the Ogaadeen, and the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1954 formally
confirmed the return of the Ogaadeen to Ethiopia. The process of
decolonizing Ethiopia, which was considered complete only with the
restoration of its internationally recognized pre-1935 frontiers, had taken
one and a half decades. The British legacy, a vision of a Greater Somalia,
had been revealed to young Somali nationalists who aspired to bring into
being a fatherland of Somali people throughout the Horn. The idea led to
wars between Somalia and Ethiopia over the disputed Ogaadeen and to
unrest in Kenya. The matter is still far from settled, and the ghost of
Greater Somalia, though temporarily stilled, lives on.
THE ERITREAN PROBLEM
In 1943, British officials continued to view the empire as substantial
and capable of future growth. One strategy was to divide Eritrea, giving
the southern part of the former Italian colony to Ethiopia and creating a
new Christian Tigray nation on either side of the Eritrean frontier under
British protection.
11
This scheme came to naught in the austere realities of
the post-war world. The financially strapped British were unwilling to
subsidize the territory, but under their tutelage, Eritreans became more
politically aware and active. A legislature with elected members chosen
from competing political parties was established, a local newspaper began
Theodore M. Vestal

75
publishing, and there was a modest increase in educational opportunities.
12
The calculus of what to do with Eritrea was complicated by, among other
things, British designs on Cyrenaica, the muddled situation in Somalia, and
international relations that were putting into place parameters of the Cold
War. The British would have preferred to give the southern part of Eritrea
to Ethiopia and the Muslim north, to the Sudan, but Khartoum declined the
offer.
The disposal of the former Italian colony finally was decided by the
United Nations, and in September 1952, Eritrea officially became "an
autonomous state federated with Ethiopia" under the Ethiopian crown. Ten
years later, Eritrea was absorbed into Ethiopia as just another province.
Many Eritreans, who, under the British administration, had learned respect
for parliamentary democracy, pluralist elections, the rule of law, and the
protection of human rights, were disappointed in their fate as they were
forced into an authoritarian monarchy.
By 1960, Eritrean liberation movements had developed and were to
engulf Ethiopia in a thirty-year civil war. One of the victors of the war, the
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), successfully negotiated for a
referendum among Eritreans about the future of their state. In April 1993,
Eritrean voters overwhelmingly declared for independence. A large
number of Ethiopians, however, thought the unilateral separation from
Ethiopia, though sanctioned by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia,
was illegal. Rancor over an independent Eritrea continues to be a divisive
issue in contemporary Ethiopia.
The dictatorship of Eritreas president Issayas Afeworki, with its
dismal record of human rights abuse and blatant disregard for a new
constitution, has disappointed many observers of the Horn who had hoped
that the ruling People's Front for Democracy and J ustice could live up to its
lofty revolutionary goals pronounced during the civil war. When
76
Ethiopian forces defeated Eritrea in a costly war from 1998 to 2002,
Issayas was severely criticized at home and abroad for his authoritarian
rule.
Instead of settlers and district officers, the British left behind seeds of
discord in the rocky passes of Tigray, in Mediterranean-like Asmara, and
in the deserts of Somalia and the Ogaadeen. But on the positive side, the
former British Somaliland constitutes the one extant polity in a country
that exists only on maps. In contrast to others, the British apparently
taught the inhabitants of their Somali colony how to make government
work. The same can be said of Eritrea. Although the British were there for
a relatively short time (from 1941-1952), they instilled in Eritreans an
appreciation for, among other things, democratic processes, political
parties, a free press, and education. This gave Eritreans a certain panache
that developed into a chip on the shoulder when they were involuntarily
joined to the less Anglicized Ethiopians. Resentment against their forced
unity with more populous Ethiopia runs deep in the Eritrean inheritors of
the benefits of both British occupation and Italian colonialism. Now we
await the outcome of an avowedly dictatorial transition to see if Eritreans
really remember the lessons inculcated in them by the British fifty years
ago. For most of the Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Somalis, who were not yet
born when the British left their lands, the hatreds and distrusts of their
neighbors in the Horn have existed so long as to seem generic. What many
of them have forgotten is the catalytic impact of British rule and
administration on their present day quandaries.
ENTER THE UNITED STATES
As part of its war effort, in late 1942, the United States opened a
lend-lease center in Eritrea and increasingly played a more important role
in Ethiopia. The opening of relations with the United States enabled the
Theodore M. Vestal

77
Ethiopian Government to begin to free itself from dependence on Great
Britain. Emperor Haile Selassie received moral support from the U.S., a
limited amount of technical assistance, and promises of more substantial
aid. This ultimately led to the signing of a "Mutual Aid Agreement"
between the U.S. and Ethiopia on 9 August 1943. The Agreement,
"planned in Washington, agreed to by Washington, and condoned by
London," was a watershed in Ethiopian diplomatic, social, and economic
history.
13
From that point on, the United States became the paramount
economic power in the Horn and the Middle East.
During World War II, the United States had its eyes on a special prize
in the Eritrean highlands. A U.S. Army feasibility study identified the
former site of an Italian naval radio station, Radio Marina, located outside
Asmara, as an extraordinary site for a communications base. From that
base, Allied forces had intercepted messages among the Axis powers that
provided vital information in preparing for the conquest of Germany.
14
It
became clear to U.S. policy makers that the maintenance of the
communications station in Eritrea was of strategic importance. The
Pentagon grew nervous about the imminent British evacuation from Eritrea
and increasingly came to appreciate that only Ethiopian sovereignty there
would guarantee U.S. control over what was becoming a strategically
important signals facility and a convenient supply and oil depot in the
Eritrean Red Sea port of Massawa.
15
By the end of 1948 Ethiopia gave
assurances to the United States concerning use of the communications
facilities outside Asmara that eventually came to be known as Kagnew
Station.
From 1953 through 1960, the United States provided Ethiopia with
strong military and economic support. The major goals of American
foreign policy, in addition to maintaining military access and
communications facilities in Ethiopia, were to keep Soviet and Egyptian
78
influence out of the Horn and a pro-Western government empowered in
Ethiopia.
16
In return, Ethiopia wanted U.S. assistance to modernize its
army, aid in the development of its economy, and political support for the
incorporation of Eritrea, control over the Ogaadeen, and backing against
any threats to its sovereignty.
In a state visit to the United States in 1954, the Emperor made the
first of several personal importuning requests to American presidents for
military aid. President Dwight Eisenhower basically approved an arms-
for-base-rights agreement.
17
Thereafter the Emperor, who was
characterized by his American hosts as having an inordinate interest in
military affairs, never was completely satisfied with the amount or quality
of the arms his country received. Beginning in 1957, the Emperor revealed
another ide fixe: his being threatened by the ideology of Greater Somalia
that was being bruited about at the time. Although the outlook for a new
Somali nation was not promising, the United States supported the
unification of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia after they achieved
independence in 1960. This perturbed Haile Selassie who was extremely
sensitive to any derogation of Ethiopian sovereignty. The Emperors fear
that the United Kingdom and United States were pushing for a Greater
Somalia became an obsession. In response, he played the Cold War card
of cozying up to the Eastern Bloc, a tactic he frequently repeated whenever
he perceived that America was not treating his country properly. In truth,
during most of the Cold War, sub-Saharan Africa, not directly threatened
by the Soviets, was relegated to the periphery of U.S. foreign policy.
At the end of the Eisenhower administration, the United States was
caught off guard by the speed of decolonization in Africa. Most of the
European colonies received little attention from the United States because
they were in the sphere of influence of allies. An example of just how
badly informed high ranking American officials were about Africa was
Theodore M. Vestal

79
contained in the minutes of a meeting of the National Security Council in
early 1959. Although President Eisenhower had been in North Africa, he
had never been in Somalia and asked what kind of an area it was. Did it
consist of wild jungle? Eisenhower inquired whether Somalia people
were primitive aborigines. He wondered as to how the natives could
expect to run an independent nation and why they were so possessed as to
try [to] do so. Maurice Stans, Eisenhowers Director of the Budget,
apparently was the only officer present with any knowledge about Somalia,
and he asserted that Somali women were said to be the most beautiful in
Africa.
18

Nineteen sixty was an annus horribilis for Haile Selassie. In
December, there was an attempted coup dtat led by the Emperors Body
Guard. The wily Emperor survived, but he also was shaken by Somalias
gaining independence in that same year. In the decade of Africa, hopes
were high for Somalias national cohesion. The people shared a common
language, a sense of cultural identity, and a dominant religion--Islam. But
competing clan and subclan allegiances were always potentially divisive to
the society. Traditionally clans were governed by experienced wise men,
but the authority of the elders slowly gave way to the power of younger
men with more arms, less education, and questionable moral suasion.
The new government fostered a Greater Somalia nationalism based
upon reuniting all Somali people. This irredentist policy was characterized
by the national flag, a white five-pointed star on a blue field that
symbolized the five supposed branches of the Somali nationthe peoples
of British and Italian Somalilands and the Somalis still living in French
Somaliland (Djibouti), Ethiopia, and Kenya.
In the United States, the election of J ohn F. Kennedy brought to the
office a President with a unique record on Africa. Kennedy had served on
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and became chair of the African
80
Subcommittee. Early in his presidency, Kennedy recommended a strong
Africa. as a goal of American policy.
19
He lent rhetorical support to
African nations, doubled their foreign aid, and sent Peace Corps
Volunteers to serve in many of the sub-Saharan countries.
In Addis Ababa, the nations of Africa assembled for the founding
meeting of the Organization of African Unity hosted by Haile Selassie in
1963. In October of that year, the Emperor paid a second state visit to
Washington where he asked Kennedy for increased military aid in the face
of Somali irredentism and the promise of the Soviets to arm Somalia. In
exchange for an expansion of Kagnew Station facilities, Kennedy agreed to
send Ethiopia a squadron of F-5 jet fighters at a later date and to provide
more training for the Army. The personal diplomacy between Kennedy
and Haile Selassie was tragically ended by the assassination of the young
President in the following month.
In February 1964 Somali forces attacked Ethiopia and Kenya to
create Greater Somalia, but they were repulsed and Ethiopian aircraft
bombed targets in Somalia. Hostilities ended in April through the
mediation of Sudan, acting under the auspices of the Organization of
African Unity. To the satisfaction of neither side, the United States
maintained impartiality in the Somali-Ethiopian dispute.
20
Under Prime
Minister Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, Somalia's government initiated a
policy of dtente with her neighbors.
21

By 1967, Haile Selassie, chronically dissatisfied with the level of
military deliveries from the United States, visited President Lyndon
J ohnson in Washington and again expressed his concern about the Soviets
arming Somalia.
22
At the time of the Emperors visit, J ohnson was
preoccupied with the escalating war in Vietnam, and the Johnson
Administration was more susceptible to the argument that the communist
bloc was actively advancing its interests worldwide and campaigning to
Theodore M. Vestal

81
dislodge the United States from the Horn. J ohnson, doubtlessly influenced
by Kagnews increased significance in U.S. research in satellite
communications and in the development of ballistic missiles, agreed to
reward Ethiopia for its pro-Western alignment. Once again the Emperors
personal diplomacy successfully manipulated the vulnerability of his arms
patron, and the United States provided Ethiopia with military vehicles,
helicopters, and F-5 fighters, the latter, a step from the sophisticated arms
export threshold maintained by Washington until that time. The end result
of the Haile Selassie-J ohnson diplomacy was that both sides got what they
wanted: the Ethiopians, the military hardware they desired and the United
States, continued use of Kagnew Station and the maintenance of a strong
presence in Ethiopia in the face of a spreading Soviet and Chinese
activities in the region.
In early 1968, Vice President Hubert Humphrey just back from a
visit to nine African nations reported to President J ohnson that among
African leaders, he had found a fierce self-pride and healthy nationalism,
combined with a sense of pragmatic realism. The Vice President had met
with Somalias President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke and Prime Minister
Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal who highly praised the activities of the U.S.
Peace Corps in their country. Reported Humphrey: Somalia may well
deserve the label of the most democratic country in Africa.
23
Indeed,
Somalia was a unified, peaceful, functioning member of the family of
nations presided over by democratically elected leaders in Mogadishu, a
picturesque capital on the Indian Ocean. At a time when ethnic rivalries
were rampant in dividing African nations, Somali people appeared united
and optimistic about their nations future. A military coup d'tat, the bane
of modern African history, brought an end to the Republic of Somalia only
nine years after its birth in 1960. Major General Muhammad Siad Barre
took control of the nation and pursued a policy of scientific socialism, an
82
oxymoronic combination of Somali nationalism, Islam, and
Marxist/Leninism. The newly renamed Somali Democratic Republic
adopted an anti-United States foreign policy and accused Washington of
imperialism. Once again tensions on the Ethiopian-Somalia border were
exacerbated by Soviet-supplied arms in Somalia.
24

The decline in the fortunes of the Horn nations was accelerated by the
policies of the Nixon administration. In 1972, Henry Kissinger as head of
the National Security Council made a confidential report that purportedly
recommended that U.S. policy toward Ethiopia should be to keep that
nation in perennial internal conflict using such vulnerabilities as ethnic,
religious and other divisions to destabilize the country. Kissingers
recommendation appears to have been followed successfully, and not only
Ethiopia but the Horn of Africa has been in turmoil ever since.
In this setting, Haile Selassie visited President Richard Nixon on his
final state visit to the United States in 1973. The growth of Soviet and
Cuban military activities in Somalia combined with a growing insurgency
in Eritrea posed real threats to Ethiopias security.
25
The Emperor
presented Nixon with a $450 million shopping list that included F-4
Phantoms, M-60 tanks, surface-to air missiles, and air-to-ground missiles.
By that time, the facilities at Kagnew were being made obsolete by satellite
technology and the development of a new U.S. base in the Indian Ocean at
Diego Garcia.
26
Thus, the Emperor no longer held the trump card, and the
Nixon administration politely rebuffed him. Haile Selassies trip was an
unqualified disaster, and his return home with little to show for the effort
was a contributing factor to his overthrow during the following year.
THE COLD WAR SWITCH
Armed by the Soviet Union, Somalia went to war with Ethiopia in
1977 at a time when Ethiopias military dictatorship, the Derg, was in
Theodore M. Vestal

83
disarray seeking to consolidate its power after overthrowing Emperor Haile
Selassie and struggling with a rebellion in Eritrea. The Somali army was
repulsed by Ethiopian forces supported by Cuban and Yemeni troops.
27

This mle of communist cronies induced an unlikely Cold War switch of
principal supporters of Horn of Africa nations with the United States
becoming the ally of Somalia and Ethiopia becoming a client state of the
Soviet Union.
Although the U.S. military utilized air and naval bases in Somalia and
included Barres troops in war games and joint military exercises in the
1980s, America was at best a reluctant ally. Light arms from the United
States promised to Barre to repel the Ethiopians instead were used to
repress the dictator's domestic opponents. This did not make America
popular with the Somalis on the street. Increasingly, government
oppression was aimed at rival clans and sub-clans, the glue of Somali
society. The war and its consequent refugee influx forced Somalia to
depend on humanitarian handouts for its economic survival. The
government degenerated into personal, one-party rule with Barre
surrounding himself with members of his own clan and isolating himself
from the public. Leaders of other clans, now known as warlords,
resisted massive atrocities by the government. A reign of terror followed
that was the beginning of the end for Somalia as a nation.
Clan warlords, some with foreign support including money from the
United States and arms from Ethiopia, created their own little fiefdoms.
Bribes and extortion, enforced by uncontrolled clan-based militias,
replaced civil government. The nation had become a cold-war dumping
ground for arms, and all the clans were armed to the teeth. Military grade
firepower was everywhere. In J anuary 1991 Barre fled Mogadishu, and
Somalia fell apart. In the North, the Somali National Movement (SNM)
84
declared its zones sovereign independence as Somaliland. Another
northern area proclaimed itself Puntland.
THE DECLINE OF SOMALIA
The chaos of clan warfare coincided with drought. By 1992, Somalia
was a major human disaster. A small United Nations operation attempted
to police delivery of relief supplies. UNITAF with 30,000 troops; of
whom 22,000 were U.S., averted a catastrophe by assuring delivery of food
and medical supplies. But in 1993 clashes between local militia and UN
troops from Pakistan in Mogadishu led to full-scale armed conflict. After
two U.S. helicopters were shot down in October 1993, President Clinton
ended U.S. involvement in UNITAF. By 1994, far higher losses had been
suffered by UNITAF forces from several other nations before their
withdrawal from what had been Somalia. Since that time, the chaos of
Somalia has amounted to what Robert Kaplan has called the coming
anarchy characterized by scarcity, crime, overpopulation, clan warfare,
and disease destroying the social fabric of the nation. Further complicating
the scenario was the appearance of Al Qaeda infiltrating Somalia, Ethiopia,
and Kenya from its training bases in the Sudan. These terrorist groups,
called Al Ittihad Al Islamiya in the Horn, brought Islamic fundamentalism
to a region that had long been home to a moderate form of Islam. With no
central government to ride herd on them, Al Ittihad successfully used
Somalia as a staging area for its mischief in East Africa. Al Ittihad agents
in Kenya bombed U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998,
and .those who escaped arrest purportedly found safe haven in Somalia.
Beginning in 2002, as part of its war on terrorism, the United States
stationed several thousand American troops in the Combined Joint Task
ForceHorn of Africa in Djibouti at Le Monier barracks, next door to
Somalia and only 30 miles south-west of the Arabian Peninsula. From
Theodore M. Vestal

85
there U.S. forces monitor assumed terrorist groups in the Horn, East
Africa, and the Middle East and train soldiers of neighboring countries,
especially Ethiopia that has one of the largest and best equipped armies in
Africa.
In an effort to bring governance to the anarchy of southern Somalia,
the UN and African Union (AU) helped form the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) in October 2004-- the fourteenth attempt to end the
mayhem since 1991. From the start, the government (that was not
popularly elected) was weak, unpopular and faction-ridden and basically
remained in Nairobi to avoid demonstrating its impotence before the other
warlords back home. The power vacuum in Somalia was filled by Al
Ittihad which created a coalition of zealously religious warlords called the
Islamic Courts Union. After fifteen years of chaos and corrupt rule, the
Courts defeated the disorganized militias of other warlords, some of whom
were supported by the United States and Ethiopia, and restored law and
order to central and southern Somalia. During the last six months of 2006,
the Courts ruled with a heavy-handed, fundamentalist brand of Islam but
also restored a semblance of peace. Then the hubris of the Courts
propelled their followers to attempt an attack on the newly returned TFG
that was holed up in a temporary capital in Baidoa, a provincial backwater.
At the same time the Courts declared their intention to take the Ogaadeen
and unleashed a rhetorical jihad against Ethiopia which had a large military
presence poised on the Somali border.
When the Courts militia approached Baidoa, Ethiopian troops
poured across the border and, joined by TFG fighters, smashed the
jihadists. The Courts forces were driven South to Mogadishu, which they
abandoned without a fight, and then on to densely wooded areas close to
the Kenyan border where they were slaughtered or surrendered. At that
point, two U.S. air strikes pounded the area where wanted Al Qaeda agents
86
purportedly were hiding. According to Ethiopian sources, U.S. military
personnel investigated the scene of the attack on the groundthe first time
American troops had been in Somalia since 1993. The U.S. Navy also had
ships off the Somali coast to make sure no one could join the Courts
militia or escape from the military operations. The United States was glad
to back up the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, and from its base in
Djibouti, it could rely on surrogates to hunt for al Qaida suspects in the
Horn.
TFG and Ethiopian troops have maintained precarious order
throughout southern Somalia by force. By late J anuary, however, the
Ethiopian army was pulling out of the country. They couldnt afford to
stay, and Somalis, with a centuries old animus against their predominantly
Christian neighbor to the West, made life miserable for the infidel
Crusader invaders. Ethiopias close alliance with the United States does
not make them popular with Somalis either. From a military perspective,
Ethiopia is happy to have a destabilized Somalia without the power or will
to fight in the Ogaadeen again.
The TFG faces a daunting task in maintaining order. Resurgent
Islamists, returning warlords, clan rivalries, rampant banditry, and weapons
galore will keep Somalis among the most wretched of the earth unless
some armed force can replace the departing Ethiopians. Fearing that the
TFG is not up to the job, the African Unions Peace and Security Council
approved an 8,000-strong force on 19 J anuary. But procuring such a force
and paying for it is problematic. What national army or police force will
knowingly move into an Iraq-like situation with a xenophobic population
infamous for not showing kindness to military strangers? And doesnt the
AU have enough on its plate with its peacekeepers scattered all over the
continent and international public opinion asking why Darfur evades an
Theodore M. Vestal

87
African solution? Nor can the United States be of much help. Its
international platter is reserved for bigger and costlier fish at the moment.
AU forces, to be known as IGASOM, might keep a tenuous peace for
a short time, but ultimately the Somali people in the South will have to
regain control of their country and rejoin the family of nations. Moderate
Somalis, if such there be, need to say enough to the warlords. It can be
done. Look to the North to the former British colony, Somaliland, which
for sixteen years has survived as a democracy, and to Puntland, where
traditional clan elders maintain a comparatively orderly state. The
Southerners will have to do it themselves. A meaningful government will
have to include moderate Islamic Courts members, clan elders, religious
leaders and civic community leaders. If these groups cannot reconcile,
Somalia will remain a fragmented threat to regional stability and a safe
haven for terrorists. Will that be the best, the people of Somalia can do?
Are they willing to accept the arrival of the coming anarchy in their once
proud land? They may have to, because the world has grown tired of
propping up failed states that cant help themselves.

NOTES
1. Richard Greenfield, Ethiopia: A New Political History (London: Pall
Mall, 1965), pp. 52-53.
2. See generally, Abdi Sheik Abdi, Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle
Hassan (London: Zed Books, 1993).
3. Theodore M. Vestal, Reflections on the Battle of Adwa and its
Significance for Today, in Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia,
eds., The Battle of Adwa: Reflections on Ethiopias Historic Victory
against European Colonialism (New York: Algora, 2005), pp. 21-35.
4. Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855-1974 (Athens, OH:
Ohio University Press, 1991), p. 153.
88
5. Anthony Mockler, Haile Selassies War, The Italian-Ethiopian
Campaign, 1935-1941 (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 61-
73.
6. Theodore M. Vestal, Consequences of the British Occupation of
Ethiopia during World War II, in Barry J. Ward, ed., Rediscovering
the British Empire (Malabar, FL: Krieger, 2002), pp. 43-57.
7. Richard Pankhurst, "Decolonization of Ethiopia, 1940-55,"
Decolonization of Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa
(Paris: UNESCO, 1981), p.123; "A History of Early Twentieth
Century Ethiopia, 15," 1941: The Italian Departure, and the Arrival of
the British, Addis Tribune, 24 April 1997;
8. Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East1945-1951
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 274-75.
9. Louis, pp. 281-82.
10. "Somaliland Protectorate and the Horn of Africa," Cabinet memo by
Mr. Lennox- Boyd advocating the creation of a Greater Somalia, CP
(56) 180, 25 July 1956, CAB 129/82.
11. Committee on Ethiopia, Report on Future Policy Towards Ethiopia,
Cairo, 18 May 1943.
12. Margaret Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1969), xxxi.
13. Harold Marcus, The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain and the
United States (Lawrenceville, NJ : Red Sea Press, 1995), p. 21; see
also Richard Pankhurst, "A History of Twentieth Century Ethiopia,
17," Ethio-American Post-War Relations, Addis Tribune, 8 May
1997
14. See David Kahn, The Code Breakers (New York: Simon & Schuster,
1996).
15. Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, Vol. XI, Africa and
S. Asia, Part 1 (U.S. Govt Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1983)
420, Meeting of Childs and Duncan Cumming, Chief Administrator
of Eritrea, 30 Jan 52.
S. Asia, Part 1, Statement of Policy on Ethiopia, 19 Nov 56.
17. Theodore M. Vestal, Emperor Haile Selassies First State Visit to the
United States in 1954: The Oklahoma Interlude, International
J ournal of Ethiopian Studies 1 (2003): 133-152.
S. Asia, Part 1, 45. Memo of Discussion at 397
th
Meeting of the NSC,
26 Feb 1959.
19. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, A Thousand Days: J FK In The White House
(New York: Random House, 1988), 552.
Theodore M. Vestal

89
20. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Vol. XXIV, Africa,
275. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in
Somalia, Washington, J anuary 15, 1964; 286. Telegram from the
Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, Washington,
February 21, 1964.
342. Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Rusk, Washington,
August 22, 1967.
328. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 14, 1967.
23. Lyndon B. J ohnson Library, NSF Country File, Box 77, AfricaThe
VPs Report to the Pres. On his nine Af Nation Visit, 12/29/67-
1/11/68.
24. David D. Laitin, Scientific Socialism, 1970-75,in Helen Chapin Metz
(ed.),
Somalia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress,
1993).
25. Nixon-Ford Administrations, Volume E-6, Foreign Relations, 1969-
1976, Documents on Africa, 1973-1976, 88. Memorandum of
Conversation, Washington, May 15, 1973.
26. Nixon-Ford Administrations, Volume E-6, Foreign Relations, 1969-
1976, Documents on Africa, 1973-1976, 94. Telegram 181336
from the Department of State to the Embassy in Ethiopia, September
12, 1973, 2048Z.
27. Said S. Samatar, Somalia's Difficult Decade, 1980-90, in Helen
Chapin Metz (ed.),
Somalia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress,
1993).
90
ETHIOPIA ON THE FIRE OF COMPETING
NATIONALISMS:
The Oromo Peoples Movement, the
State, and the West
Asafa Jalata
Ethiopia is an empire on the verge of collapse because of the
competing nationalisms of various population groups, such as
Oromos, Amharas, Tigrayans, Ogaadeen-Somalis, and Sidamas.
While the colonized populations, including Oromos, Sidamas,
Ogaadeen-Somalis and others, see Ethiopian nationalism that
manifests itself as an Amhara or a Tigrayan nationalism as oppressor
nationalism, Amharas and Tigrayans consider the nationalism of the
colonized nations as tribalist and secessionist. The refusal of the
Tigrayan-dominated minority regime and its supporters from the West
to deal democratically with these contradictory issues and the
commitment to maintain Ethiopian colonialism and its massive human
rights violations and state terrorism on one side, and the determination
of the colonized nations to achieve national self-determination and
multinational democracy or complete independence on the other side,
have set Ethiopia on fire. Further, the determination of the Amhara
elites to come back to power to control the Ethiopian colonial state has
increased the intensity of the Ethiopian political problem. Since it is
impossible to deal with all these issues in this paper, I focus on the
Oromo struggle for national self-determination due to its centrality to
the current Ethiopian political crisis.
Oromos are one of the three largest ethno-national groups in Africa;
in Ethiopia alone they are estimated at 40 million. Some Oromo branches
also live in Kenya. Before their colonization, the Oromo people used to
call their homeland Biyya Oromoo, which Lewis Krapf named Ormania
in the mid-1850s.
1
When Africa was partitioned during the last decades of
the 19th century by European colonial powers, Ethiopia was seen as a
Christian Island. Since Ethiopians (Amharas and Tigrayans) were ready to
collaborate with European colonial powers, they were given military and
other assistance to colonize the Oromo and other peoples. In this process,
Oromos were incorporated into Ethiopia and the European-dominated
Asafa J alata

91

racialized capitalist world system as colonial subjects and semi-slaves.
Since then, Oromos have been under the total control of the Ethiopian
colonial state that has been supported by global powers, namely the UK,
the former USSR, and the U.S.
2
As a result, today the Oromo people are
one of the impoverished and uneducated world population groups. Oromos
live under Ethiopian political slavery, and they do not have freedom of
expression, access to the media, and freedom to organize.
3

Today Oromos are exposed to massive human rights violations and
state terrorism because of their resistance to Ethiopian colonialism and
exploitation of their abundant economic resources.
4
The Tigrayan-
dominated Ethiopian regime has acquired complex information and
communication networks and modern weaponry through its connections
with global powers and transnational elites, and uses these to terrorize
Oromo activists and the Oromo population in order to destroy their social
and organizational infrastructures. First, this paper seeks to explain the
nature of the Oromo peoples movement. Second, it explores the
relationship between Ethiopia and global powers to situate the Oromo
question in the global context. Third, the paper explains how the Tigrayan-
led Ethiopian regime practices state terrorism to control Oromos and
transfer their resources to Tigrayans and their supporters. Fourth, it
explores why the West supports the Meles regime by claiming that it is
democratic. Fifth, the paper suggests some political strategies and
approaches that can help different ethnonational groups to move beyond
conflict and war by recognizing and correcting the past and present crimes
and injustices in order to engage in peaceful co-existence and development.
The Oromo Peoples Movement
The Oromo peoples movement seeks self-determination for the
nation known as Oromia. The movement also struggles to restore Oromo
92
democracy known as the Gada system.
5
Oromos have been engaged in the
Oromo national movement under the leadership of the Oromo Liberation
Front (OLF) since the early 1970s to liberate themselves from Ethiopian
colonial repression and exploitation. This movement, as an anti-colonial
national struggle, aims at dismantling racial/ethno-national hierarchy,
Ethiopian settler colonialism, and its institutions that have been legitimated
by the ideology of racism.
6
Racism is defined as a discourse and a practice
in which the racial/ethno-national project is politically, culturally, and
scientifically constructed by global and regional elites in the capitalist
world system to naturalize and justify racial/ethno-national inequality in
which those at the top of the hierarchy oppress and exploit those below
them by claiming biological and/or cultural superiority. In other words,
race and racism are sociopolitical constructs that maintain the identities of
the dominant ethno-nations and their power and privileges through policy
formulation and implementation. Consequently, these two concepts as
sociopolitical constructs define the relationship between the colonizer and
the colonized ethno-nations in Ethiopia.
The central contradiction that is built into Ethiopian colonial politics
is the racialization/ethnicization of state power leading to further rigid
ethno-class stratification and dependence on big powers without
accountability to the ruled. The acute political and economic crises in
Oromia and Ethiopia, and the policy response to them, have contributed to
social unrest, and ethno-cultural and social movements. These crises stem
from the political behavior of the Ethiopian racialized/ethnicized state and
the global forces that have been involved in the Ethiopian empire on the
side of this state without requiring accountability, the rule of law, or the
implementation of at least limited democracy.
The interplay of multiple social structural and historical factors and
conjunctures in the racialized global capitalist world system fostered the
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development of Oromo nationalism. The inability of the colonizers to
crush the Oromo human spirit, individual and collective resistance to
colonial or racial/ethno-national domination, the immortality of certain
cultural memory, changes in social structures because of economic and
political changes, urbanization and community formation, the development
of institutions, the emergence of an educated class, politicized collective
grievances, and the dissemination of social scientific and political
knowledge through global and local networks have interacted to inspire
Oromo nationalism. The development of Oromo nationalism cannot be
understood without linking it to the processes of ideological formation and
cultural revitalization, institutional and organizational manifestations, and
alternative knowledge production and dissemination. The development of
Oromo nationalism was slower than that of other Africans who were
colonized directly by the European powers. Oromos were colonized
directly by the Ethiopian (Amhara-Tigray) minority settlers that attempted
to destroy Oromo people-hood through genocide, ethnocide and selective
assimilation. The Ethiopian colonial government with the help of the
weapons, mercenaries, and advisors from Great Britain, France, and Italy
liquidated half the Oromo population (i.e. five million out of ten million)
and their leadership during the last decades of the nineteenth century.
7

The Ethiopian colonial settlers established their main geopolitical
centers in Oromia through which racist and colonial policies have been
formulated and implemented to keep the remaining Oromos as second-
class citizens, and to exploit their economic and labor resources by denying
them access to state power. These geopolitical centers are garrison cities
surrounded by the Oromo rural masses that are denied meaningful health,
educational, and other social services, despite the fact that these colonial
settlers and their collaborators depend on the economic and labor resources
of the Oromo majority. Placing these complex contradictions in the global
94
and historical context and analyzing them enables us to critically
understand the relationship between the West, particularly the US, and the
Meles Zenawi regime and the difference between the legitimizing
discourse of democracy and the actual political practices of massive
human rights violations and state terrorism.
Ethiopia, Global Powers, and the Discourse of Race
Ethiopia is an empire in which two ethnonational groups, namely
Amharas and Tigrayans successively control state power.
8
These two
dominant population groups call themselves Habashas.
9
Successive
Ethiopian regimes have used the discourses of race, culture, and
Christianity to link themselves to the Middle East, Europe and North
America in order to consolidate their power against their fellow Ethiopians
and the colonized population groups. Race, Christianity, socialism and
democracy have been used as political discourses by successive Habasha
ruling classes to legitimate Ethiopian state power without changing its
essence of authoritarianism and terrorism. The Ethiopian state has different
policies and practices: It practices authoritarianism on the Amharas and
Tigrayans from which it emerged, and terrorizes the colonized population
groups, such as Oromos. Therefore, I characterize the Ethiopian state as an
authoritarian-terrorist regime. Successive heads of the Ethiopian state
have had the power to kill their subjects without any repercussions, and
they have been above their own laws. These authoritarian-terrorist regimes
are highly militarized and repressive, and they tightly controlled
information and resources by reason of foreign aid, domestic financial
resources, lucrative businesses, and political appointments. They have also
directly owned and controlled all aspects of state power including the
security and military institutions, judiciary and other public bodies, and
financial institutions. These successive regimes have legitimized their
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corrupt political practices in the discourses of culture, civilization, religion,
race, and other ideologies.
Habashas see themselves as a Semitic people who are racially and
culturally superior to other Africans. Paul Baxter explains that they used
to stress their Middle Eastern rather than African cultural roots, as is so
obvious in the reiteration of the Solomonic legend, taught in schools as
history and justification of imperial rule. J ust as the expansion of the
European empire in Africa coincided with that of Abyssinian, so the latter
took on some of the same sanctimonious assumptions of bringing
civilization to the savages. Minilik and his courtiers became honorary, if
second-class, bearers of the `white mans burden in Africa
10
Habashas
have also effectively used cultural racism
11
in destroying or suppressing
other peoples. Cultural racism and its contradictions may result in the
extermination or/and continued subjugation of the dominated population
groups. Racism does not necessarily manifest itself by the discourse and
claim of biological differences. Usually it combines the discourses of
biological and cultural differences to justify unequal treatment of different
population groups. The extermination of J ews by Germans, the continued
subjugation of Palestinians by the Israeli state, the ethnic cleansing of
Bosnians by Serbians, the destruction of Tutsis by Hutus, and suppression
of Hutus by Tutsis are examples of extreme forms of cultural racism.
As Eurocentric scholars have intellectually separated the original
Black civilization of Kemet (Egypt) and Kush or Nubia from other African
civilizations, then linked them to the Middle East to prove the racist notion
of superiority of non-Blacks to Blacks,
12
some Ethiopianists tried to prove
the racial and cultural superiority of Amharas and Tigrayans by Semitizing
and coupling them to the Middle East and Europe. Baxter notes that
evolutionists and racist assumptions, mostly unvoiced, have contributed to
the belief that a Christian, Semitic culture with Middle Eastern leanings
96
had to be superior to a black Africa.
13
Recognizing the political and
diplomatic significance of the name Ethiopia (the old name for the Black
world), the Abyssinian state elites replaced officially the name Abyssinia
with that of Ethiopia in the 1930s. However, the Ethiopian ideological
history claims the modern Ethiopian state as the direct heir to the Ethiopia
mentioned in biblical and classical sources. Ethiopian and Western
scholars presented Ethiopia as an entity that had existed continuously as an
integrated and independent state for three thousand years.
14
This
ideological claim has enabled Ethiopia (former Abyssinia) to conceal the
fact that Ethiopia is a neocolonial state that emerged during the partition of
Africa by European powers. By allying itself with these powers, Ethiopia
participated in the partition and colonization of Africa.
Successive Ethiopian state elites use the African and Semitic
discourses both regionally and globally. Globally, they use the Semitic
discourse and the discourse of Christianity to mobilize assistance from
Europe, North America, and the Middle East. Skillfully, they have also
used their blackness to mobilize other Africans, the African Diaspora,
15

and Black American policy elites against Oromos and other colonized
peoples. By confusing original Ethiopia (the Black world) with
contemporary Ethiopia (former Abyssinia), Habasha elites have misled
some historically naive people in Africa, Europe, North America, and the
world. Most people do not know the difference between ancient Ethiopia
and contemporary Ethiopia. Because of this historical misinformation,
Africans who were colonized and enslaved by Europeans, except those
who were enslaved and colonized by contemporary Ethiopians, wrongly
considered contemporary Ethiopia (former Abyssinia) as an island of black
freedom since they maintained formal political power. Most blacks knew
very little about the social and political conditions of Ethiopia. What they
wrote or said about Ethiopia was at best a manifestation of their emotional
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state.
16
Most Africans were unaware that Ethiopias political power came
from an alliance with the colonizing European powers. In reality, the
Ethiopia that participated in the slave trade and the scramble for Africa was
not an island of black freedom. Instead, it has been a prison house in
which Oromos and other colonized peoples have been brutalized.
By using the discredited racist categorization of human groups, such
as Semitic, Hamitic, Negroid, and Cushitic, Habashas place Oromos
between themselves and the people that they wrongly call Shankillas
whom they consider Negroid.
17
Despite the fact that Habashas are black,
they consider themselves Semitic to identify themselves with the Middle
East and dissociate themselves from Africa whose peoples they consider
both racially and culturally inferior. For instance, when the Nigerian Daily
Times interviewed Haile Selassie, the emperor of Ethiopia, about
Ethiopian racial identity in the 1930s, he said that Ethiopians were not,
and did not regard themselves as Negroes, as they were a Hamito-Semitic
people.
18
J ohn Sorenson expresses this racist attitude as a multiplicity of
Ethiopians, blacks who are whites, the quintessential Africans who reject
African identity.
19
Since the concept of race is a socio-political construct,
it is essential to critically understand a historical context in which
Ethiopian racism is produced and reproduced to dehumanize the colonized
peoples in order to deny them access to Ethiopian state power and other
privileges.In Ethiopian discourse, racial distinctions have been invented
and manipulated to perpetuate the political objective of Habasha
domination of the colonized population groups. The fact that racial
distinctions are easily manipulated and reversed indicates, Sorenson
notes, the absurdity of any claims that they have an objective basis and
locates these distinctions where they actually occur, in political power.
20

