The Uncoupling of System

and Lifeworld
[urgen Habermas
Theprovisional concept of society proposed hereisradically different inone
respect fromtheParsonian concept: themature Parsons reinterpreted thestruc-
tural components of the lifeworld - culture, society, personality - as action
systems constituting environments for one another. Without much ado, he
subsumed the concept of the lifeworld gained from an action-theoretical
perspective under systems-theoretical concepts. As we shall seebelow, the
structural components of thelifeworld becomesubsystems of ageneral system
of action, towhich thephysical substratum of thelifeworld isreckoned along
with the "behavior system." Theproposal I amadvancing here, by contrast,
attempts to take into account the methodological differences between the
internalist and the externalist viewpoints connected with the two conceptual
strategies.
Fromthe participant perspective of members of alifeworld it looks as if
sociology withasystems-theoretical orientation considers only oneof thethree
components of the lifeworld, namely, the institutional system, for which
culture andpersonality merely constitute complementary environments. From
theobserver perspective of systems theory, ontheother hand, itlooks asif life-
world analysis confines itself to one societal subsystem specialized in
maintaining structural patterns (pattern maintenance); inthis view, thecom-
ponents of thelifeworld aremerely internal differentiations of this subsystem
which specifies the parameters of societal self-maintenance. It is already
evident onmethodological grounds that asystems theory of society cannot be
self-sufficient. The structures of the lifeworld, with their own inner logic
placing internal constraints onsystemmaintenance, have tobegotten at by a
hermeneutic approach that picks up onmembers' pretheoretical knowledge.
Furthermore, the objective conditions under which the systems-theoretical
objectification of thelifeworld becomes necessary havethemselves only arisen
172
J Urgen Habermas
inthecourse of social evolution. And this calls for atype of explanation that
does not already movewithin thesystemperspective. .
I understand social evolution as asecond-order process of differentiation:
systemand lifeworld aredifferentiated inthesensethat thecomplexity of the
oneand therationality of theother grow. Butitisnot onlyquasystemand qua
lifeworld that they aredifferentiated; they get differentiated fromoneanother
at thesametime. Ithasbecome conventional for sociologists todistinguish the
stages of social evolution as tribal societies, traditional societies, or societies
organized around astate, and modern societies (where the economic system
has been differentiated out). From the system perspective, these stages are
marked by the appearance of new systemic mechanisms and corresponding
levels of complexity. On this plane of analysis, theuncoupling of system and
lifeworld is depicted in such away that the lifeworld, which is at first co-
extensive with ascarcely differentiated social system, getscut down more and
more toonesubsystem among others: Intheprocess, systemmechanisms get
further and further detached fromthe social structures through which social
integration takes place. As we shall see, modern societies attain a level of
system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations are
connected with oneanother viadelinguistified media of communication: these
systemic mechanisms - for example, money - steer asocial intercourse that has
been largely disconnected from norms and values, above all in those sub-
systems of purposive rational economic and administrative action that, on
Weber's diagnosis, have become independent of their moral-political foun-
dations.
At the same timei,. the lifeworld remains the subsystem that defines the
pattern of thesocial systemasawhole. Thus, systemic mechanisms need tobe
anchored inthelifeworld: they have tobeinstitutionalized. Thisinstitutional-
ization of new levels of system differentiation canalsobeperceived fromthe
internal perspective of thelifeworld. Whereas systemdifferentiation intribal
societies only leads totheincreasing complexity of pregiven kinship systems,
at higher levels of integration new social structures take shape, namely, the
state and media-steered subsystems. Insocieties with alow degree of differ-
entiation, systemic interconnections aretightly interwoven with mechanisms
of social integration; inmodern societies they areconsolidated and objectified
intonorm-free structures. Members behave toward formally organized action
systems, steered viaprocesses of exchange and power, as toward ablock of
quasi-natural reality; within thesemedia-steered subsystems society congeals
into asecond nature. Actors have always been abletosheer off fromanorien-
tation to mutual understanding, adopt a strategic attitude, and objectify
normative contexts into something in the objective world, but in modern
societies, economic and bureaucratic spheres emerge inwhich social relations
areregulated only via money and power. Norm-conformative attitudes and
identity-forming social memberships are neither necessary nor possible in
thesespheres; they aremade peripheral instead. [... ]
Insubsystems differentiated out viasteering media, systemic mechanisms
The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld
173
create their own, norm-free social structures jutting out fromthe lifeworld.
