Anarchist Themes in The Work of Elinor Ostrom

Governance, Agency and
Autonomy: Anarchist Themes

in the Work of Elinor Ostrom
Kevin Carson
Center for a Stateless Society
Center for a Stateless Society Paper No. 16 (Second Half 2013)

INTR!"CTIN
This !a!er is intended as one in a series, to "e read along #ith my !revious
one on $ames C% Scott
&
, on anarchist and decentralist thinkers #hose affection
for the !articularity of local, human'scale institutions overrides any doctrinaire
ideological la"els%
T#e $o%ernance of Co&&on Pool Reso'rces. Ostrom "egins "y noting
the !ro"lem of natural resource de!letion(#hat she calls )common !ool
resources*(and then goes on to survey three largely com!lementary
+)closely related conce!ts*, ma-or theories that attem!t to e.!lain )the many
!ro"lems that individuals face #hen attem!ting to achieve collective
"enefits*: /ardin0s )tragedy of the commons,* the !risoner0s dilemma, and
Olson0s )logic of collective action%*

1nfortunately, these models +or this model, ossified into a dogma, serving
more often as a su"stitute for thought than a starting !oint% Even more than
t#enty years after Ostrom0s seminal #ork, it0s still common to state as a
truism("acked only "y a !assing allusion to /ardin or the !risoner0s dilemma
(that the actual users of resources #ill inevita"ly de!lete them in the
a"sence of governance "y some higher authority or other% Ostrom cites one
"lithe assertion, in an article on fisheries in The Economist: )left to their o#n
devices, fishermen #ill overe.!loit stocks%%%% 2T3o avoid disaster, managers
must have effective hegemony over them%*
4

This last 5uote e.em!lifies !erfectly the common a!!roach to the governance
of common !ool resources taken "y advocates "oth of state regulation and
cor!orate !rivati6ation% Garrett /ardin himself, later revisiting his article on
the tragedy of the commons, argued that the !ro"lem of resource de!letion
#ould have to "e addressed either "y )a !rivate enter!rise system* +i%e%
o#nershi! "y for'!rofit "usiness firms, or )socialism* +i%e% o#nershi! and
regulation "y the state,%
7
+The assum!tion that )!rivate enter!rise* and
)socialism* "oth re5uire managerial hierarchies of one sort or another, and
are incom!ati"le #ith hori6ontal, self'organi6ed institutions, s!eaks volumes
a"out the internali6ed values of the intellectual stratum%,
1 Kevin Carson, Legibility & Control: Themes in the Work of James C. Scott. Center for a Stateless Society Paper No. 12
(Winter/Spring 2011) <ttp!//c"ss.org/#p$content/%ploa&s/2011/0'/(a)es$Scott.p&f*.
2 +linor ,stro), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of nstitutions for Collective !ction (Ca)-ri&ge .niversity
Press, 1//0), pp. 1$0.
1 bi"., p 2.
" bi"., p. /.
4
Ostrom goes on to consider the unsatisfactory !erformance of "oth the state
and the market
8
in addressing the !ro"lem%
9t should "e noted right off that the -u.ta!osition "et#een )common !ro!erty*
and )!rivate !ro!erty* !ut for#ard "y mainstream ca!italist li"ertarians is -ust
!lain silly% 9n cases #here !arceling out a common resource to individuals is "y
the nature of the case im!ossi"le, Ostrom says, one is hard'!ressed to
understand -ust #hat is meant "y )!rivate%* O!en fields or common !asture
can "e divided u! into se!arate !lots and distri"uted to individuals: "ut
fisheries;
<
Common !ool resources, "y the nature of things, must "e o#ned
and governed "y some sort of collective institution, #hether it "e the state, a
cor!oration(or a self'organi6ed, hori6ontal association of the users
themselves%
O#nershi! "y a for'!rofit cor!oration is no more )!rivate* than +or if you
!refer, -ust as )collectivist* as, the administration of a commons "y its users%
9n cor!orate la#, a firm0s !ro!erty is o#ned, and its management em!loyed,
"y a unitary !erson created under the terms of the cor!orate charter% =o
individual shareholder or grou! of shareholders has any right of o#nershi!
over the firm0s assets or authority over its management%
>oth the conventional )!rivati6ation* and )state regulation* a!!roaches
amount, #hen all the legal fictions are stri!!ed a#ay, to su"stituting the
-udgment of managers #orking for some a"sentee central authority +!erha!s
only in theory, #orking in fact for their o#n interests, for that of users% So #e
might e.!ect it to result in the same kno#ledge and incentive !ro"lems that
al#ays result from e.ternali6ing costs and "enefits, #hen o#nershi! and
control are divorced from direct kno#ledge of the situation%
On the other hand, #e might e.!ect that !lacing control directly in the hands
of those #ith /ayekian local kno#ledge of a situation results in outcomes far
!refera"le to either of the other t#o a!!roaches "ased on verticality and
a"sentee control%
And Ostrom0s findings "ear out that e.!ectation%
?ather than starting from the assum!tion that the users of common resources
are hel!less #ithout an outside authority intervening to !rotect them from
themselves, she assumes that )the ca!acity of individuals to e.tricate
themselves from various ty!es of dilemma situations varies from situation to
' ,stro) consistently %ses te ter) 3)ar4et5 in te sense of 3cas ne6%s5 or 3for$profit -%siness sector,5 rater tan a
general legal regi)e of vol%ntary contract an& enforcea-le property rigts. .nless specifie& oter#ise, 7 #ill -e %sing te
ter) in er sense.
8 bi"., p. 1/.
7
situation,* and then ado!ts the em!irical a!!roach of surveying )"oth
successful and unsuccessful efforts to esca!e tragic outcomes%*
@
To the t#o orthodo. models of state and cor!orate o#nershi!, Ostrom
-u.ta!oses the administration of a commons "y a "inding contract among the
commoners themselves, )to commit themselves to a coo!erative strategy
that they themselves #ill #ork out%*
Of course there are #ays they could go #rong: livestock o#ners )can
overestimate or underestimate the carrying ca!acity of the meado#,* or their
monitoring system can "reak do#n% >ut even so, these !otential !oints of
failure argua"ly e.ist in stronger form in the case of a"sentee governance "y
a central institution% The monitoring system is "ased on the users themselves,
#ho are neigh"ors and #ho as users have a strong incentive to !revent
defection "y the others, o"serving each other directly(considera"ly more
effective, one #ould think, than the ty!ical ins!ection regime of a state
regulatory authority +my mother, #ho #orked in a !oultry !rocessing !lant
and came into daily contact #ith 1SAA ins!ectors, could have told you that,%
And their calculations of carrying ca!acity and sustaina"le yield, #hile falli"le,
at least )are not de!endent on the accuracy of the information o"tained "y a
distant government official 2or cor!orate home office, 9 might add3 regarding
their strategies%*
B
Ostrom0s em!irical survey casts light not so much on #hether such hori6ontal
governance of a commons "y the commoners themselves #orks(o"viously
sometimes it does("ut on #hat !articular governance rules !roduce o!timal
results%
?eally, it stands to reason that coo!erative governance of common !ool
resources, all other things "eing e5ual, #ill "e more effective in formulating
and enforcing rules than governance "y either a government agency or a
cor!oration% )>ecause the individuals involved gain a ma-or !art of their
economic return from the CC?s, they are strongly motivated to try to solve
common !ro"lems to enhance their o#n !roductivity over time%*
D
So #hat remains, in the course of Ostrom0s investigation, is )to identify the
underlying design !rinci!les of the institutions used "y those #ho have
successfully managed their o#n CC?s over e.tended !eriods of time%%%%*
&E

What measures, in !articular, did they take to address the real !ro"lems
!resented "y )tem!tations to free'ride, shirk, or other#ise act
0 bi"., p. 1".
2 bi"., pp. 1'$12.
/ bi"., p. 28.
10 bi"., p. 20.
8
o!!ortunistically*;
&&
The middle !art of her "ook is accordingly devoted to a
survey of
field settings in #hich +&, a!!ro!riators have devised, a!!lied,
and monitored their o#n rules to control the use of their CC?s and
+, the resource systems, as #ell as the institutions, have
survived for long !eriods of time% The youngest set of institutions
to "e analy6ed%%% is already more than &EE years old% The history
of the oldest system to "e e.amined e.ceeds &,EEE years%
&
The rules for governing common !ool resources, in the instances Ostrom
e.amined, #orked in situations #here game theory #ould have !redicted
incentives to defect #ere strong and negative conse5uences of defection
#ere #eak +as in common governance systems for irrigation #ater in the
S!anish Chili!!ines, #here monitoring #as relatively #eak and fines #ere lo#
com!ared to the "enefits of defection, and stealing #ater in a drought might
save an entire season0s cro!,%
&4

And far from reflecting )an anachronistic holdover from the !ast,* governance
systems for common !ool resources have ty!ically reflected close em!irical
reasoning from historical e.!erience% 9n the case of communal for !astoral
mountain land,
for at least five centuries these S#iss villagers have "een
intimately familiar #ith the advantages and disadvantages of
"oth !rivate and communal tenure systems and have carefully
matched !articular ty!es of land tenure to !articular ty!es of land
use%
&7
>ased on her survey, Ostrom distilled this list of common design !rinci!les
from the e.!erience of successful governance institutions:
&% Clearly defined "oundaries% 9ndividuals or households #ho
have rights to #ithdra# resource units from the CC? must "e
clearly defined, as must the "oundaries of the CC? itself%
% Congruence "et#een a!!ro!riation and !rovision rules and
local conditions% A!!ro!riation rules restricting time, !lace,
technology, andFor 5uantity of resource units are related to local
conditions and to !rovision rules re5uiring la"our, material, andFor
money%
11 bi"., p. 2/.
12 bi"., p. '2.
11 bi"., p. '/
1" bi"., p. 81.
