MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS vs.

HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA

This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, declaring
Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made permanent. No
pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA
Judge
1

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein
petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.
2

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN
ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE
CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
3

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537
4
prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or
occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of
foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid
monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less
than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.
5

On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and
restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null
and void.
6

In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory
and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed
P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any
standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal
delegation of legislative powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to
life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
7

On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment
declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.
8

Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969.
Petitioner assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968:
9

I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO.
6537 VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE
NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE
NO. 6537 VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on
uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance
No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure
in nature.
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature
has no merit. While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor
involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment
permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not
regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for
employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in
situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien
whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held
that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action,
expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks
standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such
ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
10

In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board,
11
where a law granted a government agency power to determine
the allocation of wheat flour among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it
vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be
measured or controlled.
It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso
12
that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon
the Mayor of Manila by the Revised Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the
limits of the law.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the
power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that
the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
13

The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.





















RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes) vs.THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief
Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words
which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion This cause, in every point of view in
which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws,
the rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to
be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce the facts and the issues,
next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American
Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to
be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of
the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-Christian people of
Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this
province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one place in order to make a permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most
convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable
Secretary of the Interior, and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead
applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the Interior
of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21,
1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of
the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and
the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to
take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty
days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive order of the governor of
the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well
as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to
be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so
detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to
take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the
provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved
by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with
the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-five of this
Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not
exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical tree of this section, if we may
be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of
various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be disclosed, is also found in
varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the
policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set
down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the
legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the
following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560.
In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of
1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in order that they may
forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized
manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the
attainment of these purposes. To carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met
at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one
thousand five hundred and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God an our Kingdom. At
these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated
from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein
they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are
obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different
orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and moderation the
concentration of the indios intoreducciones; and to deal with their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without
causing inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the
protection of those already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be
not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the greater part of our
Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and
the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains,
ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live stock that they
may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived
of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no change shall be made
in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and
profit therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove thepueblos or
the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal
district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests, or indios request such a change or consent to it by
offering or giving information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those
of the indios, we hereby order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same reduccion; if there be
more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be a big one,
there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less
than forty, there should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the
presence of the priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589.
Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this law and the one
following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live to live in the reduccionesand towns and
towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with the indios are
men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the
wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides
maltreating them and utilizing their services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their
blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above-
mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, presidents, governors, and courts take great
care in executing the law within their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest.
As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them,
and who are to inherit their houses andhaciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it appearing to be a harsh thing to
separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of the less advanced
inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an integral part of a nation
should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to humanity for all
governments to civilize those backward races that might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance,
lack of all the nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns
under the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation of the non-Christian
races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of depredations, precisely
in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the representative of the Government of the, metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most important question, and
that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers who have even
sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the
means and the preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have
the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving
and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into account the prestige
which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and obedience to the
national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving
the most careful study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and
material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics,
and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the unanimous conformity of the meeting held
with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans,
Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so
indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a practical manner for the
submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the common law, save
those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, and of the
necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races which may be divided into three classes; one,
which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another, made up of
those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and
rebellious pagans shall be published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the
provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall
have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their compliance, they must be observed in
the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the means which their zeal
may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued, and shall
adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of
courts and schools, and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative
organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning
of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the remaining towns of the archipelago, with
the only exception that in the first two years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those
previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants
thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be
fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest;
and, in either of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force composed precisely of
native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based upon that of the
abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and duties affecting them
and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products thereof, with the only
exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers,
and with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction
with the rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious indiosshall be fixed; and
whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact
along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains igorrots the following
advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession of good lands
and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year,
and clothes upon effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to
natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of
missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them security and trust them; the
purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from
thequintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who
elect such officials under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall, in return, have the
obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which place them in
communication with one another and with the Christians; provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual
residences, when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting
of families in a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding the peace,
protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from
now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall
proceed with the organization of the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall
have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors,
and implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be repeated twice a year,
and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones
where such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other subordinates to my authorities, local
authorities, and other subordinates to may authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid
and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern part of the
Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council or permanent
commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations that
may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in brining about due compliance
with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de
Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp. 128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best method for dealing with the
primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the Philippines was President
McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill,
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional
legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in
permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government and under which
many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or
unwilling to conform. Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of
section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the
organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine
Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusi ve
jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known
as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine
Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth
district to be composed of the Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory which, at the
time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The
law establish a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public
affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the territory not inhabited by Moros or other
non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or
other non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most
notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act no. 83, the
Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and
government of the Moro Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government
Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger; and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of
the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of
1916 an d1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387,
sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of
Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua
(Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES
IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their
designations and badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus
prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-
seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the townships and settlements of
Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further authorized, when he
deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation on
sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to
comply with such directions shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire the knowledge and
experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall be exercised
to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to
make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act
Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by
the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby expedited in
accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of laws,'
passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 and 1397. The last named Act
incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of
1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions.
These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference
to the methods to be followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to be found in section 7 of the
Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission,
establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705
of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned
Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of
the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076,
2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos.
2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576,
Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to it a religious signification.
Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the
Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and
certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and
Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898,
vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions of many laws. Thus,
according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth
senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again,
adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian
tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of this article, preceding section
2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the
Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has
never seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the
Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of who are Christians and some of whom are
not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise inadquate. The reason it that the
motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but
the whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the term. "The so-called non-
Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction,
recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the
'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third
session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future political status of the
Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior
of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated by reference to legislative,
judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of
the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic
investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing
about their advancement in civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29,
Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning
the husband who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or
members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites prescribed by General
Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order
of intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating
circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been called upon to interpret and enforce the
law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians
and who had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official
addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received
recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally non-Christian but have
recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396
and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not advanced far in civilization,
to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of
the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one
most satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular
religious belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought under the
Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the person baptized has
attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the member of so-
called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction of regularly organized
municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to which they
have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion above expressed and
who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the Provincial
Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better classification has as yet
been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same meaning as the
expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of
civilization rather than of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the
law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal Revenue. The question arose
for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was
requested on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This
Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated
June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of
Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of Christian
worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all
persons preserving tribal relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all
others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or
towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form of religious
worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is
living in a civilized manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this
question has not come up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a
non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila
claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, however,
continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians, Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large
proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs
and other s are quite widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also
exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office in all parts of these
Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their tribal
relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by the Secretary of Finance
and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes due from members of
non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming members of the body
politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings
thereunder is hereby published for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they do not profess
Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is
concerned . . .
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs whatever tribal
relations he may have had and attaches himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby
makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other members of that community and from and after the
date when he so attaches himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other
members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to
persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the expiration of such period, and a
regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to
pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man is subject to the
regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or
failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in
civilization and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados"
and "Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal
Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of
advancement and so forth are practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina
tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio
Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of
Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-
General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these:
"Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit
an infraction of the law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of
Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is probable that the person in question remains a
non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make themselves liable to
prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon
the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the Administrative code
which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all non-Christian
inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized
members of the non-Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the mountains,
beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes
as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized life, did not
intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulti es
which later would be occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and
2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because this is the
evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as
making distinctions base the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of
non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the
Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the
classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and
Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-division under
the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the
terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials, specifically, join in the
proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903 divided them into four
classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this
word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain inhabitants of
Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its
employed in three Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In
Pampango this ending still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by the modern invaders, in
whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in
civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have
shown no desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization
to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I,
pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the Indian
Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is
said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian
tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state of pupilage." The recognized
relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the
Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority
of the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819
"for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act
avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this
object by civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is
herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position
of the Indians in the United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since the Revolution, to the
people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians who were found here,
the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the Indians a possessory
right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title
in the land itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the
consent of this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United
States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this could be done. The United States
recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians
themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-
independent position when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of the fall
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus
far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation. The are communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their
political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by
Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government over these
remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else,
because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied,
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was whether the status of the
Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands
notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendent
charged with guarding their interests and founds that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish dominion, the Indians of
the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the
alienation of their property." And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to
regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care
and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the courts to overrule the judgment
of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the
judicial department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S.vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278;
U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall,
616; Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomasvs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553;
Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286;
U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United
States sets apart any public land as an Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may
be necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of
United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against
Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians.
The petition alleged in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and completely severed their tribal
relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their
own exertions, and without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being
guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent,
George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with, the
Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory
had departed therefrom without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the
General of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their tribe in the Indian
Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus. The second question, of
much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being
returned to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the
policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed
for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, confer
upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful
authority . . . Whether such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not , need not
be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld."
The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a
writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined or in custody
under color of authority of the United States or where he is restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of
the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the Platte, has the custody
of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore.
3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory, as the respondent has
been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white race, and have the
inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on
forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws thereof, the relators
must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine that Rubi, the Manguian
petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of theHabeas Corpus Act, and as such,
entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even admitting similarity of
facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of
the country and placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so
located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson
can be drawn form the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive
branches of the government and that when once so decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
governmental system. Perhaps, just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the different
Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power to provincial authorities. In
so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously protected, we agree. An
understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not bee violated in his instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of
case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton
County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments
of subordinate official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead
[1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 21454 of the Administrative
Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the
Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary of the Interior to approve
the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and
affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall,
under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the
management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a
good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad
enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is
not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised.
In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department." (See also as corroborative authority,
it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204 U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general rule. sanctioned by
immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine
Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial
board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to
judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of
the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to
provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown clients, says that "The
statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it
provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law "constitutes an attempt
by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature must be understood to mean what it has
plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated
this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued
meaning given to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to
what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to natives of the Philippines
Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between
individuals an account of religious differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine
Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality." (Yick Wo vs.Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian
as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession of like liberty by every
other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. That
authorized licentiousness that trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the
savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more
restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is protected from injury. (II
Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being forced to do what one ought not do desire.
(Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac according to one's own will. It is only freedom
from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other
basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto
himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a
principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may
asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government especially of any
free government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that
in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by
reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905]
197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the
individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized community, consistently with the
peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been
endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of
authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free
to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out these
purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's
employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done by free men. (There can
be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S.,
274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man
must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the
common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without restraint, deprive other citizens of
rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be
restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police
power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs.Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the course of the argument in
the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of
"due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities under the protection of the general
rules which govern society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to
the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither
is due process a stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by
age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and
preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law." (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S.,
516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state
or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due
process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody
[1909], 212 U. S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute which is applicable to all of a
class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United States Constitution particularly
as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary
servitude exist except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the
Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine.
However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of
the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their
corollary, peonage, all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203 U.S., 1.)
The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter
under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom. Next must come a description
of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is the farreaching scope of the
power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not
interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the
'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by
the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of
the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right
of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the
promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the
Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental
principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding whether any constitutional
provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature in enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered,
assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian
people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the
public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection, the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior
on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that creditable
progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging
reaction by the boys to the work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest
after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour
and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the period of less than one year since the
beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be expected. But the
Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the
influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them into political communities and to
educate their children with the object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit them to live a
wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit
crimes and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to
abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian people, has adopted as the
polaris of his administration "the advancement of the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with
the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to leave their wild habitat
and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions inhabited by the non-
Christian people.
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their development and the extention of
government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to promote social and
commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and
Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian people. These people
are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the benefits of
civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and
settle in organized settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize
them politically into fixed and per manent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid
them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children, and show them the
advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the purposes and
objectives of the Government of leading them to economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more
highly civilized inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote
their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404,
2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-
Christian people in the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and liberty in favor of the
region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and complete
manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political development of those regions, always having in view the aim of
rendering permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements
populating the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering
care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for
the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here, we have on the Island of
Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways
of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than
into a reservation was to gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in
fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the bells." The same idea adapted
to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it
required, if they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some
cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the
manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the axiom is not precisely accurate.
The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers.
True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But
just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the
State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the
executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory
men, or they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these
penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources
of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to guarantee peace and
order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not
conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of
overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes) are engaged in the
works of destruction burning and destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to
the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of
liberty they wish to preserve and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to
the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected
to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice liberty in a rightful way.
They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will going from one place to another in the mountains, burning
and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they are being deprived
thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law' apply to a
class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to what liberty is. It will
mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and advancement of
the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state
of savagery without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the alternative of either
letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in accord
with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the education and
civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the
Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day which is not far distant when they will become
useful citizens. In the light of what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the
backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests
would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the Government to lead this people
in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the
claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without recourse to pursue the
works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and become a
vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught and guided to
improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object of the government is to organize them
politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated
in a school especially established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in
civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or
put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody but for themselves. There is,
therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under penalty of imprisonment.
Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have
permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire
space where they are roving about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering
from one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a
certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire territory? This measure is
necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will
always long to return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make
them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases. Could be not, however, be
kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat.
at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law
provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and followed
time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people confined as in a prison at the
mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be
that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or not motive to oppress these people; on
the contrary, the presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and
patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of removal in the hands of superior
officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. When, however, only the validity of the law is generally
challenged and no particular case of oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should not
unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and liberties of the individual members
of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government from
the beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the
peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders
imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities of the class attempted to be
benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen,
this is, and for a along time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and political theory, are of the
past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts
unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its
rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists
a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike
to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the determination that section
2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with
which we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee writes:
We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new question that comes before the
courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or
line of cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to tip the
scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But
public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must
be made from time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has been in vain, if we fail to
realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify
the people of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law,
all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated,
and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to
benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as
we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a coordinate branch, be
exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political
ideas are the moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional
law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the
many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a view to upholding the law, with
a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy, and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and
bigoted sense, but with that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other
departments of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty
without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in
accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145
of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United
States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue. This is the true
ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners. So ordered.



ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates in the synchronized elections of
May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth Legislative District.
Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.
During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by respondent Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San Quintin on the ground that
it contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities were included in the canvass. On May
21, 1992, the PBC rules against the objection of private respondent.
1
From the said ruling, private respondent Micu appealed to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as SPC No. 92-208.
On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution which reads:
Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the Commission en banc tabulated the votes obtained by
candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of Sangguniang Panlalawigan member
of the province of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement of votes by precinct submitted by the
municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said examination, the Commission rules, as follows:
1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the municipality of
San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu
obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.
Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in favor of
petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with 1,055 votes in the
municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan.
2

Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was completed on May 20, 1992, private
respondent Micu together with the Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with the PBC petitions for
correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors committed in the computation thereof.
In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was alleged to have become final, the
PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and private respondent the votes for each as indicated in the said
resolution and on the basis of the COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities, petitioner had a total of 27,370 votes
while the private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not, however, proclaimed winner
because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC.
Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.
On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order
3
directing the PBC "to reconvene, continue with the
provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of Pangasinan, and other
candidates for provincial offices who have not been proclaimed
4
as of that date.
In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of Tayug and San Manuel filed by
private respondent and the MBCs of the said municipalities, rules "to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities
of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass and on the basis of the
corrected documents, the Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the winning candidate.
5

On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the correction alleging that the PBC had no jurisdiction
to entertain the petition. The appeal was docketed as SPC No. 92-384.
On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion for the issuance of an order directing the PBC
to reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He alleged that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 on June 29, 1992
affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an urgent petition to cite Atty. Felimon Asperin
and Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for Contempt with alternative prayer for proclamation as
winner and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking a "definitive ruling and a clear
directive or order as to who of the two (2) contending parties should be proclaimed"
6
averring that "there were corrections already
made in a separate sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan
which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation, candidate Emiliano will win by 72 votes. On the
other hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote.
7
On even date, the
COMELEC promulgated its resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of the
municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the
basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules and
guidelines on canvassing and proclamation.
8

As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon Asperin dissenting, proclaimed
candidate Bince as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pangasinan. Assailing the proclamation of Bince,
private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and Amended Urgent Petition for
Contempt and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the PBC defied the directive of the COMELEC
in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution on July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of
which reads:
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:
1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr, respectively, of
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not be declared in contempt of
defying and disobeying the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July 1992, directing them to RECOVENE
immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winning
candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected
Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the corrected Certificated of Canvass of the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan;
2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers (dissented by
Chairman Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;
3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim the winning candidate for
the second position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and
corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all the municipalities in the
6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with law.
9

Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court seeking to set aside the foregoing resolution of the
COMELEC, contending that the same was promulgated without prior notice and hearing with respect to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No.
92-384. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 106291.
On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc
10
granted the petition ratiocinating that:
Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the petitioner's
proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due process. Moreover,
there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel to warrant the
annullment of the petitioner's proclamation.
1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position of the second
elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth Legislative District.
Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the majority of the PBC to
proclaim the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution of respondent COMELEC which
does not expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug and San Manuel; since, as of that time, the only
corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin, which was made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority
of the PBC cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the 9 July 1992 Resolution (Rollo, p. 51) merely directed it:
(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as
corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the 6th District
of Pangasinan;
(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6th District of
Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in
accordance with the law, the rules and guideline on canvassing and proclamation. (Emphasis
supplied)
The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could only refer to the
nine 99) COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for which was completed on 21 May 1992, and that of San
Quintin, respectively. Verily, the above resolution is vague and ambiguous.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is notproperty under
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire a vested
right to public office (CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is, nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J.,
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925]
and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432 [1924]). Due process in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC,
exercising its quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC
possesses, in appropriate cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate (Section 248,
Omnibus Election Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3
March 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988) andGallardo vs. Commission on
Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent COMELEC as a Special Case
(SPC) because its ruling therein was made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. Special Cases
under the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the pre-proclamation controversies (Rule 27 in relation to
Section 4(h)l Rule 1, and Section 4, Rule 7). We have categorically declared in Sarmiento vs. Commission on
Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and companion cases, 6 August 1992) that pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the
1987 Constitution, . . . the commission en banc does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation
cases at the first instance. Such cases should first be referred to a division
Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid to annul the proclamation;
consequently, its 29 July 1992 Resolution is motion is null and void. For this reason too, the COMELEC en
banc Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-2()8 resolving the private respondent's appeal from the ruling of the
PBC with respect to the COC of San Quintin is similarly void.
2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid corrected Statements of Votes
and Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to such would be clearly unfounded.
While it may be true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on simultaneous petitions to correct the SOVs and COCs
for Tayug and San Manuel ordered the MBCs for these two (2) municipalities to make the appropriate corrections
in the said SOVs and their corresponding COCs, none of said Boards convened to the members of actually
implement the order. Such failure could have been due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner to
the COMELEC or the fact that said members simply chose not to act thereon. As already adverted to the so-called
"corrected" Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass consist of sheets of paper signed by the respective
Election Registrars of Tayug (Annex "F-l" of Comment of private respondent; Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of
petitioner) and San Manuel (Annex "F-2, Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not valid corrections because the Election
Registrars, as Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their Section 225 of the respective Board.
Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A] majority vote of all the members of the
board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That majority means at least two (2) of the three (3)
members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that
the "municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the election registrar or a representative of the
Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-chairman, and the most senior district school supervisor
or in his absence a principal of the school district or the elementary school, as members"). As to why the Election
Registrars, in their capacities as Chairmen, were 7th only ones who prepared the so-called correction sheets, is
beyond Us. There is no showing that the other members of the Boards were no longer available. Since they are
from the Province of Pangasinan, they could have been easily summoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect
the corrections on the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass.
Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered as the corrected SOVs and COCs.
Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of Canvass could only be accomplished either by inserting the
authorized corrections into the SOV and COC which were originally prepared and submitted by the MBC or by
preparing a new SOV and COC incorporating therein the authorized corrections. Thus, the statement in the 29 July
1992 Resolution of the COMELEC referring to "the Certificates of Canvass of the municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Tayug and San Manuel" (Last clause, paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion, Annex "A" of Petition: Rollo 15), is
palpably unfounded. The Commission could have 7 been misled by Atty. Asperin's ambiguous reference to
"corrections already made in separate sheets of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificate of Canvass of
Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan" (Quoted in the Resolution of 9 July 1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking the
COMELEC to rule on who shall be proclaimed. However, if it only took the trouble to carefully examine what was
held out to be as the corrected documents, respondent COMELEC should not have been misled.
Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets of paper constitute sufficient corrections,
they are, nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the time the Election Registrars prepared them on 6 July 1992
respondent COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's appeal (SPC No. 92-384) from the 24 June 1992
ruling of the PBC authorizing the corrections. Petitioner maintains that until now, his appeal has not been resolved.
The public respondent, on the other hand, through the Office of the Solicitor General, claims that the same had
been:
. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmed respondents
(sic) Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayug and 2,179 in San
Manuel (see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition) (Rollo, p. 71)
On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:
This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewise deemed
affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra and Comelecen banc Resolution
No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992 (Id., 36);
If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July 1992 that SPC
No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently, the so-called "correction sheets" were still prematurely prepared. In any
event, the COMELEC could not have validly ruled on such appeal in its 29 July 1992 Resolution because the same
was promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion For Contempt and to Annul Proclamation filed by the private
respondent. Furthermore, before the resolution of SPC No. 92-384 on the abovementioned date, no hearing was
set or conducted to resolve the pending motion. Therefore, on this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution,
even if it was meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent nullity for having been issued in gross violation of the
requirement of notice and hearing mandated by Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section
18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and for having been resolved by
the COMELEC en banc at the first instance. The case should have been referred first to a division pursuant to
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections. Moreover,
the COMELEC's claim that the questioned resolution affirmed the correction made by the Board is totally baseless.
The PBC did not make any corrections. It merely ordered the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San
Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated, however, the said MBCs did not convene to make these
corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who signed the sheets of paper purporting to be corrections.
For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, private respondent
COMELEC private respondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph of Section 16 of R.A. No. 7166,
and the consequent affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the number of votes, must
necessarily fail.
The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on, 13 August 1992 by the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections of 29 July 1992 and the proclamation of the private respondent on 13 August 1992 as the second
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan, representing its Sixth Legislative District
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent Commission on Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending incidents
conformably with the foregoing disquisitions and pronouncements.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
11

On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC praying that the latter hear
and resolve the pending incidents referred to by this Court. Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC No. 92-208 and SPC
No. 92-384, both cases left unresolved by the COMELEC.
Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993. During the hearing, both Micu and
Bince orally manifested the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Also withdrawn were the petitions to disqualify Atty. Asperin and
to cite the Board for contempt. The parties agreed to file their respective memoranda/position papers by March 15, 1993.
Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No. 92-208 affirmed the ruling of the
PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it were not withdrawn, Section 16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to terminate the appeal.
Bince likewise asserts that his appeal in SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in view of this Court's ruling nullifying the June
24, 1992 order of the PBC granting the petitions for correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel aside from being
superseded by the PBC ruling proclaiming him on July 21, 1992.
On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his Position Paper filed on March 15, 1993 postulated that the petitions filed on June
11, 1992 for the correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, as well as the ruling of the PBC of June 24, 1992 granting the same were valid so that the withdrawal of Bince's appeal in
SPC No. 92-384 firmly affirmed the PBC ruling of June 24, 1992 allowing the corrections.
On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Commission (First Division) holds that the petitioner Alfonso C.
Bince Jr. is entitled to sit as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sixth District of Pangasinan.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the proclamation of
petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan on 21 July 1992 as the duly
elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth District of the Province of Pangasinan.
12

On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution.
On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls motion for reconsideration in a resolution which
dispositively reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano S. Micu is
granted. The Resolution of the Commission First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The proclamation of petitioner
Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July 21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers
is hereby directed to reconvene, with proper notices, and to order the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San
Manuel and Tayug to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in the said municipalities. Thereafter,
the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to include the results in the said municipalities in its canvass.
The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth
Legislative District of Pangasinan.
SO ORDERED.
13

This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.
We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner.
Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of petitioner
Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
Tayug and San Manuel to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said municipalities and to proclaim the winner in
the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.
At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when it resolved the "pending
incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case of Bince, Jr. v.COMELEC on February 9, 1993
Petitioner's contention that his proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the aforesaid case is baseless.
In Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done without the requisite due notice and
hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In so doing, however, we did not affirm nor confirm the
proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive to respondent COMELEC to resolve the pending incidents of the case so as to
ascertain the true and lawful winner of the said elections. In effect, petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of
regularity and validity of an official act. It was not categorically declared valid.
Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a mathematical
error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both petitioner and private
respondent.
The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992. The
petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5, 1992. Still,
private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June 11, 1992, respectively,
definitely well within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Section 6 clearly
provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before proclamation of a winner, thus:
Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of canvassers. (a) Where it is clearly
shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of election returns,
or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns of one precinct or two
or more copies of a certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2) two copies of the election returns or
certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had been a mistake in the adding or copying of the
figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement of votes, or (4) so-called election returns from non-
existent precincts were included in the canvass, the board may, motu propio, or upon verified petition by any
candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the
errors committed.
(b) The order for correction must be in writing and must be promulgated.
(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said order may appeal
therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the promulgation.
(d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning candidates, unless their votes
are not affected by the appeal.
(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all parties who may be adversely affected thereby.
(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons, together with a copy of
the appeal, to the respondents.
(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.
(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).
The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of
validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will cannot be countenanced. In Benito
v. COMELEC,
14
categorically declared that:
. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently observed by this
Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes vs. Commission on Elections (178
SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also
settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical
objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni
v. Sarcon, G.R. No.
L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalanang, G.R. No.
L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27,
1967). In an election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512,
December 29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Emphasis ours)
In the later case of Rodriguez vs. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was reiterated and the
Court went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the
free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the
results, This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).
The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws should not
frustrate the determination of the popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of what are purely mathematical
and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes;
neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private respondent and respondent
MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakesin mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere
clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors
sought to be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan.
In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should only have been 2,415.
Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV reflected the total number
of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually
received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes.
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in theSangguniang Panlalawigan of
the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore flawed from the
beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation.
As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such as the one at issue
should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers'
money, if they can be settled below without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.






















PEOPLE VS SANCHEZ
. . . a plot seemingly hatched in hell . . .
This was how Judge Harriet O. Demetriou
[1]
of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, in her 132-page Decision dated
March 11, 1995 now before us on review, emphatically described the Allan Gomez-Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay that drew strong
condemnation from an outraged populace in the middle of 1993. After a protracted and grueling 16-month trial, she found all those
charged therewith, namely: Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez (hereafter the Mayor), George Medialdea, Luis and Rogelio Corcolon,
Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit (appellants herein), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide
on seven counts and sentenced each one of them:
. . . to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the seven offenses or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for
each accused. In addition, the Court hereby orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims respective families the
following sums by way of civil indemnity:
1. the sum of P3,432,650.00 representing the actual damages sustained by the Sarmenta family;
2. the sum of P3,484,000.00 representing the actual damages sustained by the Gomez family;
3. the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by the Sarmenta family;
4. the sum of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by the Gomez family;
5. the sum of P191,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses incurred by the Gomez family; and
6. the sum of P164,250.00 for litigation expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family.
As to the antecedents, appellants all appear to agree that the trial court, in the very words of counsel
[2]
who prepared the
consolidated brief for the Mayor and Medialdea, made a very detailed summary of both the prosecution and defense
evidence.
[3]
This Court can thus conveniently provide a briefer but fairly accurate account of the respective versions of the State and
the defense on the basis of the trial courts summary, rather than combing the heap of evidence presented by both sides.
The prosecutions version of the events on that horrible night of June 28, 1993 was based mainly on the recollections of its star
witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan (a member of appellant Sanchez security team) co-conspirators turned state
witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in the abduction of Eileen and Allan, but denied any personal involvement in the rape of
Eileen and the twin killings that followed. Heres their story.
Medialdea (then the Deputy Chief of the PNP Calauan), together with Centeno who was driving an ambulance, fetched witness
Malabanan at his residence in the early morning of June 28, 1993 on the pretext that they will apprehend one Rodolfo Calva alias
Tisoy a notorious gun runner and drug pusher in the locality. Next to be picked up was Ama in Barangay Masiit, then Luis
Corcolon (hereafter, Luis) in Barangay Mabacan. On board the ambulance, the five (5) men made stopovers in Barangays Imok and
Wawa until they headed back for Calauan at past 7:00 oclock in the evening, upon orders of Luis.
At the Shell gas station in the poblacion of Calauan, the five (5) men met and picked up Rogelio Corcolon (hereafter, Boy), Kawit
and Brion, then they proceeded to Los Baos. Along the way, Luis announced to the group that the real purpose behind the Los
Baos trip is to take a pretty young lass long desired by the Mayor and offer her to him as a gift. Luis, to satisfy his companions
curiosity, even guaranteed that her beauty will make their saliva drip.
Not for long, the ambulance arrived at the U.P. Los Baos grounds. Witness Centeno drove the ambulance around the campus
at a snails pace while Luis scoured the area with watchful eyes. As the search inside the campus proved fruitless, Luis then ordered
Centeno to slowly drive out of the university compound and to stop upon reaching the vicinity of the Agrix complex. Luis, Boy, Ama,
Brion and Kawit alighted from the ambulance and went inside the Agrix complex. Witness Centeno overheard Medialdea informing
the Boss, via the radio, that they were already in the area. The Boss was the Mayor.
Inside the Agrix complex is a restaurant called Caf Amalia. Parked in front of that establishment was a Tamaraw van. Eileen
and Allan were its passengers, both occupying the front seats. She was wearing a T-shirt, white shorts and rubber shoes. Armed
with guns, Luis and Boy approached Eileen and Allan, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the back of the van. All the
appellants boarded the van while Centeno and Malabanan stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm
situated in Barangay Curba, owned by the Mayor.
As soon as the group arrived at the farm, the two (2) captives were brought down the van. Eileen was gagged by a
handkerchief and her hands, like Allan, were tied. A white towel was wound around Allans mouth. The Mayor, then wearing a
jogging attire, emerged from the resthouse and asked the group: My children, whats the problem? To this Luis respondent:
Mayor, this is our gift to you, the girl youve been longing for. Shes really beautiful. But whos that man? asked the
Mayor. Eileens companion, boss. Medialdea replied. We brought him along to avoid complications, he continued.
The two youngsters were then brought inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly
beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. Kawit followed-up by striking Allans
diaphragm with the butt of an armalite, causing Allan to fall against a cement box. Brion thought Allan was already dead, but Kawit
said: :His death will come later.
Meanwhile, Centeno, while waiting for further orders, joined the Mayors personal aides Edwin Cosico and Raul Alorico watch
television at the adjacent resthouse. Alorico told Centeno that the Mayor had been eagerly waiting for the group and worried that
they will not arrive.
At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea her hair
disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her shorts. The Mayor, clad merely in white polo,
appeared and thanked Luis and Medialdea for the gift. I am through with her. Shes all yours, the Mayor uttered in
contentment. When asked what will happen to Allan, Medialdea assured the Mayor that they will also kill him for full
measure. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by the appellants and headed for Calauan, followed closely by the
ambulance.
En route to Calauan, Centeno, who was driving the ambulance, noticed the van swaying from side to side. Then he heard
gunfire coming therefrom. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already drenched in blood, out of
the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a single gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away.
The next destination was a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan. It was here that Luis
announced that its tiime for the group to feast on Eileen (the exact words of Luis were Turbohin na rin natin ang tinurbo ni
Boss). She was laid at the back of the van, with her hands and legs being held by the appellants while waiting for their turn. Then
the gang-rape began. The first to ravish Eileen was Luis, then Medialdea, Boy, Ama, Brion and finally, Kawit. Bewailing the
helplessness of her situation, Eileen pleaded, in between sobs and whimpers, for the torture to stop. However, her tears for
compassion fell, weak and ineffective, upon the insensitive brutes. Kawit invited Centeno to join the sexual fiasco but the latter
refused as he cannot, in conscience, bear the bestiality being committed on Eileen who appeared to be dead. After Kawits turn,
Eileen knelt on the seat of the van and begged for her life. Unmoved, Luis muted Eileens cried by forcing an object into her mouth
and then fired his baby armalite at her. Centeno was thereafter ordered to get rid of Eileens dead body. Moments later, all eight
(8) men boarded the ambulance and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens remains behind. Along the way,
Centeno and Malabanan watched in dismay as Luis, Boy, Medialdea, Ama, Brion and Kawit savored the nights escapade, to
their sickening delight. Appellants and Malabanan were then brought to their respective homes by Centeno.
June 29, 1993 and the day following were tense moments for the group. In the morning of June 29, Medialdea and Centeno
fetched Malabanan, Luis and Ama. They were going to Barangay Imok to make it appear that they were conducting some police
operations in that area. Upon reaching Barangay Imok, the group saw Allans body which they dumped a few hours earlier. Luis,
Medialdea and Malabanan alighted from the ambulance, whereupon Luis ordered Centeno to drive back to the municipal hall.
Boy Corcolon, who was at the municipal hall, informed Ama that a dead female loaded inside a Tamaraw van was found in
Barangay Mabacan. Ama then radioed the PNP Chief of Calauan, Major Cao, who at that time was summoned by the
Mayor. Major Cano thereafter arrived and ordered one SPO2 Melencio Nuez to investigate the matter. Meanwhile, Centeno
received word that he was to fetch Malabanan, Luis and Medialdea in Barangay Imok. After picking up the three (3), Centeno drove
the ambulance to Barangay Mabacan where the dead Eileen was found.
Eileens body lying inside the Tamaraw van was a pitiful sight. Her face bore a gunshot wound; a handkerchief was stuffed in
her mouth; her T-shirt was rolled up revealing her breasts; and her panty was rolled down on one of her feet still with rubber shoes
on. Medialdea covered Eileens exposed private parts by fixing her T-shirt and underwear and by placing a sackcloth over her lower
body. The group then escorted the van with Eileens body in it, to the UP Los Baos police station where student milled around and
identified the cadaver to be Eileen indeed. Later on, the van carrying Eileen, as well as Allans body, was brought to the Calauan
municipal hall. There, Centeno saw a prisoner named Arnold cleaning the van.
Meanwhile, Malabanan, Ama and Medialdea, on June 29, went to the site (Bgy. Imok) where Allans body was found, started
asking residents about the incident and were able to retrieve an empty armalite shell. Malabanan thereafter handed the empty
shell to Major Cao at the police station. The three (3) men and one SPO3 Rizaldy Belen, sometime in the afternoon of the same
day, visited the Mayor at his house in Bay, Laguna. Medialdea informed the Mayor of the presence of people from the CIS, NBI and
press in the locality. The Mayor flared up and blamed them for not using their heads. But he later on assured them that he could fix
the problem in less the amount of a brand new car.
The following day, June 30, Medialdea, upon the Mayors directive, handed a pair of white walking shorts to Major
Cao. When Malabanan asked Medialdea whose pair of shorts was that, the latter replied that it was the short of Eileen which the
Mayor wanted to be delivered to Major Cao.
That same day of June 30, Centeno went to see the Mayor at his house in Calauan about his worries over reports that the
driver of the ambulance involved in the rape-slay was being hunted down. The Mayor gave Centeno P2,000.00 and advised him to
keep silent or better yet, to go into hiding. Centeno did hide himself until CIS agents accosted him at the Divisoria market on August
10, 1993. As to Malabanan, he, Medialdea and Ama were brought to the PNP Sta. Cruz Command to shed light on the cleaning of
the Tamaraw van.
Coming now to the defense, each of the appellants had an alibi to tell and sought to put the blame on Kit Alqueza, the son of a
feared general (Dictador Alqueza) who earned the monicker Barako from the local residents.
The Mayor claimed that he was at the residence of his mistress Elvira in Bay, Laguna in the morning of June 28, 1993. They left
for Makati City at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon thereafter proceeded to San Pablo City at around 4:00 p.m., left that city at
7:30 p.m. and then returned to Elviras house in Bay at around 10:00 p.m. He and Elvira retired at around 12:30 in the morning. He
woke up at 5:00 a.m. Jogging was his favorite form of exercise, but foul whether prevented him from running that morning. His
three (3) children with Elvira greeted him at around 6:30 a.m. before heading for school. He took his breakfast and lunch at Elviras
house.
Medialdea, Ama and Malabanan arrived between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. and informed the Mayor of the rape-slay in which Kit
Alqueza was the prime suspect. This made the Mayor very angry, for which he ordered a thorough investigation of the incident to
avoid any whitewash. "I will not hesitate to have the perpetrators of this crime killed (by electric chair), whether a generals son in
involved or not, son of a bitch!, he blurted. The Mayor then advised appellants not to worry if they were really innocent and that
the primordial concern is that a full investigation be conducted.
The Mayor then went to his residence in Calauan. At around 4:00 p.m. of that same day (June 29), he sent his driver Mario
Puyales to Barangays Masiit and Balayhangin to inquire from the residents about the crime. Puyales returned at around 7:00 p.m.
and informed the Mayor that a card gambler was able to retrieve a pair of white shorts lying near the national highway in Barangay
Balayhangin. Puyales was sent back to that barangay to advise the residents thereof to keep the shorts at their fence near the
highway as it may later on aid the on-going investigation.
In the morning of June 30, 1993, the Mayor, with some companions, jogged towards the direction of Barangay Mabacan and at
the same time inquired from residents whether they noticed anything unusual on the night of June 28, 1993. A certain Mang Torio
told the Mayor that he found a pair of maong pants lying at the side of the road but left if there. After inspecting the dirty
maong pants, the Mayor instructed Mang Torio to keep the pants as the former will send someone back to pick it up.
Eventually, the Mayor got hold of the pairs of white shorts and maong pants. The shorts was clean, with complete beltloops
and without any tear. He then ordered his driver Puyales to send the articles to Medialdea for safekeeping. But during the trial, the
Mayor, when shown the shorts and pants, claimed that they are quite different from the articles he got hold of previously. The
maong pants shown to him by Mang Torio was of a darker shade of blue. As to the white shorts, it was the same pair he gave to
Medialdea, but now it is torn and has some missing beltloops.
Based on his own investigation, the Mayor came to know that Kit Alqueza is a feared and dangerous student of the university,
being a member of an elite fraternity in the campus and a generals son at that. The Mayor later informed Congressman Tingzon of
Kits probable involvement in the crime. Congressman Tingzon, in turn, disclosed that Kit, his nephew-in-law (the congressmans
wife is the sister of Gen. Alquezas wife), was hiding in his house and that the legislator will call Gen. Alqueza in Davao City to discuss
the matter.
The Mayor also testified that he closely coordinated with Major Cao in investigating the case. This included frequent evening
conferences with Malabanan, medialdea and Ama who were members of Major Caos investigation team.
Subsequently, the Mayor was requested to facilitate the surrender of Luis and Boy Corcolon to Camp Crame since the CIS
suspected them of being involved in the crime together with Kit. The Corcolon brothers, accompanied by the Mayor, peacefully
surrendered to CIS operatives in the afternoon of July 12, 1993.
On August 10, 1993, the Mayor received an anonymous phone call advising him that he would better leave the country
because he was to be arrested in three (3) days time. He refused to heed the advice because he had nothing to do with the
crime. And so he was apprehended on August 13, 1993 at his Calauan residence and brought to Camp Vicente Lim where he was
presented to the media. There he saw Centeno and Malabanan who did not greet him. General Salimbangon ordered the two (2)
witnesses to implicate the Mayor. The general then ordered that the Mayor be handcuffed as he is the rapist. You son of a bitch,
Salibangon. You framed me up, the Mayor cursed.
The Mayor denied having given Centeno advice and P2,000.00 pocket money on June 30, 1993. It was only in the courtroom
that he saw Centeno, although he knows the latter. The Mayor also denied Malabanans testimony implicating him in the crime. In
fact, Malabanan wrote him letters asking for his help. The trial court noted, however, that the letter adverted to by the Mayor were
all addressed to Judge Baldo.
Appellant Medialdea was Calauan policeman until his summary dismissal on September 10, 1993. He claimed that he, being a
member of a crack team formed by Major Cao and composed of Malabanan, Luis and Ama, was preoccupied the whole day of June
28, 1993 conducting police operations on board an ambulance in different barangays of the town in search of Tisoy. The frui tless
operations ended at about 9:00 p.m. of June 28. Driving the ambulance, he got home at around 10:30 p.m. where he saw his wife
playing mahjong with some friends. Medialdea joined the players for about an hour, then he slept until 5:00 a.m. of the next day
(June 29).
The crack team met again in the morning of June 29, 1993 to continue the manhunt for Tisoy. At around 7:15 a.m. in
Barangay Imok, they saw Tisoy speed by in a motorcycle. Medialdea and Luis fired shots in the air but Tisoy managed to
escape. Centeno was not present when this event transpired because he was instructed to go to the municipal hall with the
ambulance.
Upon hearing news over the radio that a dead body was found at Sitio Paputok, Km. 74, Barangay Mabacan, Medialdea radioed
Centeno to fetch the group at the fishpond of one Gani. As soon as Centeno arrived at around 8:00 a.m., they proceeded to Km. 74
where they saw Eileens body inside the van parked in the sugarcane field. Major Cao and several policemen were already
there. Medialdea had to pull down Eileens T-shirt and roll up her underwear to spare her from numerous kibitzers staring at her
naked body. He recovered several scattered items inside the van like cigarette packs, a paddle, spike shoes, and 5 bottles of
beer. The van was then driven by a certain Gener to the UP Los Baos escorted by the ambulance and Major Caos police car.
Thereafter, at around 9:30 a.m., Medialdea, on Major Caos directive, went to the Gomez residence and asked for Allan. The
maid told him that Allan has not come home since the night before and that she last saw him at around 6:30 p.m. with one Jet
Tejada. As there was no other person inside the house except the maid, Medialdea, with her permission, searched for Allan inside
but to no avail. Before leaving, he instructed the maid to tell Allan that he better make good his hiding because Allan is a suspect in
the crime. At the Tejada residence, Jet was neither there. So Medialdea proceeded to the boarding house of Eileen and instructed
the landlady to inform calmly Eileens parents on what had happened to their daughter.
Medialdea then returned to the UP Los Baos security force where he told Major Cao that Allan had escaped. Before leaving
UP campus to bring Eileens body to Calauan, Major Cao ordered Medialdea to still look for Allan. When his efforts to find Allan
inside the campus proved futile, Medialdea sought the aid of Barangay Captain Cesar Ruiz who brought him to the barangay hall
where Jet Tejada was. Tejada strongly objected to Medialdeas insinuation of his and Allans participation in the crime, saying that
they can never do anything as dastardly as that.
Afterwards, a certain Allan, a barangay tanod, volunteered that he knew Allan. This Allan opines that if Allan was dead
then Kit had a hand on it since Allan had earned Kits ire when the former began dating the latters girlfriend named
Rose. Medialdea informed Major Cao that Allan perhaps has gone to Manila with his father. The Major replied that Allan is here,
but is likewise dead.
Ama then informed Major Cao that they have a suspect named Kit who had an axe to grind against Allan. Then someone in
the crowd uttered Ako iyon. Kit approached and told Ama that he and Allan had patched up their differences three (3) months
ago. Medialdea noticed a drop of blood on the middle of Kits right thigh. Kit explained that the blood oozed after punching a wall
with his right knuckle.
At the municipal hall, Ama handed an empty armalite shell recovered from the site where Allans body was found. Thereafter,
Arnold (the prisoner who was cleaning the van) was seen carrying the rubber matting of the Tamaraw van to hang it over the
municipal fence to dry. Ama could not help but curse Arnold and ordered the latter to bring it back. Ama explained to Major Cao
that they could be dragged to the case just like what happened to the policeman in the Paraaque massacre who burned a
mosquito net and was thereafter sacked.
Medialdea also testified that it was Major Cao who ordered the cleaning of the van to diffuse the stench caused by the blood
stains therein.
Then on July 6, 1993, Medialdea, together with Ama and Malabanan, went to the PNP Sta. Cruz Command to answer queries
about the cleaning of the van. They were then brought to Canlubang where they executed their respective sworn
statements. Medialdea also recalled that Major Cao instructed them not to say anything about the cleaning of the
van. Afterwards, they were brought back to the PNP Sta. Cruz and detained therein pending the filing of formal charges against
them.
Major Cao visited Medialdea the next day, July 7. The major advised him that they should just point to Malabanan as the one
who cleaned the van. Medialdea did not heed his advice for he pitied Malabanan and besides, it was Major Cao who really ordered
its cleaning. The major then reiterated the reason why he caused its cleaning (the unbearable stench of blood).
Days later, on July 16, 1993, Medialdea and Ama, together with Malabanan, were brought to the Department of Justice where
Fiscal Abesamis asked them to sign a waiver of their detention. On July 24, 1993, the three (3) men were led back to PNP Canlubang
where Colonels Gualberto and Tiangco began investigating then on July 27, 1993. During the investigation, Medialdea was being
enticed by Col. Gualberto to cooperate with the government by testifying against the Mayor, as there is an order from the higher
echelon to bring the Mayor down. He refused, saying that the Mayor is completely innocent because he is pro-poor and the Mayor
even walks the church aisle on his knees. Col. Gualberto threatened that he will be dragged all the more to the case if he will not
cooperate. Medialdea begged for mercy and suggested that they should investigate Kit instead. The colonel said that messing up
with Kit is like ramming into a wall. Medialdea was then asked to sign a statement that contained inaccurate answers. The
inaccuracies were supplied by Col. Gualberto.
Medialdea also professed his ignorance before Col. Tiangco. This colonel was less diplomatic. He splashed coffee on
Medialdeas face, cursed him and whipped his face. So was Malabanan. The investigators would hit then when they try to
reason. Back to his cell, Medialdea heard Col. Tiangco order somebody to have him killed in the evening.
On August 13, 1993, one Colonel Versoza advised Medialdea to follow Malabanan in testifying against the Mayor. They will be
placed under the Witness Protection Program where they would be entitled to allowances, free housing facilities and the chance to
go abroad with their families where they can live peacefully, Col. Versoza assured them. Medialdea refused once again. Malabanan
therafter informed him that he and Centeno had already given false statements for they can no longer stand the torture inflicted on
them. But Medialdea stood pat with his refusal, for he cannot testify falsely against his companions just to free himself. It is still
better to live than to die a martyr, Malabanan answered.
We now to go appellant Luis Corcolons story which painted the Kit Alqueza angle in greater detail. In the morning of June
25, 1993, three (3) men went to Luis residence in Barangay Mabacan. They told Luis that their boss, Edgardo Lavadia alias Uod,
wanted to see him the next day. Lavadia is a very generous friend of Luis for so many years who, as a professional forger of checks,
is being protected by General Alqueza.
Luis arrived at Lavadias house at around 2:00 p.m. of June 26. There he saw Kit and Lavadias men. Lavadia requested him to
abduct and kill Allan because the latter has done something wrong to Kit. Luis asked what Allans fault was and then suggested that
if its just a small squabble, they better forgive Allan. Lavadia insisted, but Luis appeared hesitant since it might put him in big
trouble. Lavadia tempered his request by asking Luis to merely help in getting rid of the body. Luis agreed. He and Lavadia were to
meet again on June 28, 1993 in the Bay cockpit. After this, Luis left.
Luis was also a member of the team formed by Major Cao to hunt down Tisoy. At around 8:30 in the morning of June 28,
1993, he was fetched by Medialdea, Ama, Malabanan and proceeded to Barangay Imok on board the ambulance driven by Centeno
to apprehend Tisoy. At around 1:00 p.m., Luis left the group and went to Bay cockpit to meet Lavadia, as agreed upon the previous
day. When he arrived at the cockpit, only Lavadias men were there. Luis then asked one of the men to tell Lavadia that he is
backing out of the agreement. He first attended the derby being held at the cockpit before returning to Barangay Imok at around
5:00 p.m. and re-joined the team. They left Barangay Imok at around 7:30 p.m. and proceeded to Barangay Wawa, San Pablo City
where they stayed for about two (2) hours waiting for Tisoy. Sensing that Tisoy would not be passing by, the team headed back for
Calauan. Luis was driven home first and reached his house at around 9:30 p.m. A certain Ernesto Bustillo was waiting for him to
borrow his passenger jeepney. Thereafter, Luis slept at around 10:30 p.m.
At around 4:45 a.m. of the next day (June 29) while Luis was preparing the breakfast of his children, a Tamaraw van, driven by
Kit, stopped in front of his house honking its horn continuously. Four (4) motorcycle-riding men, each wearing bonnet masks and
maong jackets, escorted the van. Kit sought his help in burying at once the dead female body inside the van. Luis inspected the
van and saw a naked corpse of a woman. He refused Kits summons after which Luis immediately returned to his house, turned off
the lights and closed door for fear that Kits escorts would shoot him. The convoy then headed towards the direction of Sitio
Paputok, Km. 74.
At about 6:30 a.m., Luis, Centeno, Medialdea and Malabanan met and continued their surveillance of Tisoy at Barangay
Imok. They saw Tisoy pass by at around 7:10 a.m. but were not able to apprehend him. The group thereafter went to Ganis
fishpond at about 8:30 a.m. then proceeded to Km. 74 to verify reports of a females death. There they saw the Tamaraw van with a
dead woman inside. Luis recognized the vehicle as that driven by Kit hours earlier, but he kept silent. The group then brought the
van to the UP Los Baos campus.
In the morning if June 30, 1993, Luis met the Mayor. The latter instructed him to investigate on who dumped Eileens body at
Km. 74. Luis obliged and said that he will make a report within a week. He, however, did not tell the Mayor about Kits involvement
in the crime.
On July 7, 1993, CIS agents of Canlubang raided his house during his absence thereat. The agents, his wife said, planted a gun
inside. The next day, Luis read in the papers that a P100,000.00 reward has been offered for his and brother Boys capture. He
rushed to the Mayor who advised him to remain quiet.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, Luis went to Boys house upon being summoned by the Mayor who was with General Quizon
and Colonel Hilario. He and Boy were brought to Camp Crame for interview. After the interview, the CIS took their sworn
statements. The answers therein, Luis said, were furnished by the agents. He signed the statement out to fear without the
assistance of a lawyer of his own choice. For several days, he was investigated by PACC agents. Then on or July 20, 1993, he and
Boy were transferred to CIS Canlubang and were interrogated by Col. Tiangco who repeatedly manhandled and cursed him. Luis
insisted on his innocence and suggested that it is Kit who they should investigate. After the interview, Luis was tortured by way of
water treatment, denied of food and was not allowed to receive visitors. In the afternoon of June 28, 1993, Luis was brought before
the PACC where he was again manhandled during the 2-hour interrogation. He answered yes to all the questions hurled at him
because he was already dizzy. He was also informed that Lavadia had already executed a statement saying that the latter paid him.
On August 1, 1993 at the PACC-TFH office, General Quizon was forcing him to testify against the Mayor. He was also
interviewed by media afterwhich, he was brought back to his cell where he met Lavadia. He cursed and strangled Lavadia. Luis
suggested that they should now tell the truth about Kits involvement, but Lavadia advised him to remain silent because repri sal
from General Alqueza would be far worse. Luis was detained at the PACC until the start of the trial. He also filed a complaint for
torture before the Commission on Human Rights.
Boy Corcolon testified that he never left house on the night of June 28, 1993. He woke up at around 7:00 a.m. of the next day
and proceeded to the Calauan police station on his motorcycle upon being informed of the discovery of a dead female in sitio
Paputok, Km. 74. After going to the municipal building where he saw Ama, Major Cao and Judge Baldo, Boy followed Major Cao
and his men in going to Km. 74. There he saw the naked body of the dead woman inside the van. Boy thereafter followed the van to
the UP compound. Moments later, the van was brought to Calauan municipal hall compound. He did not stay in the municipal hall,
but went straight home instead.
The CIS agents raided his house on July 7, 1993. The next day, Boy read in the papers that he and his brother Luis were being
haunted down by the authorities and a P100,000.00 bounty is at stake for their capture. He rushed to the house of the Mayor to
inform the latter of the raid. The Mayor advised him to remain calm and to avoid being visible.
In the afternoon of July 12, 1993, he and Luis were fetched by General Quizon and Colonel Hilario at Luis residence and
thereafter brought to Camp Crame. At the camp, press people interviewed them after which they were led to a room for taking of
their respective sworn statements. Boy claimed that he was forced to give his statement after being kicked, slapped and cursed by
the investigators. He tried to correct portions of his statement but the investigating officer did not allow him. Boy and Luis were
detained at the camp until charges have been filed against them, for their refusal to cooperate with the CIS.
On July 20, 1993, the two (2) brother were brought to an uninhabited place near a hill in Barangay Paliparan where they were
made to stand in front of the military group consisting of Generals Quizon and Salimbangon, Colonel Gualberto and his men. Boy
and Luis were each asked to hold an armalite rifle, and then pictures were taken of them handing the rifles over to the generals.
The next day (June 21), they were brought to CIS Canlubang and stayed there until the start of the trial in September,
1993. Boy claimed he was subjected to electric shock and water treatment to make him confess his guilt.
Ama, also a member of the team involved in the Tisoy manhunt, related a similar story on the groups sorties in different
barangays on June 28, 1993. After the failed mission, Centeno dropped him off at his residence in Barangay Masiit at about 10:00
p.m. of the same day and did not leave the house until the next morning.
At around 6:15 a.m. of the next day (June 29), he was at Barangay Balayhangin to wait for Tisoy per Medialdeas
instruction. Minutes later, he saw Tisoy pass by on a motorcycle and thereafter reported the matter to Medialdea. Ama learned of
Eileens death at around 8:00 a.m. when he was at the Calauan police station. Centeno thereafter picked him up and they, together
with Medialdea, Malabanan and Luis proceeded to Sitio Paputok where Eileens body was found.
From the university compound, he, Medialdea, Malabanan and a UP student named Butch went to Allans house but the latter
was not there. They also went to Jet Tejadas and Eileens boarding houses.
At Barangay Batong Malaki, Los Baos, barangay tanod Allan revealed to Medialdea that the dead Allans enemy was
Kit. Allan was fond of girls and there was a time when Kit got angry at and threatened Allan when the latter dated Kits girlfriend
Rose, the tanod narrated.
Ama and the rest of the group were able to talk to Jet Tejada who denied any involvement in the crime. After Major Cao
informed him that Allan is already dead, Ama told the major about the friction between Allan and Kit. Then someone tapped Major
Caos shoulder and identified himself as Kit who clarified that he had patched up with Allan about three (3) months ago. Kit
angrily pointed his finger at Ama, then Major Cao pacified them. Ama asked Kit about the drops of blood on his right thigh. Kit
explained that the blood came from his right knuckle. He is our suspect Ama blurted. Major Cao, however, reprimanded him for
making such a loud comment.
*(On the cleaning of the van, Amas story is similar to Medialdeas account heretofore discussed).
Thereafter, Ama, Medialdea and Malabanan found their way to the Mayors residence in bay. Ama revealed to the Mayor that
Kit is the suspect. The Mayor said that Kit comes from a very powerful and influential family, and that his father, General Alqueza, is
a tough man. The Mayor nonetheless assured them of his support.
On July 1, 1993, Ama accompanied some CIS personnel at the site where Allans body was found. They found drops of blood,
cigarette butts and wrappers in the area. Later in the afternoon, Ama went to Canlubang as he was asked by Colonel Roxas to make
a written report on the Kit Alqueza angle. He completed his statement in about five (5) hours. The officer before whom he was
sworn, Ama noticed, was drunk.
On July 3, 1993, he received word that he was to undergo counter-insurgency training effective that same day. Two (2) days
after (July 5), he asked a certain Colonel Toco why he was being required to undergo training again. The colonel promised to look
into the matter. On that same day, Malabanan informed him that Luis appeared panicky and was acting suspiciously, as the latter
seemed to go back and forth to the municipal hall and kept asking Malabanan for the names of people investigating the case. Also
on that day, Ama gave the NBI Regional Director some information about Kit and Luis which started the NBI investigation.
On July 6, 1993, Ama, together with Medialdea and Malabanan, executed his statement in CIS Canlubang assisted by one Atty.
Exconde who asked him to sign the same even before Ama can read it. At PHQ Sta. Cruz, the Deputy Provincial Commander for
Operations fumed when he declared in his statement that he was absent during the cleaning of the van. He declared so because
Major Cao instructed him to keep silent on that matter. Subsequently (July 7), he learned of Malabanans escape.
On July 24, 1993, Ama, Malabanan and Medialdea were brought to CIS Canlubang. They ate drugged food which gave him
chest pain and made him very weak and talkative. He saw Medialdea being whipped on the head with a newspaper by one official.
Five days later (July 29), they were brought to the PACC where Luis pointed to them before the media. The next day (July 30),
he and General Alqueza met at the Department of Justice. The general cursed him for dragging Kit in the case and even challenged
him to a fistfight outside the building.
On August 7, 1993, at General Salimbangons office, the general informed him that his summary dismissal is on hand unless he
testifies against the Mayor. When he refused, the general cursed him. Colonel Gualberto also tried to convince him by offering
promotion, house and lot, monthly allowance, or a chance to leave the country with his family. But Ama insisted on his innocence.
On August 13, 1993, a sobbing Malabanan embraced Ama and asked for his forgiveness because the former has already
implicated him falsely in the crime. Malabanan said he could no longer bear the torture being inflicted on him and the threats on his
life and family. He was also advised by Malabanan to follow suit, but he refused once again.
Brion is the Mayors nephew. He denied being in the company of any of the appellants on the evening of June 28, 1993 as he
stayed at their house on J. del Valle St., Calauan the whole night. In the morning of July 29, 1993, he was arrested at his father-in-
laws house without any warrant. The arresting officer told him that Colonel Navarro (PNP Director of Laguna) wanted to interview
him. Brion was brought to the Calamba police station from where he was taken to Canlubang. There, Col. Navarro cursed him for
being so elusive. Brion answered that he never went into hiding. Col. Navarro informed him that Luis Corcolon has revealed that he
was the third man to rape Eileen. Brion then heard Malabanan shouting that he is taking all the blame for the crime if they would
just spare the two students (Brion and Kawit) who are totally innocent.
Brion, together with Malabanan, Ama and Luis, was brought to the office of the then Vice-President Estrada who asked Ama
and Malabanan whether they raped Eileen. Ama belied the accusation. Malabanan, too, professed innocence and said that in the
nine (9) years he stayed in Mindanao, it is his first time to cry this way. This convinced the vice-president of Malabanans
innocence. Kawit also cried at this point. Brion saw Luis being held up by two men towards the room as Luis appeared to be on the
brink of collapse. One of the escorts then raised Luis hand so as to point at Brion.
On July 30, 1993, Brion, Ama, Malabanan, Kawit, Luis and Boy were brought to the Department of Justice where Fiscal Zuo
asked them to sign some papers. Luis was instructed to re-affirm his sworn statement before the PACC while Brion and Kawit were
asked to sign a waiver of detention. The three (3), however, refused. Fiscal Zuo offered them a lawyer from the Public Assistance
Office (PAO) to assist them but Brion rejected the offer.
On August 6, 1993, General Quizon asked Brion to sign a confession but he refused. When a second statement was prepared,
he cried because he was allowed to read only that portion relating to his personal circumstances before being forced to sign it
without the assistance of a lawyer. Thereafter, he was brought back to PHQ Sta. Cruz at around 5:00 p.m.
Brion related having executed a sworn statement detailing the methods of torture he underwent to force him into implicating
the Mayor, Ama, Medialdea and Malabanan, viz:
1) he would be placed in a doghouse-like cell fitted with loudspeakers;
2) his hands would be tied behind his back and he would be tied to a bench. A towel would be placed over his mouth and
nostrils, then 7-up is poured on his face;
3) his body would be whipped with guns.
No medical examination was ever conducted on him. More, his captors would padlock his cell whenever Atty. Arias paid him a visit.
Kawit was a houseboy of the Mayor in his Calauan residence. He claimed he slept at around 9:00 p.m. of June 28, 1993 and
woke up at 6:00 a.m. the following day to water the plants.
On July 16, 1993, he was interrogated in connection with the deaths of Eileen and Allan. Later in the day, Medialdea and some
policemen fetched him at his house in Barangay Bagong Pook and brought him to PHQ Sta. Cruz. Kawit was led into a room where
Medialdea, in the presence of Centeno and Malabanan, asked him the name of the girl who was reportedly shouting while Kawit
was dragging her at CPAMMS. Kawit answered that there were two (2) bar girls, whose names are Carla and Ninja Joyce, who
were shouting at Barangay Bagong Pook. Ama then entered the room and requested Malabanan and Medialdea not to hurt
Kawit. When Malabanan and Medialdea left the room, Kawit explained to Ama that the two (2) bar girls complained of one Melvin
Pajadan not paying them for their services.
Thereafter, Kawit was asked by one Major Uyami to make a statement. After signing the statement, Kawit was told by
investigator Cansanay that the major wanted him to include in his statement the Mayors involvement in the Gomez-Sarmenta
slaying, but Kawit refused. He was thus detained for the night. A policeman in civilian clothes thereafter asked him to sign a paper
bearing his name and the handwritten words: Pauuwiin ka na bukas ng umaga. Kawit signed the paper, but he was not released
the next day.
Before this Court, Mayor Sanchez and Medialdea filed their consolidated Appellants Brief, and so did Ama, Brion and
Kawit. Brothers Luis and Boy Corcolon, on the other hand, filed separate appeal briefs. Briefly, the pith of the assigned errors and
the focus of the appellants arguments is the issue of witnesses Centeno and Malabanans credibility, whose open-court narrations
served as principal basis for the trial courts rendition of a guilty verdict.
So oftenly repeated by this Court is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge
[4]
who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their
credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line
between fact and fancy. The forthright answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or
the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch these can reveal if the witness is telling the truth or lying in his teeth.
[5]

