PCIB v.

Escolin
Nationality Principle
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the
moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in favor of
her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment
of her death (for while one group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group
contended that no renvoi was possible).
ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved
by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not
said law at any other time). NOTE: Dynamics of law.


Bellis v. Bellis
Nationality Principle
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he divorced he
had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three
illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other
disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate
children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should
be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the
illegitimate children.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law,
being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.


TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and consequently
was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his
death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always considered himself a
citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia
who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that
California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the
domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be i ncreased
in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the
heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law
of the deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter;
that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any
property possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the
conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule says:
If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the
person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California,
the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a
circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.


IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and
LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA,
oppositor-appellant January 31, 1963FACTS: Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to
California, where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the
Philippines where hebecame a domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in
this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5,1951, he
instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum
of money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged
natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law,
the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile;

that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view
of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of
Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the
deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that
under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property
possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and
his will remain undisturbed. ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of
Christensen? RULING: The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there
are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in
California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The
California conflict rule says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is
deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Christensen being
domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred
back to California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLES BANK & TRUST COMPANY, executor, MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS.EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees June 6,
1967FACTS: Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had5
legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children withhis 2nd wife,
Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines
in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner: a. $240,000 to his
1st wife Mary Mallen; b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each; c. The remainder shall go to his
surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares. Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company,
an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein. Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its Executors Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it
reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000
delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total
of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the
benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages. Among the 3 illegitimate children,
Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that
they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children. The lower court denied their respective motions
for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of
his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law. Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the
absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our
appellants, position Is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos
Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates cannot be applied to the
testate of Amos Bellis.

PCIB VS. ESCOLIN56 SCRA 266FACTS: Linnie Jane Hodges died giving her testamentary provisions to her
husband. At the time of her death, she was citizen of Texas but, was, however domiciled in the Philippines. To
see whether the testamentary provisions are valid, it is apparent and necessary to know what law should be
applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not laws of Texas is applicable.
RULING: It is necessary that the Texas law be ascertained. Here it must be proven whether a renvoi will happen
or whether Texas law makes the testamentary provisions valid. In line with Texas law, that which should be
proven is the law enforced during the death of Hodges and not in any other time. The Supreme Court held that
the estate of Mrs. Hodges inherited by her brothers and sisters could be more than just stated, but this would
depend on (1) whether upon the proper application of the principle of renvoi in relation to Article 16 of the Civil
Code and the pertinent laws of Texas, it will appear that Hodges had no legitime as contended by Magno,
and (2) whether or not it can be held that Hodges had legally and effectively renounced his inheritance from
his wife. Under the circumstances presently obtaining and in the state of the record of these cases, as of now,
the Court is not in a position to make a final ruling, whether of fact or of law, on any of these two issues, and
We, therefore, reserve said issues for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court o
quo, as hereinabove indicated. We reiterate, however, that pending such further proceedings, as matters
stand at this stage, Our considered opinion is that it is beyond cavil that since, under the terms of the will of Mrs.
Hodges, her husband could not have anyway legally adjudicated or caused to be adjudicated to himself her
whole share of their conjugal partnership, albeit he could have disposed any part thereof during his lifetime, the
resulting estateof Mrs. Hodges, of which Magno is the uncontested administratrix, cannot be less than one-
fourth of the conjugal partnership properties, as of the time of her death, minus what, as explained earlier, have
been gratuitously disposed of therefrom, by Hodges in favor of third persons since then, for even if it were
assumed that, as contended by PCIB, under Article 16 of the Civil Code and applying renvoi the laws of the
Philippines are the ones ultimately applicable, such one-fourth share would be her free disposable portion,
taking into account already the legitime of her husband under Article 900 of the Civil Code

Bellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Divorce, Doctrine of Processual Presumption

Laws Applicable: Art. 16, 17 1039 NCC


Violet Kennedy (2
nd
wife) Amos G. Bellis --- Mary E. Mallen (1
st
wife)
Legitimate Children: Legitimate Children:
Edward A. Bellis Amos Bellis, Jr.
George Bellis (pre-deceased) Maria Cristina Bellis
Henry A. Bellis Miriam Palma Bellis
Alexander Bellis
Anna Bellis Allsman

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States.
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis
(who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman
By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis
August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate as follows:
1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen
2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis
3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives
July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A
September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on
People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the will did as the will directed
Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions on the ground that they were
deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children
Probate Court: Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed
Doctrine of Processual Presumption:
The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall
be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum.
In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours. Apply Philippine laws.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in
intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They
provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.


