Research Article

Revisiting the Radical View: Power, Real

Interests and the Difculty of
Separating Analysis from Critique
Clare Heyward
University of Birmingham
Lukess three-dimensional view of power (1974) included a substantial normative element. This
prompted some, including Hay (1997 and 2002) to argue that Lukes conated analysis and critique,
which resulted in unsatisfactory answers to some difcult questions about the exercise of power.
This article examines Hays critique and Lukess defence of the normative component in his revised
edition of Power: A Radical View (2005). It argues that attempts to formulate a purely empirical
account of real interests and separate the analysis of the third face of power from critique fail
because positions on the structure and agency debate are at least partly informed by normative
commitments and it shows how Lukess 2005 reformulation can provide answers to two questions
raised in his 1974 discussion.
Introduction
Steven Lukes (1974) famously argued that the behaviouralism-inuenced pluralist
and elitist models of power were incomplete. In addition to the rst two faces of
power as the ability to affect decision-making (Dahl, 1957) and the ability to set
the agenda (Bacharach and Baratz, 1962), Lukes argued that power had a third
dimension: the ability to shape an agents preferences or perceptions of their real
interests. Lukes distinguished between perceived and real interests and sug-
gested that the powerful can control the weak by causing them to misperceive their
real interests. Whereas the pluralist and elitist models assumed that agents can
always identify and articulate their own interests, the radical view refused to take
that for granted. If the third dimension of power was successfully exercised, even a
slave might be content with his exploitation.
The concept of real interests included a normative component, which was heavily
criticised. As Colin Hay put it, Lukes conated analysis with critique (Hay, 2002, p.
183). This precluded the idea that power can be exercised legitimately (therefore
altering its usual scientic and folk meanings signicantly) and prevented theorists
from ever agreeing on the concept of power (Hay, 2002, p. 184), putting power
relations beyond scientic, objective analysis. It was also cited as the reason for
Lukess unsatisfactory answers to two questions raised in his 1974 discussion.
The rst question was: Can A exercise power over B in Bs real interests?. Lukes
answered:
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there are two possible responses: (1) that A might exercise short-term power
over B (with an observable conict of subjective interests), but that if and when
B realises his real interests, that power relationship ends: it is self-annihilating; or
(2) that all or most forms of attempted or successful control by A over B
constitutes a violation of Bs autonomy and B has a real interest in autonomy;
so that such an exercise of power cannot be in Bs real interests (Lukes, 1974,
p. 33).
Lukes admitted the rst response smacked of paternalism, whereas the second
anarchist response failed to distinguish power from any other forms of inuence.
He argued that the rst is preferable if there is a suitable empirical basis for Bs real
interests (Lukes, 1974, p. 33), but, as Hay points out, without providing a means of
establishing such a basis (Hay, 2002, p. 182).
The second question was: Can A exercise power over B when the knowledge of the
effects of As actions are not available to A? (Lukes, 1974, p. 51). Lukes answered:
If As ignorance of those effects is due to his (remediable) failure to nd out, the
answer appears to be yes. Where, however, he could not have found out
because, say, certain factual or technical knowledge was simply not available
then talk of an exercise of power appears to lose all its point (Lukes, 1974, p. 51).
According to Hay, this is unsatisfactory because Lukes assumed that the conse-
quences of As actions must be negative such that to ascribe responsibility is to
apportion blame, and to identify a power relation between A and B is to hold A
responsible for its consequences (Hay, 2002, p. 187). Hay argues that blame,
responsibility and power can, and should, be separated. For example, a doctor
assisting a patient in voluntary euthanasia is responsible for this exercise of power,
but not necessarily blameworthy (Hay, 2002, p. 187).
Lukess critics, such as Hay, Ted Benton (1981) and Stewart Clegg (1989) argued
that the conception of real interests should be replaced by a purely empirical one to
ensure that power relations were rendered visible prior to critique. This article will
examine Hays account as it links power to recent developments in the structure
agency debate.
Hays alternative to real interests
Hay (1997 and 2002) dened power as (1) the ability to affect an agents actions
(direct power); (2) to alter the context of action so that an agent has more, or fewer,
options from which to choose (indirect power).
