G.R. No.

202791 June 10, 2013

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
LEANDRO LEGASPI, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January 5,
2012 Resolution
1
and July 20, 2012 Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
116686, which denied the petitioners motion to amend the dispositive portion of the June 29, 2011
CA Decision.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Respondent Leandro Legaspi (respondent) was employed as Utility Pastry on board the vessel
"Azamara Journey" under the employment of petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
(petitioner). Respondents employment was covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
wherein it was agreed that the company shall pay a maximum disability compensation of up to
US$60,000.00 only.
While on board the vessel, respondent suffered "Cardiac Arrest S/P ICD Insertation." He was
checked by the ships doctor and was prescribed medications. On November 14, 2008, respondent
was repatriated to receive further medical treatment and examination. On May 23, 2009, the
company designated physician assessed his condition to be Disability Grade 2.
Not satisfied, respondent filed a complaint for full and permanent disability compensation against
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The Labor Arbiters Ruling
In its January 25, 2010 Decision,
3
the LA ruled in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents (now petitioner) are hereby ordered to pay complainant jointly and
severally, the following:
1. US$80,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment as permanent disability
compensation;
2. US$1,320.00 or its peso equivalent as sick wages;
3. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.
Notably, the LA awarded US$80,000.00 based on the ITF Cruise Ship Model Agreement for
Catering Personnel, not on the CBA.
Not satisfied, petitioner appealed the LA decision before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
The NLRCs Ruling
In its May 28, 2010 Decision, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Petitioner timely filed its
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC in its July 30, 2010 Resolution. On
September 5, 2010, the NLRC issued the Entry of Judgment stating that its resolution affirming the
LA decision had become final and executory.
On October 22, 2010, during the hearing on the motion for execution before the NLRC, petitioner
agreed to pay respondent US$81,320.00. The terms and conditions of said payment were embodied
in the Receipt of Judgment Award with Undertaking,
4
wherein respondent acknowledged receipt of
the said amount and undertook to return it to petitioner in the event the latters petition for certiorari
would be granted, without prejudice to respondents right to appeal. It was also agreed upon that the
remaining balance would be given on the next scheduled conference. Pertinent portions of the said
undertaking provide:
x x x x
3. That counsel (of the petitioner) manifested their willingness to tender the judgment award
without prejudice to the respondents (now petitioner) right to file a Petition for Certiorari and
provided, complainant (now respondent) undertakes to return the full amount without need of
demand or a separate action in the event that the Petition for Certiorari is granted;
4. That complainants counsel was amenable to the arrangement and accepted the offer.
NOW THEREFORE complainant and his counsel hereby acknowledge RECEIPT of the sum
of EIGHTY-ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY AND 0/100 (US$81,320.00)
covered by CITIBANK CHECK with No. 1000001161 dated October 21, 2010 payable to the
order of LEANDRO V. LEGASPI and UNDERTAKES to RETURN the entire amount to
respondent PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC. in the event that the Petition for
Certiorari is granted without prejudice to complainants right to appeal. Such undertaking
shall be ENFORCEABLE by mere motion before this Honorable office without need of
separate action.
5
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
On November 8, 2010, petitioner timely filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
6

In the meantime, on March 2, 2011, the LA issued a writ of execution which noted petitioners
payment of the amount of US$81,320.00. On March 16, 2011, in compliance with the said writ,
petitioner tendered to the NLRC Cashier the additional amounts of US$8,132.00 as attorneys fees
and P3,042.95 as execution fee. In its Order, dated March 31, 2011, the LA ordered the release of
the aforementioned amounts to respondent.
The CAs Ruling
Unaware of a) the September 5, 2010 entry of judgment of the NLRC, b) the October 22, 2010
payment of US$81,320.00, and c) the writ of execution issued by the LA, the CA rendered its
Decision, dated June 29, 2011. The CA partially granted the petition for certiorari and modified the
assailed resolutions of the NLRC, awarding only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA between
Celebrity Cruise Lines and Federazione Italianaa Transporti CISL.
Petitioner then filed its Manifestation with Motion to Amend the Dispositive Portion, submitting to the
CA the writ of execution issued by the LA in support of its motion. Petitioner contended that since it
had already paid the total amount of US$89,452.00, it was entitled to the return of the excess
payment in the amount of US$29,452.00.
In its assailed January 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the motion and ruled that the petition
should have been dismissed for being moot and academic not only because the assailed decision of
the NLRC had become final and executory on September 5, 2010, but also because the said
judgment had been satisfied on October 22, 2010, even before the filing of the petition for certiorari
on November 8, 2010. In so ruling, the CA cited the pronouncement in Career Philippines Ship
Management v. Geronimo Madjus
7
where it was stated that the satisfaction of the monetary award
rendered the petition for certiorari moot.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed July 20, 2012
Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED IN COLLECTING THE EXCESS
PAYMENT IT MADE TO THE RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE RECEIPT OF
JUDGMENT AWARD SIGNED BY THE RESPONDENT
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN INVOKING THE RULING OF CAREER V. MADJUS
Petitioner argues that it clearly filed its petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period
and, thus, the NLRC resolutions could not have attained finality. Citing Delima v. Gois,
8
petitioner
avers that the NLRC cannot declare that a decision has become final and executory because the
period to file the petition has not yet expired. Petitioner, thus, contends that the finality of the NLRC
judgment did not render the petition moot and academic because such is null and void ab initio.
Petitioner also argues that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking, which was never
refuted by respondent, clearly stated that the payment of the judgment award was without prejudice
to its right to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. Petitioner asserts that the case relied upon by
the CA, Career Philippines, is not applicable as it is not on all fours with this case. Instead, it asserts
that the applicable case should be Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater,
9
where it was held that
the satisfaction of the monetary award by the employer does not render the petition for certiorari
moot before the CA.
On the other hand, respondent reiterates the CA ruling, asserting that the voluntary satisfaction by
petitioner of the full judgment award rendered the case moot, and insists that it was a clear indication
that it had already been persuaded by the judiciousness and merits of the award for disability
compensation. He also avers that this petition is merely pro-forma as it is a reiteration of petitioners
previous issues and arguments already resolved by the CA.
The Courts Ruling
Petition for Certiorari, Not Moot
Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that decisions, resolutions or
orders of the NLRC shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties, and entry of judgment shall be made upon the expiration of the said
period.
10
In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,
11
however, it was ruled that judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC may be sought via a petition for certiorari before the CA under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court; and under Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of
the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in cases where a petition for
certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and
modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.
Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari was not filed within the 10-day period,
petitioner timely filed it before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65. It has,
thus, been held that the CAs review of the decisions or resolutions of the NLRC under Rule 65,
particularly those which have already been executed, does not affect their statutory finality,
considering that Section 4,
12
Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, provides that a petition
for certiorari filed with the CA shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision unless a
restraining order is issued. In Leonis Navigation, it was further written:
The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed
decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot make this
determination without looking into the evidence of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can
only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have been
capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all other evidence on
record.
13
Notably, if the CA grants the petition and nullifies the decision or resolution of the NLRC on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or
resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision or
resolution never became final and executory.
14

Career Philippines not applicable
In Career Philippines, believing that the execution of the LA Decision was imminent after its petition
for injunctive relief was denied, the employer filed before the LA a pleading embodying a conditional
satisfaction of judgment before the CA and, accordingly, paid the employee the monetary award in
the LA decision. In the said pleading, the employer stated that the conditional satisfaction of the
judgment award was without prejudice to its pending appeal before the CA and that it was being
made only to prevent the imminent execution.
15

