- Phil. Agila Satellite vs. Lichauco - Landbank vs. Jacinto - Omictin vs. CA - Pimentel vs. Pimentel - Magestrado vs. People - Quimiging vs. ICAO - Coca Cola vs. SSC - Continental Steel vs. Montao - Yap vs. Cabales
BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE GR. No. 137567
FACTS: Meynardo Beltran (petitioner) and his wife Charmaine Felix were married on June 16, 1973. After four years of marriage, Meynardo filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine alleged that Meynardo was the one who abandoned their home and cohabited with another woman. She then filed a criminal suit for concubinage against Meynardo.
Petitioner Meynardo filed a motion to deter the proceedings on the ground that the pending civil case for the declaration of the nullity of marriage raises a prejudicial question. He further argued that he should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void.
ISSUE: WON the pendency of the petition for the declaration for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the case of concubinage.
HELD: No, it is not a prejudicial question. The elements of prejudicial question are as follows: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The pendency of the declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question to the case of concubinage because for the civil case to be considered prejudicial to the criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based and the resolution is determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused.
In his contention that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void is not a defense. If a man cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The court, therefore, has not erred in ruling that the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in the criminal case of concubinage. PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE, INC. vs. LICHAUCO
FACTS: On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a group of private telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). The private telecom carriers formed a corporation and adopted a corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI).
By letter dated June 28, 1996, the president of PASI, Rodrigo Silverio, requested the Secretary of the DOTC, Amado Lagdameo, for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites.
By letter dated July 3, 1996, Lagdameo confirmed the assignment of the orbital slots to PASI, who thereafter undertook preparations for the launching and operations of its satellites.
On December 3, 1996, PASI president and CEO Michael de Guzman, informed Jesli Lapuz, president and CEO of Landbank of the Philippines, of the governments assignment to PASI of the orbital slots. He requested the banks confirmation of its participation in a club loan amounting to $11 million, the proceeds of which would be applied to PASIs interim satellite.
Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzmans letter to the DOTC Undersecretary, Josefina Lichauco, who wrote to Lapuz stating that: 1. There is no basis for De Guzman to allege that the DOTC assigned two (2) slots to PASI. Slot 153E was to be used for the migration of the Russian satellite in time for the APEC Leaders Summit, thus it could no longer be assigned to PASI. 2. PASI is interested in pursuing their interim satellite project and are applying for a loan with Landbank. The DOTC supports this venture but they will be getting only one orbital slot for both the Interim Satellite Project and for the Launch Project. 3. As regards the use of the name Agila, Mr. de Guzmans allegation that PASI has registered Agila as a corporate alias/trademark, is FALSE. There is no such thing as registration of a corporate alias.
However, on December 1997, Lichauco subsequently issued a Notice of Offer for several orbital slots including 153E. Another company, whose identity had not been disclosed, had submitted a bid and won the award for slot 153E.
PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge, filed on January 23, 1998 before the RTC a complaint against Lichauco and the unknown awardee for injunction to enjoin the award of 153E, declare its nullity, and for damages.
On February 23, 1998, PASI also filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Lichauco, for gross violation of Sec.3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which states:
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman, by evaluation report dated April 15, 1998, found the existence of a prejudicial question, saying that the civil case filed in the Ombudsman is premature since the issues involved herein are now subject of litigation in the case filed with the RTC.
ISSUES: 1. WON there exists a prejudicial question in the civil case filed with the Ombudsman, in relation to the criminal case filed with the RTC. 2. If so, WON the dismissal of the complaint in the Ombudsman is correct.
HELD: 1. Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed bidder of the orbital slot 153E is declared valid for being within Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. Thus, whether or not the criminal case can proceed is dependent upon the judgment of the civil case. This constitutes a prejudicial question.
2. No, according to Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or the investigating officer.
A complaint at the evaluation stage may be dismissed outright only for lack of palpable merit, which means that there is no basis for the charges. However, if the complaint has prima facie merit, the investigating officer shall recommend the adoption of any of the actions enumerated in Rule II, Section 2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE
FACTS: A criminal case of perjury was filed against petitioner, Francisco Magestrado by private respondent, Elena M. Librojo. Respondent alleged that petitioner falsely claimed that he lost his Owner's Duplicate for the Title of a property and had subscribed and swore to a duly notarized Affidavit of Loss. Said title has been surrendered to private respondent as security for a loan availed by petitioner from her.
