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B. PROCEDURE FOR THE PASSAGE OF
BILL.
BILLS that must originate EXCLUSIVELY
FROM THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
APPROPRIATION BILLS
A BILL CREATING A NEW OFFICE AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR IS
NOT AN APPROPRITION BILL.
A law regulating an industry, though
incidentally imposing a taz does not make the
law a revenue bill
Revenue bills
Tariff bills
Bills authorizing the increase of debt
Bills of local application
Private bills

A. Procedure for enactment
Must be by any member of the HoR or
senate except for some measures that must
originate only from the former chamber

FIRST READING:
The reading of the title and the number; the
bill is passed by the Senate President or
Speaker to the proper committee

SECOND READING
Entire text is read and debates are held and
amendments introduced. The bill as
approved in the second reading is printed in
its final form and copies are distributed
three days before the third reading

THIRD READING
Only the title is read, no amendments are
allowed. Vote shall be taken immediately
thereafter and the yeas and nays entered in
the journal

SENT TO OTHER CHAMBER
Once the bill passes the third reading. It is
sent to the other chamber where it will go
under third readings

ENROLLED BILL
The bill is printed as finally approved by the
Congress, authenticated with the signatures
of the Senate President or the Speaker and
the Secretary and approved by the
President.

b. SUBMISSION TO THE PRESIDENT
the PRESIDENTS VETO POWER
every bill, in order to become law,
must be presented to and signed by
the President
if the President does nit approve of
the bill, he shall veto the same and
return his objections to the House
from which it originated. The house
shall enter the objections in the
journal and proceed to reconsider it
the President must communicate his
decision to veto within 30days fro the
date of receipt thereof. If he fails to
do so, the bill shall become a law as
if he signed it
to override the beto, at least 2/3 of
ALL the members of each house
must agree to pass the bill. In such
case the vero is overridden and
becomes a law as if he signed it
the President may veto particular
items in appropriation, revenue or
tariff bill
this veto will not affect items to which
he does not object
VETO of a Rider
a rider is a provision which does
not relate to a particular
appropriation stated in the bill.
Since it is an invalid provisoon
under Section(25)2 the President
may veto it as an item.


TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE
(SUPRA)


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PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

1. HOUSE BILL NO. 10900, THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATION BILL OF 1994 (GAB OF
1994) ! passed and approved by both
houses of Congress on December 17,
1993.
- Imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the
proposed budget previously submitted
by the President.
- Authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the
"pork barrels" allotted to them and to
realign their respective operating
budgets.
2. President signed the bill into law, making it
as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN
ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE
TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE,
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-
FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
(GAA of 1994).
3. SAME DAY: the President delivered his
Presidential Veto Message ! specifying
the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions.
4. PETITIONERS: ASSAIL THE SPECIAL
PROVISION ALLOWING A MEMBER OF
CONGRESS TO REALIGN HIS
ALLOCATION FOR OPERATIONAL
EXPENSES TO ANY OTHER EXPENSE
CATEGORY.
- Violates Section 25, Article 7 of the
Constitution.
- To declare unconstitutional and void
THE PROVISION UNDER ARTICLE
16 OF THE COUNTRYWIDE
DEVELOPMENT FUND AND THE
VETO OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SPECIAL PROVISION OF ART XLVIII
OF THE GAA OF 1994.

ISSUE:


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WON the petitioners have locus standi. YES.
WON the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds is
constitutional. NO, an attempt to repeal PD
1177.

RATIO: A member of Congress has the legal
standing to question the validity of a
presidential veto or any other act of the
Executive which injures the institution of
Congress.

- It becomes the duty of the Court to draw
the dividing line where the exercise of
executive power ends and the bounds of
legislative jurisdiction begin.
- EXECUTIVE FUNCTION UNDER THE
COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND:
implementation of the priority projects
specified in the law while the authority
given to members of Congress is only to
propose and identify projects to be
implemented.
o THE AUTHORITY GIVEN TO THE
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IS ONLY
TO PROPOSE AND IDENTIFFY
PROJECTS TO BE IMPLEMENTED
BY THE PRESIDENT ! MERELY
RECOMMENDATORY.
o It is the President who shall implement
them.
- THE PROCEDURE OF PROPOSING AND
IDENTIFYING BY MEMBERS OF
CONGRESS OF PARTICULAR
PROJECTS OR ACTIVITIES UNDER
ART. XLI OF THE GAA OF 1994:
IMAGINATIVE AND INNOVATIVE.
o CDF attempts to make equal the
unequal.
o Members of Congress are likely to be
KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE
NEEDS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE
CONSTITUENTS and the priority to be
given each project.
- The members ONLY DETERMINE THE
NECESITY OF THE REALIGNMENT OF
THE SAVINGS IN THE ALLOTMENTS for
their operating expenses BUT IT IS THE
SENATE PRES. AND THE SPEAKER OF

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THE HOW WHO SHALL APPROVE THE
REALIGNMENT.
o They are in the best position to do so
because they are the ones who know
whether there are savings available in
some items and whether there are
deficiencies in other items of their
operating expenses that need
AUGMENTATION.
o Before SP and SHOR approve:
1. The funds to be realigned or
transferred are actually savings in
the items of expenditures from
which the same are to be taken.
2. The transfer of realignment is for
the purpose of augmenting the
items of expenditure to which
said transfer or realignment is to
be made.
- CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
DIRECTS HIGHEST BUDGETARY
PRIORITY TO EDUCATION ! MERELY
DIRECTORY (Guingona vs. Carague).
- GENERALLY, THE PRESIDENT HAS TO
VETO THE ENTIRE BILL, not merely
parts. EXCEPT in regard to general
appropriations bills where he may veto any
particular item or items, in which case he
has to veto the ENTIRE ITEM.
- DOCTRINE OF INAPPROPRIATE
PROVISION: any provision which does
NOT RELATE to ANY PARTICULAR
ITEM, or which EXTENDS IN ITS
OPERATION BEYOND AN ITEM OF
APPROPRIATION ! CAN BE VETOED
SEPARATELY FROM AN ITEM.
o UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
and PROVISIONS WHICH ARE
INTENDED TO AMEND OTHER
LAWS ! these are maters of general
legislation more appropriately dealt
with in separate enactments.
- Second paragraph of SP No. 2 !
divergence in policy of Congress (30% of
the total appropriation for road
maintenance should be contracted out)
and the President (70% - more efficient,
economical and practical) ! VETO IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
o The SP is NOT AN INAPPROPRIATE

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PROVISION ! NOT ALIEN to the
appropriation for road maintenance.
o SPECIFIC: 70% by administrative and
30% by contract.
- SP requiring that all purchases of
medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with formulary embodied in the
National Drug Policy of the Department of
Health (RA No. 6675) ! an appropriate
provision ! VETO IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
o Directly related to and inseparable
from the appropriation item on
purchases of medicines by AFP ! SP
cannot be vetoed by the President
without also vetoing the said item.
- Appropriation for the modernization of
AFP: SP No. 2 (Use of Fund) and entire
SP No. 3 (Specific Prohibition) ! VETO
IS VALID.
o SP No. 2 is an exercise of the
congressional or legislative veto ! a
means by the legislature can block or
modify admin action taken under a
statute; a form of legislative control in
the implementation of particular
executive actions ! what Congress
cannot do directly by law it cannot do
indirectly by attaching conditions to the
exercise of that power.
o SP No. 3 is violative of the
Constitutional prohibition on the
passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts ! benefits
should be covered by direct
appropriations.
- Condition on the deactivation of the
CAFGUs ! VETO IS VALID.
o PRESIDENT MSG: The deactivation
should be done in accordance to his
timetable, taking into consideration the
peace and order situation in the
affected localities.
o Appropriation law is not the proper
vehicle for such purpose ! must be
manifested in another law; existing
laws on the CAFGUs need to be
amended.
- Conditions on the appropriation for the SC,
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR !
Petitioner: Fiscal autonomy? VETOES
ARE VALID.
o The issuance of administrative
guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an
exercise by the President of his
constitutional duty to see that the laws
are faithfully executed.
- The Courts interpretation of the law is part
of that law as of the date of its enactment.



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GONZALES VS. MACARAIG: upheld the
authority of the President and other key
officials to augment any item or any
appropriation from savings in the interest
of EXPEDIENCY and EFFICIENCY.

FACTS:

1. Dec. 1988: Congress passed House Bill
No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989)
which eliminated or decreased certain
items included in the proposed budget
submitted by the President.
2. Dec. 1988: President signed bill into law
(RA 6688) but VETOED 7 SPECIAL
PROVISIONS AND SEC 55, A GENERAL
PROVISION.
3. Feb. 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 !
Senate as an institution decided to contest
the constitutionality of the veto of the
president of SEC 55 only ! DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, therefore VOID.
- SEC. 55 disallows the president and
heads of several departments to augment
any item in the GAB ! violation ART. VI
SEC 25(5).
4. PETITIONER: (1) the President's line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is
limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY
'89) and Section 16 (FY '90) which are
provisions; (2) When the President objects
to a provision of an appropriation bill, she
cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) The item-
veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions for
that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4)
The power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has
to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the
exercise of that power.
5. SOLICITOR GENERAL: (1) the issue in
the present case is a political question
beyond the power of this Court to

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determine; (2) Gonzales et al. had a
political remedy, which was to override the
veto; (3) Section 55 is a "rider" because it
is extraneous to the Appropriations Act
and, therefore, merits the President's veto;
(4) The power of the President to augment
items in the appropriations for the
executive branches had already been
provided for in the Budget Law, specifically
Sections 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as
amended by RA 6670 (4 August 1988);
and
(5) The President is empowered by the
Constitution to veto provisions or other
"distinct and severable parts" of an
Appropriations Bill.