The CA later dismissed the employers petition for being moot and academic, noting that the
decision of the LA had attained finality with the satisfaction of the judgment award. This Court
affirmed the ruling of the CA, interpreting the "conditional settlement" to be tantamount to an
amicable settlement of the case resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari, considering (i)
that the employee could no longer pursue other claims,
16
and (ii) that the employer could not have
been compelled to immediately pay because it had filed an appeal bond to ensure payment to the
employee.
Stated differently, the Court ruled against the employer because the conditional satisfaction of
judgment signed by the parties was highly prejudicial to the employee. The agreement stated that
the payment of the monetary award was without prejudice to the right of the employer to file a
petition for certiorari and appeal, while the employee agreed that she would no longer file any
complaint or prosecute any suit of action against the employer after receiving the payment.
In contrast, in Leonis Navigation, after the NLRC resolution awarding disability benefits became final
and executory, the employer paid the monetary award to the employee. The CA dismissed the
employers petition for certiorari, ruling that the final and executory decisions or resolutions of the
NLRC rendered appeals to superior courts moot and academic. This Court disagreed with the CA
and held that final and executed decisions of the NLRC did not prevent the CA from reviewing the
same under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was further ruled that the employee was estopped from
claiming that the case was closed and terminated, considering that the employees Acknowledgment
Receipt stated that such was without prejudice to the final outcome of the petition for certiorari
pending before the CA.
In the present case, the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was fair to both the
employer and the employee. As in Leonis Navigation, the said agreement stipulated that respondent
should return the amount to petitioner if the petition for certiorari would be granted but without
prejudice to respondents right to appeal. The agreement, thus, provided available remedies to both
parties.
It is clear that petitioner paid respondent subject to the terms and conditions stated in the Receipt of
the Judgment Award with Undertaking.
17
Both parties signed the agreement. Respondent neither
refuted the agreement nor claimed that he was forced to sign it against his will.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari was not rendered moot despite petitioners satisfaction of the
judgment award, as the respondent had obliged himself to return the payment if the petition would
be granted.
Return of Excess Payment
As the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding
on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.
18
Respondent
agreed to the stipulation that he would return the amount paid to him in the event that the petition for
certiorari would be granted. Since the petition was indeed granted by the CA, albeit partially,
respondent must comply with the condition to return the excess amount.
The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was a fair and binding
agreement. It was executed by the parties subject to outcome of the petition. To allow now
respondent to retain the excess money judgment would amount to his unjust enrichment to the
prejudice of petitioner.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to
account for them. To be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconveyance. Rather, it is a
prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.
19
There is unjust enrichment when:
1. A person is unjustly benefited; and
2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.
20

In the case at bench, petitioner paid respondent US$81,320.00 in the pre-execution conference plus
attorneys fees of US$8,132.00 pursuant to the writ of execution. The June 29, 2011 CA Decision,
however, modified the final resolution of the NLRC and awarded only US$60,000.00 to
respondent.1wphi1 If allowed to return the excess, the respondent would have been unjustly benefited to
the prejudice and expense of petitioner.
Petitioner's claim of excess payment is further buttressed by, and in line with, Section 14, Rule XI of
the 20 II NLRC Rules of Procedure which provides:
EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF EXECUTED JUDGMENT. Where the executed judgment is totally or
partially reversed or annulled by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the Labor Arbiter shall,
on motion, issue such orders of restitution of the executed award, except wages paid during
reinstatement pending appeal. [Emphases supplied]
Although the Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the plight of the workers and has
upheld their cause in their conflicts with the employers, such inclination has not blinded it to the rule
that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts
and applicable law and doctrine.
21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions, dated January 5, 2012
and July 20, 2012, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Leandro Legaspi is
ORDERED to return the excess amount of payment in the sum of
US$29,452.00 to petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. The amount shall earn interest at
the rate of 12o/o per annum from the finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of e opinion of the Courts Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Rollo. pp. 37-41, penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred
in by Associate Justice Josefina Gucvara-Salonga and Associate Justice Franchito N.
Diamante.
2
Id. at 57-58.
3
Rollo, pp. 8-9
4
Id. at 75-77.
5
Id. at 76.
6
Id. at 59-68.
7
G.R. No. 186158, November 22, 2010, 635 SCRA 619.
8
G.R. No. 178352, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 731.
9
G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 182.
10
SECTION 14. FINALITY OF DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AND ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT. - a) Finality of the Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the Commission. -
Except as provided in Section 9 of Rule X, the decisions, resolutions or orders of the
Commission shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof by the counsel or authorized representative or the parties if not assisted by counsel
or representative.
b) Entry of Judgment. - Upon the expiration of the ten (10) calendar day period
provided in paragraph (a) of this Section, the decision, resolution, or order shall be
entered in a book of entries of judgment.
x x x x
11
G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 494.
12
SECTION 4. EFFECT OF PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON EXECUTION. A petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the
assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by said courts.
13
Dole Philippines, Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 332,
363.
14
Tomas Claudio Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152568, February 16,
2004, 423 SCRA 122, 130.
15
"That this Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award is without prejudice to herein
respondents Petition for Certiorari pending with the Court of Appeals docketed as C.A. GR
SP No. 104438 entitled "Career Philippines Shipmanagement Ltd., vs. National Labor
Relations Commission and Geronimo Madjus" and this Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment
Award has been made only to prevent imminent execution being undertaken by the NLRC
and complainant."
(Emphases supplied)
16
"5. That I understand that the payment of the judgment award of US$66,000.00 or its peso
equivalent of PhP2,932,974.00 includes all my past, present and future expenses and
claims, and all kinds of benefits due to me under the POEA employment contract and all
collective bargaining agreements and all labor laws and regulations, civil law or any other law
whatsoever and all damages, pains and sufferings in connection with my claim.
6. That I have no further claims whatsoever in any theory of law against the Owners
of MV "Tama Star" because of the payment made to me. That I certify and warrant
that I will not file any complaint or prosecute any suit of action in the Philippines,
Panama, Japan or any country against the shipowners and/or released parties herein
after receiving the payment of US$66,000.00 or its peso equivalent of
PhP2,932,974.00."
(Underscoring and Emphases supplied)
17
Rollo, p. 76.
18
Bilbao v. Saudi Arabia Airlines, G.R. No. 183915, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 540,
551.
19
GSIS v. COA, G.R. No. 162372, September 11, 2012.
20
Art. 22, CIVIL CODE.
21
Alfaro v. CA, 416 Phil. 310, 320 (2001).
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 July 23, 2013
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee,
FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 206982
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS), represented by its President and Incumbent Representative in the House of
Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J .:
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS) that are now
praying for essentially the same reliefs from this Court.
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep. Arquiza), the organizations incumbent
representative in the House of Representatives. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the
Arquiza Group. The other group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organizations erstwhile third
nominee. This group shall be hereinafter referred to as the Datol Group.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the
Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO]
and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO])
1
filed in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS by Francisco G.
Datol, Jr. For brevity, we shall refer to this petition as the Datol Groups petition.
G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction)
2
filed on behalf of SENIOR CITIZENS by Rep.
Arquiza. We shall refer to this as the Arquiza Groups petition.
The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 64
3
in relation to Rule 65
4
of the Rules of Court, both
assailing the Omnibus Resolution
5
dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). Said Resolution disqualified
SENIOR CITIZENS from participating in the May 13, 2013 elections and ordered the cancellation of
its registration and accreditation as a party-list organization.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list
organization in a Resolution
6
issued on even date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL).
SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007 elections. However, the organization failed to
get the required two percent (2%) of the total votes cast.
7
Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was
granted leave to intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections.
8
In accordance with the procedure set forth in
BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was
allocated one seat in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organizations first nominee, served as a
member of the House of Representatives.
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable
Covenant, the relevant terms of which we quote:
IRREVOCABLE COVENANT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT
We, in representation of our respective personal capacity, hereby covenant and agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
PARTIES AND PERSONS
1. ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at
1881 C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, and representing the Senior Citizens
Party-list in my capacity as President with our General Headquarters at Room 404
West Trade Center, 132 West Avenue, hereinafter referred to as the FIRST PARTY;
2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 35 Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, hereinafter referred to as the SECOND PARTY;
3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at North
Olympus Blk., 3, Lot 15 Ph4 Grieg St., Novaliches, Quezon City, hereinafter referred
to as the THIRD PARTY;
4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881
C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, hereinafter referred to as the FOURTH
PARTY;
5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age, married, Filipino, and residing at 150 Don
Francisco, St. Francis Vil., San Fernando, Pampanga City (sic) hereinafter referred
to as the FIFTH PARTY;
x x x x
ARTICLE III
THE LIST OF CANDIDATES
We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST and in the following order
shall be:
Name CTC No. Issued at Issued on
1. Godofredo V. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#2615256 Manila 04-02-04
2. David L. Kho 16836192 Quezon City 03-15-09
3. Francisco G. Datol, Jr. 27633197 Quezon City 02-10-10
4. Remedios D. Arquiza S.C.I.D.#50696 Quezon City 01-02-07
5. Linda Gaddi David CCI2009 12306699 Pampanga 01-04-10
ARTICLE IV
SHARING OF POWER
The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and personal honor and interest as well as the
legal privileges and rights of the respective party-list offices, under the following circumstances and
events:
ELECTION RESULTS
Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed, then No. 1 shall assume the Office of
Party-list Representative in CONGRESS from July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2012 and shall relinquish his
seat in Congress by the proper and legal acts and No. 2 shall assume said seat from July 1, 2012 to
June 30, 2013;
In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then, No. 1 shall serve for three (3)
years, and No. 2 and No. 3 will each serve for one-and-a-half years.
In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are proclaimed, then No. 1 shall serve for three
years; No. 2 will serve for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish the second seat to No. 4
nominee, who will then serve for one (1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third seat for two (2) years and
afterwards shall relinquish said seat on the third year to Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining
one (1) year.
In Fine:
If only one (1) seat is won
No. 1 nominee = 2 years
No. 2 nominee = 1 year

