WITH REFERENCE TO ANY TWO COUNTRIES OF YOUR

CHOICE, COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE PROBLEMS

CONFRONTING DEFENCE PLANNERS IN INDUSTRIALISED
ECONOMY AND A
NON-INDUSTRIALISED ONE.

BY
CLIFFORD OGBEIDE
Ogbeide2000@yahoo.com
08058773326, 07067040962

AAU/SPS/CSDS/2008/M.SC/2540

A SEMINAR PAPER PRESENTED AT THE CENTRE FOR

STRATEGIC AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (CSDS), AMBROSE
ALLI UNIVERSITY, EKPOMA, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF M.Sc. DEGREE IN
STRATEGIC STUDIES, NOVEMBER 2009.

LECTURER: PROFESSOR T.A. IMOBIGHE

1
 ABSTRACT
This seminar paper seeks to compare and contrast problems faced by defence in India
(As an industrialized nation) and in Nigeria (as Non Industrialised Nation). The work
focused on defence planning in both nations which is largely determined by their
national interests and objectives. Factors that determine defence policy in both nations
include threat, perception of the country’s leaders, domestic situation, technology
assessment, resources available, current capabilities and global trends. There is also
consideration for the historical and cultural life of the people.

In the research work, it was discovered that among the various functions of government,
defence planning is perhaps the most complex and strategic tool for its survival.
Problems /constraints encountered include lack of scientific culture, corruption, extra
powers’ influence and weak economic base. Other problems also discovered are
absence of an integrated and coordinated policy, process of weapon procurement and
political instability among others.

To overcome these problems, it was suggested that heavy dependence on external arms
supply must be discouraged. There is need for long term defence planning methods.
Need for adequate training was emphasized and advanced technology for rapid growth
and development must be pursued by Nigeria and India. The research methodology
involves consultation of relevant books, journals, the internet and the historical method of
data analysis.

2
 INTRODUCTION
The place of any nation in the world is determined by how it protect its interest in the
international community. These interests are affected by global trends and other external
influences. It is for this reason that every nation adopts policies and programmes to
ensure stability, freedom, from attack and economic development.

A nation that attains a high level of security means it has put in place measures to ward
off all perceived threats to her and the generality of its citizens at affordable resources at
its disposal. For a nation to achieve the above, a good defence plan is important to her
survival.

Defence planning is essentially a subset of overall national level planning in the political,
economic and social spheres and has to be evolved in the context of global and
proximate factors affecting the nation. It also has to take into account the philosophy
and ethos animating the national psyche; in other words the historical and cultural factors
which have shaped the collective memory and outlook of the people over the centuries.
[1]
These factors include; assessing the international security environment, threat
perception, the domestic situation, technology assessment, resources available, current
capabilities, historical and cultural life of the people.[2]

The Cold War was a classic example of the factors stated above. The Cold War was a
classic example of the factors stated above. There were fundamental philosophical
differences between the adversaries – the western bloc, advocating the virtues of free
enterprise and its own interpretations of democracy, and the Soviet bloc, equally strongly
asserting the merits of the socialist system as the only one genuinely meeting
democratic aspirations and assuring social equality and economic wellbeing of the
people as a whole, rather than for a few. Fifty years of the Cold War could not conclude
the capitalism-socialism debate, though, in the end, it did push the socialist forces into,
perhaps temporary retreat. This was because the struggle was really for power and
domination. “The evil empire” of Ronald Reagan’s description may have withered away,
but the necessity for the US to target the so called “rogue states” has not disappeared.[3]

Many examples can be found of philosophical differences leading to stand-offs, usually

with the USA as one of the parties. The USA-Cuba divide is a long-standing one. USA-
Venezuela stand-off is just developing and resonating in other Latin American countries.
Sometimes the differences are couched in the language of anticipated threats, such as in
US-North Korea, or US-Iran relations. The true reasons and underlying causes are
buried in verbiage and obfuscation. A more serious rift has developed over the selective
and poorly conceptualised US war on terrorism, launched for spurious reasons in Iraq,
when the real source of terror was elsewhere and far more complex. Differing religious
beliefs and rigidities are often cited as causes but do not sufficiently explain conflicts

3
within the same religion, as between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland or the
Shias and Sunnis in Iraq and elsewhere. [4]