ISSUES:

WON Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY
'90) are provisions, not items, in the
appropriation bill. NO.
WON the veto by the President of Sec. 55 of
the 1989 Appropriation Bill, and subsequently,
its counterpart Sec. 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill is unconstitutional and
without effect. NO.

RATIO: THEY ARE INAPPROPRIATE
PROVISIONS THAT SHOULD BE TREATED
AS ITEMS: The challenged "provisions" fall
short of this requirement.

1. The vetoed "provisions" do not relate to
any particular or distinctive appropriation.
They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in
the Appropriations Bill.
2. The disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the
Bill. To discover them, resort will have to
be made to the original recommendations
made by the President and to the source
indicated by the "Legislative Budget
Research and Monitoring Office."
3. The vetoed Sections are more of an
expression of Congressional policy in
respect of augmentation from savings

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rather than a budgetary appropriation.

They are even inappropriate conditions:
THEY ARE ACTUALLY GENERAL LAW
MEASURES MORE APPROPRIATE FOR
SUBSTANTIVE AND, THEREFORE,
SEPARATE LEGISLATION.

- SECTIONS 55 (FY '89) AND 16 (FY '90)
PARTAKE MORE OF A CURTAILMENT
ON THE POWER TO AUGMENT FROM
SAVINGS; IN OTHER WORDS, "A
GENERAL PROVISION OF LAW,
WHICH HAPPENS TO BE PUT IN AN
APPROPRIATION BILL."
- The veto power of the President is
expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the
1987 Constitution.
- IT ALLOWS THE EXERCISE OF THE
VETO OVER A PARTICULAR ITEM OR
ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATION,
REVENUE, OR TARIFF BILL.
- The President may not veto less than all
of an item of an Appropriations Bill !
THE POWER GIVEN THE EXECUTIVE
TO DISAPPROVE ANY ITEM OR ITEMS
IN AN APPROPRIATIONS BILL DOES
NOT GRANT THE AUTHORITY TO
VETO A PART OF AN ITEM AND TO
APPROVE THE REMAINING PORTION
OF THE SAME ITEM.
- The restrictive interpretation urged by
Gonzales et al. that the President may not
veto a provision without vetoing the entire
bill NOT ONLY DISREGARDS THE
BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT A DISTINCT
AND SEVERABLE PART OF A BILL MAY
BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE
VETO BUT ALSO OVERLOOKS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE THAT
ANY PROVISION IN THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS BILL SHALL
RELATE SPECIFICALLY TO SOME
PARTICULAR APPROPRIATION
THEREIN AND THAT ANY SUCH
PROVISION SHALL BE LIMITED IN ITS
OPERATION TO THE APPROPRIATION
TO WHICH IT RELATES.
- THE PRESIDENT PROMPTLY VETOED
SECTION 55 (FY '89) AND SECTION 16
(FY '90) BECAUSE THEY NULLIFY THE
AUTHORITY OF THE CHIEF
EXECUTIVE AND HEADS OF
DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT TO AUGMENT ANY
ITEM IN THE GENERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW FOR THEIR
RESPECTIVE OFFICES FROM
SAVINGS IN OTHER ITEMS OF THEIR
RESPECTIVE APPROPRIATIONS, as
guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of
the Constitution.
- When Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY
'90) prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations
disapproved or reduced by Congress,
THEY IMPAIR THE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY OF THE
PRESIDENT AND OTHER KEY
OFFICIALS TO AUGMENT ANY ITEM
OR ANY APPROPRIATION FROM
SAVINGS IN THE INTEREST OF
EXPEDIENCY AND EFFICIENCY.
o The exercise of such authority in
respect of disapproved or reduced
items by no means VESTS IN THE
EXECUTIVE THE POWER TO
REWRITE THE ENTIRE BUDGET.



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BENGZON VS. DRILON

FACTS:

1. Petitioners ! retired justices of the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who
are currently receiving pensions under RA
910 as amended by RA 1797.
2. President Marcos issued a decree
repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which
authorized the adjustment of the pension
of retired justices and officers and enlisted
members of the AFP.
3. PD 1638 was eventually issued by
Marcos which provided for the automatic
readjustment of the pension of officers
and enlisted men was restored, while that
of the retired justices was not.
4. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297
in 1990.
5. President Aquino issued the veto now
challenged in this petition.
6. VETOED BILL: PROVIDED FOR THE
INCREASE OF THE PENSIONS OF THE
RETIRED JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION.
7. Marcos issued PD 644 which repealed RA
1797, BUT IT never became a valid law
absent its publication, thus there was no
law ! that RA 1797 was still in effect and
HB 16297 was superfluous because it
tried to restore benefits which were never
taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297
did not also produce any effect.
8. PETITIONERS: (1) The subject veto is not
an item veto. YES, they are provisions,
(2) The veto by the Executive is violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers,
(3) The veto deprives the retired Justices
of their rights to the pensions due to them,
(4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal
Autonomy granted by the Constitution.
YES.

ISSUE:

WON the veto by the President of certain

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provisions in the GAA 1992 relating to the
payment of the adjusted portions of retired
Justices of the SC and CA is unconstitutional
.YES.


RATIO: The act of the Executive in vetoing the
particular provisions is an exercise of a
constitutionally vested power.

- BUT EVEN AS THE CONSTITUTION
GRANTS THE POWER, IT ALSO
PROVIDES LIMITATIONS TO ITS
EXERCISE. THE VETO POWER IS NOT
ABSOLUTE.
- IN THE EXERCISE OF THE VETO
POWER, IT IS GENERALLY ALL OR
NOTHING.
- However, when it comes to appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, the Administration
needs the money to run the machinery of
government and it cannot veto the entire
bill even if it may contain objectionable
features.
o The President is, therefore,
compelled to approve into law the
entire bill, including its undesirable
parts.
o It is for this reason that the
Constitution has wisely provided the
"item veto powers" to avoid
inexpedient riders being attached to
an indispensable appropriation or
revenue measure.
- GONZALES VS. MACARAIG: The
Constitution provides that ONLY A
PARTICULAR ITEM OR ITEMS MAY BE
VETOED. The power to disapprove any
item or items in an appropriate bill does
not grant the authority to veto a part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion
of the same item.
- THE ARE PROVISIONS, NOT items: the
augmentation of specific appropriations
found inadequate to pay retirement
payments, BY TRANSFERRING
SAVINGS FROM OTHER ITEMS OF
APPROPRIATION IS A PROVISION AND
NOT AN ITEM. WHY? It gives power to
the Chief Justice to transfer funds from

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one item to another. There is no specific
appropriation of money involved.
- WHAT THE PRESIDENT REALLY
VETOED:
1. RA 1797 enacted as early as Jun 21,
1957 (provided for the adjustment of
pensions of retired Justices which
privilege was extended to retired
members of the ConCom).
2. The Resolution of the Supreme
Court (Nov. 28, 1991).
- SINCE PD 644 NEVER REALLY
BECAME A LAW (AND THE COURT
HAD ALREADY RULED ABOUT THAT),
IT COULD NOT HAVE REPEALED RA
1797 ! VETOING THIS IS BEYOND
THE PRESIDENTS POWER.
O WHY? THE EXECUTIVE HAS NOT
AUTHORITY TO SET ASIDE AND
OVERRULE A DECISION OF THE
SC.
O The Presidents power is merely to
execute the laws as passed by
Congress.
O THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER
TO ENACT OR AMEND STATUTES
PROMULAGATED BY HER
PREDECESSORS, MUCH LESS TO
REPEAL EXISTING LAWS.
- FISCAL AUTONOMY:
1. The fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the
Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on
Audit, the Commission on Elections,
and the Office of the Ombudsman
contemplates A GUARANTEE OF
FULL FLEXIBILITY TO ALLOCATE
AND UTILIZE THEIR RESOURCES
WITH THE WISDOM AND
DISPATCH THAT THEIR NEEDS
REQUIRE.
2. It recognizes THE POWER AND
AUTHORITY TO LEVY, ASSESS
AND COLLECT FEES, FIX RATES
OF COMPENSATION NOT
EXCEEDING THE HIGHEST
RATES AUTHORIZED BY LAW
FOR COMPENSATION AND PLAY
PLANS OF THE GOVERNMENT
AND ALLOCATE AND DISBURSE
SUCH SUMS as may be provided by
law or prescribed by them in the
course of the discharge of their
functions.
3. Fiscal autonomy means FREEDOM
FROM OUTSIDE CONTROL.
4. The Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman
MUST HAVE THE INDEPENDENCE
AND FLEXIBILITY NEEDED IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES.
- THE FREEDOM OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE IS WITHHELD: TO MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS IN THE UTILIZATION
OF THE FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR
THE EXPEDITURES OF THE
JUDICIARY, INCLUDING THE USE OF
ANY SAVINGS FROM ANY
PARTICULAR ITEM TO COVER
DEFICITS OR SHORTAGES IN OTHER
ITEMS OF THE JUDICIARY.
O It knows its priorities just as it is
aware of the fiscal restraints.
- Retired Justices have a vested right to the
accrued pensions due to them pursuant to
RA 1797.