If two (2) seats are won
No. 1 nominee = 3 years
No. 2 nominee = 1 years
No. 3 nominee = 1 years
If three (3) seats are won:

No. 1 nominee = 3 years
No. 2 nominee = 2 years
No. 3 nominee = 2 years
No. 4 nominee = 1 year
No. 5 nominee = 1 year

All beginning July 1, 2010
SHARING OF RIGHTS
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES
That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the event one or more is elected and qualified
shall observe proper sharing of certain benefits by virtue of his position as such, to include among
others, appointment of persons in his office, projects which may redound to the benefits and
privileges that may be possible under the law.
The above mentioned parties shall oversee the implementation of this COVENANT.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands this MAY 05 2010 in QUEZON
CITY.
(Signed)

Godofredo V. Arquiza
(Signed)

David L. Kho
S.C.I.D. #2615256 Iss. at Manila
on 04-02-04
CTC#16836192 Iss. at
Quezon City on 03-15-09
(Signed)

Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
CTC#16836192 Iss. at
Quezon City on 03-15-09
(Signed)

Remedios D. Arquiza
S.C.I.D.#50696 Iss. at
Quezon City on 01-02-07
(Signed)

Linda Gaddi David
CTC#CCI2009 12306699 Iss. at
San Fernando, Pampanga on 01-04-10
9


After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the
party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat
was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee,
David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about not long after. According to the Datol
Groups petition, the members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention on November 27,
2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his constituents."
10
Further, a
new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees of the organization were allegedly elected
during the said convention. SENIOR CITIZENS third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., was
supposedly elected as the organizations Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an
opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that
were allied with Rep. Arquiza.
11

Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been engaged in a bitter rivalry as both
groups, with their own sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.
The Resignation of Rep. Kho
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of COMELEC Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. in a letter
12
dated December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS,
Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which was to take effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth
nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion
from the organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a petition
13
dated December 14, 2011 in the
name of SENIOR CITIZENS. The petition prayed that the "confirmation and approval of the
replacement of Congressman David L. Kho, in the person of the fourth nominee, Remedios D.
Arquiza, due to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in
order to pave the way of her assumption into the office."
14
Before the COMELEC, the petition was
docketed as E.M. No. 12-040.
Attached to the petition was the resignation letter
15
of Rep. Kho, which was addressed to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. The letter stated thus:
THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
House of Representatives
Congress
Republic of the Philippines
Quezon City
Sir:
I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as Representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list
in the House of Representatives, effective December 31, 2011 in the event that only two (2) seats
are won by our party-list group; and will resign on June 30, 2012 in case three seats are won.
As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
shall nominate my successor pursuant to law and Rules on the matter.
Please accept my esteem and respect.
Truly yours,
(Signed)
Rep. David L. Kho
Party-list Congressman
Copy furnished:
The Board of Trustees
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc.
16

According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a letter dated December 31, 2011,
notifying them of his resignation in this wise:
December 31, 2011
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC.
Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building
132 West Avenue, Quezon City
Gentlemen/Ladies:
It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed organization of my decision to resign as the
party-list nominee for the House of Representatives this 15th Congress for personal reason already
conveyed to you.
Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens of our dear country.
Very truly yours,
(Signed)
DAVID L. KHO
17

In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366
18
was
promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof provided that:
SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among
nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed.
On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS that were allied with Rep. Arquiza
issued Board Resolution No. 003-2012, which pertinently stated thus:
BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 003-2012
Series of 2012
A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE BOARD IN RESOLUTION NO. 11-
0012 OF THE RESIGNATION OF CONGRESSMAN DAVID L. KHO AND ALLOWING HIM TO
CONTINUE REPRESENTING THE SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS TERM AND IMPOSING CERTAIN
CONDITIONS ON HIM TO BE PERFORMED WITH THE COALITION;
WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho, tendered his resignation as
representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list effective December 31, 2011, x x x;
WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board of Trustees in a resolution signed
unanimously, in view of the nature of his resignation, and in view of his determination to resign and
return to private life, x x x;
WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the said nominee changed his mind and
requested the Board of Trustees to reconsider the acceptance, for he also reconsidered his
resignation, and requested to continue his term;
WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the party-list and in view of the forthcoming
elections, the Board opted to reconsider the acceptance, recall the same, and allow Cong. David L.
Kho to continue his term;
WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the Board, is however imposing certain
conditions on Cong. Kho to be performed;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED to recall the acceptance of
the resignation of Congressman David L. Kho in view of his request and change of mind, hence
allow him to continue his term subject to conditions stated above.
19

Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS
petition in E.M. No. 12-040. At the hearing, the counsel for SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group)
admitted that Rep. Khos tender of resignation was made pursuant to the agreement entered into by
the organizations nominees.
20
However, said counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the
organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Khos resignation and the latter was, instead, to
complete his term.
21
Also, from the transcript of the hearing, it appears that the Arquiza Group
previously manifested that it was withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the Datol
Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC.
22