Every nation has its own history of defence plan based on the factors mentioned above.
Whichever defence plan adopted by a nation, there are specific objectives common to all
of them:

OBJECTIVES OF DEFENCE POLICY

i. Deter attacks against such country and her important interest, including sources
of strategic resource, military and industrial complex and associated lines of
communication.

ii. Prevent an enemy from coercing

iii. Maintain the nation’s territorial and national integrity

iv. Conduct military operation at all level, intensity and duration necessary to attain
the country’s political objectives.

v. Employ diplomacy to rally allies and isolate threats

vi. Maintain effective armed forces

vii. Implementing civil defence and emergency preparedness measures (including

anti-terrorism legislation)

viii. Establish military pact and defence cooperation.[5]

Effective defence policy or planning is difficult to achieve. This is because of foreign,

economic, domestic, political and military issues which are interrelated, each with
implications on the other.

The remaining parts of this paper will concentrate on the problems encountered by
defence planners in India and Nigeria.

NIGERIA DEFENCE PLAN:

The Nigeria foreign policy has always been formed on the bedrocks of our defence plan.
Nigeria has a policy of good neighbourliness i.e. being magnanimous towards her
neighbours by settling her borders disputes amicably with some of them and operate a
policy that is neither antagonistic nor aggressive to the big powers lurking around her
borders.[6]

4
Africa has been the pivot of our foreign policy. That is to promote African peace, unity,
total economic, social and cultural liberation of Africa and combat racial discrimination in
all forms.

However good as Nigeria’s foreign policy is, it does operate in a global system that
abhors equity and justice. [7]

Nigeria’s policy of Africa self-realization, anti apartheid policy and promotion of Africa
integration has attracted hostile act from those whose interest represent opposite views.

The Nigerian foreign policy is closely linked to national defence policies which aim to
achieve the followings:

1. Protection of the nation strategic investment resources.

2. The achievement of respect from foreigners that Nigeria has the will and power to
protect Nigerian citizens both home and abroad in pursuit of legitimate interests.

3. Development of society conscientiousness among the generality of the Nigerian

people.

4. Co-operate with other African nations in the promotion of those tendencies in the
continent that reinforce our economic and security interests.

5. Proper strengthening of the institution and economic management.

6. Protection of the institution, which promotes good governance, equity, rule of law
and social justice.

7. Contribution to world peace and security.

8. Supporting all effort to bring out total liberation and eradication of all forms of
colonialism and neo-colonialism in the continent of Africa. [8]

PROBLEMS IN DEFENCE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA

In the implementation of defence policy in Nigeria, several constraints or problems have

been experienced by defence planners. These problems are both internal and external.
One of such problems in defence planning in Nigeria is the consideration of financial
responsibilities in maintaining personnel during peace and war times.

The financial factors become glaring especially during a protracted war when a lot of the
resources of the nation will have to be channelled into it. These were witnessed during
the three years of civil war in Nigeria and in Liberia where Nigeria spearheaded the
ECOMOG military operations.

There is the tension between the preservation of the state and the rights and freedoms of
individuals. Often times, defence planners are constantly faced with accusations of

5
infringement on the fundamental rights and freedom of individuals. These infringements
include censorship of the mass media, mass surveillance of the citizens which in most
cases cannot be justified.

Another problem is the activities of subversive elements designed to undermine the

nation’s government set. It involves all those moves or action carried out to paralyze the
economy, military, political psychological and moral strength of the nation. If urgent steps
are not taken, subversive element can tear the socio-political and economic fabric of the
nation apart and render it weak for easy manipulation.[9]

The subversive action mentioned above can lead to the destruction of our vital and
sensitive installation like military hardware, act of deliberate distortion and ethics
violation. It can also be used as a clandestine political weapon to destroy the machinery
for production, blowing of bridges, power stations and communication lines.

Internal insurrection or coup d’état which has resulted in frequent leadership changes
and collapse of well designed policies and programmes is also constraints in defence
planning in Nigeria. The coups d’état of January 1966, July 1966, 1976, and 1985 are
examples of such leadership changes, political instability and lack of continuity.

The problems of corruption and the “Get rich quick syndrome” of our leaders is a major
challenge facing our defence planners. The resultant effective is the embezzlement of
the financial resources of the nation by very few, to the detriment of the nation and
abandonment of developmental projects.

