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Journal of Peace Research
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343309350005
2010 47: 71 Journal of Peace Research
Ekaterina Balabanova
Media power during humanitarian interventions: Is Eastern Europe any different from the West?

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Research article
Media power during humanitarian
interventions: Is Eastern Europe any
different from the West?
Ekaterina Balabanova
School of Politics & Communication Studies, University of Liverpool
Abstract
The role of the media in foreign policymaking has been the subject of significant academic enquiry, particularly in response to
the so-called CNN effect, but this work has mostly focused on prominent Western nations (particularly the United States).
This article enlarges the debate by adding a comparative and post-communist perspective. Taking the Kosovo conflict as a case
study, it analyses the role of the media in foreign policy in Bulgaria and Britain. Through the application of Robinsons policy
media interaction model, the article argues that the Bulgarian press did not have any substantial impact on the governments
position on the Kosovo conflict because it framed its reports in a neutral way. The British press/foreign policy relationship dis-
closes a clear case of media support for governmental policy. The findings raise questions about the validity of certain claims
about the mediapolicy relationship in former socialist countries. The article identifies limitations to models based on Western
media systems and suggests that their construction is often based on certain cultural assumptions and hence very much context
bound.
Keywords
CNN effect, Kosovo conflict, mediaforeign policy relationship, mediapolicy models, post-communist media
Introduction
In the context of an increased willingness on the part of
Western governments to get involved in other peoples wars
by intervening militarily for humanitarian reasons, claims for
the existence of a so called CNN effect
1
foreign policy
influenced by media coverage abound. The majority of these
claims are based on experiences, research and observations over
the Western primarily US news media. One of the tools
used to analyse the relationship between media and foreign
policy has been the policymedia interaction model developed
by Piers Robinson (2002). This model predicts that media
influence is likely to occur when policy is uncertain and media
coverage is critically framed and empathizes with suffering
people. When policy is certain, media influence is unlikely
to occur. Research on Eastern European media along similar
lines is yet to be carried out and so conclusions are still to
be reached about their power during humanitarian
interventions.
Within the broader context of the relationship between
media and politics, this article addresses the gap and brings the
debate to bear upon the mediaforeign policy relationship in a
post-communist state and in a West European one. Thus, it
offers a comparative perspective by looking at the media
foreign policy interaction in two European countries which
differ geopolitically, economically and culturally Bulgaria
and Britain. It utilizes the Kosovo crisis as a case study and asks
what could have been the possible effects of the print media
coverage of the conflict on policymaking? In particular, the
article considers the role played by the national press in both
countries during the period directly preceding NATOs mili-
tary involvement from 24 February to 25 March 1999. This
is the period that was marked by final attempts to reach a dip-
lomatic solution to the conflict, together with preparation for
NATO military involvement. Particularly for Bulgaria, atten-
tion was also (if not mainly) on the countrys participation in
the conflict and actual risks for Bulgaria. The period was
1
The first use of the term CNN effect was associated with the channel itself
and originated during the 1991 Gulf War (Gilboa, 2005b: 3). Since then, the
phrase has become a generic term for the ability of news media to provoke
major responses from domestic audiences and political elites, and the
debates have focused not only on the role and impact of CNN but on the
impact of news media in general, including both press and television (see
Robinson, 2002; Herman, 1993; Jakobsen, 2000).
Corresponding author:
Ekaterina Balabanova, School of Politics and Communication Studies, Roxby
Building, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK. Email:
e.balabanova@liverpool.ac.uk
Journal of Peace Research
47(1) 7182
The Author(s) 2010
Reprints and permission: http://www.
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343309350005
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selected as a reflection of the significance of the main issues at
play throughout. The intention of the analysis is to measure
possible media influence on policymaking with regard to the
decisions taken in response to the humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo and to put forward arguments with regard to the
nature of the mediaforeign policy relationship in Britain and
Bulgaria individually and in a comparative way.
