G.R. No. 120295.

June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G.
FRIVALDO, respondents.

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May
8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another
candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that Frivaldo "be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by
reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and that his
Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second
Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon
until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he
was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995,
the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned Resolution of the
Second Division.

The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election
returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the following votes
obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.

In an order dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the
petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose
of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x."

Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was proclaimed
governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the annulment
of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his
oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for
repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the
said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was released and
received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening,
there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as
governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two
cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the Vice-Governor not Lee should occupy
said position of governor.

On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the
herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the
highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as
duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest
number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".

Issues:
1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino
citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or
hold the governorship of Sorsogon NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and
legal in light of existing jurisprudence? -NO!

Held:
1.)
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying
Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that
in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he
was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because
a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again, as the occasion demands."

2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him
for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact remains
that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino
vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second placer, just that, a second placer."
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or
defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-
acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest
number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be
proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and
should now be corrected.
========================================================
CONCLUSION OF THE COURT
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local
Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the
latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of
office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be
in full force and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or
repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation
by virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and
effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the
law granting him a new right to resume his political status and the
legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been
forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of
escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given retroactive
effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of
which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of
Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor,
and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore,
since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994,
his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been
validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is
not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings
recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide
petitions for annulment of proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the
electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest
will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will.
Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the
end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection,
defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court
has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In
any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the
issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority,
for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be
filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must
clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and
thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately
create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with
his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the
effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his
failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter
before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual
findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of
repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a
disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But
the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over
patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut
consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate
development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against
and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh
anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the
larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation
approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he
sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the
dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt
about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first
opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people
once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him
three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every
time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed
naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated
tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth
despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact
and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention
and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now
at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as
well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and
equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo
was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful
country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on
returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of
birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law
which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and
above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most
certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming
choice.















































Bengzon III vs HRET

FACTS:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.

On Nov. 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the US. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under sec. 1(4) of CA No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship by, among others, rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. Then on June 5,
1990, he was naturalized as a US citizen, in connection with his service in
the US Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran against
petitioner Bengson III for the office of Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections and was elected for
said office. Bengson III then filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam
with HRET, claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a
member of the House since he was not a natural-born citizen. HRET
dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who
became an American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born
Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship

HELD:

Petition is without merit.

Citizenship, How Acquired

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the
two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth
Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which
repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic
Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting
Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from
its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening
period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated
himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of
any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to
any Government announced policies.

Modes of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire
the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63
(C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization,
(2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under
this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by
those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;
(2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3)
service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time; (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic
necessity.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
simply consists of the taking of an oath ofallegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the
place where the person concerned resides or last resided.

Repatriation Results in Recovery of Original Nationality

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other
hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he
rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he
subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and
having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen,
a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears
stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to,
his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

What is a Natural-Born Citizen

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born
citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is
untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term
"natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the
1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a
person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have
to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of
Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who
were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino
mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-
born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and had
to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to
perfect their Philippine citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born.
After defining who natural-born citizens are, Section 2 of Article IV adds
a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens."
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under
the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1)
those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did
not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the
absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a
natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.



Dissenting Opinion: Sandoval-Gutierrez

Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution[1] provides:

Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. xxx.

Petitioner contends that the phrase from birth indicates that
citizenship must start at a definite point and must be continuous,
constant and without interruption. The Constitution does not extend the
privilege of reacquiring a natural-born citizen status to respondent, who
at one time, became an alien. When he reacquired his citizenship in
1994, he had to comply with the requirements for repatriation, thus
effectively taking him out of the constitutional definition of a natural-
born Filipino.

Respondent maintains that the phrase from birth refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born. Since he
was born to Filipino parents, he has been a natural-born Filipino from
birth. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
2630 results in his reacquisition of his inherent characteristic of being a
natural-born citizen.

