[G.R. No. L-8639. March 23, 1956.

]
In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto Vasquez, Maria
Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik. LEOPOLDO PRASNIK, Petitioner-Appellee, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

Facts:
Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition seeking to adopt Pablo Vasquez,
Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children of
Paz Vasquez. He claims that they are also his children but without the benefit of marriage and he
desires to adopt them to promote their best interest and well-being. Petitioner acknowledged that
they are his natural children during the hearing.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the plea that he could not legally adopt them for
the reason provided by the Civil Code which states:
Article 338. The following may be adopted:
1) The natural child, by the natural father or mother.
XXX
refers only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child.
CFI - upheld the opposition but, upon MR, it granted the petition. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON Art 338 of the CC only refers to UNACKNOWLEDGED natural children?

HELD: NO.
The law evidently intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If the
intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, as contended, then the provision
of Article 338 would be of no useful purpose because such children could have been validly
adopted even without it. And we say so because a natural child not recognized has no right
whatever 1 and being considered legally a total stranger to his parents, he may be adopted under
Article 337.
It should be borne in mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than
those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the great advantage of the latter if he be given, even
through legal fiction, a legitimate status. And this view is in keeping with the modern trend of
adoption statutes which have been adopted precisely to encourage adoption Under this modern
trend, adoption is deemed not merely an act to establish the relation of paternity and filiation but
one which may give the child a legitimate status. It is in this sense that adoption is now defined
as a juridical act which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation


G.R. No. L-12088 December 23, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was convicted of the crime of illegal possession of fire-
arms under Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code in the CFI of Lanao.
Accused admitted the ownership of the firearm and ammunitions in question but his legal excuse
is the appointment issued to him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953,
which reads as follows:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu
Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET
AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is
hereby authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun,
12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful
execution of his hazardous mission.
Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all
activities and whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal
District of Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein existing.
ISSUE: WON accused, as secret agent, is exempted to hold and carry a gun under the Revised
administrative code?
HELD: YES. Accused is acquitted.
It may be true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit but
section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by the subject matter
therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of
license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879.




G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion
of firearms under Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code. Accused claims he is excused
from said law being a special agent of CIS.
ISSUE: WON the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently
authorizes him to carry and possess firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit
corresponding thereto?
HELD: NO.
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case
of People vs. Macarandang (December 23, 1959) wherein the SC held that the appointment of
a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection
of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879."
The case of People vs. Mapa revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30,
1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as
secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted.









G.R. No. 2122 September 13, 1905
PEDRO T. ACOSTA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DAVID FLOR, defendant-appellee.
Facts: Plaintiff and the defendant were candidates for the office of municipal president of Laoag, Province
of Ilocos Norte.
According to the plaintiff, he won by a majority of 100 votes but notwithstanding this fact, defendant has
usurped said office and unlawfully held. Hence, plaintiff filed a case against defendant to exclude him
from the exercise of such office and that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled to the same and that he be
given possession thereof.
During trial, not a single witness of the pplaintiff confirmed the allegations contained in the complaint, to
the effect that the plaintiff had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election, nor can it be inferred
from the evidence introduced by the plaintiff that he, as a result of the said election, or for any other
reason, was entitled to the office of municipal president of Laoag.
ISSUE: WON plaintiff can maintain the action?
HELD: NO. The right to maintain such an action is especially and expressly governed by the provisions
of sections 197 to 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the fiscal of any province, when
directed by the Chief Executive of the Islands, must commence any such action; and when upon the
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the two preceding sections
can be established by proof, he must commence such action."
Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the fiscal for a province, may, at his
own instance, bring such an action, or he may, on leave of the court in which the action is to be
commenced, or a judge thereof in vacation, bring the action upon the relation of and at the request of
another person; but, if the action is brought at the request of and upon the relation of another person, the
officer bringing it may require an indemnity for expenses and costs of the action, to be given to him by
the party at whose request and upon whose relation the same is brought, before commencing it."
Finally, section 201, under the heading "An individual may commence such action," provides as follows:
"A person claiming to be entitled to a public office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may
bring an action therefor."
If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to maintain an action for usurpation of
public office, he would have plainly said so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching
importance. A simple provision would have sufficed for this purpose. Far from it, the legislator has on the
contrary especially and specifically provided in sections 199, 200, and 201 who must and who may bring
such actions; and it is very clear that it was his intention to give such right to those expressly mentioned
in the above-cited sections and to no other, following the well-known rule of law "inclusio unius est
exclusio alterius." It has been noticed that the above referred to three sections only mention the Attorney-
General, the provincial fiscal, and the individual claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully held and
exercised by another. It is to be inferred from this last provision that the individual who does not claim to
have such a right cannot bring an action for usurpation of public office.
G.R. No. L-32717 November 26, 1970
AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention filed a special
civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on
Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes. According to him, it is
"violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of speech."

The prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act,

which made
it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin."

COMELEC contended that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped
voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to
confiscation. For COMELEC, the last three words (and the like) sufficed to justify such an
order.
ISSUE: WON taped jingles are included in the said prohibition?
HELD: NO.
Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any
enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically
referred to.

It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of
gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution.










[G. R. No. 5000. March 11, 1909.]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO NIO, Defendant-
Appellee.

Facts: Victor Santo Nino was caught with 1 iron bar, about 15 inches in length provided with an
iron ball on one end and a string on the other to tie to the wrist and was charged with violation of
Act No. 1780.

Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides: It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed
about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That this
prohibition shall not apply to firearms in possession of persons who have secured a license
therefor or who are entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act.

RTC dismissed the case stating that
The words or other deadly weapon only signify a kind of weapon included within the
preceding classification. In other words, the rule of ejusdem generis must be applied in
the interpretation of this law, which rule is as follows:
The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific and generic
terms of the same nature are employed in the same act, the latter following the
former. While in the abstract, general terms are to be given their natural and full
signification, yet where they follow specific words of a like nature they take their
meaning from the latter, and are presumed to embrace only things or persons of
the kind designated by them.

ISSUE: WON RTC correctly applies the rule of ejusdem generis?

HELD: NO. Case is remanded for further proceedings.
The rule of construction above referred to is resorted to only for the purpose of
determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly
appears from other parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary to the
result which would reached by application of the rule of ejusdem generis, the latter must give
way. In this case the proviso of the Act clearly indicates that in the view of the legislature the
carrying of an unlicensed revolver would be a violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested
its intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than the armas blancas therein specified.




***Mejo mahaba lang kasi ayokong burahin ung mga law, baka ipabasa nanaman nya
satin May history pa kasi to eh
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. GUILLERMO
MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Facts: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. He moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, he is NOT
one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of
the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and
no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant claims that section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the
peace," and such omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the
peace from its operation.
ISSUE: WON a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code?
HELD: YES.
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible
during the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial or
Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or employee
of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any candidate or
influence in any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or Assembly election
under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public
office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide, however, That the foregoing provisions
shall not be construe to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any
election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or
employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or
Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deprived
of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office or
employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing
provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right to
vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March
10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis
supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. Any judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any
officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any candidate
or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any election
otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor
more than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation
of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved December 3, 1927.) (Emphasis
supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This law
provided in Section 48 (Omitted na ung justice of the peace):
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. No justice, judge,
fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the
Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified civil
service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in
any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public
peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was taken.
However, that in the two instances when the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com.
Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration
did not carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the word
"judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance", the words "justice of the peace"
would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the words "justice of the peace" were
omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the conclusion
that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not
intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said
officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records
which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which
legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the peace."
Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications from
these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the historical background
of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-
appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held
to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices
of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the
operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. But the rule has no applicability to the
case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has
been clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been shown that the
legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers
precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by
another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace
were just called "judges."
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a
case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person,
object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for
reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution
of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
It is to be noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy and
purposes of the statute. The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this
particular instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the
statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the
Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute,
are now within its encompass.
The rule of "expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" that RTC and CA used in arriving at the
conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54 has no application. Said the
Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known as expressio
unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer that there was an intention of
omitting the term "justice of the peace from Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54,
neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed,
there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion
alterius has been erroneously applied.
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or
things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated
should not have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the
maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be invoked.