These structures do, of course, remain linked with everyday communicative
practice viabasic institutions of civil or public law. Wecannot directly infer
fromthe mere fact that system and social integration have been largely un-
coupled to linear dependency in one direction or the other. Both are
conceivable: theinstitutions that anchor steering mechanisms such as power
and money inthelifeworld could serve aschannels either for theinfluence of
thelifeworld onformally organized domains of action or, conversely, for the
influence of thesystemoncommunicatively structured contexts of action. In
the onecase, they function as aninstitutional framework that subjects system
maintenance tothenormative restrictions of the lifeworld, in the other, as a
base that subordinates the life-world to the systemic constraints of material
reproduction andthereby "mediatizes" it.
Intheories of thestateandof society, bothmodels havebeenplayed through.
Modern natural law theories neglected the inner logic of a functionally
stabilized civil societyinrelation tothestate; theclassicsof political economy
were concerned to show that systemic imperatives were fundamentally in
harmony with thebasic norms of apolity guaranteeing freedom and justice.
Marx destroyed this practically very important illusion; he showed that the
laws of capitalist commodity production havethelatent function of sustaining
a structure that makes amockery of bourgeois ideals. The lifeworld of the
capitalist carrier strata, which was expounded inrational natural law and in
the ideals of bourgeois thought generally, was devalued by Marx to asocio-
cultural superstructure. In his picture of base and superstructure he is also
raising themethodological demand that weexchange theinternal perspective
of the lifeworld for an observer's perspective, so that we might grasp
the systemic imperatives of an independent economy as they act upon the
bourgeois lifeworlda tergo. Inhisview, onlyinasocialist societycould thespell
cast upon thelifeworld by thesystembebroken, could thedependence of the
superstructure onthebasebelifted.
In one way, the most recent systems functionalism is anheir-successor to
Marxism, which itradicalizes and defuses at thesametime. Ontheonehand,
systems theory adopts the view that the systemic constraints of material
production, which it understands as imperatives of self-maintenance of the
general social system, reach right through thesymbolic structures of thelife- ;
world. On the other hand, it removes the critical sting from the
base-superstructure thesis by reinterpreting what was intended tobean em-
pirical diagnosis as a prior analytical distinction. Marx took over from
bourgeois social theory apresupposition that wefound again inDurkheim: it
isnot amatter of indifference toasociety whether and towhat extent forms of
social integration dependent on consensus are repressed and replaced by
anonymous forms of systemintegrative sociation. A theoretical approach that
presents the lifeworld merely as one of several anonymously steered sub-
systems undercuts this distinction. Systems theory treats accomplishments of
social and system integration as functionally equivalent and thus deprives
174 J urqen Habermas
itself of thestandard of communicative rationality. And without that standard,
increases in complexity achieved at the expense of a rationalized lifeworld
cannot beidentified as costs. Systems theory lacks theanalytic means topursue
thequestion that Marx (also) built into his base-superstructure metaphor and
Weber renewed inhisownway byinquiring intotheparadox of societal ration-
alization. For us, this question takes ontheformof whether therationalization
of the lifeworld does not become paradoxical with the transition to modern
societies. The rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible the emergence
and growth of subsystems whose independent imperatives turn back destruc-
tively upon thelifeworld itself.