The “big brother” posture and the over bearing influences in African affairs is a major
Problem also facing defence planners in Nigeria as the country’s neighbours hates
Nigeria’s attitude. The unfriendly nations include Chad, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea,
South Africa, Libya, Benin republic, Gabon, and Cote d’Ivoire.[10] Most of these
countries have received military training and stockpile of sophisticated equipment from
foreign powers, which could be turned against Nigeria.

There is also the problem of espionage on our facilities and installation by foreign secret
agents. With sufficient information on our social, political and economic interest, any
potential aggressor knows when to attack us.

Nigeria is envied by some of her neighbours because of her abundant natural/ human
resources. They are often apprehensive “of the country’s moves on the continents”.[11]

The western nations especially Britain, France and Germany are not happy with
Nigeria’s fore front posture in the liberation struggle that brought about independence in
Namibia, Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa. So these foreign powers
with their imperialistic design are a big threat to our national security.

There is this syndrome of external dependency on weapons purchase which makes us

heavily disadvantaged. Our hostile enemies could get information about our request and

6
purchase contract and then use those information to make similar purchases in order to
balance their capabilities. [12]

Not just the dependency on weapons but the drain on our foreign exchange, which
would have been used for social economic development and growth. As the country
spends its scare resource to purchase sophisticated weapons, the economies of those
countries are being stimulated; jobs are created for their citizens to our impoverishment.
This arms dependency could be used as a diplomatic blackmail, which can be used to
put Nigeria in check.

The problem of smuggling across Nigeria’s porous borders has affected our trade
restriction, foreign exchange and resulted in shortage of some commodities for our local
consumption. The petroleum products are a good reference point. This trade restriction
which is being seriously affected according to Imobighe “was embarked upon to protect
our teething domestic industries”.[13] If smuggling is allowed unchecked it will plunge the
country into embarrassing economic situation.

The defence pact and defence co-operation being entered into by Nigeria’s immediate
neighbours give cause for worry. For instance, Cameroun and France defence
agreement could make Cameroun overcome her capability problems and in turn
constitute a security threat to Nigeria and this will ultimately alter the situation to Nigeria
disadvantage. [14]

Another problem is Nigeria’s contiguous security zone being used by foreign powers to
establish bases. These extra-Africa powers include France, USA, China and others.
These military base just few kilometre from Nigeria’s borders have therefore rendered
useless the contiguity problem faced by these antagonistic power in the event of a
military action against Nigeria. [15]

Lack of coordinated and integrated planning among the three armed forces is a major
problem in defence planning. The country’s armed force can not fight as an integrated
team because each service chief desire to be autonomous and decided what was best
for the troops and carried it straight to the defence minister without discussing it with her
colleagues. This practice has lead to unnecessary competition for scarce defence
resources, absence of inter-service communication system and possibility of striking
each other in the event of war. Lack of formation of joint operation plans and absence of
joint training and military exercises. [16]

Defence planners in Nigeria, are also faced with parliamentary control over defence
issues. This has to do with the powers conferred on the parliament to give approval
before containing defence issues/ actions are implemented. This very provision has
taken the responsibility off the executive especially when it comes to quick action for
nation’s self defence.

The above problem of parliamentary control is compounded by most members of

parliament who lack security knowledge. Issues that borders on defence are hardly given

7
rigorous scrutiny. The competence and expertise to weigh and the balance the
diplomatic and domestic implication of the equipment to be procured is absent.

INDIA DEFENCE PLANNING

Preamble:

Planning for the security and defence of a vast country like India with its particular
geographical location, historical experiences and associations, social, ethnic, religious
and cultural diversity, political and economic structure and a large, relatively poor,
democratically governed population, is a complex and challenging task. It is rendered
more so in the context of the national and international situation in the last sixty years or
so, embracing post-World War II de- colonisation, partition, the creation of Pakistan and
later Bangladesh, conflicts with Pakistan and China, the Cold War and its aftermath, the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the redefinition of NATO’s role, and of most recent
and decisive significance, the September 11, 2001 terror attack on the United States
mainland. This last factor is significant because it resulted in a major re-orientation in US
foreign policy. [17]

Strategic Overview:

Planning for defence pre-supposes identification of threats and contingencies. Until

about five years ago, the strategic situation for India was difficult but relatively clear.
Pakistan was a definite threat, conventional, clandestine and nuclear. China was a
strategically reducing threat, though its international power, influence and economy were
growing. Uncertainties in Bangladesh and Nepal required her to be vigilant for fall-out
effects. There were problems in the north-east of insurgent groups exploiting the ethnic
ties and jungles in Myanmar, and the destabilising spill-over effects of the activities of the
Liberation Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. [18]

The presence in India’s proximate waters, of non-littoral naval forces in substantial

numbers, such as those of the US, which has been traditionally supportive of Pakistan,
had to be taken cognisance of. Also the fact that warfare at sea, because of its distinctive
characteristics of rapidity of concentration and dispersal of forces, mobility, flexibility and
speed of execution, requires a different, longer term approach to threat assessment.

The pathological hostility of the Pakistanis establishment towards India is rooted in its
quest for a national identity, which no novel interpretations, distortions or reinventions of
sub-continental history seem able to provide. It will be a long time before there can be
normal relations with Pakistan because they are influenced more by the internal
contradictions and dynamics of the Pakistani state rather than considerations of mutual
benefits through good relations. Since the Pakistan army is the self-appointed guardian

8
of the undefined “ideology of Pakistan”, normalcy will come when the Army decides it
should be so; or the cost-benefit equation alters. [19]

With China, there is perceptible progress on resolving disputes and fostering economic
and cultural relations. As for Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, there is no
significant positive change, and because of shared borders, internal problems in those
countries will continue to spill over into India. Instability in Afghanistan remains a cause
of concern, especially because of Pakistan’s dubious role, and this will have its impact
on the pursuit of India’s energy and strategic interests in Central Asia. [20]

China’s long term plans for a naval presence in the region have to be taken note of.
There are ample signs of Chinese maritime interest, starting from building and operating
communications facilities in Myanmar to financing and building Pakistan’s Gwadar Port
on the Makran coast, collaboration in building warships for the Pakistan Navy at Karachi
shipyard, as well as port building in Sri Lanka. On the western rim of the Indian Ocean,
China is vigorously pursuing options in Africa, underlined by the meeting of 49 heads of
state/government in Beijing in early November this year. [21]

Planning for defence involves almost all aspects of government, not only because of the
extreme seriousness of the undertaking, but also because a long duration war will
require marshalling the total resources of the nation. It can never be presumed that
hostilities will always be of short duration, as there is a tendency to do so in the context
of India-Pakistan conflicts. No rational planning can be done on basis of a worst-case
scenario. Apart from being illogical, it is unaffordable, and therefore unachievable.
Rather, realistic defence planning requires a thorough and detailed analysis and
evaluation of the security environment, threat perceptions, technological assessments,
etc. and should result in an integrated defence plan. Such a plan should be linked to
national capacity in the civil sector and integrate utilisation of resources such as road
transport, civil aviation and technical manpower in a pre-determined manner for war.

Planning for defence is an extremely complex matter abounding in uncertainties. Since

the state is dealing with future requirements, the success of research or design effort,
availability of material resources or skilled personnel, capability of the builder,
manufacturer or supplier, or even assurance of funding and stability of policy cannot be
taken for granted. This is further complicated if foreign governments or manufacturers
are involved, introducing uncertainties of licensing, sanctions, denial regimes, end-user
issues and even unrelated matters such as diplomatic pressure . There are also the
complications of offsets, sweeteners, kickbacks and disinformation/misinformation by
competitors and interested parties. [22]

Integrated Defence Planning

Whatever the complications, it would seem self-evident that comprehensive integrated

planning for the defence of India would reduce duplication and waste, better utilisation of

9
technical and manpower resources, make for more efficient and cost-effective
procurement for the armed forces, and simplify their logistics management. This is of
course easier said than done. The first difficulty is the vastly disproportionate size of the
Indian army compared to the Navy and the Air Force, the nature of its operational role
and its special equipment requirements, very little of which is common to the other two
services. Until more common platforms such as the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH)
and the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) enter service, shared logistics will remain restricted
to basic items such as ammunition, transport vehicles, rations, medical supplies and the
like. Some commonality also exists in indigenously developed missiles, UAVs, radars,
communications equipment etc, but the list could be expanded. [23]