Civil cases to recover a sum of money and for cancellation of mortgage and delivery of title, and damages were also filed, so petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case against him on the ground that the civil cases pose a prejudicial question, hence they must first be resolved.
The trial court denied the motion for the reason that the outcome of the civil cases would not determine, petitioner's guilt or innocence in the perjury case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, and then an appeal, but both the RTC and the CA found no merit in his petition.
ISSUE: WON the civil cases to recover a sum of money and for cancellation of mortgage and delivery of title, and damages were also filed, so petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case against him on the ground that the civil cases pose a prejudicial question to the criminal case of perjury
HELD: NO. The Civil cases are principally for the determination of whether a loan was obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a real estate mortgage involving the property covered by the title claimed to have been lost by petitioner. On the other hand, the criminal case involves the determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the same title. It is evident that whatever the resolution of the civil cases will be, shall have no bearing and won't determine the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in committing perjury. This goes to show that the civil cases and the criminal cases may proceed independently of each other. There is no prejudicial question to be settled first.
Petition was dismissed.
COCA COLA BOTTLERS vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION Prejudicial Question
FACTS: Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Is a corporation engaged in manufacture and sale of softdrink beverages. Co-petitioner Eric Montinola was the general manager of its plant in Bacolod City. Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a former retainer physician at the companys plant in Bacolod City.
In 1988, the petitioner company entered into a Retainer Agreement with Dr. Climaco with a compensation and he can also charge separately professional fees for professional services. The contract includes that either party may terminate the contract upon giving 30 day notice written notice to either party. Explicit in the contract is the provision that there is no employer-employee relationship.
Meantime, on 1994, Dr. Climaco inquired with Department of Labor and Employment and the SSS whether he was an employee of the company or not. Both agencies replied affirmative. As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint before the NLRC, he sought recognition as a regular employee demanding 13 th month pay, COLA, Holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and other benefits.
During the pendency of the complaint, the petitioner company terminated the retainer agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another complaint for on the ground of Illegal Dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner company. The first complaint was dismissed as the company did not have the power of control over Dr. Climacos performance of his duties and responsibilities. Second complaint was likewise dismissed in view of the dismissal of the first complaint.
Meantime, while the NLRC cases were pending, Dr. Climaco filed with the SSC a petition praying, among others, that the petitioner Coca-cola bottlers be ordered to report him for compulsory social security coverage. Petitioner moved for dismissal.
The Court notes that petitioners, in their petition, averred that the appeal from the NLRC and CA dispositions on the illegal dismissal of respondent Climaco is still pending with this Court. Upon verification, however, it was unveiled that the said case had already been decided by this Courts First Division on February 5, 2007.
ISSUE: WON the action for regularization and/or illegal dismissal poses a prejudicial question in the case at bench.
HELD: No prejudicial question exist.
There is prejudicial question when; (a) The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the case at bar there is no pending criminal case. Therefor there is no prejudicial question to talk about. The consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as previously instituted civil action. In Berbari v. Concepcion, [40] it was held that a prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal action, that which requires a decision with which said question is closely related.
In addition, the issue in the case filed by Dr.Climaco with the SSC involves a question regarding his employment subject to coverage in SSS. On the contrary, case filed in the NLRC involves different issue, which is the recognition as a regular employee of the company. Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are not determinative of whether or not the SSC should proceed. It is settled that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case before the court.
YAP vs. CABALES GR. No. 159186
FACTS: Jesse Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business through their company Primetown Property Group. In 1996, they purchased several real properties from Evelyn Te. In consideration of the said purchases, Jesse issued several BPI postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovit Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored because the account was closed. Demands were made by spouses Mirabueno and spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good of the checks. Despite this, Yap failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.
Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and attorney's fees with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against Yap before the trial court. Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar action.
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed several information for violation of BP 22 against Yap. In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to suspend proceedings an account of the existence of a prejudicial question and motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings. Yap prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases pending before RTC were finally resolved.