1
This removed references to inter-
ests and identied both agential and structural components of the exercise of
power. Hay argued that his denition removed the normative component from the
exercise of power, making it possible to infer that As action has affected Bs conduct
or context of action, i.e. that A has exerted power over B (Hay, 2002, p. 186),
without drawing conclusions about the rightness or wrongness of the action or
whether A should be held responsible or culpable. For Hay, for A to have power
over B means that B does not have reciprocal powers to alter As actions or context
of action (Hay, 2002, p. 185).
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The difculties of separating analysis from critique
Although Hays account removes references to real interests, it does not remove the
normative component. Instead, value judgements are smuggled back in via his use
of reciprocity, which involves the idea of trade-offs and priorities. It is conceivable
that A could exert power over B in one context, but B could change different
contexts in which A acts. For example, a trafc warden might be able to exercise
power by clamping cars, which has a big impact on peoples day-to-day lives.
However, a rich businessman who has had his car clamped might be able to get the
policy on clamping changed, so altering the context in which the trafc warden
does his job. In these instances, who has power over whom? When assessing the
power relations between agents, we need a theory of which contexts are the more
important or signicant, which Hay does not provide. Intuitively, it seems that the
businessman who can change council policy is the more powerful, even though
within the context of getting a parking ne he is not. How do we account for this?
One way is to introduce normative assumptions about which contexts are the most
important to people.
There is an alternative. Strategic contexts can overlap, or be embedded in others. If
power in one context gives an agent power to inuence many strategic contexts for
many people, then he can be said to be more powerful than someone who has the
power to inuence only a few. So, in the above example, the businessman has more
power because his inuence over council policy means that he has the potential to
affect many more peoples lives, in many different areas, than the trafc warden
who exercises power in the simple context of enforcing trafc rules. This response
assumes that identifying contexts is straightforwardly empirical but there are
reasons to doubt this. In earlier work on the structureagency debate, Hay argued
that structures can be identied by looking for a systematic distribution of
resources, opportunities or constraints from the perspective of different persons and
social groups (Hay, 1995, p. 206). However, it remains difcult to quantify strategic
contexts, or to identify structures without an implicit appeal to the normative
because, for Hay, to transform a strategic context means to change the strategic
selectivity of the context: to redene what actions are more favourable or
unfavourable in order to realise certain goals, or to change the costs or benets of
a course of action. Here, the normative element returns. The judgement about what
counts as a constraint or a cost is a value judgement, informed by the idea of what
is good for persons in general. The strategic-relational view therefore seems based
upon unacknowledged assumptions about values what is good for people, how
agents ought to be treated and what they can be expected to bear.
Lukess reformulation
Having hopefully vindicated Lukess inclusion of a normative component, let us
now turn to his 2005 reformulation of the radical view. Lukes does not directly
address the two questions raised in his 1974 discussion, but I hope to show his
reformulation can provide answers to them. For this purpose, two main changes are
noteworthy. The rst is that Lukes makes more explicit the idea that power is
mediated by social structure and can hence be exercised in various ways, including
unintentionally and passively. The second is that he introduces a distinction
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between power over and domination, where the latter is conceived as A exer-
cising power over B in a way that adversely affects Bs real interests. The conception of
real interests is further elaborated. This means that power over is not necessarily
a pejorative concept, though domination is.
Structures and power
As Clegg notes, the 1974 discussion is agent-focused, with no conception of power
as a structural property (Clegg, 1989, p. 99), despite Lukess criticism of pluralist
and elitist models for neglecting social arrangements and structures (Lukes, 1974,
p. 22). In his reformulation Lukes states that social life involves an interplay
between agent power and structure (Lukes, 2005, pp. 689)
2
and introduces four
sets of distinctions. Power can be:
1. exercised with respect to one or many issue(s);
2. context-bound or context-transcending;
3. exercised intentionally or unintentionally;
4. manifested in active exercise or inactive enjoyment (Lukes, 2005, pp. 7481).
The rst of each pair is congruent with agent-focused views of power, whereas their
opposites suggest a greater role for structure. Let us turn to the third and fourth
pairs, where this is especially apparent.