Judge Demetriou who presided over the entire trial until its very conclusion expressed her satisfaction with the way witnesses
Centeno and Malabanan survived the hot seat with flying colors, so to speak. With respect to Centeno, the honorable Judge had
this to say:
In thus passing upon the credibility of Centeno, this Court kept his alleged dubious reputation for veracity in mind. But, after
carefully reviewing the testimony of Centeno in his direct examination and gruelling (sic) cross-examination for almost 3 months,
this Court, even with a jaundiced eye, could not help but be impressed about the myriad of details in his testimony and his frank,
spontaneous and straightforward manner of testifying. The lengthy and punishing cross-examination by seven lawyers to which he
was subjected failed to bring out any serious flaw or infirmity in his perception or recollection of events or destroy the coherence of
his narration. That Centeno merely wove such a yarn from his fertile imagination, conflict with a multitude of details, is highly
improbable considering that his highest educational attainment was sixth grade in the elementary school.
[6]

Similarly, Malabanan displayed a frank, straightforward manner of answering questions and a desire to state all the facts wi thin his
knowledge, and his credibility was never shaken on cross-examination; there was no indication of prevarication or
evasiveness. Consequently, (his) testimony is entitled to full faith and credit, the honorable Judge observed.
[7]
Her impressions of
these star witnesses for the State bind this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses.
[8]
They, therefore, ought not to be disturbed.
[9]
And once the prosecution witnesses are afforded full faith
and credit, the defenses version necessarily stands discredited.
[10]

To recall, all the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi, i.e., they were at their respective homes on the night of the
rape-slay. But Centeno and Malabanan confirmed the presence of all the appellants on the night of June 28, 1993 till the early
morning of the following day and detailed the exact participation of each in the crime. Positive identification by credible witnesses
of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime, as we have consistently held, demolishes the alibi
[11]
-the much abused sanctuary of
felons.
[12]
Moreover, except for the Mayor who presented Ave Marie Tonee Jimenez Sanchez (his daughter with his mistress Elvira)
and Medialdea who presented his neighbor Anastacia Gulay, the other appellants failed to present corroborating testimonial
evidence to butress their respective alibis. The defense of alibi is inherently weak especially when wanting in material
corroboration. Categorical declarations of witnesses for the prosecution of the details of the crime are more credible than the
uncorroborated alibi interposed by the accused.
[13]
Ave Maries testimony is of no help to the Mayor, since alibi becomes less
plausible as a defense when it is invoked and sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his immediate
relatives.
[14]
Anastacia Gulays testimony is likewise worthless since the trial court found her testimony rehearsed. We will not
disturb this finding because it touches on credibility.
In fine, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility of witnesses, and the assessment of the trial court,
unless patently and clearly inconsistent, must be accepted.
[15]

In an attempt to discredit Centeno, appellants principally harp on the contradictions in four (4) Sworn Statements executed by
Centeno on August 13, 1993, August 15, 1993, August 17, 1993 and August 30, 1993. The Solicitor Generals Office summarizes
appellants asseverations on this point, viz:
Appellants point out that while in his Sworn Statement dated August 13, 1993, Centeno stated that after the victims were seized,
they were brought to CPAMMS, in his Sworn Statement dated August 15, 1993, he claimed that the two were brought to Erais Farm
(p. 86-96, Sanchez and Medialdea; p. 11-12, Luis Corcolon; p. 38, Ama, Brion and Kawit; p. 10, Rogelio Corcolon). Appellant also
point out that in the August 13, 1993 Sworn Statement, Centeno merely referred to a person named Edwin (without stating his
family name) and another person he did not know who was in the place where the victims were brought. In his Sworn Statement
dated August 17, 1993, Centeno supplied the family name of Edwin as Cosico and the name of the other person whom he did not
know as Lito Angeles (pp. 96-97, Sanchez and Medialdea).
Another major contradiction pointed out is that in his August 13, 1993 Sworn Statement, Centeno mentioned that he drove the
Corcolon brothers to the house of Edgardo Uod Lavadia in Bangkal Street, Los Baos, Laguna. Upon arriving at the house of
Lavadia, Centeno saw Lavadia and Teofilo Kit Alqueza talking. Later Lavadia handed an envelop to Luis Corcolon. In the latest Sworn
Statement dated August 30, 1993, Centeno stated that they did not go to the house of Lavadia and that during the whole day of June
26, 1993, Centeno was with Malabanan (pp. 99-102, Sanchez and Medialdea; pp. 37-40, Ama, Brion and Kawit; p. 8, Rogelio
Corcolon).
[16]

The trial judge found Centenos explanation on these inconsistencies satisfactory, justifying such finding with pertinent
jurisprudence. The Court, therefore, affirms and adopts her disquisition on the matter, viz:
With respect to the portion of his sworn statement dated August 13, 1993 which implicated Kit Alqueza, Centeno explained that it
was dictated by a CIS agent named Rommel. He feared Rommel because the latter threatened him that he would be hurt if he did
not cooperate. Even when his family was already under the custody of the CIS on August 15, 1993, he did not ask for the deletion of
the said portion because he was still under the CIS custody. It was only on August 30, 1993 when he was placed under the Witness
Protection Program that he found the courage to execute another sworn statement for the specific purpose of deleting the
reference to Kit Alqueza. Although he was placed under the Witness Protection Program on August 17, 1993, there was a delay in
his retraction of Kit Alquezas involvement due to his inability to reach Fiscal Arellano.
Centenos explanation is quite believable because he had already implicated the accused Sanchez in his sworn statement of August
13, 1993. Thus, the portion implicating Kit Alqueza does not jibe with the main story of Centeno that Eileen Sarmenta was abducted
by Medialdea, Ama, the Corcolon brothers, Brion and Kawit to be given as a gift to their boss, Mayor Sanchez.
As to his sworn statement of August 15, 1993 where he stated that the victims were taken to Erais Farm instead of CPAMMS as
originally indicated in his August 13, 1993 sworn statement, Centeno explained that when he gave his first statement he was still
hoping that Mayor Sanchez would help him. Furthermore, he feared the power and influence of the Mayor. Thus, according to him,
he gave the wrong place to mislead his investigators. It was only on August 15, 1993 when the accused Sanchez was already in
prison that Centeno decided to correct his previous statements.
This Court is inclined to accept the explanation of Centeno that his earlier attempt to mislead the investigators by saying that the
victims were taken to CPAMMS was out of fear of the Mayor. Our Supreme Court has recognized that the inherent fear of reprisal
by witnesses who refuse initially to disclose what they know about a crime is quite understandable, especially when the accused is a
man of power and influence in the community (People v. Catao, 107 Phil. 861 [1960]).
In a recent case, People v. Pascua (206 SCRA 628 *1992+), the Supreme Court observed that Fear for ones life explains the failure
on the part of a witness to immediately notify the authorities of what exactly transpired. And, *o+nce such fear is overcome by a
more compelling need to narrate the truth, the Supreme Court went on to say, then the witness must be welcomed by the courts
to help dispense justice.
Consequently, this Court will not reject the testimony of Centeno on the basis of inconsistencies in his sworn statements taken by
police authorities which have been sufficiently explained. What is more important is that Centeno testified on the witness stand in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remained consistent on cross-examination. This Court, therefore,
finds Centeno a credible witness.
[17]

To further fortify this observation, we advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn statements and
testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses.
[18]
Sworn statements/affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiants mental faculties are
not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired.
[19]
Testimonies given
during trials are mush more exact and elaborate.
[20]
Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn
statements/affidavits.
Appellants would also quibble on the following portions of Centenos testimony, to wit:
1) he could not give exactly where the appellants went after sexually abusing Eileen;]
2) he was unsure whether it was Eileens left or right foot that hit the chair of the van when she was struggling;
3) he was unsure of their speed while on their way to the UP compound;
4) he could not give the exact distance between the ambulance he was driving and the van;
5) he said he could see the protruding end of the roof of a kubo when he parked the ambulance in front of the Big J
restaurant. Appellants claim that from where Centeno was allegedly standing, there was no way he could see the roof of that
kubo;
6) he was able to recall what appellants were wearing on that night of June 28, 1993;
7) he saw Kawit hit Allan at his diaphragm with the butt of an armalite, but the medico-legal finding of Dr. Escueta
revealed no injury in the abdominal region of Allan;
8) his testimony that the appellants raped Eileen inside the van which was very limited space, while appellants could have
chosen a far more comfortable or remote place to do the crime. With respect to the Mayor, it was very unbelievable for him to
commit rape inside his room filled with religious adornments and in the process risk his reputation as mayor and an established
man in the community;
9) his testimony to the effect that appellants rolled their pants down to their knees and then climbed the van to rape
Eileen. Appellants would consider such testimony impossible, claiming that the narrow circumference of the waistline will
impede and obstruct the upward movement of the legs.
10) his admission that he can lie for money, or out fear.
It may be conceded that these inconsistencies marred Centenos testimony, but they refer to trivial details which do not, in
actuality, touch upon the whys and wherefores of the crime committed.
[21]
Equally settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the
testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their
declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do
not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification
of the assailants,
[22]
as in this case. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the sincerity of a witness and prove that his
testimony is not rehearsed.
[23]
They are fail-safes against memorized perjury.
[24]
Besides, errorless testimonies cannot be expected
especially when a witness is recounting details of a harrowing experience.
[25]
Even the most truthful witnesses can make mistakes
but such innocent lapses do not necessarily affect their credibility.
[26]
Consequently, Centenos and Malabanans credibility still
remains intact notwithstanding these inconsistencies.
Other pieces of evidence further enhance the damaging testimonies of Centeno and Malabanan. For one, a missing belt loop
from the pair of white shorts worn by Eileen on the night of the crime was recovered from Erais Farm by prosecution witness Major
Lulita Chambers who, together with Col. Gualberto and other officers, went there on August 19, 1993 to effect service of the search
warrant issued by RTC Judge Geraldez. Major Chambers, a forensic chemist, conducted a series of laboratory examinations and later
concluded that the retrieved beltloop matched in color, size and fiber composition with a beltloop she detached from the white
shorts of Eileen which she (Major Chambers) used as a standard.
Another corroborating evidence is the M16 empty bullet shell recovered at the site where Allans body was found. The ballistic
examination on the empty shell conducted by FID-PNP Chief Ballistician Vicente de Vera revealed that the striations of the empty
shell were the same as those registered by the cartridges from M16 rifle bearing Serial No. 773159 surrendered by Luis
Corcolon. Mr. De Vera also found the metallic fragments recovered from Eileens body, after conducting microscopic examinations
thereof, to bear the same characteristics as those from a bullet fired from an M16 rifle.
The autopsy and vaginal examination conducted by prosecution witness Dr. Vladimir V. Villaseor, medico-legal officer of the
PNP-CIS, on Eileens cadaver buttresses all the more the gang-rape story of the prosecution. Dr. Villaseors findings, in a nutshell,
disclosed the presence of multiple contusions on Eileens body, fresh shallow lacerations on her hymen, a congested cervix, a gaping
labia majora and oozing whitish fluid (tested positive for spermatozoa) from the vaginal opening. Oozing spermatozoa, Dr. Villaseor
explained, means that the amount of semen was much more than the vaginal canal could contain and that there were several
seminal ejaculations that occurred therein. He also noted that a great quantity of whitish fluid continued to ooze from Eileens
vaginal opening despite her death for several hours. Taking into account all these findings, Dr. Villaseor ruled out the possibility of
any consented sexual intercourse. In this connection, appellants would belittle Dr. Villaseors findings by insisting as the more
convincing opinion the defenses medical expert witness, Dr. Ernesto Brion who testified to the effect that there can be no multiple
rape if there is only one laceration on Eileens hymen as testified to by Dr. Villaseor. We dismiss appellants argument by
reiterating anew that the absence of extensive abrasions or contusions on the vaginal wall does not rule out rape because the
slightest penetrations enough.
[27]
It is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of said crime.
[28]
Moreover, Dr.
Brion is an uncle by consanguinity and erstwhile counsel of record of the Mayor, thus making his objectivity highly questionable.
Appellants Ama, Kawit and Brion would assail the trial courts finding that they were part of the conspiracy to commit the rape-
slay. Their concurrency of sentiment with the other appellants, however, was evident from the time they abducted Eileen and Allan,
brought the two to Erais Farm where Eileen was raped by the Mayor and Allan beaten up black and blue, headed for a sugarcane
field killing Allan along the way, sexually abused Eileen in rapid succession and finally killed her. In not an instance did any of the
three appellants (Ama, Kawit and Brion) desist from that common design.
[29]
Likewise, the complicity of the Mayor in the crime can
be deduced from the following conversations he had with some of the appellants at the Erais Farm (per Centenos testimony), viz.:
LUIS CORCOLON: Mayor, ito po yung regalo namin sa inyo. Ito po yung babae na matagal na po ninyong kursunada.
MAYOR: Aba, and ganda talaga ng babaeng yan. Pero sino yung kasama ninyong lalake?
MEDIALDEA: Boss, kasama ho yan ng babae yung lalake. Isinama na rin ho namin para wala pong bulilyaso.
After raping Eileen, the Mayor had this short exchange with Medialdea:
MAYOR: O sige mga anak, salamat sa regalo ninyo. Salamat sa regalo ninyo sa akin. Tapos na ako, sa
inyo na iyan. Bahala na kayo diyan. Ano naman ang gagawin ninyo diyan sa lalake?
MEDIALDEA: Boss, papatayin na rin po namin ito para wala pong bulilyaso.
Finally, on appellants claim that the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair trial, we need only to revisit this
Courts pronouncements in People v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), viz:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the
print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and
now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting
enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden
of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials
but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny
and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given
a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverages does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and
impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to out
breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For
another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the
jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system
are mounting and Mark Twains wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he observed: When a gentleman of high
social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and
newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity x
x x. Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and miscreants? Our
judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejsndro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the
trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
And so we come to hear another tale of woe, of an infamous public figure and his minions indicted for having raped and killed a
young lady and a budding lad, of these victims who had led short obscure lives that earned an equally ignominous end, and of a
criminal enterprise so despicable only the unthinking beasts can orchestrate. It was, indeed, a plot seemingly hatched in hell. And
let it not be said that the full protection of the law had been deprived appellants. Even a beast cannot deny this.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. In addition, each of the appellants having been found
guilty of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide and considering that existing jurisprudence pegs the amount of indemnity for the
death of the victim at Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, this Court hereby orders each of the appellants to pay the respective heirs
of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand (P700,000.00) Pesos as additional indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

















FELICIDAD ANZALDO vs. JACOBO C. CLAVE
This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose occupant heads the Medical Research Department in
the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST).
Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20,
1980, revoking her appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor IIand directing the appointment to that
position of Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon, 48.
The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar, became Director of the Biological
Research Center. Doctor Kintanar recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo protested
against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and meritorious (p. 34, Rollo).
Because of that impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not resolve, the position was not filled up.
At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon were holding similar positions in the
Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV with an annual compensation of P12,013 per annum. Both
were next-in-rank to the vacant position.
Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed
Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position with compensation at P18,384 per annum. The appointment was approved by the Civil
Service Commission.
Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978, explained that the appointment was made after a thorough study and screening
of the qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon and upon the recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation Committee that gave
88 points to Doctor Anzaldo and 61 points to Doctor Venzon (p. 78, Rollo).
Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the Office of the President of the
Philippines (pp. 139-40). The appeal was forwarded to the NIST Anzaldo to the contested position (p. 63, Rollo). The appeal-protest
was later sent to the Civil Service Commission.
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated
August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978
appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service Commission (pp. 30 and 48, Rollo).
The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 807 (which
took effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall
consult the Civil Service Commission."
After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Doctor Anzaldo appealed to the
Office of the President of the Philippines. As stated earlier, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor Anzaldo's appointment and ruled that, "as
recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should
be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be considered "valid and
effective during the pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest (p. 36, Rollo).
In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Doctor Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On
August 25, 1980, she filed in this Court the instant special civil action of certiorari.
What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave is that it is an
implementation of Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.
In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service Commission, recommended that Doctor Venzon be
appointed Science Research Supervisor II in place of Doctor Anzaldo.
When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of the Civil
Service Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with
himself (p. 35, Rollo).
It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the
recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs.
Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the decision of Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was void because it was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative justice.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should
decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and
Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the Philippines.
Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by the Office
of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal of the
protestant in a contested appointment.
In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service Commission who was
consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation
for, as held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant.
We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon. The
appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in accordance with law and properly exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor Anzaldo
to the contested position.
Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in 1950 in the College of Pharmacy, University of the Philippines. She obtained from
the Centro Escolar University the degree of Master of Science in Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the degree of Doctor of Pharmacy.
Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist and supervisor (unassembled).
She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served in that agency for about twenty-eight (28) years now. As already stated, in
January, 1978, she was appointed to the contested Position of Science Research Supervisor II. Her present salary as Science Research
Supervisor II, now known as Senior Science Research Specialist, is P 30,624 per annum after she was given a merit increase by Doctor
Kintanar, effective July 1, 1981 (p. 259, Rollo).
On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the medical course in the University of Santo Tomas in 1957. She started working in the
NIST in 1960. She has been working in that agency for more than twenty-one (21) years.Doctor Anzaldo is senior to her in point of
service.
Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged the duties of the contested position for more
than four (4) years now and that she is qualified for that position, her appointment should be upheld. Doctor Venzon's protest
should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Clave dated March 20, 1980 is set aside, and petitioner Anzaldo's promotional
appointment to the contested position is declared valid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.




PEOPLE VS DORIA
This is an appeal from a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 262, promulgated on November 26, 1997, in
Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D finding accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
[1]

Accused-appellant was charged in Criminal Case No. 3618-D for violating Section 15,
[2]
Article III of R.A. No. 6425. The
information reads as follows:
That on or about the 16
th
day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 5.08 grams of white crystalline substance positive to the test for
methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.
[3]

Accused-appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 3619-D for violating Section 16,
[4]
Article III of R.A. No. 6425 with an
information which reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and/or (sic) under his custody and control four (4) transparent plastic bags
containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of 200.45 grams, which were found positive to the test for
methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in violation of the above cited law.
[5]

Arraigned on June 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges.
[6]
Joint trial ensued thereafter.
The prosecutions version, as gathered from the testimonies of SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral, SPO1 Neowille De Castro and P/Sr. Insp.
Julita T. De Villa, is as follows:
On April 14, 1996, a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in camp Crame and
reported to SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral that there is a certain person engaged in illegal drug pushing activities in Caloocan, Malabon and
Mandaluyong. SPO2 Cabral reported the matter to his superior, Police Senior Inspector Manzanas.
[7]
Accordingly, Sr. Insp. Manzanas
directed SPO2 Cabral to confirm the veracity of the report. Thus, SPO2 Cabral requested the confidential informant to contact the
suspected drug pusher to introduce him as a possible buyer.
[8]

On April 15, 1996, the informant returned to the NARCOM office and told SPO2 Cabral that he had arranged a meeting with the
suspected drug pusher. The two then proceeded to the pre-arranged meeting place at a Seven Eleven Store along Boni Avenue,
Mandaluyong City. At around 5:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived on board a Toyota Corolla.
[9]
Without alighting from his car,
accused-appellant spoke with the informant.
[10]
The informant introduced SPO2 Cabral to accused-appellant as a prospective buyer
of shabu. Accused-appellant inquired how many grams of shabu he wanted to buy and SPO2 Cabral replied that he needed five (5)
grams. The suspect then offered the shabu at the price of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per gram to which SPO2 Cabral
agreed.
[11]
Accused-appellant told SPO2 Cabral to return the following day. They agreed that the pick up point would be at the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Building also along Boni Avenue. Upon their return to Camp Crame, SPO2 Cabral and the
informant reported the results of their meeting to Sr. Insp. Manzanas. Based on their information, a buy-bust operation was
planned. SPO2 Cabral was designated to act as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 de Castro as his back-up. Sr. Insp. Manzanas was
assigned to stay in the car and await the signal to be given by SPO2 Cabral, through his pager, before apprehending accused-
appellant.
At around 3:30 in the early morning of April 16, 1996, the buy-bust team proceeded to the agreed meeting place at the UCPB
Building in Boni Avenue.
[12]
Upon reaching the area, SPO2 Cabral alighted from the car while the other operatives positioned
themselves in strategic areas.
[13]
After thirty (30) minutes, accused-appellant arrived.
[14]
after talking for a short time with SPO2
Cabral, accused-appellant asked the former if he had the money.
[15]
SPO2 Cabral showed the bundle of money
[16]
and accused-
appellant told him to wait. When he returned, SPO2 Cabral gave him the money and, in exchange, accused-appellant handed a pack
containing a white crystalline substance.
[17]
As planned, SPO2 Cabral turned on his pager which prompted the backup operatives to
close in and apprehend accused-appellant.
[18]
SPO2 Cabral asked accused-appellant if he could search the latters car. Accused-
appellant acceded to the request and, as a result, SPO2 Cabral found a brown clutch bag at the drivers seat of the car. Inside the
clutch bag, they found therein four plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance which they suspected was shabu.
[19]

Accused-appellant was brought to Camp Crame for booking. SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro then submitted the substance
they confiscated to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
[20]
They thereafter brought accused-appellant to the PNP General
Hospital for a medical and physical examination.
[21]

The laboratory report on the white crystalline substance showed that the same tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu
[22]
and that the contents of the substance sold weighed 5.08 grams while those taken from the bag had a
total weight of 200.45 grams. The report reads:
PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-448-96

CASE: Alleged Viol of RA 6425 SUSPECT/S: LORETO MEDENILLA
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 2145H 16 April 1996
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, SOU-HQS-PNPNARCOM
Camp Crame, Quezon City
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh A One (1) brown MARUDINI CLUTCH BAG containing the following specimens:
1. One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic bag marked as Exh A-1 with 5.08 grams of white crystalline substance:
2. Four (4) transparent plastic bags marked as Exhs. A-2 through A-5 each with white crystalline substance and having
a total weight of 200.45 grams. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug. xxx
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave positive result to the tests for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx
CONCLUSION:
Exhs. A-1, A-2 through A-5 contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 0740H 17 April 1996
[23]

For his defense, accused-appellant presented a different version of the events leading to his arrest.
On or about April 12, 1996, accused-appellant rented a car, a Toyota Corolla, from a certain Jess Hipolito. It was to be used by
his brother for a trip to Pangasinan.
[24]
On April 15, 1996, his brother turned over the car to accused-appellant with the instruction to
return the car to Jess Hipolito.
[25]
However, before returning the car, accused-appellant decided to use the same for a night out with
his friends. Accused-appellant, along with four (4) of his friends, namely, Joy, Tess, Willy and Jong-jong, went to Bakahan in Quezon
City for dinner and, thereafter, transferred to Music Box Lounge located in front of the said restaurant,. After having some drinks,
accused-appellant decided to return the car to Jess Hipolito and just take a taxicab with his friends in going back to their place in
Caloocan City.
[26]
They all proceeded to the condominium unit of Jess Hipolito located along Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong
City.
[27]
they reached the place at around 2:30 a.m.
[28]
Accused-appellant told the guard of the condominium building that he wanted
to see Jess Hipolito to retun the car he rented. The guard instructed him to park the car in front of UCPB. After doing so, accused-
appellant, together with Jong-jong and Joy went up to the unit of Jess Hipolito while their two companions, Willy and Tess, stayed in
the lobby.
[29]
While inside the unit of Jess Hipolito, accused-appellant was introduced to Alvin.
[30]
Accused-appellant told Jess Hipolito
that he wanted to return the car. However, Jess Hipolito requested accused-appellant to drive Alvin, using the rented car, to quezon
City since the latter was carrying a large amount of money.
[31]
Accused-appellant acceded to the request of Jess Hipolito. They then
all went down and, along with Willy and Tess who were then at the lobby, boarded the vehicle.
[32]
However, when accused-appellant
was about to back out the vehicle, a white car blocked the rear portion of the car.
[33]
The passengers of the white car then stepped
out of their vehicle and approached them. One of the passengers of the white car, SPO1 de Castro, asked accused-appellant to roll
down his window and, after doing so, SPO2 Cabral introduced himself and his companions as police officers.
[34]
Accused-appellant
then asked: Bakit po, sir?
[35]
In response, one of the police officers said: May titingnan lang muna kami, baba muna
kayo.
[36]
after alighting from the vehicle, accused-appellant and his companions were frisked.
[37]
Thereafter, SPO2 Cabral noticed a
brown clutch bag being held by Alvin and confiscated the same. SPO2 Cabral then asked accused-appellant if he can search the
car. The latter agreed. SPO2 Cabral searched the car for about 15 minutes but found nothing.
[38]
SPO2 Cabral then opened the
brown clutch bag he confiscated from Alvin and found plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance. The police officers
then instructed accused-appellant and his companions to board their vehicle. They were all brought to Camp Crame.
[39]
When they
reached the said camp, they were instructed to alight from the vehicle one by one. The first one to step out of the vehicle and go
inside the office was Alvin. After 20 minutes, the two women, Tess and Joy, were brought inside the office and, after 30 minutes,
accused-appellant, along with the two remaining passengers, Willy and Jong-jong, followed.
[40]

When they were all inside the NARCOM office, their personal circumstances were taken down. Thereafter, Jong-jong, Willy
and accused-appellant were separated from the group and placed inside the detention cell. Alvin and the two women were left
behind in the office and were later on released.
[41]
After a few hours, Jong-jong and Willy were brought out of the detention cell
while accused-appellant, who was then sleeping, was left in confinement. Jong-jong and Willy were brought into the office and
were made to sign a document on a yellow pad, prepared by the police officers. The police officers then cautioned the two that they
will be implicated in the case if they interfered. They were then released and accompanied out to Camp Crame by a police
officer.
[42]
Accused-appellant was the only one who remained in detention and was, subsequently, solely charged for the illegal sale
and possession of shabu.
While in detention, accused-appellant learned that the vehicle he borrowed from Jess Hipolito was owned by a certain Evita
Ebora, who was also detained in the Mandaluyong City Jail for a drug-related offense.
[43]

On November 17, 1997, the trial cour found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accuse LORETO MEDENILLA y DORIA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 15 and 16, in relation to Section 20, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Said accused is hereby sentenced to: (a) with respect to Criminal Case No. 3618-D, suffer an indeterminate
sentence of a minimum of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days, to a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional; (b) with respect to Criminal Case No. 3619-D, suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and pay a fine in the
amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00); (c) suffer all the accessories penalties consequent thereto; and (d) pay the costs.
The shabu involved in this action is hereby confiscated in favor of the government and ordered to be forwarded to the Dangerous
Drugs Board to be disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
[44]

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following issues:
I. Was the accused arrested illegally?
II. Was there in fact any buy-bust operation?
III. Was the accused accorded his right to due process?
[45]

Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and second issues jointly.
The defense insist that there was no prior agreement between accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral for the sale of 5 grams of
shabu on April 16, 1996 and that no buy bust operation actually took place. The prosecutions claim that there was a buy-bust
operation is, according to the defense, belied by the testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus that when the incident
took place, accused-appellant was not alone but was accompanied by five (5) other persons.
[46]
thus, the defense argues that since
there was no buy-bust operation, the arrest of accused-appellant was illegal since the arresting officers were not properly armed
with a warrant of arrest.
Accused-appellants argument deserves scant consideration. The prosecution through the testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and
SPO1 de Castro adequately established the fact that there was a legally conducted buy-bust operation. Their testimonies clearly
showed that their confidential informant reported the drug operations of accused-appellant; that a meeting took place between
accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral where they agreed on the sale of 5 grams of shabu; that the NARCOM operatives planned a buy-
bust operation; that the said operation was indeed conducted; and that the same resulted in the arrest of accused-appellant and the
confiscation of 5 plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance. In this regard, the testimonies of the police officers were
given full credence by the trial court, to wit:
The prosecution witnesses gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of accused Medenilla from
the time Cabral was introduced to accused Medenilla up to the buy-bust operation, which culminated in the arrest of accused-
Medenilla. This Court can find no inconsistency in their testimonies and, as such, gives full faith and credit thereto. In addition, it is
to be noted that no evidence exists to show that the law enforcers failed to perform their duty regularly. Neither was any evidence
presented to show that there was improper motive on the part of said witnesses to falsely implicate accused Medenilla. On the
contrary, it was established that they did not know accused Medenilla prior to the buy bust operation. xxx
[47]

The trial courts determination of the credibility of the police officers deserves the highest respect by this court, considering
that the trial court had the direct opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying.
[48]
Furthermore, in the absence
of any proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against accused-appellant, the
testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro on the buy-bust operation are deserving of belief due to the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to law enforcers.
[49]
Clearly, accused-appellants mere denial and concoction
of another arrest scenario cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the police officers.
Even the supposed corroborative testimony of Wilfredo de Jesus is not credible since the said witness appeared to have been
making a mockery of the proceedings before the lower court as noted by the trial judge, to wit:
COURT:
You better refrain from smiling, I have been warning you. You keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Your Honor, because he laughs.(interrupted)
COURT:
No, he is laughing.
x x x
COURT:
And keep on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
He is smiling your Honor.
COURT:
No, he is not smiling, you can ask him. I do not understand why this guy is keep (sic) on laughing.
Atty. Arias:
Binabalaan ka na bata. Huwag kang tatawa, huwag kang ngingiti kundi magsalita ka ng maayos at tiyak at tahasan.
[50]

The testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus are not convincing since they are replete with numerous
inconsistencies and improbabilities. First, accused-appellant testified that the Bakahan restaurant and the Music Box lounge they
went to on the evening of April 15, 1996 are located in Quezon City.
[51]
However, Wilfredo de Jesus claimed that the said
establishments are located in Mandaluyong.
[52]
The divergence of their assertions on the location of these establishments goes into
the credibility of their claim that they were together with other people and had a night out on the evening of April 15, 1996. Second,
accused-appellant claimed that at the time the police officers approached the car prior to the arrest, one of the officers requested
them to alight from the vehicle.
[53]
On the other hand, Wilfredo de Jesus testified that when the police officers approached them,
they were forcibly pulled out of their vehicle.
[54]
Their inconsistency on this matter renders questionable the veracity of the claim of
Wilfredo de Jesus that he was present during the arrest of accused-appellant by the NARCOM operatives. Third, their claim that
they were at the parking lot of UCPB in Boni Avenue at around 3:00 oclock in the morning of April 16, 1996 to return the rented
vehicle to Jess Hipolito is hard to believe. Human experience dictates that one does not return a rented vehicle to its owner in the
early hours of the morning. Business transactions, such as returning a rented car, would ordinarily be transacted during regular
hours of work or, perhaps, even earlier but definitely not during the hours of dawn. Fourth, both accused-appellant and Wilfredo de
Jesus claimed the improbable scenario that, after they were accosted by the police officers, they were all brought to camp Crame by
riding the same vehicle they rented. If this is believed, then two unlikely situations are made to appear. Either all the six original
passengers boarded the vehicle along with a seventh passenger, one of the NARCOM operatives who will ensure that they will
proceed to the camp, or only the six original passengers boarded the car to go to Camp Crame and they were just escorted by the
police officers who all rode another vehicle. The first situation is implausible since a bantam car, like a Toyota Corolla, can only
accommodate five, at most six, fully grown adults but, definitely, not seven. On the other hand, the second situation is contrary to
human experience since it will not be in accord with good police operating procedure to allow a group of suspects arrested for a
drug-related offense to board a vehicle by themselves and drive the same to the police headquarters.
Furthermore, if there were indeed five other passengers on board the vehicle aside from accused-appellant, why were they not
charged or, at least, booked in the records of the NARCOM? No proof, not even an allegation, was presented by the defense to
reasonably explain why charges were not lodged against these alleged other passengers. The most that accused-appellant did was
to claim in his appeal brief that the reason why the other suspects were not charged was because the police officers feared that bad
luck might befall them if all were charged. Thus, he argues:
xxx Due to the belief of karma, the Narcom operatives instead of filing case or cases against all the other occupants of the car
together with the accused, the Narcom operatives filed only one case and that is against the accused and in open court denied the
presence of the other companions of the accused.
[55]

Clearly, such type of reasoning and justification shows that accused-appellant is already grasping at straws in order that he may
be acquitted, through whatever allegation, legal or otherwise, of the crimes he is charged with.
We now come to the third issue raised by accused-appellant that he was denied due process. In this regard, accused-appellant
claims that he was deprived of such constitutional right on the following grounds:
a) the denial of the court a quo of the motion of the accused through his counsel to have the
questioned shabu quantitatively examined; and
b) the bias attitude of the presiding judge of the lower court.
[56]

Accused-appellant admits the veracity of the quantitative test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory on the 5 plastic
containers of the white crystalline substance which resulted in the issuance of Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96.
[57]
This was
stipulated upon by accused-appellant when the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. de Villa, was
presented as a witness, to wit:
Prosec. Paz:
The testimony of the witness is formally offered to prove in both cases, Crim. Cases No. 3618-D and 3619-D, that in Crim.
Case 36180D that the white crystalline substance which was sold by the accused Loreto Medenilla to the police operatives
was examined by the witness and found positive to the test ofshabu and weighs 5.08 grams and in Crim. Case No. 3619-D to
prove that accused Loreto Medenilla y Doria that the four (4) transparent plastic bags found in the possession of the
accused with a total weight of 200.45 grams was found positive to the test of shabu as examined by the witness, your
Honor.
May we know from counsel for the accused if he is willing to enter into a stipulation?
COURT:
Atty. Arias, are you willing to enter into stipulation?
Atty. Arias:
I will admit that the witness is an expert, second, I admit that there was an examination conducted by her and that the
result of her examination was reduced into writing.
COURT:
And it was found positive that the specimen submitted to the crime lab was shabu.
Atty. Arias:
Yes, your Honor, according to the examination and I will also state for the record that the witness does not know where
the specimen came from, how the specimen came into being.
x x x
Prosec. Paz:
May we request counsel for the accused to admit the authenticity and veracity of this document prepared by witness after
examining the specimen and the findings as stated in the initial laboratory report.
Atty. Arias:
As we have stated earlier, your Honor, that the result of her examination was reduced into writing, this is the result of the
examination, so be it, your Honor.
x x x
Prosec. Paz:
May we also request that the counsel will admit the weights of the specimens as found by the forensic chemist.
Atty. Arias:
Everything is written in the document.
[58]

However, despite this admission, accused-appellant filed a motion to require the forensic chemist to conduct a quantitative as
well as a qualitative analysis on the subject menthamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to determine its purity.
[59]
The trial court,
after the prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition
[60]
to the motion, issued an Order, dated March 17, 1997, denying the motion, to
wit:
This resolves the motion filed by the accused through his counsel praying that the forensic chemist be required to conduct a
qualitative and quantitative analysis on the subject methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Records will show (TSN dated October 23, 1996) that the defense counsel, with the express conformity of the accused, had
agreed to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts concerning the nature, quality and quantity of the specimens submitted for
chemical analysis. The results of said analysis indicated that said specimens were positive to the test for shabu, and they weighed
5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively. These results were explicitly admitted by both the accused and his counsel. The only matter
that was not admitted was the alleged source of the stuff, it being denied that it was found in and taken from the possession of the
accused. The defense counsel who was given the opportunity to cross-examine raised the forensic chemist when she was
presented, never raised the issue or even suggested that what was examined could not have been pure shabu, and that if such was
the case, it was necessary to determine which part is shabu and which was otherwise. It appears that this idea is merely an after-
thought. To the mind of the Court, the attempt to have the specimens examine at this stage of the action, when the prosecution
had already terminated the presentation of its evidence and is, in fact, about to make a written formal offer of exhibits, can have no
other purpose than to repudiate the findings of the forensic chemist, which had already been previously admitted. This cannot be
permitted bythe Court as it detracts from the full respect that must be accorded to judicial admissions that have been freely and
intelligently made. As correctly observed by the prosecution, said judicial admissions are conclusive and binding upon the
accused. The judicial admission that the stuff submitted for analysis, weighing 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively, are indeed
shabu forecloses any further challenge as to its alleged purity. To speculate at this stage of the action that the stuff is not pure
shabu is to virtually repudiate the findings of the forensic chemist, previously admitted without any qualification that the stuff
analysed were indeed such illegal drug. This can no longer be permitted by the Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DENIED for lack of merit.
[61]

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant insists that he should have been allowed by the trial court to have the shabu subjected
to a quantitative test by the PNP Crime Laboratory. He argues that such a test is crucial in view of the nature of the penalties for the
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, which are graduated depending on the amount of regulated or
prohibited drugs involved in a case. Accused-appellant claims that a quantitative test will definitely show that the shabu involved
herein is not pure and, as such, is less than 200 grams contrary to the assertion of the prosecution that it is 200.45 grams. He
anchors this argument on the contention that shabu is never 100% pure but, at most, is only 85% unadulterated.
[62]

We find that the trial court committed no reversible error in denying the motion. When the defense stipulated with the
prosecution that the results of the laboratory examination, as reflected in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96, were true and
correct, the accused-appellant, in effect, admitted that the substance examine was indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride having
a weight of 5.08 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3618-D, and 200.45 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3619-D. Accused-appellant made no
qualifications on the veracity of the PNP Crime Laboratorys finding on the total weight of the examined shabu. In fact, no cross-
examination was conducted by accused-appellants counsel on the witness, P/Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa, regarding this matter. Thus,
when the defense tried to renege on the previous stipulation by filing a motion requesting for a quantitative test on
the shabu involved herein, the trial court was correct in denying the same.
Furthermore, in the case of People vs. Barita,
[63]
we held that there is no need to examine the entirety of the submitted
specimen since the sample testing is representative of the whole specimen, we held:
We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted of selling 2,800 grams of marijuana,
the whole specimen must be tested considering that Republic Act 7659 impose a penalty dependent on the amount or the quantity
of drugs seized or taken. This court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically presumed to be
representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant.
[64]

This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Zheng Bai Hui,
[65]
thus:
To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a substance weighing 992.3 grams. This amount is more than the minimum of 200
grams required by the law to warrant the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be aggravating, circumstances, the
death penalty. Appellants however foist the probability that the substance sold could contain additives or adulterants, and not just
methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the actual weight of pure shabu could be less than 992.3 grams, thereby possibly reducing
the imposable penalty.
The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:
Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were not done for the entire amount of drugs allegedly found inside the bags. It is
suggested that since the law, Republic Act No. 7659, imposes a penalty dependent on the amount or quantity of drugs seized or
taken, then laboratory test should be undertaken for the entire amount or quantity of drugs seized in order to determine the proper
penalty to be imposed.
The argument is quaint and even borders on being ridiculous. In the present case, even assuming that the confirmatory tests
were conducted on samples taken from only one (1) of the plastic packages, accused-appellants arguments must still fail.
It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages weighed 1.1 kilograms, an amount more than sufficient to justify imposing
the penalty under Sec. 14 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. A sample taken from one (1) of he packages is
logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-
appellant. Therefore, a positive result for the presence of drugs is indicative that there is 1.1 kilogram of drugs in the plastic package
from which the sample was taken. If it is then proved, beyond reasonable doubt, xxx that accused appellant transported into the
Philippines the plastic packages from which samples were taken for tests, and found positive as prohibited drugs, then conviction for
importing shabu is definitely in order.
Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, it can be presumed that the
entire substance is shabu. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused who must prove otherwise. Appellants in this case have not
presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.
It is clear, therefore, that when accused-appellant stipulated that the weight of the examined specimens for Criminal Case Nos.
3618-D and 3619-D totaled 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively, he in effect admitted that the said amounts of shabu are pure and
unadulterated. Moreover, accused-appellant made no reservations as to his admission on the veracity of the results as reflected in
Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96. His only concern, at that time, was to make it clear that the forensic scientist who examined
the confiscated substance was not aware of where the specimen came from.
[66]
This was in accord with the theory of the defense
that it was not accused-appellant but a companion, Alvin, who was in possession of the confiscated substance. Thus, due to the
absence of any reservation on the total weight of the shabu examined, accused-appellant can no longer be heard to go back on his
previous admission by requesting a quantitative test of the same.
Nevertheless, accused-appellant argues that a quantitative test should be allowed in view of an alleged circular issued by this
Court sometime in 1996 directing the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct a qualitative and a quantitative examination on all illegal
drugs submitted to the said office in relation to a case.
[67]

This argument of accused-appellant is totally bereft of any legal basis. This Court never issued any such circular requiring the
PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct quantitative and qualitative tests on substances which they examine. It is clear that this argument
was resorted to by counsel for the defense in order to mislead the trial court and this court into acquitting his client. This
contemptuous conduct of counsel for the defense will be dealt with appropriately.
Accused-appellant also claims that the biased attitude of the trial judge deprived him of due process. In this regard, he cites in
his appeal brief a single instance when the judge allegedly revealed his bias, to wit:
COURT:
Mark it.
Q What happened after the accused handed to you one pack of crystalline substance?
A Immediately, I switched on our voyager pager which prompted my backup to subdue the suspect and introduce ourselves as
Anti Narcotics police, sir.
COURT:
By the way, did you not give the money to the accused when he handed to you the alleged substance?
A I gave it to him, your honor.
COURT:
So the money was already in the possession of the accused when you received the shabu from him.
A Yes, your Honor.
[68]

We fail to see how this single noted instance of questioning can justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. We have
exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in presiding
over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a witness if the
purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. Thus, in Zheng Bai Hui, we said:
In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop the truth and to
get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a
conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in
putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in
this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they
permitted a miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some
material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him
to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine or cross-
examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may
seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or
the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which
tend to destroy the theory of one party.
[69]

The sale of less than 200 grams of methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, is punishable with a penalty ranging
from prision correccional toreclusion temporal, depending on the quantity.
[70]
Thus, if the regulated drug weighs less than 66.67
grams, then the penalty is prision correctional, if 66.67 grams or more but less than 133.33 grams then the penalty is prision mayor,
and if 133.33 grams or more but less than 200 grams then the penalty is reclusion temporal. In Criminal Case No. 3618-D, the
amount of shabu involved weighs 5.08 grams, as such the appropriate penalty is prision correccional. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period or from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be within the range of prision correccional medium
and the minimum penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed or, in this case, arresto mayor. It is,
therefore, clear from the foregoing that the trial committed an error in imposing an indeterminate sentence of 1 year, 8 months and
20 days, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months, as maximum, of prision correccional. Accordingly, this must be modified.
On the other hand, the possession of 200 grams or more of shabu carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Since no aggravating
circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, was correct in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant
Loreto Medenilla y Doria is hereby found GUILTY of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, and hereby sentenced: (a) in Criminal Case No. 3618-D, to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto
mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Counsel for the defense, Atty. Marcelino Arias, is hereby ordered to explain within ten (10) days why he should not be cited in
contempt for citing an inexistent circular in his pleadings.
SO ORDERED.

MARCOS VS SANDIGANBAYAN
This scenic Philippine archipelago is a citadel of justice, due process and rule of law. Succinct and clear is the provision of the
constitution of this great Republic that every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. [Art. 111, Sec. 14(2)]. As
held in People of the Philippines vs. Ellizabeth Ganguso y Decena (G.R. No 115430, November 23, 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275):
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution
which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not
even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean
such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of error, produce absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the
offense charged.
So also, well-settled, to the point of being elementary, is the doctrine that when inculpatory facts are susceptible to two or
more interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill or hurdle the test of
moral certainty required for conviction. (People of the Philippines vs. Eric F. Timtiman, G.R. No. 101663, November 4, 1992, 215
SCRA 364, 373 citingPeople vs. Remorosa, 200 SCRA 350, 360 [1991]; People vs. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248; People vs. Aranda, 226 SCRA
562; People vs. Maongco, 230 SCRA 562; People vs. Salangga, 234 SCRA 407)
Mindful of and guided by the aforecited constitutional and legal precepts, doctrines and principles prevailing in this jurisdiction,
should petitioners Motion for Reconsideration be granted?
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 17450 before the Sandiganbayan, the Information indicting Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans,
Jr. for a violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
alleges:
That on or about June 8, 1984, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Makati, Metro-Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused IMELDA R. MARCOS and JOSE P. DANS, JR., public officers, being then Chairman and
Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), a government corporate entity created under Executive Order
No. 603 of the former President Ferdinand Marcos, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their
positions and committing the crime in relation to their offices, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with
one another, enter on behalf of the aforesaid government corporation into a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in
Pasay City, with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and conditions manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled off to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan, with Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena, as Chairman
and Justices Jose S. Balajadia and Narciso T. Atienza, as members. On September 15, 1993, when the First Division failed to comply
with the legal requirement of unanimity of its three members due to the dissent of Justice Narciso T. Atienza, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special Division of five and designating Justices Augusto M.
Amores and Cipriano A. Del Rosario, as additional members.
On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Presiding Justice Garchitorena requesting that he be given fifteen (15) days to
send in his Manifestation. However, on the same day, September 21, 1993, when Justice Balajadia and Presiding Justice
Garchitorena agreed with the opinion of Justice Del Rosario, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Administrative Order No. 293-
93, dissolving the Special Division of Five, without waiting for Justice Amores manifestation. Justice Garchitorena considered the
said request of Justice Amores as pointless because of the agreement of Justice Balajadia and the undersigned to the conclusion
reached by Justice Atienza. Thus, on September 24, 1993, the now assailed decision was handed down by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
Under the aforequoted Information charging accused Imelda R. Marcos and Jose P. Dans, Jr. with a violation of Section 3(g) of
RA 3019, the following elements of the offense charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: 1] that the accused acted
as a public officer; 2] that subject Contract or transaction entered into by the latter is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
There is no dispute that sometime in the year 1984, the herein petitioner, Imelda R. Marcos, was Minister of Human
Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was the Minister of Transportation and Communication. The two served as ex oficio Chairman and
Vice Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail Transport Authority (LRTA). Petitioner Marcos was also Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI).
On June 8, 1984, petitioner, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI, and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA, signed the
Lease Agreement (Exhibit B) by virtue of which LRTA leased to PGHFI subject lot with an area of 7,340 square meters, at a monthly
rental ofP102,760.00 for a period of twenty-five (25) years.
On June 27, 1984, the PGHFI, represented by its Chairman Imelda R. Marcos, and Transnational Construction Corporation,
represented by its President Ignacio B. Gimenez, signed the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit D), wherein said lessee rented the same
area of 7,340 square meters for P734,000.00 a month, for a period of twenty-five (25) years.
For executing the aforesaid Lease Agreement (Exhibit B), petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr. were indicted in the said
Information, for conspiring and confederating with each other in entering into subject Lease Agreement alleged to be manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
After trial, as earlier alluded to, the Sandiganbayan convicted the petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr. of the offense charged.
On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of this court came out with its decision affirming the judgment, as against petitioner
Imelda R. Marcos, in G.R. No. 126995, but reversing the same judgment, as against Jose P. Dans, Jr., in G.R. No. 127073.
In affirming the judgment of conviction against petitioner, the Third Division found the rental price stipulated in the Lease
Agreement, (Exhibit B) unfair and unreasonably low, upon a comparison with the rental rate in the Sub-lease
Agreement (Exhibit D), which contract petitioner subsequently signed on behalf of PGHFI, with TNCC. Undaunted, the petitioner
interposed the present Motion for Reconsideration.
The pivot of inquiry here is whether all the elements of the offense charged have been duly substantiated. As regards the first
element, did petitioner Imelda R. Marcos enter into the Lease Agreement marked Exhibit B as a public officer? As clearly stated
on the face of the subject contract under scrutiny, petitioner signed the same in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI and not as
Human Settlement Minister nor as ex-officio Chairman of LRTA. It was Jose P. Dans, Jr. who signed said Contract, as ex-officio Vice-
Chairman of LRTA. Although petitioner was the ex-officio Chairman of LRTA, at the time, there is no evidence to show that she was
present when the Board of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease Agreement sued upon.
In light of the foregoing antecedent facts and circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that petitioner did not sign subject
Lease Agreement as a public officer, within the contemplation of RA 3019 and, therefore, the first element of the offense charged i s
wanting.
It bears stressing, in this connection, that Jose P. Dans, Jr., the public officer who signed the said Lease Agreement (Exhibit
B) for LRTA, was acquitted.
As regards the second element of the offense - that such Lease Agreement is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government, the respondent court based its finding thereon against the petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr., on a ratiocination that while
the rental price under the Lease Agreement is only P102,760.00 a month, the monthly rental rate under the Sub-lease Agreement
is P734,000.00. After comparing the two rental rates aforementioned, the respondent court concluded that the rental price
of P102,760.00 a month is unfair, unreasonable and disadvantageous to the government.
But Exhibit B does not prove that the said contract entered into by petitioner is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the government. There is no established standard by which Exhibit Bs rental provisions could be adjudged prejudicial to LRTA or
the entire government. Exhibit B standing alone does not prove any offense. Neither does Exhibit B together with the Sub-lease
Agreement (Exhibit D) prove the offense charged.
At most, it creates only a doubt in the mind of the objective readers as to which (between the lease and sub-lease rental rates)
is the fair and reasonable one, considering the different circumstances as well as parties involved. It could happen that in both
contracts, neither the LRTA nor the Government suffered any injury. There is, therefore, insufficient evidence to prove petitioners
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Verily, it is too obvious to require an extended disquisition that the only basis of the respondent court for condemning the
Lease Agreement(Exhibit B) as manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government was a comparison of the rental rate
in the Lease Agreement, with the very much higher rental price under the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit D). Certainly, such a
comparison is purely speculative and violative of due process. The mere fact that the Sub-lease Agreement provides a monthly
rental of P734,000.00 does not necessarily mean that the rental price of P102,760.00 per month under the Lease Agreement (Exhibit
B) is very low, unreasonable and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. There are many factors to consider
in the determination of what is a reasonable rate of rental.
What is more, as stressed by Jose P. Dans Jr., when subject Lease Agreement was inked, the rental rate therein provided was
based on a study conducted in accordance with generally accepted rules of rental computation. On this score, Mr. Ramon F. Cuervo,
Jr., the real estate appraiser who testified in the case as an expert witness and whose impartiality and competence were never
impugned, assured the court that the rental price stipulated in the Lease Agreement under scrutiny was fair and
adequate. According to him, witness, the reasonable rental for subject property at the time of execution of Exhibit B was
only P73,000.00 per month.
That the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit D) was for a very much higher rental rate of P734,000.00 a month is of no
moment. This circumstance did not necessarily render the monthly rental rate of P102,760.00 manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the lessor. Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the rental rate of P102,760.00 per month was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. Not even a single lease contract covering a property within the vicinity
of the said leased premises was offered in evidence. The disparity between the rental price of the Lease Agreement and that of the
Sublease Agreement is no evidence at all to buttress the theory of the prosecution, that the Lease Agreement in question is
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. Gross is a comparative term. Before it can be considered gross,
there must be a standard by which the same is weighed and measured.
All things viewed in proper perspective, it is decisively clear that there is a glaring absence of substantiation that the Lease
Agreement under controversy is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, as theorized upon by the prosecution.
Furthermore, that the lessee, PGHFI, succeeded in obtaining a high rental rate of P734,000.00 a month, did not result in any
disadvantage to the government because obviously, the rental income realized by PGHFI from the Sub-lease Agreement (Exhibit
D) augmented the financial support for and improved the management and operation of the Philippine General Hospital, which
is, after all, a government hospital of the people and for the people.
Another sustainable ground for the granting of petitioners motion for reconsideration is the failure and inability of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner was present when the Board of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease
Agreement complained of. Albeit, petitioner was ex oficio chairman of the Board of Directors of LRTA when the said Lease
Agreement was entered into, there is no evidence whatsoever to show that she attended the board meeting of LRTA which
deliberated and acted upon subject Lease Agreement (Exhibit B). It is thus beyond cavil that petitioner signed the said Lease
Agreement as Chairman of the PGH Foundation, Inc., a private charitable foundation, and not as a public officer.
Neither can petitioner be considered as in conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been found without any criminal liability
for signing the same Lease Agreement. Absent any conspiracy of petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter cannot be viewed as an
act of the former. Petitioner is only answerable for her own individual act. Consequently, petitioner not having signed Exhibit B as
a public officer, there is neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under Section 3 (g) of Rep Act 3019.
It bears repeating that apart from the Lease Agreement and Sub-lease Agreement marked Exhibits B and D, respectively,
the prosecution offered no other evidence to prove the accusation at bar.
What makes petitioners stance the more meritorious and impregnable is the patent violation of her right to due process,
substantive and procedural, by the respondent court. Records disclose that: (a) the First Division of the Sandiganbayan composed of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could not agree on whether to convict or acquit the
petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending against her. Justice Atienza was in favor of exonerating petitioner in Criminal Case
Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452. Justices Garchitorena and Balajadia wanted to convict her in Criminal Case Nos. 17450, 17451, 17452
and 17453. As there there was no unanimity of votes in Criminal Case Nos. 17451 and 17452; (b) on September 15, 1993, in
accordance with Sec. 5 of P. D. No. 1606, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Adm. Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special
Division of five (5) justices, and naming thereto, Justices Augusto M. Amores and Cipriano A. del Rosario; (c) on September 21, 1993,
Justice Amores sent a written request to Presiding Justice Garchitorena asking that he be given fifteen (15) days to submit his
Manifestation; (d) on the same day, September 21, 1993, however, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and del
Rosario, after attending a hearing of the Committee of Justice of the House of Representatives, lunched together in a Quezon City
restaurant where they discussed petitioners cases in the absence of Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence of a non-
member of the Special Division. Thereat, Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the
position of Justice Atienza to acquit petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 17449, 17451 and 17452 and to convict her in the other cases;
and (e) when the Justices returned to the official workplace of Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued Adm. Order No.
293-93 dissolving the Special Division.
Such procedural flaws committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its decision convicting petitioner
for the following reasons, viz:
First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or division, shall be held in
itsprincipal office in the Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and determine all cases filed with it x x x. This rule reiterates Sec. 2
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, creating the Sandiganbayan.
Second, The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow unscheduled discussion of cases. We take judicial notice of the procedure
that cases in all courts are carefully calendared and advance notices are given to judges and justices to enable them to study and
prepare for deliberation. The calendaring of cases cannot be the subject of anybodys whims and caprices.
Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also allow informal discussion of cases. The deliberations in case at bar did not
appear on record. The informal discussion of the three justices came to light only when petitioner moved to inhibit Presiding Justice
Garchitorena after her conviction by the resuscitated First Division. Presiding Justice Garchitorena, in a paper entitled Response,
revealed for the first time the informal discussion of petitioners cases at an unnamed restaurant in Quezon City. There is no way to
know how the discussion was conducted as it was not minuted.
Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the presence of a non-member in the deliberation of cases. In the case
at bar, a certain justice was present when Presiding Justice Garchitorena, Justice Balajadia, and Justice del Rosario discussed
petitioners cases while taking their lunch in a Quezon City restaurant.
Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the exclusion of a member of a Division, whether regular or special, in the
deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza and Amores were members of the Special Division but were not present when petitioners
cases were discussed over lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. They were not notified of the informal, unscheduled meeting. In fact,
Justice Amores had a pending request for 15 days to study petitioners cases. In effect, Atienza and Amores were
disenfranchised. They were denied their right to vote for the conviction or acquittal of petitioner.
These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to be tried by a collegial court. Under PD No. 1606, as amended, and
pursuant to the rules of Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted except upon the vote of three justices, regardless of
whether her cases are before a regular division of three (3) justices or a Special Division of five (5) justices. But more important than
the vote of three (3) justices is the process by which they arrive at their vote. It is indispensable that their vote be preceded by
discussion and deliberation by all the members of the division. Before the deliberation by all, any opinion of a justice is but tentative
and could be changed. It is only after all the justices have been heard should the justices reach a judgment. No one opinion can be
denigrated in importance for experience shows that an opinion that starts as a minority opinion could become the majority opinion
after the collision of views of the justices. The right of the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard by all the five justices of the
Special Division. She is entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members.
In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack
of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5)
justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases
against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and agree with the original
opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del
Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the
unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was
denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.
We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice Amores was of de minimis importance as it cannot overturn the votes
of the three justices convicting the petitioner. This is a mere guesswork. The more reasonable supposition is that said opinion could
have changed the opinions of the other justices if it is based on an unbiased appreciation of facts and an undistorted interpretation
of pertinent laws. For we cannot unreasonably suppose that Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justices Balajadia and Atienza are
bigots who will never change their opinions about the guilt of the petitioner despite a better opinion.
Yet, that is not all the value of the aborted opinion of Justice Amores. If it were an opinion for the acquittal of the petitioner,
that opinion will have an added value when petitioner appeals her conviction to this Court. Again, depending on its scholarship, that
minority opinion could sway the opinion of this Court towards the acquittal of petitioner.
Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that the decision of the First Division of the respondent Sandiganbayan
convicting the petitioner is void for violating her right to substantive and procedural due process of law.
It is opined, however, that this case should be remanded to the respondent Sandiganbayan for re-decision by a Special Division
of 5. As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings for a void judgment does not expose an accused to double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a
different treatment considering the great length of time it has been pending with our courts. Records reveal that petitioner was first
indicted in Criminal Case No. 17450 in January 1992. More than six (6) years passed but petitioners prosecution is far from
over. To remand the case to the Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional right to its speedy disposition. Section 16,
Article III of the Constitution assures all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all j udicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies. This right expands the right of an accused to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial x x x in
criminal cases guaranteed by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. It has a broadening effect because Section 16 covers the
periods before, during and after trial whereas Section 14(2) covers only the trial period.
[1]
Heretofore, we have held that an accused
should be acquitted when his right to speedy trial has been violated. Thus, in the early 1936 case of People vs. Castaeda, et al. 63
Phil 480, 485, 486, a ponencia of Mr. Justice Laurel, we held:
A strict regard for the constitutional rights of the accused would demand, therefore, that the case be remanded to the court
below for new trial before an impartial judge. There are vital considerations, however, which in the opinion of this court render this
step unnecessary. In the first place, the Constitution, Article III, section 1, paragraph 17, guarantees to every accused person the
right to a speedy trial. This criminal proceeding has been dragging on for almost five (5) years now. The accused have twice
appealed to this court for redress from the wrong that they have suffered at the hands of the trial court. At least one of them,
namely, Pedro Fernandez (alias Piro), had been confined in prison from July 20, 1932 to November 27, 1934 for inability to post the
required bond of P3,000 which was finally reduced to P300. The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings
against the accused to come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law. (Conde vs. Rivera and
Unson, 45 Phil., 650).
We reiterated this rule in Acebedo vs. Sarmiento , viz:
[2]

2. More specifically, this Court has consistently adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy
trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within
the prohibition against an accused being twice put in jeopardy. The extensive opinion of Justice Castro in People vs. Obsania noted
earlier made reference to four Philippine decisions, People vs. Diaz, People vs. Abao, People vs. Robles, and People vs. Cloribel. In
all of the above case, this Court left no doubt that a dismissal of the case, though at the instance of the defendant grounded on the
disregard of his right to a speedy trial was tantamount to an acquittal. In People vs. Diaz, it was shown that the case was set for
hearing twice and the prosecution without asking for postponement or giving any explanation failed to appear. In People vs. Abao,
the facts disclosed that there were three postponements. Thereafter, at the time the resumption of the trial was scheduled, the
complaining witness as in this case was absent, this Court held that respondent Judge was justified in dismissing the case upon
motion of the defense and that the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal would place the accused twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. People vs. Robles likewise presented a picture of witnesses for the prosecution not being
available, with the lower court after having transferred the hearings on several occasions denying the last plea for postponement
and dismissing the case. Such order of dismissal, according to this Court is not provisional in character but one which is tantamount
to acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. This is a summary of the Cloribel case as set
forth in the above opinion of Justice Castro. In Cloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from
September 27, 1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial, after numerous postponements,
mostly at the instance of the prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon motion of
defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held, that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a dismissal but an
acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants insistence on their constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the
prosecutions failure to appear on the date of trial. (Italics supplied) There is no escaping the conclusion then that petitioner here
has clearly made out a case of an acquittal arising from the order of dismissal given in open court.
The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of Article III of the Constitution is the same: justice delayed is justice
denied. Violation of either section should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused.
There are other reasons why the case should not be remanded to the court a quo. Three justices of the Special Division,
namely Justice Atienza, Balajadia and Amores have already retired. Presiding Justice Garchitorena is still with the respondent court
but his impartiality has been vigorously assailed by the petitioner. Mr. Justice Francisco of the Third Division of this Court noted that
Presiding Justice Garchitorenas undue interference in the examination of witness Cuervo revealed his bias and prejudice against
petitioner.
[3]
As Mr. Justice Francisco observed the court questions were so numerous which as per petitioner Dans count totaled
179 compared to prosecutor Querubins questions which numbered merely 73. More noteworthy, however, is that the court
propounded leading, misleading, and baseless hypothetical questions rolled into one.
[4]
Mr. Justice Franciscos opinion was
concurred by Mr. Justice Melo. Truly, even Mr. Chief Justice Narvasa, Madam Justice Romero and Mr. Justice Panganiban who voted
to convict petitioner did not refute Mr. Justice Franciscos observations on the lack of impartiality of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena. They disregarded Mr. Ramon F. Cuervos testimony and based the conviction of petitioner purely on the
documentary evidence submitted by the People. Moreover, all the evidence in the case at bar are now before this Court and to
avoid further delay, we can evaluate the evidence. In fact, the same evidence has been passed upon by the Third Division of this
Court in formulating its judgment of affirmance sought to be reconsidered. Certainly, it will be sheer rigmarole for this Court to still
remand the case for a Special Division of five of the Sandiganbayan to render another decision in the case, with respect to the herein
petitioner.
I consider this opinion incomplete without quoting herein the following portion of the concurring and dissenting opinion of
former Associate Justice Ricardo J. Francisco dated January 29, 1998:
Thus, purely from the legal standpoint, with the evident weakness of the prosecutions case and the procedural aberrations that
marred the trial, it is simply unsound and impossible to treat differently each petitioner who found themselves in one and the same
situation. Indeed, our regained democracy, creditably, is successfully bailing us out from the ruins of the authoritarian regime, and it
expects that government efforts in going after the plunderers of that dark past remain unrelenting and decisive. But let us not, in
our anxiety to carry out this duty, for a moment forget that our criminal justice system is not a popularity contest where freedom
and punishment are determined merely by the fame or infamy of the litigants. The scales of justice, it has been aptly said,
[5]
must
hang equal and, in fact, should even be tipped in favor of the accused because of the constitutional presumption of
innocence. Needless to stress, this right is available to every accused, whatever his present circumstance and no matter how dark
and repellent his past. Culpability for crimes must always take its bearing from evidence and universal precepts of due process -
lest we sacrifice in mocking shame once again the very liberties we are defending.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration is hereby GRANTED and petitioner Imelda R.
Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.



























EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. CALDERON, respondent.
Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC),
seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision dated November 25, 2002
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60016,
which partially affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Makati City, Branch 61, insofar as it grants moral damages
and costs of suit to herein respondent, Jose T. Calderon.
The decision under review recites the factual background of the case, as follows:
Plaintiff-appellee [now respondent] Jose T. Calderon (Calderon for brevity), is a businessman engaged in several business activities
here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. In addition thereto, he is a stockholder of
PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the
U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the defendant-appellant [now petitioner] Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC for brevity),
is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of
deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among others.
xxx xxx xxx
Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card (Visa card for brevity). The said
Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso
transaction is TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar
account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.
In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates, went to Hongkong for business and pleasure
trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the
basement of the Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of
shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in
cash, he used his Visa card (No. 4921 6400 0001 9373) to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit
card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of
his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought
the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to
cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that
he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on account of EBCs
wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed with the Regional
Trial Court at Makati City a complaint for damages
[2]
against EBC.
In its Answer,
[3]
EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the latters credit card privileges for dollar transactions were
earlier placed under suspension on account of Calderons prior use of the same card in excess of his credit limit, adding that
Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase on due date, thereby causing his obligation to become past due. Corollarily, EBC
asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain the required minimum deposit of $3,000.00.
To expedite the direct examination of witnesses, the trial court required the parties to submit affidavits, in question-and-
answer form, of their respective witnesses, to be sworn to in court, with cross examination to be made in open court.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 10, 1997,
[4]
the trial court, concluding that defendant bank was negligent if not in bad
faith, in suspending, or blacklisting plaintiffs credit card without notice or basis, rendered judgment in favor of Calderon, thus:
WHEREFORE PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as against defendant EQUITABLE
BANKING CORPORATION, which is hereby ORDERED to pay plaintiff as follows:
1. the sum of US$150.00 as actual damages;
2. the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. the sum of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P500.00 per court hearing and
5. costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, EBC went to the Court of Appeals (CA), whereat its recourse was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 60016.
After due proceedings, the CA, in a decision dated November 25, 2002,
[5]
affirmed that of the trial court but only insofar as the
awards of moral damages, the amount of which was even reduced, and the costs of suits are concerned. More specifically, the CA
decision dispositively reads:
[6]

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision of the court a quo dated 10 October 1997
is AFFIRMED insofar as the awards of moral damages and costs of suit are concerned. However, anent the award of moral damages,
the same is reduced to One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.
The rest of the awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Evidently unwilling to accept a judgment short of complete exemption from any liability to Calderon, EBC is now with us via the
instant petition on its lone submission that THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO
MORAL DAMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ACTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ATTENDED WITH ANY MALICE OR
BAD FAITH.
[7]

The petition is impressed with merit.
In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.
[8]
However, to be entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough that one
merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party.
[9]
In Philippine
Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
[10]
we have had the occasion to reiterate the conditions to be met in order
that moral damages may be recovered, viz:
An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological suffering
sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of
the instances expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith,
[11]
or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations.
[12]
Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
[13]

Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended petitioners dishonor of respondents credit card. For,
as found no less by the same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement
[14]
with
respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all charges incurred including charges incurred
through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the credit privileges
shall be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11 hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its very own finding of absence of bad faith or malice on the part of the
petitioner, the CA nonetheless adjudged it liable for moral damages to respondent.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable for moral damages, the CA justified the award on its assessment that EBC was
negligent in not informing Calderon that his credit card was already suspended even before he left for Hongkong, ratiocinating that
petitioners right to automatically suspend a cardholders privileges without notice should not have been indiscriminately used in the
case of respondent because the latter has already paid his past obligations and has an existing dollar deposit in an amount more
than the required minimum for credit card at the time he made his purchases in Hongkong. But, as explained by the petitioner in
the memorandum it filed with this Court,
[15]
which explanations were never controverted by respondent:
xxx prior to the incident in question (i.e., April 30, 1986 when the purchases at the Gucci store in Hongkong were made),
respondent made credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong from August to September 1985 amounting to US$14,226.12, while only
having a deposit of US$3,639.00 in his dollar account as evidenced by the pertinent monthly statement of respondents credit card
transactions and his bank passbook, thus exceeding his credit limit; these purchases were accommodated by the petitioner on the
condition that the amount needed to cover the same will be deposited in a few days as represented by respondents secretary and
his companys general manager a certain Mrs. Zamora and Mr. F.R. Oliquiano; respondent however failed to make good on his
commitment; later, respondent likewise failed to make the required deposit on the due date of the purchases as stated in the
pertinent monthly statement of account; as a consequence thereof, his card privileges for dollar transactions were suspended; it was
only four months later on 31 January 1986, that respondent deposited the sum of P14,501.89 in his dollar account to cover his
purchases; the said amount however was not sufficient to maintain the required minimum dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the
respondents dollar deposit stood at only US$2,704.94 after satisfaction of his outstanding accounts; a day before he left for
Hongkong, respondent made another deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but did not bother to request the petitioner for
the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same remained under suspension.
[16]

The foregoing are based on the sworn affidavit of petitioners Collection Manager, a certain Lourdes Canlas, who was never cross
examined by the respondent nor did the latter present any evidence to refute its veracity.
Given the above, and with the express provision on automatic suspension without notice under paragraph 3, supra, of the
parties Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no basis for holding petitioner negligent for not notifying respondent of the
suspended status of his credit card privileges.
It may be so that respondent, a day before he left for Hongkong, made a deposit of US$14,000.00 to his dollar account with
petitioner. The sad reality, however, is that he never verified the status of his card before departing for Hongkong, much less
requested petitioner to reinstate the same.
[17]

And, certainly, respondent could not have justifiably assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his card by reason alone
of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he left for Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has the option to decide
whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on considerations which the petitioner deemed
proper, not the least of which are the cardholders payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with any additional
requirements imposed by it. That option, after all, is expressly embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of which
unmistakably states:
The issuer shall likewise have the option of reinstating the card holders privileges which have been terminated for any reason
whatsoever upon submission of a new accomplished application form if required by the issuer and upon payment of an additional
processing fee equivalent to annual fee.
[18]

Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not have been properly adjudged liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material distinction
between damages and injury. To quote from our decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
[19]

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.
We do not take issue with the appellate court in its observation that the Credit Card Agreement herein involved is a contract of
adhesion, with the stipulations therein contained unilaterally prepared and imposed by the petitioner to prospective credit card
holders on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. As said by us in Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals:
[20]

A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of contract which the other party
may accept or reject, but cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely
affixes his signature or his adhesion thereto giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain
on equal footing.
On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that such a contract is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being
that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.
[21]

Moreover, the provision on automatic suspension without notice embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement is couched in
clear and unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself was entered into by respondent who, by his own account, is a
reputable businessman engaged in business activities here and abroad.
On a final note, we emphasize that moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claim for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
[22]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision under review REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.


























EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. CALDERON, respondent.
Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC),
seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision dated November 25, 2002
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60016,
which partially affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Makati City, Branch 61, insofar as it grants moral damages
and costs of suit to herein respondent, Jose T. Calderon.
The decision under review recites the factual background of the case, as follows:
Plaintiff-appellee [now respondent] Jose T. Calderon (Calderon for brevity), is a businessman engaged in several business activities
here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. In addition thereto, he is a stockholder of
PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the
U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the defendant-appellant [now petitioner] Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC for brevity),
is one of the leading commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of
deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among others.
xxx xxx xxx
Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card (Visa card for brevity). The said
Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines. The credit limit for the peso
transaction is TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar
account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.
In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates, went to Hongkong for business and pleasure
trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went to Gucci Department Store located at the
basement of the Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). There and then, Calderon purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of
shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in
cash, he used his Visa card (No. 4921 6400 0001 9373) to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit
card to the saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of
his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted. Calderon sought
the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not honor it and even threatened to
cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci goods and items that
he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on account of EBCs
wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed with the Regional
Trial Court at Makati City a complaint for damages
[2]
against EBC.
In its Answer,
[3]
EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the latters credit card privileges for dollar transactions were
earlier placed under suspension on account of Calderons prior use of the same card in excess of his credit limit, adding that
Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase on due date, thereby causing his obligation to become past due. Corollarily, EBC
asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain the required minimum deposit of $3,000.00.
To expedite the direct examination of witnesses, the trial court required the parties to submit affidavits, in question-and-
answer form, of their respective witnesses, to be sworn to in court, with cross examination to be made in open court.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 10, 1997,
[4]
the trial court, concluding that defendant bank was negligent if not in bad
faith, in suspending, or blacklisting plaintiffs credit card without notice or basis, rendered judgment in favor of Calderon, thus:
WHEREFORE PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as against defendant EQUITABLE
BANKING CORPORATION, which is hereby ORDERED to pay plaintiff as follows:
1. the sum of US$150.00 as actual damages;
2. the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. the sum of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P500.00 per court hearing and
5. costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, EBC went to the Court of Appeals (CA), whereat its recourse was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 60016.
After due proceedings, the CA, in a decision dated November 25, 2002,
[5]
affirmed that of the trial court but only insofar as the
awards of moral damages, the amount of which was even reduced, and the costs of suits are concerned. More specifically, the CA
decision dispositively reads:
[6]

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision of the court a quo dated 10 October 1997
is AFFIRMED insofar as the awards of moral damages and costs of suit are concerned. However, anent the award of moral damages,
the same is reduced to One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.
The rest of the awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Evidently unwilling to accept a judgment short of complete exemption from any liability to Calderon, EBC is now with us via the
instant petition on its lone submission that THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO
MORAL DAMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ACTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ATTENDED WITH ANY MALICE OR
BAD FAITH.
[7]

The petition is impressed with merit.
In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.
[8]
However, to be entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough that one
merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other party.
[9]
In Philippine
Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
[10]
we have had the occasion to reiterate the conditions to be met in order
that moral damages may be recovered, viz:
An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or psychological suffering
sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of
the instances expressed or envisioned by Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted
fraudulently or in bad faith,
[11]
or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations.
[12]
Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
[13]

Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended petitioners dishonor of respondents credit card. For,
as found no less by the same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card Agreement
[14]
with
respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all charges incurred including charges incurred
through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit shall become due and demandable and the credit privileges
shall be automatically suspended without notice to the CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11 hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its very own finding of absence of bad faith or malice on the part of the
petitioner, the CA nonetheless adjudged it liable for moral damages to respondent.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable for moral damages, the CA justified the award on its assessment that EBC was
negligent in not informing Calderon that his credit card was already suspended even before he left for Hongkong, ratiocinating that
petitioners right to automatically suspend a cardholders privileges without notice should not have been indiscriminately used in the
case of respondent because the latter has already paid his past obligations and has an existing dollar deposit in an amount more
than the required minimum for credit card at the time he made his purchases in Hongkong. But, as explained by the petitioner in
the memorandum it filed with this Court,
[15]
which explanations were never controverted by respondent:
xxx prior to the incident in question (i.e., April 30, 1986 when the purchases at the Gucci store in Hongkong were made),
respondent made credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong from August to September 1985 amounting to US$14,226.12, while only
having a deposit of US$3,639.00 in his dollar account as evidenced by the pertinent monthly statement of respondents credit card
transactions and his bank passbook, thus exceeding his credit limit; these purchases were accommodated by the petitioner on the
condition that the amount needed to cover the same will be deposited in a few days as represented by respondents secretary and
his companys general manager a certain Mrs. Zamora and Mr. F.R. Oliquiano; respondent however failed to make good on his
commitment; later, respondent likewise failed to make the required deposit on the due date of the purchases as stated in the
pertinent monthly statement of account; as a consequence thereof, his card privileges for dollar transactions were suspended; it was
only four months later on 31 January 1986, that respondent deposited the sum of P14,501.89 in his dollar account to cover his
purchases; the said amount however was not sufficient to maintain the required minimum dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the
respondents dollar deposit stood at only US$2,704.94 after satisfaction of his outstanding accounts; a day before he left for
Hongkong, respondent made another deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but did not bother to request the petitioner for
the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same remained under suspension.
[16]

The foregoing are based on the sworn affidavit of petitioners Collection Manager, a certain Lourdes Canlas, who was never cross
examined by the respondent nor did the latter present any evidence to refute its veracity.
Given the above, and with the express provision on automatic suspension without notice under paragraph 3, supra, of the
parties Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no basis for holding petitioner negligent for not notifying respondent of the
suspended status of his credit card privileges.
It may be so that respondent, a day before he left for Hongkong, made a deposit of US$14,000.00 to his dollar account with
petitioner. The sad reality, however, is that he never verified the status of his card before departing for Hongkong, much less
requested petitioner to reinstate the same.
[17]

And, certainly, respondent could not have justifiably assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his card by reason alone
of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he left for Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has the option to decide
whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on considerations which the petitioner deemed
proper, not the least of which are the cardholders payment record, capacity to pay and compliance with any additional
requirements imposed by it. That option, after all, is expressly embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of which
unmistakably states:
The issuer shall likewise have the option of reinstating the card holders privileges which have been terminated for any reason
whatsoever upon submission of a new accomplished application form if required by the issuer and upon payment of an additional
processing fee equivalent to annual fee.
[18]

Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not have been properly adjudged liable for moral damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material distinction
between damages and injury. To quote from our decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals:
[19]

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal i njury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.
We do not take issue with the appellate court in its observation that the Credit Card Agreement herein involved is a contract of
adhesion, with the stipulations therein contained unilaterally prepared and imposed by the petitioner to prospective credit card
holders on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. As said by us in Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals:
[20]

A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of contract which the other party
may accept or reject, but cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the other party merely
affixes his signature or his adhesion thereto giving no room for negotiation and depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain
on equal footing.
On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that such a contract is as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being
that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.
[21]

Moreover, the provision on automatic suspension without notice embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement is couched in
clear and unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself was entered into by respondent who, by his own account, is a
reputable businessman engaged in business activities here and abroad.
On a final note, we emphasize that moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claim for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
[22]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision under review REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.


























SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs.HON. RALPH C. LANTION
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government. His only
guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need.
The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizen's basic due process rights, or the government's ironclad duties under a
treaty. The bugle sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation
under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state
where the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to
enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide the executive department and the courts
in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the
United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11,
expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting
Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by
the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing
a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand
Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents
for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of
the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years
on each count);
B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical
evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official
English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that
needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States
Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondent's July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999 (but received by private
respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and supporting documents from the United
States Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in
accordance with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition Treaty between
the Philippines and the United States enumerates the documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under
which the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under our domestic
law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary
investigation of criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law
and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused
in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the
court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a
request for ample time to evaluate said documents.
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury information and documents obtained through
grand jury process covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the
concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information to Philippine government
and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said
information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the United States
Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. This
Department's denial of your request is consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition
requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and
to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him
access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the
request impartially, fairly and objectively);certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to
restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to
the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction (pp.
104-105, Rollo).
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court
stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be
given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by
refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of
the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional
Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the
parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their
written comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE:
I.
BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I.E., TO DESIST FROM
REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUSIN THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED
SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.
PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND
THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY
DEFICIENT; AND
IV.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed for, was a temporary
restraining order (TRO) providing:
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph
C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to
CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil Case No. 99-
94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August
1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent. However, a review of these issues as
well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and
hearing? An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of which
are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued
by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition
with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights
at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the legal commitments and
obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a
breach, is there any conflict between private respondent's basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive merits of the case, brushing
aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing
of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court.
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty which was executed only on
November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine
Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any
criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted
individual, are abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be
accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the authority of the
Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and identity of the
accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the
commission of these acts;
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or description of the
offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Sec. 4. Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Sec. 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet the requirements of this law and
the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related documents to the Secretary of
Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the sufficiency of the request
and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive authority must ascertain whether or
not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable location of the person
sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which extradition is
requested;
4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense;
5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the execution of punishment for
the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said Article, as
applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his arrest and
committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying documents received in support of
the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State
(Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the
Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting documents are sufficient and
complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and
authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P.D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall
then file a written petition with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an
order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. The j udge
may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the
ends of justice (Paragraph [1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding.
Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of
Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing,
Section 8 of the Decree provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a
showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of
Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing
appeal in criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required 15-day period to
file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on the application of the dual
criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether
or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition
Treaty).1wphi1.nt
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents itself: What is the nature of the
role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition
after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is
authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to
determine whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under
non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of
Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to abide by the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on
June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the
Department of Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. The
statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a
post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of
the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to
determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply with the requirements
laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the
Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to
be able to prepare an extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private
respondent insisted on the following; (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard
which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the opposition;
and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its powers and the other
enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that
it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it
would not allow private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed
the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed
documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review
the papers all by himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his
undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal
investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to
outrightly deny the request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable; and
(c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US
Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon
the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text
and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or
investigatory power, is one or the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-
judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records
and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure
of information by means or accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative
agency's performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an investigatory body
with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and
making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial
functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights
and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based
on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the
parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition documents. The body has no
power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only
power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be
the basis of an extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine whether or
not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not
the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by certain
peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty
of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective
extraditee pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party
may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential
Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a request is forwarded to the
Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article
9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to
prevent his possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It is not only an
imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an
investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences
the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a
"tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78,Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation
certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice
Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier
stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo
vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination under Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings
which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with
immorality, which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case
of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of one's license as a medical practitioner, is an even
greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a respondent which was filed under
Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property,
the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the
earlier case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid down the test to
determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the
forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it
must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however,
the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the proceeding is civil in nature.
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one's property or property right. No less is this true, but
even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited
property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus
saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person
charged. Similar to the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioner's reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, petitioner's Memorandum) that the extradition
treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken.Wright is not authority for
petitioner's conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty
in Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with the denial of
the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether
sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good,
which regards and preserved these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California,
110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective
jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly identical language and
terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which
the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make
them capable of meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the
exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are interpreted in both the United States and the
Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the
confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78).
Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play" (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owner's Association vs.
City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering
with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of
notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993
Ed., pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals
are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein
and present their side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
guarantees the respondent's basic due process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits,
and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from
receipt thereof. Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceeding where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a nuisance per
se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like
establishments which are immediate threats to public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person
sought for criminal prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded from enjoying the
right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy
of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings
fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy considering that the subject
treaty involves the U.S. Government.
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S.
Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the
asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are
given a liberal construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of persons for trial
to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged
fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the
extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at
the time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission of the crime or that
prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents
are then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which
essentially include a copy of the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made
before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are
necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the government of the asylum state to effect extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory
provision requiring duplicate copies of the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other
instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney is
directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex
parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 andEx parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive authority of the Requested
State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having authority
to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioner's memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed
by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests for the provincial
arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and
vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the
diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of Justice. Before doing
so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full
force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings,
that the offenses are covered as extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been
authenticated in accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184).
Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition
request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign country. The court
must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the
defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause
to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having received a "complaint made
under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions
pronounce that international extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a
committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its determinations in factual
findings and conclusions of law and certifies the person's extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of
extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to
surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the requesting government in
seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government
concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one entity the Department of
State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the
Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the court's determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the
Department of Foreign Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points earlier
mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for
extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the
Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing,
and prosecuting the petition for extradition.
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person sought to be extradited be given
due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioner's primary concern is the possible delay in
the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondent's citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of
cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed,
one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they were designed to
protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may
characterize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that no right that of liberty secured not
only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
(pp. 40-41, Private Respondent's Memorandum.)
In the Philippine context, this Court's ruling is invoked:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does
not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to
pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no
question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable
exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right
guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny
him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-
376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioner's argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement. To be effective, requests
for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-
tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord.
Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in "ordered liberty."
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict
sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the
absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers,
he may hold that federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur 2d 819).
Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the power to deny the behest from the
requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that
the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice
for the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest our government with
jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring compliance with the
requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers
(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact,
petitioner even admits that consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those
from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated
period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt
action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from
enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic
of the evaluation procedure. On one hand there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative if
adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the
extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not
only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest
allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information
on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access to official records documents. The general right guaranteed by said
provision is the right to information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is
likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil.
Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion
which alone can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondent's letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee
of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other hand,
private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private
interest only becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the right to
information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby, his right to information becomes
absolute.
The concept of matters of public concerns escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a public officer in the conduct of
the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed.,
p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150
SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has "standing".
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct bearing on his life, and may
either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of
Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes
Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the government (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records, and in
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from the U.S. Government. No
official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign relations with
the U.S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are
matters of public concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be tilted, at such
particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure,
no official governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later,
and in contrast, records of the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be
forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would private respondent's
entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between
the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the
basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a
treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by
Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form
part of the law of the and land no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga
& Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts
should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted
with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the
conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova,
9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly
bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The
doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are
not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may
repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En contrario, these two
components of the law of the land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be
upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as
regards the basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of
extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is
silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex
parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic twin due process rights of
notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes
these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In
fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the
extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a
demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality
argument is, however, overturned by petitioner's revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be
obtainable during trial. The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of
certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the
extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.
A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.
One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American jurisprudence and procedures on
extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by
analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary investigation since both procedures
may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even
allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following
petitioner's theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ
or habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioner's
theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has
already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of
the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." Can
petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and hence affecting foreign relations, the
aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be subservient thereto?
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative proceeding is an opportunity
to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96
[1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997];
Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In essence, procedural due process refers
to the method or manner by which the law is enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
[1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty.
Petitioner's fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested State's non-performance of its commitments
under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of Presidential Decree No.
1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go
vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No.
807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the
Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the
Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707,
although summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of due
process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
. . . [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an employee may be removed or
dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be
informed of the charges preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by
furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense
with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that
the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of
the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his
defenses. . . .
(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or employment, but of liberty
itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioner's favorable action on
the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Court's equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside legality," may be
availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar
does not even call for "justice outside legality," since private respondent's due process rights, although not guaranteed by statute or
by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict
construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on
which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and government authority, he must ever
hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within
which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and
academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.SO ORDERED.
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as
the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23,
2001
[1]
and July 3, 2001
[2]
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.
[3]
The first assailed Order set for hearing
petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to
Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the *Court+ finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a
Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION
PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash.
Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List.
[4]

Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal
custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.
[5]

Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,
[6]
the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the
Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 25.
[7]
The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No.
139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies
of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.
[8]

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution.
[9]
By an identical
vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has
become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with
the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The
Petition alleged, inter alia,that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment
No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code
Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections
1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in
violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion,
[10]
which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that
hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition
case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned
July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one milli on pesos in
cash.
[11]
After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
[12]

Hence, this Petition.
[13]

Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court:
I.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD No.
1069.
II.
The public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail and in allowing Jimenez to go on provisional liberty because:
1. An extradition court has no power to authorize bail, in the absence of any law that provides for such power.
2. Section 13, Article III (right to bail clause) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 (Bail) of the Rules of Court,
as amended, which [were] relied upon, cannot be used as bases for allowing bail in extradition proceedings.
3. The presumption is against bail in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
4. On the assumption that bail is available in extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition, bail is not a matter of
right but only of discretion upon clear showing by the applicant of the existence of special circumstances.
5. Assuming that bail is a matter of discretion in extradition proceedings, the public respondent received no evidence of special
circumstances which may justify release on bail.
6. The risk that Jimenez will flee is high, and no special circumstance exists that will engender a well-founded belief that he will not
flee.
7. The conditions attached to the grant of bail are ineffectual and do not ensure compliance by the Philippines with its obligations
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
8. The Court of Appeals Resolution promulgated on May 10, 2001 in the case entitled Eduardo T. Rodriguez et al. vs. The Hon.
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 17, Manila, CA-G.R. SP No. 64589, relied upon by the public respondent in granting bail, had been
recalled before the issuance of the subject bail orders.
[14]

In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and heari ng before
a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extraditi on
proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this
Court.
[15]
We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity of Present Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court: (1) the issues
were fully considered by such court after requiring the parties to submit their respective memoranda and position papers on the
matter and thus, the filing of a reconsideration motion would serve no useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a patent nullity,
absent factual and legal basis therefor; and (3) the need for relief is extremely urgent, as the passage of sufficient time would give
Jimenez ample opportunity to escape and avoid extradition; and (4) the issues raised are purely of law.
[16]

For resorting directly to this Court instead of the CA, petitioner submits the following reasons: (1) even if the petition is lodged
with the Court of Appeals and such appellate court takes cognizance of the issues and decides them, the parties would still bring the
matter to this Honorable Court to have the issues resolved once and for all [and] to have a binding precedent that all lower courts
ought to follow; (2) the Honorable Court of Appeals had in one case
[17]
ruled on the issue by disallowing bail but the court below
refused to recognize the decision as a judicial guide and all other courts might likewise adopt the same attitude of refusal; and (3)
there are pending issues on bail both in the extradition courts and the Court of Appeals, which, unless guided by the decision that
this Honorable Court will render in this case, would resolve to grant bail in favor of the potential extraditees and would gi ve them
opportunity to flee and thus, cause adverse effect on the ability of the Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing
extradition treaties.
[18]

As a general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior court has been given,
through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1)
when the issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency.
[19]
As a fourth exception, the
Court has also ruled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua
non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the
lower court.
[20]
Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also involve pure questions of law that are of public
interest. Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with.
Likewise, this Court has allowed a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when there are special
and important reasons therefor.
[21]
In Fortich v. Corona
[22]
we stated:
*T+he Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly [before] it if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has
been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and, Advincula vs.
Legaspi, et. al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and
to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has
sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, x x
x requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:
[23]

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should
have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
In a number of other exceptional cases,
[24]
we held as follows:
This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrent with that of Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,quo warranto and habeas corpus, and we entertain direct resort to us in cases where special
and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the same.
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to
take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local
jurisprudence to guide lower courts.
Five Postulates of Extradition
The substantive issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty and the law on extradition. A
cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.
[25]
Since PD 1069 is intended as a
guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory,
[26]
understanding certain postulates of
extradition will aid us in properly deciding the issues raised here.
1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime
[27]
by facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer
[28]
of a fugitive
[29]
from one state to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another
for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting
their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon extradition as the major effective instrument of
international co-operation in the suppression of crime.
[30]
It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to
the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance with municipal and international law.
[31]

An important practical effect x x x of the recognition of the principle that criminals should be restored to a jurisdiction competent
to try and punish them is that the number of criminals seeking refuge abroad will be reduced. For to the extent that efficient means
of detection and the threat of punishment play a significant role in the deterrence of crime within the territorial limits of a State, so
the existence of effective extradition arrangements and the consequent certainty of return to the locusdelicti commissi play a
corresponding role in the deterrence of flight abroad in order to escape the consequence of crime. x x x. From an absence of
extradition arrangements flight abroad by the ingenious criminal receives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the
commission of crime itself.
[32]

In Secretary v. Lantion
[33]
we explained:
The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the extradition of
persons covered by treaties duly entered [into] by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one
world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose of this trend towards
globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the
great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational
crimes.
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and
criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.
2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each
others legal system and judicial process.
[34]
More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty
signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited.
[35]
That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all
relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed,
or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
[36]
extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal
proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are
not.
An extradition *proceeding+ is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee x x x.
x x x x x x x x x
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in
nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an
extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being
rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final
discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion
in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to
extradite.
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited.
[37]
Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and
delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of the assisting authorities to
enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.
[38]
The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only
to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.
[39]

4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified
it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity
[40]
with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure
to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage
other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
[41]

Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.
[42]
This principle
requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty,
are satisfied. In other words, *t+he demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is
entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the
surrender.
[43]
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience
[44]
of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to
flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country.
[45]
Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment
proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that
the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has
demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity,
from fleeing a second time?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Notice and Hearing
Before the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC --informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition
Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest -- gives him notice to escape and to avoid
extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited
-- including terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invoke it in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional
right to liberty without due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo, the formulation of that procedure
is within the discretion of the presiding judge.
Both parties cite Section 6 of PD 1069 in support of their arguments. It states:
SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the
presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and
hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the accused which may be served any where within
the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice. Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received the summons fail to answer
within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the hearing thereof.
(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the accused and
the attorney having charge of the case. (Emphasis ours)
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
We rule in the negative.
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails
sending notices to the opposing parties,
[46]
receiving facts and arguments
[47]
from them,
[48]
and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered immediate. The law could not
have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase if it appears, the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The
trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the
filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused.
Attached to the Petition for Extradition, with a Certificate of Authentication among others, were the following: (1) Annex H, the
Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999 by Mr. Michael E. Savage -- trial attorney in the Campaign Financing Task Force of the Criminal
Division of the US Department of Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices of various exhibits that constituted evidence of
the crimes charged in the Indictment, with Exhibits 1 to 120 (duly authenticated exhibits that constituted evidence of the crimes
charged in the Indictment); (3) Annex BB, the Exhibit I Appendix of Witness *excerpts+ Statements Referenced in the Affidavi t of
Angela Byers and enclosed Statements in two volumes; (4) Annex GG, the Exhibit J Table of Contents for Supplemental Evidentiary
Appendix with enclosed Exhibits 121 to 132; and (5) Annex MM, the Exhibit L Appendix of Witness *excerpts+ Statements
Referenced in the Affidavit of Betty Steward and enclosed Statements in two volumes.
[49]

It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate for him to make an
initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be arrested in order to best serve the ends of
justice. He could have determined whether such facts and circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that the extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that probable causedid exist. In the second questioned Order, he stated:
In the instant petition, the documents sent by the US Government in support of *its+ request for extradition of herein respondent
are enough to convince the Court of the existence of probable cause to proceed with the hearing against the extraditee.
[50]

We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that
a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez.
[51]

Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer
after receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word hearing is notably absent
from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary
[52]
in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the
Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step i n the
entire proceedings.
It is taken for granted that the contracting parties intend something reasonable and something not inconsistent with generally
recognized principles of International Law, nor with previous treaty obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning of a
treaty is ambiguous, the reasonable meaning is to be preferred to the unreasonable, the more reasonable to the less reasonable x x
x .
[53]

Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it
for hearing at some future date would give them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the
Law could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been defeated by the escape of the accused
from the requested state.
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under
oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear
the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People
[54]
and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just
for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the
judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which
to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
[55]

In Webb v. De Leon,
[56]
the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a
warrant of arrest:
Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt
of an accused. In doing so,judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further
examine complainants and their witnesses.
[57]
In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice
of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the
accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort
to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the
entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of
extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite
-- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition
Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination,
no prima facie finding
[58]
is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.
On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant
for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary
hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the
petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure
will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows:
Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that this constitutional provision secures the right to bail of all persons, including those
sought to be extradited. Supposedly, the only exceptions are the ones charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. He also alleges the relevance to the present case of Section 4
[59]
of Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court which, insofar as practicable and consistent with the summary nature of extradition proceedings, shall also apply according
to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution granting the right to bail to a
person who is the subject of an extradition request and arrest warrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail quoted above,
as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violati on of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not
be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
[60]
It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal
proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
[61]
Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It
cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him
one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is
charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case Paretti
[62]
in arguing that, constitutionally, *n+o one shall be deprived of x x x
liberty x x x without due process of law.
Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violati on
of his right to due process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard
[63]
but, at
the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
[64]
Where the circumstances --
such as those present in an extradition case -- call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough.
[65]
In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to his
being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the DOJs filing in court the Petition with
its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant
treaty; (2) the extradition judges independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the courts custody, to apply for bail as an exception to
the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process now
has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
In this light, would it be proper and just for the government to increase the risk of violating its treaty obligations in order to
accord Respondent Jimenez his personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed
immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process that he had previously shunned pales against the governments interest in
fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating with the world community in the suppression of crime. Indeed,
*c+onstitutional liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against
exigent and palpable government interests.
[66]

Too, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences
of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if,
through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our
custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in
extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring
fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14
[67]
of the
Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention
here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the
Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty
to curb grave abuse of discretion
[68]
and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional
rights.
[69]
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to
extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient,
adaptable to every situation calling for its application.
[70]

Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or
placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances
[71]
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting
state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the
presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst states,
which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be
characterized by caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective of the sporting idea of fair play, it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there are special circumstances that are compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail. We have carefully examined these circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of Representatives. On that
basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v.
Jalosjos,
[72]
the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument when it ruled thus:
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from
a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws. This simply means that all persons
similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show
any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from]
prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives,
not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President
or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need
for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has
the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police
officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from
those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest*,+ wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against
groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class.
[73]

It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been prepared for the
consequences of the extradition case against their representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the
case. Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule against his claim that his election to public office is by
itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
2. Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that because the extradition proceedings are lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him
during the pendency of the case. Again we are not convinced. We must emphasize that extradition cases are summary in
nature. They are resorted to merely to determine whether the extradition petition and its annexes conform to the Extradition
Treaty, not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither is it, as a rule, intended to address issues relevant to the constitutional rights
available to the accused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling the possibility that petitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings. This is quite another
matter that is not at issue here. Thus, any further discussion of this point would be merely anticipatory and academic.
However, if the delay is due to maneuverings of respondent, with all the more reason would the grant of bail not be
justified. Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving him
the power to grant bail to himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings
even more. This we cannot allow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight risk. To support this claim, he stresses that he learned of the extradition request in
June 1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True, he has not actually fled during the preliminary stages of the request for his
extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to mean that he will not flee as the process moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears
the footsteps of the requesting government inching closer and closer. That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken
to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution
of the Petition for Extradition.
In any event, it is settled that bail may be applied for and granted by the trial court at anytime after the applicant has been
taken into custody and prior to judgment, even after bail has been previously denied. In the present case, the extradition court may
continue hearing evidence on the application for bail, which may be granted in accordance with the guidelines in this Decision.
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the extradition court, we believe, is totally unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The parties
-- in particular, Respondent Jimenez -- have been given more than sufficient opportunity both by the trial court and this Court to
discuss fully and exhaustively private respondents claim to bail. As already stated, the RTC set for hearing not only petitioners
application for an arrest warrant, but also private respondents prayer for temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the RTC were
memoranda on the arrest, then position papers on the application for bail, both of which were separately filed by the parties.
This Court has meticulously pored over the Petition, the Comment, the Reply, the lengthy Memoranda and the Position Papers
of both parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them in Oral Arguments, a procedure not normally observed in the great
majority of cases in this Tribunal. Moreover, after the Memos had been submitted, the parties -- particularly the potential
extraditee -- have bombarded this Court with additional pleadings -- entitled Manifestations by both parties and Counter-
Manifestation by private respondent -- in which the main topic was Mr. Jimenezs plea for bail.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious process would be repeated in its entirety. The trial court would again hear
factual and evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however, that, in all his voluminous pleadings and verbal propositions, private
respondent has not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he realizes that there is absolutely no need to rehear factual
matters. Indeed, the inadequacy lies not in the factualpresentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies in
his legal arguments. Remanding the case will not solve this utter lack of persuasion and strength in his legal reasoning.
In short, this Court -- as shown by this Decision and the spirited Concurring, Separate and Dissenting Opinions written by the
learned justices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated and carefully passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus, a
remand will not serve any useful purpose; it will only further delay these already very delayed proceedings,
[74]
which our Extradition
Law requires to be summary in character. What we need now is prudent and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and convoluted
delay. What is needed is a firm decision on the merits, not a circuitous cop-out.
Then, there is also the suggestion that this Court is allegedly disregarding basic freedoms when a case is one of
extradition. We believe that this charge is not only baseless, but also unfair. Suffice it to say that, in its length and breath, this
Decision has taken special cognizance of the rights to due process and fundamental fairness of potential extraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request expressed in the petition, supported
by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and
Law; and whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist the requesting state in bringing
the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped -- back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or soundness of
the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt or innocence is
determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily
available. It is more akin, if at all, to a courts request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has
escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting state, the reasonable prima facie
presumption is that the person would escape again if given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge shall make a prima facie
finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to submit further documentation,
or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a
warrant for the arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled hearings on the
petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding,
they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail
therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of
right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due process does not always call
for a prioropportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during
the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with
the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark of democracy and the conscience
of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-
equal and co-independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty
and power of implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review authority to prevent or excise grave abuse
and tyranny. They should not allow contortions, delays and over-due process every little step of the way, lest
these summary extradition proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due to our inability
to comply in good faith with a treaty partners simple request to return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into
a dubious haven where fugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat the quest
for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the
legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while
the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by
private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it,
with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our
Extradition Law. No costs.
SO ORDERED.





















THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and RAMON V. TIAOQUI vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TRIUMPH SAVINGS BANK
May a Monetary Board resolution placing a private bank under receivership be annulled on the ground of lack of prior notice and
hearing?
This petition seeks review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. S.P. No. 07867 entitled "The Central Bank of the
Philippines and Ramon V. Tiaoqui vs. Hon. Jose C. de Guzman and Triumph Savings Bank," promulgated 26 September 1986, which
affirmed the twin orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City issued 11 November 1985
1
denying herein petitioners' motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. Q-45139, and directing petitioner Ramon V. Tiaoqui to restore the private management of Triumph Savings
Bank (TSB) to its elected board of directors and officers, subject to Central Bank comptrollership.
2

The antecedent facts: Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector (SES), Department II, of
the Central Bank (CB) "that the financial condition of TSB is one of insolvency and its continuance in business would involve probable
loss to its depositors and creditors,"
3
the Monetary Board (MB) issued on 31 May 1985 Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of
TSB, forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver.
Tiaoqui assumed office on 3 June 1985.
4

On 11 June 1985, TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45139, against
Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596, with prayer for injunction, challenging in the process the
constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise known as "The Central Bank Act," as amended, insofar as it authorizes the Central
Bank to take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of any law or regulation, much less found guilty
thereof.
5

On 1 July 1985, the trial court temporarily restrained petitioners from implementing MB Resolution No. 596 "until further orders",
thus prompting them to move for the quashal of the restraining order (TRO) on the ground that it did not comply with said Sec.
29, i.e., that TSB failed to show convincing proof of arbitrariness and bad faith on the part of petitioners;' and, that TSB failed to post
the requisite bond in favor of Central Bank.
On 19 July 1985, acting on the motion to quash the restraining order, the trial court granted the relief sought and denied the
application of TSB for injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings Bank filed with Us a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court
6
dated 25 July 1985 seeking to enjoin the continued implementation of the questioned MB resolution.
Meanwhile, on 9 August 1985; Central Bank and Ramon Tiaoqui filed a motion to dismiss the complaint before the RTC for failure to
state a cause of action, i.e., it did not allege ultimate facts showing that the action was plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith, which
are the only grounds for the annulment of Monetary Board resolutions placing a bank under conservatorship, and that TSB was
without legal capacity to sue except through its receiver.
7

On 9 September 1985, TSB filed an urgent motion in the RTC to direct receiver Ramon V. Tiaoqui to restore TSB to its private
management. On 11 November 1985, the RTC in separate orders denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and ordered receiver Tiaoqui
to restore the management of TSB to its elected board of directors and officers, subject to CB comptrollership.
Since the orders of the trial court rendered moot the petition for certiorari then pending before this Court, Central Bank and Tiaoqui
moved on 2 December 1985 for the dismissal of G.R. No. 71465 which We granted on 18 December 1985.
8

Instead of proceeding to trial, petitioners elevated the twin orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65.
9
On 26 September 1986, the appellate court, upheld the orders of the trial court thus
Petitioners' motion to dismiss was premised on two grounds, namely, that the complaint failed to state a cause of
action and that the Triumph Savings Bank was without capacity to sue except through its appointed receiver.
Concerning the first ground, petitioners themselves admit that the Monetary Board resolution placing the Triumph
Savings Bank under the receivership of the officials of the Central Bank was done without prior hearing, that is,
without first hearing the side of the bank. They further admit that said resolution can be the subject of judicial
review and may be set aside should it be found that the same was issued with arbitrariness and in bad faith.
The charge of lack of due process in the complaint may be taken as constitutive of allegations of arbitrariness and
bad faith. This is not of course to be taken as meaning that there must be previous hearing before the Monetary
Board may exercise its powers under Section 29 of its Charter. Rather, judicial review of such action not being
foreclosed, it would be best should private respondent be given the chance to show and prove arbitrariness and
bad faith in the issuance of the questioned resolution, especially so in the light of the statement of private
respondent that neither the bank itself nor its officials were even informed of any charge of violating banking laws.
In regard to lack of capacity to sue on the part of Triumph Savings Bank, we view such argument as being specious,
for if we get the drift of petitioners' argument, they mean to convey the impression that only the CB appointed
receiver himself may question the CB resolution appointing him as such. This may be asking for the impossible, for
it cannot be expected that the master, the CB, will allow the receiver it has appointed to question that very
appointment. Should the argument of petitioners be given circulation, then judicial review of actions of the CB
would be effectively checked and foreclosed to the very bank officials who may feel, as in the case at bar, that the
CB action ousting them from the bank deserves to be set aside.
xxx xxx xxx
On the questioned restoration order, this Court must say that it finds nothing whimsical, despotic, capricious, or
arbitrary in its issuance, said action only being in line and congruent to the action of the Supreme Court in the
Banco Filipino Case (G.R. No. 70054) where management of the bank was restored to its duly elected directors and
officers, but subject to the Central Bank comptrollership.
10

On 15 October 1986, Central Bank and its appointed receiver, Ramon V. Tiaoqui, filed this petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07867 be set aside, and that the civil case pending before
the RTC of Quezon City, Civil Case No.
Q-45139, be dismissed. Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred
(1) in affirming that an insolvent bank that had been summarily closed by the Monetary Board should be restored
to its private management supposedly because such summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad faith" and a denial
of "due process";
(2) in holding that the "charge of lack of due process" for "want of prior hearing" in a complaint to annul a
Monetary Board receivership resolution under Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 "may be taken as . . allegations of arbitrariness
and bad faith"; and
(3) in holding that the owners and former officers of an insolvent bank may still act or sue in the name and
corporate capacity of such bank, even after it had been ordered closed and placed under receivership.
11

The respondents, on the other hand, allege inter alia that in the Banco Filipino case,
12
We held that CB violated the rule on
administrative due process laid down in Ang Tibay vs. CIR (69 Phil. 635) and Eastern Telecom Corp. vs. Dans, Jr. (137 SCRA 628) which
requires that prior notice and hearing be afforded to all parties in administrative proceedings. Since MB Resolution No. 596 was
adopted without TSB being previously notified and heard, according to respondents, the same is void for want of due process;
consequently, the bank's management should be restored to its board of directors and officers.
13

Petitioners claim that it is the essence of Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 that prior notice and hearing in cases involving bank closures should not
be required since in all probability a hearing would not only cause unnecessary delay but also provide bank "insiders" and
stockholders the opportunity to further dissipate the bank's resources, create liabilities for the bank up to the insured amount of
P40,000.00, and even destroy evidence of fraud or irregularity in the bank's operations to the prejudice of its depositors and
creditors.
14
Petitioners further argue that the legislative intent of Sec. 29 is to repose in the Monetary Board exclusive power to
determine the existence of statutory grounds for the closure and liquidation of banks, having the required expertise and specialized
competence to do so.
The first issue raised before Us is whether absence of prior notice and hearing may be considered acts of arbitrariness and bad faith
sufficient to annul a Monetary Board resolution enjoining a bank from doing business and placing it under receivership. Otherwise
stated, is absence of prior notice and hearing constitutive of acts of arbitrariness and bad faith?
Under Sec. 29 of R.A. 265,
15
the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, is vested with exclusive authority to assess, evaluate
and determine the condition of any bank, and finding such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business
would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, forbid the bank or non-bank financial institution to do business in the
Philippines; and shall designate an official of the CB or other competent person as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets
and liabilities. The fourth paragraph,
16
which was then in effect at the time the action was commenced, allows the filing of a case to
set aside the actions of the Monetary Board which are tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith.
Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank may be directed
to stop operations and placed under receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides for the filing of a case
within ten (10) days after the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable that the assailed actions should
precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no prior notice and hearing" in the
closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of absence thereof.
In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v. Arca [1965],
17
We held that a previous hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor
does the constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the Monetary Board's resolution to stop
operation and proceed to liquidation be first adjudged before making the resolution effective. It is enough that a subsequent judicial
review be provided.
Even in Banco Filipino,
18
We reiterated that Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 does not require a previous hearing before the Monetary Board can
implement its resolution closing a bank, since its action is subject to judicial scrutiny as provided by law.
It may be emphasized that Sec. 29 does not altogether divest a bank or a non-bank financial institution placed under receivership of
the opportunity to be heard and present evidence on arbitrariness and bad faith because within ten (10) days from the date the
receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, resort to judicial review may be had by filing an appropriate pleading with the court.
Respondent TSB did in fact avail of this remedy by filing a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City on the 8th day following the
takeover by the receiver of the bank's assets on 3 June 1985.
This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the
bank's assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders and the general public.
In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
19
We stated that
. . . due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may
be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be
the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment
will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
We stressed in Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
20
that
. . . the banking business is properly subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the state because
of its nature and relation to the fiscal affairs of the people and the revenues of the state (9 CJS 32). Banks are
affected with public interest because they receive funds from the general public in the form of deposits. Due to the
nature of their transactions and functions, a fiduciary relationship is created between the banking institutions and
their depositors. Therefore, banks are under the obligation to treat with meticulous care and utmost fidelity the
accounts of those who have reposed their trust and confidence in them (Simex International [Manila], Inc., v. Court
of Appeals, 183 SCRA 360 [1990]).
It is then the Government's responsibility to see to it that the financial interests of those who deal with the banks
and banking institutions, as depositors or otherwise, are protected. In this country, that task is delegated to the
Central Bank which, pursuant to its Charter (R.A. 265, as amended), is authorized to administer the monetary,
banking and credit system of the Philippines. Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Central Bank is
tasked with providing policy direction in the areas of money, banking and credit; corollarily, it shall have
supervision over the operations of banks (Sec. 14, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution, and Sec. 20, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution). Under its charter, the CB is further authorized to take the necessary steps against any banking
institution if its continued operation would cause prejudice to its depositors, creditors and the general public as
well. This power has been expressly recognized by this Court. In Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE
v. Philippine Veterans Banks (189 SCRA 14 [1990], this Court held that:
. . . [u]nless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed
and mismanaged banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the
prejudice of the national economy itself, not to mention the losses suffered by the bank
depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the government. The
government cannot simply cross its arms while the assets of a bank are being depleted through
mismanagement or irregularities. It is the duty of the Central Bank in such an event to step in and
salvage the remaining resources of the bank so that they may not continue to be dissipated or
plundered by those entrusted with their management.
Section 29 of R.A. 265 should be viewed in this light; otherwise, We would be subscribing to a situation where the procedural rights
invoked by private respondent would take precedence over the substantive interests of depositors, creditors and stockholders over
the assets of the bank.
Admittedly, the mere filing of a case for receivership by the Central Bank can trigger a bank run and drain its assets in days or even
hours leading to insolvency even if the bank be actually solvent. The procedure prescribed in Sec. 29 is truly designed to protect the
interest of all concerned, i.e., the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself, and the general public, and the summary
closure pales in comparison to the protection afforded public interest. At any rate, the bank is given full opportunity to
prove arbitrariness and bad faith in placing the bank under receivership, in which event, the resolution may be properly nullified and
the receivership lifted as the trial court may determine.
The heavy reliance of respondents on the Banco Filipino case is misplaced in view of factual circumstances therein which are not
attendant in the present case. We ruled in Banco Filipino that the closure of the bank was arbitrary and attendant with grave abuse
of discretion, not because of the absence of prior notice and hearing, but that the Monetary Board had no sufficient basis to arrive
at a sound conclusion of insolvency to justify the closure. In other words, the arbitrariness, bad faith and abuse of discretion were
determined only after the bank was placed under conservatorship and evidence thereon was received by the trial court. As this
Court found in that case, the Valenzuela, Aurellano and Tiaoqui Reports contained unfounded assumptions and deductions which
did not reflect the true financial condition of the bank. For instance, the subtraction of an uncertain amount as valuation reserve
from the assets of the bank would merely result in its net worth or the unimpaired capital and surplus; it did not reflect the total
financial condition of Banco Filipino.
Furthermore, the same reports showed that the total assets of Banco Filipino far exceeded its total liabilities. Consequently, on the
basis thereof, the Monetary Board had no valid reason to liquidate the bank; perhaps it could have merely ordered its reorganization
or rehabilitation, if need be. Clearly, there was in that case a manifest arbitrariness, abuse of discretion and bad faith in the closure
of Banco Filipino by the Monetary Board. But, this is not the case before Us. For here, what is being raised as arbitrary by private
respondent is the denial of prior notice and hearing by the Monetary Board, a matter long settled in this jurisdiction, and not the
arbitrariness which the conclusions of the Supervision and Examination Sector (SES), Department II, of the Central Bank were
reached.
Once again We refer to Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
21
and reiterate Our pronouncement therein that
. . . the law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the institution
to do business in the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's assets and
liabilities. They are: (a) an examination made by the examining department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said
department to the Monetary Board; and (c) prima facieshowing that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors.
In sum, appeal to procedural due process cannot just outweigh the evil sought to be prevented; hence, We rule that Sec. 29 of R.A.
265 is a sound legislation promulgated in accordance with the Constitution in the exercise of police power of the state.
Consequently, the absence of notice and hearing is not a valid ground to annul a Monetary Board resolution placing a bank under
receivership. The absence of prior notice and hearing cannot be deemed acts of arbitrariness and bad faith. Thus, an MB resolution
placing a bank under receivership, or conservatorship for that matter, may only be annulled after a determination has been made by
the trial court that its issuance was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith. Until such determination is made, the status quo shall be
maintained, i.e., the bank shall continue to be under receivership.
As regards the second ground, to rule that only the receiver may bring suit in behalf of the bank is, to echo the respondent appellate
court, "asking for the impossible, for it cannot be expected that the master, the CB, will allow the receiver it has appointed to
question that very appointment." Consequently, only stockholders of a bank could file an action for annulment of a Monetary Board
resolution placing the bank under receivership and prohibiting it from continuing operations.
22
In Central Bank v. Court of
Appeals,
23
We explained the purpose of the law
. . . in requiring that only the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock may bring the
action to set aside a resolution to place a bank under conservatorship is to ensure that it be not frustrated or
defeated by the incumbent Board of Directors or officers who may immediately resort to court action to prevent
its implementation or enforcement. It is presumed that such a resolution is directed principally against acts of said
Directors and officers which place the bank in a state of continuing inability to maintain a condition of liquidity
adequate to protect the interest of depositors and creditors. Indirectly, it is likewise intended to protect and
safeguard the rights and interests of the stockholders. Common sense and public policy dictate then that the
authority to decide on whether to contest the resolution should be lodged with the stockholders owning a majority
of the shares for they are expected to be more objective in determining whether the resolution is plainly arbitrary
and issued in bad faith.
It is observed that the complaint in this case was filed on 11 June 1985 or two (2) years prior to 25 July 1987 when E.O. 289 was
issued, to be effective sixty (60) days after its approval (Sec. 5). The implication is that before E.O
. 289, any party in interest could institute court proceedings to question a Monetary Board resolution placing a bank under
receivership. Consequently, since the instant complaint was filed by parties representing themselves to be officers of respondent
Bank (Officer-in-Charge and Vice President), the case before the trial court should now take its natural course. However, after the
effectivity of E.O. 289, the procedure stated therein should be followed and observed.
PREMISES considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07867 is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it upholds the
Order of the trial court of 11 November 1985 directing petitioner RAMON V. TIAOQUI to restore the management of TRIUMPH
SAVINGS BANK to its elected Board of Directors and Officers, which is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings to determine whether the issuance of
Resolution No. 596 of the Monetary Board was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith and to decide the case accordingly.
SO ORDERED.














WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN VS. HERNANI T. BARRIOS
On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order No. 8
dated September 27, 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them."
In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with
jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of
rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.
In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972, "crimes against persons . . . as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code"
were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.
Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October 11, 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration
of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of G.O. No. 49,
Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa.
On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve (12) others, were arrested and charged in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 entitled,
"People of the Philippines vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before the Military Commission No. 1, for the crimes of:
(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973 of Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim Ket Kai
family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.
The accused were:
1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc
2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
6. Enrique Labita
7. Oscar Yaun
8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie
9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping
10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge
11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak
12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga
13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho
14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong
15. Manuel Beleta, and
16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition).
(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.)
Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to the requests of the defendants' lawyers) to transfer
the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court (Annexes A to C of Supplemental/Amended Petition,
pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused were detained without bail in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame.
Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness.
He was released from detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).
Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense
witnesses filled up twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p. 75, Rollo).
On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission finding five (5) of the
accused namely:
1. Luis Tan
2. Ang Tiat Chuan
3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
4. Antonio Occaciones, and
5. Leopoldo Nicolas
guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months, and twenty-one (21) days, to twenty (20) years.
A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM, and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution (Annex B, Petition).
Eight (8) of the accused, namely:
1. Oscar Yaun
2. Enrique Labita
3. Eusebio Tan
4. Alfonso Tan
5. Go E Kuan
6. William Tan (petitioner herein)
7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and
8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)
were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).
On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and commissions.
On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the
sentence rendered on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military
commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses
properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. This
Court declared unconstitutional the creation of the military commissions to try civilians, and annulled all their proceedings as
follows:
Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose
either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial
contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a
whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process, Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial system.
...
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are
simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as
Commander in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military
representatives. Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of
interpreting the laws (as when an individual should be considered to have violated the law) is
primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive
Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain
open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of
martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for
offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it
otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian
concerned. (Olaguer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, 158-160.)
In October 1986, several months after the EDSA revolution, six (6) habeas corpus petitions were filed in this Court by some 217
prisoners
1
in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military commissions during
the nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel
R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). The petitioners asked the Court to declare unconstitutional
General Order No. 8 creating the military tribunals, annul the proceedings against them before these bodies, and grant them a
retrial in the civil courts where their right to due process may be accorded respect.
Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the
conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally
unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.
The Court
(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of those of some who had fully served their sentences, or had
been acquitted, or had been granted amnesty;
(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were convicted and still serving the sentences meted to them by the military courts,
but, without ordering their release, directed the Department of Justice to file the necessary informations against them in the proper
civil courts. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as petitioners Virgilio Alejandrino,
2
Domingo
Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado, Daniel Campus,
3
Reynaldo C. Reyes and
Rosalino de los Santos,
4
are concerned. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered
to effect the immediate release of the abovementioned petitioners, unless there are other legal
causes that may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino,
Getulio G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne,
Eric F. Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera,
Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran,
Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy
C. Realis. Democrito Lorana who are all military personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the necessary
informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses involved, within one
hundred eighty (180) days from notice of this decision, without prejudice to the reproduction of
the evidence submitted by the parties and admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually
convicted, the period of the petitioners' detention shall be credited in their favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT with
dispatch the necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the grant of bail which may be initiated
by the accused. (Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700, 711-712.)
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez issued Department Order No. 226 designating State Prosecutor
Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case No.
MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On
November 15, 1988, State Prosecutor Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of the regular fiscal
who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).
Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on December 9, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro City two (2) informations for:
1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824; and
2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 including those
who had already died
5
(Annexes D and E, Petition)
The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that:
this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme Court Order in the case of Cruz, et al. vs. Ponce
Enrile in G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599, 79600, 79862 and 80565 as all accused are
detained
6
except those that are already dead. (p. 7, Rollo.)
He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the accused in the two cases (p. 8, Rollo). Later, he increased the recommended bail to
P140,000 for each accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824). In the murder case (Crim. Case No. 88-825), he
recommended that the bail be increased to P250,000 for each of the accused, except Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, and Mariano Velez,
Jr., for whom he recommended no bail. Still later, on October 28, 1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9, Rollo)
because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances; (1) prize or reward; and (2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N.
Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued an order on October 26, 1988, requiring
State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of
the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the above-entitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of his said order
(Annex F, Petition). The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order for, as a matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order
to re-file the criminal cases against the herein petitioners and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67 of the now
defunct Military Commission No. 1, because none of them, except Antonio Occaciones, were parties in theCruz vs. Enrile habeas
corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).
On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the
informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge dated October 26, 1988 be annulled, and
that the public respondents or any other prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined from indicting, prosecuting and trying them
anew for the offenses charged therein because they had already been acquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim.
Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).
On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the petition for being premature as:
... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash the allegedly invalid informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88825 (Annexes D and E) whose annulment they seek from this
Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The filing in the lower court of such
motion is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of the petitioners. The existence of that
remedy (which they have not yet availed of) bars their recourse to the special civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court (p. 41, Rollo.)
Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court that the lower court had issued warrants for their
arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we issued a temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining the respondents from implementing the
orders of arrest and ordering them to comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).
The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting them
upon the supposed authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of informations by the Secretary of Justice against THOSE who, like
the petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings during the period of martial law.
2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners who were not parties in that case, who were not heard, and over
whom the court did not acquire jurisdiction.
3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy.
4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they had been acquitted by the military tribunal which the State
itself had clothed with jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State may not retroactively divest of
jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court that acquitted the petitioners would amount to an ex post
facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo, Supplemental Petition).
6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null and void because it was filed without a prior preliminary
investigation, nor a finding of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112, 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure).
In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios disclosed that the information in Criminal Case No. 88-824
for illegal possession of firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a hearing on January 27, 1988" (should be 1989?) (pp.
66-68, Rollo). The reason for dropping the charge is not stated. It may be because Benemerito, the gunman who was convicted of
this felony and sentenced to death by the Military Commission, is already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the information
for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825) against the petitioners and twelve (12) others, including those already dead, is pending in the
lower court (p. 37, Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of the petitioners on the ground that it will not constitute double jeopardy
because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from attaching,
thereby nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res judicata is not applicable. Neither prescription, because "it had been
interrupted by the filing of the earlier charge sheets with the Military Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings involving civilians before a military commission were
null and void because we ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over civilians, hence, their decisions,
whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar re-prosecution for the same crime before a civil court (p. 102, Rollo).
The petition is meritorious. The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority
to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by Military Commission No. 1
during the period of martial law. It is an unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in vain
for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much less those who had been acquitted by such
bodies more than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.
The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of oppression and injustice unless given a limited application only to the
parties/petitioners therein who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings against themselves and prayed for a retrial in
the civil courts of the criminal cases against them. They alone are affected by the judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not all and sundry who
at one time or another had been tried and sentenced by a court martial during the period of martial law.
Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt. "Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice those who were not parties
to it." (54 C.J. 719.) It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a court's judgment or order in a case shall not adversely affect persons who
were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860). Hence, this court's pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying
the proceedings in military courts against the civilian petitioners therein and ordering the refiling of informations against them in the
proper civil courts, may not affect the rights of persons who were not parties in that case and who, not having submitted to the
court's jurisdiction, did not have their day in court (Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil, 1033). Their reprosecution, based on the
decision in Cruz vs. Enrile in which they took no part and were not heard, would be violative of their right to due process, the same
right of the petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that this Court endeavored to protect when it nullified the proceedings against them in the
military tribunals by applying the Olaguer doctrine that the trial of civilians by military process was not due process.
7

There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in the application of the Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs. Enrilewhich needs to be
rectified. For, although the Court nullified the proceedings against the civilians-petitioners who were still serving their sentences
after conviction by the military courts and commissions, and we directed the Secretary of Justice to file the necessary informations
against them in the proper civil courts, we did not nullify the court martial proceedings against the other civilians petitioners who:
(1) had finished serving their sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3) had been acquitted by the military courts. We did not
order their reprosecution, retrial, and resentencing by the proper civil courts. We set them free.
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted by the military courts and were still serving their
sentences, and another rule for those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of their sentences. The Court
applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first group (whom the Court ordered to be reprosecuted before the proper civil courts)
and another of prospective invalidity for the others (whom the Court ordered to be released from custody).
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and
cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final
judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer
decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State
shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a
retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no
longer possible, the accused should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which sentenced him to death without receiving evidence in his
defense. It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether,
unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already been acquitted and released, or
have accepted the sentences imposed on them and commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a military
court, much less those who were acquitted and released, desires to undergo the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit
in a civil court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of a military court, who is satisfied that he had a
fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court to risk
being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even if there is a chance of being acquitted the second time
around, it would be small comfort for the accused if he is held without bail pending the completion of his second trial which may
take as long as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving or already served.
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial
rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers, is an
operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those
proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated
and which now prevent us from carryingOlaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang vs.
Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of the creation of a municipality by executive
order wiped out all the acts of the local government thus abolished:
In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.' Accordingly, he held that
bonds issued by a board of commissioners created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the
municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the
executive order is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.'
For the existence of Executive Order 386 is 'an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.' As
Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording
no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal,
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity, cannot be justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive
order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon
the validity of the creation of that municipality. (Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA
533)
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission
No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate
the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of
their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges
against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546)
years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the petitioners would place them in double
jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.
The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State:
The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all
the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired
as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty
is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-
producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal
of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so.
(Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)
Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military commission in their
particular case by retroactively divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had exercised over them would amount to
an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict constitutional theory. An ex-post facto law or rule, is one which
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes
such an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and,
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA
428, 431)
Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of an ex post facto law or bill of attainder.
We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information against them is invalid because there was no preliminary
investigation, no finding of probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of the information by the City Fiscal
before it was filed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. Respondent State Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby ordered to discharge the petitioners from the information in
Criminal Case No. 88-825. The temporary restraining order which we issued on January 16, 1989 is hereby made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.