Habasha elites recognize the importance of racial distinctions in linking
themselves to the Middle East, Europe, and North America to mobilize
98
support for their political projects. Most J ews, Arabs, Europeans, and
Americans see Habashas closer to themselves than the peoples whom they
consider real blacks. Also, the West, particularly the US, places
Habashas on an intermediate position between whites and blacks and
consider them closer to the European race or members of the great
Caucasian family.
21
There were Europeans who considered Habashas as a
very intelligent people because of their racial affinity with the Caucasian
race.
22
There were also those who saw Habashas as dark-skinned white
people and racial and cultural middleman between Black Africa on one
side and Europe and the Middle East on the other side.
23
One German
scholar admired the intelligence of Habashas and noted that he never saw
such mental capability among Negroes, Arabs, Egyptians, and Nubians.
24

These racist discourses are unchallenged in academic and popular
discourses because they help reproduce Ethiopian colonial power and other
privileges.
U.S. foreign policy elites, diplomats, and other officials recognize and
defend such racial pretensions of Ethiopias ruling class.
25
One would
expect that African American policy elites in the U.S. State Department,
including George Moose, Irvin Hicks, Susan Rice, Condoleezza Rice, and
Collin Powell, would think differently from their White counterparts and
genuinely promote social justice and democracy in Africa. But African
American policy elites, because of the distorted historical knowledge,
and/or because of their class interests, have accepted the ideological
discourse on Ethiopia that presented this empire as the home of black
freedom when all blacks were under Euro-American colonialism and
slavery and endorsed the racist U.S. policy toward Ethiopia and Oromia.
As some African kings and chiefs participated in the slave trade with
European slave merchants to commodify Africans and ship them to North
America and other parts of the world, these African American elites
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collaborate with the racist structures that dehumanize African peoples. It is
an irony of history that the lack of critical historical knowledge or class
interest or the ideological confusion built into this racist policy has brought
an alliance between the biological or ideological descendants of slavers
and the descendants of slaves to victimize people like Oromos who have
been brutalized by colonialism and slavery. The current Ethiopian rulers
are the ideological descendants of Ethiopian Warlords, such as Yohannes
and Minilik, who participated in the massacre and enslavement of millions
of Oromos and others.
While glorifying the culture and civilization of Habashas, racist
scholars, such as Edward Ullendorff, advanced the notion that Oromos as a
barbaric people did not possess significant material or intellectual culture
that could allow them to contribute to the Semitized civilization of
Ethiopia.
26
To demonstrate the civilization and cultural superiority of
Amharas and Tigrayans, racist scholars downplayed the African-ness of
[Abyssinia] . . . to emphasize its similarities to European societies.
27
As
Sorenson expounds, along with the emphasis on a Great Tradition in
Ethiopian history, came a specific configuration of racial identity. As in
other discourses of race, this configuration merged power with phenotypic
features in order to devalue the Oromo and other groups as both more
African and more primitive than the Amhara [and Tigray]. The Oromo
were presented as warlike, essentially `people without history and without
any relationship to the land.
28
In Ethiopian studies, Oromos were depicted
as crueler scourges and barbarian hordes that brought darkness and
ignorance in the train to Ethiopia;
29
they were also depicted as evil,
ignorant, order-less, destructive, infiltrators, and invasive.
30

Oromos also were seen as a decadent race that was less advanced
because of their racial and cultural inferiority. Therefore, their colonization
and enslavement by the alliance of Ethiopians and Europeans were seen as
100
a civilizing mission.
31
Since in the racist and modernist thinking historical
development is linear, and society develops from primitive or backward to
civilized or an advanced stage, Oromos who have been seen as primitive
people are also considered as a collection of tribes or a single tribe or a
`cluster of diverse groups that cannot develop any nationalist political
consciousness except tribalism.
32
Racist and modernist scholars have
also denied the existence of a unified Oromo identity and argued that
Oromos cannot achieve statehood because they are geographically
scattered and lack cultural substance.
33
Since the creation of the Ethiopian
Empire, Habasha elites claimed that they have a superior religion and
civilization, and even sometimes expressed that they were not black and
saw other Africans as baryas (slaves); in Abyssinia proper, Galla and
barya have been used interchangeably.
34
The Ethiopian colonizers and
Euro-American scholars called Oromos Galla, a derogatory name
(equivalent to nigger).
The Oromos never accepted the name that was given to them by
Ethiopians since it implied savagery, slavery, paganism, inferiority, and
cultural backwardness. Alberto Sbacchi asserts that the Habashas have
traditionally looked upon the dark skinned people as inferiors and given
them the name of `Shankalla [sic].... The Black Americans were known as
Negro [sic], which in Ethiopia was associated with slavery. Hence to the
Ethiopians the Afro-Americans were Shankalla.
35
William R. Scott, an
African American, who participated in a student work-camp in Ethiopia in
1963, expresses his painful encounter with Habasha racism as the
following: I was called barya (slave) by young, bigoted Ethiopian
aristocrats, who associated African-Americans with slavery and identified
them with the countrys traditional servant class.
36

The participation of Habashas in the scramble for Africa and in the
slave trade and the commodification of millions of Oromos and others
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encouraged them to associate themselves with Europe and the Middle East
rather than black Africans. Western discourse . . . duplicated many of the
assumptions and ideologies that had been put in place by the ruling elites
of Ethiopia, Sorenson writes, constructing the latter as the carriers of a
Great Tradition which was engaged in its own Civilizing Mission with
respect to what it regarded as other uncivilized Groups in Ethiopia.
37
The
popular discourse on Oromos is full of racist prejudices and stereotypes.
When Habashas want to show the inferiority of Oromos on
racial/ethnonational hierarchy, or to deny the humanity of Oromos, they
debase an Oromo and his/her nationality by asking sawu nawu wayim
Galla? (Is he/she a human being or a Galla?); this query shows that
Habashas consider Oromos as inferior human beings. There are several
other racial slurs that Ethiopians have used against Oromos.
38
Because of
such racist views the Ethiopian Orthodox Church publication denounced
sexual relations between Habashas and Oromos by saying that J esus would
punish those who had sexual intercourse with the cursed, the dumb, the
Moslems, the Galla, the Shankilla, the Falasha, the horse, the donkey, the
camel and all those who committed sodomy.
39
This religious tract was
written in Geez (an old Abyssinian language) and was translated into
Amharic in 1968, but its original date of writing and its author were not
known. But the piece was popular and widely recited by literate Habashas.
Oromos, Ethiopian J ews, Muslims, and various peoples were categorized
with beasts, such as horses, donkeys and camels. Of course, the implicit
intention of the Orthodox Church was to draw a racial/ethnonational
boundary between Habashas and non-Habashas to maintain the
racial/ethnonatiional purity of the former.
Oromos have been insulted for even trying to assimilate to Ethiopian
culture by speaking in an Ethiopian language. Habasha racists have
expressed their anger toward Oromos who have mispronounced Amharic
102
words by saying that Afun yalfataGalla; tabitaba Galla (an Oromo who
cannot express himself clearly). To psychologically demoralize Oromos,
the Habasha discourse also depicts Oromos as cowardly people who
cannot resist subordination; the saying and Amhara matto Galla yinadal
clearly shows the essence of this discourse. Literally it means one
Amhara can force one hundred Oromos to submission or subordination.
However, historical evidence indicates that until they allied with
Europeans and obtained modern weapons, Habashas saw Oromo fighters
as their nightmare. Even a poor Habasha or a leper claims that he is better
than a Galla; the expressions Even if I am poor, I am not a Galla, and
Even if I am a leper, I am not a Galla clearly show how most Habashas,
including the sick and the poor, claim racial/ethnonational superiority.
Generally speaking, Habashas have looked upon and treated the
indigenous people as backward, heathen, filthy, deceitful, lazy, and even
stupid -- stereotypes that European colonialists commonly ascribed their
African subjects.
40

Habasha social institutions, such as family, school, media,
government, religion, reproduce and perpetuate these damaging racist
prejudices and stereotypes among Ethiopian society.
41
Explaining how
racial insults wound the colonized people, Delgado says, The racial insult
remains one of the most pervasive channels through which discriminatory
attitudes are imparted. Such language injures the dignity and self-regard of
the person to whom it is addressed, communicating the message that
distinctions of race are distinctions of merit, dignity, status, and
personhood. Not only does the listener learn and internalize the messages
contained in racial insults, these messages color our societys institutions
and are transmitted to succeeding generations.
42
These prejudices and
stereotypes consciously or unconsciously influenced Ethiopian and
Ethiopian studies. Ethiopians -- and particularly those Ethiopian scholars
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and Ethiopianists who have been influenced by these racist assumptions,
never respected Oromo culture and also opposed the Oromo struggle for
social justice and human rights under different pretexts. Some assert that
since Oromos are dispersed among other peoples, the question of national
self-determination is not applicable to their cause; others argue that the
assimilation of Oromos to Habashas both biologically and culturally
prevent them from having a cultural identity that entitles them to have
national self-determination.
43
Further, some Ethiopian elites contest that
since Oromos invaded Ethiopia, they do not deserve self-determination
because the region that they call Oromia does not belong to them.
44
This
assertion implicitly assumes that Oromos must accept their subjugation and
second-class citizenship, or they must leave Ethiopia before they will be
totally annihilated for continuing to demand self-determination and
democracy.
The political agenda of the destruction of Oromo society is not a new
phenomenon. The West has supported this political agenda. The massive
killings of Oromos during Abyssinian colonialism were never condemned
as genocide. As Leenco Lata notes, despite its unparalleled brutality,
Miniliks conquest escaped condemnation as the only positive historical
development in the Africa of the late 1800s. To achieve this, the Oromo
were made to appear deserving to be conquered.
45
J ust as genocide
committed by Minilik and his followers escaped world condemnation, so
does the ethnic cleansing that is systematically committed by the Meles
regime.
46
According to Lata, massacres of Oromos by any one of the
Ethiopian forces rarely get mentioned in Ethiopian or Euro-American
writings. The slightest threat to the Abyssinian by the Oromo, however,
can throw up a storm of protest and condemnation.
47
Denying the reality
that contemporary Abyssinia/Ethiopia was the product of neocolonialism
that was invented by the alliance of Ethiopian colonialism and European
104
imperialism, the West praises Abyssinia (later Ethiopia) as the country that
was never colonized in Africa.
The idea that Ethiopia was not colonized laid the cornerstone for the
ideology of Greater Ethiopia. Ethiopia was seen as A civilized nation of
an immense intelligence, the only one that is civilized without wearing
trousers and shoes.
48
The ideology of Greater Ethiopia that has been
accepted and developed by European and American policy elites and their
governments has been the bedrock of racism on which Ethiopia was built
and still maintained.
49
When the French and British could not decide which
of them would get Abyssinia, and were not willing to go to war with each
other over it, each backed a different proxy leader; the British chose
Yohannes of Tigray, and the French chose Minilik of Amhara. But when
Yohannes died in 1889, the British and the Italians devised a different
solution for sharing access to the region. The British and Italians vied at
Miniliks court to advise and control him, and seek his favor; because of
Miniliks failing health in 1906, France, Great Britain, and Italy devised
the policy behind the Tripartite Treaty without Miniliks even knowing
about it. This treaty states that We the Great powers of Europe, France,
Great Britain, and Italy, shall cooperate in maintaining the political and
territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by the state of affairs at
present existing and the previous [boundary] agreements.
50

The foreign policy experts of Western countries not only provided
technology and expertise in different fields, but they have been playing a
critical role in formulating and promoting racist mythologies to justify the
colonization and continued subjugation of the colonized subjects. For
instance, the notion of claiming Abyssinia/Ethiopia as an ancient kingdom
was originally suggested by an Italian expert in 1891: Francisco Crispi
instructed an Italian agent in Addis Ababa to inform Minilik that the
European powers were establishing their boundaries in Africa and that the
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emperor should, with Italian assistance, circulate a letter defining his
borders in order to guarantee the integrity of his empire. Crispi suggested
that in the letter, Minilik ought to point out that Ethiopia was an ancient
Kingdom which had been recognized as independent by the Christian
states of Europe.
51

The racist idea that Habashas were different from the rest of Africa
lay at the core of European justification for empowering them to colonize
and rule Oromos and other nations who were seen like other colonized
Africans. In the 1930s, when Haile Selassie went to Europe and became
the darling of the Western media, the ideology of Greater Ethiopia was
refined and celebrated in Europe, America, and Ethiopia.
52
He was praised
for his extraordinary handsome face, next door to black, with high
standing curly hair, a crisp black beard, a fine hawkish nose, and large
gleaming eyes; he was also glorified for his devotion to modernization.
53

The Ethiopian empire that was created with the alliance of European
imperialist powers and Habasha warlords has maintained itself through an
alliance with successive imperial superpowers, namely, Great Britain, the
former Soviet Union, and the United States, which provided protection to
successive Ethiopian state elites and their governments.
54

After colonizing Oromos and other nations with the help of European
technology and expertise, Abyssinian colonial settlers in Oromia and other
regions justified their colonial domination with racist discourse. With the
establishment of their colonial authority in the colonized regions, Habasha
settlers assumed that their own innate superiority over the local residents
accounted for this accomplishment.
55
Since then Habashas and their
Euro-American supporters have contributed to Ethiopian mythology
[which] consists in part of the erroneous notions that [Abyssinian] society
had reached a superior evolutionary stage at the time of conquest, making
them able to move in and take over Oromia and others. The illusion plays a
106
critically important role in holding the entire complex together, the
ideology of Greater Ethiopia.
56
The ideology of Greater Ethiopia
57
claims
that Ethiopia was not colonized like other parts of Africa because of
Habasha bravery and patriotism that made this empire unique in Africa;
Ethiopian historical discourse claims that Ethiopian boundaries are sacred
since they were established for 3000 years; Abyssinian society
represented an advanced level of social and economic organization that
enabled it to defend itself from European colonialism by eliminating
slavery and protecting all the peoples of greater Ethiopia from falling prey
to European imperialism;
58
Ethiopia claimed to play a significant
civilizing mission by colonizing and dominating Oromos and other nations
who were perceived as backward, pagan, destructive, and inferior.
These racist mythologies of Greater Ethiopia helped the Haile
Selassie regime gain admission to the League of Nations in 1924. As a
result, Ethiopia began to enjoy more recognition in Europe and North
America, and there was extended public discussion of Ethiopias place in
the world community and a great elaboration of the Ethiopian mythology
initiated by European writers for a European public.
59
By joining the
League of Nations, the Ethiopian empire, according to Evelyn Waugh,
had been recognized as a single state whose integrity was the concern of
the world. Tafaris new dynasty had been accepted by the busy
democracies as the government of this area; his enemies were their
enemies; there would be money lent him to arm against rebels, experts to
advise him; when trouble was brewing he would swoop down from the sky
and take his opponents unaware; the fabulous glories of Prester John were
to be reincarnated.
60
These essential components of racist discourse of
Greater Ethiopia have remained intact.
Later socialist and then democratic discourse have been
introduced by successive Habasha state elites and accepted by their Euro-
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107

American supporters without changing the colonizing and racist structure
of Ethiopian society. A decade and a half ago, the Mengistu regime utilized
a socialist discourse to ally itself with the Soviet bloc and to consolidate
its power. The U.S. supported the Haile Selassie regime from the 1950s to
the mid-1970s. It started to assist the Meles regime in 1991. Ethiopian
racism and White racism have conveniently intermarried in the U.S. policy
formulation and implementation in Ethiopia. When policy issues are
discussed on Ethiopia, Semitic civility, Christianity, antiquity, bravery, and
patriotism of Amharas and Tigrayans are retrieved to valorize and to
legitimize Habasha dominance and power; moreover the barbarism,
backwardness, and the destructiveness of Oromos and others are
reinvented to keep Oromos from access to state power. The combined
racist views about Oromos and the racist assumptions of U.S. foreign
policy elites effectively mobilize the U.S. State Department against the
Oromo people.
The U.S., the Tigrayan-led Ethiopian State, and the Oromo National
Struggle
The U.S. supported the creation of the Ethiopian Peoples
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) by the Tigrayan Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF), and with Israel, it finessed the flight of Mengistu
in 1991, and supported the emergence of the Meles regime. It still
provides all necessary assistance to the regime. U.S. foreign policy makers
mainly support regimes like that of Ethiopia for perceived strategic and
economic self-interest. As far as these policy makers believe that the U.S.
self-interest is promoted, they are not interested to have a deep and critical
understanding of the political context in which they involve. Currently the
main rationale for U.S. policy makers to engage in Ethiopia is to maintain
political order and to fight against global terrorism. While ignoring the
108
impact of state terrorism, U.S. attempts to solve the problem of global
terrorism are doomed to be ineffective.
The major reason why the U.S. government cannot effectively deal
with global terrorism is that it practices double standards, and condones the
terrorism of friendly states, such as that of Ethiopia, and complains about
other forms of terrorism.
61
As Eqbal Ahmad comments, as a global power
the U.S. cannot promote terrorism in one place and reasonably expect to
discourage terrorism in another place.
62
Despite the fact that the U.S.
government documents massive human rights violations in Ethiopia, it
assists the regime militarily, financially, diplomatically, and
technologically. The West in general, and the U.S. in particular, only
practice lip service on the issues of democracy and human rights in
Ethiopia. During the early 1990s, some scholars and political activists
believed that the U.S., as the only superpower, would promote human
rights and democracy in Oromia and Ethiopia and in other peripheral
countries. But the practical reality in Ethiopia challenges the position of
such scholars and activists.
U.S. officials are more concerned with political stability, neo-liberal
economic reform, and the existence of regimes such as that of Ethiopia at
any cost, and care less for democracy and human rights. The Economist
notes that Meles Zenawi "is regarded as one of Africa's `new leaders': he
recently won an award in the United States for good government . . .
[Western] governments tend to give priority to the Prime Minister's
economic reforms rather than his record on human rights. "
63
The U.S.
does not care about the Oromo struggle that promotes the principles of
national self-determination and multinational democracy. For Oromos,
democracy is not a new concept, but it is part of their culture and
tradition.
64
Unfortunately, the Meles regime is acceptable to the West as far
as it can suppress popular opposition forces in order to establish political
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stability and implement the structural adjustment of the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund.
Oromos struggle for survival, self-determination, and democracy, and
oppose any dogmatic social or ideological system. Since they have been
abused in the names of Christianity, Islam, socialism, democracy, and free
market, Oromos take things pragmatically. The U.S. policy of
"democracy promotion" or democratization of the polity drastically failed
in Ethiopia. Bonnie Holcomb asserts that the democratization of the
Ethiopian polity or the introduction of elite democracy by the U.S. failed
because of the fundamental contradictions that exist between the Ethiopian
colonizers and the colonized peoples.
65
Many scholars assume that the
West and the U.S. promote elite democracy when they are sure that those
who will come to state power through election are not against the capitalist
world system.
66
In the early 1990s, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and
other independent Oromo organizations were ready to work within the
system if fair and free election would take place in Ethiopia. Global powers
ignored their own policy of democracy promotion, when the Tigrayan-led
regime declared war on these organizations in 1992, to expel them from the
Ethiopian political process.
Despite the fact that most international observers concluded that the
J une 21, 1992, elections exacerbated existing tensions, reinforced the
hegemonic power of the EPRDF while marginalizing other fledging
parties, and were a central factor in the withdrawal of the OLF from the
TGE [Transitional Government of Ethiopia] and return to war in the
Oromo region, the West, particularly the U.S. government, is committed
to keeping the Meles regime in power despite the fact that the government
lacks any political legitimacy
67
on account of its authoritarian and terrorist
behavior and practice. The decision by the U.S. to support the Tigrayan
110
authoritarian-terrorist government has nothing to do with economic or
political rationality and the principles of human rights and democracy.
If Oromos, the largest nation with a democratic cultural foundation,
and other population groups are not against U.S. sponsored democracy,
why have U.S. officials in the State Department chosen a minority group
that give lip service to democracy? Although the U.S. and other Western
countries do not openly admit that the strategy of democracy promotion
failed in Ethiopia, they have recognized that the Ethiopian crisis is
expanding. The Tigrayan state elite and the U.S. political operatives and
theorists conveniently convinced themselves that the Oromo and other
peoples do not understand the genuine meaning of democracy. These
wrong assumptions underlie the Tigrayan elite and their U.S. backers
assumption that they could impose a Tigrayan form of colonial control on
the Oromo and other peoples in the name of democracy. Receiving the
green light from the U.S. and following his blind ambition for personal and
Tigrayan interests, Meles expelled all independent liberation fronts and
political organizations from the Ethiopian political process through state
terrorism and replaced them with puppet organizations that he and his
group had already created under the umbrella of EPRDF. This is what
democracy means for the TPLF/EPRDF and its international supporters.
It should surprise no one that Meles sought advice from Samuel
Huntington, whose writings portray him as a Eurocentric, covert racist and
a Christian chauvinist. Samuel Huntington, the U.S. policy ideologue,
went to Ethiopia in 1993 to advise Meles Zenawi how to establish a
Tigrayan party rule in the name of democracy.
68
It is clear from
Huntingtons book, The Clash of Civilizations, that he opposes the
principles of democracy and cultural diversity and promotes Christian
civilization at any cost. The U.S. policy, as articulated by its ideologue
Huntington, has intensified the historical and contemporary contradictions
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between the Ethiopian colonizers and the colonized Oromo and others
rather than solving them. As a result, Oromos who were willing to
participate in democracy have been forced to intensify armed, cultural and
intellectual struggle. Rather than finding a just and democratic solution,
the U.S. has openly allied with the Meles regime that practices state
terrorism and engage in gross human rights violations.
State Terrorism and Gross Human Rights Violations
Today the Ethiopian colonial settlers, led by the Tigrayan-dominated
regime, have dominated cities in Oromia and segregated the Oromo
national majority in both urban and rural areas and kept them under
Ethiopian political slavery by using the army, modern weaponry, the
media, the telephone, the fax, the Internet, and other communication and
information apparatus and networks. Using political violence, the Tigrayan
authoritarian-terrorist regime has dominated and controlled Oromos and
denied them the freedom of expression, association or organization, and
the media, and all forms of communication and information networks. The
Oromo people are denied the freedom of self-expression and self-
development and forced to provide their economic and labor resources to
the Ethiopian colonizers and their supporters and live under deplorable
conditions in the 21
st
century. Producing lies and misinformation in the
name of democracy and disseminating them through its complex
information and communication networks, the Tigrayan state elites try to
hide the true characteristics of the Ethiopian regime that include state-
terrorism, state rape, and hidden genocide to terrorize and control the
Oromo and other peoples.
While engaging in political violence in the form of state terrorism,
state rape, and hidden genocide to control the Oromo people and loot their
economic resources, the Tigrayan state elites claim that they are promoting
112
democracy, federalism, and national self-determination. Since the regime is
weak, illegitimate, and lacks capacity, accountability, and professionalism,
it engages in terrorism and hidden genocide to protect its power. Bridget
Welsh suggests that since weak states lack the capacity to meet the
demands and rights of citizens and improve the standard of living for the
majority of population, they engage in political violence and in genocidal
massacres to suppress the population groups that struggle for political and
economic rights.
69
This regime is committed to enrich itself and to improve
the living standard of the Tigrayan population at the cost of the colonized
population groups such as Oromos. Since most of the Oromo people, under
the leadership of the OLF, are determined to challenge the racist policy of
this regime, this government mainly targets them for destruction. As Lisa
Sharlach attests, a politically dominant group, frightened by what its
members perceive as an onslaught of internal movements for
democracy and socioeconomic change, harnesses the state apparatus to
destroy the subordinate group altogether. This is genocide.
70

The Oromo people have no protection from political violence since
there is no rule of law in the Ethiopian empire. They do not have personal
and public safety in their homes and communities. Oromos live under
Ethiopian settler colonialism that has taken away their sovereignty and
exposed them to massive human right violations and absolute poverty by
denying them their fundamental needs and rights. Because of the
magnitude of the Oromo problem, it is impossible to provide a numerical
face to the devastating effects of political violence, hunger, poverty,
suffering, malnutrition, disease, ignorance, alienation, and hopelessness.
The following discussion demonstrates how the lack of access to an
information and technological apparatus, political freedom, democracy,
and an accountable government, and the denial of the inalienable right to
self-determination, have prevented the Oromo people from freely
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expressing, organizing, and defending themselves from state terrorism.
State-terrorism is the systematic policy of a government through which
massive violence is practiced to terrorize a given population group in order
to force them to change their behavior of political struggle or resistance.
The state that engages in terrorism is not a protector of citizens; it
rather violates civil and human rights through assassinations, mass killings
and imprisonments, and display of corpses on streets so that the remaining
population accepts the violent state due to fear of terror and intimidation.
The main assumptions of such a state are that it can control the population
by destroying their culture and leaders. States that fail to establish
ideological hegemony and political orders are unstable and insecure, and
hence they engage in state terrorism.
71
The development of the Oromo
national movement, representing the largest national group in the Ethiopian
empire, has prevented the new colonial ruling class to establish its
hegemony and consolidate its state. The TPLF/EPRDF government
employs state violence against Oromos and others as a legitimate means of
establishing political stability and order, despite its adoption in its
constitution of the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and International Covenants on Human Rights.
72

State terrorism is associated with the issues of control of territory and
resources and the construction of political and ideological domination.
Annamarie Oliverio explains two essential features of state terrorism:
First, the state reinforces the use of violence as a viable, effective,
mitigating factor for managing conflict; second, such a view is reinforced
by culturally constructed and socially organized processes, expressed
through symbolic forms, and related in complex ways to present social
interests. Within increasing economic and environmental globalization,
gender politics, and the resurgence of nationalities within territorial
boundaries, the discourse of terrorism, as a practice of statecraft, is crucial
114
to the construction of political boundaries. As such, terrorism is invoked in
the art of statecraft when multiple, often conflicting versions of the past are
produced and, at particular historical moments, become sites of intense
struggles.
73
The Meles regime practices state terrorism mainly against
Oromos because they have ideologically, culturally and intellectually
challenged Ethiopian cultural and ideological hegemony and also in the
process of redefining the relationship between Oromos and Ethiopians
(particularly Amharas and Tigrayans).
Furthermore, since the Tigrayan regime mainly survives on Oromo
economic resources, it uses terrorist actions mainly against the Oromo
people.
74
The regime, which proclaims in its constitution that democracy
and human rights are inviolable and inalienable in Ethiopia, has engaged in
terrorist activities, such as systematic assassinations of prominent Oromos,
open and hidden murders of thousands of Oromos, reinitiating of
villagization and eviction in Oromia, expansion of prisons in Oromia,
forcing thousands of Oromos into hidden and underground concentration
camps, looting economic resources of Oromia to develop Tigray, settling
armed Tigrayans and Amharas in Oromia, and enriching Habasha elites
and their collaborators.
75
Umar Fatanssa, an elderly Oromo, says the
following: "We had never experienced anything like that, not under Haile
Selassie, nor under the Mengistu regime: these people just come and shoot
your son or your daughter dead in front of your eyes."
76
State terrorism
manifests itself in this empire in different forms, but its obvious
manifestation is violence in the form of war, assassination, murder,
castration, burying alive, throwing off cliffs, hanging, torture, rape,
confiscation of properties by the police and the army, forcing people to
submission by intimidation, beating, and disarming citizens.
77

Former prisoners testified that their arms and legs were tied tightly
together on their backs and their naked bodies were whipped. Large
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containers or bottles filled with water were fixed to their testicles, or if they
were women, bottles or poles were pushed into their vaginas. There were
prisoners who were locked up in empty steel barrels and tormented with
heat in the tropical sun during the day and with cold at night. There were
also prisoners who were forced into pits so that fire could be made on top
of them. According to Trevor Trueman, Torture - especially arm tying,
beating of the soles of the feet, suspension of weights from genitalia and
mock execution - is commonplace, at least in unofficial places of detention.
Female detainees estimate that several soldiers or policemen on several
occasions rape 50% of women during detention, often. The Minnesota
Center for Victims of Torture has surveyed more than 500 randomly
selected Oromo refugees. The majority had been subjected to torture and
nearly all of the rest had been subjected to some kind of government
violence.
78
TPLF/EPRDF soldiers have openly shot thousands of people
in rural Oromia and left their bodies for hyenas, or buried them in mass
graves, or threw their corpse off cliffs.
There are other methods of killings, including burning, bombing,
cutting throats or arteries in the neck, strangulation, and burying people to
their necks in the ground. Mohammed Hassen estimates that since 1992
about fifty thousand killings and sixteen thousand disappearances
(euphemism for secret killings) took place in Oromia.
79
He also notes that
90 percent of the killings are not reported.
80
To hide these criminal
practices from the world community, the Meles government does not
keep written records of its extrajudicial executions and prolonged detention
of political prisoners.
81
The regime also kills Oromos who engage in a
peaceful demonstration. For instance, on March 25, 1992, in the town of
Watar, Hararghe, the soldiers of the regime massacred 92 Oromos and
wounded more than 300, and many of these people died later.
82
In 1995,
the government soldiers burned houses and killed 70 Oromos in the two
116
villages of Siree, and in the same year, many Oromo communities were
burned and several Oromo farmers and herders were either killed or
imprisoned in Wabbie, a subdistrict of the Bale region.
83
The
TPLF/EPRDF soldiers killed hundreds of Oromos at Awaday in Hararghe
and Meta Robi in Shawa in early 1995; in 1996 more than one thousand
Oromos in Borana were summarily executed.
84

In November 2001, one hundred Oromos were executed in Borana
and Bale by the armed forces that claimed that they were members of the
OLF. Further, from 2002 to 2006, the regime killed hundreds of
demonstrators and jailed thousands of them for peacefully demonstrating
against fraudulent elections and oppressive policies. Prompted by apparent
hate for Oromos, the TPLF soldiers never spared even pregnant women or
youth. They killed several pregnant women and hundreds of Oromo
children between the ages of 12 and 16.
85
According to the Oromia
Support Group, "A 7-month pregnant woman in Robe, Bale, was arrested
and beaten . . . She miscarried and later died in custody. When relatives
went to claim her body, they were told to replace the corpse with a living
relative. When asked to explain, the TPLF soldiers said `She died with
OLF objectives still stuck in her brain and we could not get what we
wanted from her.'"
86
From 2000 to 2006, the regime has killed hundreds of
Oromo students who have engaged in peaceful demonstration; it has also
imprisoned and tortured thousands of them or expelled them from
elementary and high schools and colleges.
87
State terrorism manifests
itself in different forms. State rape is one of them.
State Rape as Mechanism of Terror.
The way the Tigrayan soldiers have treated Oromo women and girls
demonstrates widespread inhumane behavior. Bruna Fossati, Lydia
Namarra and Peter Niggli report that "in prison women are often
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humiliated and mistreated in the most brutal fashion. Torturers ram poles
or bottles into their vaginas, connect electrodes to the lips of their vulva, or
the victims are dragged into the forest and gang-raped by interrogation
officers."
88
In addition to the effects of mental and bodily tortures, these
TPLF soldiers and officers are spreading AIDS in Oromo society.
Lisa Sharlack argues that the state-sanctioned use of sexual violence
is a tactic of genocide that the dominant ethnonational group practices for
destroying the subordinate ethnonational group.
89
She indicates that, as a
campaign to commit genocide, the West Pakistan army raped thousands of
the Bangladeshi women, the Serbian army raped the women of Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the Hutu men raped Tutsi women.
Genocide studies ignore the full extent of the humiliation of the ethnic
group through the rape of its women, the symbols of honor and vessels of
culture. When a womans honor is tarnished through illicit intercourse
the ethnic group is also dishonored. The aftereffects of rape; forced
impregnation, psychological trauma, degradation, and demoralization, go
beyond the rape victims themselves.
90
To demoralize, destroy, and to
show that Tigrayans are a powerful group that can do any thing to Oromos,
Tigrayan cadres, soldiers, and officials have raped Oromo girls and
women. Most of the rape survivors have contracted diseases, such as
syphilis, gonorrhea, and HIV/AIDS.
What Catharine MacKinnon says, referring to the ethnic cleansing
that occurred in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, applies to the condition
of the rape of Oromo women: It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre,
rape to kill and to make the victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an
instrument of forced exile, rape to make you leave your home and never
want to go back. It is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told to
others: rape as spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community,
to shatter a society, to destroy a people. It is rape as genocide.
91
An
118
Oromo journalist who wants to remain anonymous also characterizes the
use of state rape as a mechanism of genocide.
92
He explains that the
Tigrayan army uses rape in its secret campaign to destroy the foundation of
Oromo families. The soldiers have collected young Oromo girls and
women into concentration camps and gang-rape them in front of their
relatives, fathers, brothers, and husbands to humiliate them and the Oromo
people. Another aspect of terrorism is the destruction of an Oromo
leadership.
The Destruction of Oromo Elites.
The Meles regime believes that Oromo intellectuals, businessmen
and women, and community and religious leaders are the enemy of the
Ethiopian Revolution. In its organ known as Hizbawi Adera, the regime
propagates that these Oromo leaders have endangered the processes of
peace, democracy, and development by promoting what it calls narrow
nationalism
93
Hizbawi Adera asserts that only by eliminating the Oromo
educated elite and capitalist class will the Oromo people be freed from
narrow nationalism.
94
The Tigrayan-led government has engaged in
destroying Oromo merchants and intellectuals by labeling them "narrow
nationalists" and the enemy of the Ethiopian Revolution and routinely
kills and impoverishes them.
95
One prominent Oromo businessman, who
was forced to run away from his family, property and country, and who
now lives an impoverished life in Djibouti, describes his predicament:
"They stole 162,000 Birr in cash, took my cattle, and slaughtered my herd
of goats, 150 animals. Both my vehicles, a land cruiser and a small lorry,
were confiscated. Soldiers moved into my home, and my warehouse
became the new prison in Kobbo."
96