ISSUE: WON there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
HELD: No prejudicial question exists. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed and the resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. This is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has 2 essential elements: a. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The issue in the criminal cases is whether Yap is guilty of violating BP 22, while in the civil cases, it is whether the spouses Mirabueno and spouses Dimalanta are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. The resolution of the said issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case against him, and there is no necessity that the civil cases should be resolved first resulting to the suspension if the criminal cases.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if the petitioner is declared nit liable for the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of BP 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an offense.
It is clear that the determination of the issues involved in the criminal action for collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of Yap in the criminal cases for violation of BP 22. In addition, Yap's claim of lack of consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases against him. The validity and merits of a party's defense and accusation, as well as the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court are better ventilated during the trial proper.
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. JANIOLA
FACTS: On February 2, 2005, petitioner, through its President and VP, filed before the MTC, a criminal information against Cleofe Janiola for violation of BP 22.
On September 20, 2006, Janiola and her husband filed before the RTC, a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal case before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
On July 25, 2007, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings of the criminal case, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related, and thereby claiming that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case.
The MTC granted the motion to suspend proceedings, reasoning that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that there must be a previously instituted civil action which raises issues against a subsequent criminal action. In this case, the criminal case preceded the civil case.
ISSUE: WON the MTC erred when it ruled to suspend proceedings in the criminal case on the basis of prejudicial question.
HELD: Yes, the MTC erred in its ruling since there is no prejudicial question.
1. The court ruled that the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action, for a prejudicial question to exist.
The circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought, and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
The civil case was filed 2 years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than 2 years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than 3 years from the execution of the construction agreement.
2. The court also ruled that the resolution of the civil case is not determinative of the prosecution of the criminal case.
Even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is still no prejudicial question.
The mere fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the check/s, or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration, does not make up the elements of the crime. The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonoured checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for the violation of BP 22.
The law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. Thus, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void, this would not affect the prosecution of the respondent in the criminal case.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON JACINTO
FACTS: The First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from Land Bank in the amount of P400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement dated August 22, 1997. As security for the loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC, issued in favor of Land Bank 9 postdated checks amounting to P465 million and drawn against FWCCs account at the Philippine National Bank. Later, before the checks matured, petitioner and respondent executed several letter agreements which culminated in the execution of a Restructuring Agreement on June 3, 1998. When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan obligation under the terms of their restructured agreement, petitioner presented for payment to the drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured. However, all the checks were dishonored or refused payment for the reason of insufficient funds. Respondent also failed to make good the checks despite demands.
On January 13, 1999, Land Bank filed before the Makati City Prosecutors Office a Complaint-Affidavit against respondent for violation of B.P. 22. Respondent filed his Counter-Affidavit denying the charges and averring that the complaint is baseless and utterly devoid of merit as the said loan obligation has been extinguished by payment and novation by virtue of the execution of the Restructuring Agreement. Respondent also invoked the proscription in the May 28, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 133 in Special Proceedings No. M-4686 for Involuntary Insolvency which forbade FWCC from paying any of its debts.
The complaint against respondent was dismissed finding that the letter- agreements between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original loan agreement. It was held that there being novation, the checks issued pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their efficacy and validity and cannot be a valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of B.P. 22. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the DOJ for review. The DOJ issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, the DOJ reversed its ruling and issued a Resolution holding that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. Thus, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Makati City is directed to file the appropriate information for violation of BP 22against respondent. Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA reversed the Resolution of the DOJ and reinstated the Resolution dismissing the complaint. While the CA ruled that novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability, it nevertheless held that novation may prevent criminal liability from arising in certain cases if novation occurs before the criminal information is filed in court because the novation causes doubt as to the true nature of the obligation. Also, the CA found merit in respondents assertion that a prejudicial question exists in the instant case because the issue of whether the original obligation of FWCC subject of the dishonored checks has been novated by the subsequent agreements entered into by FWCC with Land Bank, is already the subject of the appeal in Civil Case No. 98-for Declaration of Novation pending before the CA. The CA also gave consideration to respondents assertion that the Order of the RTC proscribing FWCC from paying its debts constitutes as a justifying circumstance which prevents criminal liability from attaching. Petitioners motion for reconsideration from the said decision having been denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the CA erred in reversing the Resolution of the DOJ. 2. WON the CA erred when it ruled that the element of a prejudicial question exists in the case. 3. WON the CA erred when it ruled that the order dated May 1998 of the RTC constitutes as a justifying circumstance that prevents criminal liability from attaching.