Bellis vs Bellis 20 SCRA 358

Facts:
Amos G. Bellis, who was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. By his first wife whom he had
divorced, Mary E. Mallen, he had 5 legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him
in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman. Then he married his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and
finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. On August
5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philipiness dividing his estate as follows: $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma
Bellis; and the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives. Subsequently, on
July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas, U.S.A. On the day of September 15, 1958 his will was
admitted to probate in the CFI of Manila on which the will be directed to People's Bank and Trust Company as
the executor of the will. However, On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased. The probate court relying upon Article
16 of NCC, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case, the Texas laws are no forced heirs or
legitimates.
Issue: Whether or not the Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will.
Held: Yes. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the nati onal law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Thus, ART. 1039.
Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under
the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis

Iloilo palay and corn Planters assn. vs Feliciano 13 SCRA 377 (Quico's version)
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager of the Rice and Corn Administration,
wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a
government agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the national
economic council as embodied in its resolution no. 70, series of 1964.
On December 28,1964, the cabinet approve d the needed importation after the said referral of the president.
The chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice and corn administration announced an invitation to bid for said
importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were all pursuant to a certain provision in
republic act 2207.
Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and
that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the petitioners together with Ramon A. Gonzales,
in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this court asking for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the respondents.

Issue:
WON RA 2207 was impliedly repealed by RA 3452?

Held:
Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is
shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207.
These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails
to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates
the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless
an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no
such inconsistency.
Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court is hereby dissolved. Cost
against petitioners.


Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., et al, v. Feliciano

Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of
rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the
National Economic Council. The President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on
December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the
importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it
is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no
law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452
which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private properties
upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from doing so. According to
them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice
of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize
such importation thru any government agency he may designate - is repealed by RA 3452.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national emergency is
repealed by RA 3452

Held:
No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is
a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict
construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific repealing
clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no inconsistency.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are different;
one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the
government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when
there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to
RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.

Lidasan v Comelec
G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967
Sanchez, J.:

Facts:
1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions
implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the
province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the
boundaries of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan
are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in theProvince of Cotabato and
not of Lanao del Sur.

3. Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of
the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato is unconstitutional for
embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1. The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from
conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in
a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the
title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative,
given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations
the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read
from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2. The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in
the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take
appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set
forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of
the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one
subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication
of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4. The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projects the
impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title
misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one
statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a
province different from Lanao del Sur.

5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise
the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of
their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao
del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

Political Law Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of
Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur, was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig
and Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts
and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of
Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this
law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan
then filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional because it did not clearly indicate in its title that it
in creating Dianaton, it would be including in the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabato
to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?
HELD: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of
Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken
away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in
the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from
Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

G.R. No. L-16704
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
Facts:
On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all Employers in computing
premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and overtime pay, as well as the cash value of
other media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc.,
through counsel, wrote the Social Security Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory
to a previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the
computation of the employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further
questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security Commission to
promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in the Official Gazette.
Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation
that needed the approval of the President and publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere
administrative interpretation of the statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law
should be construed. Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161
empowering the Social Security Commission.
Held:
There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an
administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a
valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law.
Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the
administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced
by a penal sanction provided therein. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to
the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and
regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the
effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employers-members of the System of what, in
the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their
employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolution appeal ed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

GIBBS vs. GOVT. OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDSG.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933FACTS:
Al l i son D. Gi bbs and hi s wi fe Eva Johnson Gi bbs are both ci ti zens of California and domiciled therein
since their marriage in July 1906. There
wasn o a n t e n u p t i a l ma r r i a g e c o n t r a c t b e t we e n t h e p a r t i e s a n d d u r i n g t h e existe
nce their marriage the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands, as conj ugal property. On
November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gi bbs di ed and that i n accordance wi th the l aw of Cal i forni a, the
communi ty property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that
of t h e h u s b a n d , b e l o n g s a b s o l u t e l y t o t h e s u r v i v i n g h u s b a n d w i t
h o u t administration. In intestate proceedings, Allison D. Gibbs, on September 22,1930, filed an
ex parte
petition. The court granted said petition and entered a decree adj udi cati ng the sai d Al l i son D. Gi bbs to
be the sol e and absol ute owner of sai d l ands, appl yi ng secti on 1401 of the Ci vi l Code of
Cal i forni a.W h e n t h i s d e c r e e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e R e g i s t e r o f D e e d s o f M a n i l
a a n d demanded for the i ssuance of a Transfer Certi fi cate of Ti tl e, i t decl i ned to accept as
binding said decree of court and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison
D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereupon, Allison filed in
the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to i ssue the correspondi ng ti tl es"
to the peti ti oner wi thout requi ri ng previ ous payment of any inheritance tax.
ISSUE:
Whet her or not E va J ohns on Gi bbs at t he t i me of her deat h i s t he owner of a descendible
interest in the Philippine lands.
RULING:
The second paragraph Article 10 of the Civil Code provides: Neverthel ess, l egal and testamentary
successi ons, i n respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and
the i ntri nsi c val i di ty of thei r provi si ons, shal l be regul ated by the nati onal l aw of the person
whose successi on i s i n questi on, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country i n
whi ch i t may
besituated. The second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal ort e s t a m e n t a r y s u c c e s s i
o n h a s t a k e n p l a c e i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s a n d i n accor dance wi t h t he l aw of
t he Phi l i ppi ne I s l ands ; and t he f or ei gn l aw i s cons ul t ed onl y i n r egar d t o t he or der of
s ucces s i on or t he ex t ent of t he successional rights;
in other words, the second paragraph
o f a r t i c l e 1 0 c a n b e i n v o k e d o n l y w h e n t h e
deceased was vested with a descendible interest inpr oper t y wi t hi n t he j ur i s di ct i on of t he Phi l i ppi ne
Islands.
In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke, the court said:
I t i s pr i nci pl e f i r ml y es t abl i s hed t hat t o t he l aw of t he s t at e i n whi ch the l and i s si tuated
we must l ook for the rul es whi ch govern i ts descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and
construction of wills and other conveyances.
This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10of our Ci vi l Code as fol l ows:
"Personal property i s subj ect to the l aws of the nation of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of
the country in which it is situated. Under t hi s br oad pr i nci pl e, t he nat ur e and ex t ent of t he
t i t l e whi ch vested i n Mrs. Gi bbs at the ti me of the acqui si ti on of the communi ty l ands here in
question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei
sitae. Iti s admi t t ed t hat t he Phi l i ppi ne l ands her e i n ques t i on wer e acqui r ed as community
property of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife. Under the law of the Philippine Islands, she
was vested of a title equal to that of her husband.
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the lawof the Philippine Islands, vested of a descendible interest,
equal to that of her husband, in the Philippine lands covered by
certificateso f t i t l e N o s . 2 0 8 8 0 , 2 8 3 3 6 a n d 2 8 3 3 1 , f r o m t h e d a t e o f t h e i r acqui
sition to the date of her death.
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaidwas transmi tted to her hei rs by vi rtue
of i nheri tance and thi s transmi ssi on plainly falls within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter
40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary i n thi s proceedi ng to
determi ne the "order of successi on" or the "extent
of t h e s u c c e s s i o n a l r i g h t s " ( a r t i c l e 1 0 , Ci v i l Co d e , supra) w h i c h w o u l d b e
regulated by section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time of the death of Mrs.
Gibbs.


I.

Insular Government vs. Frank 13 Phil 236, G.R.No.2935. March23, 1909.FACTS:
In 1903 in the state of Illinois, Mr. Frank, a US citizen and a representative of the Insular Government of the
Philippines entered into a contract whereby the former shall serve as stenographer in the Philippinesfor a period
of 2 years. The contract contained a provision that in case of violation of its terms, Mr. Frank shall be liable for
the amount incurred bythe Philippine Government for his travel from Chicago to Manila and one-half salary
paid during such period. After serving for 6 months, defendantleft the service and refused to make further
compliance with the terms of the contract, therefore the Government sued him to recover the amount
of $269.23 plus damages. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, hencethe defendant appealed
presenting minority as his special defense. Byreason of the fact that under the laws of the Philippines, contracts
made byperson who did not reach majority age of 23 are unenforceable. Defendantclaim that he is an adult
when he left Chicago but was a minor when hearrived in Manila and at the time the plaintiff attempted to
enforce thecontract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract is valid.
RULING:
Mr. Frank being fully qualified to enter into a contract at the placeand time the contract was made, he cannot
therefore plead infancy as adefense at the place where the contract is being enforced. Although Mr.Frank
was still a minor under Philippine laws, he was neverthelessconsidered an adult under the laws of the state of
Illinois,the place wherethe contract was made.No rule is better settled in law than that mattersbearing upon
the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract aredetermined by the law of the place where the
contract is made. Mattersconnected to its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at theplace of its
performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as bringing of asuit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of
limitations, depend upon thelaw of the place where the suit is brought.Although generally, capacity of the
parties to enter into a contract isgoverned by national law. This is one case not involving real property
whichwas decided by our Supreme Court, where instead of national law, whatshould determine capacity to
enter into a contract is the lex loci
celebrationis. According to Conflict of Laws writer Edgardo Paras, Franks
capacity should be judged by his national law and not by the law of theplace where the contract was entered
into. In the instant case whether it is
the place where the contract was made or Franks nationality, the result
would be the same. However, as suggested by the mentioned author, forthe conflicts rule in capacity in
general, national law of the parties is controlling