The very first natural-born Filipinos did not acquire that status at birth.
They were born as Spanish subjects. In Roa vs. Collector of Customs, the
Supreme Court traced the grant of natural-born status from the Treaty of
Paris, and the Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902 and March 23, 1912.

It was further held therein that under the said provision, every person
born after the 11th of April, 1899, of parents who were Spanish subjects
on that date and who continued to reside in this country are at the
moment of their birth ipso facto citizens of the Philippine Islands.

Under the April 7, 1900 Instructions of President William McKinley to
the Second Philippine Commission, considered as our first colonial
charter or fundamental law, we were referred to as people of the
Islands, or inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, or natives of the
Islands and not as citizens, much less natural-born citizens. The first
definition of citizens of the Philippine Islands in our law is found in
Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

Philippine citizenship, including the status of natural-born, was initially a
loose or even non-existent qualification. As a requirement for the
exercise of certain rights and privileges, it became a more strict and
difficult status to achieve with the passing of the years.

Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that Philippine citizenship
could be acquired under either the jus sanguinis or jus soli doctrine.

This liberal policy was applied even as the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 appear to have
limited citizens of the Philippine Islands to resident inhabitants who
were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, their children born subsequent
thereto, and later, those naturalized according to law by the Philippine
legislature. Only later was jus sanguinis firmly applied and jus soli
abandoned.

Hence, the status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a
privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended, and actually
continued, to belong to the Philippine Islands.

Respondent wants us to believe that since he was natural-born Filipino
at birth, having been born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, he was
automatically restored to that status when he subsequently reacquired
his citizenship after losing it.

HRET affirmed respondents position when it pronounced that the
definition of a natural-born citizen in Section 2, Article IV of the
Constitution refers to the classes of citizens enumerated in Section 1 of
the same Article, to wit:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Thus, respondent HRET held that under the above enumeration, there
are only two classes of citizens, i.e., natural-born and naturalized. Since
respondent Cruz is not a naturalized citizen, then he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen.

I do not agree. I reiterate that Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution
defines natural-born citizens as those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship.

Respondent Cruz had to perform certain acts before he could again
become a Filipino citizen. He had to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil
Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his
American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of
reacquisition of Philipine citizenship.

Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The
cardinal rule in the interpretation and construction of a
constitution is to give effect to the intention of the framers and of
the people who adopted it. Words appearing in a Constitution are
used according to their plain, natural, and usual significance and
import and must be understood in the sense most obvious to the
common understanding of the people at the time of its adoption.


















































MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 (1999) G.R. No. 135083

Facts:
Edu Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel Daza were candidates for
Vice Mayor of Makati City during the May 11, 1998 elections.
A certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for disqualification on
Manzano contending that Manzano is an American citizen thus
suspending the proclamation of the private respondent.
COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition cancelling the
certificate of candidacy of Manzano on
May 7, 1998 on the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified under Sec
40 of the Local Goverment Code from running any elective position.
Manzado filed a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 1998 and the
motion remained pending even after the election.
The petitioner, Mercado sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification which was opposed by the private respondent.
On August 19, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution
reversing the decision of the COMELEC's Second Division, declaring that
private respondent Manzano is qualified to run for Vice mayor of Makati.
Pursuant to the resolution rendered by the COMELEC enbanc, on
August 31, 1998, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent
as the Vice Mayor of the city of Makati.
Thus, this petition for Certiorari praying to set aside the resolution of
the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent Manzano,
disqualified to hold the office Vice Mayor of Makati.

Issues:
1. WON, petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering
that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by
Ernesto Mamaril.
2. WON dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?
3. WON there was a valid election of citizenship?

Reasons:
1. Yes, petitioner Mercado, has the right to bring suit. At the time
Mercado filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998,
there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner's purpose
was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for
[an] elective local position" under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so
was Mercado since the he was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati
City. Mercado had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for
the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 which provides that
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has been no final judgment rendered. Failure of
COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for certiorari.