AURORA MEJIA vs. HON. MANUEL PAMARAN, HON. ROMEO ESCAREAL, HON. CONRADO MOLINA
This is a petition for review of the decision of the SANDIGANBAYAN of April 23, 1981, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 1988, accused Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to
suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of
Pl,000.00 representing the money given to her; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 1989, accused Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez hereby found guilty beyond is and reasonable
doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as
maximum, to Buffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the
amount of P500 representing the money given to her.
Accused is further ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER AND IN
EVENTUALLY CONVICTING HER, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND IN VIOLATION OF THE GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
CONSIDERING THAT IT HAS NEITHER BEEN CREATED AS MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION NOR CONSTITUTED AS CONCEIVED BY
THE DECREE FOR ITS CREATION;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN BY RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN THE CASE AT BAR ARE VOID AB
INITIO CONSIDERING THAT THE DECREE CREATING IT PROVIDE FOR THE PROCEDURES THAT PARTAKES THE NATURE OF AN EX-POST
FACTO LAW AND SUCH PROCEDURES VIOLATE THE GUARANTY TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CONSIDERING THAT DIFFERENT
AND PREJUDICIAL METHOD OF APPEAL IS PRESCRIBED;
3. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS WHEN THE
PRETENDED REQUEST AND RECEIPT OF MONEY FROM THE COMPLAINING WITNESS WAS ALLEGEDLY IN CONSIDERATION OF "THE
EARLY SETTING OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND A FAVORABLE RESOLUTION THEREON "WHEN SAID
COMPLAINANT WAS NEVER A PARTY TO ANY COMPROMISE AGREEMENT (Crim. Case No. 1988);
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY BE CONVICTED ON FATALLY DEFECTIVE INFORMATION AS WHEN SAID INFORMATION
CHARGES THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY DEMANDED AND RECEIVED P500 AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN MADE A FINDING THAT THE
AMOUNT WAS P1,000 Criminal Case 1988) AND WHEN THE INFORMATION CHARGES THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY REQUESTED AND
RECEIVED P1,000 AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN MADE A FINDING THAT THE AMOUNT WAS P500 (Crim Case No. 1989) (Annexes "B"
and "C")
5. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT OF CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WAS MAINLY HEARSAY AND THE MOTIVES OF COMMENT COMPLAINANTS
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IN HER CAPACITY AS BRANCH CLERK OF COURT NTERVENES IN SETTING CASES FOR HEARING
AND FORMULATES RESOLUTIONS THEREON;
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN COULD DISREGARD ESTABLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE, AS WHEN IT
ALLOWED THE RECALL OF PETITIONER, AFTER EXHAUSTING CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND SUBJECTED HER TO ADDITIONAL CROSS-
EXAMINATION ON ALLEGED ATTEMPT ON PETITIONER'S PART TO BRIBE PROSECUTOR CRISTINA PATERNO, WHICH SHOULD HAVE
BEEN PART OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IN CHIEF.
The findings of facts of the respondent court are as follows:
The instant prosecutions had their roots on six (6) ejectment cases filed separately in the City Court of Manila by
Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose Mabalot and
Vicente Villamor. All were decided by the City Court of Manila against the defendants, all of whom appealed in due
time to the Court of First Instance of Manila where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over b the
Honorable Jose P. Alejandro, docketed therein as follows: Civil Case No, L-22794 (Feliciano F. Endangan), Civil Case
No. L-22795 (Josefina Meimban).
Civil Case No. L-22796 (Teodorico Bontia), Civil Case No. L-22797 (Rolando Antillon), Civil Case No. L-22798 (Jose
Mabalot), Civil Cam No. L-22799 (Vicente Villamor), On August 12, 1979, five (5) of the defendants-appellants,
namely, Endangan (Case No. L-22794), Bontia (Case No. L-22796, Antillon (Case No. L-22797), Mabalot (Case No. L-
22798) and Villamor (Case No. L-22799) entered into a compromise agreement with the plaintiff, Eusebio Lu
whereby the appellants individually received from the appellee the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which the
appellants agreed to vacate the premises in question and remove their houses therefrom within sixty (60) days 3m
the date of the execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have the authority to demolish the
appellant's houses with costs thereof chargeable against them the compromise agree went was-submitted to the
court. Josefina Meimban, the defendants-appellant-in Case No. L-22795, did not join her co-defendants-appellees
in entering into the compromise agreement (Exh. "A"). Up to that stage of the cases, the counsel of record of the
defendant-appellants was Atty. S. G. Doron., On August 22, 1979, Atty. Modesto R. Espano of the Citizens Legal
Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty. Doron to inform him that Mrs. Meimban has sought the assistance of the CLAO
regarding her case, and asked that the records of the case be sent to Mm. (Exh. "F-l"). As a consequence, Atty.
Doron filed on August 30, 1979 his MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE as counsel for defendant-appellant
Josefina Meimban in Civil Case No. L-22795. (Exh. "F"). In short, while the five (5) other defendants-appellants,
Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot and Villamor, have decided to settle with the plaintiff through compromise
agreement that they signed, Josefina Meimban resolved to prosecute her appeal in her own case, Civil Case No. L-
22795. These backdrops are not disputed.
What transpired while the cases were pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila insofar as material to the
prosecutions at bar, are matters contested by conflicting evidence of the prosecution and the defense.
Josefina Meimban testified that she followed up her case in Branch XVII of the Court of First Instance of Manila and
had occasion to talk to Danilo Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case was already submitted for
decision. She sought assistance from the CLAO where she was instructed by Atty. Espano to find out the real status
of the case. She returned to the court sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first came to know Atty.
Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided because there was still one party who has not
signed the compromise agreement prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was surprised why
rich people were helping in that case, like a certain Atty. Lu a brother of the plaintiff, who has been approaching
the presiding judge; and then told her she would help them provided they give Pl,000 each for a gift to the Judge,
to which she replied she would broach the matter to her companions. From the court, she went to Atty. Modesto
Espano and told the lawyer the case was not yet submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get her papers from
Atty. Doron, which she did. Thereafter, she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of defendant Jose Mabalot in Civil Case
No. L-22798, and Gloria Antonio, daughter of defendant Vicente Villamor in Civil Case No. L-22799, about the help
offered by Atty. Mejia. The two said they would think it over as they had already signed something. When she
went to the court to deposit her rentals Atty. Mejia asked her if her companions were agreeable to the suggestion
and she replied she had already told them and that they would consider the matter.
On August 22, 1979, Meimban and Atty. Espano went to the City Hall and Atty. Espano filed his formal appearance
as counsel for Meimban in Civil Case No. L-22795, Branch XXVI. On that Atty. Mejia again mentioned to Meimban
the gift she was asking from the latter to be given to the Judge, and added that if Meimban wanted to win the case
and she wanted her help, they have to give to the Judge because she was the one making the decision. She was
not able to give any reply. She went home without telling Atty. Espano what Atty. Mejia had told her When she
returned on August 30, 1979 to deposit her rental, Atty. Mejia asked her why her companions were not yet moving
when they had a chance of winning the case provided they returned the money they received from the plaintiff
under the compromise agreement. She replied she would tell them again. When she told Pilar Bautista and Gloria
Antonio about it, the two replied that if they could still win their cases by returning the money, she accompany
them to Atty. Espano.
They saw Atty. Espano on October 26, 1979. After knowing the purpose of their visit, Atty. Espano agreed to help
Bautista and Antonio and prepared a MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE E AND TO FILE MEMORANDA
(Exh."B") Bautista and Antonio signed the motion for their fathers. The three women Meimban Bautista and
Antonio and Atty. Espano proceeded to the City Hall and filed the motion. From the court they went down to the
canteen at the mezzanine floor of the City Hall where Atty. Espano left them to have some documents xeroxed.
Atty. Mejia followed them to the canteen. This time Atty. Mejia told Bautista she could help them provided they
gave her P500 for expenses. Bautista and Antonio just kept silent. Atty. Espano returned to the canteen and
rejoined them. Atty. Mejia told Atty. Espano there was a chance of winning the Meimban case. Before leaving
them, Atty. Mejia told her Meimban to take care of her companions.
When she deposited her rentals on October 30, 1979, Atty. Mejia told her the Judge needed the money right away.
She promised to give Pl,000 on November 20, 1979. From there she went to Atty. Espano and told him about it. At
Atty. Espano's suggestion they agreed to meet in Branch XXVI at 10:00 a.m. on November 20 when the, would
entrap Atty. Mejia in the delivery of the money with the assistance of her policeman friend assigned in the office of
the Mayor. She arrived in court with Sylvia Dizon from whom she borrowed P500 to complete the Pl,000 at about
11:00 a.m. but did not meet Atty. Espano. At Atty. Mejia's instruction they waited for about an hour Sylvia Dizon
seated outside in the corridor fronting the door of Atty. Mejia office. Atty. Mejia asked her if she had brought the
money, she replied she had and gave the P1,000 to Atty. Mejia. She and Sylvia Dizon then left and looked for Atty.
Espano in the different sala.8 of the court. Not finding him, they went to his office. Atty. Espano got mad upon
knowing that she had given the money to Atty. Mejia and told her not to give anymore.
December 7, 1979 was the date set for the hearing of the MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE AND TO FILE
MEMORANDA (Motion in short) filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio in behalf of their father (Exh- "C").
Meimban and Pilar Bautista went to Branch XXVI for that hearing. Atty. Mejia told them to wait and that if an
oppositor to the Motion would appear, she would accompany them to the sala of Judge Cui of Branch XXV (the
pair branch of Branch XXVI
1
), where the Motion would be heard since Judge Alejandro of Branch XXVI was on
leave. While they were waiting, Atty. Mejia approached her Meimban and said no oppositor might arrive, and
asked her if Bautista had brought one-half (1/2) of the P1,000.00. She asked Bautista and the latter replied she did
not have anything as she thought it was Meimban who had the money. In the meantime, Atty. Mejia left and told
her that if Bautista would have the money, just put it in an envelope. Bautista borrowed P500 from her, which was
supposedly intended for the branch Clerk of Court of Judge Cui. Bautista placed the money in an envelope and the
two of them, Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista handed the envelope containing the
money to Atty. Mejia who received it.
Pilar Bautista y Mabalot confirmed that her father, Jose Mabalot, had received P5,000.00 from the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. L-22798 pursuant to the compromise agreement that her father had signed; that while they were waiting
for their house to be demolished Josefina Meimban told her they still had hope of winning the case because she
has been frequenting Branch XXVI and talking with Atty. Mejia who had promised to assist them; that Gloria
Antonio, the daughter of one of the other defendants, Vicente Villamor, convinced her that they try it; and that
they asked Meimban to accompany them to Atty. Espano of the CLAO on October 26, 1979. She testified further
that Atty. Espano prepared the Motion at hers and Antonio's request which they signed for their fathers (Exh. "B").
With Atty. Espano, Meimban and Antonio, they went to the court and Mod the motion with Atty. Mejia. They
proceeded to the canteen, and while there Atty. Espano left to have some documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia arrived
shortly after Atty. Espano had left. Atty. Mejia told them if they wanted the resolution of the Motion expedited
they each give Pl,000.00 for expenses. They did not say anything. When Atty. Espano rejoined them, Atty. Mejia
commended him for his memorandum and said it was well prepared and there was hope in the case. Atty. Mejia
then left and they went home after Meimban paid their bill which they shared among themselves. On December
6,1979, in the afternoon, she and Meimban went to Branch XXVI to file a motion for postponement of the hearing
of the Motion scheduled the next day, December 7,1979. Atty. Mejia told them to come just the same on the
following day despite their motion for postponement. So they did return on December 7, reaching the court at
about 8:30 a.m. Atty. Mejia told them to wait because oppositors to the Motion might appear. When no oppositor
appeared, Atty. Mejia asked them to give even one-half of the amount intended for expenses because the case
was with the a of Judge Cui as Judge Alejandro was absent, and the money was intended for the clerk of court of
Judge Cui. She asked Meimban if she had money with her and it was from Meimban that she borrowed P500. At
Meimban's suggestion that they put the money in an envelope, they secured one near the GSIS building, put the
P500 in it and returned to the office of Atty. Mejia to whom she handed the envelope containing the money. Atty.
Mejia received the envelope and placed it inside her desk drawer. A few days later, she received a copy of an order
dated December 10, 1979 signed by Judge Cui denying their Motion (Exh. "D"). She forthwith went to Atty. Mejia
and asked her what happened. Atty. Mejia answered that she go to Meimban and get the P500 because Meimban
still lacked Pl,000, and that she also tell Mrs. Meimban to see her (Atty. Mejia). She went to Meimban and told her
what Atty. Mejia said. They went to Atty. Espano who told her not to give anything.
Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion confirmed that she loaned P500 to Josefina Meimban and went with her to the court
on November 20, 1979 to verify if Meimban really needed the money to give to Atty. Mejia. She was seated at the
corridor near the door of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open, and she saw Meimban handed an envelope
to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her desk drawer.
Atty. Modesto Espano y Rodriguez was with the lawyer assigned by the CLAO to assist Josefina Meimban in her
case. He was with Meimban on August 22, 1979 when he filed his formal appearance in the case pending before
Branch XXVI of the Court of First Instance. On the occasion, he saw Atty. Mejia talk to Meimban. Later, on October
26, 1979, Meimban told him that Atty. Mejia was demanding money and gift to be given to the presiding judge of
Branch XXVI, of the Judge and that Atty. Mejia would reverse the decision of the City Court in the appealed case. it
was also on that day, October 26, 1979, in his office at the CLAO that he met Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio for
the first time accompanied by Meimban. Bautista and Antonio were also seeking assistance from the CLAO in their
desire to withdraw a compromise agreement that their fathers had signed and submitted to the court for approval.
From his interview of Bautista and Antonio, he gathered that Bautista's father, Jose Mabalot, and Antonio's father
Vicente Villamor, were defendants in the ejectment cases filed by Eusebio Lu and that their fathers were misled by
one Endangan and Atty. Doron into signing the agreement. When he asked the whereabouts of their fathers he
was told that Vicente Villamor was in Cotabato and Jose Mabalot was an octogenarian. He also gathered from
Bautista and Antonio that they had decided to withdraw the compromise agreement because Atty. Mejia had told
them that they had a chance of winning the case by having the decision of the lower court reversed if they
returned the P5,000 given by the plaintiff, as she was the one preparing the decisions for Branch XXVI. He
prepared the Motion (Exh. "B") and had it signed by Bautista for Jose Mabalot, and Antonio for Vicente Villamor.
That same afternoon of October 26, 1979, he filed the Motion in court with Meimban, Bautista and Antonio.
Meimban told him that Atty. Mejia wanted to talk to her at the canteen. He and his female companions went
ahead to the canteen, but he left them there to have some papers xeroxed at the ground floor of the City Hall.
When he returned to the canteen, he saw Atty. Mejia talking to his women companions. He joined them. Atty.
Mejia told him that they could win the Meimban case because the decision of the lower court was against Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25, and advised him to file a good memorandum. Atty. Mejia also mentioned that there was a good
chance of winning the Mabalot and Villamor cases provided the P5,000 each received by the defendants was
returned. He did not say anything since he had advised his clients already not to give Atty. Mejia anything. After
leaving the canteen and while they were still at the ground floor his clients told him that Atty. Mejia was
demanding money from them for expenses for the Judge. He reiterated his advise to them not to give any.
Testimony was also given regarding an alleged attempt of Atty. Mejia to bribe the Tanodbayan Investigator who
investigated the complaints that led to the filing of the instant cases. Christina Corall-Paterna declared that she
signed and submitted her recommendation to prosecute the accused for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act on the complaint of Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista, and to drop the other complaints, on
August 27, 1980. On September 3, 1980, Atty. Mejia came to her to inquire (nangumusta) She replied she had
already collated the evidence and submitted her recommendation to Director Herrera. Atty. Mejia then placed
something on her table wrapped in pink tissue paper and immediately stood up and left without saying anything.
She opened the wrapper and found an intricate gold chain with a pendant bearing an inscription of letter "C." Her
initial reaction was to return it but on second thought that she needed somebody to witness the returning of the
jewelry, and it being almost 4:00 p.m. and Atty. Mejia might not return to her office anymore, the waited till next
morning and asked one of their employees, Dante Ramos, to return the gold chain the first hour of September 4.
Dante Ramos was able to return it.
Under the first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent court acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the guaranty
of due process of law as it has neither been created as mandated by the Constitution nor constituted as conceived by the decree for
its creation. Petitioners stress that the creation of the Sandiganbayan by Presidential Decree No. 1606 is an arrogation by the
President of the power vested by the Constitution in the National Assembly.
In the case of Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan
2
this Court categorically ruled on the issue when it held:
It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the
Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution
contemplated that such an act should the National Assembly the 1976 Amendments made clear come from the
National Assembly that he as incumbent President" shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law
shall have been lifted.
3
Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on
Elections
4
decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the
legality of such lawmaking authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, ... .
5
As the opinion went
on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already eating in favor of
the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law.
6

Under the second assigned error it is alleged that the procedure provided for by the Sandiganbayan are and hence all proceedings
taken against petitioner are void ab initio being investigation violation of the Constitution.
It is further argued that only one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner under PD No. 1606 which effectively deprives her of
the intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court only issues of law may be raised and worse
still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. Petitioner contends this is a denial of the equal
protection of the law.
Again, in Nuez
7
this Court effectively disposed of this issue when it held:
2. Petitioner in memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to Presidential Decree No.
1486. What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration.
8
The Ideal situation is
for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could
chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of
the very essence of the Idea of law.
9
There is recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact eats "cannot
approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of
the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in
fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut
into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
finds no support in reason.
10
Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason
decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same
fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
11

3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum that: 1. The
Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of
law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by
certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indicates are entitled
to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of
Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court.
12
That is hardly convincing, considering that the classification
satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice Laurel in People v. Vera
13
requiring that it must be based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not
be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
14
To repeat, the
Constitution specifically makes the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It
follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17,
1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether
a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co Chiong v. Cuaderno,
15
a
1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of rights included among which are the due process of law
and equal protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific provision, in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino
citizens of the operation of public services or utilities.
16
The scope of such a principle is not to be con stricted, It is
certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.
4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto provision of the
Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted ordered
efficacy wise ...
17
A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of persuasiveness of such
an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami
18
decision, promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent
and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of Justice Makasiar: An ex post facto law
is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the
legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of
a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction
or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
19
Even the most careful scrutiny of the above definition fails to sustain
the claim of petitioner. The lawful protection to which an accused" has become entitled" is qualified, not given a
broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right to appeal is
therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v.
Vilo,
20
a 1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the
nine Justices there composing this Court, excepting only the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto, were of
the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the requirement of unanimity under Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer
from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes committed before its enactment would not
make the law ex post facto.
5. x x x x
9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the exhaustive forty-two page
memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted to its discussion. There is the allegation of
lack of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading American Supreme
Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts.
21
Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice of
words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in
maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity
to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in very concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the
thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable however, which may be the pressure of
incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must
not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament We are to keep the balance true.
22
What is required for compliance
with the due process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson,
23
this Court with Justice Tuason as
ponente, succinctly Identified it with a "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of
defense.
24
In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed as to why he is
proceeded against and what charge he hall to meet, with his conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not
tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being implied in accordance with a
valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction.
25
The
above formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American Supreme Court in a case of Philippine
origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States
26
decided during the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus:
This court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal
procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority
of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.
27

Under the third assigned error it is alleged that the information in Criminal Case No. 1988 states that the pretended request and
receipt of money by petitioner from companions t witness Josefina Meimban was in consideration of the early setting of the hearing
of the motion to withdraw the compromise agreement and to secure a favorable resolution thereof when in fact said complainant
was never a party to any compromise agreement so that she could not be convicted of an offense not alleged in the information.
Under the fourth arraigned error the petitioner alleges that she cannot be convicted on the two defective informations, the first of
which (Crim. Case 1988) she allegedly demanded and received P 500.00 which the respondent court found to be P1,000.00; and that
in Criminal Case No. 1989 the information charged that the petitioner requested and received P l,000.00 while the respondent court
found that the amount received was P500.00 so petitioner pleads she cannot be convicted on such defective informations. Under
both informations petitioner is charged for violation of Section enumerates the corrupt practices of any public officer which are
declared unlawful as among others
Sec. 3 (b). Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself
or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The elements of the offense are that
1. It must be committed by
1) a public officer;
2) who requested and who received a gift, present, etc.;
3) the gift, present, etc. was for the benefit of said public officer;
4) said public officer requested and/or received the gift, present, etc. in connection with a contract or transaction
with the government; and
5) said officer has the right to intervene in such contract or transaction in his/her official capacity under the law.
The finding of the respondent court is that the petitioner demanded and received money from the persons involved in certain cases
in Branch 26 of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila where the petitioner was the branch clerk of court in consideration of a
promise that she will help in getting them a favorable judgment. In the case of the complainant Josefina Meimban although it is true
that she did not enter into an amicable agreement regarding her case as erroneously alleged in the information, nevertheless it has
been shown, and as it is also alleged in the information, that she yielded to the request of petitioner for some money in
consideration of a promise that petitioner wig get a favorable judgment. In a prosecution under the foregoing provision of the Anti-
Graft Law the value of the gift, money or present, etc. is immaterial nor is it determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused or
the penalty to be imposed. What is penalized is the receipt of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit by a public officer in
connection with a contract or transaction with the Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene in his official capacity.
Under the fifth assigned error petitioner argues that there was an ulterior motive on the part of the complainants in testifying
against her and that the prosecution evidence is hearsay.
Petitioner therefore raises the question of credibility of the witnesses. The rule is that the findings of facts of the respondent court
are conclusive unless there are some facts or circumstances that may have been overlooked that may otherwise affect the result of
the case. Petitioner has not successfully demonstrated any cogent reason why this Court should depart from this rule.
Petitioner imputes that Meimban and Bautista testified against her as she refused to intercede in their behalf with the judge to
secure a favorable action. The court is not persuaded. Contrary to her pretension that prosecution witnesses were inmotivated in
testifying against her. The Court finds that said complaining witnesses would not impute the serious charges against petitioner were
it not the truth. Moreover, the testimony of said complaining witnesses are corroborated by Atty. Modesto Espano and Sylvia Dizon
who are certainly disinterested witnesses. The bare denial of petitioner cannot prevail over such positive evidence of the
prosecution.
Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in the setting of the hearing of cases and she does not
formulate resolutions thereof. The branch clerk of court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge whose duty is to assist
in the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or judgment of the
judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner with the judge who presumably has reposed confidence in her which appears to
have been taken advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the complainants to give her money in consideration of a promise to
get a favorable resolution of their cases.
Under the seventh assigned error the recall of petitioner for further cross-examination on her attempt to bribe the Tanodbayan
prosecutor is a matter within the sound discretion of respondent court. Indeed the testimony of said prosecutor that petitioner tried
to persuade her not to prosecute petitioner by giving her a gold chain with pendant wrapped in tissue paper which said prosecutor
returned is material evidence to establish the guilt of petitioner.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds and so holds that the guilt of the petitioner of the offenses charged
against her has been established beyond reasonable doubt. She took advantage of her position as branch clerk of court by
persuading the offended parties Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista to deliver to her the sums of P 1,000.00 and P500.00,
respectively, in consideration of a promise that petitioner WW get a favorable resolution of their cases in court.
The evils of corruption are slowly corroding the pillars of our society. Our courts are not spared by this plague. More often than not
those in government who are persuaded or tempted if not actively involved in graft and corruption are the court personnel who lead
litigants to believe that they could get a favorable judgment or action in their favor or are otherwise approached or persuaded to so
help for a consideration. Worse still there are instances when the corruption reaches the level of the judge which spells the doom of
our quest for an honest and impartial administration of justice. Anyone involved in such corrupt exercise should be denounced. This
Court does not hesitate to apply the scalpel to cut off the roots of this cancer in the judicial system that can destroy the very
purpose of its existence.
Those who are involved in the administration of justice from the highest to the lowest level must live up to the strictest standard of
honesty and integrity in the public service. The general public should respect and support such imperative. No attempt to influence
them one way or the other much less to bribe them should be made. One cannot buy a bad case nor sell a good one. No amount of
money can make out a good case out of a bad one. And even if one succeeds in so doing it would certainly be uncovered and
reversed on appeal. Justice will prevail.
This case should be an object lesson for those in the public service. All that we need to do is to go back to the too well known rule of
conduct that honesty is the best policy. Those who cannot live up to this criterion should get out of the government service. It is as
simple as that.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.








PEOPLE VS. ESTRADA
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City
in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D.
[1]
We nullify the proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of murder
for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a butchers knife, with intent to kill one
ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the
said weapon, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab
Wound as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to
the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, December 29, 1994.
[2]

At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellants counsel, the Public Attorneys Office, filed an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital. It was alleged that accused-appellant
could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that before the commission of the
crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his
arraignment and the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital.
[3]

The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on accused-
appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him intelligently, the court denied the motion that same
day.
[4]

The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellants behalf.
[5]

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City who
issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1
Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda Sobremonte, the victims
sister. The prosecution established the following facts:
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation was being performed
by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand
people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final blessing to the children in the
front rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center of the altar. He
stopped beside the Bishops chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishops chair. The man was
accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan approached
accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the Bishops chair. Gripping the chairs armrest, accused-appellant replied in
Pangasinese: No matter what will happen, I will not move out! Hearing this, Santillan moved away.
[6]

Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-appellant
and told him to vacate the Bishops chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used
it to tap accused-appellants hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the latters hand. Still no
reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and
stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to stab him again but
Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up, went to the microphone and shouted:
Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishops chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and
bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar.
[7]

Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a commotion inside the
cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one
hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the knife. Accused-appellant
obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City,
who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-
appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue
accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist.
[8]
He
was brought to the police station and placed in jail.
In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival. He died of
cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound.
[9]
He was found to have sustained two (2) stab
wounds: one just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the following findings:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 x 1 penetrating. The edge of
one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, x x . The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and
pointed.
INTERNAL FINDINGS
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the left lung. The left pulmonary blood
vessel was severely cut.
[10]

After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. He claimed that the
prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that
there was unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accused-appellants hand with his nightstick; and that accused-
appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.
[11]

The Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused pretended to be weak, tame and
of unsound mind; that after he made the first stab, he furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off
undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted; and the plea of unsound mind
had already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of January 6, 1995.
[12]

On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector
Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General
Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. The other prisoners were
allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he
could escape and see his family.
[13]

As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail wardens letter. He reiterated that the mental
condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless a competent government agency certifies
otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to determine whether accused-appellant was
mentally ill or not.
[14]

In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence.
[15]
Accused-appellant moved for
reconsideration.
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine
Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been
exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and cause panic among the jail inmates and
personnel; that appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep
for fear of being attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and
waste matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused panic among the inmates. Appellants counsel prayed that his
client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital.
[16]
Attached to the motion
were two (2) letters. One, dated February 19, 1996, was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the
trial court judge informing him of appellants irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order for the immediate
psychiatric and mental examination of accused-appellant.
[17]
The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector
Llopis from the Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the president,
secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of appellants unusual behavior and requested that immedi ate
action be taken against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail.
[18]

On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the Demurrer to Evidence. The court ordered
accused-appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996.
[19]

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan,
[20]
a
resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellants medical and clinical
records at the said hospital.
[21]
Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the BGH from February 18, 1993 to
February 22, 1993 and that he suffered from Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid
type;
[22]
and after four (4) days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental condition.
[23]
The medical and
clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del
Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for admission and treatment after a relapse of his violent behavior;
[24]
(2) the
clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH;
[25]
(3) the consent slip of appellants wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the
BGH;
[26]
(4) the Patients Record;
[27]
(5) the Consent for Discharge signed by appellants wife;
[28]
(6) the Summary and Discharges of
appellant;
[29]
(7) appellants clinical case history;
[30]
(8) the admitting notes;
[31]
(9) Physicians Order Form;
[32]
(10) the Treatment
Form/ medication sheet;
[33]
and (11) Nurses Notes.
[34]

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant guilty of
the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and in view
of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is
sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P50,000.00.
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
[35]

In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH
TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE.
[36]

The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him.
[37]
Under the classical theory
on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will.
[38]
Man is essentially a moral creature with
an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil.
[39]
When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is
presumed to have been done voluntarily,
[40]
i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.
[41]
Man, therefore, should be adjudged or
held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.
[42]

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind
[43]
and that all acts are
voluntary.
[44]
The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a
person.
[45]
This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor
from criminal liability.
[46]

The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order
his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to
leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused
insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or
asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright rel ease,
but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution.
[47]

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
[48]
The accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal
intent.
[49]
He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power
to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
[50]

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and
positive evidence.
[51]
And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very
moment of its execution.
[52]

To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of hi s mind
within a reasonable period both before and after that time.
[53]
Direct testimony is not required.
[54]
Neither are specific acts of
derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense.
[55]
Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffices; for the
unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A persons thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by
outward acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
[56]

In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the time he killed Mararac. The
absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time.
From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan
[57]
attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that should have placed the
trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. I t was
highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit on the Bishops chair while the Bishop was administering the Holy
Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without
sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic
faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone
and, over the public address system, uttered words to the faithful which no rational person would have made. He then returned to
the Bishops chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts attention on the day of the arraignment. Counsel for
accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a
plea due to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Cri minal
Procedure which provides:
Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand
the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
(b) x x x.
The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under
these circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination of the accused, and if confinement
be necessary for examination, order such confinement and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental
faculties at the time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself
a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto.
[58]

The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
[59]
And the test to determine whether
the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would
have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused person on the ground of present
insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to
justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance
which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal
counsel, it is not necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself.
[60]
In the
American jurisdiction, the issue of the accuseds present insanity or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is separate and
distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the
defendants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission. Present insanity is commonly referred to as competency to
stand trial
[61]
and relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendants present inability
to participate meaningfully and effectively.
[62]
In competency cases, the accused may have been sane or insane during the
commission of the offense which relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial is
simply postponed until such time as he may be found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely postpones
the trial.
[63]

In determining a defendants competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his position,
understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate,
communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed.
[64]
This test is prescribed by state
law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at common law.
[65]
Thus:
*I+t is not enough for the x x x judge to find that the defendant *is+ oriented to time and place, and *has+ some recollecti on of
events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
[66]

There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his
counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance
of the trial and his relation to it.
[67]
The first requisite is the relation between the defendant and his counsel such that the defendant
must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e.,
that he must have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings.
[68]

The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public.
[69]
It has been
held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty.
[70]
To put a legally
incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial
[71]
and due process
of law;
[72]
and this has several reasons underlying it.
[73]
For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an
incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is relevant to the proof of
his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right
to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights
are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain
basic decisions in the course of a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is his
plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the
courtroom in a manner which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of
comprehension fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial
proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned
interaction between an individual and his community and becomes an invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important
that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what
occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of
institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend
its significance.
[74]

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the tri al
court.
[75]
Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt
[76]
or a
bona fide doubt
[77]
as to defendants competence to stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is evidence of the
defendants irrational behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance,
demeanor of the defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a particular case.
[78]

In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accuseds mental
condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by
him. The court declared::
x x x
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on the accused, and he (accused) answered
intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he answered, in Tayug.
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio
General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
[79]

The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that he was
competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition that
effectively renders *the accused+ unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. It is not clear
whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to fully understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his
plea was made intelligently. The plea of not guilty was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial court because of his refusal
to plead.
[80]

The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a persons mental health. To
determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least ordered the
examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latters history of mental illness.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of accused-appellants competency to stand
trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City
wrote the trial judge informing him of accused-appellants unusual behavior and requesting that he be examined at the hospital to
determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later,
accused-appellants counsel filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. Attached to this
motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of the
Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters,
[81]
the judge ignored the Motion to Confine
Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. The records are barren of any order disposing of the said motion. The
trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence.
[82]

Dr. Gawidan testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a lifetime illness and that this
requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses.
[83]
After accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never
returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up.
[84]

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-appellant was waiving the right to testify in
his own behalf because he was suffering from mental illness.
[85]
This manifestation was made in open court more than two (2)
years after the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all the overwhelming
indications of accused-appellants state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and never even considered
subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death!
Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a mental examination.
[86]
The human mind is an entity, and
understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon emotional and psychological
appreciation.
[87]
Thus, an intelligent determination of an accuseds capacity for rational understanding ought to rest on a deeper and
more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a
medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time,
the accuseds abilities may be measured against the specific demands a trial will make upon him.
[88]

If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have served a dual purpose
[89]
by
determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and
clinical findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of the crime served as one of the bases for the acquittal of the
accused.
[90]
The crime in the instant case was committed way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a
medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of the crimes commission
for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.
[91]
Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellants
competence to stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial meaningfully.
By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial. The trial courts
negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must
be nullified. In People v. Serafica,
[92]
we ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the cases remanded to the
court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated
murder, entered a plea of guilty to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the accuseds plea was not an
unconditional admission of guilt because he was not in full possession of his mental faculties when he killed the victim; and
thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of
commission of the crime.
[93]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D
convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a
quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial, and for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.






ANG TIBAY vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority
opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los
salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo
fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual
tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de
duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como
consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No.
213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado
organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by
the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from
the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with
the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro,
the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are
highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil
war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern
labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union,
Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they
could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-
General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we
deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature,
to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding
principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the
proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion
of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the
hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to
suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of
any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares
or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided
that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural
dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the
sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile
the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the
President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it
may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose,
or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies
between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is
a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point
out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in
such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of
preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court
have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the
effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.
Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements
of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the
rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298
U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court inEdwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously
futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v.
National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F.
2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute
provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of
this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere
admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative
order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene
and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed.
431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in
their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the
law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts
material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and
determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration
or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the
Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers
and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise
of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be
that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the
United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates
to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory
authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between
the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual
basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it
is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all
the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the
"records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood
Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal."
Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so
inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far
reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable
discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue
involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.













ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN (DISSENTING OPINION-KAPUNAN, J.:)
The primary duty of the Court is to render justice. The resolution of the issues brought before it must be grounded on law,
justice and the basic tenets of due process, unswayed by the passions of the day or the clamor of the multitudes, guided only by its
members honest conscience, clean hearts and their unsullied conviction to do what is right under the law.
The issues posed by the instant petition are quite difficult. The task of the Court to resolve the same is made more daunting
because the case involves a former President of the Republic who, in the eyes of certain sectors of society, deserves to be punished.
But the mandate of the Court is to decide these issues solely on the basis of law and due process, and regardless of the personalities
involved. For indeed, the rule of law and the right to due process are immutable principles that should apply to all, even to those we
hate. As Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., a noted constitutionalist, aptly puts it--
x x x the greater disaster would be if the Supreme Court should heed the clamor for conviction and convict Estrada even under
an unconstitutional law but of the belief that Estrada deserves to be punished. That would be tantamount to a rule of men and
not of law.
[1]

The Basic Facts

The petition before us questions the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7080 (R.A. No. 7080 or Plunder Law), as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659,
[2]
entitled An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder.
[3]
This original petition for certiorari and
prohibition against Respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan filed by petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada assails Respondent
courts Resolution, dated July 9, 2001, denying his Motion to Quash the information against him in Criminal Case No. 26558 for
Plunder. Petitioner likewise prays that the Sandiganbayan be prohibited and enjoined from proceeding with his arraignment and
trial in Criminal Case No. 26558 due to the unconstitutionality of R. A. No. 7080.
On the heels of the finality of the joint decision of this Court in G.R. No. 146710 (Estrada vs. Desierto, et al.) and in G.R. No.
146738 (Estrada vs. Macapagal-Arroyo), promulgated on April 3, 2001, upholding the constitutionality of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyos assumption of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines and declaring that the former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada no longer enjoyed immunity from suit, the Ombudsman filed eight (8) Informations against Estrada. These
cases were Criminal Case No. 26558 (for Plunder); Criminal Case No. 26559 (for Violation of Sec. 3[a] of Republic Act No. 3019);
Criminal Case No. 26560 (for Violation of Sec. 3[a] of R.A. No. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26561 (for Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. 3019);
Criminal Case No. 26562 (for Violation of Sec. 3[e] of R.A. No. 3019); Criminal Case No. 26563 (for Violation of Sec. 7[d] of R.A. No.
6713); Criminal Case No. 26564 (for Perjury); and Criminal Case No. 26565 (for Illegal Use of Alias).
The aforementioned informations were raffled to the five divisions of the Sandiganbayan. Criminal Case No. 26558 was raffled
to the Third Division of said court. The amended information against petitioner charging violations of Section 2, in relation to
Section (d) (1) (2) of the statute reads:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, by himself and in conspiracy with his co-accused, business associates and persons heretofore
named, by taking advantage of his official position, authority, connection or influence as President of the Republic of the Philippines,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth, and unjustly enrich himself in
the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17, more or less, through a combination and series of overt and criminal acts, described as
follows:
(a) by receiving, collecting, directly or indirectly, on many instances, so-called jueteng money from gambling operators
in connivance with co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and Edward Serapio, as witnessed by Gov.
Luis Chavit Singson, among other witnesses, in the aggregate amount of FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000.000.00), more or less, in consideration of their protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers in
their illegal jueteng activities; and
(b) by misappropriating, converting and misusing for his gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of One Hundred Seventy Million Pesos
(P170,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, in conspiracy
with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, as witnessed by Gov. Luis Chavit Singson, among other witnesses; and
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System
(SSS) to purchase and buy a combined total of 681,733,000 shares of stock of the Belle Corporation in the aggregate
gross value of One Billion Eight Hundred Forty-Seven Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Pesos and Fifty
Centavos(P1,847,578,057.50), for the purpose of collecting for his personal gain and benefit, as in fact he did collect
and receive the sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
(P189,700,000.00) as commission for said stock purchase; and
(d) by unjustly enriching himself in the amount of THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) comprising
his unexplained wealth acquired, accumulated and amassed by him under his account name Jose Velarde with
Equitable PCI Bank:
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[4]

On April 16 and 17, 2001, the Ombudsman filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation to Withdraw Information in Criminal Case Nos.
26559, 26560, 26561, 26562 and 26563. Petitioner registered his objection to the Ombudsmans motion to withdraw. The divisions
of the Sandiganbayan to which said cases were assigned granted the withdrawal of the informations, save for that in Criminal Case
No. 26561. At present, the Order of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan denying the Ombudsmans motion to withdraw in
Criminal Case No. 26561 is still under reconsideration.
In Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner filed on April 11, 2001 an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Office of
the Ombudsman for: (1) the conduct of a preliminary investigation as regards specification d of the accusations in the information
in said case; and (2) reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses in specifications a, b and c to enable petitioner to file his
counter-affidavits as well as other necessary documents.
On April 25, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding that:
(p)robable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of accused former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John
Doe a.k.a Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramon Tan or Mr. Uy and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas.
Subsequently, on May 31, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners Omnibus Motion.
On June 15, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution but the same was denied in a Resolution of
June 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on June 14, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the information in Criminal Case No. 26558, invoking the
following grounds: (1) the facts charged do not constitute an indictable offense as R.A. No. 7080, the statute on which it is based, is
unconstitutional; and (2) the information charges more than one offense.
The People of the Philippines filed an Opposition thereto on June 21, 2001. Petitioner filed his Reply to the Opposition on June
28, 2001.
On July 9, 2001, the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying his motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 26558. Petitioner argues that R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
I. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE FOR ITS VAGUENESS
II. IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO KNOW THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION
AGAINST HIM
III. IT VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE BY
LOWERING THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY FOR PROVING THE COMPONENT ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER
IV. IT IS BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO DELIMIT THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD
AND TO ABOLISH THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN MALA IN SE CRIMES BY CONVERTING THESE TO MALA PROHIBITA, IN
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
[5]

The provisions of law involved

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 provides:
Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the
crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the
attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties
and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. (As amended by Sec. 12, RA No.
7659.)
Section 1(d) of the same law defines "ill-gotten wealth" as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of
any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates, and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public
officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
[6]

On the other hand, Section 4 states:
Rule of Evidence - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act
done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Petitioners theory

Petitioner asserts that R.A. No. 7080 is vague and overbroad on its face, and suffers from structural deficiency and
ambiguity.
[7]
In sum, he maintains that the law does not afford an ordinary person reasonable notice that his actuation will
constitute a criminal offense. More particularly, petitioner argues that the terms "combination" and series are not clearly defined,
citing that in a number of cases, the United States (U.S.) federal courts in deciding cases under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO law), after which the Plunder Law was patterned, have given different interpretations to series of acts or
transactions.
[8]
In addition, he terms raid on the public treasury, receiving or accepting a gift, commission, kickbacks, illegal
or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets, monopolies or other combinations, special interests, taking undue
advantage of official position, unjustly enrich all suffer from overbreadth which is a form of vagueness.
[9]

In arguing that the law on plunder is vague and impermissibly broad, petitioner points out that the terms combination and
series used in the phrase any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes are not defined under the
statute. The use of these terms in the law allegedly raises several questions as to their meaning and import.
Petitioner posits the following queries: Does it (referring to the term series) mean two, three, four, of the overt or criminal
acts listed in Section 1(d)? Would it mean two or more related enterprises falling under at least two of the means or similar
schemes listed in the law, or just a joint criminal enterprise? Would it require substantial identity of facts and participants, or
merely a common pattern of action? Would it imply close connection between acts, or a direct relationship between the charges?
Does the term mean a factual relationship between acts or merely a common plan among conspirators?
[10]

The term combination is allegedly equally equivocal. According to petitioner, it is not clear from the law if said term covers
time, place, manner of commission, or the principal characters. Thus petitioner asks: Does it (referring to the term combination)
include any two or more acts, whether legal or illegal, or does the law require that the combination must include at least two of the
means or similar schemes laid down in R.A. 7080? Does it cover transactions that have occurred in the same place or area, or in
different places, no matter how far apart? Does combination include any two or more overt acts, no matter how far apart in time,
or does it contemplate acts committed within a short period of time? Does the combination cover the modus operandi of the
crimes, or merely the evidence to be used at the trial?
[11]

It is also argued that the phrase pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy adds to the
vagueness of the law because pattern is not defined therein and is not included in the definition of the crime of plunder even
though it is an essential element of said crime.
[12]

Petitioner also maintains that the Plunder Law violates the due process clause and the constitutional presumption of innocence
by lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for proving the component elements of plunder because Section 4 does not require
that each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy be proved, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
[13]

Finally, petitioner alleges that it is beyond the power of Congress to delimit the reasonable doubt standard and to abolish the
element of mens rea in mala in secrimes by converting these to mala prohibita, thereby making it easier for the prosecution to prove
malversation, bribery, estafa and other crimes committed by public officers since criminal intent need not be established.
[14]

Considering the infringement to the constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of an accused, petitioner contends that
R.A. No. 7080 cannot be accorded any presumption of constitutional validity.
Respondents theory

On the other hand, Respondents argue that the particular elements constituting the crime of plunder are stated with
definiteness and certainty, as follows:
(1) There is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;
(2) There is an amassing, accumulating or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth;
(3) The total amount of ill-gotten wealth so amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00); and
(4) The ill-gotten wealth, which is defined as any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) of R.A. No. 7080, was acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates, and/or business associates by any combination or series of the means or
similar schemes enumerated in Section 1(d).
[15]

Moreover, Respondents maintain that assuming that there is some vagueness in the law, it need not be declared
unconstitutional but may be clarified by judicial construction.
[16]
Respondents further add that the ordinary import of the terms
combination" and "series" should prevail, as can be gleaned from the deliberations of the Congress in the course of its passage of
the law. According to respondents, series of overt criminal acts simply mean a repetition of at least two of any of those
enumerated acts found in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080. And combination means a product of combining of at least one of any of
those enumerated acts described in Section 1(d) with at least one of any of the other acts so enumerated. Respondents score
petitioner for arguing on the basis of federal courts decisions on the RICO law, citing that the U.S. courts have consistently rejected
the contention that said law is void for being vague.
[17]

Respondents deny that the Plunder Law dispenses with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. While there may
be no necessity to prove each and every other act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme to acquire ill-gotten wealth, it is
still necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
scheme or conspiracy, as well as all the other elements of the offense of plunder.
[18]
Respondents also point out that conspiracy
itself is not punishable under the Plunder Law, which deals with conspiracy as a means of incurring criminal liability.
[19]

Respondents likewise contend that it is within the inherent powers and wisdom of the legislature to determine which acts
are mala prohibita in the same way that it can declare punishable an act which is inherently not criminal in nature.
[20]

In conclusion, Respondents assert that petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.
Petitioners Reply

Petitioner, in his Reply to Comment, draws attention to Section 4, arguing that the provision states the most important
element, which is the common thread that ties the component acts together: a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
[21]
and raises the following questions:
(a) Reference is made to a pattern of overt or criminal acts. The disjunctive or is used. Will a pattern of acts, which
are overt but not criminal in themselves, be indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy?
(b) Under what specific facts or circumstances will a pattern be indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy?
(c) Under what specific facts or circumstances will the required pattern or scheme even be said to be present or to
exist?
(d) When is there an unlawful scheme or conspiracy?
[22]

Issues raised in the oral arguments

Oral arguments were heard on September 18, 2001. At said hearing, the Court defined the issues for resolution as follows:
1.) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VAGUE;
2) WHETHER R.A. NO. 7080 REQUIRES LESS EVIDENCE FOR PROVING THE PREDICATE CRIMES OF PLUNDER AND THEREFORE
VIOLATES THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS; and
3) WHETHER PLUNDER AS DEFINED IN R.A. NO. 7080 IS A MALUM PROHIBITUM AND IF SO, WHETHER IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF
CONGRESS TO SO CLASSIFY THE SAME.
[23]

Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda in which they discussed the points which they raised in their earlier
pleadings and during the hearing.
I believe that there is merit in the petition.
A penal statute which violates constitutional
guarantees of individual rights is void.

