Amatan vs Aruejo

A.M. No. RTJ-93-956. September 27, 1995

StatCon Issue: Construction in favor of right and justice OR Construction to avoid injustice
FACTS:
A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias Meon of the crime of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was filed by the PNP Station Commander in Bato, Leyte
for the fatal shooting of Genaro Tagsip. After preliminary investigation by the office of the
provincial fiscal, Umpad was charged with the crime of Homicide.
Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and the
consent of the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was agreed that the accused
would plead guilty to the lesser offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as originally
charged in the information.
Consequently, in his decision promulgated on the 27th of June 1990, respondent judge found the
accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted
Homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment as stated in the plea bargaining agreement.
In a letter-complaint addressed to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-
law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of
the law and gross misconduct, relative to his disposition of Crim. Case No. H-223 entitled People
v. Rodrigo Umpad alias Meon.
Responding to the complaint, respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the
1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused individual
with the consent of the offended partyto plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether
or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge erred in applying Sec.2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure in the case at bench?
HELD:
YES. While Section 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the accused in
a criminal case to plead guilty to a lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, the fact of death of the victim for which the accused was
criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain common sense, be reconciled with the plea of
guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide.

Art 10 of the Civil Code states that In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. When a provision
of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution responsive to the vehement urge
of conscience. In instances where a literal application of a provision of law would lead to
injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common
sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code admonishes judges to take principles of right and
justice at heart. Fiat justicia ruat coelum.
ARTICLE 10, NCC
Salvacion v. Central Bank
G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997
Torres, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for the crime of serious illegal detention and 4
counts of rape against Karen Salvacion, daughter of herein petitioners, Federico and Evelina
Salvacion. The police were able to recover from accused several dollar checks and a dollar
account in China Banking Corporation. On the day of the scheduled hearing for petition for bail,
the accused was able to escape from jail. In the meantime, the petitioners filed a civil case for
damages with preliminary attachment against accused. It was granted by the trial court for which
a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued. In view said judgment of the trial court, a Notice
of Garnishment was given to respondent China Banking Corporation, but the latter argues that
the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli cannot be made subject of a garnishment, in accordance with
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, which provides that Foreign currency deposits
shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Respondent
Central Bank further avers that Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 is copied verbatim from a
portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that
grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A.
6426 as amended) itself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as
amended by the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (P.D. 1246), can be made applicable to the dollar
deposits of the accused.
HELD:
No. Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by
the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (P.D. 1246) are held to be inapplicable to this case. The
questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that the rape victim
and her parents fully deserve. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted.
The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such
as the case at bar.
The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. If the questioned Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960, which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order
or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, will be applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New
Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Ninguno non deue
enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge
of conscience.
Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and
to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.
SK Elective Official Qualifications
Garvida vs. Sales, Jr.
G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997
Puno, J.
Facts:
The case at bar is for the annulment and setting aside of the order of COMELEC en banc
on suspending petitioners proclamation as SK chairperson of Brgy. San Lorenzo, Municipality
of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The suspension arises from respondent Sales, Jr.s complaint submitted
through facsimile to respondent COMELEC regarding the age of petitioner, which he claims to
be beyond 21 yearsthe requirement stated in Sec. 424 of the Local Government Code and Sec.
3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. COMELEC en banc ordered as a response, that
proclamation of petitioner Garvida be suspended in the instance that she wins the election.
Come May 6, 1996 election, she won the majority vote and was proclaimed SK
chairperson on June 2, 1996 as without prejudice to any further action by [COMELEC] or any
other interested party. Petitioner seeks that the proclamation be upheld, and reasserts that her
age of 21 years and 10 months on the day of the election is within the provision of the Local
Government Code, and assails the validity of Sec. 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824,
which she claims to be ultra vires.
Issues
1
:
1) Whether or not petitioner was eligible to run as SK chairperson under Sec. 424 of the
Local Government Code
2) Whether or not Resolution No. 2824 is ultra vires with regards to the Local
Government Code
Held:
1) No. A closer look at the Local Government Code will reveal a distinction between the
maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective
SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a members maximum age at 21 years only. There is no
further provision as to when the member shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand,
Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old on the day
of his election. The addition of the phrase on the day of his election is an additional

1
Additional issue, but does not involve Statutory Construction: Whether or not the procedure undergone by
respondents complaint to COMELEC was legal. Its been held that the proper complaint procedure is not through
facsimile (or Fax), but through a mail submission with the procurement of 10 copies to be submitted through the
COMELEC Division, and not en banc.
qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he
registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be
more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering that
the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official than for a member of the
Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio. The courts may distinguish when there
are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.
2) No. The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21 years
of age on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the Local Government Code of
1991. In fact the term qualified voter appears only in COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Since a
qualified voter is not necessarily an elective official, then it may be assumed that a qualified
voter is a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Section 424 of the Code does not provide
that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is determined on the day of
the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it
sets the age limit of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the election.
However, reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428 of the Code, the latest date
at which an SK elective official turns 21 years old is on the day of his election. The maximum
age of a youth official must therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in
relation to Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it fixes
the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.
Noscitor a Sociis
Buenaseda vs. Flavier
G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993
QUIASON, J
FACTS:
The petitioners sought to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive
suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et al.
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) The authority of the Ombudsman is only
to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend; and (b) Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are
conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; and said conditions have not been
met in the instant case.
In their defense, respondents invoked Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given to the Ombudsman under the
said provision provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law, including the power to order preventive
suspensions.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other
agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation
conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has
three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against
public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine,
censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
outside of his own office while investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said
officials and employees are pending.
HELD:
Yes, the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials employees as aid in
investigations. When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power "to recommend the
suspension" of a public official or employees , it referred only to "suspension," as a punitive
measure. All the words associated with the word "suspension" in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule
of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words
with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is
found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension, provided that the requisites are complied with, may be
imposed as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to
perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. The said R.A. should be given
such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any
interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
Hence, the petition was dismissed.




Summary:
An administrative complaint was filed with the Ombudsman by the private respondents
against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Ombudsman ordered the preventive suspension of the petitioners
Petitioners Buenaseda et al sought to nullify the order of suspension provided by the
Ombudsman.
The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that the authority of the Ombudsman is
only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend and thus he acted
outside of his authority.
In their defense, the respondents (The Ombudsman included) invoked Sec. 24 of R.A.
6770 (The Ombudsman Law). The said provision states that the ombudsman may order
preventive suspensions an aid in the investigation of administrative charges.
Unconvinced, the Solicitor General invoked Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which
states that the ombudsman may only recommend suspension of officials and employees
facing administrative investigation conducted by his office, and that he may not directly
order the suspensions.
o Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution states that the Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the power, function, and duty to direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
The SC ruled in favor of the respondents and against the Solicitor General. Applying the
rule of Noscitor a sociis, the court declared that the constitutional provision that the
solicitor general cited referred only to "suspension," as a punitive measure, and not to
procedural suspensions. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis, the word "suspension"
should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a
particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may
be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which
it is associated.
The constitutional provision does not prohibit the Ombudsman from ordering
preventive/procedural suspensions as aid in investigations. (Procedural = suspension,
Punitive Measure/Penalty/Sanction = dismissal/removal; it is sometimes necessary for the
ombudsman to order preventive suspensions in order to prevent disruptions in the
investigations. in those cases, the preventive suspensions are merely procedural
measures, not punitive.)
Hence, the petition was dismissed.