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MILLER VS. MARDO

FACTS:

1. CASE 1: Manuel Gonzales filed complaint
against Bill Miller at the Department of
Labor, claiming that he is a driver of Miller
and was arbitrarily dismissed without
separation pay.
- Miller filed petition for prohibition
against Hearing Officer Mardo of the
Dept. of Labor on ground that HO
has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide on the case.
- Court rendered decision though
that Reorg. Plan 2-A did not
repeal Judiciary Act that conferred
to CFI original jurisdiction to take
cognizance of money claims
regarding violations of labor
standards.
2. CASE 2: Cresencio Estano filed complaint
at the Department of Labor against Chin
Hua Trading Co., for not being paid
overtime and vacation leave pay as a
driver in the company.
- Court issued permanent injunction
against hearing the cases by the
Hearing Officer, as Reorg. Plan 2-A
is null and void.
3. CASE 3: Numeriana Raganas filed with
CFI a complaint against Sen Bee Trading
Company for being underpaid, not being
paid overtime, without sick leave and
vacation leave pay, as a seamstress
- Sun Bee filed motion to dismiss, and
insisted that CFI does not have
jurisdiction as money claims must be
filed with Regional Office of
Department of Labor under Reorg.
Plan 2-A
4. CASE 4: Vicente Romero filed case
against Sia Seng at the DOL Sia Leng did
not file an answer and a decision was
rendered in favor of Romero.
- But Labor Administrator Hernando
refused to issue the writ of execution
of the decision as he believed that
Sia Seng deserved to be heard.

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- They insist as well that Reorg. Plan
is not validly passed as a statute and
unconstitutional.
5. CASE 5: Mariano Pabillare filed at the
DOL a complaint against Fred Wilson
and Co., as he was summarily
dismissed without cause, without
separation pay, and without sufficient
notice.
- They moved to dismiss as it is only
an administrative body, with no
power to adjudicate money claims.

ISSUE:

WON the par. 5, Art. VI of Reorganization Plan
No. 20-A is valid. NO.

RATIO: Under this provision, the regional
offices of the Department of Labor have been
given ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER:

1. All cases falling under the WORKMENS
COMPENSATION LAW.
2. All cases affecting MONEY CLAIMS
arising from VIOLATIONS OF LABOR
STANDARDS ON WORKING
CONDITIONS, UNPAID WAGES,
UNDERPAYMENT, OVERTIME,
SEPARATION PAY AND MATERNITY
LEAVE OF EMPLOYEES AND
LABORERS.
3. All cases for UNPAID WAGES,
OVERTIME, SEPARATION PAY,
VACATION PAY AND PAYMENT FOR
MEDICAL SERVICES OF DOMESTIC
HEALTH.

Before, DOL had no authority over B and C !
ONLY AUTHORITY: to mediate merely or
arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing !
ERGO, B and C ARE NEW CONFERMENT
OF POWER.

- NOT VALID BECAUSE: THESE
FUNCTIONS (RA 1241 ! CREATING
THE GOVERNMENT SURVEY AND
REORGANIZATION COMMISSION)
REFER MERELY TO ADMINISTRATIVE,
not judicial functions.
- Why? THE GSRC was created to carry
out the reorganization of the EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, which plainly DID NOT
INCLUDE THE CREATION OF COURTS.
- Constitution: the Judicial power shall be
vested in one SC and in such inferior
courts as may be established by law.
- THE LEGISLATURE CAN CONFER RO
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS OR BODIES
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS ! MUST BE
STATED IN ITS INTENTION IN
EXPRESS TERMS THAT WOULD
LEAVE NO DOUBT, AS EVEN QUASI-
JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES MUST BE
LIMITED, IF THEY ARE TO BE VALID !
ONLY INCIDENTAL TO OR IN
CONNETION WITH THE
PERFORMANCE OF JURISDICTION
OVER A MATTER EXCLUSIVELY
VESTED IN THE COURTS.
- CANNOT BE IMPLIED FROM A MERE
GRANT OF POWER TO A BODY SUCH
AS THE GSRC.
- COROMINAS V. LABOR STANDARDS:
THELEGISLATURE MAY NOT AND
CANNOT DELEGATE ITS POWER TO
LEGISLATE OR CREATE COURTS OF
JUSTICCE TO ANY OTHER AGENCY
OF THE GOVERNMENT.
- THE PLAN BECAME A LAW BY NON-
ACTION ON THE PART OF
CONGRESS:
1. The Reorganization Commission
submitted Reorganization Plan No.
20-A to the President.
2. President transmitted the same to
Congress.
3. Congress adjourned WITHOUT
PASSING A RESOLUTION
DISAPPROVING OR ADOPTING
THE SAD PLAN.
- Violates the constitutional provision
requiring POSITIVE and SEPARATE
ACTION BY EACH HOUSE of Congress
! REVERSAL OF DEMOCRATIC
PROCESS.



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EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

ARTICLE 2 OF CC
LAWS SHALL TAKE EFFECT AFTER 15DAYS
FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THEIR
PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE,
UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED.
THIS CODE SHALL TAKE EEFECT ONE
YEAR AFTER SUCH PUBLICATION

unless otherwise provide this phrase refers to
the date of effectivity and nit the publication is
indispensable.

TANADA VS. TUVERA: nakalimutan ko na
kasi tong case na to !


EO 200
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF
LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE
PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR
THEIR EFFECTIVITY
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code
partly provides that "laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided . . . ;" cdasia
WHEREAS, the requirement that for
laws to be effective only a publication
thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice
has entailed some problems, a point
recognized by the Supreme Court in
Taada, et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No.
63915, December 29, 1986), when it
observed that "[t]here is much to be said of
the view that the publication need not be
made in the Official Gazette, considering its
erratic release and limited readership;"
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed
that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function
of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available,
have a wider readership, and come out
regularly;" and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing
premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should
accordingly be amended so the laws to be
effective must be published either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order:
SECTION 1.Laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided. cdtai
SECTION 2.Article 2 of Republic Act
No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil
Code of the Philippines," and all other laws
inconsistent with this Executive Order are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 3.This Executive Order shall
take effect immediately after its publication
in the Official Gazette.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 18th
day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Seven.
Published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 83 No.
26 Page 3038-A on June 29, 1987.

QUESTION HOUR AND LEGISLATIVE
INVESTIGATION
SEC21-22 OF THE CONSTITUTION


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ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO

FACTS:

1. BUENAVISTA ESTATE
- The Philippine government LEASED
FROM SAN JUAN DE DIOS
HOSPITAL FOR 25 YEARS the
Buenavista estate ! had an
OPTION TO PURCHASE THE
SAME FOR P 3 MILLION.
- Republic tendered the owner the
sum of P 3 million ! REJECTED !
deposit the said funds in Court,
together with the accrued rentals of
P 324,000.
- SAN JUAN DE DIOS ON JUNE 29,
1946 SOLD THIS SAME
PROPERTY TO ERNEST H. BURT,
a non-resident American for P
5,000,000 with the initial down
payment of P 10,000 with the
balance payable under very
favorable terms ! BURT WAS
UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE
TERMS AGREED.
2. TAMBOBONG ESTATE
- THE SAME BURT PURCHASE
FROM PHILIPPINE TRUST
CORPORATION, THE
TAMBOBONG ESTATE FOR P 1.2
MILLION WITH A DOWNPAYMENT
OF P 10,000.00.
- THERE WAS HOWEVER NO
OTHER PAYMENT RECEIVED
FROM BURT.
- THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT,
THROUGH THE RURAL
PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION,
ACQUIRED THIS SAME
PROPERTY FROM ITS ORIGINAL
OWNER FOR THE SUM OF P
750,000 ! instituted a notarial
demand upon Burt FOR THE
RESOLUTION AND
CANCELLATION OF HIS
CONTRACT OF PURCHASE WITH
PHILIPPINE TRUST FOR NON
PAYMENT.