Every law enacted by Congress enjoys a presumption of constitutionality,
[24]
and the presumption prevails in the absence of
contrary evidence.
[25]
A criminal statute is generally valid if it does not violate constitutional guarantees of individual
rights.
[26]
Conversely, when a constitutionally protected right of an individual is in danger of being trampled upon by a criminal
statute, such law must be struck down for being void.
[27]

One of the fundamental requirements imposed by the Constitution upon criminal statutes is that pertaining to clarity and
definiteness. Statutes, particularly penal laws, that fall short of this requirement have been declared unconstitutional for being
vague. This void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in the basic concept of fairness as well as the due process clause of the
Constitution.
The Constitution guarantees both substantive and procedural due process
[28]
as well as the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
[29]
A criminal statute should not be so vague and uncertain that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application.
[30]

There are three distinct considerations for the vagueness doctrine. First, the doctrine is designed to ensure that individuals are
properly warned ex ante of the criminal consequences of their conduct. This fair notice rationale was articulated in United States
v. Harriss:
[31]

The constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.
[32]

Second, and viewed as more important, the doctrine is intended to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law
enforcement.
[33]
Vague laws are invariably standardless and as such, they afford too great an opportunity for criminal
enforcement to be left to the unfettered discretion of police officers and prosecutors.
[34]
Third, vague laws fail to provide sufficient
guidance to judges who are charged with interpreting statutes. Where a statute is too vague to provide sufficient guidance, the
judiciary is arguably placed in the position of usurping the proper function of the legislature by "making the law" rather than
interpreting it.
[35]

While the dictum that laws be clear and definite does not require Congress to spell out with mathematical certainty the
standards to which an individual must conform his conduct,
[36]
it is necessary that statutes provide reasonable standards to guide
prospective conduct.
[37]
And where a statute imposes criminal sanctions, the standard of certainty is higher.
[38]
The penalty
imposable on the person found guilty of violating R.A. No. 7080 is reclusion perpetua to death.
[39]
Given such penalty, the standard of
clarity and definiteness required of R.A. No. 7080 is unarguably higher than that of other laws.
[40]

Void-for-vagueness doctrine
applies to criminal laws.

A view has been proffered that vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are not applicable to penal laws.
[41]
These two
concepts, while related, are distinct from each other.
[42]
On one hand, the doctrine of overbreadth applies generally to statutes that
infringe upon freedom of speech.
[43]
On the other hand, the void-for-vagueness doctrine applies to criminal laws, not merely those
that regulate speech or other fundamental constitutional rights.
[44]
The fact that a particular criminal statute does not infringe upon
free speech does not mean that a facial challenge to the statute on vagueness grounds cannot succeed.
[45]

As earlier intimated, the vagueness doctrine is anchored on the constitutionally-enshrined right to due process of law. Thus,
as in this case that the life, liberty and property of petitioner is involved, the Court should not hesitate to look into whether a
criminal statute has sufficiently complied with the elementary requirements of definiteness and clarity. It is an erroneous argument
that the Court cannot apply the vagueness doctrine to penal laws. Such stance is tantamount to saying that no criminal law can be
challenged however repugnant it is to the constitutional right to due process.
While admittedly, penal statutes are worded in reasonably general terms to accomplish the legislatures objective of protecting
the public from socially harmful conduct, this should not prevent a vagueness challenge in cases where a penal statute is so
indeterminate as to cause the average person to guess at its meaning and application. For if a statute infringing upon freedom of
speech may be challenged for being vague because such right is considered as fundamental, with more reason should a vagueness
challenge with respect to a penal statute be allowed since the latter involve deprivation of liberty, and even of life which,
inarguably, are rights as important as, if not more than, free speech.
It has been incorrectly suggested
[46]
that petitioner cannot mount a facial challenge to the Plunder Law, and that facial or
on its face challenges seek the total invalidation of a statute.
[47]
Citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
[48]
it is also opined that claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and
that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct. For this reason, it is argued further that on its face invalidation of statutes has been described as
manifestly strong medicine, to be employed sparingly and only as a last resort. A reading of Broadrick, however, shows that the
doctrine involved therein was the doctrine of overbreadth. Its application to the present case is thus doubtful considering that the
thrust at hand is to determine whether the Plunder Law can survive the vagueness challenge mounted by petitioner. A noted
authority on constitutional law, Professor Lockhart, explained that the Court will resolve them (vagueness challenges) in ways
different from the approaches it has fashioned in the law of overbreadth.
[49]
Thus, in at least two cases,
[50]
the U.S. courts allowed
the facial challenges to vague criminal statutes even if these did not implicate free speech
In Kolender v. Lawson,
[51]
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a California criminal statute which required persons who
loiter or wander on the streets to provide a credible and reasonable identification and to account for their presence when requested
by a peace officer under circumstances that would justify a valid stop. The U.S. Supreme Court held that said statute was
unconstitutionally vague on its face within the meaning of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
encourages arbitrary enforcement by failing to clarify what is contemplated by the requirement that a suspect provide a credible
and reasonable identification. Springfield vs. Oklahoma
[52]
on the other hand involved a challenge to a Columbus city ordinance
banning certain assault weapons. The court therein stated that a criminal statute may be facially invalid even if it has some
conceivable application. It went on to rule that the assailed ordinances definition of assault weapon was unconstitutionally
vague, because it was fundamentally irrational and impossible to apply consistently by the buying public, the sportsman, the law
enforcement officer, the prosecutor or the judge.
[53]

It is incorrect to state that petitioner has made little effort to show the alleged invalidity of the statute as applied to him, as he
allegedly attacks on their face not only 1(d)(1) and (2) of R.A. 7080 under which he is charged, but also its other provisions
which deal with plunder committed by illegal or fraudulent disposition of government assets (1(d)(3)), acquisition of interest i n
business (1(d)(4)), and establishment of monopolies and combinations or implementation of decrees intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests ( 1(d)(5)).
[54]
Notably, much of petitioners arguments dealt with the vagueness of the key phrases
combination or series and pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy which go into
the very nature of the crime for which he is charged.
Taking into consideration that the Plunder Law is a penal statute that imposes the supreme penalty of death, and that
petitioner in this case clearly has standing to question its validity inasmuch as he has been charged thereunder and that he has been
for sometime now painfully deprived of his liberty, it behooves this Court to address the challenge on the validity of R.A. No. 7080.
Men steeped in law find

difficulty in understanding plunder.

The basic question that arises, therefore, is whether the clauses in Section 2--
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof
and Section 1(d), which provides--
x x x by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
x x x
6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
as qualified by Section 4 which also speaks of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth and of
a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy, are clear enough that a person of
common intelligence need not guess at their meaning and differ as to their application.
The above raise several difficult questions of meaning which go to the very essence of the offense, such as:
a. How many acts would constitute a combination or series?
b. Must the acts alleged to constitute the combination or series be similar in nature? Note that Section 1(d) speaks of similar
schemes while Section 4 speaks of the scheme and of a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
c. Must the combination or series of overt or criminal acts involving the aggregate amount of at least P50 million be conceived
as such a scheme or a pattern of overt or criminal acts from inception by the accused?
d. What would constitute a pattern? What linkage must there be between and among the acts to constitute a pattern? Need
there be a linkage as to the persons who conspire with one another, and a linkage as to all the acts between and among them?
e. When Section 4 speaks of indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy, would this mean that the scheme or
conspiracy should have been conceived or decided upon in its entirety, and by all of the participants?
f. When committed in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons or through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates, would such fact
be part of the pattern of overt or criminal acts and of the overall unlawfulscheme or conspiracy such that all of those who are
alleged to have participated in the crime of plunder must have participated in each and every act allegedly constituting the crime of
plunder? And as in conspiracy, conspired together from inception to commit the offense?
g. Within what time frame must the acts be committed so as to constitute a combination or series"?
I respectfully disagree with the majority that "ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters" are provided in the
law
[55]
to resolve these basic questions.
Even men steeped in the knowledge of the law are in a quandary as to what constitutes plunder. The Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, Justice Francis Garchitorena, admitted that the justices of said court have been quarrelling with each other in
finding ways to determine what [they] understand by plunder.
[56]
Senator Neptali Gonzales also noted during the deliberations of
Senate Bill No. 733 that the definition of plunder under the law is vague. He bluntly declared: "I am afraid that it might be faulted
for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation of an
accused.
[57]
Fr. Bernas, for his part, pointed to several problematical portions of the law that were left unclarified. He posed the
question: "How can you have a 'series' of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to
be criminal?"
[58]

The meanings of combination and series

as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.

Although the law has no statutory definition of combination or series, the majority is of the view that resort can be had to
the ordinary meaning of these terms. Thus, Webster's Third New International Dictionary gives the meaning of "combination": "the
result or product or product of combining: a union or aggregate made of combining one thing with another."
[59]

In the context of R.A. No. 7080, combination as suggested by the Solicitor General means that at least two of the enumerated
acts found in Section 1(d), i.e., one of any of the enumerated acts, combined with another act falling under any other of the
enumerated means may constitute the crime of plunder. With respect to the term series, the majority states that it has been
understood as pertaining to two or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category"
[60]
as gleaned from the
deliberations on the law in the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Further, the import of combination or series can be ascertained, the majority insists,
[61]
from the following deliberations in
the Bicameral Conference Committee on May 7, 1991:
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say, THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT
OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if
there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included,
how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included
also?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, because we say series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that-
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes. Combination is not twicebut combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean two different acts. It can not be a repetition of
the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN: (REP. GARCIA): Yes, This distinguishes it, really, from the ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts. So
HON. ISIDRO: I know what you are talking about. For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation
of public funds who raids the public treasury, now, for example, misappropriation, if there are a series of
misappropriations?
x x x
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series. One after the other eh di
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN TAADA): So that would fall under term series?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Its not two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA): Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA): For example, ha
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition
[62]

The following deliberations in the Senate are pointed to by the majority
[63]
to show that the words "combination" and "series"
are given their ordinary meaning:
Senator Maceda. In line of our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or. To read, therefore: or
conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts
are in the plural.
Senator Taada. That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
The President. Probably, two or more would be.
Senator Maceda. Yes, because a series implies several or many two or more.
Senator Taada. Accepted, Mr. President.
x x x
The President. If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder
there should be, at least, two or more.
Senator Romulo. In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
[64]

To my mind, resort to the dictionary meaning of the terms combination and series as well as recourse to the deliberations
of the lawmakers only serve to prove that R.A. No. 7080 failed to satisfy the strict requirements of the Constitution on clarity and
definiteness. Note that the key element to the crime of plunder is that the public officer, by himself or in conspiracy with others,
amasses, accumulates, or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in
Section 1(d) of the law. Senator Gonzales, during the deliberations in the Senate, already raised serious concern over the lack of a
statutory definition of what constitutes combination or series, consequently, expressing his fears that Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080
might be violative of due process:
Senator Gonzales. To commit the offense of plunder, as defined in this Act and while constituting a single offense, it must consist of
a series of overt or criminal acts, such as bribery, extortion, malversation of public funds, swindling, illegal exaction, and graft or
corrupt practices act and like offenses. Now, Mr. President, I think, this provision, by itself will be vague. I am afraid that it might be
faulted for being violative of the due process clause and the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation of an
accused. Because, what is meant by series of overt or criminal acts? I mean, would 2, 3, 4 or 5 constitute a series? During the
period of amendments, can we establish a minimum of overt acts like, for example, robbery in band? The law defines what is
robbery in band by the number of participants therein. In this particular case probably, we can statutorily provide for the definition
of series so that two, for example, would that be already a series? Or, three, what would be the basis for such
determination?
[65]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The point raised by Senator Gonzales is crucial and well-taken. I share petitioners observation that when penal laws enacted
by Congress make reference to a term or concept requiring a quantitative definition, these laws are so crafted as to specifically state
the exact number or percentage necessary to constitute the elements of a crime. To cite a few:
Band Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be
deemed to have been committed by a band. (Article 14*6+, Revised Penal Code)
[66]

Conspiracy A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. (Article 8, Revised Penal Code)
[67]

Illegal Recruitment by a Syndicate Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme x x x. (Section 38, Labor Code)
Large-scale Illegal Recruitment Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group. (Section 38, Labor Code)
Organized/Syndicated Crime Group *M+eans a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or mutually
helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime. (Article 62 (1)(1a), Revised Penal Code)
[68]

Swindling by a Syndicate x x x if the swindling (estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons
formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme x x x . (Section 1, P.D.
No. 1689)
[69]

The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee and of the Senate cited by the majority, consisting mostly of
unfinished sentences, offer very little help in clarifying the nebulous concept of plunder. All that they indicate is that Congress
seemingly intended to hold liable for plunder a person who: (1) commits at least two counts of any one of the acts mentioned in
Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080, in which case, such person commits plunder by a series of overt criminal acts; or (2) commits at least
one count of at least two of the acts mentioned in Section 1(d), in which case, such person commits plunder by a combination of
overt criminal acts. Said discussions hardly provide a window as to the exact nature of this crime.
A closer look at the exchange between Representatives Garcia and Isidro and Senator Taada would imply that initially,
combination was intended to mean two or more means,
[70]
i.e., number one and two or number one and something else x x
x,
[71]
two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration,
[72]
two different acts.
[73]
Series would refer to a repetition of
the same act.
[74]
However, the distinction was again lost as can be gleaned from the following:
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) Yes. Combination is not twice but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO. So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It can not be a repetition of
the same act.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). That be referred to series. Yeah.
REP. ISIDRO. No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). A series.
REP. ISIDRO. Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or
more, di ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA). Yes. This distinguishes it really the ordinary --- Thats why I said, thats a very good suggestion,
because if its only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime. But we have here a combination or series, of overt or criminal
acts (Emphasis supplied).
[75]

x x x
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Series. One after the other eh di
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA) So, that would fall under the term series?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P) Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO. Now, if it is combination, ano, two misappropriations
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA) Its not two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO. So, it is not a combination?
THE CHAIRMAN. (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. When we say combination, two different?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA) Two different.
REP. ISIDRO. Two different acts.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) For example, ha
REP. ISIDRO. Now a series, meaning, repetition
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA) Yes.
REP. ISIDRO. With that
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA) So, it could be a series of any of the acts mentioned in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 of Section 2 (d), or
1 (d) rather, or a combination of any of the acts mentioned in paragraph 1 alone, or paragraph 2 alone or paragraph 3 or
paragraph 4.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) I think combination maybewhich one? Series?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA) Series or combination.
REP. ISIDRO. Which one, combination or series or series or combination?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA) Okay. Ngayon doon sa definition, ano, Section 2, definition, doon sa portion ng Saan iyon? As
mentioned, as described
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Described. I think that is
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. TAADA) better than mentioned. Yes.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Okay?
REP. ISIDRO. Very good.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. TAADA) Oo, marami pong salamat.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. GARCIA P.) Maraming salamat po.
The meeting was adjourned at 1:33 p.m.
[76]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The aforequoted deliberations, especially the latter part thereof, would show a dearth of focus to render precise the definition
of the terms. Phrases were uttered but were left unfinished. The examples cited were not very definite. Unfortunately, the
deliberations were apparently adjourned without the Committee members themselves being clear on the concept of series and
combination.
Moreover, if combination as used in the law simply refers to the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth
amounting to at least P50 Million through at least two of the means enumerated in Section 1(d), and series, to at least two counts
of one of the modes under said section, the accused could be meted out the death penalty for acts which, if taken separately, i.e.,
not considered as part of the combination or series, would ordinarily result in the imposition of correctional penalties only. If such
interpretation would be adopted, the Plunder law would be so oppressive and arbitrary as to violate due process and the
constitutional guarantees against cruel or inhuman punishment.
[77]
The penalty would be blatantly disproportionate to the
offense. Petitioners examples illustrate this absurdity:
a. One act of indirect bribery (penalized under Art. 211 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods),
combined with -
one act of fraud against the public treasury (penalized under Art. 213 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period).
equals
Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death plus forfeiture of assets under R. A. 7080)
b. One act of prohibited transaction (penalized under Art. 215 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 or both).
combined with
one act of establishing a commercial monopoly (penalized under Art. 186 of Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its
minimum or a fine ranging from P200 to P6,00, or both.
equals
Plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets under R.A. 7080).
c. One act of possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (penalized with prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both under Art. 216 of the Revised Penal Code).
combined with
one act of combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade (penalized under Art. 186 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its minimum period, or a fine of P200 to P1,000, or both),
equals
plunder (punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and forfeiture of assets).
[78]

The argument that higher penalties may be imposed where two or more distinct criminal acts are combined and are regarded
as special complex crimes, i.e., rape with homicide, does not justify the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death in
case plunder is committed. Taken singly, rape is punishable byreclusion perpetua;
[79]
and homicide, by reclusion temporal.
[80]
Hence,
the increase in the penalty imposed when these two are considered together as a special complex crime is not too far from the
penalties imposed for each of the single offenses. In contrast, as shown by the examples above, there are instances where the
component crimes of plunder, if taken separately, would result in the imposition of correctional penalties only; but when
considered as forming part of a series or combination of acts constituting plunder, could be punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. The disproportionate increase in the penalty is certainly violative of substantive due process and constitute a cruel and
inhuman punishment.
It may also be pointed out that the definition of ill-gotten wealth in Section 1(d) has reference to the acquisition of property
(by the accused himself or in connivance with others) by any combination or series of the means or similar
schemes enumerated therein, which include the following:
x x x
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other forms of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment or any business enterprise or undertakings;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
x x x
The above-mentioned acts are not, by any stretch of the imagination, criminal or illegal acts. They involve the exercise of the
right to liberty and property guaranteed by Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Receiving or
accepting any shares of stock is not per se objectionable. It is in pursuance of civil liberty, which includes the right of the citizen to
be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; x x x to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, and/or that
purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful
conclusion.
[81]
Nor is there any impropriety, immorality or illegality in establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combination and/or implementation of decrees and orders even if they are intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests. The phrases particular persons and special interests may well refer to the poor,
[82]
the indigenous cultural
communities,
[83]
labor,
[84]
farmers,
[85]
fisherfolk,
[86]
women,
[87]
or those connected with education, science and technology, arts,
culture and sports.
[88]

In contrast, the monopolies and combinations described in Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code are punishable because, as
specifically defined therein, they are on restraint of trade or commerce or to prevent by artificial means of free competition in the
market, or the object is to alter the price of any merchandise by spreading false rumors, or to manipulate market prices in
restraint of trade. There are no similar elements of monopolies or combinations as described in the Plunder Law to make the acts
wrongful.
If, as interpreted by the Solicitor General, series means a repetition or pertains to two or more acts, and combination as
defined in the Websters Third New International Dictionary is the result or product of combining one thing with another,
[89]
then,
the commission of two or more acts falling under paragraphs (4) and (5) of Section 1(d) would make innocent acts protected by the
Constitution as criminal, and punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
R.A. No. 7080 does not define pattern,

an essential element of the crime of plunder.

Granting arguendo that, as asserted by the majority, combination and series simplistically mean the commission of two or
more of the acts enumerated in Section 1(d),
[90]
still, this interpretation does not cure the vagueness of R.A. No. 7080. In construing
the definition of plunder, Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 must not be read in isolation but rather, must be interpreted in relation to the
other provisions of said law. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that to ascertain the meaning of a law, the same must be read
in its entirety.
[91]
Section 1 taken in relation to Section 4 suggests that there is something to plunder beyond simply the number of
acts involved and that a grand scheme to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth is contemplated by R.A. No.
7080. Sections 1 and 2 pertain only to the nature and quantitative means or acts by which a public officer, by himself or in
connivance with other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth. Section 4, on the other hand, requires the
presence of elements other than those enumerated in Section 2 to establish that the crime of plunder has been committed because
it speaks of the necessity to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy.
Clearly, it will not suffice that the illegal wealth amassed is at least Fifty Million Pesos and that this was acquired by any two
or more of the acts described in Section 1(d); it is necessary that these acts constitute a combination or series of acts done in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, and which constitute a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy.
That pattern is an essential element of the crime of plunder is evident from a reading of the assailed law in its entirety. It is that
which would distinguish plunder from isolated criminal acts punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws, for without
the existence a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall scheme or conspiracy to acquire ill-gotten wealth, a
person committing several or even all of the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) cannot be convicted for plunder, but may be convicted
only for the specific crimes committed under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code or other laws.
For this reason, I do not agree that Section 4 is merely a rule of evidence or a rule of procedure. It does not become such
simply because its caption states that it is, although its wording indicates otherwise. On the contrary, it is of substantive character
because it spells out a distinctive element of the crime which has to be established, i.e., an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
indicated by a pattern of overt or criminal acts or means or similar schemes to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
The meaning of the phrase pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy, however,
escapes me. As in combination and series, R.A. No. 7080 does not provide a definition of pattern as well as overall unlawful
scheme. Reference to the legislative history of R.A. No. 7080 for guidance as to the meanings of these concepts would be
unavailing, since the records of the deliberations in Congress are silent as to what the lawmakers mean by these terms.
Resort to the dictionary meanings of pattern and scheme is, in this case, wholly inadequate. These words are defined as:
pattern: an arrangement or order of things or activity.
[92]

scheme: design; project; plot.
[93]

At most, what the use of these terms signifies is that while multiplicity of the acts (at least two or more) is necessary, this is not
sufficient to constitute plunder. As stated earlier, without the element of pattern indicative of an overall unlawful scheme, the
acts merely constitute isolated or disconnected criminal offenses punishable by the Revised Penal Code or other special laws.
The commission of two or more of the acts falling under Section 1(d) is no guarantee that they fall into a pattern or any
arrangement or order. It is not the number of acts but the relationship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing
principle that renders them ordered or arranged:
A pattern is an arrangement or order of things, or activity, and the mere fact that there are a number of predicates is no
guarantee that they fall into an arrangement or order. It is not the number of predicates but the relationship that they bear to each
other or to some external organizing principle that renders them ordered or arranged.
[94]

In any event, it is hardly possible that two predicate acts can form a pattern:
The implication is that while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient. Indeed, in common parlance, two of anything will
not generally form a pattern.
[95]

In H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. et al.
[96]
(hereinafter referred to as Northwestern), the U.S. Court reiterated the
foregoing doctrine:
xxx Nor can we agree with those courts that have suggested that a pattern is established merely by proving two predicate acts.
[97]

Respondents metaphorical illustration of "pattern" as a wheel with spokes (the overt or criminal acts of the accused) meeting
at a common center (the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth) and with a rim (the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy) of the wheel
enclosing the spokes, is off tangent. Their position that two spokes suffice to make a wheel, even without regard to the relationship
the spokes bear to each other clearly demonstrates the absurdity of their view, for how can a wheel with only two spokes which are
disjointed function properly?
That pattern is an amorphous concept even in U.S. jurisprudence where the term is reasonably defined is precisely the point
of the incisive concurring opinion of Justice Antonin Scalia in Northwestern where he invited a constitutional challenge to the RICO
law on void-for-vagueness ground.
[98]
The RICO law is a federal statute in the United States that provides for both civil and criminal
penalties for violation therefor. It incorporates by reference twenty-four separate federal crimes and eight types of state
felonies.
[99]
One of the key elements of a RICO violation is that the offender is engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.
[100]
The
RICO law defines the phrase pattern of racketeering activity as requiring at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which
occurred after the effective date of 18 USCS 1961, and within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
[101]
Incidentally, the Solicitor General claims that R.A. No. 7080 is an entirely
different law from the RICO law. The deliberations in Congress reveal otherwise. As observed by Rep. Pablo Garcia, Chairman of the
House of Representatives Committee on Justice, R.A. No. 7080 was patterned after the RICO law.
[102]

In Northwestern, conceding that *the U.S. Congress+ has done nothing . . . further to illuminate RICOs key requirement of a
pattern of racketeering, the U.S. Supreme Court, through Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., undertook the task of developing a
meaningful concept of pattern within the existing statutory framework.
[103]
Relying heavily on legislative history, the US Supreme
Court in that case construed "pattern as requiring continuity plus relationship.
[104]
The US Supreme Court formulated the
relationship requirement in this wise: Criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events.
[105]
Continuity is clarified as both a closed and open-ended concept, referring either to a closed period
of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.
[106]

In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the majoritys formulation. The talismanic phrase of continuity
plus relationship is, as put by Justice Scalia, about as helpful as advising the courts that life is a fountain. He writes:
x x x Thus, when 1961(5) says that a pattern requires at least two acts of racketeering activity it is describing what is
needful but not sufficient. (If that were not the case, the concept of pattern would have been unnecessary, and the statute could
simply have attached liability to multiple acts of racketeering activity). But what that something more is, is beyond me. As I have
suggested, it is also beyond the Court. Todays opinion has added nothing to improve our prior guidance, which has created a
kaleidoscope of Circuit positions, except to clarify that RICO may in addition be violated when there is a threat of continuity. It
seems to me this increases rather than removes the vagueness. There is no reason to believe that the Court of Appeals will be any
more unified in the future, than they have in the past, regarding the content of this law.
That situation is bad enough with respect to any statute, but it is intolerable with respect to RICO. For it is not only true, as Justice
Marshall commented in Sedima, S.P.R.L. vs. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 x x x, that our interpretation of RICO has quite simply
revolutionize*d+ private litigation and validate*d+ the federalization of broad areas of state common law of frauds, x x x so that
clarity and predictability in RICOs civil applications are particularly important; but it is also true that RICO, since it has criminal
applications as well, must, even in its civil applications, possess the degree of certainty required for criminal laws x x x. No
constitutional challenge to this law has been raised in the present case, and so that issue is not before us. That the highest court in
the land has been unable to derive from this statute anything more than todays meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that
challenge is presented.
[107]

It bears noting that in Northwestern the constitutionality of the RICO law was not challenged.
[108]
After Northwestern, the U.S.
Supreme Court has so far declined the opportunity to hear cases in which the void-for-vagueness challenge to the pattern
requirement was raised.
[109]

Admittedly, at the district courts level, the state statutes (referred to as Little RICOS)
[110]
have so far successfully survived
constitutional challenge on void-for-vagueness ground. However, it must be underscored that, unlike R.A. No. 7080, these state
anti-racketeering laws have invariably provided for a reasonably clear, comprehensive and understandable definition of
pattern.
[111]
For instance, in one state, the pattern requirement specifies that the related predicate acts must have, among others,
the same or similar purpose, result, principal, victims or methods of commission and must be connected with organized
crime.
[112]
In four others, their pattern requirement provides that two or more predicate acts should be related to the affairs of the
enterprise, are not isolated, are not closely related to each other and connected in point of time and place, and if they are too
closely related, they will be treated as a single act.
[113]
In two other states, pattern requirements provide that if the acts are not
related to a common scheme, plan or purpose, a pattern may still exist if the participants have the mental capacity required for the
predicate acts and are associated with the criminal enterprise.
[114]

All the foregoing state statutes require that the predicate acts be related and that the acts occur within a specified time
frame.
Clearly, pattern has been statutorily defined and interpreted in countless ways by circuit courts in the United States. Their
divergent conclusions have functioned effectively to create variant criminal offenses.
[115]
This confusion has come about
notwithstanding that almost all these state laws have respectively statutorily defined pattern. In sharp contrast, R.A. No. 7080, as
earlier pointed out, lacks such crucial definition. As to what constitutes pattern within the meaning of R.A. No. 7080 is left to
the ad hoc interpretation of prosecutors and judges. Neither the text of R.A. No. 7080 nor legislative history afford any guidance as
to what factors may be considered in order to prove beyond reasonable doubt pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
Be that as it may, it is glaringly fallacious to argue that series simply means a repetition or pertaining to two or more and
combination is the result or product or product of combining. Whether two or more or at least three acts are involved, the
majority would interpret the phrase "combinations' or "series" only in terms of number of acts committed. They
entirely overlook or ignore Section 4 which requires "a pattern of overt of criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy" to convict.
If the elements of the offense are as what the majority has suggested, the crime of plunder could have been defined in the
following manner:
Where a public official, by himself or in conspiracy with others, amasses or acquires money or property by committing two or more
acts in violation of Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019), or Articles 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216 and
217 of the Revised Penal Code, he shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
The above would be a straightforward and objective definition of the crime of plunder. However, this would render
meaningless the core phrases "a combination or series of" "overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy," or the phrase "any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes" or "a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy."
But that obviously is not the definition of the crime of plunder under R.A. 7080. There is something more. A careful reading of
the law would unavoidably compel a conclusion that there should be a connecting link among the means or schemes comprising a
series or combination for the purpose of acquiring or amassing ill-gotten wealth. The bond or link is an overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy mentioned in Section 4. The law contemplates a combination or series of criminal acts in plunder done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. It does not postulate acts
committed randomly, separately or independently or sporadically. Otherwise stated, if the legislature intended to define plunder
as the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the manner espoused by the majority, the use in R.A. 7080 of such words and phrases as
combination" and "series of overt or criminal acts" xxx "in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy is absolutely pointless and
meaningless.
R.A. No. 7080 makes it possible for a person

conspiring with the accused in committing

one of the acts constituting the charge

of plunder to be convicted for the same crime.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states that *a+ny person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree
of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. Both parties share the view that the law as it is worded makes it possible for a person who partici pates in
the commission of only one of the component crimes constituting plunder to be liable as co-conspirator for plunder, not merely the
component crime in which he participated.
[116]
While petitioner concedes that it is easy to ascertain the penalty for an accomplice or
accessory under R.A. No. 7080, such is not the case with respect to a co-principal of the accused.
[117]
In other words, a person who
conspires with the accused in the commission of only one of the component crimes may be prosecuted as co-principal for the
component crime, or as co-principal for the crime of plunder, depending on the interpretation of the prosecutor. The unfettered
discretion effectively bestowed on law enforcers by the aforequoted clause in determining the liability of the participants in the
commission of one or more of the component crimes of a charge for plunder undeniably poses the danger of arbitrary enforcement
of the law.
[118]

R.A. No. 7080 does not clearly state

the prescriptive period of the crime of plunder.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7080 provides that the crime punishable under said Act shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Considering
that the law was designed to cover a combination or series of overt or criminal acts, or a pattern of overt or criminal acts, from
what time shall the period of prescription be reckoned? From the first, second, third or last act of the series or pattern? What shall
be the time gap between two succeeding acts? If the last act of a series or combination was committed twenty or more years after
the next preceding one, would not the crime have prescribed, thereby resulting in the total extinction of criminal liability under
Article 89(b) of the Revised Penal Code? In antithesis, the RICO law affords more clarity and definiteness in describing pattern of
racketeering activity as at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity.
[119]119
119 The U.S. state statutes similarly provide
specific time frames within which racketeering acts are committed.
The Solicitor General enjoins the Court to rectify the deficiencies in the law by judicial construction. However, it certainly
would not be feasible for the Court to interpret each and every ambiguous provision without falling into the trap of judicial
legislation. A statute should be construed to avoid constitutional question only when an alternative interpretation is possible from
its language.
[120]
Borrowing from the opinion of the court
[121]
in Northwestern,
[122]
the law may be a poorly drafted statute;
but rewriting it is a job for Congress, if it so inclined, and not for this Court. But where the law as the one in question is void on its
face for its patent ambiguity in that it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, the Court cannot breathe life to it through the guise of construction.
R.A. No. 7080 effectively eliminates mens rea

or criminal intent as an element of the crime of plunder.

Section 4 provides that for the purpose of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
The majority would interpret this section to mean that the prosecution has the burden of showing a combination or series
resulting in the crime of plunder. And, once the minimum requirements for a combination or a series of acts are met, there i s no
necessity for the prosecution to prove each and every other act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to
amass, accumulate, or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
[123]

By its language, Section 4 eliminates proof of each and every component criminal act of plunder by the accused and limits itself
to establishing just the pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of unlawful scheme or conspiracy. The law, in effect, penalizes the
accused on the basis of a proven scheme or conspiracy to commit plunder without the necessity of establishing beyond reasonable
doubt each and every criminal act done by the accused in the crime of plunder. To quote Fr. Bernas again: How can you have a
series of criminal acts if the elements that are supposed to constitute the series are not proved to be criminal?
[124]

Moreover, by doing away with proof beyond reasonable doubt of each and every criminal act done by the accused in the
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient just to prove a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy, the Plunder Law effectively eliminated the mens rea or criminal intent
as an element of the crime. Because of this, it is easier to convict for plunder and sentence the accused to death than to convict him
for each of the component crimes otherwise punishable under the Revised Penal Code and other laws which are bailable
offenses. The resultant absurdity strikes at the very heart if the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.
Plunder is a malum in se.

The acts enumerated in Section 1(d) are mostly defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, e.g. malversation, estafa,
bribery and other crimes committed by public officers. As such, they are by nature mala in se crimes. Since intent is an essential
element of these crimes, then, with more reason that criminal intent be established in plunder which, under R.A. No. 7659, is one of
the heinous crimes
[125]
as pronounced in one of its whereas clauses.
[126]

The fact that the acts enumerated in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 were made criminal by special law does not necessarily make the
same mala prohibita where criminal intent is not essential, although the term refers generally to acts made criminal by special
laws. For there is a marked difference between the two. According to a well-known author on criminal law:
There is a distinction between crimes which are mala in se, or wrongful from their nature, such as theft, rape, homicide, etc., and
those that are mala prohibita, or wrong merely because prohibited by statute, such as illegal possession of firearms.
Crimes mala in se are those so serious in their effects on society as to call for almost unanimous condemnation of its members;
while crimes mala prohibita are violations of mere rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs
of society. (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Rawles 3rd Revision)
(1) In acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in those mala prohibit the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? (People vs. Kibler, 106 N.Y., 321, cited in the case of U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 132)
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy, as in illegal possession of
firearms. (People vs. Conosa, C.A., 45 O.G. 3953)
(2) The term mala in se refers generally to felonies defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code. When the acts are
inherently immoral, they are mala in se, even if punished by special laws. On the other hand, there are crimes in the
Revised Penal Code which were originally defined and penalized by special laws. Among them are possession and use
of opium, malversation, brigandage, and libel.
[127]

The component acts constituting plunder, a heinous crime, being inherently wrongful and immoral, are patently mala in se,
even if punished by a special law and accordingly, criminal intent must clearly be established together with the other elements of
the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. By eliminating mens rea, R.A. 7080 does not require the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the component acts constituting plunder and imposes a lesser burden of proof on the prosecution, thus paving
the way for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on the accused, in plain violation of the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Evidently, the authority of the legislature to omit the element of scienter in the
proof of a crime refers to regulatory measures in the exercise of police power, where the emphasis of the law is to secure a more
orderly regulations of the offense of society, rather than the punishment of the crimes. So that in mala prohibita prosecutions, the
element of criminal intent is a requirement for conviction and must be provided in the special law penalizing what are
traditionally mala in se crimes. As correctly pointed out by petitioner,
[128]
citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Smith Act was
ruled to require intent to advocate
[129]
and held to require knowledge of illegal advocacy.
[130]
And in another case,
[131]
and
ordinance making illegal the possession of obscene books was declared unconstitutional for lack of scienter requirement.
Mens rea is a substantive due process requirement under the Constitution, and this is a limitation on police
power. Additionally, lack of mens rea or a clarifying scienter requirement aggravates the vagueness of a statute.
In Morisette v. U.S.
[132]
the U.S. Supreme Court underscored the stultifying effect of eliminating mens rea, thus:
The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The purpose
and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecutions party to conviction, to strip the
defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore
allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common law crimes on
judicial initiative.
In the same breath, Justice Florenz Regalado expreses serious doubts as to the authority of the legislature to complex mala in
se crimes with mala prohibita,saying:
x x x although there has been a tendency to penalize crimes under special laws with penalties borrowed from the Code, there is
still the question of legislative authority to consolidate crimes punished under different statutes. Worse, where one is punished
under the Code and the other by the special law, both of these contingencies had not been contemplated when the concept of
a delito complejo was engrafted into the Code.
[133]

Petitioner is not estopped from questioning

the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080.

The case at bar has been subject to controversy principally due to the personalities involved herein. The fact that one of
petitioners counsels
[134]
was a co-sponsor of the Plunder Law
[135]
and petitioner himself voted for its passage when he was still a
Senator would not in any put him in estoppel to question its constitutionality. The rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not
of law.
[136]
Moreover, estoppel should be resorted to only as a means of preventing injustice.
[137]
To hold that petitioner is estopped
from questioning the validity of R.A. No. 7080 because he had earlier voted for its passage would result in injustice not only to him,
but to all others who may be held liable under this statute. In People vs. Vera,
[138]
citing the U.S. case of Attorney General v.
Perkins, the Court held:
x x x The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that
to an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation upon their government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an
adequate statute relied on in justification is unconstitutional, it is a statute only in form, and lacks the force of law, and is of no more
saving effect to justify action under it it had never been enacted. the constitution is the supreme law, and to its behests the courts,
the legislature, and the people must bow. x x x
[139]

The Court should not sanction the use of an equitable remedy to defeat the ends of justice by permitting a person to be depri ved of
his life and liberty under an invalid law.
Undoubtedly, the reason behind the enactment of R.A. 7080 is commendable. It was a response to the felt need at the time
that existing laws were inadequate to penalize the nature and magnitude of corruption that characterized a "previous
regime."
[140]
However, where the law, such as R.A. 7080, is so indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct
becomes a matter of guesswork, the indefiniteness runs afoul of due process concepts which require that persons be given full
notice of what to avoid, and that the discretion of law enforcement officials, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, be limited by explicit legislative standards.
[141]
It obfuscates the mind to ponder that such an ambiguous
law as R.A. No. 7080 would put on the balance the life and liberty of the accused against whom all the resources of the State are
arrayed. It could be used as a tool against political enemies and a weapon of hate and revenge by whoever wields the levers of
power.
I submit that the charge against petitioner in the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 does not constitute
"plunder" under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. If at all, the acts charged may constitute offenses punishable under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) or the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the information charging petitioner with
plunder must be quashed. Such quashal, however, should be without prejudice to the filing of new informations for acts under R.A.
No. 3019, of the Revised Penal Code and other laws. Double jeopardy would not bar the filing of the same because the dismissal of
the case is made with the express consent of the petitioner-accused.
[142]

In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.




























































DAVID VS ARROYO


All powers need some restraint; practical adjustments rather than rigid formula are necessary.
[1]
Superior strength the
use of force cannot make wrongs into rights. In this regard, the courts should be vigilant in safeguarding the constitutional rights
of the citizens, specifically their liberty.

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans philosophy of liberty is thus most relevant. He said: In cases involving liberty, the
scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the
dispossessed and the weak. Laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption
against their constitutional validity.
[2]

These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017
(PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve
democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such
issuances are void for being unconstitutional.


Once again, the Court is faced with an age-old but persistently modern problem. How does the Constitution of a free people
combine the degree of liberty, without which, law becomes tyranny, with the degree of law, without which, liberty becomes
license?
[3]

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20
th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section
18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . .
. may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-
in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and
to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.

She cited the following facts as bases:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with
authoritarians of the extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by
military adventurists the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State who are now in a tactical
alliance and engaged in a concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly
constituted Government elected in May 2004;

WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down the President;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the
national media;

WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance
including hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in government and their
faith in the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the
opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the
democratic institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
constitute a clear and present dangerto the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino
people;


On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017, thus:

WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political opposition have conspired with authoritarians of
the extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the extreme Right, represented by military adventurists -
the historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State and who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a
concerted and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the duly-constituted Government elected
in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring down our republican government;

WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been recklessly magnified by certain segments of the
national media;

WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine State by obstructing governance, including
hindering the growth of the economy and sabotaging the peoples confidence in the government and their faith in
the future of this country;

WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the economy;

WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both the extreme Left and extreme Right the
opening to intensify their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine State;

WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes the defense and preservation of the democratic
institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;

WHEREAS, the activities above-described, their consequences, ramifications and collateral effects
constitute a clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the Philippine State and of the Filipino
people;

WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has been issued declaring a State of National
Emergency;

NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the powers vested in me under the
Constitution as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, do hereby call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country;

I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the
AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and
prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.