I shall now takeacloser look at theconceptual means bywhich this hypoth-
esis might be given amore exact formulation. The assumption regarding a
"mediatization" of thelifeworld refers to"interference" phenomena that arise
when system and lifeworld have become differentiated fromone another to
such an extent that they can exert mutual influence upon one another. The
mediatization of thelifeworld takes effect onandwith thestructures of thelife-
world; it is not one of those processes that are available as themes within the
lifeworld, and thus it cannot be read off from the intuitive knowledge of
members. On theother hand, it isalsoinaccessible fromanexternal, systems-
theoretical perspective. Although itcomes about counterintuitively and cannot
easily beperceived fromtheinternal perspective of thelifeworld, there arein-
dications of it intheformal conditions of communicative action.
Theuncoupling of system integration and social integration means at first
only adifferentiation between two types of action coordination, one coming
about through the consensus of those involved, the other through functional
interconnections of action. System-integrative mechanisms attach totheeffects
of action. As they work through action orientations in a subjectively in-
conspicuous fashion, they may leave thesocially integrative contexts of action
which they areparasitically utilizing structurally unaltered - it is this sort of
intermeshing of system with social integration that wepostulated for the de-
velopment level of tribal societies. Things are different when system
integration intervenes inthevery forms of social integration. Inthis case, too,
wehave todowith latent functional interconnections, but thesubjective incon-
spicuousness of systemic constraints that instrumentalize a communicatively
structured lifeworld takes on the character of deception, of objectively false
consciousness. The effects of the system on the lifeworld, which change the
structure of contexts of action in socially integrated groups, have to remain
hidden. Thereproductive constraints that instrumentalize alifeworld without
weakening the illusion of its self-sufficiency have to hide, soto speak, in the
pores of communicative action. This gives rise to a structural violence that,
without becoming manifest assuch, takes hold of theforms of intersubjectivity
of possible understanding. Structural violence isexercised by way of systemic
restrictions oncommunication; distortion isanchored intheformal conditions
of communicative action in such away that the interrelation of the objective,
social, and subjective worlds gets prejudged for participants in a typical
The Uncoupling of Systemand Lifeworld 175
fashion. Inanalogy tothecognitive apriori of Lukacs' "forms of objectivity," I
shall introduce theconcept of afarm afunderstanding [Verstiindigungsfarm].
Lukacs defined forms of objectivity asprinciples that, through the societal
totality, preform theencounters of individuals with objective nature, norma-
tive reality, and their own subjective nature. He speaks of apriori forms of
objectivity because, operating within theframework of thephilosophy of the
subject, he starts fromthe basic relation of aknowing and acting subject to
thedomain of perceptible and manipulable objects. After thechange of para-
digmintroduced by thetheory of communication, theformal properties of the
intersubjectivity of possible understanding cantaketheplaceof theconditions
of the objectivity of possible experience. A form of mutual understanding
represents acompromise between the general structures of communicative
action and reproductive constraints unavailable asthemes within agiven life-
world. Historically variable forms of understanding are, as it were, the
sectional planes that result when systemic constraints of material reproduction
inconspicuously intervene in the forms of social integration and thereby
mediatize thelifeworld.
I shall now (a) illustrate theconcept of aformof understanding with those
civilizations inwhich religious-metaphysical worldviews take on ideological
functions, in order (b) to gain an analytic perspective on the hypothetical
sequence of forms of mutual understanding.
(a) Insocieties organized around astate, aneed for legitimation arises that,
for structural reasons, could not yet exist intribal societies. Insocieties organ-
ized through kinship, theinstitutional systemisanchored ritually, that is, ina
practice that isinterpreted bymythical narratives and that stabilizes itsnorma-
tivevalidity all byitself. Bycontrast, theauthority of thelawsinwhich ageneral
political order isarticulated has tobeguaranteed, inthefirst instance, by the
ruler's power of sanction. But political domination has socially integrating
power onlyinsofar asdisposition over means of sanction doesnot rest onnaked
repression, but ontheauthority of anofficeanchored inturn inalegal order.
For this reason, laws need tobeintersubjectively recognized by citizens; they
have tobelegitimated asright and proper. Thisleaves culture with thetask of
supplying reasons why an existing political order deserves to berecognized.