CIT vs OPLE
CORTES, J.
FACTS:
6 cases where consolidated by the SC to address a controversy regarding tuition hikes and the
rewards of allowances/bonuses to the teaching and teaching personnel. The cases were file by
the previously mentioned persons as well as parents of students studying on said schools, then
minister of labor and employment, his deputy, NLRC and then minister of Education. The gist
of their complaints lies in the interpretation of Sec 3 of PD 451 which bore the fruit of the case
at bar under the refusal of private schools concerned to pay allowances and benefits on the
ground that the said items stated in PD 451 is deemed included in the salary. Thus petitioners
seeking remedy from SC.

ISSUES:
Whether or not allowances and benefits of faculty members and other school employees can be
charged in compliance with PD 451 but not against the 60% meant for salary increase ?

HELD:
YES. Statutory construction rules state that when the language of the law is clear and
unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. Where the legislative intent
were consistent with the interpretation of the law of PD 451 it can no longer be argued as to the
meaning of such clear law.

Notes:
SEC. 3. Limitations. The increase in tuition or other school fees or other charges as well as
the new fees or charges authorized under the next preceding section shall be subject to the
following conditions;
(a) That no increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be approved unless sixty
(60%) per centum of the proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of
the faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the balance for institutional
development, student assistance and extension services, and return to investments: Provided That
in no case shall the return to investments exceed twelve (12%) per centum of the incremental
proceeds.
Principle of Necessary Implication (Or pwede nadin, interpretation of words to uphold purpose?)

Sugbuanon Rural Bank v. Laguesma
2

G.R. No. 116194, Feb. 2, 2000
J. Quisimbing

Facts:
Petitioner, through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, seek for the annulment of
the DOLE resolution affirming the order of the Med-Arbiter which denied petitioners motion to
dismiss respondent unions (Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office and Technical
Employees Union or APSOTEU-TUCP) petition for certification of election. They contended
that since the members of the union are composed of MANAGERIAL and/or CONFIDENTIAL
EMPLOYEES following the doctrines in the Tabacalera and Panday cases, they are therefore
deemed disqualified from engaging in any labor organization.

On the other hand, Respondents claim that the members of the union are not managerial
employees but are merely SUPERVISORY employees of the bank which under the provision of
the Labor Code (Art. 245) should not be subject to such disqualification.

2
Certification of Election automatically conducted by med-arbiter upon petition of a recognized and legitimate
labor organization, in the case at bar, petitioner assails the legitimacy of the labor organization to hinder the
proceedings of the certification of election kaya nila ayaw yan dahil once certified they can proceed with their
CBA, of course as MANAGEMENT, ano pa nga ba? they dont want CBA.
Confidential employees - those who assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies (specifically in the field of labor relations). The two criteria: 1. The
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his superior officer. 2. That officer must handle the
prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
Managerial employees (Art. 212) - one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial
actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment.
Illegibility of Managerial employees from union; right of supervisory employees (Art. 245) - Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible
for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
organizations of their own.
Tabacalera Case - classification of a credit and collection supervisor by management held as a
managerial/supervisory personnel
Panday case - branch accountant held as managerial employee


Issue: Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or
highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations
and engaging in union activities.

Held:
No. With regard to the claim of being managerial employees, the reliance of petitioner to the
aforesaid cases are completely erroneous since they were unable to prove that the employees in
question (the Cashiers, Accountant, and Acting Chief of the Loans Department) were vested with
similar powers which are the power to appoint and hire subordinates and the power to
recommend promotions and/or increase. Moreover, their job descriptions do not even allow them
to TRANSFER, SUSPEND, LAY-OFF, RECALL, DISCHARGE, ASSIGN OR DISCIPLINE
EMPLOYEES, contrary to the comprehension of Article 212 which defines the duties of
managerial employees.

As to their status as confidential employees, Article 245 does not expressly include confidential
employees to be illegible from engaging in any union activity, however, by virtue of
NECESSARY IMPLICATION, the Court held that disqualification of managerial employees
equally applies to confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of
confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of
management policies relating to labor relations. Since confidential employees have a confidential
relationship with his superior officer who handles responsibilities regarding labor relations, such
confidential employees are consequently aware of management policies relating labor relations
and are thus prohibited by law. HOWEVER, if he does not have access to confidential labor
relations information, then there shall be no impediment for him to join a union.

Petitioner claims that the employees are confidential employees by the contention that they have
access to the banks confidential data. The Court held that they have failed to establish the
officers access of information relating to labor relations policies and that the only information
they can access are CORPORATE policies. As a result, they are not deemed as confidential
employees.