The article begins by briefly looking at the main findings of
the research conducted so far into media effects on policymak-
ing in response to humanitarian crises. As part of this discus-
sion, the methodology of the current analysis is outlined. The
article proceeds with an overview of the British and Bulgarian
print media, highlighting their characteristic features, before
applying the policymedia interaction model with regard to
the Kosovo crisis.
2
In the British case, it is discovered that a
predominantly empathy-framed coverage of the suffering peo-
ple in Kosovo and a clearly supportive coverage of the official
UK policy was accompanied by policy certainty on the part of
the British government, suggesting that it is highly unlikely
that the media were in a position to put any pressure on the
policymaking community. In the Bulgarian case, media
framed their reports in a neutral way when the questions dis-
cussed related to the governmental position on the Kosovo cri-
sis and the NATO air strikes, while the reports referring to
refugees and the devastation of war were empathy-framed.
In parallel, the Bulgarian government had a clear policy line
on the Kosovo conflict and demonstrated policy certainty in
all its decisions with regard to the conflict. By the mere fact
that the media framed reports in a neutral way, they restricted
their opportunity to get involved in the foreign policymaking
process. Furthermore, the common social, cultural and reli-
gious characteristics shared by Bulgaria and Serbia represent
an important variable in the mediapolicy relationship on the
conflict. In conclusion, the article considers the usefulness of
the mediapolicy interaction model to both case studies, high-
lighting its rather straightforward application to the British
context and the need for modification when used to under-
stand the Bulgarian mediaforeign policy relationship.
Media effects and humanitarian interventions
Research conducted so far examining the medias influence in
crisis foreign policymaking reveals the debates and the contra-
dictions that the CNN effect triggers. While for some it has
completely transformed foreign policymaking and world poli-
tics (Shaw, 1996), others remain sceptical, suggesting that the
CNN effect has not changed the mediagovernment interac-
tion in general or specifically in the context of humanitarian
interventions. From this viewpoint, if it occurs it is only rarely
and in situations of extremely dramatic and persistent cover-
age, lack of clear governmental policy and chaotic policymak-
ing (see Minear, Scott & Weiss, 1996; Gowing, 2000;
Jakobsen, 2000; Seib, 2002; Natsios, 1996; Strobel, 1997;
Gilboa, 2005b). The existence of these opposing views on the
role of media justifies Gilboas claim (2005a: 34) that [s]cho-
larly and professional studies of the CNN effect present mixed,
contradictory, and confusing results. These results are drawn
out from research focusing primarily on the Western media.
To be more precise, the reference in most of the cases is to the
US news media. Although to a certain degree this is justifiable
and understandable, considering the leading role the United
States has in international interventions, still the absence of
analyses of the European Western and Eastern media
policy relationship is surprising.
Overall, most research on the influence of the news media
in foreign policymaking in times of security conflicts finds less
substantial or direct effects than are generally believed. Other
important factors relate to the role of different actors in the
policy process and the nature of conflicts themselves. News
media may speed up decisionmaking or make a small matter
suddenly loom large (Gilboa, 2003). But only rarely can the
coverage itself substantially change the course of policy. As
Strobel (1997: 47) points out, news media reports do not
determine policy per se but rather shape the milieu (and a
rather stark one at that) in which governing takes place. If the
resulting policy is clear and strongly held, is communicated
well and has the necessary public backing, then the news
media tend to follow that policy. If these conditions are not
present, implying weakly held policy with insufficient public
and official support, inattentive or unsure policymakers, then
the news media may have some influence on policy.
Policymedia interaction model
These latter findings are incorporated in the policymedia
interaction model developed by Robinson (2000, 2002). This
uses two concepts: policy certainty, as a key factor in determin-
ing whether the news media impact on policy, and media
framing, as a key factor in determining the potential of media
coverage to elicit pressure for intervention. Thus, it allows the
analysis of both the media and political processes. It serves as
a measure of news media power and allows drawing conclu-
sions about the presence of media effects that can be located
within the general CNN effect concept strong CNN, weak
CNN, agenda-setting, accelerant, impediment, potential and
enabling effects. The model also allows identifying those
effects that are closely associated with the opposite to the
CNN effect the manufacturing consent thesis. The latter
holds that policymaking is the prerogative of an informed elite
with the media in a subordinate status. In its totalizing version
(e.g. Chomsky & Herman, 1988), the manufacturing consent
argument emphasizes that media operate on the basis of a set
of ideological premises, depend heavily and uncritically on
2
There is a large literature on the Kosovo conflict, including work that looks
at the media coverage of the crisis, although only Robinson (2002) has
previously applied the policymedia interaction model to the case. For
example, see Chandler (2005), Chomsky (1999), Freedman (2000),
Hammond (2007), Ignatieff (2001), Robinson (2000), Vickers (2000),
Livingston (2000), Willcox (2005).
72 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 47(1)
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elite information sources and participate in propaganda cam-
paigns helpful to elite interests. While the power of govern-
ments to set news media agendas is acknowledged, Hallin
(1986) and Bennett (1990) have put forward more nuanced
understandings that have received substantial empirical sup-
port.
3
According to Hallin (1986), three spheres of consen-
sus, legitimate controversy and deviance exist with regard to
any political issue. The news media take their cues from polit-
ical elites and rarely produce coverage within the deviant
sphere, but rather reflect either elite consensus or elite legiti-
mate controversy. On his part, Bennett (1990: 108) argues
that mass media news is indexed implicitly to the dynamics
of governmental debate.
Some detail on the concepts of framing and policy cer-
tainty/uncertainty is in order. Framing generally refers to
the specific properties of . . . [a] narrative that encourage
those . . . thinking about events to develop particular
understandings of them (Entman, 1991: 7). The concept
has been subjected to criticism for its lack of precision, and
the closest to a standard definition of framing is the one
suggested by Entman (2004: 5): selecting and highlighting
some facets of events or issues, and making connections among
them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation,
and/or solution (emphasis in the original). With regard to
the news media framing of disasters and humanitarian
crises, two distinct forms of media framing can be
identified.
4
The first type is labelled as empathy and critical
framing, as the coverage encourages association of the
reader with the suffering of people and criticizes the gov-
ernment inaction. In the context of the policymedia inter-
action model, this is the type of coverage that creates a
political imperative for policymakers to do something. How-
ever, in situations when the governments have already taken
the decision to intervene, empathy coverage functions to sup-
port the policy of intervention (Robinson, 2002: 29). The
alternative framing is distance framing, in the sense that this
type of coverage creates an emotional distance between the
audience and the people suffering in a conflict. Distance fram-
ing is also implicitly supportive of a government opposed to
intervention and as such consciously or not promotes the
policy of non-intervention (Robinson, 2002: 28).
On a practical level, the identification and measurement
of the above frames involves the application of a combination
of approaches. The first one requires the identification of the
subject matter and overall tone of reports, the unsystematic
and interpretative part of the analysis that requires the ana-
lyst to read complete news texts and develop a sense of the
overall tone and emphasis of the media reports' (Robinson,
2002: 137). In this case, reports making significant reference
to air strikes and use of ground troops were coded as
supportive, critical or neutral. Reports making significant ref-
erence to the war, refugees and negotiations were coded as
empathizing, distancing or neutral. The second approach
involves the identification in the media reports of an initially
predicted set of keywords that could be expected to be asso-
ciated with either of the outlined frames. According to
Robinson, this method is more systematic and reliable as it
asks for a quantification of keywords used in reports.