On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had
been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. She issued Proclamation No. 1021 which reads:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006, was issued declaring a state of national emergency;

WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No.5 and No.6 dated February 24, 2006, which were issued on the
basis of Proclamation No. 1017, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police
(PNP), were directed to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent and suppress all form of
lawless violence as well as any act of rebellion and to undertake such action as may be necessary;

WHEREAS, the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence
and rebellion;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist.


In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind
the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and
some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo.
[4]
They considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
During the oral arguments held on March 7, 2006, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5. Significantly, there was no refutation from petitioners counsels.
The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. He emphasized that none of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was
without factual bases. While he explained that it is not respondents task to state the facts behind the questioned Proclamation,
however, they are presenting the same, narrated hereunder, for the elucidation of the issues.
On January 17, 2006, Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and
Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio,
Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to
show and proclaim our displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the streets in protest,
but also by wearing red bands on our left arms.
[5]


On February 17, 2006, the authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I which detailed plans for bombings
and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The plot was to assassinate selected targets
including some cabinet members and President Arroyo herself.
[6]
Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to
attend the Alumni Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated at the PMA
parade ground.
On February 21, 2006, Lt. San Juan was recaptured in a communist safehouse in Batangas province. Found in his
possession were two (2) flash disks containing minutes of the meetings between members of the Magdalo Group and the National
Peoples Army (NPA), a tape recorder, audio cassette cartridges, diskettes, and copies of subversive documents.
[7]
Prior to his
arrest, Lt. San Juan announced through DZRH that the Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20
th
Anniversary of
Edsa I.
On February 23, 2006, PNP Chief Arturo Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP- Special Action Force
were planning to defect. Thus, he immediately ordered SAF Commanding General Marcelino Franco, Jr. to disavow any defection.
The latter promptly obeyed and issued a public statement: All SAF units are under the effective control of responsible and
trustworthy officers with proven integrity and unquestionable loyalty.
On the same day, at the house of former Congressman Peping Cojuangco, President Cory Aquinos brother, businessmen
and mid-level government officials plotted moves to bring down the Arroyo administration. Nelly Sindayen of TIME Magazine
reported that Pastor Saycon, longtime Arroyo critic, called a U.S. government official about his groups plans if President Arroyo is
ousted. Saycon also phoned a man code-named Delta. Saycon identified him as B/Gen. Danilo Lim, Commander of the Armys elite
Scout Ranger. Lim said it was all systems go for the planned movement against Arroyo.
[8]

B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Brigade Commander Col. Ariel Querubin confided to Gen. Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), that a huge number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed
component to the Anti-Arroyo protests to be held on February 24, 2005. According to these two (2) officers, there was no way they
could possibly stop the soldiers because they too, were breaking the chain of command to join the forces foist to unseat the
President. However, Gen. Senga has remained faithful to his Commander-in-Chief and to the chain of command. He immediately
took custody of B/Gen. Lim and directed Col. Querubin to return to the Philippine Marines Headquarters in Fort Bonifacio.
Earlier, the CPP-NPA called for intensification of political and revolutionary work within the military and the police
establishments in order to forge alliances with its members and key officials. NPA spokesman Gregorio Ka Roger Rosal declared:
The Communist Party and revolutionary movement and the entire people look forward to the possibility in the coming year of
accomplishing its immediate task of bringing down the Arroyo regime; of rendering it to weaken and unable to rule that it wil l not
take much longer to end it.
[9]

On the other hand, Cesar Renerio, spokesman for the National Democratic Front (NDF) at North Central Mindanao, publicly
announced: Anti-Arroyo groups within the military and police are growing rapidly, hastened by the economic difficulties suffered by
the families of AFP officers and enlisted personnel who undertake counter-insurgency operations in the field. He claimed that with
the forces of the national democratic movement, the anti-Arroyo conservative political parties, coalitions, plus the groups that have
been reinforcing since June 2005, it is probable that the Presidents ouster is nearing its concluding stage in the first half of 2006.
Respondents further claimed that the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan was also
considered as additional factual basis for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. So is the raid of an army outpost in Benguet
resulting in the death of three (3) soldiers. And also the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front
organizations to join 5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests.
[10]

By midnight of February 23, 2006, the President convened her security advisers and several cabinet members to assess the
gravity of the fermenting peace and order situation. She directed both the AFP and the PNP to account for all their men and ensure
that the chain of command remains solid and undivided. To protect the young students from any possible trouble that might break
loose on the streets, the President suspended classes in all levels in the entire National Capital Region.
For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the
20
th
anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments.
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of
destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of
facilities, including media, can already be implemented.
[11]

Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters (members
ofKilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-KMU]), marched from various
parts of Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who were already near the EDSA site were
violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water
cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and scatter the massed participants. The same police action was
used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao, Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA. That same
evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo de Roxas Street in
Makati City.
[12]

According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at
the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-
listAkbayan.
At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated
news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City
were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were
stationed outside the building.
[13]

A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-
opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
The raid, according to Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor, is meant to show a strong presence, to tell media
outlets not to connive or do anything that would help the rebels in bringing down this government. The PNP warned that it would
take over any media organization that would not follow standards set by the government during the state of national
emergency. Director General Lomibao stated that if they do not follow the standards and the standards are - if they would
contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will
recommend a takeover. National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis urged television and radio networks
tocooperate with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He asked for balanced reporting from
broadcasters when covering the events surrounding the coup attempt foiled by the government. He warned that his agency will not
hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media coverage when the national security
is threatened.
[14]

Also, on February 25, 2006, the police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran, representing the Anakpawis Party and
Chairman of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), while leaving his farmhouse in Bulacan. The police showed a warrant for his arrest dated
1985. Beltrans lawyer explained that the warrant, which stemmed from a case of inciting to rebellion filed during the Marcos
regime, had long been quashed. Beltran, however, is not a party in any of these petitions.
When members of petitioner KMU went to Camp Crame to visit Beltran, they were told they could not be admitted because
of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Two members were arrested and detained, while the rest were dispersed by the police.
Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo eluded arrest when the police went after him during a public forum at the Sulo
Hotel in Quezon City. But his two drivers, identified as Roel and Art, were taken into custody.
Retired Major General Ramon Montao, former head of the Philippine Constabulary, was arrested while with his wife and
golfmates at the Orchard Golf and Country Club in Dasmarias, Cavite.
Attempts were made to arrest Anakpawis Representative Satur Ocampo, Representative Rafael Mariano, Bayan
MunaRepresentative Teodoro Casio and Gabriela Representative Liza Maza. Bayan Muna Representative Josel Virador was
arrested at the PAL Ticket Office in Davao City. Later, he was turned over to the custody of the House of Representatives where the
Batasan 5 decided to stay indefinitely.
Let it be stressed at this point that the alleged violations of the rights of Representatives Beltran, Satur Ocampo, et al., are
not being raised in these petitions.
On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist.
In the interim, these seven (7) petitions challenging the constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were filed with this
Court against the above-named respondents. Three (3) of these petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent.
In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and(3) it violates
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDGs act of raiding
the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of censorship or prior restraint. They also claimed that the term emergency refers
only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is absolutely no emergency that warrants the issuance
of PP 1017.
In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and twenty one (21) other members of
the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel
Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute usurpation of legislative powers; violation of freedom of
expression and a declaration of martial law. They alleged that President Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in calling out the
armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to
do so.
In G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was
without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their
grievances.
In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional
because they violate (a) Section 4
[15]
of Article II, (b) Sections 1,
[16]
2,
[17]
and 4
[18]
of Article III,

(c) Section 23
[19]
of Article
VI, and (d) Section 17
[20]
of Article XII of the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an arbitrary and unlawful exercise by
the President of her Martial Law powers. And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued
that it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval. In addition, petitioners
asserted that PP 1017 goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code.
And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424, petitioner Loren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional for
being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to
information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. In this regard, she
stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.
In respondents Consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General countered that: first, the petitions should be dismissed for
being moot; second, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.)
and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing; third, it is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as
respondent; fourth, PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and fifth, PP 1017 does not violate the peoples right to free
expression and redress of grievances.
On March 7, 2006, the Court conducted oral arguments and heard the parties on the above interlocking issues which may be
summarized as follows:
A. PROCEDURAL:
1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.
2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et
al.),171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing.
B. SUBSTANTIVE:
1) Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.
2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.
a. Facial Challenge
b. Constitutional Basis
c. As Applied Challenge

A. PROCEDURAL

First, we must resolve the procedural roadblocks.
I- Moot and Academic Principle
One of the greatest contributions of the American system to this country is the concept of judicial review enunciated inMarbury
v. Madison.
[21]
This concept rests on the extraordinary simple foundation --
The Constitution is the supreme law. It was ordained by the people, the ultimate source of all political
authority. It confers limited powers on the national government. x x x If the government consciously or
unconsciously oversteps these limitations there must be some authority competent to hold it in control, to
thwart its unconstitutional attempt, and thus to vindicate and preserve inviolate the will of the people as
expressed in the Constitution. This power the courts exercise. This is the beginning and the end of the theory of
judicial review.
[22]


But the power of judicial review does not repose upon the courts a self-starting capacity.
[23]
Courts may exercise such power
only when the following requisites are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy; second, petitioners have to raise a
question of constitutionality; third, the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth, the decision of
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
[24]

Respondents maintain that the first and second requisites are absent, hence, we shall limit our discussion thereon.
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is
definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief.
[25]
The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the
present petitions were rendered moot and academic by President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021.
Such contention lacks merit.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
[26]
so that
a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
[27]
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case
[28]
or dismiss it
on ground of mootness.
[29]

The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and
academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts
in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the
vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers
no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.
[30]

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
[31]
second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
[32]
third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
[33]
and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
[34]

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Courts assumption of jurisdiction over the instant
petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the
issues being raised affect the publics interest, involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly
and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on
the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees.
[35]
And lastly, respondents contested actions are capable of
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans
Separate Opinion in Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary.
[36]
However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justices very statement
that an otherwise moot case may still be decided provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be
prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance. The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule
pointed out by the Chief Justice.
II- Legal Standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems it imperative to have a more than
passing discussion on legal standing or locus standi.

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
[37]
In private suits, standing is
governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It
provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-
party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit.
[38]
Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.


The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently
from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid
down in Beauchamp v. Silk,
[39]
where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a
citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:
[40]
In matter of mere
public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see
that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers
suits, Terr v. Jordan
[41]
held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use
of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court
laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt,
[42]
later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman.
[43]
The same Court ruled
that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show
that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all
members of the public.
This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera,
[44]
it held that the person who impugns
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate,
[45]
Manila Race
Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente,
[46]
Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works
[47]
and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v.
Felix.
[48]

However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise
of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan,
[49]
where the transcendental
importance of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v.
Comelec,
[50]
this Court resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the far-reaching implications of the petition
notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases
where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute
actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
[51]

Thus, the Court has adopted a rule that even where the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they have been allowed to
sue under the principle of transcendental importance. Pertinent are the following cases:
(1) Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
[52]
where the Court ruled that the enforcement of the
constitutional right to information and the equitable diffusion of natural resources are matters of
transcendental importance which clothe the petitioner with locus standi;

(2) Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,
[53]
wherein the Court held that given the transcendental
importance of the issues involved, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow the suit to prosper
despite the lack of direct injury to the parties seeking judicial review of the Visiting Forces Agreement;

(3) Lim v. Executive Secretary,
[54]
while the Court noted that the petitioners may not file suit in their
capacity as taxpayers absent a showing that Balikatan 02-01 involves the exercise of Congress taxing or spending
powers, it reiterated its ruling in Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,
[55]
that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely and standing requirements may
be relaxed.

By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives
as legislators.
Significantly, recent decisions show a certain toughening in the Courts attitude toward legal standing.
In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,
[56]
the Court ruled that the status of Kilosbayan as a peoples organization does not give it the
requisite personality to question the validity of the on-line lottery contract, more so where it does not raise any issue of
constitutionality. Moreover, it cannot sue as a taxpayer absent any allegation that public funds are being misused. Nor can it sue as
a concerned citizen as it does not allege any specific injury it has suffered.
In Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Comelec,
[57]
the Court reiterated the direct injury
test with respect to concerned citizens cases involving constitutional issues. It held that there must be a showing that the citizen
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury arising from the alleged illegal official act.
In Lacson v. Perez,
[58]
the Court ruled that one of the petitioners, Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), is not a real party-
in-interest as it had not demonstrated any injury to itself or to its leaders, members or supporters.
In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
[59]
the Court ruled that only the petitioners who are members of Congress have standing
to sue, as they claim that the Presidents declaration of a state of rebellion is a usurpation of the emergency powers of Congress,
thus impairing their legislative powers. As to petitioners Sanlakas, Partido Manggagawa, and Social Justice Society, the Court
declared them to be devoid of standing, equating them with the LDP in Lacson.
Now, the application of the above principles to the present petitions.
The locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 171396, particularly David and Llamas, is beyond doubt. The same holds true
with petitioners in G.R. No. 171409, Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co. Inc. They alleged direct injury resulting from
illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the Solicitor General does not
question their legal standing.
In G.R. No. 171485, the opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers. They also raised the issue
of whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are
used. Moreover, it is in the interest of justice that those affected by PP 1017 can be represented by their Congressmen in bringing
to the attention of the Court the alleged violations of their basic rights.
In G.R. No. 171400, (ALGI), this Court applied the liberality rule in Philconsa v. Enriquez,
[60]
Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan,
[61]
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,
[62]
Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,
[63]
and Taada v. Tuvera,
[64]
that when the issue concerns a
public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
In G.R. No. 171483, KMUs assertion that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violated its right to peaceful assembly may be deemed
sufficient to give it legal standing. Organizations may be granted standing to assert the rights of their members.
[65]
We take
judicial notice of the announcement by the Office of the President banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public assemblies
following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners, Cadiz et al., who are national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) have no
legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP as an institution or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the issuance of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5. In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
[66]
the Court held that
the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not suffi cient to
clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However,
in view of the transcendental importance of the issue, this Court declares that petitioner have locus standi.
In G.R. No. 171424, Loren Legarda has no personality as a taxpayer to file the instant petition as there are no allegations of
illegal disbursement of public funds. The fact that she is a former Senator is of no consequence. She can no longer sue as a
legislator on the allegation that her prerogatives as a lawmaker have been impaired by PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Her claim that she
is a media personality will not likewise aid her because there was no showing that the enforcement of these issuances prevented her
from pursuing her occupation. Her submission that she has pending electoral protest before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is
likewise of no relevance. She has not sufficiently shown that PP 1017 will affect the proceedings or result of her case. But
considering once more the transcendental importance of the issue involved, this Court may relax the standing rules.
It must always be borne in mind that the question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise
of judicial power. This is the underlying legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal standing. It cannot be doubted that the
validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramount importance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase
Justice Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits with bated breath the ruling of this Court on this very critical matter. The
petitions thus call for the application of the transcendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of the standing requirements for the
petitioners in the PP 1017 cases.

This Court holds that all the petitioners herein have locus standi.

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during
his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
[67]
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in
the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial
branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does
not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he remains accountable to the people
[68]
but he
may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment.
[69]


B. SUBSTANTIVE
I. Review of Factual Bases

Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not necessary for President Arroyo to issue such
Proclamation.
The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the Presidents exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power
has reached its distilled point - from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker
[70]
and Montenegro v. Castaneda
[71]
to
the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia,
[72]
Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile,
[73]
and Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.
[74]
The tug-of-war always cuts
across the line defining political questions, particularly those questions in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
[75]
Barcelon and Montenegro were in unison in declaring that
the authority to decide whether an exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive on the
courts. Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous in the conviction that the Court has the
authority to inquire into the existence of factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the principle of
separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks and balances, under which the President is supreme, x x x
only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not
he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme.
[76]
In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile.
[77]
There, the Court
was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the imposition of Martial Law is a political
or justiciable question.
[78]
Then came Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile which greatly dilutedLansang. It declared that there is a need to re-
examine the latter case, ratiocinating that in times of war or national emergency, the President must be given absolute control
for the very life of the nation and the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only to his conscience,
the People, and God.
[79]

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora
[80]
-- a recent case most pertinent to these cases at bar -- echoed a principle
similar to Lansang. While the Court considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result
of the Courts reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are
authorized not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government. The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.
[81]
It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in terms of power but also of duty.
[82]


As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of power, Lansang adopted the test that judicial inquiry
can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the Presidents decision is correct, but that the President did not
act arbitrarily. Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
[83]
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines, this Court
further ruled that it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis and
that if he fails, by way of proof, to support his assertion, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings.

Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of
factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the
events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the
Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines,
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to
refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
calling for military aid.



Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing
to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.

II. Constitutionality of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5

Doctrines of Several Political Theorists
on the Power of the President
in Times of Emergency


This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the various
political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion.


John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the
problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal
obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative power
to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes even against it.
[84]
But
Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for
resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that the people
have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven.
[85]



Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in time of
emergency. According to him:
The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in
certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State

It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend
their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse...

If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the
method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign
authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the peoples first intention is
that the State shall not perish.
[86]



Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or supreme magistracy as he termed it. For him, it would
more likely be cheapened by indiscreet use. He was unwilling to rely upon an appeal to heaven. Instead, he relied upon a
tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.
[87]



John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: I am far from condemning, in cases of
extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.
[88]


Nicollo Machiavellis view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an
ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political
theory, thus:
Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra constitutional measures; for
although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established
for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no
republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency
and fixed rules for applying it.
[89]



Machiavelli in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of
standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to
meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with
effective constitutional restraints.
[90]


Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional
democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.
[91]
Frederick M. Watkins saw no reason why absolutism
should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions, provided it serves to protect established institutions from
the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of
political life.
[92]
He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional
governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time imposing limitation upon that
power.
[93]
Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a
dictatorship: The period of dictatorship must be relatively shortDictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in
characterFinal authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator
himself
[94]
and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be strict political conservatism.

Carl J. Friedrich cast his analysis in terms similar to those of Watkins.
[95]
It is a problem of concentrating power in a
government where power has consciously been divided to cope with situations of unprecedented magnitude and gravity. There
must be a broad grant of powers, subject to equally strong limitations as to who shall exercise such powers, when, for how long, and
to what end.
[96]
Friedrich, too, offered criteria for judging the adequacy of any of scheme of emergency powers, to wit: The
emergency executive must be appointed by constitutional means i.e., he must be legitimate; he should not enjoy power to
determine the existence of an emergency; emergency powers should be exercised under a strict time limitation; and last, the
objective of emergency action must be the defense of the constitutional order.
[97]


Clinton L. Rossiter, after surveying the history of the employment of emergency powers in Great Britain, France, Weimar,
Germany and the United States, reverted to a description of a scheme of constitutional dictatorship as solution to the vexing
problems presented by emergency.
[98]
Like Watkins and Friedrich, he stated a priori the conditions of success of the constitutional
dictatorship, thus:
1) No general regime or particular institution of constitutional dictatorship should be initiated
unless it is necessary or even indispensable to the preservation of the State and its constitutional order

2) the decision to institute a constitutional dictatorship should never be in the hands of the
man or men who will constitute the dictator

3) No government should initiate a constitutional dictatorship without making specific
provisions for its termination

4) all uses of emergency powers and all readjustments in the organization of the government
should be effected in pursuit of constitutional or legal requirements

5) no dictatorial institution should be adopted, no right invaded, no regular procedure altered
any more than is absolutely necessary for the conquest of the particular crisis . . .

6) The measures adopted in the prosecution of the a constitutional dictatorship should never be
permanent in character or effect

7) The dictatorship should be carried on by persons representative of every part of the citizenry
interested in the defense of the existing constitutional order. . .

8) Ultimate responsibility should be maintained for every action taken under a constitutional
dictatorship. . .

9) The decision to terminate a constitutional dictatorship, like the decision to institute one
should never be in the hands of the man or men who constitute the dictator. . .

10) No constitutional dictatorship should extend beyond the termination of the crisis for which it
was instituted

11) the termination of the crisis must be followed by a complete return as possible to the
political and governmental conditions existing prior to the initiation of the constitutional dictatorship
[99]



Rossiter accorded to legislature a far greater role in the oversight exercise of emergency powers than did Watkins. He would secure
to Congress final responsibility for declaring the existence or termination of an emergency, and he places great faith in the
effectiveness of congressional investigating committees.
[100]

Scott and Cotter, in analyzing the above contemporary theories in light of recent experience, were one in saying that, the
suggestion that democracies surrender the control of government to an authoritarian ruler in time of grave danger to the nation
is not based upon sound constitutional theory. To appraise emergency power in terms of constitutional dictatorship serves merely
to distort the problem and hinder realistic analysis. It matters not whether the term dictator is used in its normal sense (as applied
to authoritarian rulers) or is employed to embrace all chief executives administering emergency powers. However used,
constitutional dictatorship cannot be divorced from the implication of suspension of the processes of constitutionalism. Thus,
they favored instead the concept of constitutionalism articulated by Charles H. McIlwain:

A concept of constitutionalism which is less misleading in the analysis of problems of emergency powers,
and which is consistent with the findings of this study, is that formulated by Charles H. McIlwain. While it does not
by any means necessarily exclude some indeterminate limitations upon the substantive powers of government, full
emphasis is placed upon procedural limitations, and political responsibility. McIlwain clearly recognized the need
to repose adequate power in government. And in discussing the meaning of constitutionalism, he insisted that
the historical and proper test of constitutionalism was the existence of adequate processes for keeping
government responsible. He refused to equate constitutionalism with the enfeebling of government by an
exaggerated emphasis upon separation of powers and substantive limitations on governmental power. He found
that the really effective checks on despotism have consisted not in the weakening of government but, but rather in
thelimiting of it; between which there is a great and very significant difference. In associating constitutionalism
with limited as distinguished from weak government, McIlwain meant government limited to the orderly
procedure of law as opposed to the processes of force. The two fundamental correlative elements of
constitutionalism for which all lovers of liberty must yet fight are the legal limits to arbitrary power and a
complete political responsibility of government to the governed.
[101]


In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists - from Locks theory of
prerogative, to Watkins doctrine of constitutional dictatorship and, eventually, to McIlwains principle of constitutionalism ---
ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to
the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective
limitations and checks.

Our Constitution has fairly coped with this problem. Fresh from the fetters of a repressive regime, the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, in drafting the 1987 Constitution, endeavored to create a government in the concept of Justice Jacksons balanced
power structure.
[102]
Executive, legislative, and judicial powers are dispersed to the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court, respectively. Each is supreme within its own sphere. But none has the monopoly of power in times of emergency. Each
branch is given a role to serve as limitation or check upon the other. This system does not weaken the
President, it just limits his power, using the language of McIlwain. In other words, in times of emergency, our Constitution
reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive but, at the
same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural limitations.

a. Facial Challenge


Petitioners contend that PP 1017 is void on its face because of its overbreadth. They claim that its enforcement
encroached on both unprotected and protected rights under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution and sent a chilling effect to
the citizens.

A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for.


First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free
speech cases, also known under the American Law as First Amendment cases.
[103]



A plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a
call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. In United States v. Salerno,
[104]
the US Supreme Court held
that we have not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment (freedom of
speech).


Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
[105]
it was
held:

It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face
and when such summary action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that
facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited
one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves
from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of otherwise
valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct.


Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.
[106]
Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.


Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to be used sparingly and only as a last
resort, and is generally disfavored;
[107]
The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court.
[108]
A writer and scholar in
Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as
applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted
to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute
on its face, not merely as applied for so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the chilling; deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws very existence may cause others
not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. An overbreadth ruling is
designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.


In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its
flaws and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence
may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. In Younger v. Harris,
[109]
it
was held that:

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these
deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions,
whichever way they might be decided.

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt
to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.

Related to the overbreadth doctrine is the void for vagueness doctrine which holds that a law is facially invalid if
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
[110]
It is subject to the same
principles governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing on their faces statutes in free speech
cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. Again, petitioners did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application. They also failed to
establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.

b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017


Now on the constitutional foundation of PP 1017.

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:
First provision:

by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision:

and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction;
Third provision:
as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.



First Provision: Calling-out Power


The first provision pertains to the Presidents calling-out power. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
[111]
this Court, through
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga, held that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reproduced as follows:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever
it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding
sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ ofhabeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual bases of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.


grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the
calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial
Law. CitingIntegrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
[112]
the Court ruled that the only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out
power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. Are these conditions present in the instant cases? As stated earlier, considering the circumstances then
prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017. Owing to her Offices vast intelligence network, she is in the best
position to determine the actual condition of the country.

Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless violence, invasion
and rebellion. This involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered
illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his powers. He cannot invoke a greater power
when he wishes to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.

It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a state of rebellion
(inSanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a state of
rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive, the statutory authority cited in Sanlakas was Section 4, Chapter 2, Book II
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:

SEC. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of
public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is
made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.


President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public moment or
interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal
significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States extraordinary power to
take over privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of
an awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless, without legal significance, or not written, as in the
case of Sanlakas.

Some of the petitioners vehemently maintain that PP 1017 is actually a declaration of Martial Law. It is no so. What defines
the character of PP 1017 are its wordings. It is plain therein that what the President invoked was her calling-out power.

The declaration of Martial Law is a warn*ing+ to citizens that the military power has been called upon by the executive to assist
in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment, not
commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law.
[113]


In his Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
[114]
an
authority in constitutional law, said that of the three powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare Martial
Law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties. It is a strong medicine which should not be resorted to lightly. It cannot be used
to stifle or persecute critics of the government. It is placed in the keeping of the President for the purpose of enabling him to secure
the people from harm and to restore order so that they can enjoy their individual freedoms. In fact, Section 18, Art. VII, provides:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.


Justice Mendoza also stated that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is no more than a call by the President to the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of
Martial Law can be done. Its use for any other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its
command is ultra vires.

Justice Mendoza further stated that specifically, (a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public assemblies;
(c) take-over of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees, are powers which can be
exercised by the President as Commander-in-Chief only where there is a valid declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ
ofhabeas corpus.

Based on the above disquisition, it is clear that PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.




Second Provision: Take Care Power

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based on
Section 17, Article VII which reads:


SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

As the Executive in whom the executive power is vested,
[115]
the primary function of the President is to
enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing laws. He sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath
or affirmation to the effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws.
[116]
In the
exercise of such function, the President, if needed, may employ the powers attached to his office as the
Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the country,
[117]
including the Philippine National Police
[118]
under
the Department of Interior and Local Government.
[119]



Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G. Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza
Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and
decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the
clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.
Petitioners contention is understandable. A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted
[120]
from Former
President Marcos Proclamation No. 1081, which partly reads:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as
defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and
to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction.



We all know that it was PP 1081 which granted President Marcos legislative power. Its enabling clause states: to enforce
obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. Upon the
other hand, the enabling clause of PP 1017 issued by President Arroyo is: to enforce obedience to all the laws and to alldecrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

Is it within the domain of President Arroyo to promulgate decrees?

PP 1017 states in part: to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees x x x promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction.

The President is granted an Ordinance Power under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of
1987). She may issue any of the following:

Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character
in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend,
shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be
embodied in memorandum orders.
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration,
which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or
offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.


President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to those issued
by Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category and binding force as
statutes because they were issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power during the period of Martial Law under
the 1973 Constitution.
[121]


This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states
that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos
exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Can President Arroyo enforce obedience to all decrees and laws through the military?


As this Court stated earlier, President Arroyo has no authority to enact decrees. It follows that these decrees are void and,
therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to laws, she cannot call the military to enforce or implement certain laws, such as
customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts and the like. She can only order the
military, under PP 1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless violence.

Third Provision: Power to Take Over
The pertinent provision of PP 1017 states:
x x x and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders, and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article XII of
the Constitution do hereby declare a state of national emergency.

The import of this provision is that President Arroyo, during the state of national emergency under PP 1017, can call the
military not only to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees x x x but also to act pursuant to the provision of Section
17, Article XII which reads:

Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.



What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she issued PP 1017?

The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP 1017 purports to grant the President,
without any authority or delegation from Congress, to take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.

This provision was first introduced in the 1973 Constitution, as a product of the martial law thinking of the 1971
Constitutional Convention.
[122]
In effect at the time of its approval was President Marcos Letter of Instruction No. 2 dated
September 22, 1972 instructing the Secretary of National Defense to take over the management, control and operation of the
Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, the
Philippine National Railways, the Philippine Air Lines, Air Manila (and) Filipinas Orient Airways . . . for the successful prosecution by
the Government of its effort to contain, solve and end the present national emergency.

Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyos inclusion of Section 17,
Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers.

This is an area that needs delineation.

A distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency
and toexercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such
power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to other national
emergency. If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a state
of national emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first
authorize the President before he can declare a state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo
could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.

But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with
public interest is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated,
different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and
considered in the light of each other.
[123]
Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted,
relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However,
knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the
Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain
conditions, thus:


(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
[124]




Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business
affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17
states that the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct
the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the
President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer,
[125]
held:

It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provision
of the Constitution. And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the
President. The contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under
the Constitution. Particular reliance is placed on provisions in Article II which say that The executive Power shall
be vested in a President . . . .; that he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed; and that he shall be
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the Presidents military power as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number of cases upholding broad
powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theater of war. Such cases need not concern us
here. Even though theater of war be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional
system hold that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take
possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production. This is a job for the
nations lawmakers, not for its military authorities.

Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant
executive power to the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the Presidents power to see that the
laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in
the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And
the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President is to
execute. The first section of the first article says that All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States. . .
[126]




Petitioner Cacho-Olivares, et al. contends that the term emergency under Section 17, Article XII refers to tsunami,
typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences. This is a limited view of emergency.



Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the degree of existing danger to
life or well-being beyond that which is accepted as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and
perception.
[127]
Emergencies, as perceived by legislature or executive in the United Sates since 1933, have been occasioned by a
wide range of situations, classifiable under three (3) principal heads: a) economic,
[128]
b) natural disaster,
[129]
and c) national
security.
[130]


Emergency, as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may include rebellion, economic crisis,
pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
[131]
This is evident in the
Records of the Constitutional Commission, thus:

MR. GASCON. Yes. What is the Committees definition of national emergency which appears in Section 13,
page 5? It reads:

When the common good so requires, the State may temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
MR. VILLEGAS. What I mean is threat from external aggression, for example, calamities or natural disasters.
MR. GASCON. There is a question by Commissioner de los Reyes. What about strikes and riots?
MR. VILLEGAS. Strikes, no; those would not be covered by the term national emergency.
MR. BENGZON. Unless they are of such proportions such that they would paralyze government service.
[132]

x x x x x x
MR. TINGSON. May I ask the committee if national emergency refers to military national emergency or
could this be economic emergency?
MR. VILLEGAS. Yes, it could refer to both military or economic dislocations.
MR. TINGSON. Thank you very much.
[133]


It may be argued that when there is national emergency, Congress may not be able to convene and, therefore, unable to
delegate to the President the power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

In Araneta v. Dinglasan,
[134]
this Court emphasized that legislative power, through which extraordinary measures are exercised,
remains in Congress even in times of crisis.

x x x

After all the criticisms that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation
of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up this form of government, with all its defects
and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino
people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other
democracy-loving peoples in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this
framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not excepting periods of
crisis no matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have specific functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws
been surrendered to another department unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative
policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or
when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our
concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal circumstances the
various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, given the ability to act, are called upon to perform
the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively.


Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that
such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President
cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without
legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken
over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the
absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
c. AS APPLIED CHALLENGE

One of the misfortunes of an emergency, particularly, that which pertains to security, is that military necessity and the
guaranteed rights of the individual are often not compatible. Our history reveals that in the crucible of conflict, many rights are
curtailed and trampled upon. Here, the right against unreasonable search and seizure; the right against warrantless arrest;and the
freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and of assembly under the Bill of Rights suffered the greatest blow.

Of the seven (7) petitions, three (3) indicate direct injury.

In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners David and Llamas alleged that, on February 24, 2006, they were arrested without warrants
on their way to EDSA to celebrate the 20
th
Anniversary of People Power I. The arresting officers cited PP 1017 as basis of the
arrest.

In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. claimed that on February 25, 2006, the CIDG
operatives raided and ransacked without warrant their office. Three policemen were assigned to guard their office as a possible
source of destabilization. Again, the basis was PP 1017.

And in G.R. No. 171483, petitioners KMU and NAFLU-KMU et al. alleged that their members were turned away and
dispersed when they went to EDSA and later, to Ayala Avenue, to celebrate the 20
th
Anniversary of People Power I.

A perusal of the direct injuries allegedly suffered by the said petitioners shows that they resulted from the implementation,
pursuant to G.O. No. 5, of PP 1017.

Can this Court adjudge as unconstitutional PP 1017 and G.O. No 5 on the basis of these illegal acts? In general, does the
illegal implementation of a law render it unconstitutional?

Settled is the rule that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid although they may be abused and
misabused
[135]
and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application.
[136]
The validity of a statute or ordinance is to
be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects in a particular
case.
[137]
PP 1017 is merely an invocation of the Presidents calling-out power. Its general purpose is to command the AFP to
suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo
to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or
violate the citizens constitutional rights.

Now, may this Court adjudge a law or ordinance unconstitutional on the ground that its implementor committed illegal
acts? The answer is no. The criterion by which the validity of the statute or ordinance is to be measured is the essential basis for the
exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion.
[138]
This is logical. Just imagine the absurdity of
situations when laws maybe declared unconstitutional just because the officers implementing them have acted arbitrarily. If this
were so, judging from the blunders committed by policemen in the cases passed upon by the Court, majority of the provi sions of the
Revised Penal Code would have been declared unconstitutional a long time ago.

President Arroyo issued G.O. No. 5 to carry into effect the provisions of PP 1017. General orders are acts and commands
of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They are internal rules issued by the
executive officer to his subordinates precisely for the proper and efficient administration of law. Such rules and regulations create
no relation except between the official who issues them and the official who receives them.
[139]
They are based on and are the
product of, a relationship in which power is their source, and obedience, their object.
[140]
For these reasons, one requirement for
these rules to be valid is that they must be reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.

G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

Unlike the term lawless violence which is unarguably extant in our statutes and the Constitution, and which is invariably
associated with invasion, insurrection or rebellion, the phrase acts of terrorism is still an amorphous and vague
concept. Congress has yet to enact a law defining and punishing acts of terrorism.

In fact, this definitional predicament or the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism confronts not only our
country, but the international community as well. The following observations are quite apropos:

In the actual unipolar context of international relations, the fight against terrorism has become one of
the basic slogans when it comes to the justification of the use of force against certain states and against groups
operating internationally. Lists of states sponsoring terrorism and of terrorist organizations are set up and
constantly being updated according to criteria that are not always known to the public, but are clearly determined
by strategic interests.

The basic problem underlying all these military actions or threats of the use of force as the most recent
by the United States against Iraq consists in the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism.

Remarkable confusion persists in regard to the legal categorization of acts of violence either by states, by
armed groups such as liberation movements, or by individuals.

The dilemma can by summarized in the saying One countrys terrorist is another countrys freedom
fighter. The apparent contradiction or lack of consistency in the use of the term terrorism may further be
demonstrated by the historical fact that leaders of national liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela in
South Africa, Habib Bourgouiba in Tunisia, or Ahmed Ben Bella in Algeria, to mention only a few, were originally
labeled as terrorists by those who controlled the territory at the time, but later became internationally respected
statesmen.

What, then, is the defining criterion for terrorist acts the differentia specifica distinguishing those acts
from eventually legitimate acts of national resistance or self-defense?

Since the times of the Cold War the United Nations Organization has been trying in vain to reach a
consensus on the basic issue of definition. The organization has intensified its efforts recently, but has been unable
to bridge the gap between those who associate terrorism with any violent act by non-state groups against
civilians, state functionaries or infrastructure or military installations, and those who believe in the concept of the
legitimate use of force when resistance against foreign occupation or against systematic oppression of ethnic
and/or religious groups within a state is concerned.

The dilemma facing the international community can best be illustrated by reference to the contradicting
categorization of organizations and movements such as Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which is a
terrorist group for Israel and a liberation movement for Arabs and Muslims the Kashmiri resistance groups who
are terrorists in the perception of India, liberation fighters in that of Pakistan the earlier Contras in Nicaragua
freedom fighters for the United States, terrorists for the Socialist camp or, most drastically, the Afghani
Mujahedeen (later to become the Taliban movement): during the Cold War period they were a group of freedom
fighters for the West, nurtured by the United States, and a terrorist gang for the Soviet Union. One could go on
and on in enumerating examples of conflicting categorizations that cannot be reconciled in any way because of
opposing political interests that are at the roots of those perceptions.

How, then, can those contradicting definitions and conflicting perceptions and evaluations of one and the
same group and its actions be explained? In our analysis, the basic reason for these striking inconsistencies lies in
the divergent interest of states. Depending on whether a state is in the position of an occupying power or in that
of a rival, or adversary, of an occupying power in a given territory, the definition of terrorism will fluctuate
accordingly. A state may eventually see itself as protector of the rights of a certain ethnic group outside its
territory and will therefore speak of a liberation struggle, not of terrorism when acts of violence by this group
are concerned, and vice-versa.

The United Nations Organization has been unable to reach a decision on the definition of terrorism
exactly because of these conflicting interests of sovereign states that determine in each and every instance how a
particular armed movement (i.e. a non-state actor) is labeled in regard to the terrorists-freedom fighter
dichotomy. A policy of double standards on this vital issue of international affairs has been the unavoidable
consequence.

This definitional predicament of an organization consisting of sovereign states and not of peoples, in
spite of the emphasis in the Preamble to the United Nations Charter! has become even more serious in the
present global power constellation: one superpower exercises the decisive role in the Security Council, former
great powers of the Cold War era as well as medium powers are increasingly being marginalized; and the problem
has become even more acute since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 I the United States.
[141]


The absence of a law defining acts of terrorism may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or
military. An illustration is when a group of persons are merely engaged in a drinking spree. Yet the military or the police may
consider the act as an act of terrorism and immediately arrest them pursuant to G.O. No. 5. Obviously, this is abuse and oppression
on their part. It must be remembered that an act can only be considered a crime if there is a law defining the same as such and
imposing the corresponding penalty thereon.


So far, the word terrorism appears only once in our criminal laws, i.e., in P.D. No. 1835 dated January 16, 1981 enacted by
President Marcos during the Martial Law regime. This decree is entitled Codifying The Various Laws on Anti-Subversion and
Increasing The Penalties for Membership in Subversive Organizations. The word terrorism is mentioned in the following
provision: That one who conspires with any other person for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Philippines x x x
by force, violence, terrorism, x x x shall be punished by reclusion temporal x x x.

P.D. No. 1835 was repealed by E.O. No. 167 (which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines) enacted by President
Corazon Aquino on May 5, 1985. These two (2) laws, however, do not define acts of terrorism. Since there is no law defining
acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute
terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without
warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and
gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the
calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that
the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.
Significantly, there is nothing in G.O. No. 5 authorizing the military or police to commit acts beyond what are necessary and
appropriate to suppress and prevent lawless violence, the limitation of their authority in pursuing the Order. Otherwise, such acts
are considered illegal.

We first examine G.R. No. 171396 (David et al.)
The Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable search and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
[142]
The plain import of the language of the Constitution is that searches, seizures and arrests
are normallyunreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental
protection given by this provision is that between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with
power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.
[143]

In the Brief Account
[144]
submitted by petitioner David, certain facts are established: first, he was arrested without
warrant;second, the PNP operatives arrested him on the basis of PP 1017; third, he was brought at Camp Karingal, Quezon City
where he was fingerprinted, photographed and booked like a criminal suspect; fourth, he was treated brusquely by policemen who
held his head and tried to push him inside an unmarked car; fifth, he was charged with Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang No. 880
[145]
and Inciting to Sedition; sixth, he was detained for seven (7) hours; and seventh, he was eventually
released for insufficiency of evidence.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

x x x.





Neither of the two (2) exceptions mentioned above justifies petitioner Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for
the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their
observation that some rallyists were wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that
petitioner David was the leader of the rally.
[146]
Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such
fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition. Further, he also stated that there is insufficient evidence for the charge
of violation of BP 880 as it was not even known whether petitioner David was the leader of the rally.
[147]

But what made it doubly worse for petitioners David et al. is that not only was their right against warrantless arrest
violated, but also their right to peaceably assemble.

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.


Assembly means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a
necessary consequence of our republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of freedom of expression,
this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
Congress has a right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of expression, the right to assemble is
not subject to previous restraint or censorship. It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from
the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held in a public place, a permit for the use of such
place, and not for the assembly itself, may be validly required.

The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while they were exercising their right to peaceful
assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the
limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were
mere afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify the arresting officers conduct. In De Jonge
v. Oregon,
[148]
it was held that peaceable assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:

Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The holding of meetings for peaceable
political action cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as
criminals on that score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to be preserved, is
not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the
speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution
protects. If the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or are engaged in a
conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of
valid laws. But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon
mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge.


On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et
al.(G.R. No. 171483) unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacaangs directive canceling all
permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant
disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
[149]
Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the
exception. Only upon a showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may deny the citizens right to
exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction between protected and unprotected
assemblies was eliminated.
Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is lodged with the local government units. They
have the power to issue permits and to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the presence of
clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and heard on the revocation of their permits.
[150]
The first time
they learned of it was at the time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a persons right is restricted by
government action, it behooves a democratic government to see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to
procedure.

G.R. No. 171409, (Cacho-Olivares, et al.) presents another facet of freedom of speech i.e., the freedom of the
press. Petitioners narration of facts, which the Solicitor General failed to refute, established the following: first, the Daily
Tribunes offices were searched without warrant; second, the police operatives seized several materials for publication; third, the
search was conducted at about 1:00 o clock in the morning of February 25, 2006; fourth, the search was conducted in the absence
of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building; and fifth, policemen stationed themselves at the vicinity
of theDaily Tribune offices.
Thereafter, a wave of warning came from government officials. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defensor was quoted as
saying that such raid was meant to show a strong presence, to tell media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help
the rebels in bringing down this government. Director General Lomibao further stated that if they do not follow the standards
and the standards are if they would contribute to instability in the government, or if they do not subscribe to what is in General
Order No. 5 and Proc. No. 1017 we will recommend a takeover. National Telecommunications Commissioner Ronald Solis
urged television and radio networks to cooperate with the government for the duration of the state of national emergency. He
warned that his agency will not hesitate to recommend the closure of any broadcast outfit that violates rules set out for media
coverage during times when the national security is threatened.
[151]


The search is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and
seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime,
unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that i t be
served at any time of the day or night. All these rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.


Not only that, the search violated petitioners freedom of the press. The best gauge of a free and democratic society rests
in the degree of freedom enjoyed by its media. In the Burgos v. Chief of Staff
[152]
this Court held that --
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the "Metropolitan
Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were
padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert
and even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.



While admittedly, the Daily Tribune was not padlocked and sealed like the Metropolitan Mail and We Forum
newspapers in the above case, yet it cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and
seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant
warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who
tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more and no less than what he is permitted to say on pai n of
punishment should he be so rash as to disobey.
[153]
Undoubtedly, the The Daily Tribune was subjected to these arbitrary intrusions
because of its anti-government sentiments. This Court cannot tolerate the blatant disregard of a constitutional right even if it
involves the most defiant of our citizens. Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative
democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. The motto should always be obsta principiis.
[154]


Incidentally, during the oral arguments, the Solicitor General admitted that the search of the Tribunes offices and the
seizure of its materials for publication and other papers are illegal; and that the same are inadmissible for any purpose, thus:

JUSTICE CALLEJO:

You made quite a mouthful of admission when you said that the policemen, when
inspected the Tribune for the purpose of gathering evidence and you admitted that the
policemen were able to get the clippings. Is that not in admission of the admissibility of
these clippings that were taken from the Tribune?

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

Under the law they would seem to be, if they were illegally seized, I think and I know, Your
Honor, and these are inadmissible for any purpose.
[155]


x x x x x x x x x

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

These have been published in the past issues of the Daily Tribune; all you have to do is to
get those past issues. So why do you have to go there at 1 oclock in the morning and
without any search warrant? Did they become suddenly part of the evidence of
rebellion or inciting to sedition or what?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Well, it was the police that did that, Your Honor. Not upon my instructions.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Are you saying that the act of the policeman is illegal, it is not based on any law, and it is
not based on Proclamation 1017.

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

It is not based on Proclamation 1017, Your Honor, because there is nothing in 1017 which
says that the police could go and inspect and gather clippings from Daily Tribune or any
other newspaper.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

Is it based on any law?

SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

As far as I know, no, Your Honor, from the facts, no.

SR. ASSO. JUSTICE PUNO:

So, it has no basis, no legal basis whatsoever?




SOLGEN BENIPAYO:

Maybe so, Your Honor. Maybe so, that is why I said, I dont know if it is premature to say
this, we do not condone this. If the people who have been injured by this would want
to sue them, they can sue and there are remedies for this.
[156]



Likewise, the warrantless arrests and seizures executed by the police were, according to the Solicitor General, illegal and
cannot be condoned, thus:

CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:

There seems to be some confusions if not contradiction in your theory.