Hundreds of Oromo business people have been harassed, killed or
imprisoned and robbed of their properties. The regime has destroyed
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prominent Oromo intellectuals, religious figures, community leaders and
businessmen by practicing extrajudicial killings on the streets, massive
imprisonment, torture and disappearance. Sagalee Haara notes Recent
murders and disappearances of Oromo and the detention of members of the
Macha/Tulama Association and the Human Rights League are part of the
implementation of policies put forward in this document [Hizbawi
Adera].
97
When it attempts to eliminate the Oromo elite through hidden
genocide to deny the Oromo a viable leadership, this racist regime prepares
the Tigrayan children for the position of leadership by providing better
education, while denying appropriate educational opportunity for the
Oromo children.
98
This regime is consolidating a racialized division of
labor. The regime engages in genocide, too.
Hidden Genocide.
The systematic destruction of some Oromos and the Oromo
leadership are characterized as hidden genocide because the world
community does not yet recognize this intentional destruction. Article II of
the United Nations Convention defines genocide as acts committed with
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group.
99
Kurt Jonassohn explains genocide as the planned destruction of
any economic, political or a social group.
100
According to Frank Chalk and
Kurt J onassohn, GENOCIDE is a form of one-sided mass killing in
which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that [sic] and
membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.
101
Chalk and J onassohn
identify two major types of genocide:
102
The first type is used to colonize
and maintain an empire by actually terrorizing people perceived to be real
or potential enemies. In this case, the main purpose of practicing genocide
is to acquire land and other valuable resources. The maintenance of
colonial domination by state elites requires the establishment of cultural
120
and ideological hegemony that can be practiced through genocidal
massacres and a belief or a political or ideological theory to legitimate their
state power by preventing the resistance of the dominated group. This is
the second type of genocide known as ideological genocide. J onassohn
notes that ideological genocides develop in nation-states where ethnic
groups develop chauvinistic ideas about their superiority and
exclusiveness.
103

The Ethiopian regime engages in genocidal and terrorist acts as Chalk
and Jonassohn explained above with the intention of destroying part of the
Oromo nation who happened to be nationalists and leaders. It considers
Oromia as part of its empire, controls all Oromian resources, and practices
terrorism and genocide on the Oromo people since it perceives them as its
potential or real enemies. The Tigrayan elites are imposing their political
ideologies, such as revolutionary democracy, federalism to legitimate
Tigrayan supremacy and state power through genocidal massacres in order
to control the Oromo population and their resources by eliminating the
Oromo leadership. Through the discourse of democracy the regime denies
its political crimes. What J onassohn describes about conspiracy of
collective denial of genocide is applicable to the condition of genocide in
the Ethiopian empire: There are many reasons for this: (a) in many
societies such materials are not written down, or are destroyed rather than
preserved in archives; (b) many perpetrators have recourse to elaborate
means of hiding the truth, controlling access to information, and spreading
carefully contrived disinformation; and (c) historically, most genocides
were not reported because . . . there appears to have existed a sort of
conspiracy of collective denial whereby the disappearance of a people did
not seem to require comment or even mention.
104

With the collaboration of the West and the imperial interstate system
the Meles regimes hides its crime against humanity in Ethiopia. In this
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121

empire, where there is no freedom of expression and the media, people
choose to be quiet to save their lives even if the government eliminates
their relatives. The Ethiopian state elites, who have been engaged in gross
human rights violations and genocide like other criminal leaders in
peripheral countries,
not only go unpunished, they are even rewarded. On the international
scene they are accorded all the respect and courtesies due to government
officials. They are treated in accordance with diplomatic protocol in
negotiations and seated in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
When they are finally ousted from their offices, they are offered asylum by
countries that lack respect for international law, but have a great deal of
respect for the ill-gotten wealth that such perpetrators bring with them.
105

The Meles regime also engages in economic violence and robbery.
Economic Violence.
The Tigrayan-led government has confiscated the properties of some
Oromos and others who have been imprisoned. Those who were released
from prisons paid a huge amount of `ransom money' collected by relatives
for TPLF soldiers and agents.
106
"The persecutions of suspected and real
political opponents and the widespread campaigns of intimidation against
the Oromo population," Fossati, Namarra and Niggli write, "produce a
considerable booty which is pocketed by the government's representatives
on the ground."
107
It seems that the TPLF leaders have implicitly decided
that Meles and his close associates use state resources and international
connections to enrich themselves, while regional and local officials and
soldiers use violence and repression to loot and accumulate wealth.
108

Fossati, Namarra and Niggli note that "some privileged members of the
TPLF have managed in dubious circumstances to privatize and run former
state enterprises and are now successful in business. They are considerably
122
better off than their former little `comrades in arms' who do the dirty work
of repression."
109

The military and political leaders of TPLF/EPRDF have emerged as a
new capitalist class through illegal means and dominate the Ethiopian
political economy. Using state power, this new class has expropriated state
corporations in the name of privatization and established joint businesses
with either local investors or foreign corporations.
110
Through looting and
expropriation, the Tigrayan-dominated government and its satellite
organizations transferred to themselves the largest and fastest growing
companies. The plan of developing Tigray at the cost of Oromia and other
regions is clear. Impoverishing people by transferring their wealth and
capital from non-Tigrayans to Tigrayan elites and Tigrayan society and
their local and international collaborators through use of state machinery
are a form of economic violence. Thousands of Oromos have lost their
lands through eviction and their cattle through looting; Oromo forests have
been set on fire in an attempt to destroy the Oromo Liberation Army. This
regime uses economic violence to impoverish and destroy Oromo society.
Oromos are not even allowed to have a meaningful relief association in
Ethiopia and neighboring countries.
The Banning of Oromo Organizations.
The Tigrayan-dominated regime banned independent Oromo
organizations, including the Oromo Liberation Front in 1992 and declared
war on these organizations and the Oromo people. It even outlawed
musical groups and professional associations, and closed down Oromo
newspapers. In its attempt to make Oromos voiceless, like the previous
Ethiopian governments, the Meles government has left Oromos without
any form of organization. Only the organizations and the media that are
owned and controlled by the Tigrayan government remain intact to impose
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the Tigrayan colonial and racist authority on the Oromo majority.
Realizing that the Ethiopian government and international organizations
care very little about the welfare of Oromo society, a few Oromo leaders
created the Oromo Relief Association, ORA, in exile as an independent
humanitarian Oromo association in the late 1970s to assist Oromo refugees
in the Horn of Africa.
111
Assuming that the political change of 1991 would
allow a peaceful and democratic political resolution for the Oromo
problem, ORA moved its head office to Finfinne (Addis Ababa) and
shifted its program from relief work to rehabilitation and settlement
activities, and developed projects that included health, educational,
agricultural and afforestation activities.
112

The Meles regime closed the ORA regional offices in August 1995
and its headquarters in February 1996 and confiscated all its properties.
The regime has denied the Oromo people to have autonomous
organizations in order to keep them under Ethiopian political slavery. The
ORA activities were banned not only in Ethiopia, but also in Djibouti,
Somalia and Kenya. One thousand three hundred fifty-two ORA orphans
moved to Oromia from Sudan, when ORA decided to locate its
headquarters in Oromia in 1991.
113
Some of these children were killed by
TPLF soldiers or drowned in wide rivers while being chased by these
soldiers, and others were captured and taken to the Didessa concentration
camp where they were beaten, tortured, raped, and some died of hunger
and infection.
114
Using the leverage of Western countries, the Meles
regime pressures neighboring governments to return or expel Oromo
refugees from their countries. The alliance of the West with this regime has
frightened neighboring countries, such as Djibouti, Kenya and Sudan and
turned them against the Oromo struggle and Oromo refugees. The United
Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has even failed to
provide reasonable protection for thousands of Oromo refugees in Djibouti.
124
Probably responding to the pressure of the Ethiopian and Djibouti
governments or through fear of these governments, the UNHCR provides
no material help to Oromo refugees in Djibouti. Fossati, Namarra and
Niggli note that:
The Oromo council of elders told us they believed they
were entitled to a small portion of the international aid
available to refugees, but did not even get a glass of
water from the UNHCR and had been completely
forgotten . . . All the Oromo that we spoke to complained
again and again that they were so poor that it was even
difficult to bury their dead properly. The community,
they said, should at least be able to guarantee a burial,
since it is the one thing a human being cannot do for
himself.
115

Hussein Sora, a young Kenyan Oromo lawyer, accused the Meles
regime of engaging in international terrorism and compiled a report on the
criminal activities of the Ethiopian security forces in Kenya since 1992.
According to this report, the TPLF forces assassinated prominent Oromo
refugees, bombed the houses of some Kenyan Oromos, abducted civil
servants, and shot some citizens in Kenya.
116

This lawyer died the same year he compiled and distributed the report
to the Kenyan authorities and international organizations; the agents of the
Ethiopian government were suspected of killing him by poisoning. The
TPLF/EPRP forces have continued to enter into Kenya, murdering and
looting the economic resources of some Kenyan Oromos by accusing them
of harboring the Oromo Liberation Army. The Tigrayan soldiers have been
killing hundreds of Kenyan Oromos by entering into Kenya. Entering into
Somalia and Kenya, the agents of this regime assassinated prominent
Oromo leaders, such as J atani Ali, Mulis Abba Gada, Sheik Mohammed
Saido, between 1991 and 2001. When it comes to Oromos, international
organizations care less even if international laws are broken. Oromos are
even denied sanctuary in neighboring countries and are deprived of the
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right to be refugees. They have been assassinated or murdered by the
regime, denied burial rights, and eaten by hyenas and other wild animals.
Since Oromo refugees are not welcomed by neighboring countries and
international organizations, there are thousands of `internal' Oromo
refugees in Oromia and Ethiopia.
Conclusion
With increasing intensity of the Oromo national movement led by the
OLF, the Tigrayan authoritarian-terrorist regime is determined to engage in
mass killings and terrorism. The regime is concerned with the existence of
the OLF and the support and the sympathy this organization enjoys from
the majority of the Oromo people. What annoys the regime is that the more
it terrorizes the Oromo people by killing or imprisoning thousands of them,
claiming that they are the supporters of the OLF, the more Oromos are
determined to embrace Oromo nationalism and the OLF. As a result,
Oromos and the OLF have almost become synonymous. Therefore, it is
impossible to destroy the OLF without destroying the Oromo people.
Further, the success of the OLF in building a broad coalition with various
political organizations has worried this minority regime. Recently, the OLF
has initiated the formation of the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy
with organizations of different population groups to implement the
principles of national self-determination and multinational democracy in
Ethiopia. This innovative political strategy, if properly and carefully
implemented, will shorten the tenure of this regime.
Like successive Amhara-dominated regimes, the Meles government
has racialized/ethnicized the Ethiopian state by making Tigrayan ethnicity
the core of this repressive state and by preventing the construction of a
legitimate state that can be accountable, democratic and reflect a
multinational society. Without an accountable, democratic and legitimate
126
state, various population groups in this empire may face disastrous
conditions similar to Bosnia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia. If current
Ethiopian state terrorism and massive human rights violations are allowed
to continue by the U.S. and other Western countries continue their support
for the Meles regime, these conditions can lead to great disasters. Further,
the social and cultural systems that traditionally satisfied the social and
material needs of the Oromo have been broken up by massive human rights
violations, state terrorism, and the intensification of globalization.
Concerned peoples and their leaders and global community need to avert
these looming catastrophes.
I propose four concrete and immediate political actions to be taken by
concerned groups and individuals to start addressing these complex and
dangerous problems before it is too late. First, the elites of the Ahmaras
and Tigrayans must recognize the past and present crimes that their
successive governments have committed on the colonized nations,
oppressed groups and classes in general and the Oromo people in
particular, and take a courageous political position similar to that of the
white elites of South Africa in the early 1990s. This requires accepting
responsibility for the crimes that have been committed against humanity
and being prepared to accept the democratic majority rule and the rule of
law. Second, If Habasha elites are not ready for the South African model of
conflict resolution; they must agree to the Eritrean model of national self-
determination. Third, the OLF and other national liberation organizations
and political parties, with their respective ethnonational groups, must
further build and consolidate the forum of the Alliance for Freedom and
democracy to implement the genuine principles of national self-
determination and multinational democracy. Four, for its part, the world
community needs to promote the principles of genuine self-determination
and peaceful conflict resolution and encourage the formation of a
Asafa J alata

127

democratic and legitimate multinational state that can prevent the
transformation of a low-level conflict into a full-fledged genocidal war.
Since state terrorism and ethnonational challenges are increasing in the
Ethiopian empire, the world community needs to become capable of
mediating these processes and to develop procedures and criteria by which
to resolve these conflicts fairly and democratically, before it is too late.
Concerned scholars, democrats, activists, humanitarians and others have
social and moral responsibility to expose the crimes that are committed in
this empire in the name of democracy, and search for just, durable and
democratic ways of conflict resolution.

Endnotes

1. J . Lewis Krapf, Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours in East Africa(London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.,
1968.
2 SeeAsafaJ alata, Oromia & Ethiopia, Second edition (Trenton, N. J .: TheRed Press).
3 Ibid,pp. 229-256.
4 SeeAsafaJ alata, ibid.
5 Beforetheir colonization, Oromos had an egalitarian democratic systemknown as Gada. This systemhas the
principles of checks and balances (such as periodic succession of eight years and division of power among
executive, legislative, and judiciary branches), balanced opposition (among fiveparties), and power sharing
between higher and lower administrativeorgans to prevent power fromfalling into thehands of despots.
Other principles of thesystemincludebalanced representation of clans, lineages, regions, and
confederacies; accountability of leaders; the settlement of disputes through reconciliation; and respect for
basic rights and liberties. Recognizing this reality and challenging Euro-centric worldviews, American
Anthropologist BonnieHolcomb notes that the Gadasystemorganized theOromo people in an all-
encompassing democratic republic even beforethefew European pilgrims arrived fromEngland on the
shores of North Americaand only later built a democracy. SinceOromos wereorganized under theGada
systempolitically and militarily, theEthiopians, although tried for several centuries, could not colonize the
Oromo until thelast decades of the19th century when thebalanceof power was changed by European
intervention in thefavor of Ethiopians. Bonnie K. Holcomb, AkkaGadaati: TheUnfolding of Oromo
Nationalism-KeynoteRemarks, Proceeding of the1991 Conference on Oromia, (University of Toronto,
Canada, 3-4 August, 1991), pp.1-10.
128

6 For further discussion, seeAsafaJ alata, Fighting against theInjusticeof theStateand Globalization: Comparing
theAfrican American and Oromo Movements, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), PP.5-12.
7 SeeMartial DeSalviac, TheOromo: An Ancient People, Great African Nation, and translation fromtheOriginal
French Edition of 1901 by Ayalew Kanno, 2005).
8. SeeAsafaJ alata, Oromia & Ethiopia, 1868-2004, second edition, (Trenton, NJ : TheRed SeaPress, 2005).
9. TheHabashas (mainly Amharas and Tigrayans) werethemixtureof Arabs and Africans. TheHabashas and the
Oromo were themajor ethnonational groups in what is now theHorn of Africawhen theEuropeans began
colonizing Africain thelast decades of thenineteenth century. The Habashas favored by theEuropeans, in
effect allied themselves with thecolonialists, creating an Ethiopian ruling class. This ruling class brought
thehuman and econmic resources of theOromos and other colonized populations under control.
10. P.T.W. Baxter, TheCreation & Constitution of Oromo Nationality, Ethnicity & Conflict in theHorn of
Africa, Katsuyoshi Fukui and J ohn Markakis, (eds.), (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), p. 172.
11. Cultural racismcan bedefined as theconscious or subconscious conviction of thepolitically dominant
population group that imposes its cultural patterns and practices through its social institutions in an attempt
to destroy or suppress thecultural patterns and practices of thecolonized and dominated population. For
detailed discussion, see Benjamin P. Bowser and Raymond G. Hunt, Eds, Impacts of Racismon White
Americans.
12. For examplesee, MariamMaat-Ka-Re-Monges, ibid. Molefi K. Asante, ibid; Martin Bernal, Black Athena: The
Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization, vol. I. TheFabrication of Ancient Greece, 1785-1985, (New
Brunswick, N.J .: Rutgers University Press, 1987).
13. P.T.W. Baxter, ibid, p. 172.
14. J ohn Sorenson, Ethiopian Discourseand Oromo Nationalism, in Oromo Nationalismand theEthiopian
Discourse, AsafaJ alata, (ed.), pp. 233-234.
15. Habashaelites several times attempted to use theAfrican diasporas for their economic and political interests by
capitalizing on theemotion they had for thenameEthiopia. Seefor example, WilliamR. Scott, TheSons
of Shebas Race: African-Americans and the Italo--Ethiopian War, 1935-1941, (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993); J oseph Harris, Raceand Misperceptions in theOrigins of United States-Ethiopian
Relations, TransAfricaForum, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1986), 9-23.
16. WilliamR. Scott, ibid, p. 26.
17. SeeDonald Donham, Old Abyssiniaand the New Ethiopian Empire: Themes in Social History, TheSouthern
Marches of Ethiopia, edited by Donald Donhamand Wendy J ames, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), p. 13; J ohn H. Spencer, Ethiopiaat Bay, (Algonac: Mich.: ReferencePublications, 1984), pp.
123-124.
18. Alberto Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness: Ethiopiaand Fascist Italy, 1935-1941, (Lawrenceville, NJ : The Red Sea
Press, 1997), p. 25.
19. J ohn Sorenson, ibid. p. 29.
20.Ibid.
21. Quoted in ibid. p. 29; quoted in Harold G. Marcus, Racist Discourseabout Ethiopiaand Ethiopians beforeand
after theBattleof Adwa, AdwaConference, AAU, March 1996, p. 5.
22. SeeHarold G. Marcus, ibid.
23. Racist Euro-American scholars who believein racial distinctions usethesekinds of racist phrases to show the
significanceof whiten-ness and denigrateblackness in human civilizations. For further discussion, see
Asafa J alata

129

MariamMaat-Ka-Re-Monges, Kush: TheJ ewel of Nubia- Reconnecting theRoot Systemof African
Civilization, (Trenton, NJ : AfricaWorld Press, Inc., 1997). pp. 23-29; seeHarold G. Marcus, Racist
Discourse, ibid. p. 7.
24. Cited in Harold G. Marcus, Racist Discourse, ibid. p. 6.
25. Cedric J . Robinson, TheAfrican Diaspora and theItalo-Ethiopian Crisis, Raceand Class 2, 1985, p. 53.
26. Edward Ullendorff, TheEthiopians, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 76 and 73 respectively.
27. Seefor example, J ohn Sorenson, ibid. J ordan Gebre-Medhin, Peasants and Nationalismin Eritrea, (Trenton,
N.J .: TheRed SeaPress, 1989).
28. J ohn Sorenson, Ethiopian Discourseand Oromo Nationalism, Oromo Nationalismand theEthiopian
Discourse, ibid. p. 234.
29. SeeW.C. Harris, TheHighlands of Ethiopia, London, 1844, vol. 3, pp. 72-73; M.deAlmeida, History of
Ethiopia, SomeRecords of Ethiopia1593-1646, translated and edited by C.F. Beckinghamand C.W.B and
Huntingford, (London: Hakluyt Society, 1954), 111-139.
30. SeeAbbaBahrey, History of theGalla, SomeRecords of Ethiopia, ibid; C.R. Markham, A History of the
Abyssinian Expedition, London, 1869; J ames Bruce, Travels in Abyssiniaand Nubia1768-1773,
(Edinburgh: Adamand Charles Black, 19730, p. 86; Edward Ullendorf, TheEthiopians, (London: Oxford
University Press, 1960), p. 76; Harold G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia, (Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1994), p. 4.
31. SeeL. Fargo, Abyssiniaon theEve, (London: Putnam, 1935), p. 45; C.F. Rey, TheReal Abyssinia, (New York:
Negro Universities Press, 1969), p. 47.
32. SeeHarold G. Marcus, ibid, p. xii; Edward Ullendorf, ibid; Christopher Clapham, HaileSelassies Government,
(New York: Praeger,), p. 81; Patrick Gilkes, TheDying Lion: Feudalismand Modernization in Ethiopia,
(London: J ulian Fridman, 1975), PP. 204 and 206.
33. Seeforeexample, Margery Perham, TheGovernment of Ethiopia, 2nd edition, (London: Faber & Faber, 1969),
p. 377; Christopher Clapham, Haile Selassies Government, (New York: Praeger 1969), p. 81; C. Clapham,
Ethnicity and theNational Question in Ethiopia, Conflict and Peacein theHorn of Africa, edited by Peter
Woodward and M. Forsyth Brookfield, (Dartmouth: Vermont, 1994); Donald Levine, Greater Ethiopia,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994; Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, (New York:
CambridgeUniversity Press).
34. For further discussion, seeDonald Donhamand W. J ames, (eds.), TheSouthern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia,
(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1986).
35. Alberto Sbacchi, Legacy of Bitterness, p. 22.
36. WilliamR. Scott, The Sons of Shebas Race, p. xv.
37. J ohn Sorenson, Ethiopian Discourseand Oromo Nationalism, ibid. p. 232.
38 Habashastereotypes depict Oromos as adirty people; theexpression Gallanasagaraeyadareyigamal
compares Oromos to feces and claims that Oromos continueto stink likefeces with passing days. This
expression warns that thecloser you get to Oromos, themoreyou find how they arebad and dirty. This
racial insult is used to createsuspicion between Oromos and Habashas. Another expression depicts Oromos
as arotten people(timbi or bisbis Galla.) Yet another expression explains that Oromos cannot beclean
even if they wash themselves again and again; it says that GallanaShinfilaayitadam, which literally
means even if you wash them, stomach lining and aGalla will never comeclean. Oromos havebeen
depicted as barbarians and backward peoplein popular discourse, too. A Habashaexpression claims that
130

Oromos attempt to becivilized cannot besuccessful sinceOromos arepredestined to fail in civilizational
projects. Thesaying Gallasisaltin bacharaqajantilayizo yizoral attempts to show that even if heis
civilized an Oromo does not know thetrueessenceof civility. Literally this saying means when an
Oromo is civilized hestretches his umbrella in moon light and walks around so that hecan beseen by
others; simply put, sinceOromos arestupid, they do not know how to behavein a civilized way. The
expression YeGalla chawa, yegomen choma yelewum depicts Oromos as asociety that does not have
respected and notableindividuals. Literally this expression means that as thereis no fat in vegetables or
greens, thereis no agentleman in theGallacommunity. Oromos havebeen seen as auseless peoplewho
do not deserverespect.
39. Quoted in Leenco Lata, Peculiar Challengeto Oromo Nationalism, ibid. p. 143.
40. Quoted in TeshaleTibebu, TheMaking of Modern Ethiopia1896-1974, (Lawrenceville, NJ : TheRed SeaPress,
1995), p. 44.
41. In all racist societies, theseprejudices and stereotypes havebeen reproduced and disseminated to perpetuate
racism. For further understanding of theroles of theseinstitutions, seeAdalberto Aguirre, J r. and David V.
Baker, (eds.), Sources: NotableSelections in Raceand Ethnicity, (Guilford, Connecticut:
Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, 2nd edition, 1998), pp.189-310.
42. Richard Delgado, Words That Wound, Sources: NotableSelections in Raceand Ethnicity,
(Dushkin/McGraw-Hill: Connecticut, 1998), p. 346.
43. SeeLeenco Lata, Peculiar Challengeto Oromo Nationalism, ibid, pp. 139-144.
44. Seefor example, Teklu Gerbee, TheGedaMilitarismand Oromo Expansion, Ethiopian Review, October
1993, p. 50.
45. Leenco Lata, ibid, 135.
46. A. J alata, US-Sponsored Ethiopian `Democracy and StateTerrorism, TheProceedings of Oromo Studies
Association, Eleventh Annual Conferenceof theOSA, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
August 9-10, 1997, pp. 53-77.
47. Leenco Lata, ibid.
48. Quoted in Harold G. Marcus, Racist Discourse, ibid. p. 7.
49. BonnieK. Holcomb and Sisai Ibsssa, TheInvention of Ethiopia, (Trenton, NJ : TheRed seaPress, 1990), p. 1.
When European imperialist powers, such as Great Britain, Franceand Italy, werecompeting to partition
northeast Africa, according to Holcomb and Ibssa, they wereunableto resolvea stalemate over which of
themwould claimtheareacalled theHorn of Africa. Having occupied therest of Africa, they clashed over
theoccupation of theregion that was strategic dueto its location near therecently opened Suez Canal and
near theheadwaters of theBlueNile. Thesolution to this conflict was to encourage, up to certain limits, the
expansionist ambitions of theleaders of various Abyssinian kingdoms, then to establish acollective
agreement among themselves to recognizeand assist theresultant entity as adependent colonial empire,
claiming that an ancient `neutral sovereign stateexisted there. Such adefensebecamethebasis for the
mythology of `Greater Ethiopia.
50. Quoted in ibid, p. 8.
51. Quoted in ibid, p. 141.
52. Ibid, pp.175-179.
53. Quoted in ibid.
54. Ibid, pp. 171-279; AsafaJ alata, Oromia& Ethiopia.
Asafa J alata

131

55. BonnieK. Holcomb and Sisai Ibssa, Ibid, p. 111.
56. Ibid, p. 143.
57. For detailed discussion, seeibid. pp. 143-144; A. J alata, ibid.; Gemetchu Megerssa, TheOromo and the
Ethiopian StateIdeology in A Historical Perspective, Papers of thexiiith International Conferenceof
Ethiopian Studies, Kyoto, 12-17 December 1997, vol. II, pp. 479-485.
58. Donald Levine, ibid, p. 16.
59. BonnieK Holcomb and Sissai Ibssa, ibid, p. 176.
60. Evelyn Waugh, Waugh in Abyssinia, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex; Penguin Books Ltd, 1985), p. 16.
61. SeeEqbal Ahmad, Terrorism: Theirs and Ours, (A Presentation at theUniversity of Colorado, Boulder,
October 12, 1998, p. 7.
62. Ibid.
63. TheEconomist, 1997, p. 36.
64. Beforetheir colonization, Oromos had an egalitarian democratic systemknown as gada. This systemhad the
principles of checks and balances (such as periodic succession of eight years and division of power among
executive, legislative, and judiciary branches), balanced opposition (among fiveparties), and power sharing
between higher and lower administrativeorgans to prevent power fromfalling into thehands of despots.
Other principles of thesystemincludebalanced representation of clans, lineages, regions, and
confederacies; accountability of leaders; the settlement of disputes through reconciliation; and respect for
basic rights and liberties.
65. Holcomb, Bonnie K., "TheTaleof two Democracies: The Encounter Between US-Sponsored Ethiopian
`Democracy' and Indigenous Oromo Democratic Forms, TheJ ournal of Oromo Studies, 1997, 4/1 & 2:
73-77.
66. Seefor example, WilliamI. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony,
(New York: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1996).
67. National Democratic Institutefor International Affairs and African-American Institute, an Evaluation of the
J une21, 1992, Elections in Ethiopia, (1992), p. 7.
68. SeeSamuel P. Huntington, Political Development in Ethiopia: A Peasant-based Dominant-Party Democracy,
Report to USAID/Ethiopiaon Consultation with theConstitutional Commission, March 28 to April 1,
1993.
69. Bridget welsh, Globalization, Weak States, and Death Toll in East Asia, in Violenceand Politics:
Globalizations Paradox, edited by Kenton Worcester, Sally Avery Bermanzohn, and Mark Ungar, (New
York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 67-68.
70. LisaSharlach, StateRape: Sexual Violenceas Genocide, in Violenceand Politics: Globalization=s Paradox,
ibid, p. 107.
71. AnnamarieOliverio, TheStateof Injustice: ThePolitics of Terrorismand theProduction of Order,
International J ournal of ComparativeSociology, vol. xx xviii, numbers 1-2, J une, 1997, pp. 48-63;
AnnamarieOliverio, TheStateof Terror, (New York: SUNY press, 199; J ack Gibbs, Conceptualization
of Terrorism, TheAmerican Sociological Review, 54, J une, 1989, pp. 329-340.
72. Article10 of this constitution proclaims: Human rights and freedoms areinviolableand inalienable. They are
inherent in thedignity of Human beings. 2. Human and democratic rights of Ethiopian citizens shall be
respected.
73. Annamarie Oliverio, TheStateof Injustice, ibid. p. 52.
132

74 According to theOromia Support Group, BecausetheOromo occupy Ethiopias richest areas and comprisehalf
of thepopulation of Ethiopia, they areseen as thegreatest threat to thepresent Tigrean-led government.
Subsequently, any indigenous Oromo organization, including theOromo Relief Association, has been
closed and suppressed by thegovernment. TheStandard reason given for detaining Oromo peopleis that
they aresuspected of supporting theOLF.
75. SeeSeifaNabalbal, (an Oromo Newspaper), no. 94, Nov. 8, 1996; Urjii, (an Oromo Newspaper, Amharic
version), 1994, 1995, 1996 and 19977 series; Amnesty International, 1995 and 1996; TheOromiaSupport
Group, 1996 and 1997 series. TheOromiaSupport Group. Press Release- October/November 1996";
Press Release- August/September 1996"; Press Release- May/J une 1997"; Press Release- March/April
1997"; Press Release- J anuary/February 1997"; Urgent Action - November 1997"; Summary Press
Release- September/October 1997"; Human Rights Abuses in Ethiopia- Press Release-
September/October 1997"; Scaleof EPRDF NepotismRevealed, Number 19, September/October 1997.
76. Quoted in BrunaFossati, L. Namarra, and Peter Niggli, TheNew Rulers of Ethiopiaand thePersecution of the
Oromo: Reports fromtheOromo Refugees in Djibouti, (Dokumentation, Evangelischer Pressedienst
Frankfurt amMain, 1996), 43.
77. SeeSuePollock, "Ethiopia- Human Tragedy in theMaking: Democracy or Dictatorship?" TheOromiaSupport
Group, 1996; SuePollock, "Politics and Conflict: Participation and Self-determination in Ethiopia:
Conquest and theQuest for Freedomand Democracy, edited by SeyoumY. Hameso, T. Trueman, and T. E.
Erena, (London: TSC Publications, 1997), pp. 81-110; Trevor Trueman, "Democracy or dictatorship," in
Ethiopia, ibid, pp. 141-150; Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1997; Survival
International, 1995; TheOromiaSupport Group, 1997 series)
78. Trevor Trueman, Genocideagainst theOromo Peopleof Ethiopia? Western Influence, Paper Presented at the
44th Annual Meeting of theAfrican Studies Association, Houston, Texas, November 14-18, 2001, p. 3.
79. Mohammed Hassen, Is Genocideagainst the Oromo in Ethiopia Possible? ibid, p. 27.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid, p. 30.
82. Ibid, pp. 31 and 71.
83. Ibid, p. 47.
84. Ibid, p. 31.
85. SeeTheOromiaSupport Group, August/September 1996.
86. TheOromiaSupport Group, 1997, p. 8.
87 AsafaJ alata, StateTerrorismand Globalization: TheCases of Ethiopiaand Sudan, International J ournal of
C
omparative Sociology, Vo. 46, No. 1-2: 79-102, 2005.
88. BrunaFossati, L. Namarra, and Peter Niggli, ibid, p.10.

89. LisaSharlack,StateRape: Sexual Violenceas Genocide, ibid, p. 107.
90. Ibid.
91. CatharineA. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Womens Human Rights, Harvard Women=s Law J ournal 17
(1994), pp. 11-12.
92.Human Beings and their Lives, 2002, pp. 1-33.
93. Hizbawi Adera, aTPLF/EPRDF political pamphlet, December1996-February 1997, Vol. 4, No. 7.

Asafa J alata

133

94. Ibid.

95. SeeHizbawi Adera, an EPRDF political pamphlet), Tahisas to Yekatit, 1989 Ethiopian Calendar.

96. Quoted in BrunaFossati, L. Namarra, and Peter Niggli, ibid, p. 34.

97. SagaleeHaara, amagazineof theOromiaSupport Group, 1998, p.6.

98. According to Hassen, Only fractions of theOromo areeducated. By 1995, according to government sources,
enrollment was only 20 percent for primary and 12 percent for secondary schools . . . Out of an estimated
population of thirty million in Oromia0.1 percent received thethird level education in 1994 . . . By 2002,
all secondary school students in Oromiawill graduatefrom10th gradeinstead of theusual 12th grade.
Oromo students start learning English in theseventh gradeand they take[high] school leaving examin
English in tenth grade. Students in Tigray start learning English in second gradeand they take[high]
school leaving exams in English in 12th grade. They havemorechancefor passing [high] school leaving
examination than Oromo students. This means that theOromo students will not haveany moreopportunity
for collegeand university level education. Only students in theprivileged stateof Tigray will havethat
opportunity in thefuture. TheTPLF dominated regimeis deliberately leaving behind Oromo children from
themain streammodern education. Mohammed Hassen, Is GenocideAgainst theOromo in Ethiopia
Possible? Paper Presented at theFourth International Biennial Conferenceof theAssociation of Genocide
Scholars, Radisson Hotel Minneapolis, Minnesota, J une10, 2001, pp. 34-35.
99. Quoted in Kurt J ohansson (with Karin Solveig Bjornson), Genocide and Gross Human Rights Violations: In
ComparativePerspective, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998, p. 9.

100. Ibid.

101.Frank Chalk and Kurt J ohansson, History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and CaseStudies, New Haven,
Conn.: YaleUniversity Press, 1990, p. 23.

102.SeeKurt J ohansson and Frank Chalk and Kurt J ohansson, Ibid., pp. 13-14; 23; ibid.

103.Kurt J ohansson, ibid, p. 23.

104.Ibid, p. 11.

105.Ibid, p. 24.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid, p. 23.

134

108. SeeAssefaNegash, ThePillageof Ethiopiaby Eritrean and their Tigrayan Surrogates, (Los Angeles: Adey
Publishing, 1996),

109. BrunaFossati, L. Namarra, and Peter Niggli, ibid, p. 35.

110. SeeTheIndian Ocean Newsletter, October 19, 1996.

111. TerfaDibaba, "Humanity Forsaken: TheCaseof theOromo Relief Association (ORA) in theHorn of Africa,
" Paper Presented to theOromo Studies Association annual meeting at theUniversity of Minnesota, 1997.