2. NO. Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner contends that
through Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code (which declares as
disqualified from running for elective local position Those with dual-
citizenship), Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the
ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold elective office.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is
involuntary; it arises out of circumstances of birth or marriage, where a
person is recognized to be a national by two or more states. Dual
allegiance is a result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. Dual citizenship is an issue because a person who has this raises a
question of which states law must apply to him/her, therefore posting a
threat to a countrys sovereignty. Hence, dual citizenship in the
aforementioned disqualification clause must mean dual allegiance.
Therefore, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
3. Yes, there was a valid election of citizenship. It should suffice that upon
filing of certificates for candidacy, such persons with dual citizenship
have elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their dual
citizenship. In private respondents certificate of candidacy, he made
these statements under oath on March 27, 1998: I am a Filipino
citizenNatural-born. I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant
to, a foreign country. I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance theretoThe filing of such certificate
of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification he might have as a dual-citizen.

Petition is DISMISSED.

Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec (1995)

DOCTRINE: If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of the
residence requirement, the 1 year period is irrelevant because wherever
he is, he is a resident of his domicile of origin. Second, if a person
reestablishes a previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year requirement
must be satisfied. (Bernas book)

FACTS:

1.) Imelda Marcos established her domicile in Tacloban City, which was
her fathers hometown, in 1938 when she was 8 years old. She pursued
her studies (GS,HS, College) in the aforementioned city and subsequently
taught in the Leyte Chinese School. In 1952, she went to Manila to work
with her cousin, speaker Daniel Romuladez, in his office in the House of
Representatives. Two years after, she married Pres. Ferdinand Marcos
when he was still a Congressman in Ilocos Norte and registered there as
a voter. In 1959, her husband was elected a Senator and they lived in San
Juan, Rizal where she again registered as a voter. And in 1965, she lived
in the Malacanang Palace when her husband became the President. This
time, she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. She served as
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during
1978. After their exile in Hawaii, she ran for President in 1992 and
indicated in her CoC that she was a resident and register voter of San
Juan, Metro Manila.

2.) Imelda was running for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. She filed her CoC for the position.

3.) The incumbent Representative, Montejo, filed for her disqualification
alleging that she did not meet the 1 year constitutional requirement for
residency.

4.) Apparently, she wrote down in her CoC in item no.8, which asked for
the number of years of residency, that she had been a resident for 7
months.

5.) Marcos filed an amended CoC changing 7 months to since
childhood, claiming that it was an honest misinterpretation that she
thought she was being asked for her actual and physical presence in
Tolosa, and not her domicile.

6.) The COMELEC found the petition for her disqualification meritorious
and cancelled her amended CoC. For them, it was clear that Marcos has
not complied with the 1 year residency requirement.
In election cases, the term residence has always been considered
synonymous with domicile. This is the intention to reside in the
place coupled with the personal presence.
When she returned after her exile, she did not choose to go back
to Tacloban. Thus, her animus revertendi
(intention to return) #JudgePrincess points to Manila.
Pure intention to reside in Tacloban is not sufficient, there must
be conduct indicative of such intention.

7.) The COMELEC denied her motion for reconsideration but issued a
resolution allowing for her proclamation should she obtain the highest
number of votes. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself
and directed the suspension of her proclamation.

8.) Marcos found out that she had won by a landslide in the said elections
and prayed for her proclamation. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the
First District of Leyte for a period of one year. YES

RULING + RATIO:

The case at hand reveals that there is confusion as to the application of
Domicile and Residence in election law.
- Originally, the essential distinction between residence and
domicile lies in the fact that residence is the PHYSICAL presence of a
person in a given area and domicile is where a person intends to remain
or his permanent residence. A person can only have a single domicile.
- It was ascertained from the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution that residence for election purposes is synonymous with
domicile.

It cannot be contested that the petitioner held various residences in her
lifetime. The Courts reiterate that an individual does not lose his
domicile even if she has maintained different residences for different
purposes. None of these purposes pointed to her intention of abandoning
her domicile of origin.