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3. FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER,
DESPITE THE FACT THE PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT ALREADY OWNED
BOTH THE ABOVE ESTATE, IT AGAIN
BOUGHT THE SAME FROM BURT: P4.5
million = Buenavista and P500k =
Tambobong).
4. The government paid initially P
1,000,000 for Buenavista and the full
amount of P 500,000 for Tambobong
through TWO CORPORATIONS ACTING
AS BURTS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT !
REPRESENTED IN THE TRASACTION
BY ONE AND THE SAME PERSON,
PET. JEAN L. ARNAULT.
5. The transactions resulted into a public
outcry which led into THE PHILIPPINE
SENATE ADOPTING RESOLUTION 8
WHICH CREATED A SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND TAMBOBONG
ESTATES DEAL.
6. Among the witnesses and apparently the
most important was PET. JEAN
ARNAULT, THE PERSON WHO
REPRESENTED BURT IN THE
TRANSACTIONS.
7. During the said hearing, ARNAULT
CONFIRMED RECEIVING THE MONEY
FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND
WITHDRAWING, IN CASH, P440,000
WHICH HE GAVE TO SOMEONE ON
INSTRUCTION OF BURT.
8. WHEN ASKED TO IDENTIFY THE
PERSON HE GAVE THE MONEY TO,
HE REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT KNOW
HIS NAME DESPITE THE FACT THAT
HE MET THE PERSON ON MANY
OCCASIONS.
9. WHEN PRESSED TO ANSWER, HE
ALSO SAID THAT ANSWERING THE
QUESTION MIGHT INCRIMINATE HIM
! SENATE ARRAIGNED HIM FOR
CONTEMPT AND SUBSEQUENTLY
FOUND HIM GUILTY OF THE CHARGE.
10. He was committed to the custody of the
Senate Sergeant at arms until he reveals
the name of the person he gave the
money to.
11. PETITIONER: (1) Senate has no power to

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punish him for contempt for refusing to
reveal the name of the person BECAUSE
SUCH INFORMATION IS IMMATERIAL
TO, AND WILL NOT SERVE, ANY
INTENDED OR PURPORTED
LEGISLATION AND HIS REFUSAL TO
ANSWER THE QUESTION: NOT
EMBARASSED, OBSTRUCTED, OR
IMPEDED THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS. (2) The Senate lack authority
to commit him for contempt FOR A TERM
BEYOND ITS PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE
SESSION (Lopez vs. De los Reyes). (3)
He would incriminate himself if he should
reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the money.
12. SENATOR SUMULONG, CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMITTEE: the investigation had
NOT BEEN COMPLETD because of the
contumacy of the witness.
- Res. No. 16: his committee was
empowered and directed to continue
its investigation ! THE
EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS.

ISSUE:

WON the question for the refusal to answer
which the petitioner was held in contempt by
the Senate is pertinent to the matter under
inquiry. YES.
WON the Senate lack authority to commit him
for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative process. NO, they have such
authority.

RATIO: THE POWER OF INQUIRYWITH
THE PROCESS TO ENFORCE ITIS AN
ESSENTIAL AND APPROPRIATE
AUXILLARY TO THE LEGISLATIVE
FUNCTION.

- A legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively IN THE ABSENCE OF
NFORMATION RESPECTING THE
CONDITIONS WHICH THE
LEGISLATION IS INTENDED TO
AFFECT OR CHANGE.
- MERE REQUESTS FOR SUCH
INFORMATION ARE OFTEN

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UNAVAILING, and also that information
WHICH IS VOLUNTEERED IS NOT
ALWAYS ACCURATE OR COMPLETE
! SO SOME MEANS OF COMPULSION
IS ESSENTIAL TO OBTAIN WHAT IS
NEEDED.
- Does NOT by necessary implication
EXCLUDE THE POWER TO PUNISH
FOR CONTEMPT ANY OTHER
PERSON.
- BUT no person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness UNLESS HIS
TESTIMONY IS REQUIRED IN A
MATTER INTO WHICH THAT HOUSE
HAS JURISDICTION TO INQUIRE.

THE MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION
MUST BE DETERMINED BY ITS DIRECT
RELATION TO THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY
and not by its indirect relation to any proposed
or possible legislation.

- The necessity or lack of necessity for
legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are
determined by THE SUM TOTAL OF THE
INFORMATION TO BE GATHERED AS A
RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION.
- THE RULING OF THE SENATE ON THE
MATERIALITY OF THE INFORMATION
SOUGHT FROM THE WITNESS IS
PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT.
- The Court cannot determine, any more
than it can direct Congress, what
legislation to approve or not to approve !
THAT WOULD BE AN INVASION OF
THE LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE.
- THERE IS NOTHING T PREVENT THE
CONGRESS FROM APPROVING
OTHER MEASURES IT MAY DEEM
NECESSARY AFTER COMPLETING
THE INVESTIGATION ! It is not within
the Courts province to determine or
imagine what those measures may be:
Same as RE CHAPMAN.
- IF THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE IS WITHIN
THE RANGE OF LEGITIMATE
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY AND THE
PROPOSED TESTIMONY OF THE

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WITNESS CALLED RELATES TO THAT
SUBJECT,OBEDIENCE TO ITS
PROCESS MAY BE ENFORCED BY THE
COMMITTEE BY IMPRISONMENT.
- Until after the Senate shall have
determined who the parties responsible
are and shall have taken such measures
as may be within its competence to take
to redress the wrong that may have been
committed against the people as a result
of the transaction.

THE SENATE O FTHE PHILIPPINES IS A
CONTINUING BODY.

- THE RESOLUTION OF COMMITMENT
WAS ADOPTED BY THE SENATE,
WHICH IS A CONTINUING BODY AND
WHICH DOES NOT CEASE TO EXIST
UPON THE PERIODICAL DISSOLUTION
OF THE CONGRESS OR OF THE HOR
! no limit as to time to the Senates
power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be
exerted ! THE INVESTIGATION HAS
NOT BEEN COMPLETED.
o If NOT, the Senate would have to
resume the investigation and
REPEAT THE CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS ! absurd,
unnecessary, and vexatious
procedure ! AVOIDED.
- HIS INSISTENT CLAIM BEFORE THE
BAR OF THE SENATE THAT IF HE
SHOULD REVEAL THE NAME HE
WOULD INCRIMINATE HIMSELF,
NECESSARILY IMPLIED THAT HE
KNEW THE NAME ! UNBELIEVABLE.
- HE GAVE THE MONEY TO A
REPRESENTATIVE OF BURT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LATTERS
VERBAL INSTRUCTION ! no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to
answer might incriminate him.
- HE HAS A CLEAR DUTY AS A CITIZEN
TO GIVE FRANK, SINCERE, AND
TRUTHFUL TESTIMONY BEFORE A
COMPETENT AUTHORITY. THE STATE
HAS THE RIGHT TO EXACT
FULFILLMENT OF A CITIZEN'S
OBLIGATION, CONSISTENT OF
COURSE WITH HIS RIGHT UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION.



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ARNAULT VS. BALAGTAS

FACTS:

1. While still in confinement in Bilibid, PET.
ARNAULT EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT !
history of the government purchase and
NAMING JESS SANTOS AS THE
PERSON WHO RECEIVED THE P440k:
presented evidence in corroboration
thereof.
2. The Senate Committee conducted an
investigation.
3. At the end of the hearing, THE
COMMITTEE DID NOT BELIEVE
ARNAULTS STATEMENT ! Res. No.
114: continued confinement of Arnault
until HE HAS PURGED HIMSELF OF
CONTEMPT.
4. PET. ARNAULT filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
5. CFI-Pasay City declared the CONTINUED
DETENTION AND CONFINEMNT IS
ILLEGAL! Senate: GAD.



ISSUES:

WON the petitioner had already purged himself
of the contempt charges when he disclosed the
fact that the one to whom he gave the money
is Jess Santos. NOT YET.
WON the Court can review the findings of the
Senate Special Committee regarding the
petitioners statement. NO.

RATIO: SENATE FINDING: the fact that
PETITIONER "HAS FAILED AND REFUSED,
AND CONTINUES TO FAIL AND REFUSE,
TO REVEAL THE PERSON TO WHOM HE
GAVE THE AMOUNT OF P440,000" AND
THAT THE SITUATION OF PETITIONER
"HAS NOT MATERIALLY CHANGED SINCE
HE WAS COMMITTED TO PRISON."

- CFI, arrogating unto itself the power to
review such finding, held that THE
"PETITIONER HAS SATISFACTORILY

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SHOWN THAT THE PERSON OF JESS
D. SANTOS ACTUALLY AND
PHYSICALLY EXISTED IN THE HUMAN
FLESH," that THE OPINION OR
CONCLUSION OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE IS NOT BORNE TO OUT
BY THE EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT
THE INVESTIGATION, that THE
SENATE ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
MAKING ITS CONCLUSION ! order the
release of petitioner ! ERRONEOUS.
- WHY? IT ASSUMED THAT COURTS
HAVE THE RIGHT TO REVIEW FINDING
OF LEGISLATIVE BODIES IN THE
EXERCISE OF THE PREROGATIVE OF
LEGISLATION, OR INTEREFERE WITH
THE PROCEEDINGS OR THEIR
DISCRETION IN WHAT IS KNOWN AS
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ! purely
of legislative cognizance.
- THE DETERMINATION OF THE
LEGISLATURE IS FINAL, EXCEPT
WHEN SO ARBITRARY AS TO BE
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE CITIZEN.
- PET. WAS NOT DENIED OF DUE
PROCESS: such right has fully been
extended the petitioner, he having been
given the opportunity to be heard
personally and by counsel in all the
proceedings prior to the approval of the
Resolution ordering his continued
confinement.
- THE SENATE FOUND THAT THE
PETITIONER-APPELLEE DID NOT
DISCLOSE, BY THE MERE GIVING OF
THE NAME JESS D. SANTOS, THE
IDENTITY OF THE PERSON TO WHOM
THE SUM OF P440,000 WAS
DELIVERED, AND, IN ADDITION
THERETO THAT PETITIONER
WITHHELD SAID IDENTITY
ARROGANTLY AND
CONTUMACIOUSLY IN CONTINUED
AFFRONT OF THE SENATE'S
AUTHORITY AND DIGNITY ! POWER
TO PUNISH FOR A PAST CONTEMPT
IS AN APPROPRIATE MEANS.
- HOW COULD THE AUTHORITY AND
POWER BECOME COMPLETE IF FOR