RULING: YES, the CA erred in reversing the resolution of the DOJ and a prejudicial question does not exist in this case.
Petitioner asserts that the restructuring Agreement did not release FWCC from its obligation with Land Bank. Whether there was novation or not is also not determinative of respondents responsibility for violation of B.P. 22, as the said special law punishes the act of issuing a worthless check and not the purpose for which the check was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. Respondent counters that there was novation which occurred prior to the institution of the criminal complaint against him and that if proven, it would affect his criminal liability. The payment of the obligation supposedly already depended on the terms and conditions of the Restructuring Agreement and no longer on the respective maturity dates of the subject checks as the value or consideration of the subject checks had been rendered inexistent by the subsequent execution of the Restructuring Agreement. He maintains that the subject checks can no longer be the basis of criminal liability since the obligation for which they were issued had already been novated or abrogated.
A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. In the instant case, the court find that the question whether there was novation of the Credit Line Agreement or not is not determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that respondent is released from his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-agreements between FWCC and Land Bank expressly provide that respondents JSS (Joint and Several Signatures) continue to secure the loan obligation and the postdated checks issued continue to guaranty the obligation. If indeed respondents liability on the checks had been extinguished upon the execution of the Restructuring Agreement, then respondent should have demanded the return of the checks. However, there was no proof that he had been released from his obligation.
On the contrary, the Restructuring Agreement contains a proviso which states that This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all previous security, mortgage, and other collateral agreements, promissory notes, solidary undertaking previously executed by and between the parties and shall continue in full force and effect modified only by the provisions of this Agreement.
Thus, the Court has held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. Even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and petitioner, respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
Lastly, the said order of May 1998 of the RTC Makati does not constitute a justifying circumstance. As stated at the outset, the said order forbids FWCC from paying its debts as well as from delivering any property belonging to it to any person for its benefit. Respondent cannot invoke this Order which was directed only upon FWCC and is not applicable to him. Therefore, respondent, as surety of the loan is not exempt from complying with his obligation for the issuance of the checks.
PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL
FACTS: On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, private respondent, filed an action for frustrated parricide against her husband Joselito R. Pimentel, the petitioner, and sometime in February, 2005, she filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
A few days after receiving the summons for the pre-trial of the civil case, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the criminal case proceedings contending that the outcome of the civil case would affect the criminal case, since, if he would be declared as not married to Maria, then his criminal case would no longer be frustrated parricide.
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that there is no prejudicial question in the civil case that would warrant the suspension of the proceeding of the parricide case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. He filed an appeal in the CA, but his petition was not granted.
ISSUE: WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the proceedings for the parricide case
HELD: NO. Annulment of Marriage is not a prejudicial question in the criminal case for parricide because:
a. the outcome of the annulment case would not determine whether or not petitioner is guilty of frustrated parricide. Even if the marriage would later be dissolved, the fact remains that the crime was committed during the subsistence of the marriage, and the nullity of the marriage would not affect the resolution of the criminal case.
b. the procedural rule on prejudicial question is that the civil case must first be instituted before the filing of the civil case, not the other way around. In the case at bar, the criminal case was filed on October, 1994, while the civil case was filed in 1995.
QUIMIGING vs. ICAO Personality
FACTS: The appellant, Quimiging, sue Icao for support and damages. The parties are neighbor in Dapitan. It was alleged that the appellee, Icao, engaged into carnal intercourse with the appellant by the use of force and intimidation and without her consent, as a result, the appellant become pregnant.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE: WON the appellant be entitled for support and damages even though the baby is not yet born.
HELD: YES, the appellant is entitled for support.
Applying Article 40 of the new civil code that a conceived child, although unborn is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. Therefore, the unborn child has the right for support from its progenitors, in this case, the appellee.
Second reason of reversal of decision is grounded on Article 20 of the same code that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.
CONTINENTAL STEEL vs. HON. ALLAN S. MONTAO G.R. No. 182836; October 13, 2009
FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. The claim was for Hortillanos unborn child who died. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was on her 38 th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor. The company granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the provision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None which existed in Hortillanos case. They further contend that the only one with civil personality could die, based on Art 40- 42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiters decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality, as defined in Art. 41-42, NCC, can die.
HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.