On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
23
in E.M. No. 12-040, dismissing the
petition of the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The pertinent portions of the Resolution stated,
thus:
First, resignation of Kho,
pursuant to the party nominees
term-sharing agreement, cannot
be recognized and be given effect
so as to create a vacancy in the
list and change the order of the
nominees.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in writing of the nominee of his nomination
is one of the three (3) exemptions to the rule that "no change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC." While we
can consider the resignation of Rep. Kho as akin to the withdrawal of his own nomination, we are
constrained however NOT to recognize such resignation but only in so far as to change the order of
petitioners nominees as submitted to the Commission.
x x x x
Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation of Rep. Kho was made by virtue of a prior
agreement of the parties, we resolve and hereby rule that we cannot recognize such arrangement
and accordingly we cannot approve the movement in the order of nominees for being contrary to
public policy. The term of office of public officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of
private parties. Public office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or be made subject
of any private agreement. Public office is vested with public interest that should not be reined by
individual interest.
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing agreements among party list nominees, the
Commission recently promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement
among nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed."
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement by the nominees of the Senior Citizens
Party-List null and void. Any action committed by the parties in pursuit of such term-sharing
arrangementincluding the resignation of Congressman David Khocannot be recognized and be
given effect. Thus, in so far as this Commission is concerned, no vacancy was created by the
resignation of Rep. Kho and there can be no change in the list and order of nominees of the
petitioner party-list.
Second, the expulsion of Datol
even if proven true has no effect
in the list and in the order of
nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
elevated as the third nominee.
x x x x
It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after submission to this Commission, is meant
to be permanent. The legislature in crafting Republic Act No. 7941 clearly deprived the party-list
organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is
submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3) enumerated instances such as when: (a) the
nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes
incapacitated.
x x x x
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true, the list and order of
nominees of the Senior Citizens party-list remains the same in so far as we are concerned as it
does not fall under one of the three grounds mentioned above. Neither does it have an automatic
effect on the organizations representative in the House of Representatives, for once a party-list
nominee is "elected" into office and becomes a member of the House, he is treated similarly and
equally with the regular district representatives. As such, they can only be expelled or suspended
upon the concurrence of the two-thirds of all its Members and never by mere expulsion of a party-list
organization.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees of the petitioner organization, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The list and order of nominees of petitioner
hereby remains the same as it was submitted to us there being no legally recognizable ground to
cause any changes thereat.
24
(Citation omitted.)
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
25
of the above resolution, but the
same remained unresolved.
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS Registration
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to
Participate in the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections under the name
of SENIOR CITIZENS.
26
The Manifestation of the Datol Group was docketed as SPP
No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was docketed as SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513,
27
which, inter alia, set for summary
evidentiary hearings by the COMELEC En Banc the review of the registration of existing party-list
organizations, which have filed their Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the Party-list System of
Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the COMELEC En Banc on August 24,
2012 and they both submitted their respective evidence, which established their continuing
compliance with the requirements of accreditation as a party-list organization.
28

On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution
29
in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM)
and 12-191 (PLM). By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the cancellation of the
registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission promulgated its resolution in a petition
that involved SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition for Confirmation of Replacement of Resigned
PartyList Nominee" and docketed as EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of said
case, this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho
and Francisco G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x x.
Nominee David Khos term as party-list congressman is three (3) years which starts on June 30,
2010 and to end on June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of the Philippines.
Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years
which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by SENIOR CITIZENS, David Khos term
starts on June 30, 2010 and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of Khos resignation.
By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the House of
Representatives is cut short to one year and six months which is merely half of the three-year term.
This is totally opposed to the prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of the House
of Representatives. Hence, when confronted with this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR
CITIZENS, this Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such term-sharing agreement
must be rejected.
x x x x
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 7, Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a ground for
cancellation of registration under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 which states:
"Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
x x x x
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
CANCEL the registration of Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines (SENIOR
CITIZENS) under the Party-List System of Representation.
The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above resolution before this Court by filing
their respective petitions for certiorari. The petition filed by the Datol Group was docketed as G.R.
No. 204421, while the petition of the Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425.
On December 11, 2012, the Court initially granted status quo ante orders on said petitions, directing
the COMELEC to include the name of SENIOR CITIZENS in the printing of official ballots for the
May 13, 2013 party-list elections. Eventually, both petitions were consolidated with the petition in
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, which was docketed as G.R. No. 203766.
On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in Atong Paglaum, which ordered the remand
to the COMELEC of the petitions that have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the
names of the petitioners in the printing of ballots. Following the parameters set forth in the Courts
Decision, the COMELEC was to determine whether said petitioners, which included the two factions
of SENIOR CITIZENS, were qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the
May 13, 2013 elections. For this purpose, the Court stated that the COMELEC may conduct
summary evidentiary hearings.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc rendered the assailed Omnibus Resolution in
SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM), ruling in this wise:
Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the Court in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v.
Commission on Elections], as well as the provisions of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 7941
("R.A. No. 7941") or the Party-List System Act, and other pertinent election laws, and after a careful
and exhaustive reevaluation of the documents submitted by the petitioners per their compliance with
Resolution No. 9513 ("Res. No. 9513"), the Commission En Banc RESOLVES as follows:
I. SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) SENIOR CITIZENS
To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to CANCEL the registration and
accreditation, of petitioner Senior Citizens, for violating laws, rules, and regulations relating to
elections pursuant to Section 6 (5) of R.A. No. 7941.
The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse its earlier finding in the Resolution for
SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) promulgated on 04 December 2012, in relation to the
Resolution for E.M. No. 12-040 promulgated on 27 June 2012. The sole ground for which the
petitioner Senior Citizens was disqualified was because of the term-sharing agreement between its
nominees, which the Commission En Banc found to be contrary to public policy. It will be noted that
this ground is independent of the six parameters in Atong Paglaum, and there is nothing in the
doctrine enunciated in that case which will absolve the petitioner Senior Citizen of what, to the
Commission En Banc, is a clear bastardization of the term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of
the Constitution as implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941, which expressly provides that
Members of the House of Representatives, including party-list representatives, shall be elected for a
term of three years. A term, in the legal sense, is a fixed and definite period of time during which an
officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a fixed interval after which the several
incumbents succeed one another. Thus, service of the term is for the entire period; it cannot be
broken down to accommodate those who are not entitled to hold the office.
That the term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while the expression of the policy prohibiting it
was promulgated only in 2012 via Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366 ("Res. No. 9366"), is of
no moment. As it was in 2010 as it is now, as it was in 1987 when the Constitution was ratified and
as it was in 1995 when R.A. No. 7941 was enacted into law, the agreement was and is contrary to
public policy because it subjects a Constitutionally-ordained fixed term to hold public elective office
to contractual bargaining and negotiation, and treats the same as though it were nothing more than a
contractual clause, an object in the ordinary course of the commerce of men. To accept this defense
will not only open the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals, but more importantly it will render
inutile Section 16 of R.A. No. 7941 which prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill a vacancy in the
available seats for a party-list group or organization. For this mistake, the petitioner Senior Citizens
cannot hide behind the veil of corporate fiction because the corporate veil can be pierced if
necessary to achieve the ends of justice or equity, such as when it is used to defeat public
convenience, justify wrong, or protect fraud. It further cannot invoke the prohibition in the enactment
of ex post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the Constitution because the guarantee only the
retrospectivity of penal laws and definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is not penal in character.
From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of the petitioner Senior
Citizens is therefore in order, and consequently, the two Manifestations of Intent to Participate filed
with the Commission should be denied.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES:
A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and CANCEL the registration and
accreditation, of the following parties, groups, or organizations:
(1) SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines, Inc.;
x x x x
Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the registry of party-list groups and
organizations of the Commission, and shall NOT BE ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE as a candidate for
the Party-List System of Representation for the 13 May 2013 Elections and subsequent elections
thereafter.
30
(Citations omitted.)
On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the earlier declaration of its disqualification,
SENIOR CITIZENS still obtained 677,642 votes.
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and its disqualification to participate
in the May 13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed the instant petitions.
On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very
2
Urgent Motion to Reiterate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order,
31
alleging that the COMELEC had ordered the
stoppage of the counting of votes of the disqualified party-list groups. The Datol Group urged the
Court to issue a TRO and/or a status quo ante order during the pendency of its petition.
Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution,
32
which considered as
final and executory its May 10, 2013 Resolution that cancelled the registration of SENIOR
CITIZENS. On even date, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers
(NBOC), promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 0006-13,
33
proclaiming fourteen (14) party-list
organizations as initial winners in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013.
The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to the "Very Urgent Petition for
Certiorari,"
34
also reiterating its application for a TROand a writ of preliminary injunction.
On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13,
35
which partially
proclaimed the winning party-list organizations that filled up a total of fifty-three (53) out of the
available fifty-eight (58) seats for party-list organizations.
On May 29, 2013, the Chief Justice issued a TRO,
36
which ordered the COMELEC to submit a
Comment on the instant petitions and to cease and desist from further proclaiming the winners from
among the party-list candidates in the May 13, 2013 elections.
On June 3, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing
Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite.
37