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EVERY ACT OF REFUSAL, EVERY ACT
OF DEFIANCE, EVERY ACT OF
CONTUMACY AGAINST IT, THE
LEGISLATIVE BODY MUST RESORT TO
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT FOR THE
APPROPRIATE REMEDY?
- LEGISLATURE: THE PROCESS BY
WHICH A CONTUMACIOUS WITNESS
IS EALTH BY THEM IS TO ENABLE IT
TO EXERCISE ITS LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF AUTHORTIY ! necessary
concomitant of the legislative power or
process.
O LEGISLATURE'S AUTHORITY TO
DEAL WITH THE DEFIANT AND
CONTUMACIOUS WITNESS
SHOULD BE SUPREME, and unless
there is a manifest and absolute
disregard of discretion and a mere
exertion of arbitrary power coming
within the reach of constitutional
limitations, the exercise of the
authority is not subject to judicial
interference.
- DIFFERENT FROM JUDICIARY: THE
PROCESS BY WHICH OFFENDERS
ARE BROUGHT TO THE COURTS OF
JUSTICE FOR THE MEETING OF THE
PUNISHMENT WHICH THE CRIMINAL
LAW IMPOSES UPON THEM ! has to
do with the enforcement and application
of the criminal law.
- In order that the petitioner may be
considered as having purged himself of
the contempt, IT IS NECESSARY THAT
HE SHOULD HAVE TESTIFIED
TRUTHFULLY, DISCLOSING THE REAL
IDENTITY OF THE PERSON SUBJECT
OF THE INQUIRY.
- THE SENATE COMMITTEE REFUSED
TO BELIEVE, AND JUSTLY, THAT IS
THE REAL NAME OF THE PERSON
WHOSE IDENTITY IS BEING THE
SUBJECT OF THE INQUIRY.
O Be taken as insult to the intelligence
of the honorable members of the
body that conducted the
investigation.
- Period of punishment for contempt
already exceeded? NO. ONLY 5
MONTHS HAD PASSED: AFFIDAVIT !
Dec. 13, 1951; RESOLUTON: Nov. 6,
1952.



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BENGZON VS. SEN. BLUE RIB.
COMMITTEE

FACTS:

1. The RP (rep. PCGG) filed with the
Sandiganbayan civil case: RP vs.
Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez ! alleges
that defendants BENJAMIN and
JULIETTE R. took advantage of their
relationship with defendants Ferdinand
and Imelda Marcos TO ENGAGE IN
SCHEMES TO ENRICH THEMSELVES
AT THE EXPENSE OF THE FILIPINO
PEOPLE.
2. THE SENATE MINORITY FLOOR
LEADER, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE
! a speech "on a matter of personal
privilege" before the Senate ON THE
ALLEGED "TAKE-OVER OF SOLOIL
INCORPORATED, THE FLAGSHIP OF
THE FIRST MANILA MANAGEMENT OF
COMPANIES (FMMC) BY RICARDO
LOPA" and called upon "THE SENATE
TO LOOK INTO THE POSSIBLE
VIOLATION OF THE LAW IN THE CASE,
PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, THE ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT."
3. Referred by the Senate to the
COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS (BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE).
4. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
started its investigation on the matter.
5. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear
before it and TESTIFY ON "WHAT THEY
KNOW" REGARDING THE "SALE OF
THE THIRTY-SIX (36) CORPORATIONS
BELONGING TO BENJAMIN "KOKOY"
ROMUALDEZ.
6. LOPA ! declined: his testimony may
unduly prejudice the defendants of the
Civil Case. BENGZON ! refused:
invoked his constitutional right to due
process.
7. SBRC REJECTED the please. THE

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COMMTTEE VOTED TO PURSUE AND
CONTINUE ITS INVESIGATION OF THE
MATTER.
8. PETITIONERS FILED THIS PRESENT
PETITION: SBRC was acting in excess of
its jurisdiction and legislative purpose !
clear blatant disregard of human rights,
etc.

ISSUES:

WON the SBRCs inquiry is in aid of legislation.
NO.
WON Congress is encroaching on the
exclusive domain of another branch of
government. YES.
WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right
to due process. YES.

RATIO: THE SPEECH OF SENATOR ENRILE
CONTAINED NO SUGGESTION OF
CONTEMPLATED LEGISLATION ! HE
MERELY CALLED UPON THE SENATE TO
LOOK INTO A POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
SEC. 5 OF RA NO. 3019, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS "THE ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT."

- PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY: TO FIND
OUT WHETHER OR NOT THE
RELATIVES OF PRESIDENT AQUINO,
PARTICULARLY MR. RICARDO LOPA,
HAD VIOLATED THE LAW IN
CONNECTION WITH THE ALLEGED
SALE OF THE 36 OR 39
CORPORATIONS BELONGING TO
BENJAMIN "KOKOY" ROMUALDEZ TO
THE LOPA GROUP ! NO INTENDED
LEGISLATION INVOLVED.
o NOT RELATED to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress.
o The matter is MORE WITHIN THE
PROVINCE OF THE COURTS
rather than of the legislature.
- FILING IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
CAME FIRST:
o The issue sought to be investigated
by the respondent Committee is
ONE OVER WHICH JURISDICTION
HAD BEEN ACQUIRED BY THE
SANDIGANBAYAN.
o THE ISSUE HAS BEEN PRE-
EMPTED BY THAT COURT.
o To allow the respondent Committee
to conduct its own investigation of an
issue already before the
Sandiganbayan WOULD NOT ONLY
POSE THE POSSIBILITY OF
CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS
BETWEEN A LEGISLATIVE
COMMITTEE and THE
POSSIBILITY OF ITS INFLUENCE
BEING MADE TO BEAR ON THE
ULTIMATE JUDGMENT OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN cannot be
discounted ! EN-CROACHMENT
INTO THE EXCLUSIVE DOMAIN
OF JUICIAL JURISDICTION.



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SENATE VS. ERMITA

FACTS:

1. Committee of the Senate ISSUED
INVITATIONS TO VARIOUS OFFICIALS
OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
FOR THEM TO APPEAR AS
RESOURCE SPEAKERS IN A PUBLIC
HEARING ON THE RAILWAY PROJECT
OF THE NORTH LUZON RAILWAYS
CORPORATION WITH THE CHINA
NATIONAL MACHINERY AND
EQUIPMENT GROUP (HEREINAFTER
NORTH RAIL PROJECT).
2. The public hearing was sparked by A
PRIVILEGE SPEECH OF SENATOR
JUAN PONCE ENRILE URGING THE
SENATE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ALLEGED OVERPRICING AND OTHER
UNLAWFUL PROVISIONS OF THE
CONTRACT COVERING THE NORTH
RAIL PROJECT ! even to some officials
of the AFP.
3. AFP Chief of Staff: requested for its
postponement "due to a pressing
operational situation that demands [his]
utmost personal attention" while "some of
the invited AFP officers are currently
attending to other urgent operational
matters."
4. Exec. Sec. ERMITA respectfully
requested for the postponement of the
hearing ! to afford time and opportunity
to study and prepare for the various
issues.
5. SEN. PRES. DRILON REPLIED !
unable to accede to the request because
everything had already been set the
previous week.
6. PRESIDENT ISSUED EO 464. BARS
THE APPEARANCE OF EXEC.
OFFICIALS BEFORE CONGRESS.
7. EXEC. SEC. ERMITA: the officials of the
Executive WILL NOT BE ABLE TO
ATTEND THE SAME WITHOUT THE
CONSENT OF THE PRESIDENT.
8. The investigation scheduled by the
Committee on National Defense and

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Security pushed through, WITH ONLY
COL. BALUTAN AND BRIG. GEN.
GUDANI AMONG ALL THE AFP
OFFICIALS INVITED ATTENDING.
9. For defying President Arroyo's order
barring military personnel from testifying
before legislative inquiries without her
approval, BRIG. GEN. GUDANI AND
COL. BALUTAN WERE RELIEVED
FROM THEIR MILITARY POSTS AND
WERE MADE TO FACE COURT
MARTIAL PROCEEDINGS.
10. Another investigation on the alleged
mismanagement and use of the fertilizer
fund ! most of them failed to attend.
11. Budget hearings ! communicated their
inability to attend due to lack of
appropriate clearance from the Pres.

ISSUES:

WON E.O. 464 contravenes the power of
inquiry vested in Congress. YES.

RATIO: POWER OF INQUIRY: SEC. 21, ART.
VI: may conduct inquries IN AID OF
LEGISLATION.

- Essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function.
- A legislative body cannot legislate wisely
or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess it.
- BROAD ENOUGH TO COVER
OFFICIALS OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH.
- THE OPERATION OF GOVERNMENT,
BEING A LEGITI-MATE SUBJECT FOR
LEGISLATION, IS A PROPER SUB-JECT
FOR INVESTIGATION.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: the power of the
Government to WITHHOLD INFORMATION
FROM THE PUBLIC, THE COURTS, AND

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THE CONGRESS (Schwartz).