112. Ibid.

113. SeeTheOromiaSupport Group, August/September, 1996.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid, p. 44.

116. Cited in TheOromiaSupport Group, 1997.

135
THE ISLAMIC COURTS, ETHIOPIAS
INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA, AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL
STABILITY
Hassan Mahadallah
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Somalia has become part of the theatre of the war on
terrorism. This was not, by any means, a national choice. Since 9/11, a
cloud of terrorist suspicion was hovering over the country. Western ships
and surveillance aircrafts were monitoring Somalias land, sea and air
space on a daily basis. Local political opportunists and Ethiopias
propaganda operatives kept stirring international suspicion by issuing
periodic pronouncements of terrorist sightings and training camps in the
country. It was under this heightened Western concern that the Somali
clerics, organized as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), assumed political
power in southern Somalia in the summer of 2006.
Upon coming to power, the mullahs were faced with a powerful
coalition of national and international forces. Led by Ethiopia and its
Somali collaborators, especially the Transitional Federal Government
(TFG), the international opposition was single-minded about the complete
destruction of the fledgling theocratic regime. There was no room for
negotiated settlement. The war that followed had an historical
consequence, i.e., the collapse and disintegration of the ICU, the
occupation of Ethiopian troops in southern Somalia, and the installation of
the TFG in the national capital, Mogadishu.
This paper seeks to assess the national and international significance
of this development. What were the underlying causes of this conflict?
136
How much of it was ideological and how much of it political? What was in
it for Addis Ababa? And more importantly, what were the role and
motivation of the United States in this crisis? These are some of the queries
this paper attempts to answer. At the outset three factors lend themselves to
critical investigation:
a) Somalias prolonged stateless condition;
b) Ethiopias hegemonic interest in Somalia and the
region; and
c) The dictates of the war on terrorism.
But before examining these factors, a brief overview of the existing
literature on political Islam in Somalia may be in order.
Review of the Literature
The academic literature on political Islam in Somalia is substantial
and old. Beginning with the colonial accounts of the early 20
th
century, the
subject has received considerable attention. Enrico Cerulli had identified at
least three ways in which political Islam manifested itself in the country,
i.e., subordinate v. dominant groups, clerics v. traditional chiefs, and
clerics v. clerics.
1
Although these were lateral conflicts (society v. society),
they were nevertheless as political as those occurring vertically (state v
society). However, this genre of political Islam in Somalia did not attract
any serious attention since Cerulli.
2
Instead, later studies cluster around the
more sensational confrontations between the Ulama and the state.
3
Written
in two distinctly different contexts (lateral and vertical), these two main
arrays of studies hardly converge to present a holistic view of political
Islam in Somalia. After the collapse of the state in 1991, the subject has
received renewed interest. Many chapters, articles, numerous internet
entries, and mainstream media reports have been produced and
disseminated.
4
However, the state-society context in which these are
written is rather limiting.
5
It omits a whole gamut of political engagements
Hassan Mahadallah

137

between the clerics and non-state actors, especially the armed clan militias.
This study aims to present a more complete view of political Islam in
Somalia by linking the two contexts in which political Islam manifests
itself in Somalia. Before doing so, however, let us take a look at the nature
and character of Somali Islam.
Nature of Somali Islam
Historically, Somalis never took to religious fanaticism. On its own
right, Islam has never developed as an ide-force that could command
social or political action in this country. This is why the post-colonial
clerics never sought, let alone acquired political power, until 1991.
6
Prior
to this period, the vast majority of the Ulama took to their centuries-old
learning and proselytization of Islam, as well as the daily toil of eking out a
meager livelihood from their surroundings.
7
Two main reasons account for
the apolitical orientation of Somali clerics.
First, for most Somalis Islam always dwelled in the spiritual sphere
and never seeped into the popular culture. It is only in societies where a
religious dogma is deeply integrated into the national schema that it
acquires a mobilizing quality. Take, for instance, Christianity and Western
societies. The former did not emerge as a nation-mobilizing tool until the
eighteenth century, when the medieval concept of corpus Christi
mysticum, was transmuted to the secular concept of popular
sovereignty, which envisioned a Christian nation whose members were
equal before the law.
8
Thenceforth, when Christianity had become an
integral part of the national identity, it acquired a mobilizing quality.
In Somalia, such fusion of religion and culture did not take place.
Thus Islam had never attained the congregational character of
Christianity. Unlike the latter, Islam never acquired any aesthetic cultural
values for the great many Somalis that can inspire political action.
9
This is
why the Jamas have never produced a national political figure since the
138
Sayyid, the early 20
th
century Somali nationalist who led a resistance
struggle against the combined powers of Britain, Italy, and Ethiopia (1898-
1920). As Lewis has correctly observed, in Somalia Muslim clerics are
venerated for their own personal piety and religious efficacy rather than
for sociological reasons.
10

Second, Somalis understanding of Islam is superficial. Traditionally,
the Quran is taught in Arabic, even though few Somalis understand the
language. Likewise, all religious sermonsi.e., Fridays, Iid, funeral and
wedding sermonsare normally delivered in the same language. For a
long time, this superficial knowledge of the religion militated against its
politicization. In late 19
th
century, Richard Burton, later Sir Richard, a
British traveler traversing the country had observed the superficiality of
Somali Islam:
The call to prayers sounds as we enter [the city]: none of
my companions prays, but all when asked reply in the
phrase which an Englishman hates, Inshallah Bukra
if Allah please, tomorrow!and they have the decency
not to appear in public at the hour of devotion. The
Somali, like most Africans, are of a somewhat irreverent
turn of mind.
11

Little has changed since the Burtons observation. To this day,
Somali Islam is barely skin deep, as few people comprehend the literary
meaning of the scripture. This hardly makes for a pious population, let
alone a fanatic one.
The apolitical orientation of Somali religious leaders ended in 1991
following the collapse of the state. Since then the Ulama have been
dappling in politics. What can explains this new political activism? Is
political Islam here to stay or is it a passing phenomenon? Is it a reflection
of underlying socio-economic changes in the country or a figment of the
imagination of few fanatic Muslim clerics? These are some of the
questions one may ask about political Islam in general and the nature and
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139

role of the U.I.C. in particular. From the start, two main factors present
themselves for critical examination, namely globalization and
underdevelopment. As in other parts of the Muslim world, where Islamism
has a long history, these two factors seem to be the root causes of the
politicization of Islam in Somalia. In the following two sections we will
examine the effects of these forces on political Islam in Somalia.
Globalization and Political Islam in Somalia
The term globalization refers to the current intensive and extensive
interactions between states and societies around the globe. This interaction,
which in terms of depth and reach surpasses anything the world has ever
seen, profoundly affects all aspects of life in every country.
12
Although
globalization benefits all participants, it tends to favor some states and
societies more than others. In the former countries, it leads to progress and
improved standard of living, generating hope and social excitement. As the
popular approval grows, so does the appetite for more globalization in
these countries.
Conversely, in areas where it causes economic dislocation and social
disturbances, it elicits popular resentment and national frustration. In these
places, globalization is met with profound skepticism and eventually with
outright objection. As the level of social deprivation rises, so does the
popular resistance to it. In Muslim countries, opponents of globalization
deal with these issues through a comprehensive critique of modern life in
the Islamic world and argue persuasively that a return to the core religious
values would bring social justice, good government and a higher level of
moral life while putting Muslims in touch with their glorious past.
13

As a mega-trend, globalization has multiple effects. Besides the
economic system, it alters social and political relations within and among
states as well. A century ago, when the economies of the colonized were
tied to those of the colonizers, it had also irrevocably changed the social
140
and political relations between and within countries. As a result, the social
and political institutions of the colonized were relegated to an inferior
status. According to Claude Ake, the process of globalization creates mass
culture. However, this mass culture draws its impetus, notably, from New
York, Tokyo, Frankfurt, London, and Paris. It is not an abstract universal
that is magically emerging everywhere; it is concrete particulars that are
being globalized. What is globalized is not Yoruba but English, not
Turkish pop culture but American, not Senegalese technology but J apanese
and German.
The politicization of Islam in Somalia began in earnest in late 19
th

century, when the gates of the country were thrown open by the whorl
winds of imperialism. The extraordinary events that accompanied the
establishment of European rule, i.e., the pacification wars, confiscation of
livestock and the indiscriminate burning of villages and farmlands
irreversibly altered the apolitical proclivity of the Somali clerics. In the
early days of colonial imposition, an English man who was stationed in
British Somaliland Protectorate described the temperament of the man the
British will later refer to as The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, in this way:
Up to this point Mohamed Abdalla had shown no very
decided animus against the British suzerainty over
Somaliland, and it appeared for the nonce as if he were
content with the homage paid to his learning and
devotional sincerity by the Ogaadeen and Dolbahanta
tribes.
14

Within a decade of this chronicle, the great mullah was politicized.
Apparently his contacts with occupying forces, not to mention his exposure
to the outside world, radically influenced his political orientation.
15
In his
sermons, the language of rebellion replaced the language of religion:
this is a time in which the infidels defeat Moslemsand it is a time in
which the learned men do serve the Christians. This is the end of all things.
May God guide us....
16
Soon other religious leaders became politicized as
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141

well. In defiance of a colonial order, the Sheikh Hassan Barsane, explained
to his followers:
The government has its laws and we have ours; we do
not accept another law other than ours. Our law is that of
God and the prophet; and we are not like others. You
have never seen our people recruited in your gaggle;
never. None of our women came to you.If you come to
our land to make war we will do all in our power to fight
you as we did the Dervishes. God said: a handful of
men can defeat a large army.
17

When the devolution of imperialism started in mid 20
th
century,
political Islam already had over sixty years of gestation in Somalia.
However, it did not kick off popular fanaticism. Although sufficient for the
challenges of colonialism, the ideology of the great clerics was incapable
of generating mass fervor. This was so, because their teachings did not
deviate much from, let alone systematically challenge, the traditional
teachings of Somali Islam. Such a development had to wait until the late
1960s, when the first modernist Islamic scholars have returned from
abroad. Most notable among these returnees were the late Sheikh Nur Ali
Olow, the late Sheikh Mohamed Mualim, and Sheikh Mohamed Geryare,
who preached a reformist Islam which rejected, among other things, the
admixture of religion and politics.
18

Upon return, these pioneering sheiks ensconced themselves in some
of the largest mosques and Islamic centers in Mogadishu, where they
preached a reformist ideology that challenged traditional views about
politics, society and religion, as well as their inter-relationships. Like their
fellow Muslim activists elsewhere, they preached strictly from the Quran
and its main accompaniments, the Hadith and the Sunnah, questioning the
political and social order of the era. As they railed against all sorts of
national ills; public corruption, religious fetishism, moral laxity, social
injustice, etcthey provided the bricks and mortar from which todays
142
political Islam was constructed. However, during the state era, the
movement made only modest progress for a couple of reasons.
First, during the time of the republic (1960-1969), Islam had to
compete with the more influential dogma of pan-Somalism. Thus,in the
post-colonial period, Islamic activism was inordinately difficult for two
inter-related reasons: (a) the dynamic of nationalism, then at the height of
its fervor, was much stronger than any other ideology, including political
Islam;
19
and (b) the machinery of the state was still controlled by the first
generation of nationalist leaders, who found militant irredentismpolitically
efficacious. Leaders were elected and ousted based on their position on the
issue.
20
Given these conditions, throughout the 1960s, the mullahs were tepid
in their demeanor and modest in their political goals, seeking only to liaison
between the state and society. This is why, during the civilian administration,
they made little political headways.
Second, the accession of Gen. Mohamed Siyaad Barre to power in
1969 ended any hope the clerics may have had to gain political power.
When he came to office, the general enacted ruthless persecution of the
religious leaders. As a military man, the new president tolerated no
deviation from, let alone opposition to, his program of scientific socialism.
He pronounced his stance loud and clear in 1974, when he executed and
imprisoned some of the best known mullahs in the country. To finish them
off politically, Barre followed this repressive act with a smear campaign
against the Islamists that lasted for more than a decade. It would take
another twenty year before the Somali religious leaders could recover from
the defeat, refurbish their image and make their bid for political power.
21

In the early 1970s, large numbers of Somalis have migrated to the
Middle East, especially the Gulf States, in search of employment and other
economic opportunities. In these countries, they made contacts with other
Muslims, who exposed them to new ways of thinking about religion and
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politics. After the end of the construction boom in mid-1980s, many have
returned to Somalia bringing with them new religious views and political
agendas. Unconstrained by state authority, which was by then enfeebled by
the withdrawal of Soviet props and a costly war with Ethiopia (1977-78),
Muslim leaders found ample opportunity to spread their new religio-
political dogmas. At the center of their conceptions was the national state.
Portrayed as a colonial artifact, it was not only an anachronistic entity but
one that is too incorrigibly flawed to meet the material and spiritual needs
of society. In its stead, they propagated a more perfect universal Islamic
statea sort of a caliphate superstructure, if you willunder which all
Muslims, the so-called Ummah, were to be subsumed.
22
It was only under
such an ideal state that Somalis would find their path to Allah and reap his
divine rewards.
In due course, the revolutionary message would resonate far and wide
in the country. Coming as it did, when the regime lost much of its coercive
capacity, the rhetoric of the clerics appeared ever more attractive. Riding a
powerful wave of popular resentment against a regime that outlived its
usfulness, the Somali clerics garnered political traction. Unencumbered by
state authority, they proliferated into so many, some times opposing,
religious organizations. A short survey of these associations may help at
this point.
Underdevelopment and the Implosion of the Somali State
Underdevelopment signifies the lagging of a country in economic,
social and political advancement. Conceptually, it is the opposite of
developmentthat integrative process that marries time, resources and
organization to produce progress.
23
Viewed in this way, underdevelopment
means the absence of one or more of these productive factors, or the
inability of a society to match them artfully. So, in most African states,
144
where development languished, one or more of these problems are at play
at any given period.
24

While it is debatable which comes first, economic or social
development, there is a wide consensus that political progress depends on
the attainment of at least one or the other. As a grand scale human activity,
development requires some form of political organization. Without such an
organization, a society will find it difficult to carry out large-scale projects
that are both correct and correctly timed. When these occur routinely
without formal enforcement mechanisms they are said to be
institutionalized. State institutions are particularly vital to national
development because they provide, among other things, protection to
private property and enforce business contracts. By personalizing power,
African leaders readily undermine these institutions, the very vehicles that
promote development. In doing so, they discourage private investment and
dampen entrepreneurial spirit. It is in this regard that Douglas North has
observed: Third World countries are poor because the institutional
constraints define a set of payoffs to political/economic activities that do
not encourage productive activity.
25

With atrophied institutions, African states continue to rut in chronic
underdevelopment. In post-independence Somalia, this is precisely what
happened. Due to the weakness of the national political institutions, since
its birth the country ranked as one of the least developed countries in the
world. Overshadowed by the more pressing problem of pan-Somali unity,
the issue of development did not register high in the national agenda. The
institutional problem was further exacerbated by the overthrow of the
civilian regime in 1969 by a military junta.
26
During the Cold War era,
when Somalia was receiving a stable stream of foreign aid, the regime was
able to remedy some of its more severe economic and political
shortcomings. However, after the end of the Cold War, when these funds
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145

suddenly dried up, public investment dropped to less than 1 percent of the
national GDP.
27
As one might expect, soon the political and economic
failings of the government became ever apparent.
Frustrated with the pace of progress, many Somalis began to question
the very legitimacy of the state. Political oppositions sprouted up in every
corner of the country. Faced with growing popular discontentment, and
with little chance to solve the developmental question, public officials
resorted to clan baiting and extralegal coercion. Ascriptive criteria became
the standard by which all public goods were distributed in society. Verily,
those in power took the lions share in government offices and the
economy. By early 1980s, students of Somali affairs were talking about the
dominance of the MOD clan alliance.
28
Nationalism gave way to
clanism.
29
With no glue to hold it together, Somalia imploded from within,
after barely three decades of independence.
The Origin of the Islamic Courts
The Islamic Courts came into being under conditions of severe
underdevelopment and political fragmentation. After the collapse of the
military regime in 1991, the country disintegrated into feuding clan
fiefdoms. Commerce and industry sunk to insignificance; and foreign aid
had practically evaporated overnight. Without income, life became a daily
struggle. Lawlessness and lack of authority further compounded the
problem. Clan militias quartered in every major city, erecting private
checkpoints at every main intersection, where they exacted extortion from
businesses and the traveling public. Marauding youth gangs, who robbed
residents at gunpoint, roamed the streets uncontrolled.
30
The problem was
most acute in Mogadishu, the national capital. As the seat of government
and a main economic center, the city attracted all kinds of political upstarts
and criminal elements in search of personal gains.
31
It was under these
146
circumstances that the interim administration of Ali Mahdi Mohamed
(1991-92) instituted (perhaps as a pilot project) the first Islamic Court in
the country in the district of Karaan, northern Mogadishu. In the next few
months, the Court, under one able Sheikh Ali Dhere, registered unqualified
success in curtailing banditry and random violence. The achievement
earned the Sheikh and his forces the approval of the local population.
32

Once the exploits of the Sheik became public, other politically
ambitious religious leaders in other parts of the city followed his example,
duplicating the Karaan experiment in their respective neighborhood. With
broken authority and idle clerical hands all around, they found the task
readily achievable. In the next decade and half, Mogadishu was blanketed
with curial jurisdictions, as every corner of the city was claimed by one
court or another. By spring 2006, when hostilities broke out between the
Islamic Courts and the local warlords, Mogadishu hosted some twelve
Islamic Courts.
33

Until the spring of 2006, the Islamic Courts operated independently
of each other, though they were linked by common religious ethos. As it
related to the existing state of affairs, the sanctity of human life and private
property ranked the highest in their considerations. Beyond this, there was
nothing that bound them togetherorganizationally, politically or
financially. In fact, in Mogadishu, where each clan staked out a specific
neighborhood early in the civil war, they operated separately in their
respective clan areasoften jealously guarding their turfs against each
other. In this sense, their relationship reflected the general fragmentation of
the Somali society. However, in due course, the Clan Courts found a
common cause to unify. What follows below is a brief discussion of the
conditions that precipitated the creation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).
The Role of al-Itihad in Forging the ICU
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Although it is hard to establish the exact date of its constitution, al-
Itihad, a militant Islamic body, has existed in one form or another since the
early 1980s. As its name suggests, the organization was formed from the
union of two Islamic groups in the late 1980s, namely the al-Jamaa al-
Islamiyya and Wahdat al-Shabaab al-Islamiyya.
34
The merger of the two
organizations was based on their ideological affinity, Wahabi Salafism,
which rejects, among other things, democracy, socialism, and the
separation of church and state in Muslim countries. However, during this
period, neither of these associations could openly advocate such a doctrine,
as the country was still in the tight control of a military junta, who
tolerated no ideological competition with its official dogma of scientific
socialism. In late 1980s, when the military regime began to unravel, al-
Itihad saw the opportunity to organize formally and arm itself in
preparation for the coming power struggle. This is why as soon as the
government was toppled the organization emerged, not only as the most
politically active, but militarily the most powerful Islamic organization in
the country. However, due to its hunger for political power and martial
approach, al-Itihad failed to capitalize on its outstanding advantages.
35

After 1996, having lost confidence in its military prowess, al-Itihad
reassessed its martial strategy, this time opting for rapport-building toward
like-minded Islamic groups across clan lines. However, since the populace
was not ready yet for a transclanal movement, the organization decided to
conduct its business through the existing social structures. Fortunately for
them, the strategy worked, as the organization was able to link with a
cross-section of Somali society, i.e., clan courts, businessmen, civil
society, college and high school students, and even common people. With
tentacles reaching far and wide in society, al-Itihad was finally able to
build a social base and financial support system that was second to none in
post-state Somalia. However, the task still remained to unify the Islamic
148
forces and bring the prolonged civil war to a final conclusion. According to
a well-informed source with whom this author had an informal discussion,
the job fell into the hands of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, commander of
al-Itihads military wing. The Sheikh, formerly a colonel of the Somali
Army, has been active in the countrys religious movements since the
1970s. In the early days of the civil war, Mr. Aweys proved to be more of
an organizational man than clanal, when he sided with his comrades-in-
arms in al-Itihad against his co-clansman the General Mohamed Farah
Aideed, when the two fought over the control of the port city of Kismayo.
In addition to his reputation as an organization man with seasoned
experience, two external factors worked in his favor.
36

First, in the spring of 2006, the United States and Ethiopia, who rode
along together on the anti-terror wagon, contracted out to the local
warlords the task of apprehending and rendering high value clerics to them.
Accordingly, the warlords carried out against the mullahs a clandestine
campaign of assassinations, kidnappings and rendition of religious men to
Ethiopia and the United States.
37
In February 2006, they formalized their
anti-clerical stance with the formation of the Alliance for the Restoration of
Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). Although the professed aim of the
organization was to apprehend and extradite international terror suspects
allegedly hiding in the country, the Islamists saw it for what it wasa
crass pursuit of power and money. Confronted with an impending danger
that transcended the clans, the formerly divided Ulama saw a common
cause to coalesce. With organizational and military experience, Sheikh
Aweys was finally able to weave the Islamic Courts together to form the
Islamic Courts Union (ICU). In March 2006, when the war with the local
warlords broke out, the organization enjoyed the largest public following
and boasted the strongest military force in South-Central Somalia.
38
This is
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149

why the ICU was able to trounce its foes without raising the ire of their
clansmen.
39

Second, after seventeen years of lawlessness, the Somali people were
ready to try anything but warlordism. Long wracked by poverty and
lawlessness, society preferred the unknown change over the intolerable
status quo. This is why even the most secular groups and individuals;
intellectuals, businessmen, civil society, and artistslined up in support of
the Islamic courts. The intellectual explanation for their preference is
provided by Mancur Olson. Employing a criminal metaphor, he posits that
when people are presented with a choice between a roving bandit, who
taxes heavily without rendering protection or other services, and a
stationary bandit, who does not only protect, but re-invests part of his
loot in public projects, they will ultimately choose the latter.
40
As he put it:
In short, the bandit leader, if he is strong enough to hold
a territory securely and monopolize theft there, has an
encompassing interest in his domain. This encompassing
interest leads him to limit and regularize the rate of his
theft and to spend some of the resources that he controls
on public goods that benefit his victims no less than
himself. Since the settled bandits victims are for him a
source of tax payments, he prohibits the murder or
maiming of his subjects.
41

The Organizational Structure of the SCICS
Upon coming to power in J une 2006, the leaders of the Islamic Courts
set up a clerical administration in south-central Somalia. This
administration, which was officially named the Supreme Council of
Islamic Courts of Somalia (SCICS), consisted of four main bodies, the
Executive Committee, the Permanent (Central) Committee, the Legislative
Council (locally known as Shura), and the J udiciary. Although the ultimate
authority of the administration rested with the Legislative Council, the
body was too large and unwieldy to exercise effective governance. So, for

150
a practical purpose, the Shura elected a Central Committee which would
closely work with the Executive Committee and serve as a transmission
belt between the two bodies. Together, these two small committees
assumed the responsibility of devising and implementing public policies
of course, with the approval of the Shura.
42

Organizationally, the SCICS was hierarchical. This means, in this
regime authority flowed from top to bottom. Accordingly, although the
Shura had vast powers, ultimate authority was wielded by the Executive
Council.
Sources of Finance for the SCICS
All governments require huge funds to function, and the SCICS was
no exception. Before coming to power, the ICU had long established
sources of revenues, and after assuming authority, they acquired new
sources of income. Since the unification of the Clan Courts in 2000, the
organization received substantial local and foreign assistance. According to
the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia of November 2006, these sources
included wealthy local and foreign individuals, charity organizations,
private companies, national expatriates, and foreign governments.
43
In
addition to these sources, the SCICS had immensely benefited from the
Executive Council
18
Legislative Council
91
(Majlis al-Shura)
J udiciary 11
Permanent
Committee 19
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n
s
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s

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e
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i
s
i
o
n
s

Cooperation
D
e
c
i
s
i
o
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s

C
o
n
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e
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s

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opening and operation of Mogadishus sea and airport. Located in a large
metropolitan city, the two facilities were well-patronized since they were
re-opened, and, therefore, produced huge proceeds for the new regime. In
the case of the seaport, fees were collected from goods and commodities
based on weight, volume and type. Like wise, airport authorities collected
fees from in-bound and out-bound cargo based on weight, and each
passenger was charged $20.00 on arrival and departure. Thus, on average
month, the airport produced an income of about $550,500 US dollars.
44

The SCICS inherited also all the financial sources which the local
warlords have long exploited. However, since much of these were based on
extortion, the Islamic rulers could not use them indiscriminately.
45
Instead,
they opted for voluntary taxations, which most of the businesses had gladly
offered.
46
Together, these sources of revenues produced enough money for
the Islamists to run a modest administration.
Why the Administration of the Islamic Courts Collapsed
The administration of the Courts lasted only six months. Two factors
appear to account for the short tenure of the Islamic Regime (IR), namely
international perception and internal dissention. Although the SCICS
enjoyed wide public support, it was born with these two mortal defects.
Soon after SCICSs assumption of power, on June 8, 2006, President
George Bush expressed Americas concern in predictable terms: [Our]
first concern, of course, would be to make sure that Somalia does not
become an al-Qaida safe haven, doesnt become a place from which
terrorists plot and plan.
47
Since then, several events colluded to reinforce
the negative international perception of the SCICS.
On J uly 31, Newsweek published an article entitled Africas
Taliban. In this article, the author cast the new Somali rulers in the image
of the Taliban, citing in particular their alleged association with
international terrorists and style of rule.
48
On August 17, the SCICS halted
152
the commemoration of al-Islahs 28
th
birthday, prompting charges of
human rights violation.
49
In November, 2006, a UN Security Council
Committee, known as the Monitoring Group on Somalia (MG), reported
that SCICS had ties with, and received financial and military support from,
among others, Hezbollah, Libya, Syria and Iran.
50
Mean while, the army of
the SCICS continued to roll over the wide expanse of territory between
Puntland and Kenya, finally engulfing the city of Baidoa, the seat of the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). At length, when the progress of
the Islamic forces was halted by Ethiopias superior force in the Bay
Region, on October 23, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the most powerful
leader of the Islamists, called on the Somali nation to start J ihad against
the invaders and those who support them.
51

The call to J ihad was not lost on the international community,
especially the United States and Ethiopia. During a meeting with his
Parliament, Meles Zenawi, Ethiopias Prime Minister, sounded the alarm
of danger posed by J ehadists who operate under the umbrella of the
Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. These forces, he explained, constituted
a threat not only to Ethiopia but to the whole region of the Horn of
Africa.
52
Within a couple of weeks, Washington picked up the rhetoric and
even ratcheted it up. The Council of Islamic Courts is now controlled by
East Africa al-Qaida cell individuals, said US Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs J endayi Frazer at a news conference. The top layer of
the Courts are extremists. They are terrorists.
53

In addition to external opposition, the SCICS was hobbled by internal
differences. The upper echelon of the regime was made up of Clan Courts
leaders, businessmen, politicians, ideologues and even warlords. Since they
came from different sectors of society, often with cross purposes, they
were unable to jell together to form a unified political and administrative
leadership united under a common ideology or material interest.
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153

Throughout their stay in power, they existed as a motley crew held
together by a temporary political expedience. This is why they had more to
disagree than agree.
54

By far, the biggest controversy among the leadership of the SCICS
related to the issue of war and peace. This dispute, which was mainly
between the political and military wings of the IR, eventually determined
its fate. The political wing of the Administration was less predisposed to
war than the military wing (locally known as al-Shabab), which was
controlled by men, who perceived an ensuing universal war between
Muslims and Crusaders, and who saw their role as holding the line at the
local front, Somalia.
55
In a politically mature system, when such a
controversy occurs, usually the political leadership prevails over the
military one. However, in a politically fluid environment, the case is often
decided on the differential access to armaments. In Somalia, this seems to
have happened. Since the Islamic Courts came to power, al-Shabab
monopolized the machinery and means of war. Thus, before the issue
could come up in political debate, it was decided on the ground. By early
December, 2006, the technicals of SCICS, manned by al-Shabab fighters,
were arrayed against the tanks of Ethiopia in several fronts. The brief war
that followed in the next few days formally ended the tenure of the SCICS
on December 25, 2006.
56

Ethiopias Hegemonic Drive
Different authors offer different definitions of the term hegemony. In
this study, the term signifies institutionalized military and diplomatic
dominance of a country over another, a region or the whole world, for that
matter. Although Ethiopias dominance over Somalia, let alone the whole
region, was never institutionalized, Addis Ababa has nevertheless sought
such a goal for more than a century. Since the founding of its modern state
154
in the late nineteenth century, the imperial state has employed a number of
strategies to attain a hegemonic status, including the clever exploitation of
the myth of the black Zion, her warding off of colonial invasions, her
victimization by Fascist Italy, her religious affinity with the great powers
of the day, and most importantly, her alignment with the dominant
ideologies of the period; anti-colonialism, anti-communism, anti-Arabism,
and more recently anti-terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.
Over time, by these various schemes, Addis Ababa was able to
construct a regime of truth, which legitimized her illegitimate conducts,
such as her incorporation of Eritrea, the Ogaadeen, the Haud and the
Reserved Area, and, most recently, her invasion and occupation of
neighboring Somalia. As Ruth Iyob has correctly put it,
Ethiopias ability to establish and maintain its diplomatic
capability and legitimacy emanates from the successful
development of its own hegemonic regime of truth. In
use, this organizes knowledge/information to justify a
given distribution of power, defining what is and what is
not a legitimate discourse. In post-colonial Africa, the
very pervasiveness of the Ethiopian regime of truth,
became the foundation of its hegemonic dominance in
the political and diplomatic consensus which sustained
its interests.
57

Ethiopia was the only African nation to participate in the Berlin
Conference.
58
Although Addis Ababa was not given her share of the loot,
her presence at the Conference wetted her appetite for territorial
aggrandizement. Writing to the European powers who quartered the
Continent, the Emperor Minilik II made his territorial ambitions clear to
them in 1891:
Ethiopia has been for fourteen centuries a Christian
island in a sea of pagans. If powers at a distance come
forward to partition Africa between them I do not intend
to be an indifferent spectator. Formerly the boundary of
Ethiopia was the sea. Having lacked strength sufficient,
and having received no help from Christian powers, our
Hassan Mahadallah

155

frontier on the sea coast fell into the power of the
Mussulman. At present we do not intend to regain our
sea frontier by force, but we trust that the Christian
powers, guided by our Saviour, will restore to us our sea-
coast line, at any rate, certain points on the coast.
59

Years later, in 1956, Miniliks successor, the Emperor Haile Selassie,
after acquiring Eritrea, called on the Somali people, whom he referred to as
the people of Benadir, to follow Eritreas example and seek reunification
with the fatherland, Ethiopia.
60
These imperialistic pronouncements did not
escape the notice of Somalias Ulama. In 1966, one Sheikh Abdirahman
Mohamed in Mogadishu expressed his view about Western attitude toward
Muslim Somalis:
I think the Christian world has always sought to destroy
Islam. I do not believe you when you say that the
Westerners have helped Muslim countries. If this were
true you would have helped Somalia gather all its people
together to make a strong nation. But it is not so; you are
helping Christian Ethiopia to hold our people in
bondage.
61

Since the collapse of the Somali state, Addis Ababa began to seek
total hegemony over Somalia. So, in the absence of a national regime, the
Islamic Courts Union took to itself the responsibility of defending the
nation against what they perceived as new Ethiopian imperialism. After
sixteen years of meddling in the internal affairs of Somalia and open
violation of its territorial sovereignty by Addis Ababa, the leading mullah
issued her an ultimatum on October 23, 2006. We have been asking the
Ethiopians to leave our country for a long time, said the leader of the
SCICS, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. This is the end of that request, he
continued. We are now telling them that from now on, their graves will be
littered everywhere in Somalia. We are not going to tell the world that
Ethiopia is interfering in Somali affairs anymore. We will now start
fighting.
62

156
The Dictates of the War on Terrorism
Before World War II, American involvement in the African
Continent was minimal. Washington lacked a defined continental policy as
it also lacked specific political, economic, or military interests in the
region. However, after the conclusion of the war, Americas attitude
toward Africa had changed drastically. Washington was now deeply
interested and involved in the affairs of the Continent. This change of
policy was caused by Washingtons new superpower status and the
emergence of the Cold War.
63
Africa, despite its lack of economic or
military resources, offered strategic values that the Soviet Union might
exploit, reasoned Washington. Thus, the United States devised a strategy
of denial toward the Continentthat is keeping the Russians out [more]
than getting Americans in.
64

Like the past communist threat, the imperatives of the war on
terrorism caused America to refocus on the Continent, particularly the
Horn Region. Given the lack of economic or military interest, the new US
policy is predicated on the same principles of deniali.e., keeping
international terrorists out and sealing off inside terrorists in. However, this
policy, which was well suited for the communists, is deficient in dealing
with terrorism. Terrorism, unlike communism, is a clandestine war that
transcends state boundaries. Moreover, since terrorists make no distinction
between military and civilian targets, they enjoy an abundance of soft
targets.
65
This can be very challenging to policy makers.
The ubiquity and elusiveness of terrorism makes American policy
toward Somalia erratic and outright hostile. Before the tragedy of 9/11
jolted US policy makers awake, Peter J. Schraeder, an expert on Somali
affairs, discounted the possibility of sustained US engagement with
Somalia.
66
In the absence of economic or military values, coupled with the
infamous Black Hawk incident, foreign policy analysts saw no reason to
Hassan Mahadallah

157

concern with Somali affairs. As a result, the country was left to its own
devices until 9/11, when Washington realized that no country in the world
could be ignored. Later on, the terrorist bombings of US embassies in East
Africa in 1998 added some urgency to American involvement in Somalia.
67

Faced with the difficult choices of invading the country or employing
proxy forces to apprehend the culprits, Washington opted for the latter.
Thus, in fall 2006, when war broke out between Ethiopia and Somalias
Islamic Regime, the US gave Ethiopias military air cover, battlefield
intelligence, and military hardware. While Ethiopias invasion of Somalia
in December 2006 was received with jubilation in Washington and Addis
Ababa, it has fueled speculation of anti-Islamic agenda in Mogadishu.
Conclusion
Recently, much has been made of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism
in Somalia. However, what we have seen was a desperate people making
pragmatic choices rather than a society driven by dogmatic impulses. For
over seventeen years, the Somali people lived under a condition of poverty
and lawlessness. To surmount these difficulties, they installed and
empowered the Clan Courts. At the time, neither the top leaders of these
courts, nor the people who supported them, were inspired by abstract
ideals. Rather, they were motivated by a common desire to rein in
criminals and restore civil life. As J onathan Stevenson recently put it, So
for manyprobably mostSomalis, support for the Islamists was
pragmatic consideration rather than a matter of principle. It is poverty and
insecurity that have driven their pragmatic tilt towards Islamism.
68