Nevertheless, there is a modest degree of integration in the Indian armed forces, starting
with the common training of officer cadets at the National Defence Academy which
began in January1949 long before the concept gained favour with leading military
powers. The Indian armed forces have been moving towards integration at the higher
levels of the defence organisation too with deliberation, within the limitations of the
security environment, the infirmities of the political system, the shortcomings of
bureaucracy and the doubts within the military establishment itself. [24]

India Defence planning is reviewed every five year intervals. The defence planning
attempt to march budgetary resources likely made available for the requirement to
establish the defence capability necessary to face the threat and challenges of the
nation. [25]

India defence services before independence was on a system of contract budget pegged
at Rs 55 million per year. However, after the Sino-India conflicts in 1962, the Indian
government started a conscious domestic weapon production by the ministry of Defence,
with the first Defence planning on a five years basis starting with 1964- 1969 plan. [25]

India defence plan is a combination of defence and development. The defence planning
commission has the task to harness all resources for the country’s defence and for the
defence to drive full sustenance from the country’s economic development plan.

10
 PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE PLANNERS IN INDIA.

Despite the several years of planning efforts, defence planning in India is confronted with
several challenges. The five year-year plan in most cases is characterised by frenzied
activities followed by periods of inaction. Sometimes, the plans are executed in a hazard
and ad-hoc basis leading to poor results.

Budgetary Proposals

Since budgets are always tight, no consensus is possible on the equipment plans of the
three services if it entails sacrificing a major service project. Budgetary proposals are
therefore, mere aggregations of each service requirements, and no matter how justified,
results only in separate rough and ready budgetary provision for the Army, Navy and the
Air force in the national budget. This by no means implies authority to spend the
amounts on the proposals submitted, which have to be again justified individually up the
tortuous chain for approval by the “competent authority”, whosoever that might be in a
given case. Delays and shortfalls are in-built into the system and seem to worry only the
military that has to live with the consequences in terms of diminished operational
capability or personnel hardship and morale.

Another major deficiency is that the Department of Defence under the Defence
Secretary, who is the de-facto Chief Staff Officer to the Defence Minister, [26] does not
participate in any meaningful way in formulating and developing the proposals received
from the armed forces before they are moved for financial and executive approval,
preferring instead, to “examine” them for ministerial endorsement, often without being
technically or professionally equipped to do so. Because of the staffing pattern, its
competence lies in procedural matters, but as “examiner”, it feels obliged to raise
numerous, supposedly searching queries that are often based on superficial information.
[27]

Parliamentary Legislation

The functional integration of the Indian Ministry of Defence requires parliamentary

legislation and a competent minister to oversee the implementation over a period of
years. There have undoubtedly been some strong ministers in the past with sound grasp
of administrative issues and the political clout to force through the desired change. But
these have been rare, and, in the present era of coalition politics with a paucity of talent
in individual political parties, it is somewhat unlikely that such a minister can be found for
the requisite duration, assuming that the government lasts its term.[28]

As a result of the complex and peculiarity nature of the India’s political landscape, rare is
the day when the Indian Prime Minister is not rushing to put out political fires lit by “allies”
or opponents against how much time he could actually devote to his job of perspective
planning for the nation and its vital international diplomatic, security and economic
concerns. [29]

11
Defence Procurement:

The armed forces procure and stores, equipment, weapons and systems costing billions
of rupees every year after a labyrinthine process of proposals and approvals. As the
experience in most other countries indicates, there are factors, which make it difficult to
streamline the process. We need to import most of our defence equipment, as India does
not yet possess all the advanced technologies required for modern military hardware.
The Navy has achieved the maximum indigenisation through its shipbuilding
programmes but still has to import major weapon systems and vessels, especially
submarines, from abroad or seek collaborations. Until recently, this was complicated by
US and western sanctions against India that restricted the transfer of numerous
technologies. Procurement as we know also has it disadvantage of disruption in arms
supplies, high cost, export restriction, and the effect it can produced in the event of a
political change.

