V.

PROBATE OF WILLS

4. JIMENEZ v IAC
184 SCRA 367

Facts:
Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez married Consolacion Ungson with whom he begot four (4) children,
namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During such marriage, Lino acquired
five (5) parcels of land in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan. When Consolacion died, Lino
contracted a second marriage with Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot the seven
petitioners herein: Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and Virginial, all
surnamed Jimenez. After Lino and Genovevas death, Virginia filed a petition before CFI praying
to be appointed as administratix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva
upon which Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. filed a motion for exclusion of his fathers name and those of
his uncle and aunts contending that they have already received their inheritance consisting of
five (f) parcels of land. However, the petition of Virginia wherein she included the said five (5)
parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of spouses Lino and Genoveva. Consequently,
Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory
contending that such parcels of land were already adjudicated to his father and to his uncle and
aunts. The probate court ordered the exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land and denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Virginia. The latter went to CA on a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking the annulment of the orders of the probate court, of which the CA dismissed.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed an amended complained before the RTC to recover
possession/ownership of the five (5) parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva.
Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action
was barred by prior judgments and by prescription and laches. Thereafter, the trial court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata. A motion for reconsideration was denied
as well as the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed before the appellate court. Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not in a probate proceeding the lower court has jurisdiction to settle questions of
ownership.
Held:
Petitioners present action for recovery of possession and ownership is appropriately filed
because as a general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of title provisionally.
The patent reason is the probate courts limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action. It has been held that in a special proceeding for the probate
of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot
resolve with finality. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to intestate
proceedings as in the case at bar.






5. OZAETA vs. CUARTERO
9 phil 1041
Facts:
Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to Carlos Palanca
Taguinlay in 1929 and 1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had been duly
established by testimonial and documentary evidence. One of the pieces of evidence presented
was the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that he married Rosa Gonzales in
which marriage they had eight children.
Issue:
Whether or not the declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as
conclusive evidence of an existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator.
Held:
Declarations in a valid Last Will and Testament may be admitted as conclusive evidence of an
existence of a fact during the lifetime of the testator of the said Will. Palanca executed his will
and he made the solemn declaration in said document that since 1923 and for some years
thereafter he maintained amorous relations with Maria Cuartero and had by her six natural
children whom, according to him, he had liberally fed and supported. He said nothing about
having married Maria; on the contrary, he declared that for grave reasons he regarded her
unworthy of being the guardian of the persons and property of his children by her and so
appointed Felisa Joson de Fernandez and the Philippine National Bank as guardians of their
persons, and property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will he spoke of his marriage
to Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him were
legitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage. Said declaration in the will may not be
taken lightly, as a statement of little significance. When he made said statement he was about
76 years old and must have felt that he had not many years left to live.

















6. Coso v Fernandez-Deza
42 phil 596
Facts:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations
with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de
libre disposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred
Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in
talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was
set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the
testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the
testator.
Issue:
Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.
Held:
Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have
that effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has
been variously stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to
avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind
of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather
than his own.
Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of
the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still
operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the
making of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.
And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying
an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised
by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the
influence destroys the testators free agency.
The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the
time of its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario
Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to
destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.
Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or
fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust
disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered
to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.







VI. INSTITUTION, PRETERITION AND SUBSTITUTION
1. Austria v. Reyes
31 SCRA 754


Facts:

Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll
have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children. During her lifetime, Basilia
filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the petitioners who are the nephews
and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was allowed. In 1954, the petitioners
filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the nearest kin of Basilia and
that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in accordance with law,
hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs. The lower court held that the
validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held that the testator was
possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud,
trickery or undue influence.

Issue:

Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

held:

Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does
not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will
set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be
annulled under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the
will, 2) the cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is
favored and doubts are resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on
the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.














2. Aznar v. Duncan
17 SCRA 590
Facts:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The court declared that Helen
Garcia was a natural child of the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the
properties of the estate of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly
recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the order, the CFI held that Helen
Garcia was preterited in the will thus, the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and
the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate.
Issue:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally divided or whether the
inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover
the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to of the entire estate.
Held:
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural daughter and limited her share
to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the
legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest
of the estate to other persons, the heir could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitime be completed.



