Actions can have intended and unintended consequences, and power can be
manifested in both. One possible example is the power of economic transactions,
which foreclose or enable opportunities for countless unknown others. Many
consequences that are not intended by a particular agent are the results of the
agents actions mediated by social structures. Likewise, when considering active or
inactive power, the latter can be (but is not necessarily) linked to structural features
like ones social status. Exercise of inactive power is possible because social struc-
tures that govern relationships can cause the weak to act to anticipate possible
actions by the powerful. Lukes writes: If I can achieve the appropriate outcomes
without having to act, because of the attitudes towards me or because of a favour-
able alignment of social relations and forces facilitating such outcomes, then my
power is surely all the greater (Lukes, 2005, pp. 7778).
Power over and domination
Lukess second major clarication is to identify two different meanings of the term
power over. Inuenced by Spinoza, Lukes differentiates between potentia (power
to) and potestas (power over). He then distinguishes between domination and
potestas. Potestas is to have power over others; i.e. to limit the range of actions that
others can perform, or to constrain their choices (Lukes, 2005, p. 73). Its exercise
can be neutral or benign. Lukes gives the examples of Socrates teaching his students
or a mothers relationship with her child (Lukes, 2005, p. 84). Domination, by
contrast, is exercise of power over others in a way that subverts their real interests.
Real interests are described in terms of an agents ability to live life according to
how his nature and judgements dictate (Lukes, 2005, p. 123). There are many
views as to what this means, hence power (more accurately, domination) remains
contestable. Real interests, or their equivalent, should be seen as:
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a function of ones explanatory framework, which in turn has to be justied.
There is no reason to believe that there exists a canonical set of such interests that
will constitute the last word on the matter that will resolve moral conicts
and set the seal on proffered explanations, conrming them as true (Lukes,
2005, p. 148).
Although not ultimately resolvable empirically, views on domination can be more
or less plausible. For example, as Lukes notes, an individuals reported preferences
and interests might reasonably be thought to be inuenced by oppressive social
structures some agents have been repeatedly told that their lives are somehow less
worthy, or more likely to involve suffering. Such people might display what phi-
losophers call adaptive preferences, where, as Amartya Sen puts it, the underdog
learns to bear the burden so well that he or she overlooks the burden itself.
Discontent is replaced by acceptance, hopeless rebellion by conformist quiet, and {
suffering by cheerful endurance (Sen, 1984, pp. 308309). For Lukes, domination
results in the dominated being less able to make independent judgements; it
constrains their ability to be self-determining.
Let us now consider how these changes answer Lukess two questions.
1. Can A exercise power over B in Bs real interests?
The mistake Lukes made in the 1974 discussion of this question was to use the term
power over to cover both domination and potestas. In his reformulation Lukes
makes clear that the third dimension of power is concerned with relations of
domination only, not about potestas per se (Lukes, 2005, pp. 64, 8586). Once this
distinction is made, the answer to his question is clearer. Quite simply, the answer
is yes if power over is interpreted as potestas, and no if it is interpreted as domi-
nation (the question becomes analytic). Why was this not apparent before? It is
explicit in Lukess discussion that in this situation A exercises power over (in the
sense of potestas) B when Bs real interests clash with Bs stated preferences. When
there is an observable conict of preferences, we can identify the power relation-
ship on the basis of the clash between Bs stated preferences and As preferences for
B alone. There is no need to invoke the third face of power, to examine Bs real
interests and consider whether As actions further them, because analysis of power
relations can take place using the rst or second dimension. The third face of power
(domination) is called upon only in analysis of possible power relations where there
is no clash between the stated preferences of the powerful and those of the victim.
Lukess conception of the third face of power informs us that we cannot rely only
on observation and taking preferences as givens, we have to look at possible
manipulation of preferences and intentions. It does not mean that we jettison the
rst two faces of power and use the third face of power to analyse all potential
power relationships, nor that we abandon hope of any empirical evidence in
analysis of any type of power relation. Relationships of potestas can be identied by
appeal to observable conict, but the radical view informs us that observable
conict is sufcient but not necessary for power relationships to exist.