Defence procurement is the area where maximum delay is caused by our tortuous
bureaucratic and financial procedures and lack of accountability and internal
transparency. It is also hamstrung by allegations of corruption and resultant political
paralysis. The case of the Bofors guns and the HDW (SSK) German submarines are well
known and the truth is still to be made public. But while the political charades go on, the
armed forces are deprived of capability build up and go into conflict without having the
weapons and wherewithal, no heads roll, and no one is arraigned for any gross
impropriety or crime. [30]

(The HDW SSK submarine project was to set India on the path of indigenous design
capability and enable their building in India with increasingly locally manufactured
equipment. Two submarines were built in Germany and two at Mazagon Docks in
Mumbai — the last some ten years ago — after which the project ground to a halt
because some persons were alleged to have taken bribes. The political attacks and
scandal that followed ensured that no government would bite that particular bullet.
Meanwhile, the HDW has changed hands several times, and at one time was owned by
an American bank as a speculative investment.)

Transparency and Confidentiality:

There is need for confidentiality, even secrecy, in defence procurement for reasons of
security, price negotiations and vendor competitiveness. But certainly there should be
internal transparency in the procurement process, in the formulations of proposals, their
processing, recommendations at various stages and financial and political decisions.
Some of this will automatically come about if an integrated defence organisation is
created since much of the procedural opacity is in fact located in the Department of
Defence and the Ministry of Finance where the political inputs are injected.

Political interventions in the national interest can be entirely legitimate if they are in
consideration of vital economic, security or diplomatic issues. They are wholly improper if
they are to further political party or personal interests, as has too often been the case.

12
Transparency is a goal earnestly to be wished for but it is futile to talk of overall
transparency unless there is honesty in the political system. This would appear to be a
bleak prospect if former Cabinet Secretary TSR Subramanian is right. He says: “In my
four decades of public service I have come across thousands of politicians... I have
worked closely with hundreds of them in one context or another. I am saddened to say
that I have come across only a handful of honest politicians.” He is unsparing too of his
own tribe, the civil servants and succinctly articulates the reasons for the collapse of the
“the steel frame”- the Indian Civil Services. [31]

The weapon development strategy initiated by the Defence and Development

organization (DRDO) requires 15-20 years to come to fruition. This strategy is not
allowed to materialise as it is frequently altered due to political instability.

The inability of the Defence and Development organization (DRDO) department to

deliver weapon system and equipment on schedule has seriously affected defence
planning and force structuring. Most of the state-of- the- art weapons and equipment
promised by the Defence and Development organization (DRDO) are yet to be delivered,
apart from astronomical cost of producing them.

Most of the department and committee set up to harmonise and co-ordinate defence
planning are staffed with civilians’ officers who don not have the professional knowledge
of the job. The department include the Directorate of General defence planning, Defence
research and development. [32]

India has too many obsolete equipment in its armoury that are not only outdated but
also can not be maintained in a cost effective manner. Examples are the Army’s Vijay
anta tanks, the MIG2Is for the India Air force. [33]

Defence planning and implementation in India is affected by lack of proper utilisation of

finance for planned period. Each year, defence planners rush to exhaust their budgetary
allocation since unspent monies must be returned to the government treasury. This is
supposedly a five year plan programme which should be rather comprehensive to cover
the period plan.

The perceived threats to her national sovereignty by the Naval in South Asia and India
Ocean are a major problem. These nations have serious security implication for India
security and the Indian Naval. And they include non-littoral forces of USA, Chinese and
activities in the Myanmar and Pakistan. The Chinese forces are building and Operating
communication facilities and financing building of warships for the Pakistan Navy. In fact
the Chinese make no secret of its intention to undermine India sovereignty at any time.

Also of concern is the Thai Navy with its acquisition of submarine capability in the Indian
littoral waters. Other Navy powers which pose threats to Indian defence include the
Malaysian, Pakistan, Australian, Iranian Iraqi and Singaporean Navy. [34]

13
TABLE 1

MAJOR INDIGENOUS NAVAL FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA AND THE INDIAN

OCEAN
Patrol
Country Carriers Destroyers Frigates Copters Aircraft Manpower
Subs
INDIA 2 16(2) 5(3) 14(3) 63 68 54000
PAKISTAN 0 6(3) 3 8(?) 13 15 22800
AUSTRALIA 0 3(6) 3 8(8) 29 129 13670
INDONESIA 0 2(2) 0 17 47 43 30000
IRAN 0(1) 2(1) 2 3 32 11 18000
THAILAND 0 0 0 12(3) 33 33 43000
SAUDI ARABIA 0 0 0 4(2) 42 0 12000
BANGLADESH 0 0 0 4(1) 0 0 8050
MALAYSIA 0 0 0 2(2) 12 4 12000
SOUTH AFRICA 0 3 0 0 10 20 5034
IRAQ 0 0 0 1 0 0 2000
SINGAPORE 0 0(1) 0 0 0 8 4000
Note: Figures in brackets denote warships planned.
Sources: http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/bulletin/96jan/si960101.html