In a Resolution
38
dated June 5, 2013, the Court issued an order, which directed the COMELEC to
refrain from implementing the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157
(PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS was concerned and to observe
the status quo ante before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise
ordered the COMELEC to reserve the seat(s) intended for SENIOR CITIZENS, in accordance with
the number of votes it garnered in the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court, however, directed the
COMELEC to hold in abeyance the proclamation insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS is concerned until
the instant petitions are decided. The Most Urgent Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing
Respondent to Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite filed by the Datol Group was denied for lack of
merit.
On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Comment
39
on the instant petitions. In a Resolution
40
dated June 10, 2013, the Court required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda. On June 19, 2013, the Arquiza Group filed its
Reply
41
to the Comment of the COMELEC. Subsequently, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group
filed their separate memoranda.
42
On the other hand, the OSG manifested
43
that it was adopting its
Comment as its memorandum in the instant case.
THE ISSUES
The Datol Groups memorandum raised the following issues for our consideration:
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
4.1
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ADDED ANOTHER GROUND
(VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION OF A PARTYLIST
GROUP AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7941.
4.2
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONERS
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
4.3
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM SHARING.
4.4
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE AUTOMATIC
REVIEW BY THE EN BANC OF THE REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION GRANTED BY ITS
DIVISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION THAT THE EN BANC CAN
ONLY REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION.
44
(Citation omitted.)
Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza Group brought forward the following
arguments:
4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 10, 2013 is invalid for
being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 10, 2013 was issued pursuant to the
directive of the Supreme Court in Atong Paglaum. Therefore, the SUBSIDIARY
ISSUES arising therefrom are:
a. Are there guidelines prescribed in Atong Paglaum to be followed by
respondent Comelec in determining which partylist groups are qualified to
participate in party-list elections?
b. If there are these guidelines to be followed, were these adhered to by
respondent Comelec?
(2) Is the ground -- the Term-Sharing Agreement between Senior Citizens nominees
-- a legal ground to cancel Senior Citizens Certificate of Registration?
4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC RESOLUTION of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for
being contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of May 20, 2013, in fact, become final and
executory?
4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of CANVASSERS (NBOC) RESOLUTION No.
0006-13 of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law and having been issued without
or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis thereof
correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?
4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 0008-13 of MAY 28, 2013 is invalid for being
contrary to law and having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with those of Issue No. 4.3, namely:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast which was made as the basis thereof
correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been followed?
4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting laws/rules on qualifications and disqualifications
of the candidates after the election where they have received the winning number of votes?
4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May 10 and 24, 2013 and NBOC
Resolutions of May 24 and 28, 2013 be annulled and set aside?
45

THE COURTS RULING
After reviewing the parties pleadings, as well as the various resolutions attached thereto, we find
merit in the petitioners contentions.1wphi 1
SENIOR CITIZENS Right to Due Process
First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their petitions, the two rival groups of SENIOR
CITIZENS are actually one in asserting that the organizations disqualification and cancellation of its
registration and accreditation were effected in violation of its right to due process.
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the
cancellation of its registration on account of the term-sharing agreement of its nominees. The
Arquiza Group maintains that SENIOR CITIZENS was summoned only to a single hearing date in
the afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELECs review therein focused on the groups
programs, accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza Group asserts that SENIOR
CITIZENS was not advised, before or during the hearing, that the issue of the term-sharing
agreement would constitute a basis for the review of its registration and accreditation.
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for cancelling the registration and accreditation of
SENIOR CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show that it complied with the
parameters laid down in Atong Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that after the promulgation of
Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted summary hearings in executive sessions, without
informing SENIOR CITIZENS. The Arquiza Group says that it filed a "Very Urgent Motion To Set
Case For Hearing Or To Be Included In The Hearing Set On Thursday, May 9, 2013," but its counsel
found that SENIOR CITIZENS was not included in the hearings wherein other party-list groups were
heard by the COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on May 10, 2013 a "2nd Very Urgent
Motion To Set Case For Public Hearing," but the same was also not acted upon. The Arquiza Group
alleges that it only found out after the elections that the assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution
was issued and the Arquiza Group was not actually served a copy thereof.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941
46
provides for the procedure relative to the review of the
registration of party-list organizations, to wit:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through
third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the
COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list
organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on
Elections
47
the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-
judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,
quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved,
and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from
the authority conferred upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the
proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17
of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in
the determination of the presence or denial of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements
of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the
decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the
guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components
of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which
must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the
conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on
substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial
body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in
substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts
and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due
process, this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of
fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism,
and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker. (Emphases ours,
citations omitted.)
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24,
2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group
and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing
compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the due process violation
was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement entered into
by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation
of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were,
both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they
were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing
agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position.
In its Comment
48
to the petitions, the COMELEC countered that petitioners were actually given the
opportunity to present their side on the issue of the term-sharing agreement during the hearing on
April 18, 2012.
49
Said hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners continuing
compliance for accreditation as a party-list organization.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of
SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim
of COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the
Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the
replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More
specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the
Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its
petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of
SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by
their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the
qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the issue of whether the term-sharing
agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case.
Chairman Brillantess remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-
sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS
registration and accreditation.
Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum, which remanded, among other cases, the
disqualification cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should have still been afforded
the opportunity to be heard on the matter of the term-sharing agreement, either through a hearing or
through written memoranda. This was the proper recourse considering that the COMELEC was
about to arrive at a final determination as to the qualification of SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead, the
COMELEC issued the May 10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No.
12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in
Atong Paglaum.
The Prohibition on Term-sharing
The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein constitute the threshold legal issue of the
instant cases: whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling
the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation
of the prohibition against term-sharing.
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting term-sharing was provided for under
Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated only on February 21,
2012. Hence, the resolution should not be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR
CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive effect. When the term-sharing agreement
was executed in 2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere execution of the Irrevocable Covenant
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections should not have been a ground
for the cancellation of the organizations registration and accreditation because the nominees never
actually implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that no term-sharing actually transpired
between the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior arrangements were
made by the nominees on the term-sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that the
resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board of Trustees and the members of SENIOR
CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-sharing agreement was actually implemented,
the Arquiza Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held to have violated Section 7
of Resolution No. 9366. The term-sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years prior to
the promulgation of said resolution on February 21, 2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can
be applied retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same cannot affect SENIOR
CITIZENS at it already earned a vested right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." As held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,
50
"the general rule is that statutes
are prospective. However, statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away vested
rights, do not fall under the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." We also
reiterated in Lintag and Arrastia v. National Power Corporation
51
that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including administrative rules and regulations, operate
prospectively unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by express terms or by
necessary implication because the retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have
already become vested. This is based on the Latin maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks
forward, not backward). (Citations omitted.)
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that it shall have retroactive effect.
Nonetheless, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that SENIOR
CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its registration as a party-list organization.
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections
52
teaches that "a public office is not a property right. As
the Constitution expressly states, a Public office is a public trust. No one has a vested right to any
public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section
2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "register, after
sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the
COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions
already registered in order to ensure the latters continuous adherence to the requirements
prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to
participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS vested right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive
application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration
and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing
agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was
manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the
COMELEC En Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was
withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep. Khos replacement. Thereafter, in its
Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to
recognize the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC
even declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution of the said agreement.
Subsequently, there was also no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to
implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court,
the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and
the COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily
penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR
CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was
no violation of an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of
SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to
stand on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify
the SENIOR CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to strike
down the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No.
12-191 (PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need to discuss the other issues raised by the
petitioners. In particular, the dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS, not being an
issue raised here, should be threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper tribunal having
jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in ordering the disqualification of SENIOR
CITIZENS and the cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said organization is entitled to be
proclaimed as one of the winning party-list organizations in the recently concluded May 13, 2013
elections.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status
Quo Ante Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos. 206844-45 and the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari
(With Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in
G.R. No. 206982 are GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the Commission on Elections En Banc in
SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar
as Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En Bane is ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list
organizations during the May 13, 20 13 elections with the number of seats it may be entitled
to based on the total number of votes it garnered during the said elections.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
(No part due to party list affiliation of wife)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
* No part.
1
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 206844-45), pp. 3-47.
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 206982), pp. 3-23.
3
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provides for the Review of Judgments and Final Orders or
Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
4
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the special civil actions of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus.
5
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 206844-45), pp. 48-60.
6
Rollo (G.R. No. 206982), pp. 38-43.
7
Id. at 6.
8
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 210.
9
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 206844-45), pp. 70-72.
10
Id. at 10.
11
Id. at 61. See COMELEC Resolution dated December 4, 2012.
12
Id. at 204. The letter dated December 8, 2011 was quoted in the Excerpt from the Minutes
of the Regular En Banc Meeting of the Commission on Elections held on February 21, 2012,
which was part of the annexes attached to the Datol Groups petition.
13
Id. at 205. The petition dated December 14, 2011 was partly quoted in the Excerpt from
the Minutes of the Regular En Banc Meeting of the Commission on Elections held on
February 21, 2012, which was part of the annexes attached to the Datol Groups petition.
14
Id.
15
The letter itself was undated, but on its face, the same was notarized on May 14, 2010.
16
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 206844-45), p. 76.
17
Id. at 109.
18
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 is entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing the 1) Filing
of Petitions for Registration; 2) Filing of Manifestation of Intent to Participate; 3) Submission
of Names of Nominees; and 4) Filing of Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-
List Groups or Organizations Participating under the Party-List System of Representation in
Connection with the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, and Subsequent Elections
Thereafter." <http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Elections/2013natloc/res/ResolutionNo9366>;
<http://comelec.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/com_res_9366.pdf> (visited July 11, 2013).
19
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 206844-45), p. 591.
20
Id. at 118-122; TSN, April 18, 2012, pp. 9-13.
21
Id. at 124; id. at 15.
22
Id. at 136-138, 161-162; id. at 27-29, 52-53.
23
Id. at 183-188; penned by COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.
24
Id. at 184-188.
25
Id. at 189-200.
26
The Datol Group filed its Manifestation on May 9, 2012 (Rollo [G.R. Nos. 206844-45], pp.
310-321) while the Arquiza Group filed its Manifestation on May 28, 2012 (Rollo [G.R. No.
206982], pp. 44-57).
27
COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 is entitled "In the Matter of: (1) the Automatic Review by
the Commission En Banc of Pending Petitions for Registration of Party-List Groups; and (2)
Setting for Hearing the Accredited Party-List Groups Or Organizations which are Existing
and which have filed Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the 2013 National and Local
Elections." The relevant portions of the fallo thereof states:
NOW THEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission on Elections, virtue of
the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, and Republic
Act No. 7941 or the "Party-List System Act", hereby RESOLVES to promulgate the
following:
x x x x
2. To set for summary evidentiary hearings by the Commission En Banc, for
purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements of R.A.
No. 7941 and the guidelines in the Ang Bagong Bayani case, and, if non-compliant,
cancel the registration of the following:
(a) Party-list groups or organizations which are already registered and accredited
and will participate in the May 13, 2013 Elections, provided that the Commission En
Banc has not passed upon the grant of their respective Petitions for Registration; and
(b) Party-list groups or organizations which are existing and retained in the list of
Registered Party-List Parties per Resolution No. 9412, promulgated on 27 April
2012, and which have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in
the Part-List System of Representation in the May 13, 2013 Elections.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution.
The Education and Information Department of the Commission shall cause the
publication of this Resolution in two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation. SO
ORDERED. <http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=Elections/2013natloc/res/res9513>;
<http://www.comelec.gov.ph/uploads/Elections/2013natloc/res/com_res_9513.pdf>
(visited July 11, 2013).
28
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 206844-45), p. 13; rollo (G.R. No. 206982), p. 10.
29
Id. at 61-69.
30
Id. at 51-59.
31
Id. at 322-329.
32
Rollo (G.R. No. 206982), pp. 150-153.
33
Id. at 154-155.
34
Id. at 109-131.
35
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 206844-45), pp. 580-582.
36
Id. at 351-353.
37
Id. at 330-344.
38
Id. at 354-356.
39
Id. at 371-406.
40
Id. at 441-442.
41
Id. at 443-458.
42
Id. at 492-527, 528-574.
43
Id. at 631-636.
44
Id. at 499-500.
45
Rollo (G.R. No. 206982), pp. 544-546.
46
Republic Act No. 7941 is entitled "An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List
Representatives Through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
47
G.R. No. 188308, October 15, 2009, 603 SCRA 692, 712-714.
48
Rollo (G.R. Nos. 206844-45), pp. 371-406.
49
In the Comment of the COMELEC, the date of the hearing was erroneously stated as
August 18, 2012.
50
516 Phil. 176, 188 (2006).
51
555 Phil. 263, 272 (2007).
52
433 Phil. 620, 637 (2002).
G.R. No. 161107 March 12, 2013
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as City Mayor of Marikina City,
JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the City
Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity as City Engineer of Marikina
City, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-MARIKINA,
INC., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
seeks to set aside the December 1, 2003 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
75691.
The Facts
Respondents St. Scholasticas College (SSC) and St. Scholasticas Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-
Marikina) are educational institutions organized under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
with principal offices and business addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila, and at West
Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina City, respectively.
2

Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square
meters, located in Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537.
Located within the property are SSA-Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine Order,
the formation house of the novices, and the retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is
enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along
the West Drive are buildings, facilities, and other improvements.
3

The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No. 192,
4
entitled "Regulating the
Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." In 1995 and 1998, Ordinance Nos.
217
5
and 200
6
were enacted to amend Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
ORDINANCE No. 192
Series of 1994
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF FENCES AND WALLS IN THE
MUNICIPALITY OF MARIKINA
WHEREAS, under Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 empowers the Sangguniang Bayan as the local legislative body of the
municipality to "x x x Prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property within the
jurisdiction of the municipality, x x x";
WHEREAS the effort of the municipality to accelerate its economic and physical development,
coupled with urbanization and modernization, makes imperative the adoption of an ordinance which
shall embody up-to-date and modern technical design in the construction of fences of residential,
commercial and industrial buildings;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the National Building Code of the
Philippines, does not adequately provide technical guidelines for the construction of fences, in terms
of design, construction, and criteria;
WHEREAS, the adoption of such technical standards shall provide more efficient and effective
enforcement of laws on public safety and security;
WHEREAS, it has occurred in not just a few occasions that high fences or walls did not actually
discourage but, in fact, even protected burglars, robbers, and other lawless elements from the view
of outsiders once they have gained ingress into these walls, hence, fences not necessarily providing
security, but becomes itself a "security problem";
WHEREAS, to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts
earlier enumerated, and as guardian of the people of Marikina, the municipal government seeks to
enact and implement rules and ordinances to protect and promote the health, safety and morals of
its constituents;
WHEREAS, consistent too, with the "Clean and Green Program" of the government, lowering of
fences and walls shall encourage people to plant more trees and ornamental plants in their yards,
and when visible, such trees and ornamental plants are expected to create an aura of a clean, green
and beautiful environment for Marikeos;
WHEREAS, high fences are unsightly that, in the past, people planted on sidewalks to "beautify" the
faade of their residences but, however, become hazards and obstructions to pedestrians;
WHEREAS, high and solid walls as fences are considered "un-neighborly" preventing community
members to easily communicate and socialize and deemed to create "boxed-in" mentality among the
populace;
WHEREAS, to gather as wide-range of opinions and comments on this proposal, and as a
requirement of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), the Sangguniang Bayan of
Marikina invited presidents or officers of homeowners associations, and commercial and industrial
establishments in Marikina to two public hearings held on July 28, 1994 and August 25, 1994;
WHEREAS, the rationale and mechanics of the proposed ordinance were fully presented to the
attendees and no vehement objection was presented to the municipal government;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE SANGGUINANG BAYAN OF MARIKINA IN
SESSION DULY ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. Coverage: This Ordinance regulates the construction of all fences, walls and gates on lots
classified or used for residential, commercial, industrial, or special purposes.
Section 2. Definition of Terms:
a. Front Yard refers to the area of the lot fronting a street, alley or public
thoroughfare.
b. Back Yard the part of the lot at the rear of the structure constructed therein.
c. Open fence type of fence which allows a view of "thru-see" of the inner yard and
the improvements therein. (Examples: wrought iron, wooden lattice, cyclone wire)
d. Front gate refers to the gate which serves as a passage of persons or vehicles
fronting a street, alley, or public thoroughfare.
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences
in excess of one (1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent
(80%) see-thru; and
(2) Fences on the side and back yard shall be in accordance with the provisions of
P.D. 1096 otherwise known as the National Building Code.
Section 4. No fence of any kind shall be allowed in areas specifically reserved or classified as parks.
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance
located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.
7