G.R. No. L-68709 July 19, 1985
NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE JOSE A. ROO Minister, Ministry of Local Government; THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF OZAMIZ CITY; THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN
A. FUENTES, Vice Mayor of Ozamiz City and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Ozamiz City; THE HONORABLE ANTONIO G. CABALLERO, JESUS S.
ANONAT, MANUEL T. CORTES, IRENE S. LUANSING, REMEDIOS J. RAMIRO,
DOMINADOR B. BORJE, FILOMENO L. ROMERO, FLORENCIO L. GARCIA, and
HARRY S. OAMINAL Members, Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner (Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz, Ozamiz City) was elected President
of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by the Board of Directors of the
said Association. As the President of the Association, petitioner was appointed by the President
of the Philippines as a member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
On March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan
Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was
not successful in the said election.
Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, petitioner informed respondent
Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was
resuming his duties as member of that body. The matter was elevated to respondent Minister of
Local Government Jose A. Rono who ruled that since petitioner is an appointive official, he is
deemed to have resigned from his appointive position upon the filing of his Certificate of
Candidacy.
ISSUE: WON an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, who ran for the position
of Mambabatas Pambansa in the elections of May 14, 1984, should be considered as resigned
upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy?
HELD: YES.
Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg, 697, which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.
(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated
National Police, as well as officials and employees of government-owned and
government-controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease
in office or position as of the time he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
however, that the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Members of the
Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers shall continue in the offices they presently hold
notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay
officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy be considered on forced leave
of absence from office. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that since Section 13(2) of Batasan Pambansa Blg. 697 makes no distinction
between elective and appointive officials, the legislative intent is clear that even appointive
Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision. (so dapat forced leave lang
daw)
Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, admits of more than one construction,
taking into consideration the nature of the positions of the officials enumerated therein, namely,
governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative
intent to distinguish between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive
positions in section 13(l) under the all-encompassing clause reading "any person holding public
appointive office or position," is clear. It is a rule of statutory construction that "when the
language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that
construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by
the enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed."
A statute's clauses and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its
parts.
Although petitioner, by filing his certificate of candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa ceased, ipso
facto, to be an appointive member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an elective
Barangay Captain from which position he may be considered as having been on "forced leave of
absence." He also continues as President of the Association of Barangay Councils but will need a
reappointment by the President, as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as
the law speaks of "members who may be appointed by the President."
*** end of it but in case tanungin kasi.
The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection (1), and officials
mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to refer to local elective officials, can be
gleaned from the proceedings of the Batasan Pambansa recorded as follows:
Mr. Valdez: ... May I go to paragraph 2 of Sec. 16, Mr. Speaker which says:
Any local elective officials, including an elected barangay official shall ipso facto cease
in his office or position as at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, unless
otherwise provided by law. (later amended and is now Subsection 2 of sec. 13)
Now, do the words 'local elective official' refer to the office or to an incumbent who has
been elected, not appointed?
Mr. Albano. Paragraph 2 covers elective official; paragraph I covers appointive officials.
So, if he is an appointive local official he would fall under paragraph (1) because it says:
'Any person holding appointive office or position.' It does not distinguish if it is
appointive or elective position.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, Mr. Speaker, do I get the distinguished sponsor correctly that
an appointed mayor but holding an elective position is not within the comprehension of
this section or this paragraph?
Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker, that would refer to paragraph 2. What maybe the
Gentleman's contemplation is: Suppose a person is appointed to the position of a mayor,
will he be covered under paragraph 1 and should be cease to hold office upon filing his
Certificate of Candidacy?
Mr. Valdez. Yes.
Mr. Albano. I would say, yes, he would fall under paragraph 1. But if he is an elective
local official he would fall under paragraph 2.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, this is a description of the mode and manner by which the
occupant is brought to the office.
Mr. Albano. Yes.
sMr. Valdez. ... not the description of the office itself.
Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Valdez. I see. Now we come to the other portion which refers to elected
barangay official. Why is it that the provision isolates the nature of the official of the
barangay who had been elected, not appointed, is he supposed to be within the
purview of paragraph 2?
Mr. Albano. No. Mr. Speaker, I will call the Gentleman's attention to paragraph 1:
Any person holding a public appointive office or position ... I presume and I assume
that the office in the barangay council is still contemplated in the words 'appointive
office.'
Mr. Valdez. Under paragraph l?
Mr. Albano. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
3
(Emphasis supplied)