<
4% Collective'choice arrangements% Gost individuals affected "y
the o!erational rules can !artici!ate in modifying the o!erational
rules%
7% Gonitoring% Gonitors, #ho actively audit CC? conditions and
a!!ro!riator "ehaviour, are accounta"le to the a!!ro!riators or
are the a!!ro!riators%
8% Graduated sanctions% A!!ro!riators #ho violate o!erational
rules are likely to "e assessed graduated sanctions +de!ending on
the seriousness and conte.t of the offence, "y other
a!!ro!riators, "y officials accounta"le to these a!!ro!riators, or
"y "oth%
<% Conflict'resolution mechanisms% A!!ro!riators and their
officials have ra!id access to lo#'cost local arenas to resolve
conflicts among a!!ro!riators or "et#een a!!ro!riators and
officials%
@% Ginimal recognition of rights to organi6e% The rights of
a!!ro!riators to devise their o#n institutions are not challenged
"y e.ternal governmental authorities%
For CPRs that are parts of larger systems:
B% =ested enter!rises% A!!ro!riation, !rovision, monitoring,
enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are
organi6ed in multi!le layers of nested enter!rises%
&8
/ere are some thoughts that occurred to me as 9 read through Ostrom0s
common !rinci!les% /istorically, many commons governance regimes have
failed as a result of outside interference, "y states and landed elites, #ith the
s!irit of =o% @% That #as true of "oth Stoly!in0s )reform* and Stalin0s forced
collectivi6ation, #hich "oth ran roughshod over the Mir0s internal rights of self'
governance% 9n addition, Stoly!in0s land !olicy in its su"stance violated =o% &,
"y allo#ing individual households to #ithdra# ali5uot shares of land from the
village0s common fields as a close +in English terms, #ithout the consent of
the Mir as a #hole% 9n so doing, it violated the "asic social understanding of
the nature of !ro!erty o#nershi! "uilt into the system from its founding%
To !ut it in terms understanda"le "y the kind of right'#ing li"ertarian #ho
instinctively cheers for the #ord )!rivate* and "oos )common,* imagine if a
legislature overrode the terms of a cor!orate charter and let individual
shareholders "arge into factories #ith front'end loaders and carry off some
1' bi"., p. /0.
@
ali5uot share of machinery(under the terms of the charter o#ned solely "y
the cor!oration as a single !erson(from assem"ly lines% 9magine ho# that
#ould disru!t !roduction !lanning #ithin a factory% That0s #hat Stoly!in0s
!olicies did to land'use !lanning "y the Mir for those lands remaining #ithin
the o!en'fields%
=o% 4, the right of those affected "y the rules to have a say in devising them,
is(normative theories of !artici!atory democracy aside(a !rere5uisite for an
efficiently functioning institution% As Ostrom says:
CC? institutions that use this !rinci!le are "etter a"le to tailor
their rules to local circumstances, "ecause the individuals #ho
directly interact #ith one another and #ith the !hysical #orld can
modify the rules over time so as to "etter fit them to the s!ecific
characteristics of their setting%
&<
The se!aration of decision'making !o#er from "oth distri"uted situational
kno#ledge and e.!erience of the conse5uences is key to all the kno#ledge
and incentive !ro"lems of hierarchical, authoritarian institutions, #hether they
"e governments or cor!orations% To!'do#n authority is a mechanism for
e.!ro!riating the "enefits of others0 #ork for oneself, and e.ternali6ing cost
and inconvenience do#n#ard%
Given the o"vious kno#ledge and incentive !ro"lems resulting from
se!aration of authority from com!etence, #hy is hierarchy ever ado!ted in
the first !lace; The ans#er lies in clearing our minds of unconscious
assum!tions that institutional design is something that )#e* or )society* do in
order to ma.imi6e some vague idea of the )common good%* /ierarchy e.ists
"ecause those #ho run the dominant institutions of state and cor!oration
have a fundamental conflict of interest #ith those #ho !ossess the situational
kno#ledge, such that the former cannot trust the latter to use their o#n "est
-udgment% The manager of a hierarchical institution, like the o#ner of a slave
!lantation, cannot trust her su"ordinates to use their o#n "est -udgment lest
she find her throat cut in the middle of the night% And su"ordinates kno# full
#ell that if they use their situational kno#ledge to ma.imi6e efficiency, any
!roductivity gains #ill "e e.!ro!riated "y management in the form of
do#nsi6ings, s!eedu!s and management "onuses%
Gost !roduction -o"s involve a fair amount of hidden or distri"uted
kno#ledge, and de!end on the initiative of #orkers to im!rovise, to a!!ly
skills in ne# #ays, in the face of events #hich are either totally un!redicta"le
or cannot "e fully antici!ated% ?igid hierarchies and rigid #ork rules only #ork
18 bi"., p. /1.
B
in a !redicta"le environment% When the environment is un!redicta"le, the key
to success lies #ith em!o#erment and autonomy for those in direct contact
#ith the situation%
The !ro"lem #ith authority relations in a hierarchy is that, given the conflict of
interest created "y the !resence of !o#er, those in authority cannot afford to
allo# discretion to those in direct contact #ith the situation% Systematic
stu!idity results, of necessity, from a situation in #hich a "ureaucratic
hierarchy must develo! some metric for assessing the skills or #ork 5uality of
a la"or force #hose actual #ork they kno# nothing a"out, and #hose material
interests militate against remedying management0s ignorance% When
management doesn0t kno# +in Caul Goodman0s #ords, )#hat a good -o" of
#ork is,* they are forced to rely on ar"itrary metrics%
We"erian #ork rules are necessary "ecause those at the to! of the !yramid
cannot afford to allo# those at the "ottom the discretion to use their o#n
common sense% >ecause the su"ordinate has a fundamental conflict of
interest #ith the su!erior, and does not internali6e the "enefits of a!!lying
her intelligence, she cannot "e trusted to use her intelligence for the "enefit
of the organi6ation% 9n such a 6ero'sum relationshi!, any discretion can "e
a"used%
On the other hand, su"ordinates cannot afford to contri"ute the kno#ledge
necessary to design an efficient #ork !rocess% ?%A% Wilson0s analogy of the
!erson in authority confronting the su"ordinate as a )high#ayman* is a good
one% The !arty #ith residual claimancy in any economic institution(like a
"usiness firm(#ill use the !o#ers associated #ith o#nershi! to o"tain a
dis!ro!ortionate share of the sur!lus% Those #ho lack o#nershi! stakes #ill
have a corres!onding incentive to under'invest their kno#ledge and skills in
the !erformance of the enter!rise% /ence, the most rational a!!roach to
ma.imi6ing !roductivity is to assign residual claimancy or o#nershi! rights to
stakeholders in accordance #ith their contri"ution to !roductivity%
&@

This almost never ha!!ens, "ecause it0s in management0s !erceived self'
interest to engage in self'dealing even at the e.!ense of the overall
!roductivity of the firm% So #orkers instead hoard kno#ledge and minimi6e
their legi"ility +in $ames Scott0s terms, to management and minimi6e the
chance that the increased !roductivity resulting from their hidden kno#ledge
#ill "e used against them or e.!ro!riated% /ence, hierarchies are a very
inefficient #ay of organi6ing activity, from the stand!oint of harnessing the
full ca!a"ilities and kno#ledge of the #orkforce%
10 Sanfor& (. 9ross)an an& ,liver :. ;art, 3<e Costs an& =enefits of ,#nersip! > <eory of ?ertical an& @ateral
7ntegration,5 Journal of #olitical Economy /"!" (1/28), pp. 018$010.
D
>ut #hen given a choice "et#een efficiency and control("et#een a larger !ie
and a larger slice of a smaller !ie(management usually !refers to ma.imi6e
the si6e of their slice rather than the si6e of the !ie% /ierarchy is a #ay of
organi6ing human activity so as to facilitate the e.traction of rents from it,
even at the e.!ense of a severe degradation in efficiency%
Gonitoring systems, =o% 7, are "est designed #hen )actors most concerned
#ith cheating 2are !laced3 in direct contact #ith one another%* Hor e.am!le, in
an irrigation rotation system the actor #hose turn it currently is is !revented
from e.tending their turn !ast its scheduled end "y the !resence of the actors
#hose turn is ne.t, eagerly #aiting to take over%
&B
Grandma0s !ractice of
letting one child cut the cake in half and the other take first !ick is the classic
e.am!le of this !rinci!le% 9n many cases monitoring others0 use of a commons
is )a natural "y'!roduct of using the commons%* And successful monitoring is
further encouraged "y informal sanctions and re#ards, sometimes as sim!le
as the social a!!roval or disa!!roval of one0s neigh"ors%
&D
The cost of front'line su!ervision is generally a"out a 5uarter as much in the
!ly#ood coo!eratives of the Cacific =orth#est as in conventional ca!italist
o!erations, "ecause of em!loyee self'monitoring%
E
1nder graduated sanctions, the modest !enalties actually serve as a mutual
confidence'"uilding regime% 1sers #ho enter into a governance system
sus!icious their neigh"ors #ill violate the rules and thus having an incentive
to defect themselves, #ill, on "eing detected and !aying a modest !enalty, "e
reassured that enforcement is credi"le, com!liance is #ides!read, and they
can e.!ect to "enefit rather than "eing taken advantage of "y !artici!ating in
the system%
There #ill al#ays "e a small minority, of course, #ho are immune to such
moral sanctions% >ut the ma-ority on #hom such sanctions do #ork #ill reduce
the cost of monitoring those #ho need closer surveillance%
Ostrom also considers the o!timal conditions for overcoming the transaction
costs of incrementally im!roving on a CC? governance system% She starts #ith
the assum!tion that a!!ro!riators are )in a remote location under a !olitical
regime that is "asically indifferent to #hat ha!!ens #ith regard to CC?s of this
ty!e,* and therefore unlikely to interfere either to !romote or im!ede local
governance decisions% 1nder such conditions, )the likelihood of CC?
a!!ro!riators ado!ting a series of incremental changes in o!erational rules to
12 ,stro), Governing the Commons, p. /'.
1/ bi"., p. /8.
20 +&#ar& S. 9reen-erg, 3Pro&%cer Cooperatives an& :e)ocratic <eory5 in (ac4all an& @evin, e&s., Worker
Coo$eratives in !merica (.niversity of California Press, 1/28), p. 1/1.