SOLICITOR GENERAL BENIPAYO:

I dont know whether this will clarify. The acts, the supposed illegal or unlawful acts
committed on the occasion of 1017, as I said, it cannot be condoned. You cannot blame the
President for, as you said, a misapplication of the law. These are acts of the police officers, that
is their responsibility.
[157]




The Dissenting Opinion states that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional in every aspect and should result in no
constitutional or statutory breaches if applied according to their letter.

The Court has passed upon the constitutionality of these issuances. Its ratiocination has been exhaustively presented. At
this point, suffice it to reiterate that PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police
committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, this Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and
illegal.

In this connection, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans concurring opinion, attached hereto, is considered an integral part
of this ponencia.

S U M M A T I O N

In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have normally rendered this
case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance
thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media
reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed if the May 1 rallies become unruly and
violent. Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be evaded; they must now be resolved to
prevent future constitutional aberration.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant
jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue
decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires andunconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of
a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief
addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the
military and the police should take only the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence. But the words acts of terrorism found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While terrorism has been denounced generally in media, no law
has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this
portion of G.O. No. 5.

On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of
petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of
theTribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the
Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the
individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or
causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this
Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities.




It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How
to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the
eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state. During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from
normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty.

Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is
that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of
constitutionalism:the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the
governed.
[158]


WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a
call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017
commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation.

G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e.
whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that
acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.





The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-
KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well
as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are
declaredUNCONSTITUTIONAL.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. HON. PETE PRADO
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of
republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these
measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of
government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so.
We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its
Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with
certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-
named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as
sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does
not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final
form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence
of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The
theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and
determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the
attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the
legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is
usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon,
by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not
expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities,
Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to addressee, with
full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered flow or
exchange of postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs, including but
not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost of
providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous
upgrading of service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act
No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements
and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of
the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act,
and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its
title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible.
3
As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as
expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the
act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the
penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly
connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in
the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly
connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is
valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and
to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."
4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the
subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.
5
As observed in one case,
6
if the title of an act
embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be
mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the
principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that,
by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and
this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200.
As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution,
reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the
House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that
Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly
added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is
not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the
conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee
jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It
was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
7
laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon
the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nayson the final reading of the
bill).
8
The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs.
Pons,
9
where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and
explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was
brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere
with the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading
of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the
same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and
the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers.
10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the
equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult
Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the
Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons.
11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for
a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed,
12
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently,
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This
might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the President of the
Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as acourtesy from the lawmaking body?
Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been
chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, by the political
departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its
repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments
would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same
observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege,
which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the
accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother
flow of communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied
the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the
Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis
precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June
1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other
agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office
of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those
coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this
considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those
who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the
courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an
operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it
altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some
and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not
need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on
the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that
Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are
intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank
mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to
operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot
excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the
government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.
14
Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free
carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the
Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it
enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking
privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themsel ves,
should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of
the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive
Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to
imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of
their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the
Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the
Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has
the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the
Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in
this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is
inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept..
As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair
and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28
is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts,
the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said
privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.

























PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"
1
challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1,
Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against males or females;"
2
that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"
3
and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker participation "in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
4
Department Order No. 1, it is
contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment
clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor Secretary
lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and
Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid
under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare."
5
As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but
has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits."
6

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power
and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited,
7
refers to it
succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens."
8

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming
necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society."
9

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in organizing
the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."
10
Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to be an absolute
guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to
one's will."
11
It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not
be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear
misuse of the power.
12

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity.
13
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the
presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers,"
14
but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution
15
does not import a perfect Identity of
rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies
of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the
Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated
instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that the
Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion
that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that women domestic workers
are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in
this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot,
however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state,
then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in
this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the
executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or the manner by
which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body,
the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns, especially when the legislature itself has
specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the
fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers
granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own
persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed
objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers"
17
this Court has no quarrel
that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good
and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist.
This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host
countries . . ."
18
), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the
ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case.
Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino
workers.
19

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to
"all Filipina workers"
20
is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have
been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is
the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting
in an unfair advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to
those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase
refers to as a law that "takes property from A and gives it to B."
21
It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of
contract and needless to state, an invalid act.
22
(Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a
real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize its validity
only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory
legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal protection."
23
In the case
at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the
Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills defined herein to
the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government;
5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international
organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor
agreements or understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or
workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite only if they are returning
to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers returning to
worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the suspension and the provision of these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection
of Filipino workers.
24

xxx xxx xxx
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among other
things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law."
25
Department Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of
the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor,"
26
pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's
rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.
27
The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable simply because of its impact
on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true
that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we
have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof.
28

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits"
29
is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the demands and necessities
of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is
that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and
daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government
is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.
In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such
protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in
fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government.
31
Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of the
Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that
suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has
convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of
discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.












PANFILO M. LACSON vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings with the trial of
Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an
organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth
Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent
Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management
Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task
Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led
by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief
Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995
was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido
Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly
involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.
1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.
The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de
Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for
murder
2
before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,
3
the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's action.
4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations
5
before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other.
One of the accused
6
was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and
c) of Republic Act No. 7975.
7
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or
more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of
only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution
8
dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman
and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,
9
the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information
and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A.
7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the
Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the
filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299
10
and No. 1094
11
(sponsored by Representatives Edcel C.
Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 844
12
(sponsored by Senator Neptali
Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought,
among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused"
in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249
13
by the President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution
14
denying the motion for reconsideration of the
Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day
15
the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de Leon. Jr.
rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the
Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman
and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely, Jewel T.
Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these cases in fact, no
order of arrest has been issued this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the Amended
Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the cases
16
(Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides that the said
law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to
precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a
pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have
been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's
vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar circumstances
in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to
make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the
Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4 and 7
which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title
one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.
17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears to have
merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng
case pending before the Sandiganbayan.
18
They further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to
procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they
acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of the
challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution
19
requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from
notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within the meaning Section 4 b of
Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required supplemental
memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.
20
The burden of proving the invalidity
of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have
jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed
by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to
their office as may be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486
21
created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws
on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,
22
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,
23
P.D. No.
1860,
24
P.D. No. 1861,
25
R.A. No. 7975,
26
and R.A. No. 8249.
27
Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of
the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases
filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court
has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals,
shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun
as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher,
as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their
equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment, resolutions
or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise
covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be
referred to the proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-quoted
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are
at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the
amended information has the rank of Superintendent
28
or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court except in certain cases,
29
contends that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (the law on bribery),
30
(d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),
31
or (e) other offenses
or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a
public official or employee
32
holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is
in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the
Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This
paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials
and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or
felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused's officials functions.
Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in
pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public offi cer as to
whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original
provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law
33
because its
enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to
deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification
made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,
35

all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of the
questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not
yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences.
36
In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define
the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations,
37
it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that
jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision.
Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly
situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and,
under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law.
Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law
(R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the part of a
Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya
38
for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is
stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong Baleleng cases during the
hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is
biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the
word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.
39
R.A 8249, while
still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved
by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the same
would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative
hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the
head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.
40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases
constitutes an ex post facto law
41
for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the
two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,
42
an ex post factolaw is one
(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed.
(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant.
43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage.
44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty
or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a
amnesty.
45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.
46
R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for
their violations;
47
or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their punishment.
48
R.A 7975, which amended
P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws
of all kinds can properly administer justice.
49
Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has been
diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court several
times
50
considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of
procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
51
R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post
facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.
52
Moreover, the law did not alter the
rules of evidence or the mode of trial.
53
It has been ruled that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.
54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law.
55
On the
removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of
innocence has been convincing overcome.
56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis is placed
on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its
jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly
stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must
only have one subject expressed in the title
57
is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects
related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
58
Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249
expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all
the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject.
59
The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law,
acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts.
60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive procedural
application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the
Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple murder case against herein
petitioner and entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations,
61
and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249.
Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.
63
This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by the public officers
and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be determined by
law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the office of the
accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,
64
we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.
65
This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations."
66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be stated in
ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts."
67
The real nature of
the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.
68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
The object of this written accusations was First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of the charge
against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so
that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts
and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant) and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact andcircumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no
indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."
70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against herein
petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense
charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations
71
for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL
RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN,
SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R.
JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT.
JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G.
ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR
INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3
CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the
crime of Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR
INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers
and members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public
office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking advantage
of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON,
SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF
INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR
TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in
relation to office as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-
the-fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no
arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila
on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to
thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was
intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that
the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories after-the-
facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above
alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests
made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that the
victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended
information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid,
arrests and shooting happened in the two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the
amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP),"
we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier
discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in
the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office is not sufficient. That
phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy between the offense
charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes,
72
where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not
by the result of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and
civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen appointed and
provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo
which is under his command . . . supervision and control where his co-defendants were stationed
entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations as well as
assumed the authority to arrest and detain person without due process of law and without
bringing them to the proper court, and that in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of
Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated
Awalin Tebag who denied in consequence thereof.
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was
perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions and
would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate that
the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of the investigation. The
informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the
said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the
evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does not appear
in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is
controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in
relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
73
not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057
(for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the said
cases.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.











INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry
discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point.
The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction.
That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.1wphi1.nt
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.
1
To enable the
School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine
or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment,
except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-
hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire
or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that
individual to the Philippines?
2

Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or
she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-
hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the
risk of deviating from a promising career path all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time
in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family,
effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and
death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he will
eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable
employment after along period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms
of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.
3

When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of
Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"
4
of the School, contested
the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the
parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On
June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in
favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than
Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.
5
The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-
hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are
foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.
6

The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The international character of the
School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student
population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which
system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice
them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who
enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and
conditions of employment which include the employment which include the employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation
wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that
the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under
terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25%
differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as
differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of
employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants
based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all
members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former
enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.
7

We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against
these evils. The Constitution
8
in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
International law, which springs from general principles of law,
9
likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include
principles of equity,
10
i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.
11
The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,
12
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
13
the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
14
the Convention against Discrimination in Education,
15
the Convention
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation
16
all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as
part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination
by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution
17
specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to
the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their
employees.
The Constitution
18
also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code
19
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to
both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal
employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
20

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes
21
the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article
248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable
conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular
women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for
equal work;
x x x x x x x x x
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work."
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.
22
This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.
23
The
Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee
less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding
insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated
unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without
violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine
Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco
v. National Labor Relations Commission,
24
we said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business.
Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the
fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of
local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For
the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in
salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits
accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel
allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"
25
"to afford labor full
protection."
26
The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
27
These relations are
not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included,
must yield to the common good.
28
Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not
hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and,
certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees,
consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under
the collective bargaining provisions of the law."
29
The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the
will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and
duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
30
The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is
fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.
31

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-
hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same
working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-
hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not
assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of
respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.


ISHMAEL HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp
Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After
the informations for murder
1
and attempted murder
2
were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September
16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975,
otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in
form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6)
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension,
3
relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil
Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v.
Sandiganbayan,
4
and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.
5
In his order dated December 14, 1993
6
respondent judge denied the motion
pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion
for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied.
7
Hence, the petition for certiorari andmandamus to set aside the
orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code
falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the
provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused
who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until
the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial,
shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:
Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the
Department.
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of
suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case
against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority
within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of
his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the
succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90
days, the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment.
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than
that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or
more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second
sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify
or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second
deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is
certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days", there is
nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within
that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal
8
or civil liability.
9
If the trial is
unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy.
He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal
by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
10

Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of
preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly
limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its
implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and
regulations are not inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to
members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law
exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060),
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an information was filed
against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended for four (4) months at
the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal
protection clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until
1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such
municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic
assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of
elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded
against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established.
Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive
suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process
question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified.
Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice
inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve
as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension
had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest.
It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal protection
question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would
be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein
enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall
not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that the principle against
indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia
v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that
an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely,
would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a
finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law."
Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be
removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly
then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite duration. In this
particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does
not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.
11

The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who
was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with similar factual
circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection."
It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused in Laynoand Deloso was
based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a
prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with
murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states
that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be
subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously
emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be
lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be
read into the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
12

Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that became R.A.
6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. We
quote:
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?" What
is this all about?
REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it is charged
with a crime, regular courts.
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.
REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the
filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the
court shall immediately suspend the accused from the office until the case is terminated."
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.
SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 Preventive Suspension.
REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may
baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga
witnesses.
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito but I think we
should also mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the
suspension of the accused from office until the case is terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo
ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as Rene
pointed out, can run to six years bago
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate. . .
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.
REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be
terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even
if you put it in the law?
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a particular
situation.
SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety days.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly
the same thing.
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really keen on
having it quick, swift.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan, the
preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days which can
also be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension.
SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.
SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a policeman may
be anti-graft in nature. . .
SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for criminal cases. I know
anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason, robbery.
That's why it is in that context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a
criminal case which could be a serious case since it is six years and one day or more, so it must be
already a grave felony.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. ALBANO. . . .
What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the
Veloso case.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The feeling here is,
for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case.
What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is
terminated, but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study what
kind of language could be done along that line. So just on the National Police Commission . . .
SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.
SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not later than . .
." whatever we agree.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.
So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission. . . . . .
13

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against
him is terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and
the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the
accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression
based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
14
Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as
the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences;
15
is germane to the purpose
of the law;
16
applies to all members of the same
class;
17
and applies to current as well as future conditions,
18
the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's
equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such
as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.








ARTURO GALLARDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
[1]
(Second
Division) in Criminal Case No. 25092 denying petitioners Motion To Quash.
The records show that the above-numbered case originated from a sworn letter-complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao by Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
charging herein petitioners Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo, Vice-Mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches, Sangguniang Bayan members Allan B.
Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin,
Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, Noel Guinita and Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional, all public officers of the
Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to
appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of
Bansalan accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.
[2]

On 08 January 1999, herein public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the Resolution dated 26 November
1998 of Graft Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding probable cause to
indict petitioners of the crime alleged.
[3]

On 13 January 1999, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan which reads:
That sometime in or about January, 1998, or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in Davao del Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo with salary grade 27, Vice-mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches
with salary grade 25, Sangguniang Bayan Members with salary grade 24 Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje,
Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P.
Espina, Noel Guinita and Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional all public officers of the Local Government Unit of Bansalan, Davao del Sur,
committing the offense while in the performance of their official duties and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding each other, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, cause undue injury to the
Public Health Workers (PHWs) of the Municipality of Bansalan, to wit: by illegally and unjustifiably refusing to perform their duties
to include an appropriation in the municipal budget for the payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of
Bansalan due to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in the aggregate amount
of P3,833,798.10 Philippine currency, thus causing undue damage and injury to the complaining PHWs thru evident bad faith in the
performance of their official duties.
[4]

On 24 February 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.
[5]
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in a resolution
dated 27 April 1999 and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation.
[6]
In a resolution dated 26 July 1999, Special
Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., recommended the dismissal of the case, which recommendation was approved by Prosecution
Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo
P. Tamayo.
[7]
This recommendation, however, was disapproved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto who stated in his own
handwriting *l+et the court determine if indeed the evidence cannot stand the judicial scrutiny.
[8]

On 15 November 1999, petitioners filed a motion to quash the information anchored on the following grounds: 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; 2) the accused are denied due process; and 3) the accused are not accorded the equal
protection of laws.
[9]

On 06 January 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion. It ruled that the averments in the Information sufficiently
charged the offense, and that the mere fact that cases similar to this case were dismissed by the Ombudsman does not mean due
process or equal protection of the law clause was denied the petitioners.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the reinvestigation conducted by Ombudsman Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., showed that
insufficient funds were the reason for petitioners failure to appropriate the money to meet the magna carta benefits of PHWs and
that petitioners acted in good faith when they failed to enact the required appropriation ordinance. The Sandiganbayan should have
duly considered such findings and the evidence adduced supporting the same, irrespective of the opinion of Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto. They conclude that the Sandiganbayan erred when it totally failed to consider the findings and recommendations of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor.
Petitioners likewise argue that the one-sentence disapproval by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the recommendations of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious for he failed to explain how such action was arrived at,
thereby depriving petitioners of their rights to be informed of the facts and the law on which the denial was based.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that petitioners choice of remedy is clearly erroneous.
It is basic that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from judgment or final orders.
[10]
A final order is one which
disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined.
[11]
The resolution of the Sandiganbayan sought to be reviewed or set aside is not in any sense
judgment or a final order, but an interlocutory order.
[12]
An order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be done on its merits.
[13]
The order of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to quash filed by petitioners
is interlocutory in nature because it leaves something more to be done by the Sandiganbayan, by way of resolving the case on the
merits. The denial of petitioners motion to quash allows the same petitioners to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on thei r
part to present the special defenses they invoked in their motion and if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom via appeal by certiorari.
[14]

Even if we consider the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we find that the Sandiganbayan did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to quash.
Petitioners fault the Sandiganbayan for not taking into account the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor which found no probable cause to charge them. Allied to this assignment of error is petitioners allegation that the
Ombudsman failed to accord them due process of law and equal protection of the law. They claimed they were denied due process
because Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation of Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., by simply
writing a one-line note. The disapproval allegedly deprived them of their right to be informed of the facts and law on which the said
disapproval was based. It is further asseverated that they were deprived the equal protection of law since the Ombudsman, in
sixteen (16) previous cases which were similar to the case at bar, dismissed the same.
These arguments are specious. Petitioners submission that they were deprived of due process hinges on the erroneous
assumption that respondent Ombudsman failed to assess and consider the evidence presented by petitioners when he disapproved
the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor to dismiss the case, and that his ruling was not supported by evidence on
record.
The truth of the matter is that petitioners were not denied due process of law. The order of the Ombudsman for the filing of
the necessary information is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence
presented. It may appear that the Ombudsmans one-line note lacks any factual or evidentiary grounds as it did not set forth the
same. The state of affairs, however, is that the Ombudsmans note stems from his review of the findings of fact reached by the
investigating prosecutor.
[15]
The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutors conclusion, was of the conviction that
petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an investigation anew.
[16]
He is
merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor, i.e., whether probable
cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the latter. He may agree, fully or partly, or disagree completely
with the investigating prosecutor. Whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove
the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional
mandate.
[17]
Generally, courts should not interfere in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of
discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman which is absent in the case at
hand.
[18]
Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the
people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.
[19]

The fact that the Ombudsman merely wrote his recommendation for the filing of the information against petitioners in a one-
line note is not a sufficient basis for this Court to attribute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of respondent. As held in Olivarez v.
Sandiganbayan:
[20]

The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was contained in a marginal note is not sufficient to impute
arbitrariness or caprice on the part of the respondent special prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they gravely abused their
discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors to dismiss or withdraw the case against petitioner.
Neither are these notes tainted with or indicative of vindictiveness or arbitrariness as imputed by petitioner. Public respondents
disapproved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors because they sincerely believed that there is sufficient evidence
to indict the accused.
The contention that petitioners right to equal protection of the law has been transgressed is equally untenable. The equal
protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated
in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
[21]
It allows
reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated
differently from another.
[22]
Simply because the respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar to the case at bar is
not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion i n pursuing
the instant case. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused
therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because
there are ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the
constitutional mandate of his office. Stated otherwise, the circumstances obtaining in the numerous cases previously dismissed by
the Ombudsman are entirely divergent from those here existing.
In the same vein, respondent Sandiganbayan could not be blamed for not considering the findings of the special prosecutor
because the rule is that in case of conflict in the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the special prosecutor, it is the formers
decision that shall prevail since the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and control of the
Ombudsman.
[23]
Moreover, once a case has been filed with the court, it is that court, no longer the prosecution, which has full
control of the case, so much so that the information may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion.
[24]
The court is
the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
[25]
In the instant case, respondent court is convinced that there is
adequate evidence against the petitioners. Absence of proof that it gravely abused its discretion, the conclusion arrived at by the
Sandiganbayan in its assailed resolution, will not be disturbed.
Besides, petitioners argument that they could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 as they acted in
good faith when they failed to appropriate funds for the unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits due the private
complainants, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, which could be raised in a full-blown trial on the merits.
[26]
As aptly
held in Deloso v. Desierto:
[27]

Public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. They
merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to
whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that prosecutors believe that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support
of the charges.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.






























BELTRAN VS SECRETARY OF HEALTH


Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known
as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.

G.R. No. 133640,
[1]
entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et
al., vs. The Secretary of Health and G.R. No. 133661,
[2]
entitled Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health are petitions
for certiorari and mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and,
(2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction
enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations; and, for a mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew
petitioners license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).

The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.
[3]


G.R. No. 139147,
[4]
entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et
al., vs. The Secretary of Health, on the other hand, is a petition to show cause why respondent Secretary of Health should not be
held in contempt of court.

This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640 and
133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999.
[5]


Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered
non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks.

Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with the
enforcement and implementation of the law in question.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to
provide

an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was
approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18,
1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.

On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said
law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
[6]


Section 7 of R.A. 7719
[7]
provides:

Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.


Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:

Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood
banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A.
7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
demand and public safety.
[8]



Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood centers run by
the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood
services.

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial
blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the
Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories. The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956,
allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood processing laboratories. The Bureau of
Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the power to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under
Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the licensure
requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due to this development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971,
was issued. The new rules and regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was characterized by
frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of such suspensions to hospitals, a more systematic record-
keeping and frequent communication with blood banks through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980s,
financial difficulties constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood banks.
[9]


Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified when the dreaded
disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of Blood
Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusion-
associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy outlining certain
principles that should be taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and
blood products for transfusion.
[10]


In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued Administrative Order No. 57, Series of
1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and tertiary depending on the services they provided. The standards were
adjusted according to this classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied according to classification level. The new
guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed by a pathologist or a hematologist.
[11]


In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program (NBSP). The BRL
was designated as the central office primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a committee
that will implement the policies of the program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils.

In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an Adequate Supply
of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes was introduced in the
Senate.
[12]


Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated to address the
issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the appropriate
committees and subsequently consolidated.
[13]


In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled Project to Evaluate the
Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by
commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based
blood banks. During the time the study was made, there were only twenty-four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or
commercial blood banks in the country. Hence, with these numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank
produces five times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than the government-run blood banks. The study,
therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the
donors of commercial blood banks and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are
those who receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run hospitals, on the other
hand, are mostly voluntary.
[14]


It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to
have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.
[15]


Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and because of this arrangement, many of
these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately. Since they need the money, these donors are not
usually honest about their medical or social history. Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary donors who give their true medical and
social history are about three times much safer than blood from paid donors.
[16]


What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific indications for blood
component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust their practices and use of
blood and blood products. It also does not matter to them where the blood comes from.
[17]

On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was
promulgated by DOH.

The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of
its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased out by May 28,
1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27,
1998.

On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was
entitled Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, docketed as G.R. No.
133640.

On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order.
[18]


In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely, Section 7
of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds:
[19]


1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the
equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which
is not germane to the purpose of the law;

2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules represent
undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the state; and,

3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules are
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.



On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction before this Court entitled Doctors Blood Center vs.
Department of Health, docketed as G.R. No. 133661.
[20]
This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.
[21]


Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations,
thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to
Republic Act No. 7719, the petition submitted the following questions
[22]
for resolution:

1. Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power?

2. Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?

3. Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?

4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to deliver the same supply
and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?

On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment. In the same
Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from implementing and
enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further orders from the Court.
[23]


On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the petitions forcertiorari and
mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
[24]


In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from commercial blood banks is unsafe
and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can close down commercial blood banks to protect the public. He cited
the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship speech of
Senator Orlando Mercado.

The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 1011,
excerpts of which are quoted below:

Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood banks. So
that in the end, the new section would have a provision that states:

ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE SERVICE FEE
TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED
IN COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES
TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH.

I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called Project to Evaluate the Safety of the
Philippine Blood Banking System. This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the assistance of the
USAID by doctors under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.

Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and
selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the very heart of my
amendment which seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man.

The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the sponsor say?

Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a
commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.

Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered.

Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on Section 3,
a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for profit and engages in the buying
and selling of blood or its components.

Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.


Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff,
Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health.

In recommendation No. 4, he says:

The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give the Department of
Health enough time to build up governments capability to provide an adequate supply of blood for the needs of
the nation...the use of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity.

Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making
the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does
not buy blood. All those who are operated on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get
volunteers who would donate blood

If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut corners
because it will protect their profit.

In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk
category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a national voluntary
blood program.

It has been said here in this report, and I quote:

Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects payment for
his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity
which increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of
limited value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four diseases in
the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet screen for and there could be others
where there are no tests available yet.

A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his expenses.
Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping
some tests altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though these have infections in them. Because there is
no existing system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away with many unethical
practices.

The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why contaminated blood
was sold was that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the testing process. They were protecting
their profits.
[25]


The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:



Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos, who,
unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a commercial blood bank,
extend their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their age, their medical history. They
will lie about when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred pesos. This may
tide them over for the next few days. Of course, until the next bloodletting.

This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood will now
be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this buying and selling,
obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.

Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients
come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an
appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section and
leaves with AIDS.

We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane dimension
of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it

For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among
medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for
collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding.

The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe blood and
for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has fallen for the linen of
commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to tell the patient to buy blood.

Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there will be no
blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow
commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and
will never work because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect commercial blood
banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only the Government can do it, and the Government must do
it.
[26]


On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to order
respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the publ ic
to source the needed blood from voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts that will ultimately cause the shutdown of
petitioners blood banks.
[27]


On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above motion stating that he has not
ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the
Court. In compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the
public which state that blood banks are closed or will be closed. According to respondent Secretary, the same were printed and
circulated in anticipation of the closure of the commercial blood banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and
circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO.
[28]


On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not be Held
in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public respondents willful disobedience of or resistance to the restraining
order issued by the Court in the said case. Petitioners alleged that respondents act constitutes circumvention of the temporary
restraining order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration of justice.
[29]
Petitioners added that
despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence of
commercial blood banks, disseminated misleading information under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets,
brochures and flyers stating, among others, that this year *1998+ all commercial blood banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who
need blood will have to rely on government blood banks.
[30]
Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health
announced in a press conference during the Blood Donors Week that commercial blood banks are illegal and dangerous and that
they are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that their commercial interest is more important than the
lives of the people. These were all posted in bulletin boards and other conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as
other medical and health centers.
[31]


In respondent Secretarys Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in Contempt of
Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing was issued by the department ordering the closure of commercial blood
banks. The subject health advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated
prior to the Courts issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998.
[32]


Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was to promote the importance
and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the hazards of patronizing blood supplies from commercial
blood banks.
[33]
In doing so, he was merely performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of Health to protect the
health and welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary blood donation program espoused by
Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that, in order to ensure the adequate supply of human bl ood,
voluntary blood donation shall be promoted through public education, promotion in schools, professional education, establishment
of blood services network, and walking blood donors.
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the program of voluntary
blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the people on the risks
associated with blood coming from a paid donor promotes general health and welfare and which should be given more importance
than the commercial businesses of petitioners.
[34]


On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention
was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661, namely, the
unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of
individuals who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time.
[35]


The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and unwarranted
deprivation of personal liberty.
[36]


In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned petition, the Court granted
the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on August 9, 1999.

In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the sale of blood is contrary to
the spirit and letter of the Act that blood donation is a humanitarian act and blood transfusion is a professional medical service
and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging fees other than
those allowed by law is even penalized under Section 12.
[37]


Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 or the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or questions raised by petitioners
concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder:

I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;

II
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;

III
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE
THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;

IV
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY;

V
WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and,

VI
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY
SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.


As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention of petitioners that the
phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of
legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix
a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions. Petitioners also contend that the
two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant
to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment
of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature.
[38]
Except as to matters of detail that may be left to
be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the
Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the
administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
[39]


Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the
Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this
objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a defini te
standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by
providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and
authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a
given legislation and effectuate its policies.
[40]
The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to
execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the Act states:

SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance
with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the approval
hereof

This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative bodys authority and expertise in
the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No.
7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation.

Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall
be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a
period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to make laws and
discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
[41]


In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was
extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of
the state:

a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public
consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;

b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service and
not a sale of commodity;
c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and blood
products;

d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards caused by the
commercial sale of blood;

e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health subjects of
the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the non-formal system;

f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-
profit collection of blood;

g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood Transfusion
Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and safe supply of
blood;

h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and
providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for costs from
patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and non-governmental entities;

i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis;

j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection units and
blood banks/centers in the Philippines;

k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and banking of
blood; and,

l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and education to
control spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases.

Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause enshrined
in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane
to the purpose of the law.
[42]


What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that
will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
[43]


Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health and
welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood
banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious diseases such as malaria,
AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation becomes more distressing as the study
showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than
voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening.
[44]


The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the importance and benefits
of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do this, the Legislature decided
to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking system, to regulate the supply and
proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the
government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to professional and
scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place.
[45]


Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination
and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and
commercial blood banks.

We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service
while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as
a sale of commodity.

Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial
blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors
who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood
banking system.

Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar
circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.

Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of
police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental
concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and
preserve public health and safety.

Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
[46]


In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health by
ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the
interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.

In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to
phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of
commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.

The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the States police power. Therefore, the
Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police
power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare.
[47]


It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of personal
liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.

Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the freedom of choice of an
individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which should be outside the domain of State intervention.
Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body
and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be made to apply to human
blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the human organs would constitute
invalid classification.
[48]


Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them as it will affect
their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down
because it violates the non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.

As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated.
[49]


Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,
[50]
settled is the rule that the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by this provision must
submit to the demands and necessities of the States power of regulation. While the Court understands the grave implications of
Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.

Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change
from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience
may demonstrate the necessity.
[51]
This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of Agrarian
Relations
[52]
where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to police power exercised for
public welfare.

As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public considering the
shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful
exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of
separation of powers.
[53]


That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the objective of the
law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the lawmay be or should be and not what
the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.
[54]


Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent Secretary of
Healths explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in
deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the law.

Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the
court.
[55]
There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information contained in the health advisory that were
distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same.

In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.
[56]
Those who petition
this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must
fail.

Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and
its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is
for Congress to determine.
[57]


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:

1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions areDISMISSED.
Consequently, the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, isLIFTED.

2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of court
isDENIED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.























ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS COMELEC


... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of
its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
[1]


One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices choices we would
not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally
prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value
protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where
moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox
philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes,
however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than
rhetoric. This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed
by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009
[2]
(the First
Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009
[3]
(the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The
case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act.
[4]


Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered
individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was
denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition
[5]
for
registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that
because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point
guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.
[6]
Ang Ladlad laid out its national
membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.
[7]


On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral
grounds, stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of
their sexual orientation and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate
and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious
beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural
use into that which is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman,
burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in
themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed a people transgressing
beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the
end of those who indulged in sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against people
who do mischief (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petitions par. 6F:
Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is further
indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: In 2007,Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs
in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation.
Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the
requirement to be complied with for accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as Any act,
omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or
disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts
whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are
inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. The
penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors
publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those
which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence,lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited
drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established policies, lawful orders,
decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which
are offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being
truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the elections.

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not
conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article that
older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As an agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty
under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.
[8]



When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,
[9]
three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners
Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for
Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and
speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly
proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual orientations per se would
benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies,
then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the
framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or
groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interests are also the nations only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of their
under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and
transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just
that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize
lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion
or belief.

x x x x

Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is elevated, there can be no denying
that Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill
of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

x x x x

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any
attempt to any particular religious groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and
precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot
ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said
religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty ofprision mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang
Ladlad apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F:Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the
record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality x x x. These are all unlawful.
[10]



On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to
grant Ang Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later
than12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.
[11]
Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given
until January 16, 2010 to Comment.
[12]
Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioners application.
[13]
Thus, in
order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own comment.
[14]
The COMELEC, through its Law
Department, filed its Comment on February 2, 2010.
[15]


In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately
and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.
[16]


Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae,attaching
thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.
[17]
The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition on moral grounds violated the standards and
principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene
[18]
which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.
[19]


The Parties Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of thePhilippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since
there was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should
have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of
speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence
contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941


The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the
Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,
[20]
the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence
through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field personnel, it was shown that save for a
few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.
[21]

This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously,
the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated
or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioners accreditation
mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioners alleged non-
existence were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst,
a belated afterthought, a change in respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never
claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to
constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion
group.
[22]
Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the
following LGBT networks:

Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City
[23]



Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had
no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is
registered as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or
the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration


Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that *n+o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
[24]
Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
[25]
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is
able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular
purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
[26]


x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice
Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes
may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard
as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct
buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the
conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might
have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and
moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual
institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian
or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and justification to
pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion
in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent
neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold
religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
[27]



Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration


Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has
long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger
it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is
nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the standard
of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence.
[28]



We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt
of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of
marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that
the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally accepted public morals have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.
[29]


The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should
have been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed or are committing immoral acts.
[30]
The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one
gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction
ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both
the straights and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.
[31]



Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither
has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning
morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered
detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one
end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is
robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article
694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or
disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings.
[32]
A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a
mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from
participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and
disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the
inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is
this selective targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the
laws, courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same
treatment of similar persons.
[33]
The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.
[34]


Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.
[35]
In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,
[36]
we declared that *i+n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the
rational basis test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
[37]


The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this
constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine electorate has expressed no such
belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume
that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a
legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELECs differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate
state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the
party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is
concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different circumstances would
similarly fail. We disagree with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection
clause.
[38]
We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received
sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be
recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position
through normal democratic means.
[39]
It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:
[40]


In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are
free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where
people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing
religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy, the state is
prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a
constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic
governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the
beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups.

Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and
accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however
small not only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance.
It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.


Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those
that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the
legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates
public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.
[41]
European and United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights
claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.
[42]
To the
extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts
analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and
lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their
actions were caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint.
[43]


With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional
structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities
or the majority of the population.
[44]
A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues
in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.
[45]
Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are
incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
[46]


We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are
entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships
between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to
exclude from consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve
to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos.We do not
suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor
expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have
not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG
argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its
authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list system.
This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

x x x x

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the
conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-
guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition
has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally
participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. x x x
[47]

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by
the OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has
been precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the
political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental
rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law


In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in particular, has
grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling with inadequate
structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly
recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.


In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied equally to all
persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article
26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
orientation.
[48]
Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.
[49]


The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.


As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights
Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to
ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

x x x x

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons
entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must
be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of political
affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy. States
parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office.
[50]


We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international
law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioners invocation of
theYogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),
[51]
which
petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There
are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in
any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
[52]
Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment of society wants or demands is automatically a human
right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for
human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law
obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if wants are
couched in rights language, then they are no longer controversial.

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law
professors, are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary
international law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation,
harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice
or opinio juris.
[53]


As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in
flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior.
Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our
democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 andDecember
16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list
accreditation.
SO ORDERED.


EN BANC





























BIRAOGO VS PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION


When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel
[1]


The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of government
are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several departments.
[2]
The Constitution
is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer.
[3]
Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply
made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the
people who run it.
[4]


For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases
[5]
both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.


The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution
[6]
as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to
appropriate funds therefor.
[7]


The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,
Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House
of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the
good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported
cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
thePhilippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle
that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the
people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;

WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious violation
of this mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life of
a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and
underprivileged sector of society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the peoples trust
and confidence in the Government and its institutions;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale
graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against
those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and
confidence in the Government and in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the Presidents battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil
it breeds;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the
President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this
end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served
without fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent
collegial body.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a
thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third
level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman.

In particular, it shall:

a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;

b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale corruption
which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of the Executive Branch,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents, books, records and other papers;

c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the House of
Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters or subjects being
investigated by the Commission;

d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the Sandiganbayan
and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to corruption cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;

e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;

f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that the ends of
justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules of Court of the
Philippines be admitted for that purpose;

g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by
means of a special orinterim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and
employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course of its
investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for graft and
corruption under pertinent applicable laws;

h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice or any of
the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and cooperation as it may
require in the discharge of its functions and duties;

i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined by it as
necessary to carry out its mandate;

j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and efficiently
carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its investigations, proceedings
and hearings, including the presentation of evidence;

k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the objectives and
purposes of this Order.

SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. x x x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. x x x.

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. x x x

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. x x x.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.

SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. x x x.

SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. Any government official or personnel
who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the
Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when
required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt
with in accordance with law.

SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. x x x.

SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds for
the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and
responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.

SECTION 12. Office. x x x.

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. x x x.

SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before
December 31, 2012.

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a
need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended
accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.



SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall
not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.

SECTION 19. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30
th
day of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed
under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
independent collegial body, it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his
control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.
[8]


To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their
arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and non-
judicial fact-finding bodies to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international humanitarian
law in a countrys past.
[9]
They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or
authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past
events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are
temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they
are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.
[10]
Commissions members are usually empowered to conduct
research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the
commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the
way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms.
[11]


Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are
examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a
reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the
wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africas model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial
retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer
[12]
puts it:


The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural
speech: To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget about the
wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice.
When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again.

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are
essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of
1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the consistent and general
international practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate
human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international
law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the
Constitution.

(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a
launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people
that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major
causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment
because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an
executive issuance or even a statute.
[13]



In their Consolidated Comment,
[14]
the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:

1+ E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the Presidents
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987
(E.O. No. 292),
[15]
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416
[16]
(as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,
[17]
and
settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation
but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman(Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-
judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.


The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances creating
similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B.
Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential
Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
[18]

From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions
and question Executive Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain whether
the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must
be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing
to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutional ity must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
[19]


Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their
personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger
of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commissions
investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.
[20]


The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive
Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the
usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez,
[21]


To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can
have a resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on
their prerogatives as legislators.
[22]


With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and the
budget for its operations.
[23]
It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission are to be
taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will
not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the Presidents power over contingent funds.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right
that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the
Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo
[24]
explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is
based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public
right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a
person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a stranger, or in the category
of a citizen, or taxpayer. In either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. In other words, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the
securing of relief as a citizen or taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions. The
distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayers suit is in a
different category from the plaintiff in a citizens suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of
public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York
Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins: In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real
partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly
pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied. With respect to taxpayers suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of
public funds to his injury cannot be denied.

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service,
the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test in Ex Parte Levitt, later
reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a
result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such
as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v.
Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations
omitted]


Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
[25]


Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,
[26]
the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,
[27]
ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance
[28]
laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco
[29]
are non-
existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of transcendental and
paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be resolved for the guidance of
all.
[30]
Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the Presidents first effort to bring about a
promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones that
clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle
legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.

Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an
adjunct body of the Office of the President.
[31]
Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be empowered by
the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed
[32]
since
there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth commission.
[33]
He adds
that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot
serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as reorganize,
transfer, consolidate, merge, and abolish.
[34]
Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of
the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined
in the Constitution and must be deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.
[35]


Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of
Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to
reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less
a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the President; 3) is limited to
the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4)
only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
[36]
Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited,
and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body such
as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to
create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized.
[37]
According to the OSG, the Executive, just
like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding committees to assist it in the
performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.
[38]
This power, as the OSG
explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section
17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.
[39]


It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his
duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to
assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.
[40]
The
power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his subordinates in the executive
branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to discipline subordinates,
[41]
his power for rule
making, adjudication and licensing purposes
[42]
and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.
[43]


The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,
[44]
where it was held that the President has the power to reorganize
the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a
valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the
President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in the
government.
[45]


The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates reorganization as limited by
the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of
the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation
of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an
office is already existent but a modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned,
much less envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term restructure an alteration of an existing structure. Evidently,
the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held
in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,
[46]



But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in
the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power that
which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled
that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between
them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence,
it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. *Emphasis Supplied+


In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the power
to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substi tute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter.
[47]
Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public
offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under
P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.
[48]
The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and materials. This decree, in relation
to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.
[49]


The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said
decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the authori ty to
reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations
pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last Whereas clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the
organization of the national government.


Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6,
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:


ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says it was
enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to
parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D.
1416 should not be considered effective anymore upon the
promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is
deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987
Constitution, correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
[50]



While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No. 1772,
the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them. The Presidents power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of
laws in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency is inherent in the Presidents powers as the Chief
Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
[51]
As explained in the landmark case
of Marcos v. Manglapus:
[52]


x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored
the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct
branches of government with provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for
the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain
to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the
execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do
not involve the execution of any provision of law,e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.


On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specificpowers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope
of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers
so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. x x x.


Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
[53]
One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano,
[54]
the authority
of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges
filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was
ruled:

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President
has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298
as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the
investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the
Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not inclined to declare such executive
power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a
public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the words of the
Solicitor General, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for
the commission.
[55]
Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and
regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The Presidents power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from
the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof.
[56]
As the Chief Executive, the president
represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He
has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department.
[57]


Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot
adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.
[58]
In simpler terms, judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these
quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of
administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights.
[59]
Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research
on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is
the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the
law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry
or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of
facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a
court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in
a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a
judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function.
To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by
the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or resolved
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
[60]
Even respondents
themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.
[61]


Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-
finding investigation.
[62]
The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges against
them,
[63]
is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, when in the course of its investigation, under Section
2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.
[64]


At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia,
[65]
it was written:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman
Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and
judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation
on charges against public employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice.
Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with
the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.
[Emphasis supplied].


Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section 15 (1)
of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]


The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation
or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTCs sphere of functions. Its power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of usurpation of the Ombudsmans
primordial duties.

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised
Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of
crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded conclusiveness.
Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at
best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide whether
or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided
by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it
does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the previous administration as its sole
object makes the PTC an adventure in partisan hostility.
[66]
Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also
cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President Arroyo.
[67]


The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts
committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies
[68]
were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the
classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first, there is no
substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or
persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of
Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.
[69]
In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the
commission should deal with graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law
with equal force.
[70]


Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the previous administration as the initial subject of the
investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption sol ely during
the said administration.
[71]
Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous
administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for the segregation of the
transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based
on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct.
[72]
To distinguish the Arroyo
administration from past administrations, it recited the following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent
call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the peoples faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants.

Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the
reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the immediate
consequence of the policies of the previous administration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the
reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies
illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed,
are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede the current administration.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide
closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good
housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created
by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of
her predecessor former President Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by
former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens
committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding Philippine Centennial projects of his
predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.
[73]
[Emphases supplied]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section
1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a
more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or
prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
[74]


According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
[75]
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner.
[76]
The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a states
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
[77]
In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.
[78]


The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.
[79]
Its inhibitions cover all
the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
[80]


It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1)
The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
[81]
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
[82]


For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class.
[83]
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense
that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long
as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a
class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-
application of the law to him.
[84]


The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number
included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and
conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated
inVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union
[85]
and reiterated in a long line of cases,
[86]

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws
upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require
that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either
in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in
the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that
it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
[Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
[87]
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically,
these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will
recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the COMMISSION, which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end,
investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the
appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served
without fear or favor.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body
under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough
fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level
public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during
the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these
distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the previous administration only. The
reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from
earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do
not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
[88]



The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to
the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.
[89]
The reason given is specious. It is without doubt
irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or end corruption and the evil it breeds.
[90]


The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have already
prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct simultaneous investigations
of previous administrations, given the bodys limited time and resources. The law does not require the impossible (Lex non cogit
ad impossibilia).
[91]


Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost a
centurys worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC,
to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have
the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be
struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
[92]




Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should not in
any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority administered.
[93]
Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
[94]
While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for
investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the
Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of substantial distinctions would only confirm the petitioners
lament that the subject executive order is only an adventure in partisan hostility. In the case of US v. Cyprian,
[95]
it was written: A
rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national
origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally
the exercise of first amendment rights.

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.
[96]
Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who
may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are
relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought
under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class.
[97]


The Court is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection
clause.
[98]
Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils within its
reach.
[99]
It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate
simply because it happens to be incomplete.
[100]
In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to
strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the
step by step process.
[101]
With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial
scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been
attacked.
[102]


In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive
order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on
unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional
discrimination.
[103]


To disprove petitioners contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not
only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration.
[104]
The OSG points to
Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:


SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need
to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and
instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly
by way of a supplemental Executive Order.


The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations
of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they
would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the
President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the
petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo
administration.
[105]




The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,
[106]
that the PCGG
Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause. The decision, however, was
devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency
of a cause of action.

A final word

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the Constitution,
itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed
by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it
continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nations thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile
grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many
times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
[107]


Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of
the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: The end does not justify the means.
No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply
irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed.
[108]
The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let
it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.

The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must
not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude.
[109]



Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it to pass
the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is the judiciary which
is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must,
however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for ours is still a government of laws
and not of men.
[110]


WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONALinsofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive
Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED.