IN RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE

AGAINST EMILIO A. GONZALEZ III,

DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, OFFICE OP Case No. 10--!"0
OF T#E OMBUDSMAN
$ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $
DECISION
The constitution mandates that public office is a public trust. Public officers
are enjoined to be at all times accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, and act with patriotism and justice.
(Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution as quoted in several cases such as Civil
Service Commission vs. Cortez, G.. !o. 1""7#$, %une #, $&&' and (illar vs.
An)eles, A*. !o. +,&-$$7-, .e/ruar0 ", $&&-1
Antecedents Facts and Statement of the Case
On 2 !ugust 2"#", a dismissed police officer, former $anila Police %istrict
Police &enior 'nspector ()aptain* +olando %el +osario $endo,a, hijac-ed a tourist
bus, and held hostage a group of twenty.one foreign tourists and four /ilipino tour
assistants.
$endo,a was a bemedaled police official who served the Philippine 0ational
Police (P0P* for thirty years prior to his termination ordered by the Office of the
Ombudsman. /or the liberty of his hostages, $endo,a1s lone demand was his
reinstatement in service.
+egrettably, the long.drawn drama ended with, the murder of eight, the injury
of seven and the demise of $endo,a, a surly scorn for the institutions of a
representative government.
This Office, perforce, mandated %epartment of 2ustice (%O2* &ecretary 3eila
%e 3ima and %epartment of the 'nterior and 3ocal 4overnment (%'34* &ecretary
2esse +obredo to conduct a thorough investigation of the incident, and recommend,
among others, the appropriate administrative and criminal charges against culpable
individuals, public officers or otherwise.
Pursuant to his mandate, 2oint %epartment Order 0O. "#.2"#" was
subse5uently issued, creating the 'ncident 'nvestigation and +eview )ommittee
(''+)*, which was chaired by &ecretary %e 3ima and vice.chaired by &ecretary
+obredo. The ''+) conducted a series of public hearings and e6ecutive sessions,
and invited several resource persons for the purpose (Investigation and Review
Committee, First Report, 16 September 2010, pp 6!"#
Ombudsman $erceditas 4utierre, and respondent %eputy Ombudsman for
the $ilitary and Other 3aw 7nforcement !gencies 7milio 4on,ale, ''' were duly sent
invitations to ta-e part in the proceedings (Id, page "# 8oth declined, however,
interposing that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body.
%Id&.
'n its /irst +eport dated #9 &eptember 2"#", nonetheless, the ''+) made
determinations based on pertinent testimonial and documentary evidence with
respect to the accountability of respondent %eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale,, which
can be summari,ed as follows:
%eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale, committed serious and
ine6cusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing $endo,a1s motion for reconsideration to
languish for nine (;* long months without any justification, in
violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions
for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five
(<* days from submission. The inaction is gross, considering
that there was no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage.ta-ing.
$oreso, $endo,a1s demand for immediate resolution of his
motion for reconsideration is not without legal and compelling
basis considering the following:
a* P&' $endo,a and four policemen were
investigated by the Ombudsman involving a
case for alleged robbery (e6tortion*, grave
threats and physical injuries amounting to grave
misconduct allegedly committed against a
certain )hristian =alaw. The same case,
however, was previously dismissed by the
$anila city Prosecutors Office for lac- of
probable cause and by the P0P.0)+ 'nternal
!ffairs &ervice for failure of the complainant
()hristian =alaw* to submit evidence and
prosecute the case On the other hand, the case
which was filed much ahead by $endo,a et al.
against )hristian =alaw involving the same
incident, was given due course by the )ity
Prosecutors Office.
2
b* The Ombudsman e6ercised jurisdiction over the
case based on a letter issued motu 2ro2rio by
%eputy Ombudsman 7milio !. 4on,ale, ''',
directing the P0P.0)+ > without citing any
reason > to endorse the case against $endo,a
and the arresting policemen to his office for
administrative adjudication. ?e also caused the
doc-eting of the case and named !tty. )larence
@. 4uinto of the P0P.)'%4.0)+, who indorsed
the case records, as the nominal complainant, in
lieu of )hristian =alaw who did not even affirm
his complaint.affidavit b the before the
Ombudsman or submit any position paper as
re5uired.
c* $endo,a, after serving preventive suspen.sion,
was adjudged liable for grave mis.conduct
based on the sole and uncor.roborated
complaint.affidavit of )hristian =alaw.
d* %espite the pending and unresolved motion for
reconsideration, the judgment of dismiss.sal was
enforced, thereby abruptly ending $endo,a1s "
years of service in the P0P with forfeiture of all
his benefits.
%eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale, li-ewise committed serious
disregard of due process, manifest injustice and oppression in
failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation of the
judgment of dismissal against $endo,a pending disposition of
his unresolved motion for reconsideration.
/or as long as his motion for reconsideration remained
pending and unresolved, $endo,a was also effectively deprived
of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to
challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts
and see- a temporary restraining order to prevent the further
e6ecution thereof.
Ahen they received $endo,a1s demand for the release of
the final order resolving his motion for reconsideration, they
should have performed their duty by resolving the
reconsideration that same day since it was already pending for
nine months and the prescribed period for its resolution is only
five days. Or they should have acted decisively by issuing an
order provisionally suspending the further enforcement of the
judgment of dismissal subject to revocation once the
reconsideration is denied and without prejudice to the arrest and
prosecution of $endo,a for the hostage.ta-ing.
3
8ut instead of acting decisively, they merely offered to review
a pending motion for review of the case, thereby prolonging their
inaction and aggravating the situation. !s e6pected, $endo,a >
who previously berated %eputy 4on,ale, for allegedly
demanding Php #<", """ in e6change for favorably resolving the
motion for reconsideration > rejected and branded as trash
(basura* the Ombudsman letter promising review, triggering
the collapse of the negotiation. (Id, pp "$!""#.
8ased on the foregoing, the ''+) recommended with respect to %eputy
Ombudsman 4on,ale,, that its findings be referred to this Office for further
determination of possible administrative offenses, and for the initiation of the proper
administrative proceedings (Id, page %1#.
Bpon a review of the findings and recommendation of the ''+), an
administrative charge was formally instituted against %eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale,.
The charge states, thus:
'FORMAL C#ARGE
/inding a prima face case as contained in the 'ncident
'nvestigation and +eview )ommittee +eport (''+)* dated #C
&eptember 2"#", particularly pages C.C< thereof, this Office
hereby formally charge %eputy Ombudsman 7milio !. 4on,ale,
''', Office of the Ombudsman, a presidential appointee, for
4ross 0eglect of %uty and Dor 'nefficiency in the Performance of
Official %uty under +ule E'@, &ection 22 of the Omnibus +ules
'mplementing 8oo- @ of 7.O. 2;2 and other pertinent )ivil
&ervice 3aws, rules and regulation and for $isconduct in Office
under &ection o of the !nti.graft and )orrupt Practices !ct.
'n view thereof, respondent is herby directed to submit within
seventy.two (C2* hours from receipt hereof, his answer under
oath to the above.charges, as narrated in said ''+& +eport copy
which is hereto attached, together with his documentary
evidence, if any. +espondent should state therein whether he
elects to have a formal investigation or waives the same.
+espondent is also advised of his right to counsel.
!ny $otion to %ismiss, +e5uest for )larification or 8ill of
Particulars shall not be entertained by this Office. !ny of these
pleadings interposed by the respondent shall be considered as
an !nswer and shall be evaluated as such. /ailure of
respondent to submit his answer within the herein re5uired
period shall be considered as a waiver thereof.
SO ORDERED.
4
'n his !nswer dated F 0ovember 2"#", %eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale,
elected a formal investigation, without waiving his right to 5uestion the validity and
propriety of the administrative proceedings.
This Office then called a )larificatory )onference on G /ebruary 2"##.
%espite due notice, however, respondent %eputy Ombudsman failed to appear.
7arlier, respondent submitted an Objection to proceedings accusing this
office of having made a prejudgment of his case even before a formal investigation
has been conducted. +espondent based his objection on news items that figured in
two local tabloids, !bante and 8ulgar, on F /ebruary 2"## that he was already meted
out the penalty of one (#* year suspension.
Ahile there was absolutely no truth to the news items in 5uestion, and despite
a subse5uent e6press retraction by $r. +aymond 8urgos of !bante, in whose
column said news items came out, and the %eputy Ombudsman1s own denial
published in the same column, the latter chose to snub the clarificatory conference
and made no amends therefor.
+espondent %eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale, having been given an opportunity
to be heard, the case was subse5uently submitted for resolution.
&he Iss'es
'n his !nswer, respondent %eputy Ombudsman contended in his defense that:
(#* This Office does not have the authority nor the jurisdiction to try
the instant case, which is cogni,able by the Office of the
Ombudsman andDor the &andiganbayanH
(2* There was never gross neglect of dutyDinefficiency in the
performance of official duties on his part prior to, during and
after the hostage.ta-ing incidentH and
(* There was no misconduct in office committed by him as he
never demanded a bribe from $endo,a.
&he R'(ing
5
A. O( )*e D+s,+-.+(+(/ A0)*o1+)2 o3 )*e O33+,e o3 )*e P1es+4e() o5e1 )*e
De-0)2 O6704s6a(
'n his !nswer, +espondent %eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale, assails the
jurisdiction or authority of this Office to e6ercise disciplinary power over him,
asserting that the Office of the President is not a judicial or 5uasi.judicial body with
authority or jurisdiction to charge or try him administratively.
+espondent %eputy Ombudsman contends that it is the Office of the
Ombudsman that has the disciplinary authority over him, citing &ection 2# of
+epublic !ct 0o. 9CC", otherwise -nown as the Ombudsman !ct of #;G;, which
states:
&ec. 2#. 344icials Su/5ect to 6isci2linar0 Authorit07 89ce2tions.
: The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the 4overnment and
its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
$embers of the )abinet, local government, government.owned
or controlled corporation and their subsidiaries, e6cept over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
$embers of )ongress, and the 2udiciary.
+espondent argues that he is not e6empt from the disciplinary authority of the
Office of the Ombudsman since he is not a member of )ongress nor is he removable
by impeachment under &ection 2, !rticle E' of the )onstitution.
+espondent adds that under &ection #<(#* of the Ombudsman !ct, it is the
Office of the Ombudsman that has the authority to investigate and prosecute any act
or omission of any public officer or employee.
&ection #<(#* of the Ombudsman !ct provides:
&ec. #<. +o;ers, .unctions and 6uties. : The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
(#* 'nvestigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. 't
has primary jurisdiction over cases cogni,able by the
&andiganbayan and, in the e6ercise of his primary
jurisdiction, it may ta-e over, at any stage, form any
investigatory agency of government, the investigation of
such casesH
666 666 666
6
+espondent1s contentions are without merit.
Ahile it may be correct to state that the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority
over respondent %eputy Ombudsman pursuant to &ection 2# of the Ombudsman
!ct, it is not correct to say that the President is without any disciplinary power over
him.
't is worthy to note that the Ombudsman1s disciplinary power over public
officers is not e6clusive in nature. 't has been recogni,ed as concurrent with the
power vested by law in similarly authori,ed heads of offices or departments ()ide*
+ffice of the +mb'dsman v ,e(i-ero, .R 1"26/$, 20 +ctober 20100 F(ores v
1ontema2or, .R no 1"0136, 2$ A'g'st 20100 +ffice of the +mb'dsman v
4e(tran, .R 16%0/5, $ 6'ne 2005#
@erily, &ection G(2* of the Ombudsman !ct itself e6pressly vests the President
with the power to remove a deputy of the Ombudsman, thus:
&ec. G. emoval7 .illin) o4 (acanc0. :
666 666 666
(2* A De-0)2, or the &pecial Prosecutor, 6a2 7e 1e6o5e4
31o6 o33+,e 72 )*e P1es+4e() 3o1 a(2 o3 )*e /1o0(4s
-1o5+4e4 3o1 )*e 1e6o5a. o3 )*e O6704s6a(, a(4
a3)e1 40e -1o,ess. <8m2hasis su22lied=
&ince the law e6pressly authori,es the President to remove a deputy of the
Ombudsman for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman,
subject to the re5uirement of due process, it is within the authority and jurisdiction of
this Office to have conducted administrative proceedings against respondent %eputy
Ombudsman, to determine cause for his administrative culpability, and to impose the
penalty of dismissal if the determination warrants the same.
't bears noting that respondent %eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale, was given two
separate opportunities to e6plain his side and answer the /ormal )harge against
him.
'n the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his
answer together with his documentary evidence, which opportunity respondent
actually availed of. 'n the second instance, this Office called a )larificatory
)onference on G /ebruary 2"## pursuant to respondent1s e6press election of a
formal investigation. %espite due notice, however, respondent %eputy Ombudsman
refused to appear for said conference, interposing an objection based on the
unfounded notion that this Office has prejudged the instant case. +espondent
having been given actual and reasonable opportunity to e6plain or defend himself in
due course, the re5uirement of due process has been satisfied.