&E
im!rove -oint #elfare #ill "e !ositively related to the follo#ing internal
characteristics:
&% Gost a!!ro!riators share a common -udgment that they #ill "e
harmed if they do not ado!t an alternative rule%
% Gost a!!ro!riators #ill "e affected in similar #ays "y the
!ro!osed rule changes%
4% Gost a!!ro!riators highly value the continuation activities from
this CC?%%%%
7% A!!ro!riators face relatively lo# information, transformation,
and enforcement costs%
8% Gost a!!ro!riators share generali6ed norms of reci!rocity and
trust that can "e used as initial social ca!ital%
<% The grou! a!!ro!riating from the CC? is relatively small and
sta"le%
&
9n other #ords, the same conditions under #hich Ostrom0s earlier list of eight
!rere5uisites for successful CC? governance are likely to "e met in the first
!lace%
As #e shall see in the ne.t section, states have e.acer"ated !ro"lems "y
artificially inflating the e.tent of "ackground conditions(e%g% large,
anonymous market areas #ith one'off dealings, social atomi6ation, etc%(in
#hich Ostrom0s !rere5uisites for successful self'governance do not e.ist%
The e.istence of an interventionist state can ham!er formation of local CC?
governance regimes in another #ay, even #hen intentions are good% When
locals in an area #ithout CC? governance regimes already in !lace are a#are
of a central government #ith an interest in regulating CC?s, the tem!tation
#ill "e greatly increased to )#ait and see* in ho!es of free'riding off a central
government regulatory !olicy%
And of course the difficulty faced "y officials from a central government in
o"taining sufficient kno#ledge of local conditions to formulate governance
rules as effective as those designed "y local a!!ro!riators in direct contact
#ith local conditions, and the constant tem!tation to devise uniform !olicies
for all -urisdictions, #ill im!ede good governance%
4
21 ,stro), Governing the Commons, p. 211.
22 bi"., p. 211.
21 bi"., pp. 211$21".
&&
Centrali(ation) *to&i(ation and S'staina+ility. Ostrom, surveying the
value of self'organi6ed governance institutions, #rites:
%%%#e #ill all "e the !oorer if local, self'organi6ed institutions are
not a su"stantial !ortion of the institutional !ortfolio of the
t#enty'first century% Gany indigenous institutions develo!ed to
govern and manage local common'!ool resources have !roven
themselves ca!a"le of ena"ling individuals to make intensive use
of these resources over the long run(centuries or even millennia
(#ithout destroying the delicate resource "ase on #hich
individuals and their future offs!ring de!end for their livelihood%%%%
1nder "anners associated #ith conserving the environment for
future generations, international donors, national governments,
international nongovernmental organi6ations, national charities,
and others have, in many cases, un#ittingly destroyed the very
social ca!ital(the shared relationshi!s, norms, kno#ledge, and
understanding(that has "een used "y resource users to sustain
the !roductivity of natural ca!ital over the ages%
These institutions are most in -eo!ardy #hen central government
officials !resume they do not e.ist +or are not effective,%
7
1nfortunately, the conventional ideological frame#ork for understanding
governance institutions !resumes that the natural state of affairs a"sent rules
introduced from a"ove is a /o""esian #ar of all against all: the !ro!er
5uestion, it follo#s from this starting !oint, is #hat !olicies governments
should formulate to im!ose order on the chaos of voluntary interaction%
This mindset re!resents centuries #orth of ingrained ha"its of thought,
resulting from a shift from social organi6ations !rimarily +to $ames Scott0s
terminology in Seeing Like a State, )legi"le* or trans!arent to the !eo!le of
local communities organi6ed hori6ontally and o!a5ue to the state, to social
organi6ations that are !rimarily )legi"le* to the state from a"ove%
8
The former kind of architecture, as descri"ed "y Cyotr Kro!otkin, #as #hat
!revailed in the net#orked free to#ns of late medieval Euro!e% The !rimary
!attern of social organi6ation #as hori6ontal +guilds, etc%,, #ith 5uality
certification and re!utational functions aimed mainly at making individuals0
relia"ility trans!arent to one another% To the state, such local formations #ere
o!a5ue%
2" ,stro), ANeiter Bar4et Nor State! 9overnance of Co))on$Pool Ceso%rces in te <#enty$first Cent%ry,A @ect%re
presente& (%ne 2, 1//" at te 7nternational Doo& Policy Cesearc 7nstit%te, Wasington, :.C., p. 2.
2' (a)es Scott, Seeing Like a State (Ne# ;aven an& @on&on! Eale .niversity Press, 1//2).
&
With the rise of the a"solute state, the !rimary focus "ecame making society
trans!arent +or )legi"le*, from a"ove% Things like the systematic ado!tion of
family surnames that !ersisted from one generation to the ne.t +and the Eth
century follo#'u! of Social Security =um"ers and other citi6en 9A num"ers,,
the systematic ma!!ing of ur"an addresses for !ostal or D&& service, etc%,
#ere all for the !ur!ose of making society legi"le to the state% Iike us, the
state #ants to kee! track of #here its stuff is(and guess #hat #e are;
>efore this transformation, for e.am!le, surnames e.isted mainly for the
convenience of !eo!le in local communities, so they could tell each other
a!art% Surnames #ere ado!ted on an ad hoc "asis for clarification, #hen there
#as some danger of confusion, and rarely continued from one generation to
the ne.t% 9f there #ere multi!le $ohns in a village, they might "e distinguished
at any !articular time "y trade +J$ohn the GillerJ,, location +J$ohn on the /illJ,,
!atronymic +J$ohn ?ichard0s SonJ,, etc% >y contrast, every#here there have
"een family surnames #ith cross'generational continuity, they have "een
im!osed "y centrali6ed states as a #ay of cataloguing and tracking the
!o!ulation(making it legi"le to the state, in Scott0s terminology%
<
Auring the ascendancy of the modern state, the hori6ontal institutions of the
free to#ns #ere at "est "arely tolerated(and usually not even that% Kro!otkin
#rote:
Hor the ne.t three centuries the States, "oth on the Continent and
in these islands, systematically #eeded out all institutions in
#hich the mutual'aid tendency had formerly found its e.!ression%
The village communities #ere "ereft of their folkmotes, their
courts and inde!endent administration: their lands #ere
confiscated% The guilds #ere s!oliated of their !ossessions and
li"erties, and !laced under the control, the fancy, and the "ri"ery
of the State0s official%%%% 9t #as taught in the 1niversities and from
the !ul!it that the institutions in #hich men formerly used to
em"ody their needs of mutual su!!ort could not "e tolerated in a
!ro!erly organi6ed State: that the State alone could re!resent the
"onds of union "et#een its su"-ects: that federalism and
)!articularism* #ere the enemies of !rogress, and the State #as
the only !ro!er initiator of further develo!ment% >y the end of the
last century, the kings on the Continent, the Carliament in these
isles, and the revolutionary Convention in Hrance, although they
#ere at #ar #ith each other, agreed in asserting that no se!arate
unions "et#een citi6ens must e.ist #ithin the State%%%% )=o state
28 bi"., pp. 8"$01.