By restoring some modicum of law and order in their areas of
operation, the Clan Courts quickly garnered popular acceptance. By the
year 2000, when they were united, they already carved out for themselves a
legitimate role in public affairs. Within five years, they became a political
158
and military force to reckon with. This had caused the local warlords a
serious consternation. In order to counter the looming threat, they formed
their own organization, the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and
Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). Speaking on the simmering hostility, one
Sheikh Mohamed Sulley, who was one of the first Courts officials to speak
on the issue publicly, expressed the aim of the ICU succinctly: Let us
eliminate these warlords and set up a peaceful administration supported by
the vast majority of people in Mogadishu.
69
The intense battle that
followed in the spring of 2006 propelled the ICU to power.
Following the ouster of the warlords, the Islamic authorities
announced the formation of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts of
Somalia (SCICS). As was expected of them, they moved quickly to
dismantle the check points, initiated the rehabilitation of roads and public
facilities, and opened the seaport and the airport, which were closed for
over seventeen years. For these activities, they have earned political
legitimacy and popular support. This is why they were able to impose law
and order without bloodshed. And had it not been for al-Shababs
youthful miscalculations and infantile bravado, as Ali Abdirahman Hersi
characterized their behavior, the Islamic Administration would have lasted
many more years than it did.
70

The SCICS was born with two fatal flaws, international
misperception and internal dissension. Upon coming to power, the
leadership declared their intention to impose Sharia law. By doing so, they
contributed to the growing international suspicion that Somalia was
captured by radical Islamists and that the country was about to become a
haven for international terrorists. This was compounded by the lack of
unified political and administrative authority that could command public
obedience. This is why the top leadership failed to rein in the youthful al-
Hassan Mahadallah

159

Shabab, who plunged the whole government headlong into an un-winnable
war.
Their militarism and subsequent declaration of Jihad turned
international opinion against the Islamists. Ethiopia and the United States
with whom the word Jihad always resonates resolved to topple the
Islamic Administration of Somalia in the fall of 2006. Thus, on December
25, when the Ethiopian tanks rolled into Mogadishu, the tenure of the
SCICS came to formal termination. Afterward, an American official, who
spoke on the issue recounted:
Yet, over time, it became evident that the UIC was
increasingly radicalized and provided safe haven for
foreign terrorists. While the United States and other
international actors supported a process of inclusive
dialogue, extremist elements within the UIC
particularly the radical Shabaab organizationhijacked
the Courts, driving the UIC toward an agenda of military
expansion and aggression.
71

Endnotes

1
See Enrico Cerulli, Document no. 28 (1964), pages 19-24, 23, 27-29,
respectively.
2
New research may shed light on, for instance, the political disputes between
the Bantu clerics and their non-Bantu counterparts in the early 20
th
century;
the conflict over land holdings between the Islamic confraternities and the
clan chiefs; the intra-order disputes between the supreme mullahs and local
clerics over the investiture of local grand mullahs; the political competition
between the traditional chiefs and the local grand mullahs; and the
intractable rivalry between the main Islamic orders across the country.
3
The literature in this genre is vast. See, for example, Douglas J ardine, The Mad
Mullah of Somaliland (London: Herbert J enkins, Ltd., 1923); Said S.
Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982); Malcolm McNeill, In Pursuit of the Mad
160

Mullah: Service and Sport in the Somali Protectorate (London: C. Arthur
Pearson, Ltd., 1902); I. M. Lewis, The Dervish Fight For Freedom, 1900-
1920, in Somalia: Antologia Storico-Culturale (Mogadishu: Ministero
Publica Istruzione, 1967); Mohamed Ahmed Ali, The Birth of the
Movement, in Somalia: Antologia Storico-Culturale (Mogadishu:
Ministero Publica Istruzione, 1967); E. R.Turton, The Impact of
Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the East African Protectorate, J ournal of
African History, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1969).
4
With the exception of a dubious work by an Ethiopian author, no single
comprehensive study on post-state political Islam in Somalia exists. The
literature consists of single chapters, articles on academic journals, media
reports and internet postings.
5
This time, the national state was replaced by the West.
6
The first and last Muslim cleric to seek and acquire political power was the
early twentieth century Dervish leader, the Sayyid Mohamed Abdalla
Hassan. He died in 1921. For a scholarly study of the Sayyid, see Said
Samatar, Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism.
7
The word Ulama is an Arabic word that denotes learning in Islam.
8
See J urgen Gebhardt, Religion and National Identity, a paper presented at
the Conference for the Study of Political Thought, Tulane University,
March 25-27 (1994), pp. 7-10.
9
The Quran is written in Arabic, a language few Somalis understand.
10
I. M. Lewis, Islam in Somalia, in Katherine Loughran et al, ed., Somalia in
Word and Image (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 140.
11
Richard Burton, First Footsteps in East Africa (New York and Washington:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 65.
12
The literature on globalization is vast. For a succinct and enlightening
treatment of the subject, see Robert O. Keohane and J oseph S. Nye,
Globalization: Whats New? Whats Not? (And So What?), Foreign
Policy, no. 118 (Spring 2000), pp. 104-119. In regard to Africa, see Ali
Mazrui, Globalization Between the Market and the Military: A Third
World Perspective, Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. xix, No. 1
(Spring 2002), pp. 13-24; Claude Ake, The New World Order: A View
From Africa, in Hans-Henrik Horlm and Georg Sorensen, eds., Whose
World Order?: Uneven Globalization and the Cold War (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995), pp. 19-42.
13
Richard W. Bulliet, The Future of the Islamic Movement, Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December, 1993), p. 39.
14
Angus Hamilton, Somaliland (Westport, Connecticut: Negro University press,
1970), p. 50.
15
It is rumored that the Sayyid was asked to furnish his documents to enter his
country as he returned from overseas trip by a British soldier at the port of
Hassan Mahadallah

161

Berbera. In his youth, the Sayyid traveled to Sudan, Yemen and Saudi
Arabia.
16
As quoted in Douglas J ardine, The Mad Mullah of Somaliland, p. 212.
17
As quoted in Cesare Maria De Vecchi, Orizzonti Di Impero (Milano: Casa
Editrice Mondadori, 1935), p. 26. The Sheikh Barsane was also a well-
traveled man. He studied with the Sayyid in Saudi Arabia.
18
The Sheikh Olow returned in 1950s. The three grand mullahs founded and led
the Salafi Movement, J amaat Ahli Islam, and J amaat Islah, respectively.
Although the three religious leaders agreed on the separation of religion
and culture, they differed in approach.
19
E.A. Bayne, From Clan to Nation, Northeast African Series, Vol. X, No. 2
(March 1963), p. 4.
20
E.A. Bayne, "Somalia and the United States: The Somali Predicament,"
Northeast African Series, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (April, 1967), pp. 3-4.
21
Gen. M. Siyaad Barre invented the political epithet wadaad xume.
22
The word Ummah is an Arabic word which denotes community of believers.
23
Robert Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of
Development (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001),
pp. 20-29.
24
See, for instance, Africas Elusive Dawn, The Economist (February 24-
March 2, 2002), pp. 17-18 and The Heart of the Matter, The Economist
(May 13-19, 2002), pp. 22-24.
25
Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 110.
North defines institution as the formal and informal rules that constrain
and inform human interaction. See page 3.
26
Upon coming to power, the military regime abolished the Legislative and
J udiciary branches.
27
J amil A. Mubarak, The Hidden Hand Behind the Resilience of the Stateless
Economy of Somalia, World Development, Vol. 25, No. 12 (1997), p.
2028.
28
MOD is the acronym for Marehan, Ogaadeen and Dhulbahante.
29
David Laitin, The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia, The
J ournal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1976), pages 456 &
458.
30
These marauding gangs became known as moriyan in Mogadishu.
31
Ken Menkhaus refers these elements as conflict constituencies. See his
article, Somalia: Political Order in Stateless Society, Current History
(May 1998), p. 221.
32
Roland Marchal, Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War Before
and After September 11, in Alex de Waal, ed., Islam and Its Enemies in
the Horn of Africa (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University
162

Press, 2004), p. 133. The karaan court was the brainchild of one of the
presidents senior advisors, Mr. Hussein Haji Bod. See page 124.
33
All twelve Islamic courts were clan-based and could operate only in their
respective clan neighborhoods in Mogadishu.
34
The word al-Itihad simply means the Union. For an expanded treatment
of this organization and its exploits, see Andre Le Sage, Prospects for Al-
Itihad & Islamic Radicalism in Somalia, Review of African Political
Economy, Vol. 28, No. 89 (2001), pp. 472-477.
35
See Somalias Islamists, International Crisis Group, Africa Report, No. 100
(December 2005), pp. 3-12. This report makes an excellent starting point
for researchers of political Islam in Somalia.
36
Ibid.
37
See Counter-terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds? International
Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 95 (11 J uly 2005), pp. 12-14. Although
the violence was initiated by the warlords and their hatchet men, the report
shows that the retribution of the Islamists was as severe and as deadly.
38
The South-Central Region includes all of the eleven administrative regions
between Kenya and Puntland, Somalia.
39
For an expanded treatment of al-Itihad and its exploits, see Andre Le Sage,
Prospects for Al-Itihad & Islamic Radicalism in Somalia, Review of
African Political Economy, Vol. 28, No. 89 (2001), pp. 472-477.
40
Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist
Dictatorships (New York: Basic Books, 2000), chapter 1. The bandit can
be an individual, a group or a ruling interest.
41
Ibid., 10.
42
The Executive Council had 18 members, who served as ministers; the
Permanent Committee had 19; and the Legislative Council had 91
members. The J udiciary Council had 11 members, who supervised three
levels of court system, namely Appeals Court, Regional Courts, and
District Courts. The Executive Council was led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed. The Legislative Council and the Permanent Committee were both
led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. As we have seen earlier, Aweys has
been a political activist since the 1970s.
43
See UN Security Council Monitoring Group on Somalia, November, 2006, pp.
33-40.
44
Ibid., p. 36.
45
The SCICS dismantled all, but few of, the checkpoints in South-Central
Somalia and rejected extortion as a method of revenue extraction.
46
This author is familiar with a case whereby a local butchery plant used to pay
10,000/So. Sh. For each slaughtered goat or sheep (more for camels and
cattle) to a local warlord. After the overthrow of the warlord, the plant
continued to save the money in case the warlord returns and demands his
Hassan Mahadallah

163

proceeds. However, after it became apparent that the warlord had no
chance of ever coming back to power, the plant owners doubled the
amount of the money and handed it over to the Islamic Administration.
47
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/Africa/jan-june/Somalia_06-08.html
48
Rod Nordland, Africas Taliban, Newsweek (J uly 31, 2006).
49
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-08/2006-08-18-
voa46.cfm?CFID=495402...
50
UN MG, esp. pages 22-24.
51
Somali Islamists Announce Start of J ihad, Mail and Guardian, October 23,
2006, 02: 14.
52
http://www.mfa.gov.et/Press_section/publication.php?Pub_Page_Id=3206
53
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/africa/july-dec06/somalia_12-15.html
54
Some of the issues they disagreed on included power sharing, foreign
diplomacy, importation and sale of Qat and tobacco, to name just a few.
55
The political wing was led by a very politically ambitious troika, Sheikh
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, and Sheikh
Abdirahman J anaqow. The top leadership of the military wing (locally
known as al-Shabab) includes Sheikh Hassan Turki, Sheikh Mukhtar
Robow, and Aden Hashi Ayrow.
56
The Ethiopian forces received US air cover, logistical support and battle
ground intelligence.
57
Ruth Iyob, Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of
Africa, J ournal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1993), pp.
268-9.
58
The Berlin Conference was convened in 1884-85 to divide Africa among the
great powers of Europe. In this Conference, Addis Ababa was given an
observer status by them.
59
Public Records Office (London), Foreign Office 1/32 Rodd to Salisbury, No.
15, May 4, 1897.
60
E. A. Bayne, Somalia on the Horn, Northeast African Series, Vol. VII, No.
8 (March 8, 1960), p. 11.
61
E.A. Bayne, A Religious Nationalist in Somalia, Northeast African Series,
Vol. XIII, No. 3 (October 1966), p. 4.
62
See Somali Islamists Announce Start of J ihad Against Ethiopia, Mail and
Guardian (October 23, 2006), pp. 1-2.
63
Paul Henze, The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace (New York: St. Martins
Press, 1991), p. 51.
64
Geoffrey Kemp, US Strategic Interests and Military Options in Sub-Saharan
Africa, in J ennifer Seymour Whitaker (ed.), Africa and the United States:
Vital Interests (New York: New York University Press, 1978), p. 124.
65
Allan J . Cigler, ed., Perspectives on Terrorism (Boston and New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 2002), p. 2.
164

66
Peter J . Schraeder, From Ally to Orphan: Understanding U.S. Policy Toward
Somalia After the Cold War, in J ames M. Scott, ed., After the End:
Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World (Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 1998), p. 352.
67
Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institutions Press, 2001), pp. 60-61.
68
J onathan Stevenson, A New Approach to Somalias Problem, Transatlantic
Issues, No. 12 (March 2007), p. 1.
69
Somali Islamists Declare J ihad on Warlords, Mail & Guardian (22 April
2006), pp. 1-2.
70

http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2007/mar/the_enormous_debt_owed_by_so_
many_to_the_uic.aspx
71
See speech by J ames Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
entitled United States Policy in Somalia delivered at Ohio State
University on April 21, 2007.
165
Local and Global Norms:
Challenges to Somalilands
1

Faisal Roble

Introduction
Beginning with the failed Somali republic
2
, coupled with the
unilateral declaration of secession by the Somali National Movement
(SNM) on May 18, 1991, separatism in the north has taken new heights. In
the last two decades, the Hargaysa administration made a concerted effort
to establish a new reality on the ground to effectuate a separate state in
what was Northern Somalia.
3
After several inter-clan and intra-clan
conflicts in the 1990s ended the second inter-Isaaqs civil war in part by
awarding a greater share of parliamentary seats to members of "opposition"
clans and in part through the development of an "interim constitution"
which, after much negotiation and modification, served as the prototype for
the current version, Somaliland seems to have established a new
reality on the ground.
4
The surprising fall of Las Anod into Hargaysa
with ease on October 15, 2007, a town that rejected secession in favor of
unity, could be viewed as an effort to complete the reconstruction of a new
reality on the ground by those seeking secession.
Nevertheless, the region still remains part of Somalia, albeit with a
relatively better administration than the rest of the country. As the West
re-engages the ailing Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG),
headed by President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, to secure the capital city,
Mogadishu, the prospect for any forthcoming recognition for Somaliland
becomes more challenging.
5
There is a general understanding by both
166
unionists and secessionists alike that stable Southern Somalia may greatly
hinder, if not fatally kill, the hope for recognition. And this is a source for
political frustration in Somaliland, often leading it to mount intermittent
cross-border raids against the neighboring autonomous region of
Puntland. With the emerging new debate in the US Pentagon to recognize
Somaliland, the State Department standing in the way notwithstanding,
6

a complete change of Somalilands status quo may lead to larger scale
inter-clan conflict in the region.
Themes on Secession Ideology
In some quarters, secession is generally synonymous with the concept
of self-determination. Self-determination is in turn a political program, led
and organized by elites claiming to represent a group of people dissatisfied
in a given political arrangement. There is no clear notion whether the
group seeking secession is a minority group that is oppressed, or a majority
group that does the oppressing. There are situations where a politically
and economically powerful minority group oppresses a majority. Such are
the historical cases of the Ethiopian Amhara, the Tutsi in Rwanda, and the
Sunnis in Iraq. However, in most cases a powerful and entrenched
majority ethnic group [mis]rules a minority group(s), and excludes or
limits political participation of the latter. A case in point is Tsarist Russia
where the powerful and numerous Russians colonized and ruled many
nations and nationalities for many generations.
The debate about secession was well articulated by 20
th
Century
leftist revolutionaries. In Lenins Critical Remarks on National
Question,
7
a highly influential book in the left circles until recently, one is
struck by the intensity of the debate between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg.
The two communists, among others, passionately debated the issue of
when a nationality is justified to secede from its host country. The most
critical cases were those of Finland, Poland, and Armenia. After long
Faisal Roble

167

spirited debates, both Lenin and Luxemburg, as well as their acolytes,
came to one conclusion: that both Poland and Finland would be better off
to leave the Russian Empire, while Armenia stays with the rest of the
empire under a reorganized Soviet system. In addition to the geopolitics of
the day, factors that helped justify, for example, the secession cases of
Poland and Finland from the Russian Empire are cultural, linguistic and
geographical dissimilarities with the administering power.
Then, there is the Wilsonian (Liberal) school of thought that, at the
turn of the 20
th
Century, interjected more vigor and energy into the debate
of secession and self-determination. American isolationist policy at the
time notwithstanding, Woodrow Wilson
8
quickly seized the concept of
self- determination to make American foreign policy more relevant to
international politics. In doing so, he drafted his 14 points position paper
on international politics and self-determination in which he attempted to
provide a framework for freedom to indigenous groups from colonial and
feudal rules, while arguing for protecting sovereignty.
9
In Article XIII of
his 14 points, Wilson called for this: An independent Polish state should
be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably
Polish populations, and whose political and economic independence and
territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.
Wilsons second concept of self-determination is one that sought the
protection and safeguarding of the territorial integrity of nation states,
thereby suggesting that all nations have the right to self-determination,
hence equating territorial integrity to the rights of nations to exist in a
secure and natural boundary respected by all. In Article XIV, Wilson put it
this way: A general association of nations must be formed under specific
covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
This latter article of Wilsons concept of self determination is now
168
enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and it protects the territorial
integrity and nation states.
In short, the concept of secession as a tool to gain self-determination,
both in the left as well as in the Wilsonian view, is rarely applied, for it sets
higher threshold prior to implementation. Most insurgent movements or
breakaway regions rarely succeed in satisfying all the intellectual, legal and
international requirements that regulate this concept in its strict sense. The
International community at large and the United Nations in particular
would like to deal with conflicts, political as well as cultural between
communities in a given country, through other means of conflict resolution
short of sanctioning secession. However, the United Nations concept of
self-determination is often invoked to uphold the territorial integrity of
member states which are protected by existing international instruments.
Despite the prolonged civil war (from 1991 to 2007) that has
devastated the hitherto cohesive Somalia, the world community has so far
upheld this concept as it applies to the statehood of Somalia. On the other
hand, Somalilands bid for a unilateral secession seems to have met its
challenges in the prevailing interpretations of international instruments that
apply to Somalias territorial integrity.
Without exception, secession by no means is an African or a Third
World political problem, but a worldwide modern political problem. Since
1955, for example, over 71 [separatist] conflicts have been recorded
around the globe, 25 of which were engaged in violent conflicts as of
2004.
10
From the Irish issue, which has been a thorn in Britains modern
history, to the issue of the Basque region in Spain, and to the Chechnya
ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union, Europe had its own
entanglements with secessionism in most of its recent past and current
history as well. Hakan Wieber documents approximately over 100
secessionist political movements in modern history, most of which ended
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169

up withering away or seeking other means of political conflict resolution to
address their respective grievances.
11

Employing extensive empirical data, Pierre Englerbert and Rebecca
Hummel identify and discuss several major variables that produce political
separatism including, but not limited to, ethnic or religious conflicts (like
the case in Ethiopia) , conflicts over resources (Biafra and Katanga) and
cultural heterogeneity (Ethiopia) in a nation state.
12
But the most serious
separatist-prone cases are found in those countries that are constituted of
two or more distinct land masses.
13
The latter case was true for
Bangladesh vis--vis Pakistan. Because of Bangladeshs success of
acquiring recognition, after a long protracted war, proponents of
Somalilands secession often invoke it for inspiration and guidance.
14

However, the following two factors which have heavily weighed on the
outcome of the Bangladesh war of secession are absent in the case of
Somaliland: (1) the geographic separation of Bangladesh from the rest of
mainland Pakistan made the war unsustainable for Pakistan. Due to this
separation, proponents for secession in this case prevailed to place the
Bangladesh case under the Unite Nations Resolution (1541) (XV) of the
General Assembly, which indicates that prima facie evidence of that
status of a territory exists if it is geographically separate and is distinct
ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it; and (2) the
geopolitics of the era, where India, with the help of the then Soviet Union,
successfully armed Bengalese to their teeth, ultimately made the war
almost prohibitive for Pakistan to win any time soon.

Consequently, on J anuary 12, 1972, after a protracted war that caused
the death of many civilians on both sides, Bangladesh declared
independence from Pakistan. Only two years after such a declaration, on
February 2, 1974, Pakistan recognized Bangladesh as an independent
country, soon (September 17, 1974) to be followed by a full status given to
170
Bangladesh at the UN, which predictably precipitated full international and
bilateral recognition by many nations. However, Somaliland is neither
geographically separate, nor culturally, ethnically, nor historically different
from the rest of Somalia. As such, the two Resolutions (1541) (XV) and
(2649) (XXV) of the General Assembly,
15
which govern and arbitrate
issues of secession, hardly apply to the impromptu secession declared by
Somaliland.
Secession Experience in the Horn of Africa
16

Ethiopia, an ancient empire in the horn of Africa region, with several
major ethnic, religious and regional groupings, offers glaring and more
valuable lessons in the history of secessionist movements. Secessionist
movements in Ethiopia trace their origins back to the concept of lack of
equality for ethnic groups, whose claim for self-determination, as a result,
are measured in varied interpretations. As early as the 1970s, responding
to growing secessionist sentiments, Ethiopia was gripped by debates on
the question of nations and nationalities. Kifflue Taddese, in his [largely
memoir] book, The Generations, traces back these debates to the radical
students discourses at the then Haile Selassie University,
17
which housed
the countrys elite children. The question of what done with nations and
nationalities in the peripheral regions, such as Eritreans, Somalis, Oromos,
Afars, to just name a few, that were less integrated into the Ethiopian
political life, was at the center of the debates.
18
The undying Somali
secessionist movements in the Somali region of eastern Ethiopia, with a
life span of over a half century, is seemingly resilient and still grips
western newspapers headlines to date.
19
Likewise, the Oromo question
was raised in the 1970s.
20

Most of all, though, the Eritrean question occupied the center of the
debates, mainly for two reasons: One, the war for independence in the
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171

Eritrean front, first started by Muslim Eritreans and the Awaita group, was
having negative social and political impacts on Addis Ababa, due to the
capitals proximity to the front line. Second, Eritreans inside Ethiopia,
particularly those actively participating in the radical university students
debates, were playing a decisive role in shaping the debates, hence
positioning the Eritrean question in the center.
The Eritrean war for secession against Ethiopias imperial court, and
later on against the autocratic rule of the Dergue, was one of the longest
wars for secession in history.
21
Unlike other African secessionist
movements, the Eritrean question was born out of Ethiopias violent
nullification (emphasis added) of the federation status that the former had,
dismissing the free and independent national parliament of Eritrea. It was
that nullification of the sprit of fedralism, plus the banning of the Tigrinya
language for popular use, a different language from Ethiopias national
Amharic, that triggered the Eritrean war of independence, which started in
earnest in 1962.
22

The existence of secession-inducing factors such as linguistic,
cultural, and historical differences between Eritrea and Ethiopia have
sustained and fed the vigor and determination of secessionist sentiments
among Eritreans, irrespective of several administrative reforms introduced
by subsequent Ethiopian governments all of which were intended to abate
ethnic demands.
23
In 1991, a combined army of Tigrean Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF) and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF)
successfully defeated the Dergue army and quickly put the whole country
under their joint control. Even with over thirty years of war under their
belt, and a de facto independence from Ethiopia due to a military victory
over the powerful Dergue army, Eritrean leaders, unlike those of the SNM
in Somaliland, did not declare a unilateral secession. On the contrary,
they waited for three long years and eventually accepted Ethiopias
172
proposals for a settled solution - a referendum prior to official secession.
On September 15, 1994, a jointly administered referendum was held to
vote on whether to secede from the rest of Ethiopia, or stay in a federally
reorganized Ethiopia.

The yes vote for independence of that plebiscite affirmed and
legitimized the secession of Eritrea both in the eyes of the sitting Ethiopian
government and in the rest of the world community. Without such a
negotiated settlement, the case of the Eritrean secession could have stalled,
and the hands of the AU and UN in particular to apply Resolutions (1541)
(XV) and (2649) (XXV) of the General Assembly may have been tied up
to do anything other than maintain the status quo. It is the agreed
referendum at which the two sides arrived that made the Eritrean case an
amicably settled divorce. Likewise, in the case of Somalia, international
instruments would stipulate that Somaliland must first seek its objectives
within the framework of the parent state.
24
Mogadishus say so in this
case is a key to any future negotiated settlement.
Matt Bryden, one of the more vocal advocates for Somalilands
secession and a key figure until recently at the influential International
Crisis Group (ICG), underscores the problematic issue of getting
recognition for Somalilands unilateral secession.
25
In a brief typology of
negotiated settlements for conflicts in the Horn of Africa, Bryden
concludes that both the Eritrean experience (a successfully negotiated
secession) and the Southern Sudan peace model (a potentially autonomous
region) would pose serious challenges for Somaliland. In both cases, the
aggrieved regions are obligated to negotiate with their respective national
governments. The course that Eritrea traveled in its pursuit for secession is
what Mat Bryden calls the Eritrean model, a model not seemingly viable
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in Somaliland due to what he calls an ill-advised impromptu
secessionist move by SNM.
Until the Buroa Convention of May 18, 1991, when the SNM
declared a unilateral secession and in doing so unexpectedly undermining a
Draft Proposal for A Transitional Government
26
proposed by Ahmed
Silanyo, former chairman of the front, the SNM advocated federalism.
27

According to Brydens assessment, secession can only succeed if
Somaliland first reverses its unilateral action and starts afresh
negotiations with the South to either mutually nullify the Act of Union of
1961 between ex-British Somaliland Protectorate and ex-Italian Somali
territory, or seek some other [federal] arrangement. This proposal is
plausible and could be the only way to resolve the current stalemate
characterizing the Northern question. The brief period M. Farah Aydiid
ruled Mogadishu (1991-1994) represents a missed opportunity too for
proponents of secession. Because Aid was so desperate to consolidate his
rule that secessionists could possibly have reached a quid pro quo deal
where Mogadishu could have let Hargaysa go. But a democratically
negotiated settlement in the north, observed and preferably supervised by a
third party, with a prominent role reserved for the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia, could have led to broaden both the ranks of
participants and the scope of the negotiation; voices that were not
adequately heard in the previous Buroa Convention (May 18, 1991) could
under this scenario prominently play a unionist role, and that might not
have augured well for full-blown secession.
Separatism versus Unity in Somalias Clan-based Society
Beginning with the 1930s, owing to the clan segmentary system,
before there was a Somali republic, traces of separatism were feasible
among Isaaq elites. But the surge of Somali nationalism in the 1940s, the
174
unification of the ex-British and ex-Italian Somaliland regions on J uly 1,
1960, and the unconditional adoption of the Act of Union on J anuary
1961, by sanctioning the creation of the Somali Republic seem to have
created insurmountable challenges to the current secessionist sentiment.

With Somali nationalism taking full shape by the end of World War
II, there emerged dual, yet contradictory, political views among the elite in
the North vis--vis Somali nationalism (one separatist and the other
unionist). The genesis of these contending views is found in the political
environment surrounding the anti-colonial struggle mounted by the Somali
nationalist leader, Sayyid Mohamed Abdulla Hassan who challenged
British rule at the turn of the last century. The arming of 3,000 tribal
levies by the British colonial administration to fight and pursue Sayyid
Mohamed Abdulla Hassan and his Derwish army defined the battles of the
two sides to the Somali question.
28
Following suit and in the aftermath of
the defeat of Sayyid Muhammad, the Isaaq Association in East Africa in
the 1930s through the 1940s, most of whom were elements from the ranks
of the so-called tribal levies, resisted any effort to forge an inclusive, all-
Somali oriented movement to collectively pressure the British colonial
government for a non-native status; the association rather emphasized the
separateness and what a British colonial officer and an observer of the
Somali question referred to as chauvinistic
29
values. Parallel to this was,
however, another strand of elites that espoused Somali national unity
beyond parochial sectarian goals. A case in point is Hajji Farah Omar.
Educated in India and an admirer of Gandhi-style nationalism, Haji Farah,
among other things, was a factor in the transformation of the nativist
movement (first started in East Africa as a movement to demand identity
certificate for its constituents, and later on, expanded to the territories) into
a movement for national independence and Somali unity.
30

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175

As the following excerpts from a long report written by the Nairobi
colonial office on J une 21, 1941 explains, the sectarian Associations
outlook both in East Africa and in the home front suddenly collapsed in
1941 in the face of a growing and expanding Somali nationalist movement:

31

However, the development of mass Somali nationalism
in the post-Second World War period challenged the
traditional goals of the Isaq: one group, initially
consisting mostly of members of the younger generation,
joined the nationalist movement; while a minority
remained faithful to the Isaq Association, which
continued to exist under a new name, and to its old
ideals. Yet, Isaq clan superiority had... proved to be a
heavy liability in the 1950s greatly diminishing the
appeal of the Association and providing an example of
the tribal chauvinists. Its membership declined
drastically and its political influence disappeared, the
more energetic and popular nationalist movement which
attracted the support of the great mass of the Isaq
themselves precisely because it seemed to offer a real
chance of improved status.

It is evident from this report that, with the exception of a small
number of the elite, the masses of the Isaaq have been patriotic and they
were then in sync with the same ideals the rest of the Somali community
adhered to, i.e., in search of its independence and reunification goals. The
report goes on to state that there was a considerable difference between
Isaq tribal chauvinism and post Second World War Somali nationalism.
32

Separatists bid for a unilateral secession since reunification has been
an on-again-off-again phenomenon, albeit always less thought-out and
clan-driven. Right after the establishment of the Somali Republic, in
December, 1961 (only a year and six months after unification), separatist
176
sentiments within the ranks of the elites surfaced.
33
Generally called the
Hassan Kayd mutiny, a number of young and inexperienced junior officers
in the unified national army took up arms and attempted an aborted
mutiny. There are conflicting views on what exactly caused the mutiny,
some claiming it to be a secessionist attempt while others suggesting that it
was trade-based grievances. Nonetheless, the mutiny, with narrow appeal,
was quickly put down by the unified government, although it has since
then become a cause clbre for secessionists. However, between 1961 and
1977, separatism in the north, although close to the hearts of an
insignificant small minority, has been waning and had increasingly muted
as northerners in general, and Isaaqs in particular, gained more and more
economic and political power.
34

Owing to multiple external and internal factors (e.g., the war with
Ethiopia in 1977/78, the 1974/75 drought that had inadvertent impacts on
the North and the suffocating political climate under the autocratic regime
of Said Bare), the muted separatism re-emerged once again, leading this
time to the formation of an armed separatist group, most importantly the
SNM. Unlike other movements in the Horn of Africa region, the SNM
movement was inclusive of all Isaaq sub clans, but exclusive of other clans
who shared the region as cohabitants with the Isaaq clan. Why the SNM
opted for an exclusive clan-based resistance is a matter of significant
debate among Somalis of all persuasions. Nonetheless, the clan factor in
the struggle waged by the SNM arguably served as a two-edge-sword.
First, the lineage-based segmentary clan system in the Somali society is so
powerful that founders and leaders of the SNM quickly seized on it to
mobilize their clan members [only] to fight against Siyad Barre and his
clan members. But, equally important is the refusal of other clans in the
region to cooperate with the Isaaq, thus reducing the entire SNM, rightly or
wrongly, to a single clan fighting against the government of Siyad Barre.
35

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177

Daniel Compagnon, who traveled with the SNM soldiers as they freely
moved in Isaaq dominated villages in the north, succinctly and more
poignantly captures this single-clan image of the SNM, where, in turn, clan
and semgmentary lineage system were deliberately utilized as a modern
political resource:
36

The SNM voluntarily confined war operations to the
Isaaq territory and the surrounding areas, a deliberate
strategy more than a result of limited military abilities.
SNM officials usually justify it in saying that their
guerrillas would not benefit from the same support from
people of the other clans [17]. It is way to admit that the
"national liberation struggle" is in fact superseded by an
affiliation.that secession of the North is the 'hidden
agenda' of this movement.
In1989, with the hope to articulate a non-clan based national
front, Ali Jimaale of the Hawiya-based United Somali Congress
(USC) proposed to form a united front between his USC and Somali
National Movement (SNM) forces against the Barre regime. But the
SNM leadership, which by this time found a level of strength within its
Isaaq clan members, turned down the offer.
37
During the same period,
writes Compagnon, the SNM was exhibiting a high level of animosity
against non-Isaaqs, a position consciously promoted by the fronts
leaders. Clan is seemingly utilized as a political resource in the same
way that Robert Jackson and Carl Rosenberg described it in their
book, Personal Rule in Black Africa
38
when seeking political power. In
other words, clan is a potent resource, just like Islamic
fundamentalism, often used to achieve political objectives by a given
interest group. Before we tackle the issue of whether secession is
justified or not, a brief discussion on the time-line of the reunification
of the two territories is due here.
178
Reunification of the Somali Territories: Myth vs. Reality
Technically speaking, prior to the advent of European colonialism at
the turn of the 19
th
century, the term Somaliland applied to all Somali
speaking regions in the Horn of Africa. The British carved out British
Somaliland Protectorate, and since its independence in1960, was confined
to the Northern region. The former British Somaliland Protectorate, with a
total area of 137,600 sq. km. and a coastline of 850 km. is bordered by
Djibouti (ex-French Somaliland) and the Gulf of Aden to the north,
Ethiopian occupied territories to the west and ex-Italian Somaliland to the
east and south.
39
The region is home to about 2.5
40
million inhabitants
comprising several major clans, notably the Isaaq, Daarood (Dhulbahante
and Walsangali), Gadabursi, Issa, Gaboye, and a host of smaller clans. In
the later parts of the 19
th
century, Her Majesty Queen Victoria of Great
Britain signed individual and separate treaties with major clans in the
region, excepting the Dhulbahante.
41
Such treaties were signed in the latter
half of the 19
th
century, and later on posed challenges to the nationalist
sentiments of Sayyid Muhammad Abdullah Hasan and his Dervish
movements. The British in turn used its treaties with separate clan leaders
as the basis for their claim to provide protectorate status. Exception to this
rule was, however, the Dhulbahante clan who never ratified an Anglo-
Dhulbahante treaty. As such, territorial administrations were merely clan-
based, and fiercely independent from each other, as if a prescriptive Lord
Lugards Indirect Rule was implemented with precision.
By the 1940s, with the winds of change for independence sweeping
the entire Somali-inhabited regions, clans established separate political
parties along clan lines. The most globalist and inclusive party at the time
was the pan-Somali Youth League (SYL); other smaller but equally
nationalist yet clan-based parties included the Somali National League
(SNL), National United Front (NUF)), and later on the United Somali
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179

Party (USP). Although Political reintegration among clans was achieved
only at or after the reunification of the two ex-colonies, the political
objective for reunification of the two colonies originated in earnest with
the rise of Somali nationalism at the end of WWII, during which time the
question of the ex-Italian Somaliland and its future was raised at the Paris
Peace Conference in 1946, at which point the British Foreign Secretary put
forward proposals for the creation of a "Greater Somaliland "by the fusion
of British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland and the Ogaden into a single
administration under British trusteeship. This scheme found a wide
measure of support among enlightened Somalis, who felt that it faced up to
the economic, ethnical and geographical realities of the situation.
42

By 1956, Britain could no longer avoid, agreeing to a gradual
introduction of a representative government and an eventual independence
for its protectorate.
43
As the independence of the Italian Somaliland
approached, the British authorities facilitated and proceeded with speed for
its Protectorates independence and reunification with the ex-Italian
territory, thus prompting The British government in principle to end its
rule in time for British Somaliland to reunite it with the Italian trust
territory on the J uly independence date that had already been decided by
the UN.
44
The reunification of ex-British and ex-Italian Somalilands,
therefore, was not an overnight love affair, in which one side won at the
expense of the other, but an evolving political consciousness of a people
in search of a nation, thus hitting a high note with the British colonial
Secretary (Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd) stating in February 1959 that his
government would facilitate the voluntary and unstoppable reunion of the
two territories. In February 1960, Mohamed H. Ibrahim Egal, was elected a
Premier, for 4 days,
45
by a wide unionist vote in the constitutional
election. With the sponsorship and facilitation by the United Nation, Egal
led a delegation to Mogadishu and met Southern counterparts at the
180
convention that took place between April 16 and 22, 1960; the two sides
agreed to reunify their territories without conditions in a unitary state under
a single president who will be elected as head of state by a unified National
Assembly with 123 seats.
46
Thus, the creation of a unitary Republic of
Somalia on 1
st
J uly, 1960, was indeed the icing on the cake of a long
struggle.
But such reunification would have been difficult to attain without the
endorsement of the clan elders in the two protectorates. The role of clan
elders in decision-making and their endorsement of reunification
underscore the separateness of clans in the absence of unified government,
as well as their centripetal role for the greater good, i.e., creating a
unified Somalia.
47
Both colonial administrators and most Somali leaders,
including Egal, strongly supported the reunification for the apparent need
to engender a sense of governance out of the humpty-dumpty disparate
clans, with each one clinging to its treaty with Her Majesty. In fact, the
former British protectorate, a more clan-based society at the time with no
known experience in self-administration, was keener in the reunification of
the two; As such, it promptly put forth a text of a draft proposed Act of
Union prior to the date of independence, which read as follows:
48

Section 1(a) stated that The State of Somaliland and the
State of Somalia do hereby unite and shall forever
remain united in a new independent, democratic, unitary
republic the name whereof shall be the SOMALI
REPUBLIC.