Section 6. Exemption.
(1) The Ordinance does not cover perimeter walls of residential subdivisions.
(2) When public safety or public welfare requires, the Sangguniang Bayan may allow
the construction and/or maintenance of walls higher than as prescribed herein and
shall issue a special permit or exemption.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners whose existing fences and walls do not
conform to the specifications herein are allowed adequate period of time from the passage of this
Ordinance within which to conform, as follows:
(1) Residential houses eight (8) years
(2) Commercial establishments five (5) years
(3) Industrial establishments three (3) years
(4) Educational institutions five (5) years
8
(public and privately owned)
Section 8. Penalty. Walls found not conforming to the provisions of this Ordinance shall be
demolished by the municipal government at the expense of the owner of the lot or structure.
Section 9. The Municipal Engineering Office is tasked to strictly implement this ordinance, including
the issuance of the necessary implementing guidelines, issuance of building and fencing permits,
and demolition of non-conforming walls at the lapse of the grace period herein provided.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. All existing Ordinances and Resolutions, Rules and Regulations
inconsistent with the foregoing provisions are hereby repealed, amended or modified.
Section 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason or reasons, local executive orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof in conflict with this Ordinance are hereby repealed and/or modified
accordingly.
Section 12. Effectivity. This ordinance takes effect after publication.
APPROVED: September 30, 1994
(Emphases supplied)
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same
time, to move it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park.
9
On April 26,
2000, the respondents requested for an extension of time to comply with the directive.
10
In response,
the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando, insisted on the enforcement of the
subject ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina,
Branch 273 (RTC), docketed as SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK.
11

The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in enforcing
Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
That demolishing their fence and constructing it six (6) meters back would result in the loss of at
least 1,808.34 square meters, worth aboutP9,041,700.00, along West Drive, and at least 1,954.02
square meters, worth roughly P9,770,100.00, along East Drive. It would also result in the destruction
of the garbage house, covered walk, electric house, storage house, comfort rooms, guards room,
guards post, waiting area for visitors, waiting area for students, Blessed Virgin Shrine, P.E. area,
and the multi-purpose hall, resulting in the permanent loss of their beneficial use. The respondents,
thus, asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be tantamount to an
appropriation of property without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate
a portion of their property through eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal of the
provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not exist as the solid concrete walls of the
school had served as sufficient protection for many years.
12

The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police
power, by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for the protection of public safety,
health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.
13

On June 30, 2000, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the demolition of the fence at SSCs Marikina property.
14

Ruling of the RTC
On the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision,
15
dated October 2, 2002, granting the petition and
ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition commanding the petitioners to permanently desist from
enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents property.
The RTC agreed with the respondents that the order of the petitioners to demolish the fence at the
SSC property in Marikina and to move it back six (6) meters would amount to an appropriation of
property which could only be done through the exercise of eminent domain. It held that the
petitioners could not take the respondents property under the guise of police power to evade the
payment of just compensation.
It did not give weight to the petitioners contention that the parking space was for the benefit of the
students and patrons of SSA-Marikina, considering that the respondents were already providing for
sufficient parking in compliance with the standards under Rule XIX of the National Building Code.
It further found that the 80% see-thru fence requirement could run counter to the respondents right
to privacy, considering that the property also served as a residence of the Benedictine sisters, who
were entitled to some sense of privacy in their affairs. It also found that the respondents were able to
prove that the danger to security had no basis in their case. Moreover, it held that the purpose of
beautification could not be used to justify the exercise of police power.
It also observed that Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, provided for retroactive
application. It held, however, that such retroactive effect should not impair the respondents vested
substantive rights over the perimeter walls, the six-meter strips of land along the walls, and the
building, structures, facilities, and improvements, which would be destroyed by the demolition of the
walls and the seizure of the strips of land.
The RTC also found untenable the petitioners argument that Ordinance No. 192 was a remedial or
curative statute intended to correct the defects of buildings and structures, which were brought about
by the absence or insufficiency of laws. It ruled that the assailed ordinance was neither remedial nor
curative in nature, considering that at the time the respondents perimeter wall was built, the same
was valid and legal, and the ordinance did not refer to any previous legislation that it sought to
correct.
The RTC noted that the petitioners could still take action to expropriate the subject property through
eminent domain.
The RTC, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
respondents to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Ordinance No. 192, Series of
1994, as amended, on petitioners property in question located at Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
16

Ruling of the CA
In its December 1, 2003 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioners appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision.
The CA reasoned out that the objectives stated in Ordinance No. 192 did not justify the exercise of
police power, as it did not only seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the respondents
property without due process of law. The respondents were bound to lose an unquantifiable sense of
security, the beneficial use of their structures, and a total of 3,762.36 square meters of property. It,
thus, ruled that the assailed ordinance could not be upheld as valid as it clearly invaded the personal
and property rights of the respondents and "[f]or being unreasonable, and undue restraint of trade."
17

It noted that although the petitioners complied with procedural due process in enacting Ordinance
No. 192, they failed to comply with substantive due process. Hence, the failure of the respondents to
attend the public hearings in order to raise objections did not amount to a waiver of their right to
question the validity of the ordinance.
The CA also shot down the argument that the five-meter setback provision for parking was a legal
easement, the use and ownership of which would remain with, and inure to, the benefit of the
respondents for whom the easement was primarily intended. It found that the real intent of the
setback provision was to make the parking space free for use by the public, considering that such
would cease to be for the exclusive use of the school and its students as it would be situated outside
school premises and beyond the school administrations control.
In affirming the RTC ruling that the ordinance was not a curative statute, the CA found that the
petitioner failed to point out any irregularity or invalidity in the provisions of the National Building
Code that required correction or cure. It noted that any correction in the Code should be properly
undertaken by the Congress and not by the City Council of Marikina through an ordinance.
The CA, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, all foregoing premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED.1wphi 1 The October 2,
2002 Decision and the January 13, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City,
Branch 273, granting petitioners-appellees petition for Prohibition in SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
18

Aggrieved by the decision of the CA, the petitioners are now before this Court presenting the
following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT CITY ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDINANCE IS AN EXERCISE OF THE CITY OF THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT THE CITY VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN IMPLEMENTING
ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994; AND
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ORDINANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION.
19

In this case, the petitioners admit that Section 5 of the assailed ordinance, pertaining to the five-
meter setback requirement is, as held by the lower courts, invalid.
20
Nonetheless, the petitioners
argue that such invalidity was subsequently cured by Zoning Ordinance No. 303, series of 2000.
They also contend that Section 3, relating to the 80% see-thru fence requirement, must be complied
with, as it remains to be valid.
Ruling of the Court
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid
exercises of police power by the City Government of Marikina.
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people."
21
The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in Section
16
22
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General Welfare
Clause,
23
which has two branches. "The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the
municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact
ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection
of their property."
24

White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,
25
discusses the test of a valid ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has
held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
26

Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police
power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an
ordinance and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by
the Court the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally
further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict
scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest
and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
27

Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must
be struck down for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the Citys purpose. More
importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites as discussed in
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:
28

As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police
power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
29