&4
#ithin the StateK* The State alone%%% must take care of matters of
general interest, #hile the su"-ects must re!resent loose
aggregations of individuals, connected "y no !articular "onds,
"ound to a!!eal to the Government each time that they feel a
common need%%%%
The a"sor!tion of all social functions "y the State necessarily
favoured the develo!ment of an un"ridled, narro#'minded
individualism% 9n !ro!ortion as the o"ligations to#ards the state
gre# in num"ers the citi6ens #ere evidently relieved from their
o"ligations to#ards each other%
@
Iike#ise, the !reem!tion and a"sor!tion(or su!!ression(of all regulatory
functions "y the state favored the develo!ment of a mindset "y #hich
!roviders of goods and services #ere relieved of their o"ligations to !rovide
relia"le certifications of the 5uality of their #ares to consumers, and
consumers #ere relieved of their o"ligations to scrutini6e their 5uality and the
re!utations of the vendors% 9t #as the state0s -o" to take care of that "usiness
for us, and #e needn0t "other our heads a"out it%
To accom!lish a shift "ack to hori6ontal trans!arency, it #ill "e necessary to
overcome a !o#erful residual cultural ha"it, among the general !u"lic, of
thinking of such things through the mind0s eye of the state: i%e, if J#eJ didn0t
have some #ay of verifying com!liance #ith this regulation or that, some
"usiness some#here might "e a"le to get a#ay #ith something or other% We
must overcome si. hundred years or so of almost in"red ha"its of thought, in
#hich the state is the all'seeing guardian of society !rotecting us from the
!ossi"ility that someone, some#here might do something #rong if Jthe
authoritiesJ don0t !revent it%
9n !lace of this ha"it of thought, #e must think instead of ourselves creating
mechanisms on a net#orked "asis, to make us as trans!arent as !ossi"le to
each other as !roviders of goods and services, to !revent "usinesses from
getting a#ay #ith !oor "ehavior "y informing each other, to !revent each
other from selling defective merchandise, to !rotect ourselves from fraud, etc%
The state has attem!ted to coo!t the rhetoric of hori6ontality +e%g% )We are
the government%*,% >ut in fact, the creation of such mechanisms(far from
making us transparent to the regulatory state(may #ell re5uire active
measures to render us opaue to the state +e%g% encry!tion, darknets, etc%, for
!rotection against attem!ts to su!!ress such local economic self'organi6ation
against the interests of cor!orate actors%
20 Pyotr Kropot4in, %utual !i": ! &actor of Evolution (Ne# Eor4! :o%-le&ay, Page F Co)pany, 1/0/), pp. 228$220.
&7
We need to lose the centuries'long ha"it of thinking of JsocietyJ as a hu"'and'
s!oke mechanism and vie#ing the #orld vicariously from the imagined
!ers!ective of the hu", and instead think of it as a hori6ontal net#ork and
visuali6e things from the !ers!ective of the individual nodes #hich #e occu!y%
We need to lose the ha"it of thought "y #hich trans!arency from a"ove even
"ecame !erceived as an issue in the first !lace% >ecause the !eo!le #ho are
seeing things )from a"ove,* in reality, do not re!resent us or have anything in
common #ith us%
Such a shift in !ers!ective #ill re5uire, in !articular, overcoming the hostility
of conventional li"erals #ho are in the ha"it of reacting viscerally and
negatively, and on !rinci!le, to anything not "eing done "y J5ualified
!rofessionalsJ or Jthe !ro!er authorities%J
Argua"ly conventional li"erals, #ith their thought system originating as it did
as the ideology of the managers and engineers #ho ran the cor!orations,
government agencies, and other giant organi6ations of the late &D
th
and early
E
th
century, have !layed the same role for the cor!orate'state ne.us that the
politiues did for the a"solute states of the early modern !eriod%
On his old GS=>C !rogram, Keith Ol"ermann routinely mocked e.hortations
to charity and self'hel!, reaching for shitkicking imagery of the nineteenth
century "arn'raiser for #ant of any other com!arision sufficient to get across
-ust ho# "ack#ard and ridiculous that kind of thing really #as% 9n Ol"ermann0s
#orld, of course, such ideas come only from conservatives% The only
ideological choice is "et#een !lain, vanilla flavored managerialist li"eralism
and the ?ight% 9n Ol"ermann0s #orld, the decentralist Ieft of 9van 9llich, Caul
Goodman, and Colin Ward()the Lrecessive IeftM of anarchists, uto!ians and
visionaries, #hich tends only to manifest itself #hen dominant genes like
Ienin or /arold Wilson are off doing something else,* as one of the editors of
Radical Technology !ut it(doesn0t even e.ist%
/el!ing your neigh"or out directly, or !artici!ating in a local self'organi6ed
friendly society or mutual, is all right in its o#n #ay, of course(if nothing else
is availa"le% >ut it carries the inesca!a"le taint, not only of the 5uaint, "ut of
the !rovincial and the !icayune(very much like the stigmati6ation of
homemade "read and home'gro#n veggies in cor!orate advertising in the
early t#entieth century, come to think of it% Ceo!le #ho hel! each other out,
or organi6e voluntarily to !ool risks and costs, are to "e !raised(#ith -ust the
slightest hint of condescension(for heroically doing the "est they can in an
era of relentlessly do#nscaled social services% >ut that !eo!le are forced to
resort to such e.!edients, rather than meeting all their social safety net needs
through one'sto! sho!!ing at the Ginistry of Central Services office in a giant
&8
monumental "uilding #ith a statue of #inged victory in the lo""y, a la !ra"il,
is a damning indictment of any civili6ed society% The !rogressive society is one
of comforta"le and #ell'fed citi6ens, com!etently managed "y !ro!erly
credentialed authorities, contentedly milling a"out like ants in the shado#s of
miles'high "uildings that look like they #ere designed "y Al"ert S!eer% And
that kind of /%G% Wells uto!ia sim!ly has no room for atavisms like the "arn'
raiser or the sick "enefit society%
=ot only does Ostrom challenge the authoritarian assum!tions of the received
vie#, "ut the focus of her #ork is almost entirely on the factors that foster
hori6ontal legi"ility in forming trust net#orks%
%%%refocus the analysis from an assum!tion that individuals are
ho!elessly tra!!ed in a situation from #hich they cannot e.tract
themselves #ithout an e.ternal authority deciding #hat should "e
done and im!osing that decision on !artici!ants% Asking #hat
)the* government should do assumes that e.ternal actors #ill
al#ays come u! #ith #ise decisions and im!lement them
effectively and fairly% The !ers!ective of this cha!ter leads the
analyst to in5uire ho# individuals facing commons !ro"lems can
gain trust that others are trust#orthy and that a coo!erator #ill
not "e a sucker #ho contri"utes #hile others continue to free
ride%
B
We should "e asking ho# different institutions su!!ort or
undermine norms of reci!rocity instead of sim!ly !resuming that
central authority is necessary to enforce rules related to
coo!eration on !artici!ants%%%%
D
She lists a num"er of factors that facilitate the creation of an assurance
commons:
When the structure of a situation includes re!eated interactions,
the level of coo!eration achieved is likely to increase in those
conte.ts in #hich the follo#ing attri"utes occur:
7% 9nformation a"out !ast actions is made availa"le:
8% ?e!eated interactions occur #ith the same set of !artici!ants:
<% Cartici!ants can signal one another "y sending !re'structured
information:
22 ,stro), 3=%il&ing <r%st to Solve Co))ons :ile))as,5 pp. 12$11.
2/ bi"., p. 2'.
&<
@% Crescri!tions are ado!ted and enforced that #hen follo#ed do
lead to higher outcomes:
B% Cartici!ants are a"le to engage in full communication +via
#riting or )chat room* #ithout kno#ing the identity of the others
involved,:
D% Cartici!ants are a"le to engage in full communication #ith
kno#n others +via face'to'face discussions or other
mechanisms,:9n addition to communication, !artici!ants can
sanction +or re#ard, each other for the !ast actions they have
taken: and
&E% Cartici!ants can design their o#n rules related to levels of
coo!eration and sanctions that are to "e assigned to those #ho
do not follo# agreed'u!on rules%
4E
Communication is central to Ostrom0s model for formulating via"le
governance systems% The )!ure theory* "ehind the Crisoner0s Ailemma game,
she #rites,
is a"out individuals #ho do not kno# one another, do not share a
common history, and cannot communicate #ith one another% 9n
this model, game theory !redicts that individuals -ointly using a
commons #ill overharvest, leading to /ardinMs +&D<B, )Tragedy of
the Commons%*
%%%When a set of anonymous su"-ects makes decisions #ithout
communication a"out a!!ro!riation from a one'shot or finitely
re!eated, common'!ool resource in a la"oratory setting "ased on
GordonMs +&D87, "ioeconomic theory, they "ehave "roadly as
game theory !redicts%%%% They overharvest%%%%
This is, ho#ever, not the end of the story% Gaking one sim!le
change in the design of a la"oratory e.!eriment, allo#ing
!artici!ants to engage in face'to'face communication +chea!
talk,, ena"les them to reduce overharvesting su"stantially%%%%
When given a chance to communicate, most su"-ects first try to
figure out #hat is the "est -oint strategy% Su"-ects, #ho are most
successful, use communication to hel! "uild a grou! identity and
commitment to follo# their agreed'u!on strategy%%%% >ehavior
changes dramatically and su"-ects greatly increase their -oint
!ayoffs%%%%
10 bi"., p. 22.
&@
%%%Hurther, #hen given an o!!ortunity to devise their o#n
sanctioning rules, those #ho ado!t their o#n rules tend to follo#
these rules closely, achieve higher -oint returns, and the use of
!unishment dro!s to almost 6ero +Ostrom et al% &DD,% Carallel to
la"oratory findings, field researchers have recorded a large
num"er of em!irical settings #here those directly involved in a
commons have themselves devised, ado!ted, and monitored
rules over time that have led to ro"ust common'!ool resource
institutions%%%%
4&
9t0s interesting that not only do !athological outcomes in the Crisoner0s
Ailemma game de!end on !reventing hori6ontal communication, "ut the
Gilgram E.!eriment0s results de!ended on totally isolating each su"-ect in the
face of authority(essentially the strategy of Jindividuali6ationJ that Houcault
descri"ed in #iscipline and Punish% Cro'social, coo!erative "ehavior de!ends
on !eo!le "eing in ongoing situations #ith hori6ontal communication
channels, in #hich they kno# they0re going to "e dealing #ith each other in
the future, and have an incentive not to shit #here they eat%
Else#here, shared norms figure !rominently in Ostrom0s list of the attri"utes
of community that are relevant for sustaina"le local systems of rules for
governing common resources:
the values of "ehavior generally acce!ted in the community: the
level of common understanding that !otential !artici!ants
share%%% a"out the structure of !articular ty!es of action arenas:
the e.tent of homogeneity in the !references of those living in a
community: the si6e and com!osition of the relevant community:
and the e.tent of ine5uality of "asic assets among those
affected%
4
Shared local cultural norms and cognitive tem!lates for inter!reting others0
"ehavior are im!ortant for a sustaina"le system of rules%
44
When !artici!ants
share cultural norms against defection, they are likely to "ehave more
coo!eratively than game theory "ased on !urely utility'ma.imi6ing
considerations #ould !redict%
47

11 +linor ,stro). A=%il&ing <r%st to Solve Co))ons :ile))as! <a4ing S)all Steps to <est an +volving <eory of
Collective >ctionA Wor4sop in Political <eory an& Policy >nalysis. 7n&iana .niversity. Center for te St%&y of
7nstit%tional :iversity (>riGona State .niversity, 2002), pp. 2$1.
12 ,stro), 'n"erstan"ing nstitutional (iversity (Princeton an& ,6for&! Princeton .niversity Press, 200'), pp. 28$20.
11 bi"., pp. 108$102.
1" bi"., p. 122.
&B
Of course, individuals start out #ith more innate inclination to#ard
coo!eration than game theory #ould !redict% Ostrom echoes Kro!otkin0s
coo!erative take on evolutionary !sychology in this regard:
/uman evolution occurred mostly during the long Cleistocene era
that lasted for a"out 4 million years to a"out &E,EEE years ago%
Auring this era, humans roamed the earth in small "ands of
hunter'gatherers #ho #ere de!endent on each other for mutual
!rotection, sharing food, and !roviding for the young% Survival
#as de!endent not only on aggressively seeking individual
returns "ut also on solving many day'to'day collective action
!ro"lems% Those of our ancestors #ho solved these !ro"lems
most effectively and learned ho# to recogni6e #ho #as deceitful
and #ho #as a trust#orthy reci!rocator had a selective
advantage over those #ho did not%%%% /umans have ac5uired #ell'
honed skills at facial recognition and strong a"ilities to detect
cheating% ?esearch !rovides evidence that humans kee! rough
internal accounts("oth in regard to good#ill%%% and threats%%%%
48
On to! of this, "ehavior also evolves on a Iamarckian !attern, #ith successful
strategies 5uickly catching on and "eing !ro!agated culturally%
4<
9ndividuals are also more likely to "ehave coo!eratively, and to formulate a
sustaina"le set of governance rules, if they are engaged in an ongoing
relationshi! in #hich !resent defection has future conse5uences and
confidence increases from continued interaction, rather than in a one'off
e.change #ith !eo!le they0ll never see again% The outcomes of Crisoner0s
Ailemma games vary a great deal, de!ending on )#hether the !artici!ants
are engaged in a one'time encounter or over an indefinitely long se5uence of
!lays%*
4@
The issue isn0t sim!ly #hether states are necessary for creating coo!erative
governance systems% The model of cor!orate ca!italism !romoted "y modern
states, argua"ly, fosters levels of centrali6ation, atomi6ation and anonymity
that directly undermine the conditions re5uired for sta"le local governance
rule systems, and are instead conducive to individual ado!tion of rational
egoist strategies at the e.!ense of more coo!erative ones%
1' bi"., p. 12'.
18 bi", pp. 128$120.
10 bi", p. '1.