Hence, the employees are not in any obstruction to engage in union activities for they are neither
managerial nor confidential employees.
CHAVEZ vs JBC
MENDOZA, J.
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives
and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as
representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase a representative of Congress.
It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent
and mandatory components of Congress, such that the absence of either divests the term of its
substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice
by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective powers in the performance of
its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution
speaks of a representative from Congress, it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no
real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs current composition. The
respondents also question petitioners belated filing of the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the standing of the JBC having 8 members and 2 of which are members of
Congress goes against the language and intent of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:
YES. The word Congress is used in its generic sense. Congress being a technical term and
well defined at that, it cannot be argued as to its definition and usage on the Constitution. The
seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a solution
should there be a stalemate in voting.
The Constitution clearly states that the JBC be composed of seven 7 members only.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
Statcon: Ejusdim Generesis
LIWAG vs Happy Glen Loop Homeowners
GR No 189755 July 4 2012
Facts:
The issue at hand comes from a water facility that is located in the Happy Glen Loop
Subdivision at Deparo Caloocan City. The original developer,FGR Sales, of the subdivision got a
loan from Ernesto Marcelo and in failing in its obligation to Marcelo FGR Sales assigned to
Marcelo all rights to several parcels of land in the subdivision. Marcelo presented to lot buyers,
National Housing Authority and Human Settlement Regulatory Commision that a water facility
was available in the subdivision. For over 30 years the residents of the subdivision relied on the
water facility for their water needs and this fact was acknowledge by Marcelo and Hermogenes
Liwag (petitioners late husband) former president of Happy Glen Loop Homeowners
Association. In 1995 Marcelo sold Lot 11 Block 5, the parcel of land that has the water facility,
to Liwag resulting to a transfer certificate of title. After the death of her husband petitioner, on
2003, issued a letter demanding the removal of water tank.
Refusing to comply with petitioners request, the respondents filed before the HLURB (House
and Land use Regulatory Board) for the annulment of sale of said parcel of land (TC 350099).
The HLURB Arbiter ruled in favour of the association (respondents). An appeal on the HLURB
board of commissions found that the lot was not an open space. Respondent then interposed an
appeal to the OP, which reaffirmed the decision of the HLURB Arbiter and ruled that the lot was
an open space by virtue of it being the site of the water installation of the subdivision per
Marcelos official representation. It also ruled that the representation was known to the
petitioner because they had knowledge to the existence of the water installation. Petition was
moved to the CA which said that HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction on the matter. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed the petition to the SC.
Issue:
Whether HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction on the matter at hand?
Whether the Land is considered as open space? (meaning di pde I benta)
Held:
YES and YES.
Here is the jurisdiction of the HLURB
Execution in the Enforcement of its Decision under Presidential Decree No. 957, viz.:
Sec. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in addition
to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall
have the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature.
A. Unsound real estate business practices; (eto yung important)
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, broker or salesman.
Yung sale daw nung land is in violation of P.D. 957 dahil alam nang both parties na may water
installation dun at un lng yung water installation ng subdivision.
STATCON RELEVANCE: Ejusdim Generesis
Meaning kukunin mo yung meaning nang phrase from the group of words na kasama niya. Sa
Case nato dito sya nag apply:
The term open space is defined in P.D. 1216 as an area reserved exclusively for parks,
playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers,
barangay centers and other similar facilities and amenities.
Hindi sinabi yung water facilities pero from the wording of the enumerated things given na its
for the benefit of the community since water is a basic human necessity.
Child Exploitation and Statutory Rape
People vs. Delantar
G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007
Tinga, J.
Facts:
In this case, appellant assigns these errors committed by the lower courts in his case
regarding his criminal case of supposedly pimping a girl (codename AAA in accordance with the
Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) under his protection as guardian,
through coercion and violence, to one Arab national named Mr. Hammond and then
Congressman Romeo Jalosjos: (1) That the trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) that
the trial court erred in convicting appellant of 2 violations of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610
3

despite the fact that only a single information was filed by the 2
nd
assistant city prosecutor of
Pasay City; and (3) The trial court erred in imposing the penalty for the crime charged in its
maximum period (reclusion perpetua) when there is no showing in its decision of the attendance
of a qualifying circumstance which would warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty.
Supreme Court only addresses the first and third questions because the second has already been
established.
Prior to the hearing of the Supreme Court, appellant has been proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt even though the defense rested its case. He was sentenced with reclusion
perpetua and to pay civil liability to the victim in the amount of PhP 60,000 in the two counts of
violation of Sec. 5(a), par. 1, 4, and 5 of Article III of R.A. No. 7610. In the Appellate Court, the
sentence has been modified in its fines that appellant is to pay PhP 50,000 for civil indemnity,
PhP 50,000 as moral damages and PhP 25,000 as exemplary damages.
Issues:
1) Whether or not there was an error in convicting the appellant
2) Whether or not the relationship of appellant to AAA as guardian will mitigate the
circumstance of guilt
3) Whether or not the lower court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
other penalties imposed therefor
Held:

3
Entitled An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties for Its Violation, and for Other Purposes
1) No. In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof
as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. There is no doubt,
drawing from the evidence, that AAA was a child who was exploited in prostitution as defined in
Section 5, Article III quoted above. The law punishes not only the person who commits the acts
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with the child but also those who engage in or
promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution. Appellant is one such person. Appellants
violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of R.A. No. 7610 is as clear as day.
2) No. Under R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 31(c), relationship is not a qualifying circumstance but
only an ordinary generic aggravating circumstance. Thus, although it was not alleged in the
information it can nevertheless be taken into account in fixing the penalty for the crime because
it was proven. A generic aggravating circumstance provides for the imposition of the prescribed
penalty in its maximum period, while a qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime.
While under the Family Code, filiation can be established by, among others, the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, yet the rule is where the birth certificate presented was not
signed by the father against whom filiation is asserted, such may not be accepted as evidence of
the alleged filiation. In Angeles v. Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363 (2005), we held: x x x Such
certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is, under Section 23, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth
of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of
paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or
by the mother alone if the father refuses. x x x We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is
prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation to appellant. After all, it
is undisputed that appellant is not AAAs biological father.
Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or
phrase susceptible of various meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.87 Section 31(c) of R.A.
No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator and the
victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is
an ascendant, parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity. It should be noted that the words with which guardian is associated
in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we may safely deduce that
the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This
relationship may be established either by being the wards biological parent (natural guardian) or
by adoption (legal guardian). Appellant is neither AAAs biological parent nor is he AAAs
adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the guardian contemplated by law.
3) On the award of indemnity and damages, we delete the Court of Appeals award of
civil indemnity because appellant was not the one who committed the lascivious acts and
perpetrated the rape of AAA. Instead, we impose a fine which shall be administered as a cash
fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation
of AAA, pursuant to Section 31 (f), Article XII, R.A. No. 7610. Likewise, the award of
exemplary damages is improper considering that appellant is not AAAs biological father.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 31 May 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00977 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. Appellant
SIMPLICIO DELANTAR y REDONDO is found guilty of one count of violation of Section
5(a), R.A. No. 7610. He is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay a fine in the sum
of P20,000.00 to be administered as a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of AAA,88 and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
ejusdem generis
Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. vs. Bautista
G.R. No. 156367. May 16, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
Respondent Bautista has been employed by petitioner Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc.
(Autobus), as driver-conductor. He was paid on commission basis. While driving along Sta. Fe,
Nueva Vizcaya, the bus that the respondent was driving accidentally bumped the rear portion of
another bus owned by the petitioner. Respondent averred that the accident happened because he
was compelled by the management to go back to Roxas, Isabela, although he had not slept for
almost twenty-four hours, as he had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela. Respondent
further alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully paid the amount of thirty percent of
the cost of repair of the damaged buses and that despite respondents pleas for reconsideration,
the same was ignored by management. After a month, management sent him a letter of
termination. Thus, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for
nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay against Autobus. In their defense,
petitioner Autobus Inc. attested that respondents employment was replete with offenses
involving reckless imprudence, gross negligence, and dishonesty. Furthermore, they claim that
due process was followed. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for Illegal Dismissal filed
by the respondent. However, respondent Bautista was entitled to his 13th month pay from the
date of his hiring to the date of his dismissal and his service incentive leave pay for all the years
he had been in service with Autobus Inc.

Petitioner Autobus Inc. appealed to the NLRC. The latter deleted the award of 13
th
month pay to
respondent Bautista. Displeased with only the partial grant of its appeal to the NLRC, petitioner
sought the review of said decision with the Court of Appeals which was subsequently denied by
the appellate court.
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner contends that the respondent is not entitled to
service incentive leave. This issue revolves around the interpretation of Article 95 of the Labor
Code Section 1(D), Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor
Code which provides:
Art. 95. RIGHT TO SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
(a) Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a
yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay.

Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE
SECTION 1. Coverage.This rule shall apply to all employees except:
. . .
(d) Field personnel and other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission
basis, or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the
time consumed in the performance thereof;

Petitioner claims that the respondent is not entitled to service incentive leave. Petitioner contends
that since the respondent is compensated under a commission basis, he should be classified under
Field personnel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave.

HELD:
Yes, respondent Bautista is entitled to service incentive leave. According to the Implementing
Rules, Service Incentive Leave shall not apply to employees classified as field personnel. The
phrase other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer must not be
understood as a separate classification of employees to which service incentive leave shall not be
granted. Rather, it serves as an amplification of the interpretation of the definition of field
personnel under the Labor Code as those whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty. The same is true with respect to the phrase those who
are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis. Said phrase should be related
with field personnel, applying the rule on ejusdem generis that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by the particular terms that they follow.

Petitioners contention that respondent is not entitled to the grant of service incentive leave just
because he was paid on commission basis is misplaced. What must be ascertained in order to
resolve the issue of propriety of the grant of service incentive leave to respondent is whether or
not he is a field personnel.

Field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by the
employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose
hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid
specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at
specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel
despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of the employee.
The definition of a field personnel is not merely concerned with the location where the
employee regularly performs his duties but also with the fact that the employees performance is
unsupervised by the employer. As discussed above, field personnel are those who regularly
perform their duties away from the principal place of business of the employer and whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Thus, in order to
conclude whether an employee is a field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual
hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty by the employer. In so
doing, an inquiry must be made as to whether or not the employees time and performance are
constantly supervised by the employer.

It was observed by the Labor Arbiter and the CA that along the routes that are plied by these bus
companies, there are its inspectors assigned at strategic places who board the bus and inspect the
passengers, the punched tickets, and the conductors reports. There is also the mandatory once-a-
week car barn or shop day, where the bus is regularly checked as to its mechanical, electrical,
and hydraulic aspects, whether or not there are problems thereon as reported by the driver and/or
conductor. They too, must be at specific place as specified time, as they generally observe
prompt departure and arrival from their point of origin to their point of destination. In each and
every depot, there is always the Dispatcher whose function is precisely to see to it that the bus
and its crew leave the premises at specific times and arrive at the estimated proper time. These,
are present in the case at bar. The driver, the complainant herein, was therefore under constant
supervision while in the performance of this work. He cannot be considered a field personnel.
Hence, the petition was denied. The assailed decision of the CA was affirmed.

Summary:
Respondent Bautista was terminated from his employment under Petitioner Autobus.
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. It was denied by the Labor Arbiter, but
he was awarded 13
th
month pay and service incentive leave.
Petitioner Autobus appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC removed the award of 13
th
month
pay, but kept the service incentive leave.
Petitioner Autobus, wanting to remove the award of service incentive leave, appealed
with the CA. The CA denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Petitioner then filed a motion for review with the SC. Pursuant to Article 95 of the Labor
Code Section 1(D), Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Labor Code, petitioner claims that respondent Bautista was not entitled to service
incentive leave as the latter was paid on a commission basis.
The SC, using the principle of ejusdem generis, declared that the fact that the respondent
was paid on a commission basis does not constitute an exception to the entitlement of
service incentive leave. What should be taken into consideration is whether or not
respondent Bautista was classified under Field Personnel
The term field personnel was defined as those who regularly perform their duties away
from the principal place of business of the employer and whose actual hours of work in
the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
The SC, using the observation of the LA and the CA which states that respondent
Bautista was under constant supervision while in the performance of his work, declared
that the respondent is not classified under field personnel and he should therefore be
entitled to service incentive leave.
The Petition was denied, and the decision of the CA was affirmed.
Ejusdem Generis; of the same kind, class or nature
Parayno vs. Jovellanos
GR. 148408 July 14 2006
Facts:
Petitioner is an owner of a Gasoline Filling Station in Calasiao Pangasinan. In1989 some
residents petitioned to the SB the closure or transfer of said station due to factors that cause
problems to the people. After investigation and recommendation from Municipal Engineer, Chief
of Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection the SB suggested to the
Mayor the closure or transfer of said gas filling station. The petitioner moved for reconsideration
but the SB denied it. Hence the petitioner moved for a special civil action and mandamus with
the RTC of Dagupan City. Petitioner claims that her gasoline station should not be covered by
section 44 of the Official Zoning Code since it was not a Gasoline Service Station but a
Gasoline Filling Station governed by section 21 thereof. RTC ruled under the maxim of
Ejusdem Generis that they are the same and denied the petition. Petitioner filed for a motion for
reconsideration but was also denied by the trial court. Then petitioner elevated the case to CA via
a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for injunctive relief. The CA
dismissed her appeal and also denied her petition for reconsideration thereafter. Hence minove
nya sa SC yung kaso.
ISSUE:
Statcon: Whether or not Gasoline Service Station = Gasoline Filling Station.
HELD:
CA: yes, SC: NO so NO tayo hahaha. Panalo ung petitioner sa SC
Why? Kasi may distinction yung Gasoline Filling Station sa Gasoline Service Station under
sa zoning ordinance ng municipality in question. Eto I copy paste ko ah:
Section 21. Filling Station. A retail station servicing automobiles and other motor vehicles with
gasoline and oil only.7
x x x x x x x x x
Section 42. Service Station. A building and its premises where gasoline oil, grease, batteries,
tires and car accessories may be supplied and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the
following services may be rendered and sales and no other.
a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor parts;
b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;
c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts, brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses,
floor mats, seat covers, windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease retainers, wheel, bearing,
mirrors and the like;
d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;
e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and polishing materials;
f. Grease and lubricating;
g. Emergency wiring repairs;
h. Minor servicing of carburators;
i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;
j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or crankcase, or raising the motor.
Dahil sa nakastate yan di nagaaply ung Ejusdem Generesis instead eto magapply legal maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means express mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of others.
Isa pang issue dito na di na relevant sa statcon (para lang alam nyo) is grave abuse of Police
power. Nagpasa kasi ng Resolution No. 50 nun ordering the closure/transfer of said station and
sinabi nila na hindi na comply yung second requisite in using police power which is DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE.
Eto ung full held ng SC:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby
directed to cease and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it
seeks to close down or transfer her gasoline station to another location.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION - PTGWO vs SAN MIGUEL
PACKAGING PRODUCTS
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of the regular
monthly-paid rank and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel Corporation.
SMCSU, SMBP, SMPP all under the banner of SMC. Respondent if member of PDMP.
08/17/99 petitioner filed cancellation of registration of respondent due to allegations of
committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registration requirements. On 14
July 2000, DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order dismissing the
allegations until he found out that the respondent did not comply with membership requirement.
CA dismissed the case filed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the CA was erred in believing that the 20% membership
requirement is not require from the respondent.
HELD:
YES. This Court deems it proper to apply the Latin maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Under this maxim of statutory interpretation, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another. When certain persons or things are specified in a law, contract, or will, an intention to
exclude all others from its operation may be inferred. If a statute specifies one exception to a
general rule or assumes to specify the effects of a certain provision, other exceptions or effects
are excluded. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
ejusdem generis
Benguet State University vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 169637. June 8, 2007
NACHURA, J

FACTS:
The Congress enacted the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8292).
Pursuant to Section 4 (d) of the said law, the Board of Regents of Benguet State University
(BSU) passed and approved a Board Resolution granting rice subsidy and health care allowance
to BSUs employees. The sums were taken from the income derived from the operations of BSU
and were given to the employees at different periods.
The grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance was disallowed in audit under a Notice
of Disallowance, stating that R.A. No. 8292 does not provide for the grant of said allowance to
employees and officials of the university.

BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the Commission on Audit (COA) Regional
Office, but the same was denied.

BSU subsequently filed a petition for review with the COA, alleging that the grant of Rice
Subsidy and Health Care allowance to its employees in 1998 is authorized by law, specifically
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, which reads thus:
Sec. 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards
x x x
d) x x x
Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, any
income generated by the university or college, from tuition fee and other charges, as well
as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the
university or college, and may be disbursed by the Board of Regents/Trustees for
instruction, research, extension or other programs/projects of the university or college x x
x
The COA declared that a closer look at the said provision clearly negate such claim of authority.
It is noted that the term other programs/projects refers to such programs which the university
may specifically undertake in pursuance of its primary objective which is to attain quality higher
education. The law could not have intended that the term program/projects embrace all
programs of BSU, for these benefits, though part of the overall operations, are not directly
related to BSUs academic program. Under the maxim of ejusdem generis, the mention of a
general term after the enumeration of specific matters should be held to mean that the general
term should be of the same genus as the specific matters enumerated and, therefore, the other
programs and projects should be held to be of the same nature as instruction, research and
extension. The inclusion of an incentive such as Rice Subsidy and Health Care Allowance to its
teachers and non-teaching personnel is a patent or blatant disregard of the statutory limitation on
the powers of the governing Board of SUCs, as these benefits are indubitably not one of
instruction, research or extension. The COA denied the petition for review.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the COA, petitioner BSU filed a petition for review with the SC.
BSU ascribes legal error and grave abuse of discretion to the COA in affirming the disallowance
of the rice subsidy and health care benefits. Relying on R.A. No. 8292, BSU maintains that it can
grant said benefits to its employees. It argues that the said law vests state universities and
colleges with fiscal autonomy and grants them freedom in the appropriation and disbursement of
their funds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is authorized to grant Health Care Allowance and Rice Subsidy to its
employees and still be entitled to reimbursement.
HELD:
No. BSUs contention that it is authorized to grant allowances to its employees is based on
Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292. The provision reads:

SECTION 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards.The governing board shall have
the following specific powers and duties in addition to its general powers of
administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a
corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the
Corporation Code of the Philippines:
x x x x x x x x x
d) to fix the tuition fees and other necessary school charges, such as but not limited to
matriculation fees, graduation fees and laboratory fees, as their respective boards may
deem proper to impose after due consultations with the involved sectors.
Such fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by
the university or college, shall constitute special trust funds and shall be deposited in any
authorized government depository bank, and all interests shall accrue therefrom shall part
of the same fund for the use of the university or college: Provided, That income derived
from university hospitals shall be exclusively earmarked for the operating expenses of the
hospitals.
Any provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, any
income generated by the university or college from tuition fees and other charges, as well
as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the
university or college, and may be disbursed by the Board of Regents/ Trustees for
instruction, research, extension, or other programs/ projects of the university or college:
Provided, That all fiduciary fees shall be disbursed for the specific purposes for which
they are collected.

If, for reasons beyond its control, the university or college, shall not be able to pursue any
project for which funds have been appropriated and, allocated under its approved
program of expenditures, the Board of Regents/Trustees may authorize the use of said
funds for any reasonable purpose which, in its discretion, may be necessary and urgent
for the attainment of the objectives and goals of the universities or college;
x x x x x x x x x
Similarly, Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum No. 03-01, the Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for R.A. No. 8292, provides:
RULE V
Powers and Duties of the Governing Boards
SECTION 18. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards (GBs).The GBs of chartered
SUCs shall have the following powers and duties, in addition to its general powers of
administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to a Board of Directors of a
corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the
Corporation Code of the Philippines, thus:
x x x x x x x x x
(d) to fix the tuition fees and other necessary charges, such as, but not limited, to
matriculation fees, graduation fees and laboratory fees, as they may deem proper to
impose, after due consultations with the involved sectors.
Such fees and charges, including government subsidies and other income generated by
the university or college, shall constitute special trust funds and shall be deposited in any
authorized government depository bank, and all interest that shall accrue therefrom shall
be part of the same fund for the use of the university or college: Provided, That income
derived from university or college hospitals shall be exclusively earmarked for the
operations of the hospitals.
Any income generated by the university or college from tuition fees and other charges, as
well as from the operation of auxiliary services and land grants, shall be retained by the
university or college, and may be disbursed by its GB for instruction, research, extension,
or other programs/projects of the university or college: Provided, That all fiduciary fees
shall be disbursed for the specific purposes for which they are collected.
If, for reasons beyond its control, the university or college shall not be able to pursue any
project for which funds have been appropriated and allocated under its approved program
of expenditures, its GB may authorize the use of said funds for any reasonable purpose
which, in its discretion, may be necessary and urgent for the attainment of the objectives
and goals of the university or college;
x x x x x x x x x
What is clear from Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292 cited by BSU as legal basis of its claim as
well as from its implementing rules is that income generated by the university may be disbursed
by its Governing Board for instruction, research, extension, or other programs/projects of the
university or colleges.