'n a long line of cases, the &upreme )ourt has held that the essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is simply the opportunity to e6plain one1s side
7
(Catbagan v 6'dge 4arte, A1 7o 1&6!02!13$2, 6 Apri( 200$0 )ide* +ffice of
the +mb'dsman vs .a(icia, .R 7o 16""11, 10 +ctober 200%0 Civi( Service
Commission v CA, .R 7o 1610%6, 23 7ovember 20060 Ca2ago v 8ina, .R
7o 135$/5, 15 6an'ar2 200$0 1ontema2or v 4'nda(ian, et a(, .R 7o 135//$,
1 6'(2 200/0 +campo v +ffice of the +mb'dsman, .R 7o 1136%/, 1% 6an'ar2
20000 A'dion v 78RC, .R 7o 10663%, 1" 6'ne 15550 9ma(i v .'ingona, 6r,
.R 7o 1/1123, 25 1arch 1555#
?eld the &upreme )ourt, thus:
666 The essence of due process in administrative proceedings
is the opportunity to e6plain one1s side or see- a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. !s long as the parties are
given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
the demands of due process are sufficiently met. (1ontema2or
v 4'nda(ian, s'pra#
Aithal, where not e6pressly provided for by law, the power to remove or
discipline may be derived under the doctrine of necessary implication from the power
to appoint (C Cr':, &he 8aw of ;'b(ic +fficers, 200/ <d, Centra( 4oo= S'pp(2,
Inc, page 22/# Otherwise put, the power to appoint carries with it the implied
power to remove or to discipline (Ag'irre v ,e Castro, .R 7o 12"6/1, 1"
,ecember 15550 )ide* ,+> v Camposano, et a(, .R 7o, 1$"6%3, 2" Apri(
200$0 8arin v <?ec'tive Secretar2, .R 7o 112"3$, 16 +ctober 155"0
4agatsing v >errera, .R 7o 8!/35$2, 2$ 6'(2 15"$#
'n the words of the &upreme )ourt:
A7se() a(2 ,o()1a12 s)a)0)o12 -1o5+s+o(, )*e -o8e1 )o
a--o+() ,a11+es 8+)* +) )*e -o8e1 )o 1e6o5e o1 )o 4+s,+-.+(e.
&ince respondent was appointed by the regional director of
%7)&, she may be disciplined or removed by the latter pursuant
to law (Ag'irre, s'pra#. <8m2hasis su22lied=
Bnder the )onstitution and the Ombudsman !ct, the power to appoint the
deputies of the Ombudsman is e6pressly vested in the President.
&ection ;, !rticle E' of the constitution provides thus:
&ection ;. The Ombudsman and his %eputies shall be
appointed by the President from a list of at least si6 nominees
prepared by the 2udicial and 8ar )ouncil, and from a list of three
nominees for each vacancy thereafter. &uch appointments shall
re5uire no confirmation. !ll vacancies shall be filled within three
months after they occur.
&imilarly, &ection F of the Ombudsman !ct states:
8
&ec. F. A22ointment. : The Ombudsman and his %eputies,
including the &pecial Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the
President from a list of at least twenty one (2#* nominees
prepared by the 2udicial and 8ar )ouncil, and from a list of three
(* nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled
within three (* months after is occurs, each of which list shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation.
666 666 666
0otably, no provision in the )onstitution or the Ombudsman !ct effectively
enjoins the President from e6ercising the power to remove or discipline a deputy of
the Ombudsman as the latter1s appointing authority.
This implied power of the President may be star-ly contrasted with his lac- of
the same power with respect to the Ombudsman, or the members of the &upreme
)ourt, or the judges of inferior courts, whom the President is vested the e6press
authority to appoint. Aith respect to the Ombudsman and the members of the
&upreme )ourt, &ection 2, article E' of the )onstitution e6pressly provides that said
public officers may be removed only through impeachment. Aith respect to
judges of inferior courts &ection ##, !rticle @''' of the )onstitution e6pressly provides
that the &upreme )ourt shall have the power to remove and discipline them.