&D
As William Gillis !ut it, )States create game theoretic environments around
their !eri!heries that su!!ress coo!eration and re#ard antisocial
strategies%*
4B
The social ca!ital em"odied in self'organi6ed governance systems takes
generations of lived e.!erience to "uild u!, and can "e 5uickly dissi!ated
#hen state !olicies are destructive to it%
The shared cognitive as!ects of social ca!ital hel! to account for
t#o of its unusual characteristics that differ from those of !hysical
ca!ital% Hirst, social ca!ital does not #ear out the more it is used%
9t may, in fact, im!rove #ith use so long as !artici!ants continue
to kee! !rior commitments% 1sing social ca!ital for an initial
!ur!ose creates mutual understanding and #ays of relating that
can fre5uently "e used to accom!lish entirely different -oint
activities at much lo#er start'u! costs% 9t is not that learning
curves for ne# activities disa!!ear entirely% ?ather, one of the
stee!est sections of a learning curve(learning to make
commitments and to trust one another in a -oint undertaking''has
already "een surmounted% A grou! that has learned to #ork
effectively together in one task can take on other similar tasks at
a cost in time and effort that is far less than "ringing an entirely
ne# grou! together #ho must learn everything from scratch% The
fungi"ility of social ca!ital is, of course, limited to "roadly similar
activities% =o tool is useful for all tasks% Social ca!ital that is #ell
ada!ted to one "road set of -oint activities may not "e easily
molded to activities that re5uire vastly different !atterns of
e.!ectation, authority, and distri"ution of re#ards and costs than
those used in the initial activities%
Second% if unused, social ca!ital deteriorates at a relatively ra!id
rate% 9ndividuals #ho do not e.ercise their o#n skills can lose
human ca!ital relatively ra!idly% When several individuals must all
remem"er the same routine in the same manner, ho#ever, the
!ro"a"ility that at least one of them forgets some as!ect
increases ra!idly over time% Hurther, as time goes on, some
individuals leave and others enter any social grou!% 9f ne#comers
are not introduced to an esta"lished !attern of interaction as they
enter +through -o" training, initiation, or any of the myriad of
other #ays that social ca!ital is !assed from one generation to
12 Willia) 9illis, 3<e Cetreat of te 7))e&iate,5 Center for a Stateless Society, Nove)-er 10, 2011
<ttp!//c"ss.org/content/22820*.
E
the ne.t,, social ca!ital can dissi!ate through nonuse% Then no
one is 5uite sure ho# a !articular -oint activity used to "e done%
Either the grou! has to !ay some of the start'u! costs all over
again or forgo the -oint advantages that they had achieved at an
earlier time%
4D
*'t#ority) ,e-i+ility and *'t#oritarian Hi-# .odernis&/ Pa-in-
0a&es Scott. According to Ostrom, most of the literature is )silent* on
5uestions involving the factors that influence the ado!tion of common !ool
resource governance rules "y a!!ro!riators, )since the !resum!tion is made
in this literature that making !olicies is #hat government officials, rather than
those #ho are directly affected "y !ro"lems, do%*
7E
1nfortunately(from the !ers!ective of government officials, any#ay(the
kinds of !olicies made "y government officials rather than those directly
affected "y !ro"lems almost al#ays result in stu!idity, irrationality and
su"o!timality% 9n fact this is true of all situations(including decisions "y
cor!orate management(in #hich authority'"ased rules override the
-udgment of those in direct contact #ith a situation%
Ostrom cites a #ide range of studies sho#ing that )national government
agencies have "een nota"ly unsuccessful in their efforts to design effective
and uniform sets of rules to regulate im!ortant common'!ool resources across
a "road domain,* including government !olicies of nationali6ing forests,
fisheries, etc%, !reviously governed "y local user'grou!s%
7&
Gany ne#ly'
inde!endent develo!ing countries nationali6ed land and #ater resources in
the !eriod from the &D8Es through the &D@Es, #ith disa!!ointing results%
The institutional arrangements that local resource users had
devised to limit entry and use lost their legal standing% The
national governments that assumed these ne# and difficult tasks
lacked ade5uate funds and !ersonnel to monitor resource use
effectively% They fre5uently turned to !rivate forestry firms to gain
revenue from these resources% Governments in these countries
#anted to convert common'!ool resources to a de -ure
government'!ro!erty regime, "ut their actions fre5uently resulted
in de facto o!en'access regimes%%%% The incentives of an o!en'
access commons #ere accentuated since local users had
1/ ,stro), 3Neiter Bar4et Nor State,5 p. 21.
"0 ,stro), 'n"erstan"ing nstitutional (iversity, p. 220.
"1 bi"., p. 221.
&
s!ecifically "een told that they #ould not receive the long'term
"enefits of their o#n costly ste#ardshi! efforts%
7
As concern for the !rotection of natural resources mounted during
the &D<Es, any develo!ing countries nationali6ed all land and
#ater resources that had not yet "een recorded as !rivate
!ro!erty% The institutional arrangements that local users had
devised to limit entry and use lost their legal standing, "ut the
national governments lacked monetary resources and !ersonnel
to monitor the use of these resources effectively% Thus, resources
that had "een under a de facto common'!ro!erty regime
enforced "y local users #ere converted to a de -ure government'
!ro!erty regime, "ut reverted to a de facto o!en'access regime%
When resources that #ere !reviously controlled "y local
!artici!ants have "een nationali6ed, state control has usually
!roved to "e less effective and efficient than control "y those
directly affected, if not disastrous in its conse5uences%%%% The
harmful effects of nationali6ing forests that had earlier "een
governed "y local user grou!s have "een #ell documented for
Thailand%%%, =e!al%%% and 9ndia%%%% Similar results have occurred in
regard to inshore fisheries taken over "y state or national
agencies from local control "y the inshore fishermen
themselves%%%%
74
T#o things are #orth noting here% Hirst, authority relations create "oth
kno#ledge and incentive !ro"lems that result from faulty internali6ation% The
main effect of authority is to decou!le decision'making !o#er "oth from
situational kno#ledge and from e.!eriencing the conse5uences of the
decision% This stands to reason, since !o#er is "y definition the a"ility to
override the -udgment of others, shift costs onto others, and a!!ro!riate
"enefits for oneself% Ae!riving commoners of the "enefits of #ise ste#ardshi!
of a common'!ool resource destroys their inventive to effectively monitor and
enforce use%
This leads us to the second note'#orthy !oint: !olicies ado!ted "y those in
authority fre5uently reflect a 6ero'sum relationshi! "et#een their interests
and those over #hom they e.ercise authority, in #hich the !ractical effect of a
!olicy(des!ite its framing and ideological legitimi6ation in terms of
"2 bi"., pp. 221$222.
"1 +linor ,stro) an& Carlotte ;ess. Private an& Co))on Property CigtsA Wor4sop in Political <eory an& Policy
>nalysis, 7n&iana .niversity W00$2' 11/2//00, pp. 0$2.

)efficiency,* )conservation,* or some other sort of )general #elfare*
consideration(is to directly !romote the interests of authorities and their
allies at the e.!ense of the governed% The reference to collusive relationshi!s
"et#een regulatory authorities and !rivate forestry firms in the "lock 5uote
a"ove is a classic e.am!le of this%
Ostrom goes on to cite findings that )large'scale government irrigation
systems do not tend to !erform at the same level as smaller'scale, farmer'
managed systems,* and )in terms of cro!!ing intensity and agricultural yield,
crudely constructed irrigation systems using mud, rock, tim"er, and sticks
significantly out!erform systems "uilt #ith modern concrete and iron
head#orks o!erated "y national agencies%*
77
The situational kno#ledge of !artici!ants is key to governing com!le.
ada!tive systems% And "ecause the total num"er of !ossi"le com!onents of a
!olicy is too great for a decision'maker to consider all !ossi"le com"inations
of them, the most successful a!!roach to decision'making is often to select
from a num"er of !ossi"le com"inations "ased on intuition and !ast
!erformance(com"ined #ith the a"ility of those in contact #ith the situation
to 5uickly t#eak and ad-ust in the face of immediate feed"ack% Ostrom uses
the e.am!le of aircraft design%
Hor far too long, social scientists have vie#ed the !hysics of
static, sim!le systems as the model of science #e should try to
emulate% Those #ho #ant to emulate the science of static, sim!le
systems are grossly out'of'date #hen it comes to understanding
contem!orary science and !articularly contem!orary
engineering% The engineers res!onsi"le for the design of air!lanes
and "ridges(and no# com!uters(have long co!ed #ith com!le.
dynamic systems% The >oeing @@@, for e.am!le, has &8E,EEE
distinct su"systems that are com!osed, in some instances, of
highly com!le. com!onents%
Aesign engineers of com!le. systems long ago gave u! ho!e of
even doing com!lete analyses of all com"inations of su"systems
under all com"inations of e.ternal environmental conditions%
O"viously, they invest heavily in trying out diverse design
elements under a variety of conditions% Testing designs "y
"uilding models, using #ind tunnels and com!uter simulations,
increases the likelihood that engineers can !roduce a via"le
com"ination of design elements that are ro"ust under many
conditions% They also invest in com!le. "acku! systems that
"" ,stro), 'n"erstan"ing nstitutional (iversity, p. 222.
4
ena"le these designed systems to achieve a high degree of
ro"ustness(meaning the ca!acity to maintain some desired
system characteristics under changing circumstances% All such
ro"ust systems are, ho#ever, fragile to a variety of small
!ertur"ations%%%% Small, rare distur"ances can cause a disastrous
cascade of failure in any highly com!le. designed system%
9nstead of assuming that designing rules that a!!roach
o!timality, or even im!rove !erformance, is a relatively sim!le
analytical task that can "e undertaken "y distant, o"-ective
analysts, #e need to understand the !olicy design !rocess as
involving an effort to tinker #ith a large num"er of com!onent
!arts%%%% Those #ho tinker #ith any tools(including rules(are
trying to find com"inations that #ork together more effectively
than other com"inations% Colicy changes are e.!eriments "ased
on more or less informed e.!ectations a"out !otential
outcomes%%%% Whenever individuals decide to add a rule, change a
rule, or ado!t someone else0s !ro!osed rule set, they are
conducting a !olicy e.!eriment% Hurther, the com!le.ity of the
ever'changing "io!hysical and socioeconomic #orld com"ined
#ith the com!le.ity of rule systems means that any !ro!osed rule
change faces a nontrivial !ro"a"ility of error%
78
Ostrom then descri"es a via"le a!!roach to formulating governance rules for
common !ool resources, "ased on the engineering analogy:
OfNcials andFor the a!!ro!riators themselves may try to im!rove
!erformance "y changing one or more rules in an ada!tive
!rocess% Cartici!ants ada!t the rules, norms, and strategies of
their !arents and elders as #ell as those #ho are vie#ed as
highly successful in a !articular culture% They learn a"out
neigh"oring systems that #ork "etter than theirs and try
to di scern #hi ch rul es are hel !i ng thei r nei gh"ors to
do "etter% /uman agents try to use reason and
!ersuasion in their efforts to devise "etter rules, "ut the
!rocess of choice from the vast array of rules they might
use al#ays involves e.!erimentation% Self'organi6ed resource
governance systems use many ty!es of decision rules to make
collective choices ranging from deferring to the -udgment of one
"' bi"., pp. 2"2$2"1.
7
!erson or elders to using ma-ority voting to relying on
unanimity%
7<
And she lists varia"les that increase the likelihood of a!!ro!riators
successfully im!roving governance rules in the face of e.!erience:
Attri"utes of the ?esource
R1% Heas i "l e i m!r ovement : ?es our ce condi t i ons
ar e not at a !oi nt of det er i o ration such that it is useless
to organi6e or so underutili6ed that little advantage results from
organi6ing%
R2. 9 ndi cators: ?el i a"l e and val i d i ndi cators of the
condi ti on of the resource system are fre5uently
availa"le at a relatively lo# cost%
R3% Credicta"ility: The Oo# of resource units is relatively
!redicta"le%
R1. S!ati al e.tent: The resource system i s
suf f i ci entl y smal l , gi ven the trans!ortati on and
communication technology in use, that a!!ro!riators can
develo! accurate kno#ledge of e.ternal "oundaries and
internal micro'environments%
Attri"utes of the A!!ro!riators
*1. Sal i ence: A!!ro!ri ators de!end on the resource
system f or a ma- or !ortion of their livelihood or the
achievement of im!ortant social or religious values%
*2. Common understanding: A!!ro!riators have a shared image
of ho# the resource system o!erates +attri"utes ?&, , 4,
and 7 a"ove, and ho# their actions affect each other and the
resource system%
*3. Io# discount rate: A!!ro!riators use a sufNciently lo#
discount rate in relation to future "eneNts to "e achieved
from the resource%
*1. Trust and reci!rocity: A!!ro!riators trust one another to kee!
!romises and relate to one another #ith reci!rocity%
*2. Autonomy: A!!ro!riators are a"le to determine access
and harvesting rules #ithout e.ternal authorities
countermanding them%
"8 bi", p. 2"".
8
*6. Crior organi6ational e.!erience and local leadershi!:
A!!ro!riators have l earned at l east mi ni mal ski l l s of
organi 6ati on and l eadershi ! through !ar tici!ation in
other local associations or learning a"out #ays that
neigh"oring grou!s have organi6ed%
7@
Of course these are all attri"utes that are facilitated "y Ostrom0s third design
!rinci!le for common'!ool resource governance from $overning the
Commons: )collective'choice arrangements%*
The third design !rinci!le is that most of the individuals
affected "y a resource regime are authori6ed to
!artici!ate in making and modifying their rules% ?esource
regimes that use this !rinci!le are "oth "etter a"le to tailor rules
to local circumstances and to devise rules that are considered fair
"y !artici!ants% As environments change over time, "eing a"le to craft
local rules is !articularly im!ortant as ofNcials located far
a#ay do not kno# of the change% When a local elite is
em!o#ered at the collective'choice level, !olicies that !rimarily
"eneNt them can "e e.!ected%%%
9n a study of forty'eight irrigation systems in 9ndia,
>ardhan +EEE, Nnds that the 5uality of maintenance of
irrigation canals is signiNcantly l o#er on those systems
#here f armers !ercei ve the rul es to have "een made
"y a local elite% On the other hand, those farmers +of the 7BE
inter'vie#ed, #ho res!onded that the rules for their
system have "een crafted "y most of the farmers, as
contrasted to the elite or the government, have a more
!osi ti ve atti tude a"out the #ater al l ocati on rul es and
the rul e c o m! l i a n c e o f o t h e r f a r me r s %
H u r t h e r , i n a l l o f t h e v i l l a g e s #h e r e a
g o v e r n ment agency decides ho# #ater is to "e allocated
and distri"uted, fre5uent rule violations are re!orted, and
farmers tend to contri"ute less to the local village fund%
Consistent #ith this is the Nnding "y ?ay and Williams +&DDD,
that the dead #eight loss from u!stream farmers stealing
#ater on government'o#ned irrigation systems in
Gaharashtra, 9ndia, a!!roaches one' f ourth of the
revenues that coul d "e earned i n an ef f i ci ent #ater
allocation and !ricing regime%
"0 bi"., pp. 2""$2"'.
<
Kno. and Gein6en'Aick +EE&, , note that !ro!erty
rights )are signiNcantly more likely to address the
interests and needs of local !eo!le #hen they are not
im!osed from the outside "ut rather are "ased on e.isting
rights and reOect local values and norms%* As they !oint
out, these rules take time and effort to develo!, try out,
modify, and then e.!eriment #ith again% 1sers #ho have
"een engaged in this !rocess for some time understand
the rules that they have crafted, agree on #hy they are
using one rul e rather than another, and tend to
f ol l o# thei r o#n rul es to a greater e.tent than those
that are im!osed on them% Sekher +EEE, con'ducted a
study of vi l l ages i n Ori ssa, 9 ndi a, that vari ed i n
regard to the e.tent of !artici!ation of local villagers in
making rules related to near"y forests that they used% /e
found that the )#ider the re!resentation of the
c ommuni t y i n t he or gani 6 at i on, t he "et t er ar e i t s
c hanc es of s ec ur i ng l oc al coo!eration and rule
confirmation for managing and !reserving the
resource*%%%%
9n a com!arative study of farmer'designed and governed
irrigation systems +HG9S,, as contrasted to those designed
and o!erated "y engineers #ithout involvement of the farmers
in making rules to govern these systems, Shukla +EE, B4,, a
#ater engineer himself, is relatively critical of the )unrealistic
!lanning and design, incom!lete develo!ment, a non'systematic
and inade5uate maintenance !rogram, deNcit o!eration, and lack
of !artici!ation of the users that characteri6ed many of
these systems in =a!al% Ara#ing on the earlier research of
Cant and Iohani +&DB4,, Poder +&DD7,, Iam +&DDB,, and
Cradhan +&DBD,, Shukla identiNes the fol'lo#ing as the strengths
of the farmer'designed systems: )+&, Their technical deNciencies
are com!ensated "y management in!uts: +, they are lo# cost
and "ased on local resources: +4, effective irrigation
organi6ations e.ist in most HG9S: +7, most HG9S have #ell'
deNned rules and roles for #ater allocation, distri"ution,
resource mo"ili6ation, and conOict resolution: and +8, the
leaders of these systems are accounta"le to the users%%%%
7B
"2 bi"., pp. 281$28'.
@
Conversely, they are undermined "y state !olicies that !romote(as #e
considered in the !revious section(centrali6ation, social atomi6ation and
anonymity%
Ostrom argues that central government !olicy regimes are relevant mainly to
the e.tent to #hich they facilitate or hinder the !rimary local efforts to
formulate governance rules% The "est central government a!!roach is sim!ly
to !rovide information and a su!!ortive atmos!here #ithout active
interference% She !uts forth, as an ideal case, the 1%S% Geological Survey:
Iet me use the e.am!le of the im!ortant role that the 1%S%
Geological Survey has !layed in the develo!ment of more
effective local ground#ater institutions in some !arts of the
1nited States% What is im!ortant to stress is that the Geological
Survey does not construct engineering #orks or do anything
other than o"tain and disseminate accurate information a"out
hydrologic and geologic structures #ithin the 1nited States% When
a local set of #ater users #ants to o"tain "etter information
a"out a local ground#ater "asin, they can contract #ith the
Geological Survey to conduct an intensive study in their area%
Water !roducers #ould !ay a !ortion of the cost of such a survey%
The Geological Survey #ould !ay the other !ortion% The
information contained in such a survey is then !u"lic information
availa"le to all interested !arties% The Geological Survey em!loys
a highly !rofessional staff #ho rely on the most recent scientific
techni5ues for determining the structure and condition of
ground#ater "asins% Iocal #ater !roducers o"tain the very "est
availa"le information from an agency that is not trying to !ush
any !articular future !ro-ect that the agency is interested in
conducting%
7 D
The interesting thing is that this function(!roviding an information commons
(is a"out as close as any government function can come to the non'coercive
)administration of things%* 9n considering ho# the same function might "e
!rovided "y institutions altogether outside the state frame#ork,
net#orkedFcro#dsourced models like amateur astronomy may "e relevant%
9n any case, the concrete kno#ledge advantages Ostrom lists for local
governance "y common'!ool resource users are things "oth Hriedrich /ayek
and $ames Scott #ould recogni6e:
"/ bi"., pp. 202$20/.
B
Iocal kno#ledge% A!!ro!riators #ho have lived and a!!ro!riated
from a resource system over a long !eriod of time have
develo!ed relatively accurate mental models of ho# the
"io!hysical system itself o!erates, since the very success of their
a!!ro!riation efforts de!ends on such kno#ledge% They also kno#
others living in the area #ell and #hat norms of "ehavior are
considered a!!ro!riate%
9nclusion of trust#orthy !artici!ants% A!!ro!riators can devise
rules that increase the !ro"a"ility that others are trust#orthy and
#ill use reci!rocity% This lo#ers the cost of relying entirely on
formal sanctions and !aying for e.tensive guarding%
?eliance on disaggregated kno#ledge% Heed"ack a"out ho# the
resource system res!onds to changes in actions of a!!ro!riators
is !rovided in a disaggregated #ay% Hishers are 5uite a#are, for
e.am!le, if the si6e and s!ecies distri"ution of their catch is
changing over time% 9rrigators learn #hether a !articular rotation
system allo#s most farmers to gro# the cro!s they most !refer
"y e.amining the resulting !roductivity of s!ecific fields%
>etter ada!ted rules% Given the a"ove, a!!ro!riators are more
likely to craft rules over time that are "etter ada!ted to
each of the local common'!ool resources than any general
system of rules%
Io#er enforcement costs% Since local a!!ro!riators have to "ear
the cost of monitoring, they are a!t to craft rules that make
infractions highly o"vious so that monitoring costs are lo#er%
Hurther, "y creating rules that are seen as legitimate, rule
conformance #ill tend to "e higher%
Carallel autonomous systems% The !ro"a"ility of failure
throughout a large region is greatly reduced "y the esta"lishment
of !arallel systems of rule making, inter!retation, and
enforcement%
8E
Aside from cognitive issues, one reason systems im!osed from outside "y
central authorities are so failure'!rone is they0re !erceived as illegitimate% As
Ostrom notes:
9f individuals voluntarily !artici!ate in a situation, they must share
some general sense that most of the rules governing the situation
is a!!ro!riate% Other#ise, the cost of enforcement #ithin
'0 bi"., pp. 221$222.