The theory of BSU that the phrase other programs/projects of the university or college in
Section 4 (d) covers all projects and programs of the university, including those designed to
uplift the economic plight of the employees is clearly erroneous.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or
kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to
things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in the
context of the statute which would repel such inference. The COA correctly ruled that the other
programs/projects under R.A. No. 8292 and its Implementing Rules should be of the same
nature as instruction, research, and extension. In BSUs case, the disbursements were for rice
subsidy and health care allowances which are, in no way, intended for academic programs
similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section 4 (d) cannot, therefore, be relied upon by
BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the allowances.
Hence, the petition was denied, and the decision of the COA was affirmed.



Summary:
BSU, pursuant to R.A. No. 8292, approved a resolution granting rice subsidy and health
care allowance to BSUs employees.
The grant of this rice subsidy and health care allowance was disallowed in audit.
BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with the Commission on Audit (COA)
Regional Office, but the same was denied.
BSU subsequently filed a petition for review with the COA. They claim that they are
authorized by law to use their funds for other programs/projects of the university or
college. They used Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 as their legal basis.
The COA, implementing the maxim of ejusdem generis, declared that the clause other
programs/projects of the university or college should be construed to refer only to
programs and projects related with instruction, research, extension and other
academically related programs and projects.
Petitioner BSU filed a petition for review with the SC. BSU maintains that R.A. No. 8292
grants them autonomy and freedom in the appropriation of their funds.
The SC declared that it is clear from Section 4 (d) of R.A. No. 8292 is that income
generated by the university may be disbursed by its Governing Board for instruction,
research, extension, or other programs/projects of the university or colleges. The scope
of clause other programs/projects of the university or colleges was restricted because it
was preceded by the specific terms for instruction, research, extension. Under the
principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind
accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to
things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated.
The petition was denied.
Construction of Contracts
Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 114323, July 23, 1998
Martinez, J.
Facts:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil
Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS
COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED. The two contracting parties made a binding contract ordering a supply from
the latter of 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement, and the former to pay $477,300 by opening an
irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The private respondent
failed to deliver the goods because of a dispute with the owner of ship MV Surutana Nava and it
was held up in Bangkok instead of reaching its destination at Bombay and Calcutta, India. As
compensation, the two parties agreed on a delivery of Class G cementbut it did not pass the
petitioners specifications. Pursuant to Clause 16 of the contract, petitioner forwarded the
concern to an arbitrator. This went up to the courts of India, and the above-mentioned court ruled
that private respondent should pay up to a total of $ 899,603.77 for all the incurred damages and
losses of petitioner.
Because private respondent failed to comply to the requirements due to several reasons
4
,
petitioners now seek to uphold the ruling of foreign court by filing a case in the Philippine RTC.
The ruling, however, was different from the first, and the Appellate Court concurs, that the
arbiter, in the first place, was not legible to hold the fix the issue at hand when Clause 16 is read
together with the rest of the contract.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the arbiter under Clause 16 of the contract is eligible to settle the issue
at hand.
2) Whether or not the ruling of the foreign court should be binding even after the non-
response of said court to the private respondents
Held:
1) No. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of statutes, is
equally applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning and scope of vague contractual
stipulations, such as the aforementioned phrase. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis, where

4
Two reasons arise from the case heard in the foreign courts: (1) Private respondent sent a letter of clarification to
the court, but did not get a reply for more than a year; and (2) Private respondents question the capacity of the arbiter
assigned for the fulfillment of the contract.
a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of the words
in which it is found or with which it is associated, or stated differently, its obscurity or doubt
may be reviewed by reference to associated words. In accordance with the doctrine of noscitur a
sociis, this reference to the supply order/contract must be construed in the light of the preceding
words with which it is associated, meaning to say, as being limited only to the design, drawing,
instructions, specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract. The non-
delivery of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature of a dispute arising from the failure
to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing, instructions, specifications or quality of the
materials. That Clause 16 should pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the
contract is but a logical inference considering that the underlying purpose of a referral to
arbitration is for such technical matters to be deliberated upon by a person possessed with the
required skill and expertise which may be otherwise absent in the regular courts.
Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a contract should not be
read in isolation from the rest of the instrument but, on the contrary, interpreted in the light of the
other related provisions. The whole and every part of a contract must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. Equally applicable is the
canon of construction that in interpreting a statute (or a contract as in this case), care should be
taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated
measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. The rule is that a construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.
The ruling that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by
the regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their contract: All questions,
disputes and differences, arising under out of or in connection with this supply order, shall be
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and
the place from which this supply order is situated.
2) Yes. The recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by
the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered
differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has
held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
forum. Thus, if under the procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid
judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrators findings, then the same must be accorded
respect. In the same vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the
Court becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts
in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules
provide otherwise.
Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones
defense or stated otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be
heard. Thus, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the
party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy and he waived his right to do so.
Application of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
5

G.R. No. 147749. June 22, 2006.
J. CORONA

Facts:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and
exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed to pay the deficiency in
millers tax and manufacturers tax by respondent. The deficiency millers tax was imposed on
SPMCs sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. (UNICHEM) while the deficiency
sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. Petitioner
opposed but was denied by respondent; as a result petitioner elevated the case to the Court of
Tax Appeals. CTA then cancelled the liability for deficiency of manufacturers tax but upheld
the assessment over the millers tax. Petitioner then moved for reconsideration but was denied.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied it for failure to comply on certain procedural rules on
verification and certification against forum shopping. Hence, a petition for review before the
Court assailing the resolution passed upon by CA. Petitioner invokes that the crude coconut oil it
sold to UNICHEM was exported by UNICHEM and should not be subject to Millers Tax as
provided in Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Petitioner further resolved its own interpretation
of the provision of such law to mean that exemptions are applicable on exportation of the
enumerated products therein, which are effected by THE MILLER HIMSELF OR THE BUYER
OR MANUFACTURER OF THE MILLED PRODUCTS.

5
Petitioners Own Interpretation - Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code contemplates two exemptions from the
millers tax: (a) the milled products in their original state were actually exported by the miller himself or by
another person, and (b) the milled products sold by the miller were actually exported as an ingredient or part of any
manufactured article by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled products. The exportation may be effected by
the miller himself or by the buyer or manufacturer of the milled products. Since UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMCs
milled products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from the millers tax.
What Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code really provides - Percentage tax upon proprietors or operators of rope
factories, sugar central mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and desiccated coconut factories.
Proprietors or operators of rope factories, sugar central and mills, coconut oil mills, palm oil mills, cassava mills and
desiccated coconut factories, shall pay a tax equivalent to three percent (3%) of the gross value in money of all the
rope, sugar, coconut oil, palm oil, cassava flour or starch, dessicated coconut, manufactured, processed or milled by
them, including the by-product of the raw materials from which said articles are produced, processed or
manufactured, such tax to be based on the actual selling price or market value of these articles at the time they leave
the factory or mill warehouse: Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and
the by-product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and dessicated coconut, if such rope, coconut oil,
palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts, shall be removed for exportation by the proprietor or
operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually exported without returning to the Philippines,
whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products...