Eight littoral states of the Indian Ocean namely Pakistan, Thai, Nepal, Bangladesh
Iranian, Malaysian, China and Sri-Lanka navies maintain and sustain the maritime
reconnaissance and strike capabilities armed with lethal anti-ship missiles. These
development has enhanced the said naval forces capabilities to conduct offensive
maritime air operation on a far greater scale and in-depth in the India Ocean.[35]

TABLE 2

TRENDS IN SUBMARINE FORCES

Figures are for Conventional Diesel Powered Submarines
COUNTRY 1995 *Planned/Projected **Total in 2002-03
INDIA 16 2 14
PAKISTAN 6 3 5
AUSTRALIA 3 6 6
SOUTH AFRICA 3 0 3
INDONESIA 2 3 5
IRAN 2 1 2(3)
SINGAPORE 0 4 to 6 4(6)

14
 THAILAND 0 3 3
MALAYSIA 0 2 to 4 2(4)
SAUDI ARABIA 0 2 to 4 2(4)
TOTAL 32 26 to 32 46(53)
* SSKs Planned (and Projected) by the Year 2002/3
** SSKs in 2002-03
Sources: http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/bulletin/96jan/si960101.html

The Indian Navy will therefore need to carry out a balance force structure, effect a major
change in Navy doctrine and tactics and a modernization programme to enhance its
capability in the blue water operations.

India as a member of the Non-aligned movement is faced with some global trends, which
are strategically inimical to her interest. These include economic sanctions, and
technology denial imposed by dominant world powers like the USA, European Union and
China. [36]

The hostile attitude of Indian neighbours particularly Pakistan Nepal Bangladesh,

Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and China is of serious concern to Indian National security. This
antagonistic attitude borders on land disputes national ideologies internal dynamics and
contradiction in the nations mentioned.[37]

Political crises in Afghanistan escalated by Pakistan dubious role is a threat to India

defence plan. These crises have the tendency of a spill over effect into India and this will
negatively affect the country’s energy and strategic interest in Central Asia.

India also has to content with vast disproportionate size of the India Army and this goes
for the operational role and the special equipment required. [38] The India army is
designed in a manner that, it has no common platform for shared logistics with other
forces except items as medical supplies and transport vehicle. Importantly too, there is
lack of integrated staff to function effectively, adopt co-operative attitude between
services, encouraged mutual goodwill, moderate the interests and willingness to achieve
common goals. Each service tends to exercise its own priorities and plans. The threat
perception of one service is at disagreement with that of another service.

Mistrust is the greatest challenge with operational and administrative functions therefore,
the Department of Defence, Ministry of Defence and the chiefs of staff committee need
to be harmonised into one effective organ for service delivery.

15
 FINDINGS
This seminar work established the challenges confronting Defence planners in Nigeria
and India as follows:

A. Defence planning is concerned with the protection of the totality of the nation’s
socio-political, economic and cultural interest.

B. Challenges of Defence planners in the both nations (Nigeria &India) were

established.

C. Each Nations tends to initiate certain programmes and policies in order to cushion
these challenges by introducing self dependence in the areas of weapons
production in order to counter trade restriction from arms suppliers.

D. There is a link between Nigeria and India Defence planning and developmental
planning.

E. The threat perception of both countries influenced their type of Defence policies
initiated.

F. Both countries are bedevilled with the challenges of Hostile neighbours as a

result of conflict of interest.

G. The moral and the welfare of the personnel of the armed forces must be boosted
with incentive, adequate training and equipment in order to have a well formidable
and balanced defence plan.

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 CONCLUSION
Defence planning is one of the most complex and challenging function for the
government of any country. In Nigeria and India (Non-industrialised and industrialised
nations respectively.), defence planning is guided by certain factors. These factors
include threat perception of the nations’ leader, resources available technology attained,
domestic situation historical and cultural life of the citizens and national interest.