5
The second concept used in the policymedia interaction
model policy certainty refers to the absence or presence of
policy regarding an issue. Robinson (2002: 26) conceptualizes
policymaking as the outcome of a complex bargaining process
between a set of sub-systems in government. He argues that if
an issue suddenly arises and no policy is in place, or if there is
disagreement, conflict of interest or uncertainty within an
executive, then an uncertain policy can be claimed to exist
(Robinson, 2002: 27). The opposite agreement and co-
ordination between the subsystems of the executive would
lead to policy certainty. In order to measure policy certainty and
assess its degree for both Britain and Bulgaria, statements to
national parliaments and press conferences cross-referenced
with other available accounts of the policy process published
documents, secondary accounts and primary interviewing
were analysed. In this way, the final inferences with regard to
the presence or absence of policy certainty are strengthened.
When applied to military interventions, the policy
media interaction model suggests that if media coverage
prior to the decision to intervene is framed as critical of
government inaction and empathetic towards the victims,
and policy is uncertain, then media coverage can be a factor
in producing the policy outcome (Robinson, 2002: 4142).
However, if the media coverage is either distance-framed or
low-level empathy-framed, then it is unlikely that it will be
a major factor in causing the intervention. Here, Robinson
(2002: 42) allows for a small weak effect on the policy
process, minding policy-makers to act with other more sig-
nificant factors expected to have had moved policy-makers
to intervene (emphasis in original). Conversely, in a situa-
tion of policy certainty, governments will promote their
policy to the media in order to intervene. Substantial media
coverage will follow the decision and be either empathetic
and supportive of official policy or critical if there is an
elite dissensus regarding the intervention. However, as dis-
cussed above, this latter critical coverage is unlikely to
influence policy.
The inferences of the application of the model were vali-
dated by primary interviewing of both policymakers and
3
See Hallin (1986), Bennett (1990), Entman (1991), Zaller & Chui (1996),
Mermin (1999).
4
For more details, see Preston (1996), Robinson (2002), Shaw (1996).
5
Measuring framing through an interpretative analysis combined with a
systematic keyword test is used, as opposed to the more common approach
of using two coders, who analyse the texts separately, and then testing inter-
coder reliability. This follows the original approach adopted by Robinson and
is based on his (2002: 138139) findings that a keyword analysis provides the
toughest test with regard to the presence of a given frame and is more explicit,
codified and public than the dual coder approach.
Balabanova 73
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journalists in Bulgaria conducted by the author and incorpo-
rated in the subsequent analysis.
British and Bulgarian print media: A brief overview
A look at the media systems in Britain and Bulgaria clearly
demonstrates the differences in the media cultures in the two
countries. Unfortunately, while the amount of literature deal-
ing with the British media, including its past and present
developments, is vast,
6
the available resources on the Bulgarian
news media in general are extremely limited.
7
The privatization of newspapers and the disappearance of
the state press in Bulgaria, the adoption of an advertising-
dominated model, the establishment of a competitive market,
the modified writing and presentation style, the diversification
and stratification of the audiences all of which have taken
place since 1989 would suggest that the print media have
moved towards Western practices, if not completely caught
up with their Western counterparts. The notion of indepen-
dence, freedom of information and political pluralism are all
now present in the Bulgarian print market. Their actual inter-
pretation and subsequent implementation, however, seem to
be different and very much context-specific and determined.
In addition, Bulgaria has kept the format of the party newspa-
per established during the communist era (although it is in gra-
dual decline at the moment), unlike Britain where the press is
extremely careful not to be seen as a mouthpiece of any polit-
ical party.
The British print media boasts what Tunstall (1996: 7)
labels Western Europes premier collection of large-sale
tabloid newspapers' together with its largest collection of cap-
ital city upmarket newspapers. The tabloid national papers are
probably the most distinctive feature of the British print
media, not found in the newspaper markets of any other major
European country, or in the United States. In addition, the
newspaper market is sharply segmented along social class lines;
the Sunday newspapers have big sales and traditionally are
separate publications from the dailies.