The Courts ruled in favor of Marcos because of the ff reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence
and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law* does not mean the same thing in Political
Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.

*Civil Code kasi sa Art 110: The husband shall fix the residence of the
family. Sobrang distinguished yung residence at domicile sa Civil law.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos,
her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she
chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.


DISPOSITION: COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial
Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.


Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and
thus candidate, of the first district of Leyte.

Yes. The Court held that the meaning of residence in Article 110
1
of the
Civil Code, which states that the husband shall fix the residence of the
family, is different therefore to the meaning of residence in the
Constitution. The term residence may have one meaning in civil law (as
under the Civil Code) and another different meaning in political law as
represented in the election requirements identified in the Constitution.
Residency is satisfied under the Civil Code if a person establishes that
they intend to leave a place when the purpose for which they have taken
up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be for pleasure,
business, or health and a person may have different residences in
various places. However, residency in the Constitution as opposed to the
Civil Code means domicile and therefore the key issue is to determine
the domicile of the petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. The Court held
that Article 110 does not create a presumption that a wife automatically
gains a husbands domicile upon marriage. When the petitioner was
married to then Congressman Marcos in 1954, she was obliged by virtue
of Article 110 (and further contemplated in Article 109
2
) of the Civil
Code to follow her husbands actual place of residence as fixed by him.
The right of the husband to fix the residence was in harmony with the
intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. It recognised the
fact that the husband and wife bring into the marriage different
domiciles and if the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their
residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they
may live together. However, the term residence in Article 110 of the
Civil Code does not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be correctly
argued that petitioner lost her domicile as a result of her marriage to the

1
The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
2
The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support.
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The Court also held that it
would be illogical for the Court to assume that a wife cannot regain her
original domicile upon the death of her husband, if she has not positively
selected a new one during the subsistence of the marriage itself.

The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced to
replace the Civil Code, confirmed the petitioners argument that marriage
does not automatically change a wifes domicile to that of her husband.
The Family Code replaced the term residence (used in the Civil Code)
with the term domicile. Article 69 of the Family Code gives a husband
and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile. The provision
recognised revolutionary changes in the concept of womens rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between the spouses. The provision recognised the right of
women to choose their own domicile and removed the automatic
transfer of a husbands domicile to his wife.

(2)
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus
Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
Yes. It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment
within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, "so
that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the
theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly
indicated it." The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that
our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render
judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision
within a given or prescribed period. In any event, Sections 6 and 7 of R.A.
6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had
jurisdiction over the question of the petitioners qualifications after the
elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.

Puno, J. (Concurring):
All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married
the former dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and
the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in
Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both
places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Francisco, J. (Concurring):
Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in
Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both
places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Romero, J. (Separate):
Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands death is
evident in this case. Marcos living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal
residency requirement.

Vitug, J. (Separate):
It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared
disqualified. The Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunal on matters
which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.

Mendoza, J. (Concurring):
The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which
they seek to be elected. It has none and the qualifications of candidates
may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition
for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate forum (not
necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET).

Padilla, J. (Dissenting):
Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy
should not be blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding the petitioner disqualified.
And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified
candidate shall not be counted.

Regalado, J. (Dissenting):
A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of
her husband does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its
original. Such theory is not stated in any of the provisions of law.

Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):
A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or
agency has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs
resolutions are within the scope and jurisdiction of this particular
agencys powers. In agreement with Regalado, re: womans domicile.






































































Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 83896)

FACTS:

The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional
Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. The
assailed law provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position,
a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his
primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government
and government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to
ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which
the President is the Chairman.

The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284 contravenes
the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII which declares:

The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any
other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested
in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.

The petitioners maintained that the phrase unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution used in Section 13 of Article VII meant that the
exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution.

Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution in Section 13, Article VII makes
reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as the appointive
officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by
the respondents provides:
Sec. 7 - Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of
his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE No. 1: Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are
concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in
general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB? No.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding
other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition
against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government
subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the
Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another
provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from
holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive
officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-
B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is
meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

The phrase unless otherwise provided in this Constitution must be
given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances
cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed
as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting
as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and
(3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of
the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE No. 2: Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio
capacity? NO

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment
under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be
construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials
specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-
officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of said officials office. The reason is that these posts do no
comprise any other office within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional
duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means from
office; by virtue of office. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. The
additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be
required by the officials primary functions. If the functions required to
be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent,
incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet
official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of any
other office prohibited by the Constitution.
ISSUE No. 3: Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the
perquisites they have received from the offices they have held pursuant
to EO 284? NO

During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be
considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered. It has been held that in cases where there is
no de jureofficer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession
of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate
action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the
respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned
positions may therefore be retained by them.

Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows
a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other
appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section
13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so,
unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
































FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ v.
SANDIGANBAYANand PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESPONENTE:
BELLOSILLO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer
impliesthat the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto
thesucceeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected
or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term
but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this
provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration
of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but
the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and
qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.

Continuation of Facts:
However, with respect to the charge of violating Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No.
3.019, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Francisco Lecaroz. It found
that Red was neither authorized to sit as member of the SB because he
was not properly appointed thereto nor had he shown to the mayor
sufficient basis for his alleged right to a seat in the municipal council. On
this basis, the court a quo concluded that Mayor Lecaroz was legally
justified in not allowing Red to assume the position of Kagawad.

ISSUES:
1) WON Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB
Federation President by virtue of his oath taken before then
Assemblywoman Reyes;

2) WON the tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his
coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had
accordingly expired; If yes - WON Lenlie could no longer occupy the
office despite the vacancy therein, in a holdover capacity;

3) WON under Sec. 2 of the Freedom
Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of the pertinent Ministry of
Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative circulars, accused
Lenlie was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in office in a
holdover capacity; if not WON accused Lenlie acted in good faith and
committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal
intent;

4) WON the accused had committed the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents within the contemplation of Art. 171 of
RPC and had violated Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

HELD: Petition is meritorious.

1) NO. Red had not validly and effectively assumed the office of KB
Federation President by virtue of his oath taken
before then Assemblywoman Reyes on 27 September 1985. Under the
provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, members of the then
Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was only
after the effectivity of RA No. 6733 that members of both Houses of
Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to
administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office
taken by Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who
had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no
oath at all.

2) The tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his
coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had expired.
However, Lenlie could occupy the office as president of the KB and his
coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB in a holdover
capacity. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer
implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto
the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or
appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term
but until their successors have been elected
and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become
vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected
and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over
until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the
term fixed by law. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never
qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie remained KB representative to
the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a
de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries
and all the emoluments appertaining to the position.

3) The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the
implementing MILG Circulars confirmed the right of incumbent KB
Federation Presidents to hold and maintain their positions until duly
replaced either by the President herself or by the Interior Ministry.

4) No. The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of
law may be the basis of good faith. In Cabungcal v. Cordova we affirmed
the doctrine that an erroneous interpretation of the meaning of the
provisions of an ordinance by a city mayor does not amount to bad faith
that would entitle an aggrieved party to damages against that official.
When Mayor Lecaroz certified to the correctness of the payroll, he was
making not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law expressing his
belief that Lenlie Lecaroz was legally holding over as member of the
Sanggunian and thus entitled to the emoluments attached to the position.
This is an opinion undoubtedly involving a legal matter, and any
"misrepresentation" of this kind cannot constitute the crime of false
pretenses. The third element requiring that the narration of facts be
absolutely false is not even adequately satisfied as the belief of Mayor
Francisco Lecaroz that Lenlie Lecaroz was a holdover member of the
Sanggunian was not entirely bereft of basis, anchored as it was on the
universally accepted doctrine of holdover. As to RA 3019, prudence and
good faith impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary steps to verify
the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian.























































Liban vs. Gordon (2009)
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Facts:

Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross
Chapter while Respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.

Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board
of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate - Sec.
13, Art. VI, 1987 Consti: No Senator or Member of the HoR may hold any
other office/employment in the Govt, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including govt-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term w/o forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which
he was elected).

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that PNRC is a govt-
owned or controlled corporation. Flores v. Drilon held that incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to
another government office.
Respondent:
Petitioners have no standing to file petition w/c appears to be an
action for quo warranto they do not claim to be entitled to the
Senate office of respondent.
Sec. 11, Rule 66, Rules of Civil Procedure: action should be
commenced w/in 1 year after the cause of public officers forfeiture of
office
respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for 40 yrs
Petitioners cannot raise a constitutional question as taxpayers no
claim that they suffered some actual damage/threatened injury or
illegal disbursement of public funds

jurisdiction in RTC
PNRC is not a govt owned/controlled corporation
Sec. 13, Art. VI of Consti does not apply because volunteer service to
PNRC is not an office/employment
Petitioners: present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning unlawful
disbursement of funds considering that respondent has been drawing his
salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer
entitled to his office. Court has jurisdiction because it involves a
legal/constitutional issue of transcendental importance.
Issues, Holding & Ratio:

WON petitioners have standing.
SC: NO. The petition is an action for quo warranto (Sec. 1, Rule 66, Rules
of Court an action for the usurpation of a public office against a public
officer who does or suffers an act which constitutes a ground for
forfeiture of his office). See facts for petitioners allegations. Petitioners do
not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.
WON PNRC is a Private or Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporation.
SC: PNRC is a Private Corporation.
May 22, 1947 Pres. Manuel Roxas signed RA 95 (PNRC Charter)
adhering to the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. PNRC is:
- A non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization
whose mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate
humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable w/o consideration of
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.
- A member of National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. 7 Fundamental
Principles:
Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary
Service, Unity, Universality.
- Must be autonomous, neutral and independent; not appear to be
instrument/agency that implements govt policy to merit the trust of
all and effectively carry out its mission therefore, it cannot be
owned/controlled by the govt
The Philippine govt does not own the PNRC does not have govt assets
and does not receive any appropriation from the Congress. It is financed
primarily by contributions from private individuals/entities obtained
through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors.

The govt does not control the PNRC. Only 6 of the 30 members of the
PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President of the
Philippines (Sec. 6, PNRC Charter). A majority of 4/5 of the PNRC Board
are elected/chosen by the private sector members of the PNRC.
The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President or any subordinate
govt official, therefore, he is not an official/employee of the Philippine
Government. Sec. 16, Art. VII of Consti President appoints all officials &
employees in the Executive branch whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Consti or by law. President also appoints those
whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. The law may
also authorize the heads of deparments, agencies, commissions, or
boards to appoint officers lower in rank.
The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private
individuals, including students and foreigners; those contribute to the
annual fund campaign of the PNRC.

Sec. 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of
1987: A govt-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the
govt, and in case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital
stock must be owned by the govt. In case of a non-stock corporation, at
least a majority of the members must be govt officials holding such
membership by appointment/designation by the govt.
WON the office of the PNRC Chairman is a govt office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VI of Consti.

SC: The office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office. The President
cannot review, reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC
Board and the PNRC Chairman. Only the PNRC Board can review, reverse
or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC Chairman. The PNRC
Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed
by the President or by any subordinate government official. The PNRC in
itself is NOT a GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded,
and privately-run charitable organization controlled by a Board of
Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Thus,
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was
elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator [as there is
no incompatibility between the two positions].
However, the PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional
Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations by Special
Law