Whereas mythical narratives interpret andmakecomprehensible aritual prac-
ticeof which they themselves arepart religious and metaphysical worldviews
of prophetic origin have theformof doctrines that canbeworked up intellec-
tually and that explain and justify an existing political order in terms of the
world-order they explicate.'
Theneed for legitimation that arises, for structural reasons, incivilizations
is especially precarious. If one compares the ancient civilizations with even
strongly hierarchized tribal societies, one finds an unmistakable increase in
social inequality. Intheframework of state organization, units with different
structures canbefunctionally specified. Oncetheorganization of social labor
is uncoupled fromkinship relations, resources canbemore easily mobilized
and more effectively combined. But thisexpansion of material reproduction is
176 J urqen Habermas
gained at theprice of transforming the stratified kinship system into astrati-
fied class society. What presents itself from a system perspective as an
integration of society atthelevel of anexpanded material reproduction, means,
from the perspective of social integration, an increase in social inequality,
wholesale economic exploitation, and the juridically cloaked repression of
dependent classes. Thehistory of penal lawprovides unmistakable indicators
of the high degree of repression required in all ancient civilizations. Social
movements that canbe analyzed asclass struggles - although they were not
carried onassuch- poseathreat tosocial integration. For thisreason, thefunc-
tions of exploitation and repression fulfilled by rulers andruling classes inthe
systemic nexus of material reproduction have to be kept latent as far as
possible. Worldviews have tobecome ideologically efficacious. [... ]
At first glance, it strikes oneaspuzzling that ideological interpretations of the
world andsociety couldbesustained against all appearances ofbarbaric injustice.
Theconstraints of material reproduction could not havereached soeffectively
and relentlessly through theclass-specific lifeworlds of civilizations if cultural
traditions had not been immunized against dissonant experiences. I would
explain this unassailability by the systemic restrictions placed on communi-
cation. Although religious-metaphysical worldviews exerted a strong
attraction on intellectual strata; although they provoked the hermeneutic
efforts of many generations of teachers, theologians, educated persons,
preachers, mandarins, bureaucrats, citizens, and thelike; although they were
reshaped by argumentation, given adogmatic form, systematized and ration-
alized in terms of their own motifs, the basic religious and metaphysical
concepts lay at alevel of undifferentiated validity claimswhere therationality
potential of speech remains more tightly bound than intheprofane practice of
everyday life, which had not beenworked through intellectually. Owing tothe
fusion of ontic, normative, and expressive aspects of validity, and totheculti-
cally rooted fixation of acorresponding belief attitude, thebasic concepts that
carried, asit were, thelegitimation load of ideologically effectiveworldviews
were immunized against objections already within the cognitive reach of
everyday communication. Theimmunization could succeed when an institu-
tional separation between thesacred and theprofane realms of action ensured
that traditional foundations werenot taken up "inthewrong place"; within the
domain of thesacred, communication remained systematically restricted due to
thelack of differentiation between spheres of validity, that is, as a result of the
formal conditions of possible understanding?
Themode of legitimation incivilizations isthus based on aformof under-
standing that systemically limits possibilities of communication owing to its
failure to differentiate sufficiently among the various validity claims. Earlier
weplaced mythical, religious-metaphysical, andmodern worldviews inahier-
archy, according to the degree of decentration of the world-understandings
they make possible. Analogously, we can order action orientations, and the
realms of action they define, according to the degree of differentiation of
The Uncoupling of Systemand Lifeworld 177
validity aspects, and inthis way wecan get at therelative apriori of the form
of understanding dominant at agiven time and place. Theseforms of the inter-
subjectivity of mutual understanding do not reflect the structures of dominant
worldviews in any symmetrical manner, for established interpretive systems
donot pervade all areas of action with thesame intensity. Aswehave seen, in
civilizations theimmunizing power of theformof understanding derives from
apeculiar, structurally describable differential between two realms of action:
in comparison to profane action orientations, sacred ones enjoy a greater
authority, even though validity spheres areless differentiated and the poten-
tial for rationality islessdeveloped insacred than inprofane domains of action.