As this text was only a draft proposed by the northern leaders, it
served as the basis for future deliberation and modifications of the
language on the reunification of the two territories. The ultimate union of
the two was indeed a win-win situation for all, but mainly for the ex-
British protectorate in that it had helped unite the Daarood with the Isaaq,
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181

with the Gadabursi, with the Issa, with Gaboye, who hitherto had a history
of conflict and competition over scarce resources.
49
The current declared
impromptu and unilateral breakup of that unification could run the risk
of easily plunging these clans into an unmanageable disunity, at best, and
into an intra-clan conflict at worst.
Is Somalilands Impromptu Secession Justified?
The simple question of what legitimizes Somalilands unilateral
secession from the rest of the country is more complex than meets the eye.
Despite the devastating confrontation with the merciless autocratic regime
of Barre, coupled with Somaliland leaders impressive diplomatic work,
there is seemingly a marked resistance by the international community to
guarantee recognition to the unilateral declaration of secession by the
SNM. At first, especially before the 9/11, 2001 terrorist bombings of the
twin tours in New York, the strategy to convince the outside world on the
merits of Somalilands recognition hung on what some viewed as
democracy dividends (Shine, 2002).
50
This strategy is intended to woe
the West and other regional governments to reward Somaliland in kind
with recognition for its commitment to multi-party liberal democracy.
However, given the degree of corruption and human rights abuses and (the
deportation of Mr. J aama M. Qaalib, a leading unionist from his own
home region, or the rape of the young Daarood girl, Zamzam Duaale,
because she was alleged/suspected of masterminding an assassination plot
against Somalilands superstitious vice president (now president), and
the virtual absence of dialogue on the very issue that impacts the different
clans in the region (an open discussion on secession), many see the
claimed democracy dividends as an attempt to seize on the buzz word of
the moment and seek to camp with the political order of the day. After the
incidents of 9/11 rearranged the Wests priorities, advocates for secession
182
quickly shifted strategy to now emphasize the geopolitical role an
independent Somaliland can offer the West in the war on terrorism.
Peter Schraeder, in an unusually simplistic pronouncement, takes this to its
extreme by suggesting that Somaliland deserves recognition if the Bush
administration is truly sincere about promoting democracy in the wider
Middle East.
51
Others still suggested that a recognized Somaliland is a
deterrent to a future Somali irredentism, hence good news for Ethiopia,
an ally in the war on terror and a Christian-island in the Horn of Africa
region. Even some wanted to woe Eritrea into the plate as expressed here:
Eritrea, which received a de facto independence from Ethiopia in 1991
and de jure independence in 1993, seemingly is a country that would be
sympathetic to Somalilands independence.
52
But, given other
geopolitical priorities, neither the West, nor Ethiopia, nor Eritrea, gave
credence to the solicitation. Beyond what could be called mere diplomatic
solicitations, following are four arguments articulated mainly by
sympathetic academics for secession.
Legal Arguments: In recent years, a new school of thoughts debate
hinges on whether separatist movements can achieve their goal by creating
a new reality on the ground has emerged. Despite international and
national norms, altered reality on the ground makes discussions about
recognition a moot subject, and simply a matter of semantics. By
expanding and giving a radical interpretation to the Montevideo
Convention, Alison Eggers argues that Somaliland has satisfied the
requirements for recognition in that it has
1. established a permanent government; has
2. a defined territory;
3. a permanent population; and
4. a capacity to enter into relationship with other states are
prerequisite for statehood.
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183

Although it is plausible to argue that Somaliland has established a
somewhat permanent but fragile government, it is not a government that
can enter into any meaningful relationship with either bilateral
governments or international bodies. Moreover, neither the population nor
the territory claimed by Somaliland is defined. Besides, an international
law presupposes that a secessionist part must do so within the framework
of the parent state. Mogadishus say so in this case is all the more
pivotal.
The legal argument surrounding the sovereignty of the state of
Somalia vis--vis that of Somaliland rests on the nullification of the
latters status prior to the implementation of the Act of Union.
53
Except
achieving independence from Britain, there are no official records to
substantiate whether Somaliland was a sovereign entity recognized by
any member state either in the immediate region or in the rest of the
world.
54
Despite David Shinns apparent lack of documented sources on
this claim, the Act of Union,
55
which was promulgated by both sides on
J anuary 31, 1960 makes all prior arrangements null and void. Paolo
Contini, an irrefutable authority on the technicalities of the Act of Union,
writes: Thus when the union was formed, its precise legal effects had not
been laid down in any instrument having binding force in both parts of the
State. As explained below, the matter was clarified seven months later by
the adoption of a new Act of Union with retroactive effect from J uly 1,
1960 for the whole territory of the Republic.
56
It goes on to say:
To dispel any uncertainties, it was thought desirable, as a
first step, to enact a law applicable to the whole territory
of the Republic, defining the legal effects of the union
with as much precision as possible. This was done on
J anuary 31, 1961, six months after unification, when the
National Assembly adopted by acclamation a new Act of
Union [32], which repealed the Union of Somaliland and
Somalia Law [33], and which was made retroactive as
from J uly 1, 1960.
57

184

This is one of the main challenges secessionists regularly face in the
legal arena of the debate. Moreover, the north at independence had neither
a separate national anthem nor a flag nor any of the insignia known to
denote distinguished qualities of a nation state.
58
All that existed at the
time was the all-encompassing national flag of Somalia and its national
anthem. This is to say that even leaders in the North did not anticipate a
separate government for the ex-British protectorate. Although there was an
insignificant opposition to a united Somalia, and a brief and less publicized
flirtation by Egal with the Haile Selassie of Ethiopia prior to the date of
independence, the triumph of unity forces, propelling Egal to the office of
prime minister (as was endorsed by USP and SNL supporters), was
inevitable.
End of Somali Nationalism: A second argument in favor of
secession hinges on the effects the Barre regime wrought on Somalia; the
singling out and targeting of the Isaaq community for atrocities as well as
decades of experiences of oppression and civil war
59
arguably fed and
cemented the ideology of secession in the north. With a sense of
apocalyptic prediction for Somali nationalism, this outlook maintains that
since Somali nationalism ran out of steam with Barres government,
Somaliland, a region dominated by the Isaaq clan, needs to reassert its
separate identity outside of Somalia.
60
This position flies in the face of
existing academic literature on the affinity that existed within the Somali
communities. For example, Unlike so many other cases, Somali cultural
nationalism is a centuries old phenomenon and not something which has
been recently drummed up to give credence to political claims, writes
Lewis.
61
Moreover, Hussein Adam adds that clan and lineage
antagonisms do not preclude a will to unite or a feeling of common destiny
62
Unlike those prematurely calling for the disintegration of Somalia, it
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185

is here where one would, with a measured comfort, argue that due to the
inherent lineage-based clan nature of centripetal and centrifugal
[tendencies], at once drawing the Somalis into a powerful social fabric of
kinship affinity and cultural solidarity while setting them against one
another,
63
that todays disintegration may not be the final chapter of
Somali history. Complicated by the negative exogenous factors, such as
Ethiopian and Western interferences, the Somali society has in all its
modern history experienced setbacks/dislocations followed by renewed
nationalist surges, just like the boom and bust cycles of economic waves,
where the clan factor is both a challenge and a resource.
For example, after the defeat of Sayyid M. Abdullah Hasan, the
society that has sustained over 1 million casualties, more or less
disintegrated to the lowest clan or sub clan organizational unit, and
remained so up until the early 1940s, only to bounce back again with an
un-paralleled nationalist surge during and after WWII. Again, owing to
the let down by the civilian government between 1960-68 (as a result of
the devastating impact of the 1964 war with Ethiopia and the runway
corruption and clan politics), social cohesion suffered greatly. With the
mobilization of the entire Somali Society on a well defined purpose and
national objective in the 1970s (development, literacy and self-reliance),
Somalia was once again as cohesive as any nation can be.
64
But all that
had evaporated with the Barre regime losing the war against Ethiopia in
1978, and then afterwards turning its guns on its own people, mainly
against dissident groups. (The Isaaq and the Majeerteen clans suffered the
brunt of Barres wrath.) However, to base the unilateral Somaliland
secession on this national misfortune, with the intent to carry out the
onslaught on the Somali nation state, amounts to a mutilation of social
science and the scholarship on Somali Studies in favor of promoting an
activist objective. If secession advocates (and I would include Lewis in
186
this camp) believed only twenty or so years ago the organic nature of the
Somali nation, in whose argument, then, is implicit the recognition of the
long trajectory of history that it took to shape this nations socio-cultural
affinity, the hastiness to view the current setback of the Somali social
cohesion beyond [passing] civil war, cant pass the scrutiny of serious
social science critique. This last misfortune of the society should not by
any means constitute the obituary of the Somali nation state.
Somaliland-Eritrean Linkage: A third argument to buttress
justification for secession is one that likens the SNMs experience with that
of Eritrea. J ust as much as Eritrea was able to create a cohesive national
identity out of nine ethnic nationalities and three religious groupings by
reason of the long protracted struggle for independence from Ethiopia,
argues this school of thought, so did clans in Somaliland develop
nationhood qualities in their war against the Barre regime. How much of
what the SNM stood for and its organizational infrastructure compare to
that of the EPLF? Daniel Compangnon offers an intimate account of the
SNM militia in the 1980s as angry tribesmen who were often agitated by
their leaders on the notion that they were fighting imaginary Daarood
forces, and the Isaaq crowds sometimes shouted: "Daarood Adoon. An
Isaaq will be more easily mobilized while shouting Daarood Adoon"
instead of "Down with the dictatorship."(This slang translates to Daaroods
are slaves.) He raises the perplexing question of Is an opposition
movement, however, entitled to fuel and manipulate such a feeling in order
to win a broader audience? This depiction of the SNM is a far cry from
the highly organized, ideologically disciplined Eritrean Peoples Liberation
Front (EPLF), who administered liberated areas better than the Ethiopian
held villages. Contrary to the SNMs clan-orientation that ran a vendetta
driven clan militia, the EPLF employed left-oriented analysis of issues and
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187

opportunities, thus accordingly developing a political program that it had
carefully applied both to its constituents and to the rest of Ethiopia.
The Somaliland-Eritrean comparison does not hold water either,
and, when critically examined, could show serious theoretical deficiencies.
Only considering the surface differences, Eritrea is more dissimilar than it
is similar to Somaliland. The former is inhabited by nine different
nationalities with distinct languages, culture, religions, race, and historical
background. Second, Eritrea is ethnically and culturally different from
Ethiopia, the country it wanted to secede from, which houses as many as
more than 400 ethnic groups. Third, Eritrea federated with Ethiopia under
international supervision, and when Ethiopia unilaterally nullified the
terms of federation, Eritrea quickly sought to reassert its statehood. Eritrea
thus qualified, under United Nations rules, as peoples, deserving
independence. On the contrary, Somaliland, with its mere four or so
inter-married clan families, neither exhibits any of the above mentioned
characteristics nor had a relationship with its sister ex-Italian Somaliland
akin to the Ethio-Eritrean complex relationship.
Social Inequality: It is difficult, if not impossible, to justify and
explain secession on the basis of social inequality which the Isaaq clan has
suffered at the hands of southern clans. There are about four major clans
(Daarood, Isaaq, Hawiye and the Maay groupings). Most of all, the Isaaq
community has never been oppressed in a particular way, and did not
suffer any visible discrimination or domination based on race, cultural or
ethnic differences. Nor were they the victims of linguistic oppression as
may be the cause with the Somali Bantu minorities in the south. Donald
Horowitz suggests that the location of an ethnic groups home territory
often provided a head start. Groups located near colonial capitals, near a
rail-line or port, or near some center of colonial commerce were well
situated to take up opportunities as they arose. Hence, he argues the
188
Hawiya and Isaaq in Somalia are some of the groups that found themselves
fortuitously situated near centers of colonial activity.
65
In other words,
communities in Hargaysa, Berbera (Isaaq inhabited centers) and
Mogadishu (Hawiye inhabited and the capital of the nation) stood during
the 100 or so years of colonial rule in Somalia to benefit more compared to
other clans in the interior districts of the country.
He further suggests that the Daaroods were the single largest group in
both the Italian and British Somalilands armies, which, in time, fueled
Daaroods nationalism and their potential for making up Somalias
political power base. Outside the Madigan experience, who are treated as a
cast, ethnic oppression is not so much pronounced, or is even non-existent,
but ethnic opportunities were in the hands of the three major tribes in
Somalia. These major tribes or clans are by and large of equal muscles,
politically, socially and economically, that some sort of dtente exists.
Since 1960, when the two regions signed the reunification act, only 4 days
after the north got its independence from Great Britain, which coincided
with the day of Independence, J uly 1, 1960, power has been fairly and
equitably shared among these groups. A more lucid fact to dispel the
alleged oppression of the Isaaq clan is that in the Barres government,
which was a most dictatorial regime, the Isaaqs had a vice president (Ali
Abokor) and six or seven ministers out of 21 cabinet positions.

Concluding Remarks: Averting Renewed Civil War in Somaliland.
If the Somaliland secession case has no coherent theory to stand on,
there are three major wrinkles of global and local nature that had impeded
the coming of recognition from either neighboring countries or from the
rest of the world community. First is the impromptu nature of this
secession case; declared only few days after Mr. Ahmed Silanyos
distribution of a draft Proposal for Establishing a Transitional
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189

Government of unity, potentially federal government reflecting the
original political belief of the front, the Buroa Convention in May, 1992,
poses challenge and makes this action unacceptable in the eyes of the
world community. If the annulment of a marriage between a man and a
woman would require intervention and a negotiated settlement, one would
rightfully think that annulling the unity of a country would be much harder.
The nonchalant annulment of the union by the SNM is hardly a shrewd
political move. A second factor relates to existing international
instruments pertaining and regulating national self- determination and the
territorial integrity of member states. As things stand, the greatest hurdle
to Somaliland's ambitions for independence, however, is that Somalia
refuses to grant a divorce.
66

Other more relevant instruments, including Resolutions (1541) (XV)
and (2649) (XXV) of the United Nations General Assembly, the AUs
article 3 of its principles and the Arab League charter in particular, also do
not endorse such a unilateral action. The third and perhaps the most
consequential problem is the clan factor. Those clans who oppose the
impromptu secession perceive Somaliland as a project sponsored by one
clan (Isaaq) without any open, frank, and fair debate on the future and
political choices of each clan in the region. Of the four major clans that
make up the communities in the region, only the Isaaq clan is known to be
diehard supporter of secession from the rest of the country. Adamantly
and with equal zeal opposed to such move are mainly the Daarood clans
(the Dhulbahante and Walsangale) who openly defied this proposal from
the beginning. Because of their fierce opposition to any move on breaking
up Somalia into north and south, the Daarood clans in the eastern half of
the region are not administered by Hargaysa, but by Puntland, an
autonomous region that opted for a federal system of government.
67

190
Somaliland has so far been walking on a fragile thin-razor robe that
could easily be broken by the slightest clan conflict, especially if triggered
by changing the status quo. In October/November, 2005, when the
incident of a young Daarood girl, who was raped, tortured and imprisoned
by the body guard of the vice president (now president) of Somaliland,
eclipsed all other aspects of life in the regions of both Puntland and
Somaliland, an all-out war between the clans became almost inevitable. In
the following weeks, in Hargaysa, for several nights Isaaq neighbors
threw stones at houses of a Dhulbahante member of the House of
representative of Somaliland, who lived with his family in the city for
year. These developments led to a limited degree of population shifts and
internal displacement, often Daaroods fleeing Isaaq dominated towns.
Two recent forays by Somaliland into Daarood districts (in 2003 and
2007), often attempting to respond to outside events related to the search
for recognition, produced low-intensity but potentially far-reaching
conflicts; this must serve us as a cautionary note. Highlighting the
potential danger awaiting the people in the region, in the event that
exogenous forces attempt to compromise on the territorial integrity of
Somalia by way of recognizing secession without public and open
discourse on the issue by all clans concerned, the Northern Somalis for
Peace and Unitys (NSPU) position paper entitled Illusory Somaliland:
Setting the Record Straight gives a stern warning, Recognition will most
certainly lead to war since the secessionist will be tempted to try again to
overrun Cayn, Sole and Sanag, thus provoking war with Puntland, which
even involve the national government. To avoid such potential inter-clan
conflict, one is forced to turn to Markus Hoehne`s soberly cautious
recommendation to maintain the status quo, further endeavors to set up a
fully effective state (be it Somaliland or Puntland/Somalia) recognized
under international law may produce large-scale armed conflict.
68

Faisal Roble

191

1
Somaliland would be in quotation throughout the paper to denote that it is
not an official country, yet. Also, clan names are used only for clarity
purposes and for historical references. I am most indebted to my friend
Said M. M. Shire (Said Suggan) of Somali Studies Association who
provided me with valuable references and doubly guided me to the right
materials on the subject matter, including advising that I use the term
reunification to denote the important fact that Somalis were of one
people prior to the advent of colonialism. Saids command of modern
history of Northern Somalia and his ownership of valuable [original]
collections as well as rare secondary materials in this field makes him an
emerging authority in this area.
2
For a discussion on failed states, see D. W. Brinkerhoff, "Rebuilding
Governance in Failed States and Post-Conflict Societies: Core Concepts
and Cross-Cutting Themes," Public Administration and Development 25
(2005), pp. 3-14.
3
Alison K. Eggers, When is A State a State? The Case for Recognition of
Somaliland Boston College International Law Review, 2007, Vol. 30, Pp
211-222
4
Suliman Baldo, Africa program Director at the International Crisis Group
(ICG), J une 30, 2006.
5
J ames Swan, Assistant Undersecretary for African Affairs, speaks about seed
seed money the US government provided for humanitarian assistance ($64
million in 2006-2007) and for law and order ($1.7 million), CISS: Sept. 15,
2007.
6
Ann Scott Tyson, U.S. Debating Shift of Support in Somali Conflict,
Washington Post, December 4, 2007.
7
See Critical Remarks on the National Question in V. I. Lenin, Collected
Works, 4th English Edition,
(Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964,) Vol. 20, pp 17-51. Pre-Soviet
Russia was known by leftists as the prison of nations for it encompassed
in its geography many non-Russian oppressed ethnic groups and
nationalities. In a limited sense, some Ethiopian leftists also referred to
Ethiopia as a prison of nations. Feudalism reigned in both Russia and
Ethiopia where serfdom thrived until revolutions with Marxist orientations
reformed both societies.
8
Phifer, Gregg Woodrow Wilson's Swing around the Circle in Defense of His
League, in Florida State University Studies, Tallahassee, Fla., Florida
State University, 1956, No. 23, pp. 65-102.
192

9
Wilsons 14 points were the basis for establishing the League of Nations at the
turn of the 20
th
Century, a period when Europe was going through
significant territorial restructuring.
10
Lee J . M. Seymour, The Surprising Success of Separatist Groups: The
Empirical and J uridical in Self Determination, Paper for the International
Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, March, 2006.
11
Hakan Wieber, Self-Determination as an International Issue, in I.M. Lewis,
National & Self Determination, Ithaca Press, London, 1983, pp. 43-65.
12
Pierre Englerbert and Rebecca Hummel: Lets Stick Together,
Understanding Africas Secession Deficit, Africa Affairs, 2005, 104/416,
pp. 299-342. Their discussion is important in establishing threshold to
assess and best estimate those cases that could succeed for being
reproduced as new states with recognition. They also maintain that many
secession cases die out in time.
13
Englerber and Hummel, 2005, pp. 299-342.
14
Iqbal J hazbahy, Somaliland: Africas Best-Kept Secret: A Challenge to
International Community? in Matt Bryden, Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues
and Possibilities (African Affairs J ournal, London 2007) pp. 106-165.
15
Resolution (1541) (XV) of the General Assembly is applied to colonies or
territories administered by a colonizing country with distinct national
characteristics, while Resolution (264) (XXV) in Article 1affirms the
legitimacy of peoples under colonial and alien domination, and, as Hakan
suggested, has been applied to Rhodesia, Apartheid South Africa,
Palestine. A similar opinion is expressed by J ohn Chipman. In Managing
the Politics of Parochialism. He states: ...neither in the instruments of the
United Nations, nor in customary international law as a whole, does there
exist any legal right to independence, by means of the right of self-
determination for any non-colonial people or for a minority within an
existing state (Ethnic Conflict and International Security, ed. Michael
E.Brown, 1995, p.242). This post WWII thinking of managing internal
conflicts support more the upholding of Somalias territorial integrity than
sanctioning the impromptu secession of the breakaway Somaliland
region.
16
In the western half of the continent, the Biafran attempt to secede (1967) from
Africas largest democracy and most populous nation, Nigeria, has ended
as being a historical footnote in secessionist and protest history.
17
Kiflu Tadasse. The Generations, (The Red Sea Press, 1993) pp. 123-165.
Tadesse, a member of the radical underground party, Ethiopian People
Liberation Party, documents the story of 40 years of intellectual debate on
the Ethiopian polity and the centrality of the national question. These
debates at minimum are guide to understand how these debates created an
inter-ethnic and multi-cultural political consciousness among the elites.
Faisal Roble

193

18
Edmond Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to Peoples Republic
(Indian University Press, 1988) pp.2 and 44.
19
There have recently been numerous lead articles in both the New York Times
(J uly, 23, 2007) and the Chicago Tribune (July 21,2007) of the accounts of
human disaster raging in the region and the resilience of the secession
sentiments among the residents, despite the claim of the Ethiopian
government that the region is autonomous and has self- rule.
20
Owing to its religious affinity with Somalis, Eastern Oromia, including parts
of Harar and Bale, has a much earlier national consciousness and history of
resistance to the central authority in Addis Ababa than the rest of Oromo
regions.
21
Bereket Habte Selassie, Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Red Sea Press, 1980)
pp 60-65.
22
Habte Selassie, ibid. 1980, p. 63.
23
The Dergi regime in Ethiopia instituted reformist legislations, between 1975-
1985, that gave Ras Gas, (limited regional autonomy) to a number of
ethnic regions including Eritrea, Afars and Somalis.
24
Alison Eggers, ibid, 2007, Vol. 30, Pp. 211-222.
25
Matt Bryden, Somalia and Somaliland: Envisioning a Dialogue on the
Question of Somali unity, African Security Review, 2004 13/2.
26
Faisal Roble, Somalia, A Nation without an Elite-based Movement:
Challenges and Opportunities http//Wardheernews.com, February
_2006.html. In A Proposal for Establishing a Transitional
Government, which Silanyo drafted and sheepishly dropped off in a
matter of days and joined company with those advocating for secession at
the convention in Burao city (May, 18, 1991), denoting the impromptu
nature of the unilateral secession of Northern Somalia.
27
I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call to Kinship; (The Red Sea Press,
Lawrenceville, N.J .) p.180, 1994; Gerard Prunier, A Candid View of the
Somali National Movement, (Horn of Africa J ournal, 13-14, J anuary-
J une, 1990-91, pp. 107-120.
28
Cedric Barnes, U Dhashay-Ku Dhashay: Genealogical and Territorial
discourse in Somali History, Social Identity, Vol. 12, 4: pp. 487-498; See
Ali Hersi, unpublished Doctoral Thesis, The Arab Factor in Somali
History, UCLA, 1978
29
http/www.wardheernews.com/Article_02/feb_02/Egalas letter.pdf
30
http/www.wardheernews.com/Article_02/feb_02/Egalas letter.pdf
31
http/www.warhdeernews, ibid, 2006.
32
I.M. Lewis, Blood and Bone, 1994, pp. 178-219.
33
Hussein M. Adam, Formation and Recognition of New States: Somaliland in
Contrast to Eritrea. Review of Africa Political Economy, 1994, 59 pp. 21-
38.
194

34
I.M. Lewis, ibid. 1994, p. 177.
35
I. M. Lewis, ibid. 1994, op.cit. 197. But an oral account narrated to the author
by the late Mohamed Farah Xasharo, founder of the Gudabursi-based
Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) differed Lewis version. Xasharo,
who was a delegate to a small group gathering of SNM leaders at a private
residence in the late 1970s in J eddah, Saudi Arabia, is that all that SNM
wanted was token non-Isaaq individuals to join the front.
36
Daniel Compognon, The Somali Opposition Fronts: Some Comments and
Questions, Horn of Africa Journal, 13-14, Nos. 1-2, J anuary-June, 190-91,
107-20.
37
J ama Mohammed Qaalib, The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience.
Lilian Barber Press, 1995, pp. 267.
38
Robert J ackson and Carl Roseburg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1982): pp. 19 - 23.
39
Somaliland Trade Directory, Somaliland Chamber of Commerce, Industry and
Agriculture (SCCIA), Hargaysa, Somaliland, 2003-2004; there is no
reliable census to register inhabitants, thus anywhere from 2.5 million to
Hargaysas 3.5 million is the range used by different analysts.
40
Asteries Hiliaras, The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and
Regional Geopolitics, (J ournal of Contemporary African Studies, 2, 20,
2002).
41
See The Illusory Somaliland: Setting the Record Straight, Research Unit,
2006. For a list of the treaties signed between Great Britain and Somali
clans, with the exception of the Dhulbahante clan, in the Ex-British
Protectorate, see exhibits A through G showing.
http://www.wardheernews.com/Articles_06/may_06/ILLUSORY__SOM
ALILAND.pdf
42
See British Somaliland, Vol. IX, No.I, (Published by The British Society for
international Understanding, January, 1948) p.15
43
Harold Nelson, Somalia: A Country Study, 1982, p. 34
44
I.M. Lewis, a Modern History of Somalia (West View Press, 1988) p. 166.
For a general discussion on the question of Somali Territory and its
partition, the Haud and Reserved Area in particular, see J ohn Drysdale,
The Somali Dispute, 1968.
45
Harold Nelson, Somalia: A Country Study, 1982, p. 3
46
http://www.hartf ord-hwp.com/archives/33/113.html. IRIN, 10, J uly 2001
47
David Latin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia: A Nation in Search of a State,
West View, Colorado, 1987, p. 67.
48
Paolo Contini, The Somali Republic: an Experiment in Legal Integration, The
Grange Press, 1969, p. 9.
Faisal Roble

195

49
The epic poems of Guba, which started in the 1930s and ran through 1950,
clearly express the level of wide clan conflict along Isaaq vs. Ogaden, or
Ogaden vs Dhulbahante, or Dhulbhante vs. Isaaq axis.
50
David Shin, Somaliland: The Little Country that Could (CSIS, African Notes,
November, No. 9, 2002).
51
Peter J . Schraeder. Why the United States Recognize Somaliland,
(http://forums.csis.org/africa/?cat=2CSIS Africa Policy Forum, 2006.)
One of the reasoning why US policy makers should overlook the clan is in
appraising the question to recognize Somaliland is to stick to the 1884
colonial border, insinuating that this reason would strike cord with the
OAU (now AU) principles of no change to colonial borders. His
argument appears simplistic in that the protection of territorial integrity
needs to be evaluated in light of the young and soft states that exist in
Africa. In a recent article by the Washington Post (December 4, 2007)
officials at the Pentagon, responding to its need for the use of the military
facilities in Barbara, indicated their eagerness to recognize Somaliland,
although the State Department stands in the way.
52
http://www.timothygoddard.com/blog/?p=238#comment-303766
53
President Rayale has in numerous speeches and interviews invoked, often
sounding half-heartedly committed to secession, this concept of taking
back sovereignty from the south.
54
Several political leaders of the secessionist region, including the current
sitting president, Reyale Kahin, as well as some Somalia observers content
that as many as 35 member states have recognized Somaliland on the
wake of its independence from Great Britain in 1960. See David Shin, ibid,
no. 9, 2002. But there are no records that have been sited or presented by
either politicians or Shin himself, despite the later being a long time US
Diplomat.
55
Shin, ibid, 2002.
56
Paola Contine, Somalia: An experiment in Legal Integration, London, Frank
Cass, 1969, viii+92 and Pp. 10-11
57
C. 32-Act of Union, Law No.5 of J anuary, 1961, 33-Supra, p.9. The repeal,
did not apply to Section, 11(4) of that law The Act of Union Page 12-13
58
NSPU: ibid, 2006.
59
Interview with Dr. Ahmed Issa in Taking the initiative: Somalilands
Regional Opportunities for International Recognition, 2006, Graduate
program in International Affairs (GIPA0, The New School.
60
Hussein Adam, From Tyran to Anarchy: The Somali Experience, Red Sea
Press, 2007; pp. 183-213. See also Taking Initiative, interview with
Ahmed Issa, a member of SNM and KULMIYE party in Hargaysa
staunchly maintains that secession is call not to be negotiated.
61
Lewis, Nationalism and Self Determination, ibid, op.cit., p. 9
196

62
Hussein M. Adam Language, National Consciousness and Identity-The
Somali Experience, in I.M. Lewis, 1994, ibid, p. op.cit., 33.
63
David Latin and Said S. Samatar, Somalia, 1987, p. 67.
64
Ahmed I. Samatar, Socialist Somalia: Myth or Rhetoric, (Boulder, Colorado,
1984), p. 45.
65
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. UC Press, 1998, ibid. pp.
151166.
66
International Crisis Report, J une, 2006.
67
Since October,, 2007 militia loyal to Somaliland has violently captured Las
Anod, the main city in the Dhulbahante country, thus leading to a potential
era for a renewed conflict.
68
Markus V. Hoehne, Political Identity, Emerging State Structures and Conflict
in Northern Somalia, J ournal of Modern African Studies, 44-3,
Cambridge University Press , 2006, pp. 394-414.
197
Cultural Contexts and Bilateral
Aid in the Horn of Africa:
USAID Education Funding in
Somalia and Somaliland

Introduction
Cultural contexts as the title of this study refer to the dynamics of cultural
issues that arise between aid-receiving and donor countries. The cultural
context of the donor country is informed by its political agenda. For the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the lead
agency in the U.S. governments development assistance efforts, a political
budgeting process determines where and how development dollars are
invested. The development projects are then coordinated by agency
bureaucrats and carried out by contracting organizations according to
evidence-based development practices adapted to the receiving countrys
cultural and political context.
The first section of this paper aims to analyze the USAID development
agenda in the Horn of Africa, which includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti,
and Somalia.
1
In the second section, the Somali social, economic, and
cultural context is examined, with particular attention to the challenges
faced by Somali women. In part three, the design and impact of a U.S.
funded teacher training project in Somaliland, the northwest zone of
Somalia, is considered in light of the USAID Somalia development
agenda.
USAID Development Agenda
The cultural context that determines the U.S. position toward Africa
shifted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on account of the Global War on
Terror. Although military aid, in the form of arms sales and military
training, had eclipsed development funding in Africa even prior to 9/11, in
February 2007 the United States ramped up its military presence in Africa
with the announcement of AFRICOM, which entails a command center
198
and troop presence in Africa to keep closer tabs on possible terrorist
activity in the continent.
2
In this study consideration of specifically military
aid will be limited as the purview is the flow of U.S. development aid.
Since the postWord War II Marshall Plan, development assistance
has always been linked to U.S. political goals. Debates about multilateral
versus bilateral aid have included the claim that bilateral aid, donated
directly to the receiving country, has the flexibility to follow political
interest; in contrast, multilateral aid, donated to international institutions,
has been described as nonpolitical.
3
In the 1950s, military aid was more
acceptable to the U.S. Congress than economic aid, and defense was an
umbrella for as much U.S. assistance as possible. In 1961, for the first
time since the end of the Marshall Plan, economic aid expenditures
exceeded military aid overall.
More recent discussions of bilateral aid have focused on motivations
for giving, including whether the human rights records of beneficiary
countries weigh in with donor countries decisions about giving aid.
4

Neumayer concludes that donor countries, contrary to their verbal pledges,
do not honor commitments to human rights.
5
In the only pre9/11 study
included here, Apodaca and Stohl looked at the Carter through Clinton
administrations and found that although human rights were a consideration,
past aid, economic need, and economic interest were greater drivers of
bilateral aid for the United States. National security issues played the most
disproportionate role in aid streams: countries with the largest number of
military personnel received aid regardless of human rights records.
6

Various other selectivity criteria have become increasingly common.
7
For
example, the Bush administrations Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC) accounts give money to countries meeting a variety of economic
and social guidelines.
8


199

Macdonald and Hoddinott discuss the trinity of mixed motives of
bilateral aid; in their assessment of Canadian aid motives, they point to
three categories: humanitarian, commercial, and political. They find that
Canadian aid is moderately altruistic when measured against these
categories.
9
From an ethics perspective, Luna calls for bilateral aid to move
from a charity model to a rights and duties model, which would recognize
services such as health and education as rights of all to receive and duties
of all to provide.
10
Historically, donor countries give a greater percentage
of aid to their former colonies, with cultural and economic linkages and
interests driving this continued dependence.
Under President George W. Bush, U.S. bilateral aid continues to be
driven by economic interests, but national security and military presence
have tipped the scales tremendously in determining aid flows. In 2004, the
top U.S. foreign aid recipient was Iraq, which received 18.44 billion
dollars in aid. Israel, Egypt, and Afghanistan were the second, third, and
fourth highest funded countries, receiving 2.62, 1.87, and 1.77 billion
dollars respectively.
11

The U.S. development agenda for number seven on the list, Pakistan,
is a prime example of funding motivated by political reasons, in this case
as payback for Pakistani cooperation with the respect to war on terror.
Ahsan chronicles the history of U.S. aid inputs for education in Pakistan,
explaining that, in the post9/11 climate, both the United States and the
United Kingdom lifted sanctions and gave generous aid packages.
12