The problem dissolves once we understand that power over, as commonly used,
covers both potestas and domination, and that observable conict is sufcient
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grounds to identify an instance of potestas. The confusion over this question results
from confusing potestas and domination and trying to use the third face to analyse
power relations when the second face is sufcient, not from anything about the
concept of real interests.
2. Can A exercise power over B when the knowledge of the effects of As actions are not
available to A?
Given Lukess original answer to this question, it is easy to see the force of Hays
argument that Lukes uses power relations to identify an agents culpability.
However, the problem is not due to conation of the normative and empirical, but
a failure to account for the role of structure. The question seems potentially
problematic in Lukess 1974 discussion because he takes an overly agent-focused
view. If structures are neglected, it seems that the third dimension of power cannot
be exercised unconsciously for such a relation to obtain, an agent must set out
intentionally to deceive the victim as to their real interests.
If the role of structures is acknowledged, it is easier to see how As actions bring
about both intended and unintended effects that might or might not be in Bs best
interests. Consequences that are not intended or even foreseen by a particular agent
are the results of the agents actions mediated through structures. The fact that
some effects of As actions were unintended does not alter the fact that those actions
have an effect, for better or for worse, on B. For example the Bank of Englands
decision to raise interest rates might mean nancial difculties for Mr and Mrs
Smith. The fact that the bank did not know of the outcome of the decision for every
single mortgage holder, and therefore could not act with it in mind when making
the decision, does not entail that it does not exercise power over them all.
If As actions have unintended but neutral or benecial consequences for B, then
the power over relationship is one of potestas; if they adversely affect Bs real
interests it is one of dominance. The action of a father in a patriarchal society
denying his beloved daughters elementary education could be an example. The
denial of elementary education to the girls is against their real interests
3
but their
father accepts the patriarchal view that education is not necessary for women. So,
although the father cares for his daughters and wants them to have a good life, he
acts against their real interests. As this result is unintentional, we might not blame
him for it, but it remains the case that his actions express domination. Although the
third dimension of power most frequently identies conscious manipulation and
deceit, it is not limited to these.
Conclusion
This article has defended the inclusion of a normative element in Lukess radical
view by showing that it is not the true cause of confusion over the issues of whether
power can be exercised unintentionally or paternalistically. It has also suggested
that to remove the normative from ideas of structure and agency is more difcult
than previously thought, if not impossible, and that the strategic-relational view of
structure, agency and power is as reliant on normative ideas as the radical view.
Inclusion of the normative does not mean that theoretical frameworks cannot be
justied, merely that the justication will include empirical and normative argu-
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ment.
4
Finally, the article cautioned against using the third face of power (properly
understood as domination) in all cases. It is one way of analysing power relation-
ships, needed only when there is no observable conict of preferences.
As David Marsh notes, the pluralist notion of power, still used in much of political
science, ignores structural inequalities which are key features of political life
(Marsh, 2002, p. 19). If we are to move towards a complete analysis of all political
issues, we must accept the normative aspects of any theoretical framework and its
most central political concepts, including the conception of power.
Notes
I would like to thank Simon Caney, Colin Hay, Ed Page, Magnus Ryner and two anonymous referees for
Politics for their very helpful comments on various drafts. This article was written during my AHRC-
sponsored Ph.D. studentship at University of Birmingham and I gratefully acknowledge the AHRCs
support.
1 Indirect power could also change what options were available without affecting the overall number.
Carter (1999) discusses quantifying freedom and constraints.
2 Lukes rst makes this argument in Essays and Social Theory (1977).
3 I assume that elementary education is necessary for a degree of self-determination and therefore in the
girls best interests. Although I cannot pursue it here, I would argue that denying elementary
education to women is defensible only on an extreme culturally-relativist view of morality. For a good
criticism of cultural relativism see Dworkin (1985); for a useful overview of arguments against cultural
relativism, see Caney (2005). It is worth noting that a defence of universal values can be sensitive to
cultural diversity, e.g. Nussbaum (2000).
4 This is not unusual: a common objection to structuralism stems from its counter-intuitive conclusions
about individual responsibility for criminal and immoral behaviour. Here, normative commitments
call into doubt an ontological position.
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