(b) With asystematic investigation of forms of understanding inmind, I shall
distinguish four domains of action: (1) the domain of cultic practice; (2) the
domain inwhich religious systems of interpretation have thepower directly to
orient everyday practice; and finally theprofane domains inwhich thecultural
shock of knowledge is utilized for (3) communication and (4) purposive
activity, without thestructures of theworldview directly taking effect inaction
orientations.
SinceI regard (1) and (2) asbelonging to the sacred realm of action, I can
avoid difficulties that result fromDurkheims oversimplified division.
Magical practices carried onby individuals outside of thecultic community
should not be demoted, as Durkheim proposed they should, to the profane
realm. Everyday practice ispermeated throughout with ceremonies that cannot
beunderstood inutilitarian terms. It isbetter not to limit the sacred realm of
action toculticpractice, but toextend ittotheclassof actions based onreligious
patterns of interpretation.'
Fur-thermore, there are internal relations between the structures of world-
views and thekinds of cultic actions: tomyth there corresponds aritual practice
(and sacrificial actions) of tribal members; to religious-metaphysical world-
views asacramental practice (and prayers) of the congregation; to the religion
of culture [Bildungsreligion] of theearly modem period, finally, acontemplative
presentation of auratic works of art. Along this path, cultic practice gets "dis-
enchanted," inWeber's sense; it loses the character of compelling the gods to
some end, and it isless and less carried oninthe consciousness that adivine
power canbeforced todo something.'
Within the realm of profane action I shall distinguish between communi-
cative and purposive activity; I shall assume that these two aspects can be
distinguished evenwhen corresponding types of action (not tomention domains
of action defined by these types) have not yet been differentiated. Thedistinc-
tion between communicative and purposive activity is not relevant to the
sacred realm. Inmy view, there isno point in contrasting religious cults and
magical practices fromthis perspective."
Thenext step would betoplace thepractices indifferent domains of action
in adevelopmental-logical order according to the degree to which aspects of
validity have been differentiated from one another. At one end of the scale
stands ritual practice, at the other end the practice of argumentation. If we
178 JOrgen Habermas
further consider that between the sacred and the profane domains there are
differentials in authority and rationality - and in the opposite directions -
we then have the points of view relevant to ordering the forms of under-
standing in a systematic sequence. The following schema (figure 12.1)
represents four forms of mutual understanding ordered along the line of a
progressive unfettering of therationality potential inherent incommunicative
action. Theareas (1-2) and (3--4)stand for theformof understanding inarchaic
societies, theareas (5-6) and (7-8) for that incivilizations, theareas (9-10) and
(11-12) for that inearly modem societies.
Taking thearchaic formof understanding asanexample, I shall next givea .
somewhat more detailed account of thecontrasting directions of the differen-
tials inauthority and rationality between thesacred and theprofane domains
of action. Following that I shall comment more briefly ontheforms of under-
standing typical of civilizations (5-8) and of early modem societies (9-12).
I I :
i
(ad 1and 2) Wefind ritualized behavior already invertebrate societies; inthe
transitional field between primate hordes and paleolithic societies, social in-
tegration was probably routed primarily through those strongly ritualized
modes of behavior we counted above as symbolically mediated interaction.
Only with thetransformation of primitive systems of callsinto grammatically
regulated, propositionally differentiated speech was thesociocultural starting
point reached at which ritualized behavior changed into ritualized action;
language opened up, sotospeak, aninterior view of rites. Fromthis point on,
wenolonger have tobecontent with describing ritualized behavior interms of
its observable features and hypothesized functions; we can try to understand
rituals - insofar asthey have maintained aresidual existenceandhavebecome
known tous through field studies.