Issue: WON Petitioner is exempted from the 3% millers tax as provided for in Section 168 of
the 1987 Tax Code as justified by Petitioners own interpretation?

Held:
No. From the express terms of the law, it is as clear as daylight that the law only intended to
exempt those which are exported by the PROPRIETOR OR THE OPERATOR OF THE
FACTORY HIMSELF. Nowhere did it provide that the exportation made by the PURCHASER
OF THE MATERIAL enumerated in the exempting clause or the MANUFACTURER OF THE
PRODUCTS UTILIZING the said materials was covered by the exception. Petitioners
interpretation is unwarranted for it enlarged the scope of the exemption clause. Expressio Unius
Est Exclusion Alterius - Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom
and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute
cannot be placed therein. To allow petitioners claim for tax exemption will violate the
established principle and derogate sovereign authority.

Hence, Petitioner is covered by the 3% millers tax under Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code due
to the fact that petitioner is not the exporter of the crude coconut oil.
Cadayona vs. Court of Appeals
6

G.R. No. 128772. February 3, 2000.
J. Gonzaga-Reyes

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion for review with the Court of Appeals to annul the resolution of
Civil Service Commission which affirmed his preventive suspension. CA dismissed the appeal
because, among other things, the annexes attached are mere photo copies. In the petition for
review before the Supreme Court, petitioner maintains that Administrative Circular 1-95 requires
that only copies of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from and material
points of record referred in the petition shall be certified; said circular does not require that the
annexes be certified true copies. Under the so-called doctrine of last antecedent, the phrase
certified true copies does not qualify the remote phrase other supporting papers; the qualifier
phrase certified true copies only refers to the immediately succeeding phrase such material
portions of the record as referred to therein.

Respondent however claims that petitioners application of the doctrine of last antecedent
is misleading for the proper application of the doctrine shows that the phrase certified true
copies qualifies the words nearest to it which are such material portion of the record as are
referred to therein and other supporting papers. Hence, CA held that the attachment of photo
copies of the annexes was a fatal flow to ground the dismissal of Petitioners appeal. Petitioner
should have attached certified true copies of all supporting documents in order to proceed with
his petition because the right to appeal is merely a statutory right and one must comply with the
requirements of the law in order to properly exercise said right.

Issue: WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF
LAW WHEN IT IMPOSED THE REQUIREMENT THAT ALL ANNEXES TO THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW BE CERTIFIED


6
Section 6 of Rule 43,5 which provides - Contents of the Petition The petition for review shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record
referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that
it was filed within the period fixed herein.
Held: Yes. While a decision of the Civil Service Commission may be appealed to the Court of
Appeals under Section 6 of Rule 43, Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. In line with this guideline, the Court shall not
construe the interpretation of Section 6 of Rule 43 of the Civil Service Commission to impose a
requirement that all supporting papers accompanying the petition should be certified true copies.
A comparison of this provision with the counterpart provision in Rule 42 (governing petitions for
review from the RTC to the CA), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (governing Appeals by Certiorari
to the Supreme Court) and Rule 65 governing certiorari and prohibition, would show that under
the latter, only the judgments or final orders or resolutions need be certified true copies or
duplicate originals. Numerous resolutions issued by this Court emphasize that in appeals by
certiorari under Rule 45 and original civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rules
46 and 56, what is required to be a certified true copy is the copy of the questioned judgment,
final order or resolution. No plausible reason suggests itself why a different treatment or a
stricter requirement, should be given to petitions under Rule 43, which governs appeals from the
Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals. None could have been
intended by the framers of the Rules. A contrary ruling would be too harsh and would not
promote the underlying objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. It must be conceded that obtaining certified true copies necessary entails
additional expenses that will make litigation more onerous to the litigants. Moreover, certified
true copies are not easily procurable and party litigants must wait for a period of time before the
certified true copies are released. At any rate, the entire records of the case will eventually be
elevated to the appellate court.
DOCTRINE OF CASUS OMISSUS
Spouses Nereo and Nieva Delfino v. St. James Hospital Inc.
G.R. No. 166735, September 5, 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:
Respondent St. James Hospital, which was established in 1990 as a ten-bed capacity hospital,
applied for a permit with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to expand its
hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution, for which a temporary
clearance for the expansion of said hospital was issued. Said issuance was challenged by herein
petitioners spouses on the ground that the proposed expansion is in violation of the provisions of
the 1981 Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning Ordinance. Aggrieved by the decision of HLURB,
respondent elevated the matter to Office of the President, which was subsequently affirmed by
the appellate court, arguing that: (1) the establishment of a ten-bed capacity hospital, is allowed
within a residential zone under the 1981 Zoning Ordinance, the law existing at the time of the
founding of the St. James hospital, but the term hospital was deleted from the list of
conforming establishments within a residential zone under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance; (2) that
under Section 2, Article 6 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, certain activities that are commercial
and institutional in character are allowed within the residential zone, and; (3) that the term
"institutional", as used in 1991 Zoning Ordinance, include hospitals and other medical
establishments.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proposed expansion of St. James Hospital may be permitted under
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, in view of the deletion therein of the phrase hospitals with not
more than ten capacity from those enumerated as allowable uses in a residential zone as
contained in the 1981 Zoning Ordinance.

HELD:
No. It was held that the expansion of the St. James Hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed capacity
medical institution is prohibited under the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance because of
the following reasons:

1. The enactment of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance effectively repealed the 1981 Zoning
Ordinance. The inclusion of the general repealing provision in the ordinance predicated the
intended repeal under the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and
prior acts. This is what is known as repeal by implication, which proceeds on the premise
that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to
abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.

2. It must be considered that any meaning or interpretation to be given to the term "institutional"
as used in Section 2, Article VI must be correspondingly limited by the explicit enumeration
of allowable uses contained in the same section. Whatever meaning the legislative body had
intended in employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light of the restrictive
enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
the express mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not expressly
mentioned.

3. The rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered to
have been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not
more than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said
allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical conclusion is that the
legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential
zone. Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital, within a
residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS
Malinias, Sario v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002
Carpio, J. (EN BANC)
FACTS:
Petitioner Malinias, a candidate for governor in Mountain Province, filed a complaint with the
COMELEC for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as Electoral Reforms
Law, and Sections 232 of Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), against Corpuz, Tangilag and
Dominguez, herein private respondents. Section 25 of Electoral Reforms Law provides for the
right to be present and to counsel during the canvass granted to any registered political party and
coalition of parties, provided that only one counsel may argue for each political party or
candidate, while Sec. 232 of Omnibus Election Code pertains to certain persons who are
prohibited inside the canvassing room. Petitioner alleged that his representatives were prevented
from attending the canvassing because of the illegal check-point set-up by police, upon orders of
private respondents. The COMELEC dismissed the complaint against private respondents.