The main aims of any defence plan is to maintain a country’s sovereignty, ability to deter
external aggression and suppress internal insurrection, maintain effective armed forces
and protect the national strategic resources and interest.

It is however observed that defence planners in Nigeria and India are faced with
enormous challenges which include political instabilities, corruption by the nation’s
political elites foreign powers interference. Other includes hostilities from neighbouring
countries, heavy reliance on weapons importation and absence of well coordinated
armed forces.

Recommendations

17
To overcome these challenges faced by defence planners in India and in Nigeria, which
have been listed earlier, I hereby recommend the following:

1. Initiation of an integrated and well co-ordinated defence plan among the three armed
forces to avoid duplication and waste, better utilization of technical and manpower
resources, cost-effectiveness, procurement and logistic management.

2. External dependence for arms supplies or military technology should be discouraged

in deliberate, phased manner.

3. Evolving a long- term plan for defence policies. The budget for defence should be
non-lapsable for each plan period.

4. Cultural values of each country should be imbibed and the need to avoid foreign
cultural infiltration should be encouraged.

5. Promotion of fair access to economic opportunities should be encouraged in order to

eliminate sabotage.

6. Equitable distribution of the commonwealth among the constituent member states to

achieve economic and social harmony.

7. Provision of basic needs to minimize socio-economic and political tension.

8. Both nations (Nigeria & India) must divest external stronghold in their strategic
defence industries.

9. Defence procurement is beset with delays, high costs and dubious transactions rooted
in the political process. These result in lost opportunities and lowered operational
capabilities. Transparency in the process of defence procurement should be adopted.
Nevertheless, apart from required confidentiality, internal transparency at staff and
decision-making levels is both recommended.

.
REFERENCES:

18
1. V. S. Shekhawat, Strategic Analysis: Challenges in Defence Planning ( New
Delhi: IDSA INDIA, 2006)
2. http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ChallengesinDefencePlanning_vsshekhawat_
1006
3. ibid
4. ibid
5. Air Force Doctrine, unpublished work for Armed Force Command and Staff
College Jaji, Nigeria, P.1
6. T. A. Imobighe, Nigeria’s Defence and Security linkages. A frame work of
analyses. (Ibadan: Heinemann, 2003) P. 66
7. Ibid p.50
8. The kuru special panel, national Defence policy for Nigeria, kuru NIPPS,
1988 P.18-21
9. T. A. Imobighe, op. cit p.66
10. The Kuru special panel, Op. cit pp.18-21
11. T.A. Imobighe, op. cit p.53
12. Ibid., p.70
13. Ibid. p.71
14. Ibid p.62
15. Ibid p.60
16. T. A. Imobighe, Nigeria Defence and security. Issues and Option for policy.
(Ibadan. Macmillan , 1987) p.1-5
17. http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ChallengesinDefencePlanning_vsshekhawat_
1006
18. Ibid
19. Ayaz Amir, Dawn, Pakistan, July 7, 2006.

20. http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ChallengesinDefencePlanning_vsshekhawat_
1006
21. Ibid
22. Ibid
23. Ibid
24. Ibid
http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/bulletin/96jan/si960101.html
General V.P. Mali, Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, Defence planning in India, p.2
25. Ibid. p.3
26. http://www.idsa.in/strategicanalysis/ChallengesinDefencePlanning_vsshekhawat_
1006
27. Ibid
28. Ibid
29. The Economic Times, New Delhi, June 26, 2006.
Former Prime Minister V P Singh claimed at the launch of his book Manzil Se
Zyada Safar, that the Congress Party had been collecting funds for elections
through defence deals from the days of Indira Gandhi. He added: “I believe every
party has to generate resources. Previously funds were procured from corporate
houses. But a time came when funds began to be collected through defence deals
abroad”.
30. TSR Subramanian, Journeys through Babudom and Netaland: Governance in
India, (New Delhi: Rupa & Co., 2004), p. 336, p235.
31. General V.P. Mali, Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal, Defence planning in India, p.2

19
32. Ibid. p.6
33. http://www.subcontinent.com/sapra/bulletin/96jan/si960101.html
34. Ibid
35. Ibid
36. V. S. Shekhawat, Strategic Analysis: Challenges in Defence Planning ( New
Delhi: IDSA INDIA, 2006) op. cit p.691
37. Ibid p.692
38. Ibid P.698

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