A modem observer is struck by the extremely irrational character of ritual
practices. Theaspects of action that we cannot help but keep apart today are
merged inoneand the same act. Theelement of purposive activity comes out
inthefact that ritual practices aresupposed magically tobring about states in
the world; the element of normatively regulated action is noticeable in the
quality of obligation that emanates fromtheritually conjured, atonceattracting
and terrifying, powers; the element of expressive action is especially clear in
the standardized expressions of feeling inritual ceremonies; finally an asser-
toric aspect isalso present inasmuch asritual practice serves torepresent and
reproduce exemplary events or mythically parrated original scenes.
Ritual practice is, of course, already part of asociocultural form of lifein
which ahigher formof communication hasemerged with grammatical speech.
Language (inthe strict sense) breaks up the unity of teleological, normative,
expressive, and cognitive aspects of action. Yetmythical thought shields ritual
practice fromthe tendencies toward decomposition that appear at the level
of language (with the differentiation between action oriented to mutual
understanding and to success, and the transformation of adaptive behavior
into purposive activity). Myth holds thesame aspects together ontheplane of
. .~
~
Sacred Profane
action
,.
Differentiation Cultic practice World-views that steer Communication Purposive activity
of validity spheres practice
Confusion of relations
1.
Rite 2. Myth
of validity and (institutionalization of
effectiveness: social solidarity) -- --
performative-
instrumental attitude
Differentiation 5. SacramentJ prayer 6. Religious and 3. Communicative 4. Purposive activity
between relations of (institutionalization of metaphysical world- action bound to as atask-oriented
validity and paths to salvation and views particular contexts and element of roles
effectiveness: knowledge) with a holistic (utilization of technical
orientation to success orientation to validity innovations)
vs. to mutual
understanding
Differentiation of 9. Contemplative 10. Religious ethics of 7. Normatively 8. Purposive activity
specific validity claims presentation of auratic conviction, rational regulated organized through
at the level of action: art (institutionalization natural law, civil communicative action legitimate power
objectivating vs. norm- of the enjoyment of religion with an argumentative (utilization of
conformative vs. art) handling of truth specialized
expressiveattitudes claims practical-professional
knowledge)
Differentiation of 11. Normatively 12. Purposive activity
specific validity claims unbound asethically neutral
at the level of -- -- communicative action purposive-rational
discourse: with institutionalized action (utilization of
communicative action criticism scientific technologies
vs. discourse and strategies)
Figure 12.1 Formsof mutual understanding
\
180
J Orgen Habermas
interpretation that arefused together inritual onthe plane of practice. An in-
terpretation of the world that confuses internal relations of meaning with
external relations among things, validity with empirical efficacy, can protect
ritual practice against rips inthe fabric woven fromcommunicative and pur-
posive activity indistinguishably. This explains its coexistence with profane
contexts of cooperation in which goal-oriented actions are effectively co-
ordinated within the framework of kinship roles. The experience gained in
everyday practice is worked up in myth and connected with narrative ex-
planations of theorders of theworld andof society. Inthisregard, myth bridges
over thetwo domains of action.
Wecan seein the formal structures of the relevant action orientations that
there is arationality differential between sacred and profane domains. At the
heart of thesacred realmisritual practice, which stands or fallswith theinter-
weaving of purposive activity and communication, of orientations to success
with orientations tomutual understanding. Itisstabilized byamythical under-
standing of the world that, while it develops innarrative form, that is, at the
level of grammatical speech, nonetheless exhibits similar categorical structures.
In the basic categories of myth, relations on validity are still confused with
relations of effectiveness. Ontheother hand, themythical worldview isopened
to theflow of experience fromthe realmof profane action. Everyday practice
already rests onadifference between aspects of validity and reality.
(ad 3 and 4) It is above all in the areas of production and warfare that co-
operation based onadivision of labor develops and requires action oriented to
success. Fromthe standpoint of developmental history l1swell, efficacy is the
earliest aspect of therationality of action. Aslong astruth claims could barely
beisolated onthelevel of communicative action, the "know-how" invested in
technical and strategic rules could not yet taketheformof explicit knowledge.
In contrast to magic, the profane practice of everyday life already calls for
differentiating between orientations to success and to mutual understanding.