D
voluntary activities "ecomes high enough that it is difficult, if not
im!ossi"le, to maintain !redicta"ility in an ongoing voluntary
activity%
8&
Ceo!le are instinctively alienated "y rules'systems in #hich they feel
!o#erless, and 5uestion the legitimacy of rules im!osed "y an authority over
#hom they have no control%
!sychological research !rovides evidence that !ositive intrinsic
motivation is increased #hen individuals feel that their o#n self'
determination or self'esteem is enhanced%%%% This leads to the
!ossi"ility that intrinsic motivation can "e )cro#ded out* in
situations #here individuals do not !erceive themselves to have
sufficient self'control over the actions they take%
8
Ostrom goes on to cite a num"er of e.!eriments !roviding )strong evidence
for the cro#ding out of reci!rocity "y the im!osition of e.ternal sanctions,*
5uoting the findings of one that:
&% E.ternal interventions cro%d out intrinsic motivation if the individuals
affected !erceive them to "e controlling% 9n that case, "oth self'
determination and self'esteem suffer, and the individuals react "y
reducing their intrinsic motivation in the activity controlled%
% E.ternal interventions cro%d in intrinsic motivation if the individuals
concerned !erceive it as supportive% 9n that case, self'esteem is
fostered, and the individuals feel that they are given more freedom to
act, #hich enlarges self'determination%
84
This is closely associated #ith the tendency of e.ternal im!osed rules to
)0cro#d out0 endogenous coo!erative "ehavior%* 9n one e.!eriment, !layers of
a Crisoner0s game on #hom e.ternal incentives for coo!eration #ere im!osed
#ere less coo!erative after the incentives #ere #ithdra#n than #ere the
!layers in a control grou! #ho !layed the regular game #ithout incentives for
coo!eration and s!ontaneously evolved their o#n strategies%
87

a social norm, es!ecially in a setting #here there is
communication "et#een !arties, can #ork as #ell or nearly as
#ell at generating coo!erative "ehavior as an e.ternally im!osed
set of rules and system of monitoring and sanctioning% Goreover,
norms seem to have a certain staying !o#er in encouraging a
'1 bi"., p. 21.
'2 bi"., p. 112.
'1 bi"., pp. 112$111.
'" bi"., p. 110.
4E
gro#th of the desire for coo!erative "ehavior over time, #hile
coo!eration that is !rimarily there due to e.ternally im!osed and
enforced rules can disa!!ear very 5uickly%
88
T#ird 3orld !e%elop&ent and Infrastr'ct're Policy and t#e .issin-
Class !i&ension. 9t0s hard to kno# ho# much of the argument of
&nstitutional &ncentives and Sustaina'le #evelopment
8<
to assign to Ostrom,
given it0s coauthored #ith t#o other !eo!le% >ut considering her name
a!!ears first on the "yline, and it0s a direct develo!ment of her a!!roach in
$overning the Commons, 9 think it0s safe to treat it as s!eaking largely #ith
her voice%
Ostrom is great, in her analysis of Third World develo!ment !olicy(and more
s!ecifically of infrastructure !ro-ects(at treating the #ay multilateral
develo!ment agencies and national governments tend to ado!t $ames Scott0s
)authoritarian high modernist* a!!roach, and ignore local, distri"uted
kno#ledge% Western develo!ment e.!erts, for the most !art, sa# local social
infrastructures in Third World countries as atavistic, and conflated them #ith
tri"alism, corru!tion, ne!otism, ine5uality and authoritarianism%
When massive amounts of !hysical ca!ital #ere introduced "y
donor countries into the countries of Africa, Asia, and Iatin
America, that had "een through long !eriods of coloni6ation, little
attention #as !aid to the massive destruction of social ca!ital
that had occurred under coloni6ation% Tri"al communities in 9ndia,
for e.am!le, had organi6ed themselves for centuries to derive
their food, fodder, tools, and "uilding materials in a sustaina"le
manner from forest lands that they governed and managed as
common !ro!erty% The >ritish government did not recogni6e
community o#nershi! and, in fact, !assed legislation during the
&B<Es to create a forestry de!artment and to e.ert mono!oly
!o#er over ever greater territories%%%% >y the time of
inde!endence, the government of 9ndia e.erted full control over
more than 7E !ercent of the total forested area of 9ndia% Similar
stri!!ing a#ay of the legitimacy of local institutions occurred
throughout Africa, Asia, and Iatin America%
To the e.tent that attention #as !aid to the earlier social ca!ital
of the !eo!le living in these areas, it #as assumed that the
'' bi"., p. 110.
'8 +linor ,stro), @arry Scroe&er an& S%san Wynne. nstitutional ncentives an" Sustainable (evelo$ment: nfrastructure
#olicies in #ers$ective (=o%l&er, San Drancisco, ,6for&! Westvie# Press, 1//1).
4&
former !atterns of relationshi!s #ere J!rimitiveJ and not #orth
saving% Gany colonial and !ostcolonial officials felt that !rior
institutions had to "e destroyed "efore develo!ment could really
occur% The diversity of different #ays of life #as seen as an
o"stacle to "e re!laced "y modern, centrali6ed institutions that
could energi6e economic activity from the ca!ital%
8@
9nstead, %%%donors from the Eastern and Western "locs !roceeded,
or as #as the case #ith the former im!erial !o#ers, continued to
su!!ort the destruction of indigenous institutional infrastructure
in IACs and the re!lacement of this social infrastructure #ith
institutional arrangements that #ere familiar to the donors% They
found #illing accom!lices in the ne# national leaders of IACs
#ho ho!ed to su!!ress any organi6ational activity outside their
control in order to !revent the emergence of via"le !olitical
com!etitors%%%%
The one institutional feature of IACs that all donors found
!otentially useful as a foundation for develo!ment #as the highly
centrali6ed national governments, #hich #ere !rimarily the
legacy of the colonial !eriod% =ational governments #ere vie#ed
as the instruments through #hich change and economic
develo!ment #ould "e accom!lished% They #ere considered so
crucial, in fact, that develo!ment efforts #ere s!ecially fashioned,
for most of the !ast half century, to enhance the ca!acity and
authority of these national governments at the e.!ense of
su"national !u"lic agencies and !rivate sector institutions% 9n the
most recent )structural ad-ustment* !hase, this tendency to
reinforce national institutions has "een accelerated% Ga-or !olicy
reforms have "een devised "y small teams com!osed almost
e.clusively of re!resentatives from ministries of finance and
central "anks #orking #ith consultants engaged "y the World
>ank and 9GH%
8B
Ostrom !roduces considera"le evidence from case studies to sho# that
infrastructure !ro-ects undertaken in such an atmos!here of disregard for
local kno#ledge tend to have less than o!timal results(a finding that should
come as no sur!rise to readers of her larger "ody of #ork%
Ostrom is 5uite right in assuming that )9ndividuals, #ho are e.!ected to invest
resources%%% in sustaining rural infrastructure, must !erceive that the "enefits
'0 ,stro), 3Neiter Bar4et nor State,5 pp. 21$22.
'2 )strom et al, nstitutional ncentives an" Sustainable (evelo$ment, pp. 8$0.
4
they o"tain%%% e.ceed the costs of the resources they devote to this effort%*
8D

And she addresses !ro"lems of rent'seeking, in #hich !ro-ects are !romoted
"y interests that get more out of them than they !ut in%
>ut she considers rent'seeking mainly at the micro'level, rather than treating
rent'seeking as "uilt into the macro'structure of the system and central to its
goals% Even the one time she s!ecifically mentions rent'seeking in the case of
infrastructure !ro-ects that generate )dis!ro!ortionate "enefits* for )certain
grou!s of !otential users, such as large lando#ners,*
<E
she treats it as -ust a
deviation to "e fi.ed "y technical -iggering #ith the incentive structure%
The glaring omission in all this, the ele!hant in the living room she fails to
mention, is class conflict and the role of states in !romoting the interests of
the economic classes that control them%
Godern societies do indeed, as 9van 9llich !ointed out in Tools for Conviviality,
ado!t !articular forms of technology and organi6ation "eyond the !oint of
counter!roductivity or diminishing returns% >ut they only do so "ecause the
coercive state, "y creating e.ternalities, shifts the costs and "urdens of
ado!tion to a different class of !eo!le from those #ho receive the "enefits%
Since the full cost of ado!tion of a technology does not a!!ear on the ledger
of its ado!ters, their decision of ho# far to ado!t it is not "ased on a full social
accounting of the costs and "enefits% The market !rice of ado!ting the
technology, #hich informs the ado!ter of the full costs and "enefits and
ena"les her to make a rational decision, is disru!ted%
Ostrom ado!ts the World >ank0s metric for )sustaina"ility* of infrastructure
!ro-ects: )#hether or not the rate of return #as e5ual to, or greater than, the
current o!!ortunity cost of the ca!ital invested in each !ro-ect%* The !ro-ect,
in other #ords, !ays in #hat its out!ut adds to the GAC%
<&
This ignores the
central 5uestion(as Ienin !hrased it(of )Kto'kogo;* Who !ays for the
in!uts, and #ho "enefits from the out!uts;
The issue is not sim!ly that centrali6ed develo!ment agencies, "ecause of
kno#ledge !ro"lems resulting from their centralism, make mistakes in
!ursuing some disinterested goal of )develo!ment%* The issue is also that the
kind of develo!ment they0re !ursuing reflects a !articular coalition of interests
and their !erce!tion of the #orld% These interests, and their !erce!tions, are
those commonly associated #ith the terms )e.!ort'oriented develo!ment*
and )neoli"eralism%*
'/ bi"., p. /.