B. O( )*e C*a1/e o3 G1oss Ne/.e,) o3 D0)2 a(49o1 I(e33+,+e(,2 +( )*e
Pe13o16a(,e o3 O33+,+a. D0)+es
Bpon a consideration of the /irst +eport, the evidence and allegations of
respondent %eputy Ombudsman himself, and other documentary evidence gathered,
this Office finds that the inordinate and unjustified delay in the resolution of )aptain
$endo,a1s $otion for +econsideration timely filed on < 0ovember 2"";, or within
five (<* days from $endo,a1s receipt of a copy of respondent1s %ecision on "
October 2"";, amounted to gross neglect of duty andDor inefficiency in the
performance of official duty.
!s correctly observed by the ''+), the delay in the resolution of $endo,a1s
$otion for +econsideration that spanned nine (;* long months constituted a flagrant
disregard of the Office of the Ombudsman1s own +ules of Procedure. The +ules
re5uire that the resolution of a motion for reconsideration be made within a period of
only five (<* days from the submission thereof (Section %, Artic(e III, +ffice of the
+mb'dsman Administrative +rder 7o 1", series of 200/#
!s further correctly observed by the ''+), the delay in the resolution of
$endo,a1s motion was all the more unjustified since no opposition to $endo,a1s
motion for reconsideration was filed whatsoever.
'n more than a single occasion, the &upreme )ourt has considered inferior
court judges1 failure to resolve motions or pending incidents within the reglementary
9
period prescribed by law as gross inefficiency ()ide* ;ere: v Concepcion, /"%
;hi( 51%0 ,e(a Cr':, eta( v )a((arta, A1 7o 1&6!03!1$/1, 6 1arch 200"0
Arcenas v Ave(ino, A1 7o 1&6!06!1632, 1$ 6'ne 200"# 8y analogy, this
Office considers the inordinate delay of nine (;* months as constituting gross
inefficiency in the performance of official duty. !fter all, the protection of the parties1
right to a speedy disposition of cases is a common consideration (Re* Cases
S'bmitted for ,ecision 4efore >on 1e(iton . <m's(an, Former 6'dge,
Regiona( &ria( Co'rt, 4ranch 3", 9rdaneta Cit2, ;angasinan, Reso('tion A1
7o R&6!10!2226, 1arch 22, 2010#
'n his !nswer, respondent %eputy Ombudsman alleged that the resolution of
$endo,a1s $otion was assigned to 4raft 'nvestigation and Prosecution Officer
(4'PO* %ennis 3. 4arcia on #F %ecember 2"";. !fter almost four (F* months or on
< !pril 2"#", 4'PO 4arcia released the draft Order resolving the $otion.
+espondent alleged that his office received the draft of the resolution on 2C !pril
2"#", and that on C $ay 2"#" he completed his review of the draft, approved the
same, and transmitted to the Ombudsman for final approval.
!ttached to respondent1s !nswer were copies of the receiving boo-s
evidencing receipt of $endo,a1s $otion by the )riminal 'nvestigation, Prosecution
and !dministrative !djudication 8ureau ()'P!!8* of the Ombudsman (Anne? @<A1,
4'PO 4arcia1s receipt thereof on #F %ecember 2""; (Anne? @FA1, receipt of the
draft Order resolving the $otion by respondent on 2C !pril 2"#" (Anne? @>A1,
receipt of the $ilitary and Other 3aw 7nforcement Offices ($O37O* +ecords &ection
on C $ay 2"#" after respondent allegedly acted on the resolution (Anne? @IA1, and
the alleged receipt of the said Order by the )entral +ecords %ivision of the Office of
the Ombudsman on #; $ay 2"#" or #2 days later (Anne? @6A1.
+espondent contended that considering the number of approvals that the
resolution on $endo,a1s $otion had to undergo, the period that elapsed could not be
considered ve6atious, capricious, or oppressive. +espondent maintained that there
was no prolonged inaction on his part since he acted on the draft Order within nine
(;* calendars days from his receipt thereof.
Ahat respondent %eputy Ombudsman conveniently failed to ac-nowledge is
the fact that when he acted on the draft resolution of $endo,a1s motion, said motion
had already languished for a period of almost five (<* months in his subordinate1s
hands. ?e should have acted with more dispatch, therefore, in resolving the $otion.
$oreover, in view of the fact that respondent %eputy Ombudsman has caused
the enforcement of $endo,a1s dismissal pending resolution of the latter1s $otion,
utmost responsibility and fundamental considerations of justice should have impelled
respondent to diligently supervise his subordinate and apprise the Ombudsman of
the necessity to e6pedite their respective official actions to avoid undue prejudice on
$endo,a, an erstwhile decorated police officer who served the P0P for thirty ("*
years.