ISSUE: Whether Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 232 of Omnibus Election Code were
violated by private respondents.

HELD:
No. There was no violation of said laws because the Electoral Reforms Law does not punish a
violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election offense. Likewise, while Section 232
categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the canvassing
room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under the Omnibus
Election Code. Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of Omnibus Election Code is not
punishable as a criminal election offense.

Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no
ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section
232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act. It is a settled rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion
of all others. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways.
One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is
implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other
matters. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of
restrictive interpretation. They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others.
They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration
in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.

Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict interpretation
in favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts mentioned in Section
232 are criminally punishable under the Omnibus Election Code. Since Sections 261 and 262 of
said Code, which lists the election offenses punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232, a
strict interpretation means that private respondents cannot be held criminally liable for violation
of Section 232.
Bersabal vs. Salvador
Case No. L-35910. July 21, 1978
StatCon Issue: Construction in favor of right and justice OR Construction to avoid injustice
FACTS:
On March 23, 1972, petitioner Purita Bersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent Judge of
August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971 and March 15, 1972 and to compel said respondent Judge to
dicide petitioners perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case
submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the
petitioner and respondents. The following facts were cited:
Private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin filed an enjectment suit against the
petitioner. A decision was rendered by the said Court on November 25, 1970,
which was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court.
During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent court issued on March 23,
1971 ordering the the Clerk of Court of Caloocan City to transmit to the Supreme
Court the transcripts of stenographic notes taken down during the hearing of the
case at bench and likewise, ordering counsels for both parties to submit their
memoranda within thirty (30) days from receipt of this order. Such order was
apparently received by petitioner on April 17, 1971.
The transcript of stenographic notes not having yet been forwarded to the
respondent court, petitioner filed on May 5, 1971 a MOTION EX-PARTE TO
SUBMIT MEMORANDUM WITHIN 30 DAYS PROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE
OP SUBMISSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT OP STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
TAKEN DUR. ING THE HEARING OF THE CASE BEFORE THE CITY
COURT OP CALOOCAN CITY which was granted by respondent court on May
7, 1971.
However, before the petitioner could receive any such notice from the respondent
court, the respondent Judge issued an order on August 4, 1971 dismissing the
appeal for failure of the defendant-appellant to prosecute the same.
Motions for considerations filed by appellant were then subsequently dismissed
by respondent Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, in light of the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 46 of Republic Act
No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the
memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of First Instance, to
dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute?

HELD:
NO. The second paragraph of Section 45 of R. A. No. 296, otherwise known as the Philippine
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by R.A. No. 6031 provides, in part, as follows: Courts of
First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda
and/or brief with oral argument if so requested.
The foregoing provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. It cannot be interpreted otherwise
than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Being optional on
the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a
logical concomitant of the choice given to the parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the
party waiving the submission of said memorandum. If the appellant so chooses not to submit the
memorandum, the Court of First Instance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the
basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts.
As a general rule, the word may when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to
confer discretion; while the word shall is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
enforced.
Moreover, memoranda, briefs and oral arguments are not essential requirements. They may be
submitted and/or made only if so requested.
Finally, a contrary interpretation would be unjust and dangerous as it may defeat the litigants
right to appeal granted to him by law.
TAX EXEMPTION
Iloilo vs Smart Communications
GR No. 167260 February 27,2009
FACTS:
February 12 2002, Smart received a letter of assessment from petitioner requiring it to pay
deficiency local franchise and business tax in the amount of P 764,545.29 plus interest and
surcharges which it incurred for the year 1997 to 2001. Smart protested on February 15 same
year by sending a letter to the city treasurer stating that it is exempted from payment of local
franchise and business taxes based on Section 9 of RA No. 7294, legislative franchise of Smart.
Under it, SMART was required to pay a 3% franchise tax of all gross receipts, which amount
shall be in lieu of all taxes (important tong line na to). They contend that in lieu of all taxes
clause exempts them from local franchise and business taxes. SMART also invoked RA No.
7925 or the Public Telecommunications Policy Act. Under section 23 of said act declares that
any existing privilege, incentive, advantage, or exemption granted under existing franchises shall
ipso facto become part of previously granted-telecommunications franchise. Petitioner denied
SMARTs protest citing the failure of respondent to comply with Section 252 or RA No. 7160 or
the Local Government Code (LGC) before applying for protest against an assessment. Section
252 requires the payment of said tax before an application of protest of the tax assessment. Then
SMART filed a case on the RTC of Iloilo against petitioner. RTC sided with SMART and
affirmed their claim of in lieu of all taxes making them exempted from local government taxes.
Issue:
Whether Smart is Exempt from local government taxes?
HELD:
NO. eto ung ruling:
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of the RTC dated
January 19, 2005 in Civil Case No. 02-27144 and find SMART liable to pay the local franchise
and business taxes amounting to P764,545.29, assessed against it by petitioner, plus the
surcharges and interest due thereon.
STATCON: Tax Exemption must be clear and unequivocal. And yung in lieu of all taxes is not
clear . It is the burden of the supposedly exempted person to prove that they are exempted (in
exemption every presumption is against it). Weird nung chineck ko yung summary ng book sa
chapter 7 pa tong tax exemption pero eto yung sinabi ng syllabus ng escra XD
Anyhow from what I read tingin ko yung galing from chapter 5 na statcon applicable sa case
nato is yung pag interpret sa in lieu of all taxes. Since unclear siya then it would be construed
against SMART. Also as said in a opinion by Justice Carpio the clear intent in using that line is
that it is only for the national taxes since walang specifically said line about local taxes. Also that
phrase of in lieu of all taxes basically exempts SMART from taxes as long as they pay the
franchise tax however on 1996 when the E-Vat law was passed franchise tax was abolished.
Thus the in lieu of all taxes clause in the legislative franchise of SMART becomes functus
officio (once had power but now has no virtue whatsoever), made inoperative by the lack of a
franchise tax.

NOTE: May isa pang cinocontest pero medyo useless para lang alam nyo, yung effectivity ng
LGC removes ALL, save by those expressly mention, tax exemption prior to its approval (Sec.
193 of the LGC). Effictivity was on January 1, 1992 and Smarts franchise was made on March
27, 1992. So essentially di natanggal ng sec. 193 of LGC yung exemption sa franchise ng Smart.
Pero di yun yung cinocontest para lang alam nyo baka itanong.