80 bi"., p. /8.
81 bi"., pp. 1"$18.
44
The larger functional role of the World >ank, 9GH and Western national foreign
aid !ro-ects since WW99 #as #ell summed u! "y K#ame =krumah in (eo)
Colonialism: foreign aid, under neo'colonialism, is #hat under colonialism
used to "e called sim!ly )foreign ca!ital investment%* 2Gaterial from GCE Ch%
B on infrastructure3
9n the s!ecific case of Third World rural infrastructure, the dominant model of
rural develo!ment centers on large'scale, e.!ort'oriented cash cro!
!roduction on large tracts of land(often situated on land stolen from evicted
!easants #ith the hel! of colonial or !ost'colonial governments(held "y
native landed oligarchs%
So in a sense the attention Ostrom devotes to free'riders in the design of local
infrastructure systems is misleading: free'riding, or rent'seeking, is the
!rimary !ur!ose of "ig most large'scale rural infrastructure !ro-ects like
irrigation systems% Their !ur!ose is to !rovide su"sidi6ed in!uts to a model of
agricultural !roduction heavily de!endent on such su"sidi6ed in!uts, on stolen
land held "y local landed elites%
She discusses )e5uity* in financing infrastructure in the conte.t of t#o rival
a!!roaches: &, "eneficiaries !ay in !ro!ortion to the marginal cost of
su!!lying the !ortion of out!ut they consume: and , "eneficiaries !ay in
!ro!ortion to their a"ility to !ay%
<
>ut from the !ers!ective of the !o#erful
economic interests served "y "ig infrastructure !ro-ects, either a!!roach
#ould violate the #hole !ur!ose: to e.ternali6e their o!erating costs on
someone else%
Ste!!ing "ack still further, ca!italism "y definition de!ends on the ine5uita"le
shifting of "enefits and costs to different !arties% Ca!italism has "een defined
"y more than one radical critic as the sociali6ation of cost and risk and the
!rivati6ation of !rofit%
Sadly, Ostrom +andFor one or "oth of her coauthors, dismiss such
considerations as )cons!iracy theories%* )At times, the criticism !resumes
cons!iratorial motivation, #ith donor agencies characteri6ed as fronts for a
ne# form of conscious im!erialism%*
<4
>ut anyone #ho has o"served infrastructure !ro-ects in o!eration
is struck "y the num"er of e.tremely hard'#orking, highly
motivated individuals in "oth the host governments and the
donor agencies #hose !rinci!al goal is clearly to im!rove the
#ell'"eing of those living in countries receiving foreign aid% Pet,
82 bi"., pp. 111$11'.
81 bi"., p. 1'8.
47
realistic assessments of the many !ro-ects designed "y donor and
host government staff re!eatedly reveal unintended negative
outcomes% Evaluations sho# that the !ro-ects have increased or
reinforced the overcentrali6ation of reci!ient countries0
governments, #ere !oorly designed +given local circumstances,,
and generated ina!!ro!riately large de"t "urdens for the
reci!ient countries% /o# is it !ossi"le for highly motivated, hard'
#orking !eo!le #ho sincerely #ant to im!rove conditions in these
reci!ient countries to "e re!eatedly involved in the design and
im!lementation of !ro-ects that do not accom!lish this goal;
<7
Ostrom !oints to several 5uite !lausi"le structural factors, some of them
#hich #ould cause readers of $ames Scott0s #ork to smile and nod% The 1%S%
Congressional mandate to s!end a certain !ortion of foreign aid on !urchases
of American'made e5ui!ment create, to some e.tent, a structural "ias in
favor of !ro-ects involving heavy e5ui!ment%
<8
The fiscal incentives all
government agencies face, of s!ending this year0s entire "udget "y the end of
the year in order to secure the same levels of funding ne.t year, creates a
"ias to#ard a smaller num"er of e.!ensive !ro-ects that can "e !rocessed
5uickly "y a limited staff%
<<
And the need for #hat Scott #ould call )legi"ility*
results, given !olitical !ressure to reduce em"arrassing levels of skimming off
the to! "y local officials in reci!ient countries, in a focus on large'scale
!ro-ects for the sake of reduced monitoring costs%
<@
The !ro"lem is that Ostrom !osits all these entirely valid and !lausi"le factors
as an alternative to )cons!iracy theories%* One doesn0t have to visuali6e World
>ank !olicy #onks literally t#irling their mustaches like Snidely Whi!lash, or
saying #ith Gilton0s Iucifer )Evil "e thou my good,* in order to see them as
actively and enthusiastically serving the interests of glo"al cor!orate ca!ital%
Sincerely !romoting some vision of the )general #elfare,* as they see it, is
!erfectly com!ati"le #ith having internali6ed an ideology in #hich the !resent
system is natural and inevita"le, and the only feasi"le alternative for
organi6ing human society%
And the neoli"eral institutions that coordinate foreign aid are guided "y an
ideology in #hich the most efficient model of develo!ment(indeed, the only
one conceiva"le "y right'thinking !eo!le(is large'scale ca!ital'intensive
industry and large'scale, mechani6ed, chemical'intensive, e.!ort'oriented
agriculture%
8" bi"., pp. 1'8$1'0.
8' bi"., p. 1'0.
88 bi"., p. 1'0.
80 bi"., p. 1'/.
48
3e4re *ll H'&ans Here. 9n all her #ork, Ostrom never lost sight of one
central truth: collective institutions, #hether they0re called governments,
cor!orations, or commons, are all framed from the same crooked human
tim"er% Advocates of government activity and criticsFske!tics of anarchism, all
too often, sim!ly assume a level of omniscience on the !art of the state that0s
denied to the state, or hand#ave a#ay the actual !ro"lem of detecting and
!unishing infractions% Hor e.am!le, those #ho are ske!tical a"out anarchism
ask the su!!osedly telling 5uestion of ho# a stateless society #ould !revent
something like the Aee!#ater /ori6ons oil s!ill(#ithout sto!!ing to consider
#hether the ECA and its regulations in our actual statist society managed to
!revent it%
Giving an official name to the collectivity does nothing to alter the fact that
it0s -ust a "unch of human "eings doing stuff together% And they don0t cease to
"e falli"le, limited in !ers!ective, and influenced "y self'interest -ust "ecause
they have official titles or claim to "e #orking in the name of the !u"lic or the
shareholders%
O"viously, 9 do not kno# if these a!!ro!riators reached o!timal
solutions to their !ro"lems% 9 strongly dou"t it% They solved their
!ro"lems the same #ay that most individuals solve difficult and
com!le. !ro"lems: as #ell as they #ere a"le, given the !ro"lems
involved, the information they had, the tools they had to #ork
#ith, the costs of various kno#n o!tions, and the resources at
hand%
<B
?esource users are e.!licitly thought of 2in mainstream
conservation !olicy literature3 as rational agents #ho !lunder
local resources so as to ma.imi6e their o#n short'term "enefits%
Government officials are im!licitly de!icted, on the other hand, as
seeking the more general !u"lic interest, having the relevant
information at hand, and the ca!a"ility of designing o!timal
!olicies%%%%
One should not, ho#ever, !resume that all government officials
are )saints* #hile assuming that all resource users are )sinners%*
=or should #e !resume that officials have all the relevant
kno#ledge to manage com!le. dynamic systems #hile local
a!!ro!riators are ignorant% The kno#ledge "ase of government
officials may not, in reality, "e "etter than that of local
82 ,stro), Governing the Commons, p. '8.
4<
a!!ro!riators #ho have used a !articular resource for years and
kno# its characteristics in considera"le detail% Even #hen the
kno#ledge "ase is similar, no guarantee e.ists that government
officials +or the researchers #ho advise them, #ill use availa"le
information to make efficient andFor sustaina"le decisions%
<D
5I5,I$R*PH6
Kevin Carson% Legi'ility * Control: Themes in the +ork of ,ames C- Scott%
Center for a Stateless Society Ca!er =o% & +WinterFS!ring E&&,
Qhtt!:FFc7ss%orgF#!'contentFu!loadsFE&&FE8F$ames'Scott%!dfR%
William Gillis% )The ?etreat of the 9mmediate* Center for a Stateless
Society, =ovem"er &@, E&4 Qhtt!:FFc7ss%orgFcontentF<@R%
Sanford $% Grossman and Oliver A% /art% )The Costs and >enefits of
O#nershi!: A Theory of Sertical and Iateral 9ntegration* ,ournal of Political
Economy D7:7 +&DB<,%
Ed#ard S% Green"erg% )Croducer Coo!eratives and Aemocratic Theory%* 9n
$ackall and Ievin, eds%, +orker Cooperatives in .merica +1niversity of
California Cress, &DB<,%
>onnie $% GcCay, $ames G% Acheson, eds% The /uestion of the Commons:
The Culture and Ecology of Communal Resources% GH7D %T7@ &DB@
Elinor Ostrom% J>uilding Trust to Solve Commons Ailemmas: Taking Small
Ste!s to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective ActionJ Worksho! in Colitical
Theory and Colicy Analysis 9ndiana 1niversity% Center for the Study of
9nstitutional Aiversity +Ari6ona State 1niversity, EEB,%
Ostrom% $overning the Commons: The Evolution of &nstitutions for
Collective .ction +Cam"ridge 1niversity Cress, &DDE,%
Ostrom% J=either Garket =or State: Governance of Common'Cool
?esources in the T#enty'first CenturyJ Iecture !resented $une , &DD7 at
the 9nternational Hood Colicy ?esearch 9nstitute, Washington, A%C%
Ostrom% 0nderstanding &nstitutional #iversity +Crinceton and O.ford:
Crinceton 1niversity Cress, EE8,%
Ostrom and Charlotte /ess% Crivate and Common Cro!erty ?ightsJ
Worksho! in Colitical Theory and Colicy Analysis, 9ndiana 1niversity WE@'8
&&FDFE@%
8/ ,stro), 'n"erstan"ing nstitutional (iversity, p. 212.
4@
Ostrom, Iarry Schroeder and Susan Wynne% &nstitutional &ncentives and
Sustaina'le #evelopment: &nfrastructure Policies in Perspective +>oulder,
San Hrancisco, O.ford: Westvie# Cress, &DD4,%
4B

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