!s correctly pointed out by the ''+), this Office notes that as long as his
$otion for +econsideration remained pending and unresolved, $endo,a was also
effectively deprived of the right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to
10
challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts and see- a temporary
restraining order to prevent the further e6ecution thereof.
4ross neglect of duty refers to negligence characteri,ed by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
conse5uences, insofar as other persons may be affected. 't is the omission of that
care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own
property. 'n cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach
of duty is flagrant and palpable (.o(angco v F'ng, .R no 13"630, 16 +ctober
20061.
Bnder the peculiar circumstances involving the disciplinary case of $endo,a,
especially including the fact that the penalty of dismissal was enforced even before
$endo,a could receive a copy of the /ebruary #9, 2""; %ecision, respondent
%eputy Ombudsman1s palpable lac- of care to supervise his subordinate to act with
more dispatch in his review of the resolution of $endo,a1s $otion for
+econsideration, and to apprise the Ombudsman of the delay which said resolution
had already suffered amount to a conscious indifference to the conse5uences of the
delay to the person (s* affected thereby.
This conscious indifference was highlighted when $endo,a demanded for a
resolution of his case during the fateful high.jac-ing incident. The following points
raised by the ''+) are apropos:
Ahen the two Ombudsman officials <Gutierrez and Gonzalez=
received $endo,a1s demand for the release of the final order
resolving his motion for reconsideration, they should have
performed their duty by resolving the reconsideration that
same day since it was already pending for nine months and
the prescribed period for its resolution is only five days. Or if
they cannot resolve it that same day, then they should have
acted decisively issuing an order provisionally suspending the
further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal subject to
revocation once the reconsideration <sic= is denied and without
prejudice to the arrest and prosecution of $endo,a for the
hostage.ta-ing. ?ad they done so, the crisis may have ended
peacefully, without necessarily compromising the integrity of
the institution. !fter all, as relayed to the negotiators,
$endo,a did e6press willingness to ta-e full responsibility for
the hostage.ta-ing if his demand for release of the final
decision or reinstatement was met.
8ut instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials
merely offered to review a pending motion for review of the
case, thereby prolonging their inaction and aggravating the
situation. 666 666 666
/or the reasons stated above, this Office finds respondent %eputy
Ombudsman guilty of gross neglect of duty.
11
C. O( )*e C*a1/e o3 G1oss M+s,o(40,)
Aith respect to the charge and findings of the ''+) that respondent may be
further held liable for gross misconduct for allegedly demanding from $endo,a the
amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P#<",""".""*, there is substantial
evidence to support the same in the light of the circumstances surrounding the
incident. !s the &upreme )ourt has taught us, only substantial evidence, that is, that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as ade5uate to
justify a conclusion is necessary in administrative cases ()ide* Adap v Come(ec,
$16 SCRA /05#
!s admitted by respondent himself in paragraphs 2 and 2F of his !nswer, he
accommodated the re5uest of 8ob =alaw to transfer the case $endo,a which was
then pending with the Philippine 0ational Police.'nternal !ffairs &ervice, to the Office
of the Ombudsman, e6plaining this wise:
2F. On 2< 2une 2""G, the father of the complainant, 8ob =alaw,
together with %indo 3ucindo, a family friend of the former, came
to my office to re5uest that the Office of the Ombudsman ta-e
over the case of )hristian =alaw. They e6pressed their concern
not just about the outcome of )hristian =alaw1s case, but the
safety of the latter, considering it wad the wife of then
respondent $endo,a who was serving the subpoena from the
'!&.
!pparently, on the strength of his visitor1s bare allegation, respondent, without
verifying the same, encroached on the P0P.'!&1 e6ercise of its primary jurisdiction
over the case. !nd when the complaint endorsed by the P0P.'!& to the Office of
the Ombudsman in 2uly 2""G was resolved in less than seven (C* months based on
the sole and uncorroborated complaint.affidavit of the alleged victim who did not
even affirm the same, there is reason to believe that respondent %eputy
Ombudsman had shown undue interest on the case. !dded to this is the lac- of
motive on the part of $endo,a to implicate him, and in statements given
spontaneously.
$isconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer, and the
misconduct is grave if it violates any of the additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules (Santos v Rasa(an, $1$
SCRA 5"0 Rodrig'e: v <'genio, $12 SCRA 3%51.
D. A17+)1a12 a(4 T21a((+,a. E:e1,+se o3 A0)*o1+)2; Be)1a2a. o3 P07.+, T10s)
!s hereinabove discussed, the Ombudsman !ct e6pressly empowers the
President to remove a deputy of the Ombudsman for any of the grounds for the
removal of the Ombudsman.
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&ection 2, !rticle E' of the constitution e6pressly provides for these grounds,
to wit:
&ection 2. The President, the @ice.President, the $embers of
the &upreme )ourt, the $embers of the constitutional
)ommissions, and )*e O6704s6a( 6a2 7e 1e6o5e4 31o6
o33+,e on impeachment 3o1, a(4 ,o(5+,)+o( o3, ,0.-a7.e
5+o.a)+o( o3 )*e Co(s)+)0)+o(, )1easo(, 71+7e12, /1a3) a(4
,o110-)+o(, o)*e1 *+/* ,1+6es, o1 7e)1a2a. o3 -07.+, )10s). !ll
other public officers and employees may be removed from office
as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
8etrayal of public trust is a new ground added by the )onstitutional
)ommission as a catch.all ground to cover all manner of offenses unbecoming a
public functionary but not punishable by the criminal statutes, li-e ine6cusable
negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of authority, breach of official duty by
malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, and obstruction of justice
(Records of the Constit'tion Commission, )o( 2, page 221.
)learly, the gross neglect of duty, gross inefficiency and misconduct
committed by respondent %eputy Ombudsman is constitutive of or amounts to a
betrayal of the public trust. Put differently, had respondent %eputy Ombudsman not
betrayed the trust of )apt. $endo,a, the latter would not have been compelled to
resort to hostage.ta-ing to advance his cause. This fact cannot be denied as clearly
e6pressed in the handwritten demand posted on the bus +elease final decision
O$8.P.!.";"<C".!.
The urgency of resolving the motion on the part of $endo,a is
understandable. To reiterate, the decision dismissing him from the service was
implemented even before he could receive a copy of the %ecision. !t this point , a
great injustice has already been committed as prior thereto, $endo,a could not file a
$otion for +econsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman nor an appeal before
the )ourt of !ppeals, and in the pendency thereof see- a temporary restraining order
against the implementation of the %ecision. )onse5uently, when he got to file his
$otion for +econsideration, the urgency of the matter heightened, as he had long
suffered from the effects of the %ecision. These considerations cannot have
escaped the respondent %eputy Ombudsman had he been circumspect in the
performance of his duties.
&ection #, !rticle E' of the )onstitution sanction, thus:
&ection #. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiencyH act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
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The provision sums up the high sense of idealism that is e6pected of every
officer of the government (6 4ernas, &he 15%" Constit'tion of the Rep'b(ic of
the ;hi(ippines A Commentar2, 200/ ed, Re? 4oo=store, Inc, page 110%1. As
2ustice $alcolm e6pressed in Corne-o v .abrie(, .R 7o 8!16%%", 1" 7ovember
1520, The basic idea of government in the Philippines as in the Bnited &tates is that
of a popular representative government, the officers being mere agents and not
rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a proprietary or
contractual right to an office, but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the
provisions of the law and holds the office as a trust for the people whom he
represents.
8ased on facts substantially established, and measured against the
fundamental mandate of his public office to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and to act with justice, this Office finds
that respondent %eputy Ombudsman 4on,ale,1s gross neglect of duty, gross
inefficiency and misconduct in office amounted to a betrayal of the public trust
reposed in him.
<#EREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds %eputy Ombudsman
7milio !. 4on,ale, ''' guilty of 4ross 0eglect of %uty and 4rave $isconduct
constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL
from service.
SO ORDERED.
%one in the )ity of $anila, this day of 2"##.
P1e-a1e4 72:
DIR. RO<ENA TURINGAN-SANC#EZ ATTY. CARLITO D. CATAYONG
Re5+e8e4 72: Re,o66e(4+(/ A--1o5a.
ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON OSE AMOR M. AMORADO
OIC-ODESLA Se(+o1 De-0)2 E:e,0)+5e Se,1e)a12
A--1o5e49D+sa--1o5e4:
PA=UITO N. OC#OA, R.
E:e,0)+5e Se,1e)a12
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