- The right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold
information from Congress, the courts,
and ultimately the public (Rozell).
- Premised on the fact that CERTAIN
INFORMATIONS MUST, AS A MATTER
OF NECESSITY, BE KEPT
CONFIDENTIAL IN PURSUIT OF THE
PUBLIC INTEREST.
1. STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE:
information is of such nature that ITS
DISCLOSURE WOULD SUBVERT
CRUCIAL MILITARY OR
DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES.
2. INFORMERS PRIVILEGE: the
privilege of the Government NOT TO
DISCLOSE THE IDEN-TITY OF
PERSONS WHO FURNISH
INFORMA-TION OF VIOLATIONS
OF LAW to officers charges with the
enforcement of that law.
3. GENERIC PRIVILEGE: for internal
deliberations ! intragovernmental
documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a
process by which government
decisions and policies are
formulated.
- REQUIRED INFO MUST FALL WITHIN
ONE OF THE TRADITIONAL
PRIVILEGES + PRIVILEGE NEEDS TO
BE HONORED IN A GIVEN
PROCEDURAL SETTING.
- US VS. NIXON: (privilege against
production of certain tapes and
documents relating to the Watergate
investigations) rejected the President's
claim of privilege, ruling that THE
PRIVILEGE MUST BE BALANCED
AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
THE FAIR ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE.
- ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ: The privilege
is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the
Constitution . . .

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- CHAVEZ VS. PCGG: governmental
privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military,
diplomatic and other national security
matters.
- CHAVEZ VS. PEA: The right to
information does not extend to matters
recognized as "privileged information
under the separation of powers," by which
the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings.
- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, WHETHER
ASSERTED AGAINST CONGRESS, THE
COURTS, OR THE PUBLIC, IS
RECOGNIZED ONLY IN RELATION TO
CERTAIN TYPES OF INFORMATION OF
A SENSITIVE CHARACTER.
- While executive privilege is a
constitutional concept, A CLAIM
THEREOF MAY BE VALID OR NOT
DEPENDING ON THE GROUND
INVOKED TO JUSTIFY IT AND THE
CONTEXT IN WHICH IT IS MADE.

SECTION 1 (VALID ON ITS FACE): applied to
department heads not made to depend on
the department heads possession of any
information which might be covered by
executive privilege.

- The consent is grounded on ART. VI, Sec.
22: QUESTION HOUR ! ATTENDANCE
WAS MEANT TO BE DISCRETIONARY.
o OBJECTIVE: to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight
function. .
- Sec. 21: ATTENDANCE WAS
COMPULSORY IN INQUIRIES IN AID OF
LEGISLATION.
o OBJECTIVE: to illicit information that
may be used for legislation.
- The power of Congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section
22 ! basis: principle of separation of
powers.
- WHILE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS A
CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF THE

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LEGISLATURE, IT CANNOT
FRUSTRATE THE POWER OF
CONGRESS TO LEGISLATE BY
REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH ITS
DEMANDS FOR INFORMATION.
- ONLY ONE EXECUTIVE OFFICIAL MAY
BE EXEMPTED FROM THIS POWER
THE PRESIDENT ON WHOM
EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED except
through the power of impeachment.
WHY? DUE RESPECT ACCORDED TO
A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT WHICH IS
SANCTIONED BY A LONG-STANDING
CUSTOM.

SECTION 2(b) [INVALID BECAUSE IT IS NOT
ASSERTED, MERELY IMPLIED]: executive
privilege actually covers PERSONS !
MISUSE: exec. Privilege is properly invoked in
relation to specific categories of
INFORMATION, and NOT TO CATEGORIES
OF PERSONS.

- REQUIREMENT: he first secure the
consent of the President prior to
appearing before Congress ! bars the
appearance of the official concerned
unless the same is permitted by the
President.
o IMPLIED CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE IS
NOT ALLOWED: 1) secure the
consent 2) President has not
reversed such determination.
o THE LETTER ASSUMES THAT
THE INVITED OFFICIALS ARE
COVERED BY EO 464.
- SECTION 3 [INVALID]: requires all the
public officials (i.e. department heads,
Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the
PNP, and the National Security Adviser)
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of
Congress.
- The letter of respondent Executive
Secretary quoted above, THE IMPLIED
CLAIM AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 3 OF
E.O. 464 IS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY
ANY SPECIFIC ALLEGATION OF THE
BASIS THEREOF (E.G., WHETHER THE
INFORMATION DEMANDED INVOLVES
MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC SECRETS,
CLOSED-DOOR CABINET MEETINGS,
ETC.).
o Congress has the right to know WHY
THE EXECUTIVE CONSIDERS THE
REQUESTED INFORMATION
PRIVILEGED.
o A CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE, BEING A
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION FROM AN
OBLIGATION TO DISCLOSE
INFORMATION, MUST,
THEREFORE, BE CLEARLY
ASSERTED ! THE FACTS MUST
BE ESTABLISHED.
o ABSENT THEN A STATEMENT OF
THE SPECIFIC BASIS OF A CLAIM
OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE,
THERE IS NO WAY OF
DETERMINING WHETHER IT
FALLS UNDER ONE OF THE
TRADITIONAL PRIVILEGES, OR
WHETHER, GIVEN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT IS
MADE, IT SHOULD BE
RESPECTED ! AN IMPROPERLY
ASSERTED CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
IS NO CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE.
O BUT Congress must not require the
executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to
compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to
protect.
- OTHERVIOLATIONS: 1) AGAINST
RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION,
2) PUBLICATION.




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SABIO VS. GORDON

FACTS:

1. SENATOR MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO INTRODUCED PHILIPPINE
SENATE RESOLUTION NO. 455
(SENATERES. NO. 455) ! directing AN
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION ON
THE ANOMALOUS LOSSES incurred by
the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications
SatelliteCorporation (PHILCOMSAT), and
PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation
(PHC).
2. Why? Due to the alleged improprieties in
their operations by their respective Board
of Directors.
3. The Senate invited Presidential
Commission on Good Governance
(PCGG) CHAIRMAN CAMILO L. SABIO
to be the resource person in a public
meeting that would deliberate on the
issues presented in Senate Res. No.455.
4. Chairman Sabio, however, declined the
invitation, invoking SECTION 4,
PARAGRAPH (B) OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 1, which provides:

NO MEMBER OR STAFF OF THE
COMMISSION SHALL BE REQUIRED
TO TESTIFY OR PRODUCE
EVIDENCE IN ANY JUDICIAL,
LEGISLATIVE OR ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDING CONCERNING
MATTERS WITHIN ITS OFFICIAL
COGNIZANCE.

5. Senator Richard J. Gordon issued a
subpoena ad testificandum ! require
Chairman Sabio and the FOUR PCGG
COMMISSIONERS TO APPEAR IN THE
PUBLIC HEARING SCHEDULED and
TESTIFY ON WHAT THEY KNOW
RELATIVE TO THE MATTERS
SPECIFIED IN SENATE RES. NO. 455.

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6. AGAIN, CHAIRMANSABIO REFUSED
TO APPEAR.
7. Another notice was sent to Chairman
Sabio requiring him to appear and testify
on the same subject matter, but Chairman
Sabio still did not comply (3
rd
TIME).
8. UNCONVINCED, THE COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND
PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND THE
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES
ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING
MAJOR GENERAL JOSE BALAJADIA
(RET.), SENATE SERGEANT-AT-ARMS,
TO PLACE CHAIRMAN SABIO AND HIS
COMMISSIONERS UNDER ARREST
FOR CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE !
BEARS THE APPROVAL OF SENATE
PRESIDENT VILLAR AND THE
MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEES'
MEMBERS.
9. CHAIRMAN SABIO FILED WITH THIS
COURT A PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS against the Senate Committee
on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services, their Chairmen, Senators
Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and
Members.

ISSUE
:
WON EO No. 1, Section 4(b), is repealed by
the 1987 Constitution. YES.

RATIO: Sec. 21, Art. VI, 198 Constitution " !
EO No. 1.