1935, 1973 & 1987 (Sec. 16) Constitutions provide that: The Congress
shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization,
or regulation of private corporations. Govt-owned or controlled
corporations may be created/established by special charters in the
interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Feliciano v. CoA Sec. 16 of 1987 Consti bans private corporations to be
created by special charters, which historically gave individuals, families
or groups special privileges denied to other citizens.
PNRC was created through a special charter, however, the elements of
govt ownership and control (e.g. capital assets and operating funds from
govt) are clearly lacking in the PNRC. It therefore cannot be considered a
govt-owned or controlled corporation.
In creating PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a
private corporation, which is not exempt from constitutional prohibition
(Sec. 16 above) even as a non-profit/charitable corporation.
PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and
grants it corp -13
are void. Other provisions remain valid as they can be considered as a
recognition by the State that PNRC is the local National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and thus entitled to
the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter.
They also implement the Phil. Govts treaty obligations based on the
Geneva Conventions.
Judgment: Office of the PNRC Chairman declared not a government
office.
Dissent: Nachura, J.
The petition is one for prohibition and petitioners have legal
standing as citizens and taxpayers. The remedy sought is preventive
and restrictive, an injunction against an alleged continuing violation of
the fundamental law. They raise a constitutional issue, w/o claiming any
entitlement to either the Senate seat or chairmanship of PNRC. The Court
has full authority and bounden duty to assume jurisdiction to determine
WON other branches of govt have kept themselves w/in the limits of the
Consti & laws and have not abused discretion given them.
PNRC is a govt-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC). Its
charter does not violate the constitutional proscription against
creation of private corporations by special law. PNRC was
incorporated under RA 95, a special law. It cannot be anything but a
GOCC. PNRC was not impliedly converted into a private corporation
simply because its charter was amended to vest in it authority to secure
loans, be exempted from payment of all duties, tax fees, etc.
The use of Sec. 2(13) of Introductory Provisions of Administrative Code
of 1987 by the ponencia to define a GOCC does not pronounce a
definition of a GOCC that strays from Sec. 16, Art. XII of Consti. It merely
declares that a GOCC may either be a stock or non-stock corporation.
Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter PNRC is officially designated to assist the RP in
discharging the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions
therefore, it is engaged in the performance of the govts public functions.
PNRC is endowed w/ corporate powers. It administers special funds
contributions of members, aid given by govt, supported by PCSO and
LGUs. It submits annual reports receipts and disbursement to the
President.
ANRC (precursor of PNRC) is considered a federal instrumentality
immunity from state taxation, subjected to governmental supervision &
regular financial audit, principal officer appointed by the President but
remains an independent, volunteer-led org. No basis to assume that it
cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out mission as a
National Red Cross Society. Separatists & insurgents do not consider
them as the enemy but as the entity to turn to in the event of injury.
Considering that PNRC is a GOCC, its charter does not violate the
constitutional provision (Sec. 16, Art. XII).

To declare Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter (creation and incorporation of the org)
invalid and the rest valid is to reach an absurd situation in w/c
obligations are imposed on and a framework for its operation is laid
down for a legally non-existing entity. Sec. 2-17 of RA 95 are not
separable from Sec. 1 cannot stand independently no separability
clause.
Presumption of constitutionality of law is presumed. There is no clear
showing that the PNRC Charter runs counter to the consti. All reasonable
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the statute.
Deleterious effects will result if PNRC is declared a private corporation
employees will no longer be covered by the GSIS; it can no longer be
extended tax exemptions and official immunity; and cannot anymore be
given support, financial or otherwise, by the National Govt, LGUs, and
PCSO. The Court must not arbitrarily declare a law unconstitutional just
to save a single individual from unavoidable consequences of his
transgression of the Consti even if done in good faith.
Sen. Gordons continuous occupancy of 2 incompatible positions is a
clear violation of the Consti (Sec. 13, Art. VI). The language in the
provision is unambiguous; requires no in-depth construction. A position
held in an ex officio capacity (a second post held by virtue of the
functions of the first office) does not violate such constitutional
proscription. The chairmanship of the PNRC Board is not held in an ex
officio capacity by a member of Congress.
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