However, within communicative actiontheclaims totruth, totruthfulness, and
to rightness likely flowed together in awhole that was first broken up in a
methodical fashion when, with theadvent of writing, astratum of literati arose
who learned toproduce and process texts.
The normative scope of communicative action was relatively narrowly
restricted by particularistic kinship. relations. Under the aspect of fulfilling
standardized tasks, goal-directed cooperative actions remained embedded in
acommunicative practice that itself served to fulfill narrowly circumscribed
social expectations. Theseexpectations issued fromasocial structure regarded
aspart of amythically explained and ritually secured world-order. Themythi-
cal system of interpretation closed the circuit between profane and sacred
domains.
(ad 5 and 6) When a holistic concept of validity was constituted, internal
relations of meaning could be differentiated from ext-ernal relations among
The Uncoupling of Systemand Lifeworld 181
things, though it was still not possible to discriminate among the various
aspects of validity. As Weber has shown, it is at this stage that religious and
metaphysical worldviews arise. Their basic concepts proved toberesistant to
every attempt toseparate off theaspects of thetrue, thegood, and theperfect.
Corresponding to such worldviews is asacramental practice with forms of
prayer or exercises and with demagicalized communication between the in-
dividual believer and the divine being. These worldviews are more or less
dichotomous instructure; theyset upa"world beyond" andleaveademythol-
ogized "this world" or a desocialized "world of appearances" to a
disenchanted everyday practice. Intherealmof profane action, structures take
shape that break up theholistic concept of validity.
(ad 7and 8) On the level of communicative action, the syndrome of validity
claims breaks up. Participants no longer only differentiate between orien-
tations tosuccess andtomutual understanding, but between thedifferent basic
pragmatic attitudes aswell. A polity with astate and conventional legal insti-
tutions has to rely on obedience to the law, that is, on anorm-conforming
attitude toward legitimate order. Thecitizens of thestate must beableto dis-
tinguish this attitude - in everyday actions as well - from an objectivating
attitude toward external nature and anexpressive attitude vis-a-vis their own
inner nature. At this stage, communicative action canfreeitself fromparticu-
laristic contexts, but itstays inthespacemarked out bysolidtraditional norms.
An argumentative treatment of texts also makes participants aware of the
differences between communicative actionand discourse. But specific validity
claims aredifferentiated only ontheplane of action. There arenot yet forms of
argumentation tailored tospecific aspects of validity."
Purposive activity alsoattains ahigher level of rationality. Whentruth claims
canbeisolated, itbecomes possible toseetheinternal connection between the
efficiency of action oriented to success and thetruth of empirical statements,
and tomake sure of technical know-how. Thus practical professional knowl-
edge can assume objective shape and be transmitted through teaching.
Purposive activity gets detached from unspecific age and sex roles. To the
extent that social labor isorganized vialegitimate power, special activities can
define occupational roles.
(ad 9and 10)That validity claims arenot yet fully differentiated at this stage
canbeseen inthecultural tradition of theearly modem period. Independent
cultural value spheres do take shape, but tobegin with only science is insti-
tutionalized inanunambiguous fashion, that is, under theaspect of exactly one
validity claim. Anautonomous art retains itsaura and theenjoyment of art its
contemplative character; both features derive fromitscultic origins. Anethics
of conviction remains tied to the context of religious traditions, however
subjectivized; postconventional legal representations are still coupled with
truth claimsinrational natural lawandformthenucleus of what Robert Bellah
has called "civil religion." Thus, although art, morality and law are already
182 JOrgen Habermas
differentiated value spheres, they do not get wholly disengaged from the
sacred domain so long as the internal development of each does not
proceed unambiguously under precisely onespecificaspect of validity. Onthe
other hand, the forms of modern religiosity give up basic dogmatic claims.
They destroy the metaphysical-religious "world beyond" and no longer
dichotomously contrast this profane world toTranscendence, or theworld of
appearances to the reality of an underlying Essence. In domains) of profane
action, structures cantakeshape that aredefined by anunrestricted differenti-
ation of validity claims onthelevels of actionand argumentation.