Pointing out this transparent political agenda in Pakistan, Ahsan argues
that aid is more useful if it is free of political motives from donors. Rather
than promoting national interests, Ahsan contends that donors should
understand the on-the-ground context and prioritize aid for pro-poor
policies. However, from the literature cited, it is clear that political
200
agenda, national security, and economic interests are the main drivers for
bilateral aid from the United States.
Bush Administration Position on Bilateral Aid
In J anuary 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the
Bush administrations current approach, called transformational
diplomacy, which emphasizes democracy-building and a global
repositioning of U.S. State Department employees away from European
posts and toward critical emerging areas in Africa, South Asia, East
Asia, and the Middle East.
13
This shift occurred to align priorities with the
Global War on Terror. Along with Secretary Rices announcement came
the release of USAIDs updated foreign aid policy, which articulated a
doctrine of transformational development in which bilateral assistance
would be used to build a safer, more secure, democratic, and prosperous
world to enhance the national security of the United States.
14

Under President George W. Bush and Secretary Rice, USAID has
been placed more squarely under the authority and guidance of the State
Department. In this paradigm, development is defined as synonymous
with economic growth and involves promoting free trade and open
markets. Since the administrations approach varies little in different
political, social, cultural, or economic contexts, it has been criticized as a
one-size-fits-all development strategy.
15

In the 2008 Bush administration budget request, the new strategic
framework for U.S. foreign assistance focuses on five objectives: 1) peace
and security, 2) governing justly and democratically, 3) investing in
people, 4) economic growth, and 5) humanitarian assistance. According to
the document, these objectives address the underlying causes of persistent
poverty, despotic governance, insecurity, and economic stagnation.
16

Development assistance itself is cut by a third overall in the 2008 request

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while USAID operating expenses are also cut. These cuts may signal a
feared trend toward whittling down traditional USAID development
efforts.
U.S. foreign policy goals for Africa
In 2006, the United States articulated six broad foreign policy goals
for Africa: improved human rights and good governance, expanded trade
and investment through the private sector, counter-terrorism, conflict
prevention and mitigation, HIV/AIDS prevention, and natural resource
protection. The USAID strategic plan for Africa laid out frameworks for
both the transformational development and the fragile states approaches
articulated by the Bush administration. The transformational development
framework for Africa cited two operational goals: to foster a healthier,
better educated, and more productive population and to increase the
effectiveness of African institutions by promoting a vibrant private sector
and democratic governance. In addition, the United States pursued an
economic hub approach at regional African cities to promote expanded
trade and private sector development. One regional hub for global
competitiveness is Nairobi, Kenya, which serves as the central point for
trade, investment, and business activities in East Africa.
Meanwhile, the fragile states framework for Africa focused on
averting conflict and managing crises.
17
U.S. national interests in the Horn
of Africa, particularly in Somalia, are stability and security, which require
ending conflict and preventing Somalia from supporting terrorism. The
fragile states framework focused on these interests.
USAID appropriations for global education
Not including supplemental spending for Iraq, congressional foreign
assistance appropriations for USAID in FY 2005 reached almost $9 billion,
making the United States the largest donor of bilateral foreign aid.
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However, when aid money is calculated as a percentage of gross national
income, the United States maintains the position of lowest ranking donor.
18

Considering the relatively low per capita funding level, linking U.S.
development assistance to national security interests may be critical in
order to secure adequate support for use of taxpayer money in lower
income and developing countries.
Since the Global War on Terrorism was declared, support for global
education from the United States has been rising steadily. From 2000 to
2006, U.S. government support for basic education increased from $98
million to $465 million.
19
These increases were fueled by the theory that
education funding would combat terrorism by promoting economic growth
and providing a gateway to productive activity and livelihood options for
youth who might otherwise fall prey to terrorist organizations. USAID
articulates support for education on the grounds that an educated
population is fundamental to sustaining democracy, increasing health,
improving per capita income, and conserving environmental resources.
20

U.S. assistance to Africa
The FY 2008 budget request for Africa boasted a 41 % increase over
the FY 2006 request for Africa. Over 73 % of the FY 2008 budget focused
on the third U.S. foreign assistance objective: investing in people.
Programs to address HIV/AIDS, malaria, childrens health, and access to
quality education were included. Lancaster points out that while sub-
Saharan Africa received a near doubling in aid from $2.4 billion in 2005 to
$4.6 billion proposed for 2008, the increase rested almost entirely on
HIV/AIDS funding.
21
Although the United States has been in the past the
largest donor of net bilateral official development assistance to sub-
Saharan Africa, European countries and the European Community have
eclipsed U.S. funding levels in Africa.
22
The leading U.S. foreign aid

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recipients in Africa from 2004 to 2006 include Uganda, Kenya, South
Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Sudan, Mozambique, and
Liberia.
23
Two of Somalias neighbors in the Horn, Kenya and Ethiopia,
are among the top ten recipients of U.S. aid dollars. With the Horn of
Africa emerging as a critical geopolitical area in the war on terrorism, it is
not surprising that U.S. assistance has been increasing in these countries,
although U.S. dollars allocated to Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti greatly
outstrip those given to Somalia. Kenya is the number two recipient of U.S.
aid money in Africa, with almost $213 million requested in FY 2006 (not
including food aid). USAID requested a total of $145 million for Ethiopia
and $9.3 million for Djibouti in the same year (excluding food aid).
24

USAIDs East Africa Mission and Education Funding Levels
USAIDs East Africa Mission has a regional office in Nairobi,
Kenya, that oversees programs in 20 countries including Somalia, Sudan,
Burundi, and Djibouti, which are considered limited presence countries.
Limited presence countries do not have bilateral USAID missions but
receive substantial amounts of development, humanitarian, and emergency
assistance.
25
Like full missions, Sudan, Somalia, and Burundi each have
integrated strategic plans (ISPs) which determine resources received and
performance results. The ISPs incorporate food, security, health,
democracy, governance, and conflict prevention, with an eye to linking
relief and development.
In FY 2004, $2.5 million was spent in Kenya on educational projects,
including social mobilization, in-service teacher training, and policy
work.
26
In FY 2005 $2 million was allocated for basic education programs.
In Ethiopia, $8.5 million was planned for education projects in FY 2004
and $5.3 million for FY 2005.
27
In Djibouti, $500,000 was allocated for FY
2005 for teacher training. In FY 2004, USAID spent $8 million to improve
204
access and quality of education in Djibouti. A strong focus on basic
education is central to each of these countries objectives.
Because Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti are relatively secure and
stable nations, USAID focuses funding for these countries on education.
In less stable situations, education has historically been viewed as a luxury
item among the many needed relief inputs, although that notion has been
changing in recent years. Education sector projects have become a larger
part of emergency and post-conflict assistance efforts, for example, in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
In the FY 2006 operational plan, USAID/Somalia appears to be
arguing that access to essential services like education must be emphasized
in weak security environments like Somalia. To justify the $945,000
requested for radio-based education programming, the plan states that in
addition to providing long-term benefits, education is an essential service
that protects children (no further explanation given about how), acts as a
stabilizing force for families, and promotes conflict resolution.
28

U.S. assistance to Somalia
Funding for Somalia is a weak U.S. priority in relation to funding for
its Horn of Africa neighbors. Since the disastrous U.S. intervention in the
Somali civil war in 1993, when 19 U.S. soldiers and an estimated 1000
Somalis were killed in what is known as the Black Hawk Down incident,
political support for assistance to Somalia has been difficult to muster.
Furthermore, the lack of a central government in southern Somalia for the
past sixteen years has deterred the United States from providing
development assistance to all three regions. However, because Somaliland
has been secure relative to the rest of Somalia, with a functioning
democracy since 1993, the United States has focused its modest aid inputs

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there. To a lesser extent Puntland, more stable than southern Somalia, has
also been an aid recipient.
The United States described itself in recent years as the largest
bilateral donor and the European Union as the largest multilateral donor to
Somalia.
29
In 2003, the European Union poured $120.6 million into
Somalia while the United States invested $29.6 million. That year the
United Kingdom reported $6.4 million in bilateral aid.
30
Funding levels
from donors such as the United Kingdoms Department for International
Development (DfID) and the European Union are rising as the U.S.
funding levels are falling. In 20062007, DfID allocated $29.3 million in
direct assistance to Somalia.
31
The EU increased expenditures in Somalia
from $44.5 million in 2000 to $120.6 million in 2003 for a 37% increase.
Meanwhile, U.S. dollar inputs for Somali development assistance
decreased by 64 % in the same time period (not counting food aid).
32

Most U.S. assistance to Somalia is for food aid. In the FY 2006
USAID budget request, just under $1.3 million was allocated for
development assistance other than food.
33
In FY 2005, the actual
appropriation for Somalia was $14.5 million; $9.4 million was PL 480
food aid money.
In FY 2003 through FY 2005, the three stated USAID objectives for
Somalia were to strengthen local governance and conflict mitigation, to
provide more productive livelihoods, and to respond to critical needs for
vulnerable groups.
34
In FY 2006, the USAID Somalia Operational Plan
strategic objectives were increased to five, and one of the five was
improving access to essential services, including education.
The productive livelihoods objective contained basic education
initiatives in FY 2003, 2004, and 2005.
35
Productive livelihoods served
as a catch-all objective, which, in addition to education sector activity, also
improved services for productive enterprises, rehabilitated water systems
206
and other infrastructure, and furthered alternative energy sources. In 2004,
$799 thousand of the $1,999 thousand non-food USAID total for Somalia
was allocated for more productive livelihoods; in 2005, funding for more
productive livelihoods increased to $2,549 thousand of the non-food
$5,100 thousand total.
In FY 2006 the strategic objectives were changed and basic education
was subsumed under a new access to essential services objective. Under
this new objective, $945,000 was requested for achieving equitable access
to quality basic education.
36
In addition, the overall budget for Somalia,
excluding food aid, was sliced by two thirds from $5 million in FY 2005 to
$1.3 million in FY 2006, although the figures reported do not appear to
include the amount requested for the new access to essential services
objective.
USAID stated support for basic education with the aim of increasing
girls' enrollment rates and improving teacher education in Somalia.
Strategies for fulfilling this objective included a teacher training project in
Somaliland. According to the USAID plan, this assistance focused on
building the capacity of teacher training institutes, training for pre-service
primary school teachers, rehabilitating classrooms, providing water and
sanitation facilities at schools, and mobilizing communities to support and
promote girls' education.
37

Somali Political, Social, Economic, and Cultural Context
In order to understand how USAID engaged the cultural context of
Somaliland in the teacher training project design, a brief discussion of the
Somali political, social, economic, and cultural context may prove helpful.
A brief political history
Somalia holds an important geopolitical position between sub-
Saharan Africa and the countries on the Arabian Peninsula, with the Gulf
of Aden and the Indian Ocean bordering its extensive northern and

207

southeastern coastline. Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya form its
northwestern and southern borders. Somalia consists of three distinct
political regions: Somaliland, Puntland, and southern Somalia.
Somalia was formed by the merger of two former colonial territories:
the British Somaliland Protectorate in the northwest and Italian Somaliland
in the southeast. The two were united in 1960, when the independent
Somali Republic was proclaimed under President Shermarke. In 1969 he
was assassinated and Siad Barre came to power by force. After the fall of
the Barre regime in 1991, Somalia struggled to find peace and establish a
functioning government. In 1991, Somaliland declared its independence
and Puntland formed its own semi-autonomous government. Southern
Somalia did not have a functioning government from 1991 onward until
the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed through a
two-year peace process in Kenya; a president was elected in 2004.
As President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmeds administration entered
Somalia to reinstate a legitimate Somali government for the first time in
sixteen years, an Islamist movement, the Consultative Council of Islamic
Courts (CCIC), seized power in much of southern and central Somalia.
The TFG clung to authority in only in a small area of southern Somalia
around Baidoa, their official seat of government. The CCIC demanded an
Islamic state under Sharia law and fought and defeated the warlords who
had previously controlled strategic towns. Most notably, the CCIC
controlled Mogadishu and the southern port town of Kismayo.
38

With U.S. military assistance, Ethiopian forces defeated the CCIC in
J anuary 2007. Two air strikes against suspected Al-Qaeda affiliates were
confirmed in the far south of Somalia.
39
Ethiopian and Somali forces
currently control Mogadishu with insurgents continuing to mount
resistance. The TFG does not have control over Somaliland, which
claimed independence from Somalia in 1991 and declared itself the
208
Republic of Somaliland. Somalilands sovereignty has yet to be formally
recognized by the international community.
40

Social, Economic, and Cultural Context
While no official figures have been reported in the past five years,
Somali human development indicators persist in being very low. In 2001,
the UNDPs human development index placed Somalia at 161 out of 163
countries. Infant and under-five child mortality rates are among the
highest in the world at 133 and 225 per 1,000 live births respectively.
Somalia also reports one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the
world with an estimated rate of 1,100 deaths per 100,000 caused by poor
prenatal, delivery, and postnatal care and severely limited obstetric
facilities. Education indicators are also exceptionally low; it is estimated
that only about 20 % of primary-school-age Somali children attend school,
one of the lowest enrollment rates in the world.
Drought, flooding, and intermittent food shortages continue to
exacerbate difficult conditions for a large number of Somalis. Years of
anarchy exacerbated environmental degradation, which resulted in
extensive, severe flooding in 2006 and weakened an already tenuous
economic system based largely on livestock trade. At least 45 % of the
population lives on less than $1 a day.
41

Aside from livestock trade, the telecommunications industry plays a
critical role in the Somali economy. Also, the Somali diaspora remits up to
an estimated $1 billion each year. In addition to the aid provided by
international donors, Muslim agencies reportedly provide substantial
support.
42

Somalia, with an estimated population of 7.7 million, is
predominantly a Sunni Muslim country.
43
Clans are a critical entity in
Somali political and cultural life. Clan memberships are malleable and

209

have been manipulated for political gain; historically, most armed conflicts
have broken out along clan lines. In all three regions of Somalia, relative
majority clan homogeneity has increased the importance placed on sub-
clan membership. For example, in Somaliland the overthrow of the Barre
regime was accomplished by Issaq clan unity, but conflict later ensued
between two Issaq sub-clans. Clans also provide a force of social cohesion
and identity, a place for customary law to resolve disputes, and a
possibility for physical security, which have all been important in the
Somali context of state collapse.
44

Women in Somali Culture
After years of civil strife, many widowed or abandoned Somali
women have of necessity taken on a larger breadwinning role. Women in
Somalia have started small businesses selling food, clothing, beeswax,
incense, and beauty products, generally from their homes. Through these
micro-enterprises, women have fed their families, given seed money for
schools and medical facilities, and helped produce a viable community
economic structure.
45

However, Somali women often face oppressive conditions and
barriers to advancement. For example, Somali girls enroll in school at a
rate of only 7%. Only 11% of Somali teachers are women.
46
In addition,
women face tremendous physical barriers due to pain and persistent health
concerns related to female genital cutting/mutilation (FGC/M), which is
widely practiced with an estimated 95 to 99% of Somali women
undergoing its severest form, called infibulation.
47

FGC/M inflicts serious lifelong physical and psychological pain and
complications, including death.
48
To learn more about the effects FGC/M,
Somali refugees living in various western countries have been studied. In
Finland, for example, a 32-year-old woman suffered urinary calculus
210
because infibulation scars created a favorable environment for stagnant
urine to crystallize.
49
Due to the pain and stigma associated with infection
and other complications, especially during menstruation, FGC/M also
affects girls attendance at school and their ability, as adults, to work in the
public sphere.
Education sector efforts are critical to promoting abandonment of
FGC/M. At least one teacher trained by the USAID-funded Somaliland
School Improvement Program talked of her commitment to discussing
FGC/M in her new role as a primary teacher.
50
If teachers open a forum for
the discussion of FGC/M, then parents, students, and the whole community
have an opportunity to rethink the practice. In addition, students educated
about FGC/M are empowered to make informed decisions for their own
daughters in the future.
51

Many Muslim leaders have spoken out against FGC/M, saying the
practice has no basis in Islam. In addition, Somalias traditional governing
and judicial structures have been enlisted in interesting ways to support the
advancement of womens rights.
Somalilands traditional structures
In Somaliland, traditional structures were perhaps the only
institutions that did not collapse during the war. The House of Elders,
known as the Guurti, and the armed rebel movement, SNM (Somali
National Movement), functioned together to form the foundation of
democracy in Somaliland. The Guurti is made up of the Suldaans, an all-
male body of the highest ranking traditional leaders in Somaliland. The
other chamber, the House of Representatives, and cabinet posts are in
theory open to women, although male elders often prefer to support men
for political posts.
52


211

The other traditional structure, which plays a more active political
role than the more ceremonial Suldaans, is the aqiils. Somaliland has
largely reestablished the British colonial administrative system, which
linked government institutions with traditional structures. The aqiils,
perceived as more trustworthy and efficient, are often preferred over the
public judiciary. Discussion of further institutionalizing the Guurti and
aqiils suggests that the two systems are still regarded as complementary.
As breadwinners and contributors to important mag-payments (fines
paid by clans for crimes committed by clan members), women are gaining
relative positions of power, which suggests the patrilineal traditional
structures will need to make space for womens evolving roles. Revenge
killings and rights of widows to inherit and to marry a man of her choice
were topics of discussion and decision in aqiil workshops in 20032004.
The start of the debate among elders on the rights of women, children, and
minorities is itself a significant achievement.
53

The social, cultural, and economic context forms the foundation of
USAID inputs into Somaliland. The larger cultural context, including the
political motivations apparent in U.S. aid investment, determines the
positioning of USAID as it develops programs and designs with
contracting organizations. In the next section, USAIDs Somaliland
School Improvement Program and its engagement of cultural contexts will
be analyzed.
Somaliland School Improvement Program
USAID considers the local cultural contexts of the countries it
supports, and such sensitivity increases the chances that programs like the
Somaliland School Improvement Program (SSIP), which was only
available from 2004 until mid-2006, will continue beyond the project
funding. To avoid redundancy, USAID also recognizes the need to
212
complement rather than overlap the efforts of other development
organizations. USAID asked its Somaliland School Improvement Program
partners, Creative Associates International Inc. and CARE, to work
closely with bilateral, multilateral, and education organizations. Capacity
building and institutional strengthening were enriched and enhanced
through collaboration with education partners in Somaliland, particularly
the Somaliland Ministry of Education, UNESCO, Save the Children/U.K.,
International Aid Sweden, and the Education Development Center (EDC).
Conceived in response to the findings of the USAID/BEPS54
education sector assessment conducted in May 200355, the purpose of
SSIP was to bring more women into teaching and mobilize communities to
support girls and womens education. By addressing these basic barriers
to girls education, it was hoped that Somali girls primary school
enrollments would increase. The eventual project design included the
creation of a two-year primary school teacher training program for women,
the community mobilization process that helped identify the teacher
trainees, and the school improvement efforts that were realized
simultaneously in the trainees communities of origin.
Over 7,419 children (3,049 of them girls) in 15 primary schools in the
Awdal, Togdheer, and Sahil regions of Somaliland benefited from the
improved facilities, furniture, school management, teacher capacity, and
access to female teachers provided through the school improvement
projects, community mobilization, and teacher training components of
SSIP. The combination of these inputs into the SSIP schools has yielded
tangible results.
More Women Teaching
Of the original 20 women (identified by their home communities)
who wanted to become primary school teachers through the SSIP

213

scholarship program, 19 graduated from the diploma-granting University
of Hargeisa two-year teaching program. During their second year, the
trainees benefited from an eight-week practicum in schools around
Hargeisa, with mentors visiting regularly to observe and offer feedback.
The new teachers took up teaching posts in their communities of origin in
August 2006.
SSIP provided additional training during the final six months of the
project. Fifty-nine teachers, including 19 SSIP teachers, completed two
days of interactive radio instruction (IRI). The IRI included a gender
inclusion emphasis. SSIP also provided an additional five-day HIV/AIDS
and gender awareness training for the 19 SSIP teachers.
In addition to meeting an immediate need for more women teachers,
SSIP also made an important contribution to growing the ranks of female
teachers in the long term. Because of USAID efforts, the University of
Hargeisa now has a faculty of education with over 400 students. The
programs focus on empowering women has been internalized as part of
the mission of the University of Hargeisa and is, significantly, strongly
supported by the Somaliland Ministry of Education. The precedent has
been set in Somaliland for this type of training, and this model will
continue to increase opportunities for women in Somaliland.
Community Support for Teachers
SSIP worked to mobilize communities to support female teachers and
girls school enrollment. One hundred and twelve community education
committee members were trained across 15 communities, resulting in
increased support for female teachers, improved school management, and a
62% increase in female primary school enrollment. School improvement
projects went hand-in-hand with the community mobilization process.
Communities signed letters of commitment to support girls enrollment in
214
15 primary schools where SSIP improved the physical structure and
resources of the schools. The communities contributed to the building
process and learned how to support the returning primary school teacher
trainees.
Improvements to Primary Schools
Fifteen primary schools benefited from improved conditions. Needs
assessments determined which of the following were required at each
school: rehabilitation of existing classrooms, addition of new classrooms to
accommodate the desired enrollment increase, water tanks, latrines
(especially when separate latrines for girls are non-existent), and furniture
for classrooms. All 15 schools received teacher aid kits, sports kits, and
electric fans. In all, SSIP and its community partners rehabilitated 28
classrooms and furnished 51 classrooms. They also built 17 new
classrooms, 10 water tanks, and 44 latrines. In addition, in collaboration
with the IRI program, SSIP procured 33 radios and placed them in the 15
SSIP schools and 18 additional schools.
More Girls in Primary Schools
Some basic barriers to Somali girls school enrollment include lack of
female teachers, lack of classrooms, lack of latrines and water at school
facilities, and lack of encouragement and understanding from the
community about the importance of supporting girls schooling. By
addressing these barriers, SSIP aimed to increase girls enrollments in
primary schools. This increase occurred and reinforced the effectiveness
of the projects design concept and implementation. Girls enrollments
increased by 62% across the 15 school sites (boys enrollments, while not
the focus of SSIP, increased by 7%). In the SSIP schools, the gender gap
between girls and boys decreased from 36% in August 2005 to 18% in
J anuary 2006.

215

Three schools showed decreases in girls enrollments. SSIP went
back to those communities to discuss the gender balance with community
education committees (CECs). In the majority of those cases, the CECs
had not allowed female members to speak in support of girls and womens
education. SSIP shifted the make-up of those CECs to bring more gender
advocacy. Also, most schools that showed a decrease in enrollment had no
female teachers, and the advent of a new female teacher from the SSIP
scholarship program was expected to make a difference the next school
year.
Follow-on and Sustainability
CARE and the Education Development Center have continued
mentoring the trained SSIP teachers. CARE, the education coordination
team, and EDC have worked closely to review the Primary Teacher
Training Curriculum and design a radio training program based on that
curriculum.
CARE is also involved in a teacher training program, SCOTT, which
is funded by the EU to continue through 2008. Through this program,
CARE ensures that the 19 SSIP teachers benefit from the ongoing
mentoring program conducted by the University of Hargeisa, Gollis
College, Amoud University, and the University of Burao. As part of
SCOTT, SSIP teachers attended residential trainings in December 2006
and J une 2007.
An unintended outcome of SSIP was the formation and growth of a
faculty of education at the University of Hargeisa. The university did not
have a faculty of education prior to SSIP, but because of USAIDs
program the University of Hargeisa was able to build and will now sustain
a teacher education program. Another USAID-funded program, the Civil
Society Strengthening Program, dovetailed its efforts with those of SSIP
216
by funding additional library and materials procurement and training for
University of Hargeisa instructors. The university will continue training
teachers for Somalilands schools beyond the life of this project, and the
seeds sown with SSIP will have far-reaching benefits for women, girls, and
the entire population of Somaliland.
SSIP focused on nurturing its relationship with the Ministry of
Education (MOE). Although SSIP was initially executed through a
fledgling primary teacher training institution, the Somaliland Teacher
Education College (STEC), it became apparent after a year of support and
training that continuing a relationship with the STEC would jeopardize
teachers certification and SSIPs collaboration with the MOE. The
program was shifted to the University of Hargeisa, which has a healthy
working relationship with the MOE. This focus on harmonizing teacher
training and certification with the MOE has made the difference in
ensuring that initial and subsequent SSIP teachers will be certified, posted,
and paid official salaries, greatly reducing the risk of teacher attrition.
Low or no salary is cited around the globe as a barrier to remaining in
teaching.
56
Also, hoping to continue SSIPs program model, the regional
education offices and the CECs are discussing identifying and recruiting
more teachers for SSIP schools.
Overcoming Challenges
Challenges for SSIP included security issues and the resulting
constraints on contractors (due to U.S. government travel restrictions), the
number and variety of voices at the disparate locations involved,
institutional constraints at teacher training institutes, the ministry of
education and teacher training institution relationship building, and the
need for remedial academic preparation for teacher trainees. It was
difficult to find women with levels of education adequate for teaching in

217

primary schools. The program focused on bringing teacher knowledge to a
level of proficiency in basic curricular areas, such as math.
Throughout the project design changes, SSIP remained focused on
the original objectives generated in September 2003 by USAID: more and
better-trained female teachers and community support for teachers
strengthened. The focus shifted from capacity-building tasks to school
improvement tasks when the original project design was adapted to fit the
evolving circumstances in Somaliland. The final project design focused on
the scholarship program for female teachers, school improvement projects,
and community mobilization.
Conclusions
Although political motivations and national security issues are
inherent to the U.S. foreign assistance agenda, in the execution of SSIP
these motives did not preclude USAID from staying attuned to the cultural
context of the receiving country. On the contrary, USAID attempted to
understand the on-the-ground context and, by focusing on marginalized
women and children, espoused a pro-poor policy.
57

The SSIP teacher training program yielded tangible benefits for girls
and women while also raising boys primary enrollment rates. These
outcomes support the argument for education inputs in persistent
emergency situations, such as in Somaliland and other parts of Somalia.
Although the Black Hawk down legacy and political insecurity in the
region have adversely affected U.S. development assistance levels for
Somalia, it is still surprising that the United States has not allocated higher
levels of aid to this geopolitically strategic country in the Global War on
Terrorism. Some, like Ahsan in his assessment of Pakistan,
58
criticize the
transparent national security motivations of donor countries, but if the
results are mutually beneficial, as Ahsan concedes they are in Pakistan,
59

218
then it may be acceptable for bilateral political motivations to drive
funding of development projects, especially if outcomes are reached
collaboratively, with significant input from international organizations and
the host government.
Political motivations have trumped human rights and
humanitarianism in driving aid flows for bilateral donors, particularly the
United States. In this era of globalization, the United States has a position
of tremendous power and influence in multilateral aid organizations; it has
used this power to gain cooperation in the war on terrorism. Perhaps the
U.S. perspective of aid could expand to a rights and duties model, as Luna
described,
60
which might guide aid motivation as a compromise between
the charity model and the national interests framework. As a member of
the global community, the United States has a vested interest in the
fulfilled rights and duties of all citizens of the worldand not just as
perceived through U.S. paradigms for national security and economic
progress.

Notes

1
In this paper, Somalia refers to three regions: Somaliland, Puntland, and
southern Somalia. If Somaliland specifically is discussed, it will be
referred to as Somaliland.
2
Lobe, J . (2007). Africa to get its own U.S. military command. Retrieved
February 22, 2007 from <http://www.antiwar.com/lobe/?articleid=10443>.
3
Asher, R. (1962). Multilateral versus bilateral aid: An old controversy
revisited. International Organization, 16, 697719.
4
Apodaca, C. & Stohl, M. (1999). United States human rights policy and
foreign assistance. International Studies Quarterly, 43, 185198;

219

Neumayer, E. (2003). Do human rights matter in bilateral aid allocation? A
quantitative analysis of 21 donor countries. Social Science Quarterly, 84,
650-666.
5
Neumayer, Do human rights matter?
6
Apodaca and Stohl, United States human rights policy.
7
Dollar, D & Levin, V. (2006). The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-
2003. World Development, 34, 2034-2046.
8
Millenium Challenge Corporation. Indicators. Retrieved February 25, 2007
from <http://www.mcc.gov/selection/indicators/index.php>.
9
Macdonald, R. & Hoddinott, J . (2004). Determinants of Canadian bilateral aid
allocations: Humanitarian, commercial or political? Canadian J ournal of
Economics, 37, 294-312.
10
Luna, F. (2005). Poverty and inequality: Challenges for the IAB. Bioethics,
19, 451-459.
11
Congressional Research Service, 2004.
12
Ahsan, M. (2005). Politicization of bilateral aid and educational development
in Pakistan. Educational Studies, 31, 235250.
13
U.S. Department of State, Transformational Diplomacy,
<http://www.state.gov>, 2006.
14
USAID. (2006, J anuary). Policy framework for bilateral foreign aid:
Implementing transformational diplomacy through development.
Washington, DC: Author.
15
Moseley, W. (2006, August 8). Americas lost vision: The demise of
development. International Herald Tribune.
16
U.S. Department of State. (2007). FY 2008 International Affairs Function
150) Budget Request Summary and Highlights. Retrieved February
25, 2007 from
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/80151.pdf.
17
USAID. (2006, February). Strategic Framework for Africa. Washington, DC:
Author.
18
Tarnoff, C. & Nowels, L. (2004). Foreign aid: An introductory overview of
U.S. programs and policy. Washington, DC: Congressional research
Service for the Library of Congress.
19
USAID. (2006). CBJ Profile. Retrieved December 9, 2006 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/pdf/so_profile05.pdf>.
20
USAID, Africa page. Retrieved December 8, 2006 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr>.
21
Lancaster, C. (2007). U.S. foreign economic aid in 2008: Winners and losers
in President Bushs proposed budget. Retrieved February 22, 2007 from
http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2007/02/us_foreign_economic_a
id_in_200.php>.
220

22
Copson, R. (2005). Africa: U.S. foreign assistance issues. Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service for the Library of Congress.
23
Ibid.
24
USAID. Leading U.S. Assistance Recipients in Africa.
25
USAID. Limited presence countries. Retrieved December 8, 2006 from
<http://www.usaidredso.org/countries/index.html>.
26
USAID. (2006). Kenya data sheet. Retrieved December 9, 2006 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr/ke.html>.
27
USAID. (2006). Ethiopia data sheet. Retrieved December 9, 2006 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr/et.html>.
28
USAID/Somalia. (June 2, 2006). USAID/Somalia Operational Plan FY 2006.
Nairobi, Kenya: Author.
29
USAID. (2006). Somalia country page. Retrieved December 9, 2006 from
<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr/so.html>.
30
Somalia Aid Coordination Body. (2003). SACB Donor Report 2003. Nairobi:
Author. Retrieved December 9, 2006 from
<http://www.somaliasupportsecretariat.info/MainDonor.htm>.
31
DfID. (2006). DfID activity in Somalia. Retrieved December 9, 2006 from
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/somalia-prog.asp/html>.
32
USAID/Somalia. (2005, June). USAID/Somalia Annual Report FY 2005.
Nairobi, Kenya: Author.
33
USAID, Congressional Budget J ustification Profile- Somalia, 2006.
34
USAID, Somalia Operational Plan FY 2005.
35
USAID, Somalia, 2006.
36
USAID/Somalia, Somalia Operational Plan FY 2006.
37
USAID/Somalia, Operational Plan FY 2005.
38
Menkhaus, K. (2007). Spoilers, state-building, and the politics of coping in
Somalia. International Security.
39
Press TV. 24 February 2007. Heavy U.S. collusion with Ethiopia in Somalia
invasion. From
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=442&sectionid=3510205>.
40
DfID, DfID activity in Somaliland.
41
Department for International Development (DfID). DfID country engagement
plan for Somalia. Retrieved December 9, 2006 from
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/somaliaep04.pdf>.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
44
World Bank. (2005, J anuary). Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and dynamics.
Washington, DC: Author.
45
McGown, R. (2003). Redefining social roles: The extraordinary strength of
Somali women. Women and Environments International, 58-59, 13-14.
46
UNICEF. (2006). Somalia. Retrieved December 10, 2006 from

221

<http://www.tsunamigeneration.org/infobycountry/somalia_865.html>.
47
The clitoris, labia minora, and labia majora are removed and stitched together
to form scar tissue over the vagina when it heals. A small opening is left to
allow for urine and menstrual flow to pass.
48
J aldesa, G., Askew, I., Njue, C., & Wanjiru, M. (2005, February). Female
genital cutting among the Somali of Kenya and management of its
complications. Washington, DC: USAID.

49
Nour, N. (2006). Urinary calculus associated with female genital cutting.
Obstetrics and Gynecology, 107, 521-523.
50
Mount-Cors, M. (2006, J uly). Somaliland School Improvement Program Final
Report. Washington, DC: Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) for
USAID.
51
J aldesa et al, Female genital cutting.
52
Gundel, J . & Dharbaxo, A. (2006). The predicament of the Oday: The role
of traditional structures in security, rights, law and development in
Somalia. Nairobi, Kenya: Danish Refugee Council and Novib/Oxfam.
53
Ibid.
54
Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) Activity, a USAID contract
managed by Creative Associates International, Inc., implemented
education projects requested by USAID foreign missions and Washington
bureaus in over 50 countries from 2000 to 2006.
55
Cummings, W. and Rost van Tonningen, L. (2003, May). Somalia education
sector assessment with special attention to the northwest zone.
Washington, DC: Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) for USAID.
56
Forojalla, S. B. (1993). Educational planning for development. New York: St.
Martins Press; Kirby, S. & Grissmer, D. (1993). Teacher attrition: Theory,
evidence, and suggested policy options. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Distribution Services.
57
Ahsan, Politicization of bilateral aid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Luna, Poverty and inequality.
222
THE ISLAMIC COURTS AND ETHIOPIAS
INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA:
REDEMPTION OR ADVENTURISM?
Said S. Samatar

Few writers have failed to notice the formidable pride of
the Somali nomad, his extraordinary sense of superiority
as an individual, and his firm conviction that he is sole
master of his actions and subject to no authority except
that of God. If they have perceived it, however, they
have been baffled by the shifting character of the
nomads political allegiance and puzzled by the fact that
the political and jural unit with which he acts on one
occasion he opposes on another (Emphasis added).
1

I was travelling between two stations in the Ukamba
Province of British East Africa, when I saw a large
caravan coming along the road. Noticing that the natives
in charge differed from any with which I was acquainted,
I turned to the corporal of my police escort, a sturdy
Baganda, and asked him to what tribe they belonged.
Putting his nose in the air, and with an expressive click
with his tongue, he replied: Somalis, Bwana, they no
good; each man his own Sultan. (Emphasis added.)
2

Constant in only one thinginconstancy. A fierce
and turbulent race of republicans.
3

Thomas Cargill and Sally Healy have made a trans-Atlantic
investment in me. Surely, they will not get an equitable return on their
investment. But that does not weigh heavily on my mind. Chatham
House, this venerable institution of British Foreign Policy establishment,
scares the daylights out of me. I heard that the likes of Arnold Toynbee
and A. J . P. Taylor used to hang out here. Their ghosts, by turns
Said S. Samatar

223

censorious and playful, no doubt still walk the hall ways. Even more
awesome I. M. Lewis, at once dean of Somali Studies and doyen of social
anthropology, sits there alive and well. What is a former nomad (me, that
is) who herded camels in the overheated deserts of the Ogaadeen and who
did not learn to read and write until the age of 16, doing here? Who am I
to stand on the hallowed ground of Chatham House? Just the same, I am
here to stay, at least for the evening. And I am loath to proceed further
without bringing in, for good measure, Dr. Taylors aphoristic dig at this
somber, history-saturated building. Maybe, he observed in his
characteristically epigrammatic style, the world would have been saved a
lot of trouble if Hitler could have been given a job in some German
equivalent of Chatham House, where he could have speculated harmlessly
for the rest of his life.
4

Now: since I had sent in the title Why Somalia is No Territory for
Islamic Terrorists, a great deal has happened. For one thing, even as we
speak, the Ethiopian flag is flyingnay, undulating beatifically in the red,
green, golden stripes and all--over Mogadishu, Somalias capital, and this
at the invitation of Somalias Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
This is surely an ironic development, in view of the fact that for ages
Ethiopia stood, in the eyes of Somalis, as the putative foe of the Somalis.
Meles Zenawi, Ethiopias Prime Minister, seems to mean business,
determined as he is to turn Somalia into a client state, if not an outright
colony. Nuruddin Farah, the Somali novelist, once aptly spoofed Ethiopia
as an Empire in Rags, whose huddled starving masses are worse off, per
capita, than the Somalis. And yet despite the Rags, Ethiopia boasts a
battle-hardened professional army that can probably defeat in a
conventional war the combined forces of Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and
Kenya. So, the new working title should read: The Islamic Courts and
Ethiopias Intervention in Somalia: Redemption or Adventurism? Id like
224
to start off, if I may, by borrowing a line from Porfirio Diaz, Mexicos
truculent dictator near the end of the 19
th
Century. Despairing over
Mexicos existential vulnerability to the machinations of the American
colossus to the north, Mr. Diaz lamented: Poor Mexico, so far from God
and so close to the United States! Can that line be modified to read:
Poor Somalia, so far from Allah, and so near to Ethiopia! To judge by
the history of Ethio-Somali relations, the Empire of Rags has managed
historically, nearly always, to have its way with the Somalis--a
circumstance that prompts the question: Is it the fate of Somalia to slink in
the shadow of Ethiopia?
More than this, political events in the Horn of Africa tend to favor the
bizarre and unpredictable. For centuries Ethio-Somali interactions have
been characterized by an unrelenting state of belligerence. As long as
memory serves, the two countries have been on the brink of war, actually
twice went to an open war in the twentieth century, once in 1964, then in
1977. Indeed, it is Somalias loss of the latter war that precipitated the
coup attempt, by army units commanded by none other than Abdullahi
Yusuf, president of the current fledgling TFG, that set Somalia on its long
course of crisis, climaxing in its collapse in 1991, thus marking the end of
Somalia as a state. Then events took a paradoxical turn in the waning days
of 2006 when, suddenly and with the express appeal of the TFG, as well as
the tacit prodding of the United States, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and
routed the Islamists, many of whom were killed, captured or left cowering
in the bushes. Who knew!? But will this be the end of the story? Or did
the mullahs make a strategic withdrawal in order to return and fight
another day? After all, following the Prophets (PBUH) pattern (Hijrah or
flight from Mecca in 622 AD, consolidation in Medina and triumphal
march on Mecca eight years later), Muslim warriors throughout the ages,
from Usuman dan Fodio of the Nigerian Hausa in the early decades of the
Said S. Samatar

225

nineteenth century to jihadists in our own time, have employed the
withdrawal-consolidation-return approach.
No one can foretell the slippery lurchings of political events in the
Horn of Africa. Did Ethiopias decisive intervention in Somalia, for
example, create a tipping point in favor of the TFG that could serve as a
prelude to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa? In any case it could
be said, at least for the time being, that there have been winners and losers
in this recent war for Somalia. One obvious winner must surely be the TFG
which, after months of exile and humiliation, might finally have taken
control of the country. A second, still more obvious winner, is bound to be
Ethiopias Prime Minister, whose lightening-speed dramatic victory over
the Islamists not only diverts attention from his serious domestic problems,
including the opposition to his government by members of his political
opponents who claim to have won the last election but were cheated out of
the fruits of victory. Many of these politicians are rotting away in jail
today. But the victory in Somalia seems to have given him the ammunition
to silence them. It would be a treasonable act, Meles would no doubt
declaim rhetorically, to criticize the government when the nation is at war.
A third winner may well be the U.S. government, which can not have
concealed its delight in seeing the ejection of the Islamists. In view of the
on-going fiasco in Iraq, and an increasingly resurgent Taliban in
Afghanistan, the Bush administration can at least point to some success in
the Horn of Africa. Still yet, a fourth winner might be the State of Kenya
which has a good reason to believe that, with a stable government in
Somalia, Somali refugees who have been pouring into Kenya, thereby
threatening to destabilize Kenyas eastern border, will now cease to stream
across. A fifth and final winner, perhaps, concerns the image of Africa as
a whole. Historically, Africans have been accused of not taking the
initiative for their domestic difficulties and always helplessly, haplessly
226
and passively, looking to the initiatives of outsiders to save them.
Ethiopias projection of force in Somalia, ostensibly in response to the
appeals of a neighboring sister country, belies the image of the passive
African. In any case, if Ethiopias intervention in Somalia leads to peace
and stability in that troubled country, Meles Zenawi, bizarrely enough, will
go down in history as a hero of Somali nationalism--indeed a mind-
boggling prospect to anticipate.
Inevitably, the Somalia muddle seems to have produced an odd
couple of losers as well. Clearly President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea has
been dragged in the mud once again, as his dog in the fight has been
decisively whipped. Egypt also lost. It could be said that the history of the
Horn of Africa, throughout the ages, has been the story of a struggle
between Egypt and Ethiopia for regional hegemony. This latest round of
Ethio-Egyptian skirmishing seems to have followed the historic pattern of
Ethiopia prevailing over Egypt. Much as Hosni Mubarak in particular, and
the Arab world in general, fulminated against Ethiopias adventurism in
Somalia, Egypt has proven once again to be too timidmaybe too
toothless in the face of a bold Ethiopian interjection--to act in behalf of its
Somali clients. There is something, it could be said, that habituallyand
perverselyworks against the diplomatic efforts of the physically big and
burly Egyptians when it comes to dealing with the slight-of-build but wily
Abyssinians. Perhaps there is some wisdom in the popular Arabic dictum:
al-Qasiir, Basiir Short is Shrewd! The Ethiopian national symbol, its
coat of arms, as it were, has been, historically, a royal-looking lion. Now
the Ethiopian Ambassa, or Lion, has come down roaring from the
highlands into the Somali lowlands in order to lie down with the Somali
lamb; but the Somali lamb will not get much sleep!
But appearance is one thing, reality another. Far from leading to a
national triumph, Ethiopias reckless plunge into the Somalia quagmire
Said S. Samatar

227

may well turn out to be a catastrophic blunder on the part of the Empire of
Rags, and may even cost the wilyand slight-of-build-- Mr. Zenawi
dearly. Ethiopias excursion into the Somali bush lands surely entails
untold dangers for the highland Abyssinian state. If Ethiopia gets bogged
down in the Somali sand dunes, as she is likely to do, this will signal the
breaking of the Somali run of back luck with respect to Ethiopia that has
plagued the pastoral Somalis since recorded times. Given the traditional
hostility between Muslim Somalia and Christian-ruled Ethiopia, the
Somalis will, undoubtedly, turn against the Ethiopian presence in their
land. A massive insurgency both against Ethiopia and its fledgling client,
the TFG, is already under way. As President George Bush has painfully
learned in Iraq, no army, however awesome its firepower, has ever
succeeded in putting down an insurgency by military means alone--short of
genocide. And genocide is unthinkable in this age of CNN cameras tagging
after U. S. platoon patrols. Yet, alarmingly in the Somali case, as
Professor Lewis pointed out in his eloquent, short piece entitled:
Ethiopias Invasion of Somalia:
Reports that the forces of transitional president and his
Ethiopian allies have committed war crimes against
civilians in the course of trying to subdue the citizens is
no surprise. Much more surprising, and morally
satisfying, [Professor Lewis continues], is the news that
the European ministers and officials, who have so
vociferously and uncritically supported Abdullahi in his
bid to represent himself as Somali President, may also be
implicated in these charges. If Lewis is right--and he
usually is in these matters--itd be quite a spectacle to see
European Union officials dragged before the
International Criminal Court and tried for war crimes in
Somalia.

As Somali resistance to the Ethiopian occupation mounts, the
Islamists will surely returnwell, they already have-- to create Iraq-like
228
conditions for the Ethiopian forces; and the ensuing mayhem and wanton
destruction is likely to drench the country in bloodshed, making unhappy
Somalia even more unhappy. Every additional day that Ethiopia stays in
Somalia is likely to bring about the apocalypse in the Horn of Africa.
Worse still, the United States sudden shift from covert to overt
involvement in the Somali conflict was surely needless, wrong-headed and
ill-advised. Americas aerial bombardment, for example, in the closing
days of December, 2006, of the remnants of the fleeing Islamists in
southwestern Somalia, further served to inflame global Islamic
sensibilities, as it was seen by Muslims throughout the world as another
naked aggression by the Great Satan against yet another Muslim country.
To their credit, again as Lewis reminds us, the Islamic courts, in
their brief months in power in Southern Somalia, with their mostly humble
poorly educated local leaders, did more to restore order and social progress
there than the US has done in Iraq in four years. But, to their lasting folly
also, which they must be regretting now, the Islamists made two fatal
blunders in the run-up to the Ethiopian invasion. One was their idle, shrill
banter of threats of jihad against the instinctively jihad-fearing Ethiopian
state. This has played into the hands of Meles Zenawi by giving him a
convenient pretext to take, as he claimed, a drastic action in self-defense
against the mullahs.
The second was their imposition on the Somalis of a primitive
Medieval-style Islamic version of Shariah law, wherein they had banned
the cinemas, outlawed music and soccer games, and even, allegedly,
executed people for not observing the ritual of the five daily prayers. By
this kind of harsh, barbaric impositions, the Islamists would surely have
come to discredit themselves in the eyes of the Somalis. In the six months
that they ruled southern Somalia, they managed to make themselves highly
unpopular. Now, with their defeat, the Islamists could gradually be
Said S. Samatar

229

transformed in the eyes of Somalis into patriotic martyrs defending their
faith and country against Christian invaders. Therefore, it can be argued
that the Ethiopian intervention was tragically premature.
Now, to turn to the issue of Why Somalia is no territory for Islamic
terrorists. Simply put, the patterns of Somali social organizationor
more appropriately disorganizationprecludes the possibility of the
growth of a large-scale, grassroots jihadist movement in Somalia. In fact
Id defy Murphys Law to argue that Somalia will never be a breeding
ground for Islamic terrorism. Here is why: the Somali polity, in my view,
is shaped to an extraordinary degree, by a central principle that overrides
all others, namely the phenomenon that social anthropologists refer to as
the segmentary lineage system. (And of course, the masterful authority
on the concept of lineage segmentation is here, I. M. Lewis. To digress for
a moment--Great Britain, in my view, produced in the 20
th
century two
pioneering social anthropologists, the one having been the late Evans-
Pritchard, affectionately known among colleagues as EP, on the Nuer of
the Sudan, and the other, the living I. M. Lewis on the Somalis. These two
have, between them, divided the world of social anthropology. There is no
third, excepting perhaps the late A. Radcliffe-Brown.)
Segmentation, that is, is a chaotic non-system that divides Somali
society into unstable warring segments and that pits practically all levels of
the Somali body politic, including the religious level, against one another,
thereby enshrining institutional instability as a norm. Thus, segmentation
stands as the root cause of the reason the Somalis have repeatedly failed to
form a centralized national government for nearly two decades now,
despite much strenuous trying, principally because the underlying social
fabric of the Somali polity militates against centralization. Instead, it
ineluctably predisposes them into being extremely individualistic, anarchic
230
and egalitarian with a marked tendency to endless schisms. As I. M. Lewis
astutely observed forty-six years ago:
Few writers have failed to (be) baffled by the shifting character of
the [Somalis] political allegiance and puzzled by the fact that the political
and jural unit with which [they act] on one occasion [they] oppose on
another.
Although I. M. Lewiss searing observation was meant to apply only
to the nomads of northern Somalia, it in fact brilliantly describes the
collective character of the Somalis as a whole; whence I have taken
liberties to replace the word nomad with Somalis. Lewis, in other
words, underscores in scientific language what the Bagandan Sergeant
contemptuously expresses in the vernacular: Somalis, Bwana, they no
good; each man his own Sultan. And both observers point to a body
politic in which anarchy reigns supreme fueled by the extremes of
galloping rapaciousness and run-away individualism with no consequences
to indiscriminate pillage (bililiqaysi) and rape (kufsasho), no sense of
individual responsibility, and no accountability for crimes against those too
powerless to defend themselves; in short no checking mechanisms against
the twin curses of human greed and selfishness.
Furthermore, the recent political history of Somalia has shown that
among Somalis ethnic loyalty easily trumps loyalty to Islam, making it all
but impossible for a Somali religious figure to command the absolute
allegiance of his followersif indeed he manages to muster any followers
at allor to rise to the level of reputed piety and spiritual sanctity as to
make his word a law unto others, as is the case with al-Qaeda and other
Islamic jihadists elsewhere. Consider, for example, the structure of the
ICU: it is a rickety amalgam of kinship factions rather than a single unified
Islamic organization, composed of at least eleven separate squabbling
groups, nearly each of which represents a different ethnic entity. I could go
Said S. Samatar

231

on to name names in order to delineate the clannish nature of the so-called
Islamic courts, but will refrain from doing so for reasons of charity,
perhaps of self-interest.
In short, the Islamic Courts Union is neither truly Islamic, nor courts,
nor a union but a fragile coalition of clans wrapping themselves in an
Islamic flag in order to make themselves appear respectable to the
international community. And of course to give the U.S. a fright! That
they won so easily against the warlords is less indicative of the greatness of
their strength and more the lack of support in the Somali populace for the
hated warlord thugs.
Curiously, the segmentary law makes success lethal to any Somali
group that rises to power and prominence because it works in both
centripetal and centrifugal ways. The segments, that is, unify as easily
against an interfering foreign force as they splinter when left alone. This is
the lesson that recent Somali experience teaches. When the U.S. and other
forces of the international community intervened to save Somalia in
Operation Restore Hope in the early 1990s, the U.S. appeared to Somalis
to be the new Big Boy on the block. Predictably, the segments, who were
previously at war with each other, banded together behind the late Gen. M.
F. Aydiid against America. The result was the disastrous U.S. military
reversal on Bloody Sunday, October 3, 1993. And when Aydiid in his turn
appeared to be the next Big Boy, warlords Muuse Suudi Yalahaw,
Muhammad F. Qanyare and others banded together against him. He was
duly fatally wounded. Then when in J anuary, 2000, Mr. Abdiqaasim Salad
became president of the TNG (Transitional National Government) before
the current TFG (Transitional Federal Government) in the Arta process in
Djibouti, Yalahaw, Qanyare and others brought him down.
Accordingly, as the strength and influence of the ICU expanded, the
segmentary law would have surely swung into action to sabotage them by
232
inspiring a counter-coalition of clans to form against them. By the time of
the Ethiopian intervention, the ICU were falling into squabbling factions,
according to the eye-witness accounts of numerous observers who
requested anonymity for reasons of security considerations. Then the
damned Ethiopians invaded Somalia, thereby restoring the respectability of
the Islamists.
Shaped thus by the weird quirks of lineage segmentation, the
Somalis, as a society, are segmental, warlike, schismatic, and extremely
pragmatic, at least as they understand pragmatism. What is in it for me? A
Somali is likely to ask on any given issue. Therefore the ideology of self-
sacrifice essential for the rise of a great grass roots movement is alien to
his psyche. No Somali, for example, has ever blown himself up for the
cause of al-Islam. (Incidentally, I heard from one source that there was a
truck-suicide bombing in one of the Ethiopian garrisons. If true, this is
indeed a new development.) A classic Somali proverb holds that once
upon a time, Allah and a warrior chieftain named Atoosh began to wage a
terrific fight over us (Somalis), and we forthwith went with the chief
against Allah, because the chief could deliver the goods faster than Allah
could. That is, a Somali would promptly go against the law of Allah, if
doing so turns out to be in his perceived material interest. Proverbs are
strong indicators of the Somali collective character: Somaliyi been waa
sheegtaa, laakiin been ma maahmaahdo: Somalis will tell a lie, but they
never codify a lie into a proverb. Another venerable Somali saying holds:
Sheikh tolkiis kama janno tego even a holy man, faced with the choice
of paradise on the one hand, and loyalty to the clan on the other, would
without hesitation choose the clan over paradise.
Arguably, the Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hasan, the George
Washington of Somali nationalism and the Dante Alighieri of Somali
literature rolled into one, did succeed in leading a rather drawn-out,
Said S. Samatar

233

grassroots resistance against the combined powers of Britain, Italy and
Ethiopia (1898-1920.) And yet his movement killed an estimated one
million Somalis and precious few infidels. As the Italian Consul in Aden,
Cavalliere Pestalozza, the only European to set eyes on the elusive Mullah,
reminds us, the Sayyids movement, having miserably failed to unify
Somalis against infidel rule, deteriorated into internecine bloodletting.
What about the Somalilanders? What explains their success in
achieving a modicum of democracy and stability? Why doesnt
segmentation wreak havoc on them, as it does in the south? Three factors,
in my view, account for their tenuous secret of success:
First, the Somalilanders fought a long bitter war of resistance against
Siyaad Barres tyranny. The SNM (Somali National Movement) fighters
fought in the same trenches, died together, suffered together and, in the
course of this, achieved a high degree of solidarity and common purpose.
The crucible of fire shaped them into a unifying common goal.
Second, because they are so desirous to receive world recognition,
Somalilanders seem to have determined to show good behavior before the
international community; and hence to keep from hanging out their dirty
linen in public. For instance, it is the conventional wisdom that the last
election (2003) was won by the opposition party, Kulmiye, led by Ahmed
Mohammad Mahamuud Silaanyo, but that he was cheated out of power
through stuffed ballot boxes and other electoral irregularities. Silaanyo was
then strongly advised, according to the prevailing view, to refrain from
fighting the fraudulent election results in order to preserve the good image
of Somaliland before the world community.
Third and most important, the traditional institution of elders is still
alive and well in Somaliland, but moribund in the south. This goes back to
the developmental difference between the two regions during the colonial
interlude. For example when, in 1991-2, Somaliland came close to a civil
234
war, it was the crucial intervention of the elders with their negotiating
skills and deference toward one another that saved it from the fate of the
south; by contrast, the elders institution is practically dead in southern
Somalia, on account of the economic transformation that destroyed
important aspects of the Souths pastoral institutions. Ex-Italian Somalia,
that is, is too changed to leave an effective role for the balancing hand and
conflict management skills of traditional elders. She is stuck in a limbo
between the rock of pre-industrial relations and attitudes on the one hand,
and the hard place of half-baked modernization on the other.
So, what next for the south? There are three clan groupings that
matter in Mogadishu and adjacent lands: the Murursade, the Habar Gidir
and the Abgaal. The Habar Gidir are solidly opposed to the TFG. The
Murursade, too, as the smallest of the three, seem to be against the TFG.
That leaves the numerically strong Abgaal as the critical element for the
survival of the rickety TFG. If they go with it, Abdullahi, Geddi and Co.
have a fair chance of surviving. If the Abgaal, too, go against them, they
are certain to be doomed.

1 I. M. Lewis. A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of pastoralismand politics among the
Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa. Oxford: International African Institute. 1999.
P. 1. First published by Oxford University Press for the International African Institute
1961.
2 R. E. Drake-Brockman. British Somaliland. London: Hurst & Rackett, LTD. 1912. P.
102.
3 Richard Burton (later Sir), disguised as a Muslimholy man named al-Hajj Abdallah,
reporting fromthe Somali coast, 1854.
4 (Origins of the Second World War. New York: Atheneum, 1983, p. xiii.)

235
Hussein Adam:
How an Ordinary Boy Became an
Extraordinary Man
Hassan MahadallahIntroduction
Said SamatarTribute Speech
Hussein Adam--Response

Introduction

Dib maxaa idiin celinayoo / Horay idiin diiday?
Mar un maad ku dayataan khalqiga / Libinta doonaaya?
What curse sets you (O, you Somalis) back and keeps
you from moving forward?
Why dont you for a change imitate the march of nations
towards peace and progress?
Haajji Aadan Afqalooc

A well-known aphorism posits that a prophet is never honored in his
village. This is even more so if the villagers are agnatically divided, like
the Somalis of today. In this society of ours today, ones prophet is always
anothers false pretender. Cite the name of any Somali hero or heroine
among Somalis and chances are that you will kick off a heated
controversy. This culture of denying and demeaning our forefathers and
compatriots impoverishes us all. It is time that we abandon it and cleanse
our souls of it.
I think it was a character in one of Brechts plays, who said, Pity the
nation that has no heroes, to which another responded: Pity the nation
that needs heroes. Either way, we are in a pitiable situation because we
have no heroes and we sorely need them. Of course, this is to our undoing.
For so long, we have denied our forefathers and compatriots who left for us
236
their noble example and character. We never recognized their great
achievements nor gave tribute to their noble deeds. The night we honored
Professor Hussein Adam at the 10
th
Triennial Somali Studies International
Association (SSIA) in Columbus was a cultural highpoint for us Somalis. It
was a remarkable night in which we crossed a cultural Rubicon: We
honored one of our own and celebrated his achievement!
The Honoring of Professor Adam was an honor to more than one
man. It was an honor to ourselves as a nation--past and present. From now
on, we can all take pride in his incredible achievement and refined
cosmopolitan character. This is the conceptual framework of the honoring
speech by Professor Said Sheikh Samatar. And the one that follows it is
Professor Adams gracious speech of acceptance.
Tribute Speech
Good evening, colleagues and comrades.
We gather here tonight to celebrate a legendary life, to renew old
friendships, and to make new ones. The title of my remarks goes
something like this:
HUSSEIN ADAM: How an ordinary Boy became an extraordinary
man.
But first, a disclaimer on behalf of Hussein Adam. He did not want
this trouble. He was dragged into it, kicking and screaming. He did agree
that it is time that Somalis learned to honor their own, but he wanted the
honoring to go to someone else. So, he rattled out a string of nameswhat
about so and so?
No, I aint interested, I replied.
What about this, that or the other?
No, I aint interested.
After six months of speechifying in which I talked at him, around
him, over him, under him, the man began to fear I might talk the hind legs
Said S. Samatar

237

off him. So reluctantly, he finally relented, and I rejoiced! Id like to start,
if I may, with a Somali cautionary tale:
Waxaa la yiri: Shimbiri maalin bay dabqaaday,
maalintiina Gurigii hooyadeed bay gubtay
Translation: Once upon a time a bird tried to do
something good for her mother by offering to transport
the fire for the family, and she ended up burning down
her mothers house.
This is the first time, ever, that Ive tried to do something good. And
I hope I dont end up burning down your house, Hussein!
To go back to the beginnings: In the lush green valley on the
foothills of Mount Mero, fifty miles away from Hemmingways The
Snows of Kilimanjaro, in the Tanzanian city of Arusha, in April 1943, a
baby boy was born of a Somali father from Hargeisa and a mother with a
mixed pedigree of a Masai woman and an Indian Muslim man. Exotic,
isnt it? The boy was a madi, Somali for an-only child, and yet he was
destined to make up for that deprivation by siring seven children
children who, now as grownups, are in their turn busy siring. This means
that Hussein will have increased the Somali population by no mean
percentage. Talk about psychology!
According to my passportnobody knows for sure the year of my
birth because I was born among the camels and camels do not keep
records-- according to the arbitrary date on my passport, I too, was born in
1943. Obviously, genius has an excellent sense of timing. Thus, 1943
heralded the birth of two stars.
Being raised in a strange land necessarily involves growing-hazards.
Dr. Adam reminisces about one particularly traumatic experience when he
was a school boy. I quote it verbatim from the notes he provided me with:
One of the memorable moments of my life took place
when I was in the 4
th
grade. During the usual school
parade, the African headmaster asked four of us Somali
238
students to step up to the front of the parade. He then
proceeded to humiliate us in front of the whole school.
He chided us with the following words that have been
ingrained in my memory: Look carefully at these four
beggars. They are begging us to stay in our paradise,
green land of (the then) Tanganyika. This is because
they have no land to go to. A friend who fought in the
war [WWII] visited Somali areas and confirmed to me
that there is nothing but desert sand, sand and sand; and a
very hot sun. They should thank us for saving them from
the sandy hot desert.
Being mocked in front of an unruly mob of school boys is devastating
enough; but when the mocker is the supreme authority figure who is
looked up to as to a god, the impact on a young sensitive child can be a
shattering of a kind that leaves a permanent wound. But the boy was gifted
with an inner strength, in truth a steely hardihood that was to stand him in
good stead throughout his life. Instead of being crushed emotionally he,
characteristically, responded with an in-your-face gesture of defiance. He
recollects:
It was at that public humiliation moment that I resolved
to love sand and deserts. I resolved that at the end of my
studies, however long it took, I would go straight to help
Somalia even though I did not even speak Somali,
whereas my Swahili was more than excellent. The
humiliation made me love everything Somali: the
beaches and the sand, the anthills, cities like Mogadishu,
Hargeisa, Burao, Beled Wein, Bosaaso and Garaowe,
and [also] love the food, and above all, really love
Somali women!!!
Amen, brother, I second that sentiment!
For the gift of Hussein, we have that Bantu headmaster to thank.
Here a vignette may be worth telling: during the height of the Spanish
Inquisition, the Muslims and J ews of Spain were confronted with three
stark choices: convert to Christianity, be exiled, or worse still, be put to
death. The Muslims retreated to their sanctuaries in North Africa. But
Said S. Samatar

239

J ews had nowhere to go. Then in an episode that both testifies to the
liberal tolerance of the classical age of Islam and the debt J ews owe to
Islam, the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481-1512) invited the hapless
J ews to settle in his dominions in complete religious freedom, with the
rider to the Spanish king: what kind of sovereign is it that impoverishes
his kingdom, while enriching mine by dispatching the best of his citizens
to me? By analogy, what kind of Headmaster is it that impoverishes
Tanzania, while enriching Somalia by sending Hussein to the latter?
At his secondary school: there was a lot of bullying. Fortunately I
was protected by Ismail Okash, Head Prefect, a fellow Somali from the
Ogaden. Despite the bullying and general brutalitiesbrutalities that
included being bounced out of bed at 5:00am in order to till the land for the
school elite--he graduated at the top of his class, then sat for the
Cambridge-administered exams wherein he scored six distinctions and one
credit. On account of that impressive scholastic achievement, a letter came
one day from out of the blue, containing an offer of a scholarship to
PrincetonIvy League Princeton, Woodrow Wilson Princeton.
At Princeton the boy from Arusha came to rub shoulders with, among
others, the eminent General Muhammad Abshir Haamaan, founder and
commander of the Somali police force, which was judged at that time as
one of the best in Africa. The rest is history, BA from Princeton, MA from
MakerereMakerere then was referred to as the Oxford of East Africa.
Another MA from Harvard, then the icing on the cake: a PhD. Dissertation
title: The Social and Political Thought of Frantz Fanon. You remember
Fanon? The titan in African thought? But then it takes a titan to tackle a
titan! With the Harvard PhD, Hussein Adam must surely have scored a
stunning firstthe first Somali to earn a doctorate from that ber-
prestigious institution.
240
Dr. Adams professional career is too vast to recount. A few
highlights: in addition to his formal degrees, he received diplomas or
attended seminars at the following: Institute of Social Studies, at The
Hague, Holland; American University, Cairo; University of Paris, (I did
not know, Hussein, that you got mixed up with the French, too, and are
French-speaking!) By turns he taught at the following: Makerere
University College, Somali National University, where he helped educated
a generation of Somalis, Brandeis University, and last but certainly not
least, the College of the Holy Cross where he serves as a distinguished
member of that Universitys department of political science.
Impressive scholarly output, too: author, co-author or editor of , by
my count, 9 books, the latest just hot off the Red Sea Press entitled FROM
TYRANNY TO ANARCHY: The Somali Experience. If it is on display at
the Red Sea Press book stalls on campus, dont leave home without it.
Scores of essays in learned journals; book chapters galore; awesome. Dr.
Adams academic honors and awards are equally too numerous to recount.
I will not even bother to go there, nor will I wander into his extra-
scholastic stints, like his tenure with the U.N. as a consultant and his role
in the formation of IGADInter-governmental Authority on
Development.
Hussein officially migrated to his beloved Somalia in 1974, where he
began a new life in a new country. As it turned out, beloved Somalia was
not always kind to him. During the long reign of Muhammad Siad Barre
he was repeatedly passed over for government positions worthy of his
stature. Repeatedly, year after year, illiterates were appointed to choice
ministerial posts on account of their ethnic connections, while the Harvard
don looked on. If that jackal that went by the name of Siad Barre had had a
drop of patriotism in his blood, hed have appointed Hussein, at least,
ambassador plenipotentiary to the three East African countries of Uganda,
Said S. Samatar

241

Kenya and Tanzania. With his native Swahili, exceptional learning and
urbane manners, diplomatically hed have run circles around the bloody
Abyssinians, and Somalia might have been spared the fate that was to
befall her.
If there ever was a man with grounds for grievance and bitterness, it
is Hussein. But he took it all in stride with grace, and without bitterness or
grudges. And that, ladies and gentlemen, bespeaks character, it is the
distinguishing mark of noble substance. But in a sense this injustice might
have been a blessing in disguise. If he had gotten embroiled in the world
of politics, he would have been lost to that of Somali education, where
scores of Somali students have learned from his giving nature. He gave
much and received little in return.
By the way, lest some of you think that I am given to singing
panegyrics, may I remind you that Hussein and I have had a few guerrilla
skirmishings, which on occasion flared up into a veritable sniping. For
example, he once called me an opportunist. I wont tell you what I called
him to return the favor!
The ancient Greeks used to take it as a verity that pain and suffering
lead to redemptive wisdom. If so, maybe what followed in Husseins life
would have a meaning. He was going from success to success, living the
dream life with his family, when abruptly his world came crushing down
around his ears. In 2002 disaster struck. His beloved wife, Faadumo,
suddenly succumbed to a coma. Instead of ditching her in a morbid
hospital bed, as surely many would do, he took her home where he has
been ministering to her needs to the present day. And this, in spite of a full
schedule of teaching, researching and writing. After all, the man is the
bread winner of the family. Again, that bespeaks character, substance,
grace. In other words, Hussein was plunged into the fiery furnace of
tragedy a mere man, and emerged a hero.
242
As the English bard reminds usit turns out that Shakespeare was a
pot head; when they recently examined his pipe, it reeked of reefer scent
as the English bard reminds us Some (men) are born great, some acquire
greatness and some have greatness thrust upon them. Undoubtedly, by
his gallant response to the calamity that befell his family, Hussein has
acquired greatness. And dont be fooled by his frail seeming demeanor.
The man is made of steel, with an abundance of inner fortitude and with a
wealth of prodigious energies.
To sum up: In Hussein, we have a man, a father, an educator, a
scholar of unparalleled versatility, and a patriotin short a national
treasure. Hussein, I salute you. Please rise to receive a token, a certificate
of appreciation that I offer in the name of the SSIA. It reads:
S SP PE EC CI IA AL L E EV VE EN NT T I IN N H HO ON NO OR R O OF F
H HU US SS SE EI IN N A AD DA AM M
F FR RI ID DA AY Y A AG GU US ST T 1 17 7, , 2 20 00 07 7
T Th he e S So om ma al li i S St tu ud di ie es s I In nt te er rn na at ti io on na al l A As ss so oc ci ia at ti io on n
( (S SS SI IA A) ) i is s p pl le ea as se ed d t to o o of ff fe er r y yo ou u t th hi is s t to ok ke en n o of f
a ap pp pr re ec ci ia at ti io on n i in n g gr ra at te ef fu ul l r re ec co og gn ni it ti io on n o of f y yo ou ur r p pa at tr ri io ot ti ic c
c co on nt tr ri ib bu ut ti io on n t to o S So om ma al li i n na at ti io on na al l l li if fe e a an nd d i in n r re es sp pe ec ct tf fu ul l
o ob bs se er rv va an nc ce e o of f y yo ou ur r r ro ol le e a as s t th he e F FO OU UN ND DI IN NG G
F FA AT TH HE ER R o of f t th he e S SS SI IA A

Hussein Adam

243

Response
I wish to thank the organizers of the Columbus 10
th
Congress of the
SSIA-Abdinur Mohamed, Abdi Kusow, Said Shire, Laura Joseph and
Steve Howard, David Kraybill for their diligent, long-term planning and
organization, and warm hospitality. I am deeply grateful to Professor Said
Samatar for his unselfish and noble gesture; I sincerely hope the tradition
will be continued involving even more deserving candidates. I also
commend him for his great sense of Somali humor.
As Said implied in his sponsoring memo, this is an honor not only
to me but also to my dear wife who has been in a coma since September
2002. One night in 1978 while lying in bed next to her, I began to sketch
potential names and acronyms for the Association in order to propose to
my colleagues. International Somali Studies Association spells ISSA we
did not wish to inject clanism. International Association of Somali Studies
spells IASS (we did not plan to be called asses). At this point she said try
SSIA, the Somali Studies International Association
She was the Coordinator of Logistics for the first SSIA Congress in
Mogadishu in 1980. She was the Communication director for the Fifth
Congress at the College of the Holy Cross in 1993. She has played a
supporting role in most of the other Congresses. She has been a pillar
behind my new book From Tyranny to Anarchy: The Somali Experience
she typed earlier versions, she translated Somali documents, provided
feedback for certain opinions and helped with the internet. The SSIA is,
therefore, a family project. And beyond that, it is truly a collective project.
I could not overemphasize the glaring fact that the SSIA is nothing
but the collective and voluntary efforts of many of you here and in other
parts of the world. Please forgive me if I have missed a name or two. I
244
pay tribute to the founding veteran members as well as previous and
present Congress Coordinators: Charles Geshekter, Lee Cassaneli, John
J ohnson, Ali Abdirahman, Said Samatar, Ahmed Samatar, Osman Sultan,
Martin Ganzglass, Mohammed Mukhtar, Ali J umale, Annarita Puglielli,
Thomas Labahn, marian Elmi, Ibrahim Awad, J an J anzen, Pablo Idahosa,
Edna Adan, Abdulkadir Osman, Martin Orwin, Mohamed Gandhi,
Suzanne Lilius, Bereket Habte Sellassie and the publisher of SSIA
volumes, Kassahun Checole, of the Red Sea/Africa World Press. And a
special tribute again goes to the editor/publishes of two distinguished
Somali studies journals Horn of Africa by Said Samatar and Bildhaan by
Ahmed Samatar. I also thank Ahmed Samatar for convening a panel on
my behalf at the 7
th
Congress in Toronto.
I wish to commend and encourage the Djibouti organizers of part 2 of
the 10
th
SSIA Congress: Abdirachid Mohamed and Adam Houssein.
Congratulations to the Ohio State University organizers for raising the bar.
Thanks to all the institutions and sponsors of the Congress and to all the
invisible staff members who have dedicated their time on our behalf and
for the success of this Congress. A sincere tribute goes to all the above on
this, the 10
th
Congress and 30
th
Anniversary of the SSIA. Permit me to
commend the Somali poets who have honored this Congress.
Once again my thanks for the honor and for your patience.

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