- The power of inquiry is INHERENT in the
power to legislate.
- BRIGGS VS. MCKELLAR: The right to
pass laws, necessarily implies the right to
obtain information upon any matter which
may become the subject of a law. It is
essential to the full and intelligent exercise
of the legislative function ! THE POWER
OF INQUIRY IS "AN ESSENTIAL AND
APPROPRIATE AUXILIARY TO THE
LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
- ARNAULT: THE OPERATION OF
GOVERNMENT, BEING A LEGITIMATE

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SUBJECT FOR LEGISLATION, IS A
PROPER SUBJECT FOR
INVESTIGATION" AND THAT "THE
POWER OF INQUIRY IS CO-
EXTENSIVE WITH THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE.
- WE FIND SECTION 4(B) DIRECTLY
REPUGNANT WITH ARTICLE VI,
SECTION 21. SECTION 4(B) EXEMPTS
THE PCGG MEMBERS AND STAFF
FROM THE CONGRESS' POWER OF
INQUIRY ! NOWHERE IN THE
CONSTITUTION IS ANY PROVISION
GRANTING SUCH EXEMPTION.
- The Congress' power of inquiry, being
broad, ENCOMPASSES EVERYTHING
THAT CONCERNS THE
ADMINISTRATION OF EXISTING LAWS
AS WELL AS PROPOSED OR
POSSIBLY NEEDED STATUTES !
extends "TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
CREATED BY CONGRESS AND
OFFICERS WHOSE POSITIONS ARE
WITHIN THE POWER OF CONGRESS
TO REGULATE OR EVEN ABOLISH." !
PCGG belongs to this class.
- A mere provision of law cannot pose a
limitation to the broad power of Congress,
in the absence of any constitutional basis.
- ALSO INCONSISTENT WITH
PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY: IT PLACES THE
PCGG MEMBERS AND STAFF BEYOND
THE REACH OF COURTS, CONGRESS
AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE
BODIES. INSTEAD OF ENCOURAGING
PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY, THE SAME
PROVISION ONLY INSTITUTIONALIZES
IRRESPONSIBILITY AND NON-
ACCOUNTABILITY.
- ALSO INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE
XI, SECTION 1 OF THE
CONSTITUTION: THE POWERS SO
DELEGATED TO THE OFFICER ARE
HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PEOPLE
AND ARE TO BE EXERCISED IN
BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT OR OF
ALL CITIZENS WHO MAY NEED THE
INTERVENTION OF THE OFFICERS.
o Such trust extends to all matters
within the range of duties pertaining
to the office. In other words, public
officers are but the servants of the
people, and not their rulers.
- ALSO OF SEC. 28, Art. II (full public
disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest), SEC. 7, Art. III (the right
of people to information on matters of
public concern).
- THE PEOPLE ARE EQUALLY
CONCERNED WITH THIS
PROCEEDING AND HAVE THE RIGHT
TO PARTICIPATE THEREIN IN ORDER
TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS ! the
extent of their participation will largely
depend on the information gathered and
made known to them. In other words, the
right to information really goes hand-in-
hand with the constitutional policies of full
public disclosure and honesty in the public
service.
- NO ACT SHALL BE VALID, HOWEVER
NOBLE ITS INTENTIONS, IF IT
CONFLICTS WITH THE
CONSTITUTION.






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NERI VS. SENATE

FACTS:

1. April 21, 2007: DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATION (DOTC) ENTERED
INTO A CONTRACT WITH ZHONG XING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
(ZTE) ! for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband
Network (NBN) Project IN THE AMOUNT
OF U.S. $ 329,481,290
(APPROXIMATELY P16 BILLION
PESOS).
2. The Project was to be financed by the
Peoples Republic of China.
3. The Senate passed various resolutions
relative to the NBN deal.
- P.S. Res. No. 127 (Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr), entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE
BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND
THE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND
INDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN
AID OF LEGISLATION, THE
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO
THE APPROVAL OF THE
BROADBAND CONTRACT WITH
ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY
THE OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN
GETTING IT CONSUMMATED"
- P.S. Res. No. 144 (Senator Mar
Roxas), entitled A RESOLUTION
URGING PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO
DIRECT THE CANCELLATION OF
THE ZTE CONTRACT.
- P.S. Res. No. 129 (Senator Panfilo
M. Lacson), entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY TO CONDUCT AN
INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION
INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF AWARDING
THE NATIONAL BROADBAND
NETWORK CONTRACT TO THE
CHINESE FIRM ZTE

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CORPORATION.
- P.S. Res. No. 136 (Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago), entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE
PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION
OF THE NATIONAL BROADBAND
NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OF
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.
4. September 18, 2007, JOSE DE VENECIA
III TESTIFIED THAT SEVERAL HIGH
EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS AND POWER
BROKERS WERE USING THEIR
INFLUENCE TO PUSH THE APPROVAL
OF THE NBN PROJECT BY THE NEDA.
5. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited
to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
6. HE APPEARED IN ONE HEARING
WHEREIN HE WAS INTERROGATED
FOR 11 HOURS AND DURING WHICH
HE ADMITTED THAT ABALOS OF
COMELEC TRIED TO BRIBE HIM WITH
P200M IN EXCHANGE FOR HIS
APPROVAL OF THE NBN PROJECT !
he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed
him not to accept the bribe.
7. HOWEVER, WHEN PROBED FURTHER
ON WHAT THEY DISCUSSED ABOUT
THE NBN PROJECT, PETITIONER
REFUSED TO ANSWER, INVOKING
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.
8. In particular, he refused to answer the
questions on: (a) whether or not President
Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b)
whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve.
9. HE LATER REFUSED TO ATTEND THE
OTHER HEARINGS.
10. Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring
that the communications between GMA
and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied.
11. HE WAS CITED IN CONTEMPT OF
RESPONDENT COMMITTEES AND AN
ORDER FOR HIS ARREST AND

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DETENTION UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT
HE WOULD APPEAR AND GIVE HIS
TESTIMONY.
12. PETITIONER: Contempt Order were
issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
- MATTERS RELATING TO
DIPLOMACY OR FOREIGN
RELATIONS
- Conversations with President Arroyo
are "candid discussions meant to
explore options in making policy
decisions."
- These discussions "dwelt on the
impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials
on the country's diplomatic relations
and economic and military affairs
and the possible loss of confidence
of foreign investors and lenders in
the Philippines."
13. RESPONDENT COMMITTEES:
(1) Petitioner's testimony is material and
pertinent in the investigation
conducted in aid of legislation;
(2) There is no valid justification for
petitioner to claim executive
privilege;
(3) There is no abuse of their authority
to order petitioner's arrest; and
(4) Petitioner has not come to court with
clean hands.

ISSUE:

WON those questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. YES.
WON the respondent committees committed
GAD. YES.

RATIO:

WHY?

1. The communications relate to a
"QUINTESSENTIAL AND NON-
DELEGABLE POWER" of the President,
i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This

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authority of the President to enter into
executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
2. The communications are "RECEIVED" BY
A CLOSE ADVISOR OF THE
PRESIDENT. Under the "OPERATIONAL
PROXIMITY" test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyo's cabinet.
3. There is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.


EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGES


PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS
PRIVILEGE
1. Communications,
docu-ments or
other materials
that reflect
presidential deci-
sion-making and
delibera-tions and
that the President
believes should
remain
confidential.
2. Applies to
decision-making of
the President.
3. Rooted in the
constitutional
principle of
separation of
power and the
Presidents unique
constitutional role.
4. Applies to
documents in their
entirety, and
covers final and

DELIBERATIVE
PROCESS
PRIVILEGE
1. Advisory
opinions,
recommendatio
ns and
deliberations
comprising part
of a process by
which
governmental
decisions and
policies are
formulated.
2. Applies to
decision-
making of
executive
officials.
3. Rooted on
common law
privilege.

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post-decisional
materials as well
as pre-deliberative
ones.
5. Congressional or
judicial negation of
the presidential
communications
privilege is always
subject to greater
scrutiny than
denial of the
deliberative
process privilege.
6. MEANT TO
ENCOMPASS
ONLY THOS
EFUNCTIONS
THAT FORM THE
CORE OF
PRESIDENTIAL
AUTHORITY !
QNDP such a
commander-in-
chief power,
appointment and
removal power,
the power to grant
pardons and
repress, the sole-
authority to receive
ambassadors and
other public
officers, the power
to negotiate
treaties.

- ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE (Nixon,
In Re Sealed Case):
1. The protected communication must
relate to a "quintessential and non-
delegable presidential power."
2. The communication must be
authored or "solicited and received"
by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial
test is that an advisor must be in
"operational proximity" with the

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President.
3. The presidential communications
privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing
of adequate need, such that the
information sought "likely contains
important evidence" and by the
unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.
- Presidential communications privilege are
PRESUMPTIVELY PRIVILEGED and that
the presumption can be overcome only by
mere showing of public need by the
branch seeking access to conversations.
- THE PETITIONER MADE HIMSELD
AVAILABLE TO THEM DURING 9/26
HEARING, WHERE HE WAS
QUESTIONED FOR 11 HOURS !
expressly manifested his willingness to
answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception of those
covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
- ART III, Sec. 7 ! right of people to
information on matters of public concern
SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS
MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW ! there is
a recognized public interest in the
confidentiality of certain information.
- NOTE: right of Congress of its
Committees to obtain information in aid of
legislation NOT EQUAL TO peoples right
to public information.
- While Congress is composed of
representatives elected by the people, it
does not follow, except in a highly
qualified sense, that in every exercise of
its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.
- ENUMERATION IS NOT EVEN
INTENDED TO BE COMPREHENSIVE !
just only to assure that the Committees
will not be left in the dark.
- GAD:
1. There being a legitimate claim of
executive privilege, the issuance of
the contempt Order suffers from
constitutional infirmity.
2. Respondent Committees did not
comply with the requirement laid
down in Senate vs. Ermita ! the
invitations should contain the
"possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry",
along with "the usual indication of the
subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof.
3. Only a minority of the members of
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
was present during the deliberation
! MAJORITY.
4. Resp. Com. Violated Sec. 21 of Art.
VI of the Constitution, requiring that
the inquiry be in accordance with the
duly published rules of procedures.
! subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14
th

Senate are procedurally infirm.

Issuance is arbitrary and precipitate ! resp.
com. Should have exercised the same
restraint, after all petitioner is not even an
ordinary witness. HE HOLDS A HIGH
POSITION IN THE CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF
GOVERNMENT.