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
30

Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to the issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of
one (1) meter shall be an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance
located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners from requiring them to (1) demolish their
existing concrete wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must be 80% see-thru, and
(3) build the said fence six meters back in order to provide a parking area.
Setback Requirement
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which requires the five-meter setback of the fence to
provide for a parking area. The petitioners initially argued that the ownership of the parking area to
be created would remain with the respondents as it would primarily be for the use of its students and
faculty, and that its use by the public on non-school days would only be incidental. In their Reply,
however, the petitioners admitted that Section 5 was, in fact, invalid for being repugnant to the
Constitution.
31

The Court agrees with the latter position.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the setback requirement was to make the
parking space free for use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for the exclusive use
of the respondents as it would also be available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain, provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that the ownership of the property will continue
to remain with the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the acquisition of title nor the total
destruction of value is essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the title remains with
the private owner that inquiry should be made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable taking.
32
The Court is of the view that the
implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking of a total of 3,762.36
square meters of the respondents private property for public use without just compensation, in
contravention to the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness," it is
obvious that providing for a parking area has no logical connection to, and is not reasonably
necessary for, the accomplishment of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been settled that the
State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.
33
The
Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. Accordingly, Section
5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of Section 5 was properly cured by Zoning
Ordinance No. 303,
34
Series of 2000, which classified the respondents property to be within an
institutional zone, under which a five-meter setback has been required.
The petitioners are mistaken. Ordinance No. 303, Series of 2000, has no bearing to the case at
hand.
The Court notes with displeasure that this argument was only raised for the first time on appeal in
this Court in the petitioners Reply. Considering that Ordinance No. 303 was enacted on December
20, 2000, the petitioners could very well have raised it in their defense before the RTC in 2002. The
settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change the legal theory of this case under which
the controversy was heard and decided in the trial court. It should be the same theory under which
the review on appeal is conducted. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately
brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court,
inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This will be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
35

Furthermore, the two ordinances have completely different purposes and subjects. Ordinance No.
192 aims to regulate the construction of fences, while Ordinance No. 303 is a zoning ordinance
which classifies the city into specific land uses. In fact, the five-meter setback required by Ordinance
No. 303 does not even appear to be for the purpose of providing a parking area.
By no stretch of the imagination, therefore, can Ordinance No. 303, "cure" Section 5 of Ordinance
No. 192.
In any case, the clear subject of the petition for prohibition filed by the respondents is Ordinance No.
192 and, as such, the precise issue to be determined is whether the petitioners can be prohibited
from enforcing the said ordinance, and no other, against the respondents.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 may be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting
the height of fences to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to be at least 80%
see-thru, should remain valid and enforceable against the respondents.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners must show the reasonable
relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
36

The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of
prohibited or unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to
ensure public safety and security. The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is unduly oppressive to private
rights. The petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not appear obvious to this Court, that
an 80% see-thru fence would provide better protection and a higher level of security, or serve as a
more satisfactory criminal deterrent, than a tall solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that such
exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be criminals to the property, and that a see-thru
fence would be easier to bypass and breach. It also appears that the respondents concrete wall has
served as more than sufficient protection over the last 40 years. `
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance, as previously discussed, the State may
not, under the guise of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake of the aesthetic
appearance of the community. Similarly, the Court cannot perceive how a see-thru fence will foster
"neighborliness" between members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is,
thus, a clear encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide
how best to protect their property.
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative of their
right to privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the
property. The right to privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the
right to be let alone,
37
as governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of its citizens.
38
It is inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of Rights
(Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
39

The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in an undue interference with the
respondents rights to property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is, thus, also invalid
and cannot be enforced against the respondents.
No Retroactivity
Ordinance No. 217 amended Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192 by including the regulation of
educational institutions which was unintentionally omitted, and giving said educational institutions
five (5) years from the passage of Ordinance No. 192 (and not Ordinance No. 217) to conform to its
provisions.
40
The petitioners argued that the amendment could be retroactively applied because the
assailed ordinance is a curative statute which is retroactive in nature.
Considering that Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 cannot be enforced against the
respondents, it is no longer necessary to rule on the issue of retroactivity. The Court shall,
nevertheless, pass upon the issue for the sake of clarity.
"Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which
would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements. They are intended to
supply defects, abridge superfluities and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons to
carry into effect that which they have designed or intended, but has failed of expected legal
consequence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action. They make
valid that which, before the enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to give validity to
acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied
with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are retroactive."
41

The petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 192 is a curative statute as it aims to correct or cure a
defect in the National Building Code, namely, its failure to provide for adequate guidelines for the
construction of fences. They ultimately seek to remedy an insufficiency in the law. In aiming to cure
this insufficiency, the petitioners attempt to add lacking provisions to the National Building Code.
This is not what is contemplated by curative statutes, which intend to correct irregularities or
invalidity in the law. The petitioners fail to point out any irregular or invalid provision. As such, the
assailed ordinance cannot qualify as curative and retroactive in nature.
At any rate, there appears to be no insufficiency in the National Building Code with respect to
parking provisions in relation to the issue of the respondents. Paragraph 1.16.1, Rule XIX of the
Rules and Regulations of the said code requires an educational institution to provide one parking
slot for every ten classrooms. As found by the lower courts, the respondents provide a total of 76
parking slots for their 80 classrooms and, thus, had more than sufficiently complied with the law.
Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is, therefore, not a curative statute which may be applied
retroactively.
Separability
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are, thus, invalid and cannot be enforced
against the respondents. Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where part of a statute is void as
repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible to being
separated from the invalid, may stand and be enforced."
42
Thus, the other sections of the assailed
ordinance remain valid and enforceable.
Conclusion
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear that the petitioners were acting in excess
of their jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the respondents. The CA was correct in
affirming the decision of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners must permanently
desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in
Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 2, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the
respondents to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance
No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on the petitioners' property in question located in Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DISODADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
(On official leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
*

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
*
On official leave.
1
Rollo, pp. 37-52. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by
Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
2
Id. at 37-38.
3
Id. at 38.
4
Id. at 74-77.
5
Id. at 78-79.
6
Id. at 80.
7
Ordinance No. 200, Series of 1998, id.
8
Ordinance No. 217, Series of 1995, id. at 78.
9
Id. at 39.
10
Id. at 85.
11
Id. at 39.
12
Id. at 56-57.
13
Id. at 57.
14
Id. at 39-40.
15
Id. at 54-68. Penned by Judge Olga Palanca-Enriquez.
16
Id. at 68.
17
Id. at 49.
18
Id. at 51-52.
19
Id. at 17.
20
Id. at 182-188.
21
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545
SCRA 92, 136.
22
Sec. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
23
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 969 (2000).
24
Rural Bank of Makati v. Municipality of Makati, G.R. No. 150763, July 2, 2004, 433 SCRA
362, 371-372.
25
G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416.
26
Id. at 433.
27
Id. at 437.
28
Supra note 21.
29
Id. at 138.
30
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 313 (2005).
31
Rollo, p. 184.
32
Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala Land, Incorporated, G.R No. 177056, September
18, 2009, 600 SCRA 617, 644-645.
33
People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443, 447-448 (1958).
34
Rollo, pp. 190-310.
35
Pea v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 155227-28, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 310, 324-325.
36
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 30, at 312-313.
37
Gamboa v. Chan, G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012, 677 SCRA 385, 396, citing Morfe v.
Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968).
38
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra note 19, at 441, citing City of Manila v.
Laguio, 495 Phil. 289 (2005).
39
Gamboa v. Chan, supra note 37, at 397-398, citing Ople v. Torres, 354 Phil. 948 (1998).
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health as may be provided by law.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
40
Rollo, pp. 78-79.
41
Narzoles v. National Labor Relations Commission, 395 Phil. 758, 764-765 (2000).
42
FKSMMN v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012, 669 SCRA 49, 74.
GARCIA VS. DRILON
Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the
part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth
by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer,
the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an
invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure
to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on
said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory,
unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it
allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised
in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for
real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on
a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by
not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the
Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other
law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.