(ad 11and 12) Itisherethat discourse becomes relevant for profane spheres of
action, too. Ineveryday communication, participants cankeep apart not only
different basic pragmatic attitudes, but alsothelevels of action and discourse.
Domains of action normed by positive law with post-traditional legal insti-
tutions, presuppose that participants are in aposition to shift from naively
. performing actions to reflectively engaging in argumentation. To the extent
that thehypothetical discussion of normative validity claims isinstitutional-
ized, the critical potential of speech can be brought to bear on existing
institutions. Legitimate orders still appear tocommunicatively acting subjects
assomething normative, but this normativity has adifferent quality insofar as
institutions are no longer legitimated per se through religious and meta-
physical worldviews.
Purposive activity is freed fromnormative contexts in amore radicalized
sense. Uptothis point, action oriented tosuccess remained linked with norms
of action and embedded in communicative action within the framework of a
task-oriented system'of social cooperation. But with the legal institutional-
ization of themonetary medium, success-oriented actionsteered by egocentric
calculations of utility loses itsconnection toaction oriented by mutual under-
standing. This strategic action, which is disengaged fromthe mechanism of
reaching understanding and calls for anobjectivating attitude even inregard
tointerpersonal relations, ispromoted to themodel for methodically dealing
with ascientifically objectivated nature. Intheinstrumental sphere, purposive
activity gets freeof normative restrictions totheextent that it becomes linked
toflows of information fromthescientific system.
Thetwoareas ontheleftinthebottomrowoffigure12.1havebeenleftempty
because, with the development of modern societies, the sacred domain has
largely disintegrated, or at least has lost itsstructure-forming significance. At
thelevel of completely differentiated validity spheres, art sheds itsculticback-
ground, just as morality and law detach themselves fromtheir religions and
metaphysical background. With this secularization of bourgeois culture, the
cultural value spheres separate off sharply from one another and develop
according tothestandards of theinner logics specific tothe different validity
claims. Culture losesjust thoseformal properties that enabled ittotakeonideo-
logical functions. Insofar as these tendencies - schematically indicated here
- actually doestablishthemselves indeveloped modern societies, thestructural
The Uncoupling of System and Lifeworld 183
force of system imperatives intervening in the forms of social integration can
no longer hide behind the rationality differential between sacred and profane
domains. Themodern formof understanding is too transparent to provide a
niche for this structural violence by means of inconspicuous restrictions on
communication. Under these conditions it is to be expected that the com-
petition between forms of system and social integration would become more
visible than previously. In the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of
social integration even in those areas where a consensus-dependent co-
ordination of action cannot be replaced, that 1 is, where the symbolic
reproduction of thelifeworld isat stake. Inthese areas, themediatization of the
lifeworld assumes theformof acolonization.
Notes
1 N. Eisenstadt, "Cultural Traditions and Political Dynamics: The Origins and
Modes of Ideological Politics." British Journal of Sociology32, 1981,p. 155ff.
2 M. Blochalso uses acommunications-theoretical approach toexplain theideologi-
cal functions that actions passed down fromtheperiod of tribal society cantakeon
in class societies. The formalism according to which ritual practices can assume
such functions may becharacterized interms of restrictions oncommunication. M.
Bloch, "The Disconnection of Power and Rank as aProcess." InS. Friedman and
M. J . Rowland (eds), The Evolution of Social Systems (London, 1977);and idem, "The
Past and Present inthePresent." Man, 13, 1978, p. 278ff.
3 See, for example, L.Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology (rev. edn), (Oxford,
1972),p. 229.
4 on the contrast between ritual and sacramental practice, see Mary Douglas,
Natural Symbols (London, 1973),p. 28l.
5 L. Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology, p. 229.
6 Strictly speaking, not even the philosophical discourse of Greek philosophy was
specialized about theisolated validity claimof propositional truth.