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GARCILLANO V. HOR

FACTS:

1. Then Minority Floor Leader Francis G.
Escudero delivered a privilege speech,
"Tale of Two Tapes", and set in motion a
congressional investigation jointly
conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety,
National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms (respondent House
Committees).
2. NBI submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape
recordings of the supposed three-hour
taped conversation.
3. The tapes were eventually played in the
chambers of the House.
4. The hearings for HELLO GARCI tapes
were suspended on Aug. 3, 2005
indefinitely.
5. ALARMED, PET. GARCILLANO filed to
restrain the committees from using these
tape recordings of the ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED wiretapped conversations !
DISCUSSION STOPPED #
6. AFTER TWO YEARS, Senator Panfilo
Lacsons speech: promised to provide the
public "the whole unvarnished truth the
what's, when's, where's, who's and why's"
of the alleged wiretap, and sought an
inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to
participate in nefarious wiretapping
activities.
7. Senator Lacson's speech was referred to
the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security, chaired by Senator
Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed
two bills 6 seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping
equipment and to prohibit the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
performing electoral duties.
8. Senate proceeded with its public
hearings.

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HELD: Court dismissed PET. GARCILLANOs
petition for BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
THEY WERE ALREADY PLAYED.

- The Senate cannot be allowed to continue
with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry without duly published
rules of procedure, in clear derogation of
the constitutional requirement.
- WHY THE NEED FOR PUBLICATION?
To satisfy the basic requirement of due
process.
- Publication is indeed imperative, for it will
be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
- With respect to the present Senate of the
14th Congress, however, of which the
term of half of its members commenced
on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these
rules when they first opened their session.
- RULES OF SENATE, RULE XLIV,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: All pending
matters and proceedings shall terminate
upon the expiration of one (1) Congress,
but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present for the first time.
o Undeniably from the foregoing, all
pending matters and proceedings,
i.e., unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the
Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up
such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for
the first time.
- RESPONDENTS: never been amended
since 1995; published in booklet form
available for anyone for free ! NO.
- The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom,
practice or tradition followed by the
Senate. WHY? Carpio: they put a
persons liberty at risk.
- Invocation of RA 8792 ! INCORRECT.
- The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do
so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure".
- NOTE: very recently, the Senate caused
the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues
of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. ! THE
RECENT PUBLICATION DOES NOT
CURE THE INFIRMITY OF THE
INQUIRY SOUGHT TO BE PROHIBITED
BY THE INSTANT PETITIONS.


9. OTHER POWERS
a, oversight

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ABAKADA VS PURISIMA
Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize
the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It
provides a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC
officials and employees if they exceed their
revenue targets. It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at
least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers,
filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform
legislation. They contend that the limiting the
scope of the system of rewards and incentives
only to officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a
system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.

Respondent contends that the allegation that
the reward system will breed mercenaries is
mere speculation and does not suffice to
invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the
declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly
classifies the BIR and the BOC because the
functions they perform are distinct from those
of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities.
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee. There is hereby created a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee composed
of seven Members from the Senate and seven
Members from the House of Representatives.
The Members from the Senate shall be
appointed by the Senate President, with at
least two senators representing the minority.
The Members from the House of
Representatives shall be appointed by the
Speaker with at least two members

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representing the minority. After the Oversight
Committee will have approved the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it
shall thereafter become functus officio and
therefore cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of
approving the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM,
NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006,
it approved the said IRR. From then on, it
became functus officio and ceased to exist.
Hence, the issue of its alleged encroachment
on the executive function of implementing and
enforcing the law may be considered moot and
academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a
time as any for the Court to confront the issue
of the constitutionality of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created
under RA 9335 (or other similar laws for that
matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now
Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of
congressional oversight in Macalintal v.
Commission on Elections
34
is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight
embraces all activities undertaken by
Congress to enhance its understanding of
and influence over the implementation of
legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to
eliminate executive waste and dishonesty,
(d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be

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intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself
and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of
government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its
oversight power with increased frequency to
check the perceived "exponential accumulation
of power" by the executive branch. By the
beginning of the 20
th
century, Congress has
delegated an enormous amount of legislative
authority to the executive branch and the
administrative agencies. Congress, thus, uses
its oversight power to make sure that the
administrative agencies perform their functions
within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x
x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the
exercise of its oversight powers may be divided
into three categories, namely: scrutiny,
investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser
intensity and continuity of attention to
administrative operations. Its primary purpose
is to determine economy and efficiency of the
operation of government activities. In the
exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may
request information and report from the other
branches of government. It can give
recommendations or pass resolutions for
consideration of the agency involved.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a
passive process of looking at the facts that are
readily available, congressional investigation
involves a more intense digging of facts. The
power of Congress to conduct investigation is
recognized by the 1987 Constitution under

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section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by
which Congress exercises its oversight power
is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision"
connotes a continuing and informed awareness
on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given
administrative area. While both congressional
scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into
past executive branch actions in order to
influence future executive branch performance,
congressional supervision allows Congress to
scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part
of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the
executive agencies through its veto power. It
typically utilizes veto provisions when granting
the President or an executive agency the
power to promulgate regulations with the force
of law. These provisions require the President
or an agency to present the proposed
regulations to Congress, which retains a "right"
to approve or disapprove any regulation before
it takes effect. Such legislative veto provisions
usually provide that a proposed regulation will
become a law after the expiration of a certain
period of time, only if Congress does not
affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the
meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides
that a proposed regulation will become law if
Congress affirmatively approves it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is
necessary to maintain the balance of power
between the legislative and the executive
branches of government as it offers lawmakers
a way to delegate vast power to the executive
branch or to independent agencies while
retaining the option to cancel particular
exercise of such power without having to pass
new legislation or to repeal existing law. They
contend that this arrangement promotes
democratic accountability as it provides
legislative check on the activities of unelected

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administrative agencies. One proponent thus
explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this
delegation policy: the policy is too deeply
embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to
say that the complexities of modern
government have often led Congress-whether
by actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by
declaring broad policy goals and general
statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy
options to the discretion of an executive officer.
Congress articulates legislative aims, but
leaves their implementation to the judgment of
parties who may or may not have participated
in or agreed with the development of those
aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in
many instances the reverse of our
constitutional scheme could be effected:
Congress proposes, the Executive disposes.
One safeguard, of course, is the legislative
power to enact new legislation or to change
existing law. But without some means of
overseeing post enactment activities of the
executive branch, Congress would be unable
to determine whether its policies have been
implemented in accordance with legislative
intent and thus whether legislative intervention
is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative
veto as undue encroachment upon the
executive prerogatives. They urge that any
post-enactment measures undertaken by
the legislative branch should be limited to
scrutiny and investigation; any measure
beyond that would undermine the
separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. They contend that legislative
veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of
the Presidents veto authority and intrusion into
the powers vested in the executive or judicial
branches of government. Proponents counter
that legislative veto enhances separation of
powers as it prevents the executive branch and
independent agencies from accumulating too
much power. They submit that reporting
requirements and congressional committee
investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only

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the exercise of delegated law-making authority.
They do not allow Congress to review
executive proposals before they take effect and
they do not afford the opportunity for ongoing
and binding expressions of congressional
intent. In contrast, legislative veto permits
Congress to participate prospectively in the
approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or
those enacted by the executive branch
pursuant to a delegation of authority by
Congress. They further argue that legislative
veto "is a necessary response by Congress to
the accretion of policy control by forces outside
its chambers." In an era of delegated authority,
they point out that legislative veto "is the most
efficient means Congress has yet devised to
retain control over the evolution and
implementation of its policy as declared by
statute.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision
requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing
rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed
by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take
effect. As such, a legislative veto in the form of
a congressional oversight committee is in the
form of an inward-turning delegation designed
to attach a congressional leash (other than
through scrutiny and investigation) to an
agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers.
43
It radically changes
the design or structure of the Constitutions
diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a
direct role in enforcing, applying or
implementing its own laws.
44

Congress has two options when enacting
legislation to define national policy within the
broad horizons of its legislative competence.
45

It can itself formulate the details or it can
assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial
decisions in conformity with those standards.
46

In the latter case, the law must be complete in
all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature.
47
Thus,
what is left for the executive branch or the
concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing
the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-
making) or ascertain facts necessary to bring
the law into actual operation (contingent rule-
making).
48

Administrative regulations enacted by
administrative agencies to implement and
interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce have the force of law and are entitled
to respect.
49
Such rules and regulations
partake of the nature of a statute
50
and are just
as binding as if they have been written in the
statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a
competent court.
51
Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not
pass upon their legality by subjecting them to
its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by
the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed
with the provisions of RA 9335, Congress
arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.

B. ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR
PRESIDENTIAL ELLECTION
PIMENTEL VS JOINT COM


C. CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION FOR
PRESIDENCY
D. DECIDE ON DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT
E. LEGISLATIVE VETO OR EXTENSION FOR
SUSPENSION OF WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS OR DECLARATION OF
MARTIAL LAW
F. PRESIDENTIAL AMNESTIES
G. CONCUR IN TREATIES
H. DECLARATION OF EXISTENCE OF WAR
I. DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS
J. UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES

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K. AMENDMENT OF CONSTITUTION
L. POWER OF IMPEACHMENT