IX. RESERVA TRONCAL
5. Larcerna v. vda de corcino
1 SCRA 1226

Facts:
Valentine Marbebe begot a daughter, Jacoba Marbebe, before his marriage with Bonifacia
Lacerna. Valentine and Bonificia had an only son, Juan.
Valentine and Bonifacia died leaving three parcels of land to their only son Juan. Juan, then,
executed a power of attorney authorizing the sister of his mother or his aunt, Agatona Vda. de
Corcino take care of the disputed land. Eventually, Juan died intestate and without any issue.
The Court of First Instance declared that the land is property of Jacoba being the half sister of
Juan. Agatona Vda. de Corcino and the nephews and nieces of Bonifacia questioned the
decision of the court. According to them, the case should be based upon Article 891 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which establishes what is known as "reserva troncal." According to
them, under this principle, the properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased
within the third degree, who belong to the line from which said properties came. Thus, since
Juan Marbebe inherited the land from his mother, they should go to his nearest relative within
the third degree on the maternal line or to his aunt and cousins and not to Jacoba Marbebe for
she belongs to the paternal line. This, however, was protested by Jacoba Marbebe. She
contends that pursuant to Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, brothers
and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in the order of intestate succession, and that, as
Juan Marbebe's half-sister, she has, accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit his
properties.
Issue:
Whether or not there is reserva troncal?
Held:
The provision on reserve troncal cannot be applied in this case. In reserve troncal, the
ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property
as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied.) This
article applies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an
ascendant from a descendant, and this is not the scenario in the given case, for the lands in
dispute were inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother,
Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is, therefore, not applicable in this case.
Furthermore, the Trial Judge, correctly awarded the land to Jacoba Marbebe. The said
decision is in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate succession, particularly Articles
1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a sister, even if only a half-
sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters, excludes
all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line from which
the property of the deceased came.
Based on the foregoing, Jacoba Marbebe has the better right to succeed Juan.






6. Chua v. Court of First Instance
78 SCRA 406

Facts:
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he
sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua
contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the
name of Juanita Frias Chua. Manuel died without leaving any issue.
Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanito of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage. In the Intestate
Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating, among others, the one-half portion of
Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of Jose's widow, Consolacion, the other half of
Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio.
By virtue of said adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of
Consolacion and Juanito.
On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time, Consolacion
executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son
Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the whole lot was issued in her name. Then on
March 5, 1966, Consolacion died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or
ascending line except her brother and sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the first
marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint before the respondent CFI
of Negros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged
to Juanito but which passed to Consolacion upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable
property for the reason that the lot in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article
981 of the NCC.
Issue:
Whether or not the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father
Jose Frias Chua gratuitously or not. (In relation to the first requisite of reserva troncal)
Held:
YES.in Cabardo v. Villanueva, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the
recipient does not give anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or
be not subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the property gives or does
nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential thing is that
the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from
the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property
in question to Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of
a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous.
The obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is imposed
upon Consolacion and Juanito not personally by the deceased Jose in his last will and
testament but by an order of the court in the Testate Proceeding. As long as the transmission of
the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. It does not matter if later the court
orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito, to pay the Standard Oil Co. This does not change
the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in
question is subject to reserva troncal under Art, 891.

































7. FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO
40 PHIL 480

Facts:
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, during his lifetime, married twice. The 1
st
time, with Antonia Faz
de Leon, with whom he begot 9 children: Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita,
Gabriel, Pedro, and Magdalena.
On becoming a widower, he married the 2
nd
time with Severina Faz de Leon, with whom he had
2 children: Mercedes and Apolonio III.
On January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio II executed a will instituting as his universal
heirs his 10 children, the posthumous Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz; he declared that
all his property should be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
Apolonio III died in 1891; his mother, Severina Faz, succeeded to all his property.
Severina Faz died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her
only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino. As such heir, said daughter took possession of all
the property left at the death of her mother, among those is that property inherited from Apolonio
II.

Issue:
Whether or not the property in question is reservable property

Held;
At the death of Apolonio II, under a will, his 11 children succeeded to the inheritance he left. In
1891, Apolonio III died; he was succeeded by his mother Severina Faz (included in the
inheritance is the property in question).
That Apolonio III acquired the property in question by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his
father is without any doubt. Thus, when, on the death of Apolonio III, without issue, the same
passed by operation of law into the hands of his mother, it became reservable property, with the
object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons other than those
comprehended within the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the source of
said property.
When Severina Faz died in 1908, she left in her will said property, together with her own, to her
only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes. However, the reservable nature of such property
was not lost.
The law so provides that ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but only its
enjoyment, use or trust. The law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve the same for
certain designated persons who, upon the death of the said ascendants-reservists, (taking into
consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the ownership of
said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs.
These designated persons (reservatarios) are the relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant from whom the reservable property came.




8. Gonzales v Court of First Instance
104 SCRA 481

Facts:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died. He was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left by Benito were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda
y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races.
Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races succeeded her deceased
daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.

Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y
Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la
Paz.

Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. The decree of probate
was affirmed by the CA.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed a motion
to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties
which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the
children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F.
Legarda.

Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an ordinary civil action against her
brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a
declaration that the said properties are reservable properties. Lower court dismissed the action
of Beatriz.

Issue:

whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal under art.

Held:

In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or
is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant
should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from
the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said property
came.

The properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda.
She was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.

Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a
disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given
and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.

To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.