The subsequent analysis of the Bulgarian print media cov-
erage of the Kosovo conflict is based on data obtained from
eight newspapers seven dailies and one weekly 24 Chasa,
Trud, Demokracia, Duma, Pari, Sega, Standart and Kapital.
The selection is determined by considerations of circulation
figures the above dailies are the leading ones published in
Bulgaria and Kapital is by far the most influential among the
weekly newspapers. In addition, factors such as political lean-
ings and type of paper are taken into account. The analysis of
the British print media coverage uses eight publications The
Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Financial
Times, The Economist, The Daily Mail, The Mirror and The
Sun. The selection is a product of the attempt to analyse a sim-
ilar range of newspapers in both countries, as far as this is pos-
sible. The same factors such as circulation, political leanings
and type of paper are taken into consideration. As a result, the
final selection represents a representative sample of the very
diverse British print media, both in terms of political prefer-
ences and quality/tabloid distinction.
Print media attention
Quantitatively, the Kosovo crisis enjoyed extensive media cov-
erage in the period directly prior to the NATO military invol-
vement, in both the Bulgarian and, to a lesser extent, the
British print media. Undeniably, the Bulgarian media assigned
a leading place to the Kosovo crisis.
8
Between 24 February and
25 March 1999, 725 articles in the selected eight newspapers
made significant reference
9
to the situation in Kosovo.
10
Table I illustrates the total distribution of articles among the
examined newspapers.
Overall, these results suggest that Kosovo was already iden-
tified and treated by the Bulgarian press as an important event
worthy of attention even before the NATO air campaign. The
leading slot allocated to the topic is also obvious from the exact
location of the articles 16% of them are published on the
front page, the majority of the rest being at the top of the inter-
nal and international pages.
For its part, the British press recognized the Kosovo conflict
as a highly newsworthy event and covered it regularly and con-
sistently only after the start of the NATO air campaign. Before
that the newspapers acknowledged the conflict but did not
6
For example, see Humphreys (1996), Curran & Seaton (2002), Seymour-
Ure (1996), Calabrese & Burgelman (1999), Seaton (1998).
7
This limitation exists in both Western and Bulgarian research in the field.
Available accounts are Znepolski (1997), Lozanov, Deianova & Spasov
(2000), Ianova (1998), Spasov (2000), Sparks (1997, 1998), Splichal (1994).
8
For more detailed account of the Bulgarian print media coverage of the
Kosovo conflict, see Balabanova (2004, 2007).
9
The term significant reference is used here to refer to those articles that had
the Kosovo conflict as their main theme, and thus we exclude fromthe analysis
those that only mentioned it in passing. No statistical connotation is implied.
10
24 Chasa, Trud, Demokracia, Duma, Pari, Sega and Standart articles were
obtained from the paper editions of these newspapers. Kapital articles were
obtained online at http://www.capital.bg.
Table I. Bulgarian press attention by newspaper, 24 February25
March 1999
Newspaper Number of articles Percentage of the total
Standart 125 17.24
Trud 104 14.34
Sega 100 13.8
Demokracia 96 13.24
Pari 94 12.97
24 Chasa 91 12.55
Duma 88 12.14
Kapital* 27 3.72
* Kapitals figure in this table should be interpreted taking into consideration
the weekly character of the newspaper.
74 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 47(1)
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really treat it is an extremely important event worthy of sub-
stantial attention. In addition, the coverage of Kosovo was sig-
nificantly more noticeable on the pages of the broadsheets,
compared with the tabloids. Overall, during the analysed
period, 360 articles in the selected newspapers made signifi-
cant reference to the situation in Kosovo.
11
The newspaper
that offered the most extensive coverage was the Guardian.
It covered different aspects of the conflict over the 30-day
observed period in 99 articles. Table II illustrates the total dis-
tribution of articles among the examined newspapers.
Overall, these results show the clear division between
broadsheets and tabloids in their coverage of the Kosovo con-
flict. While the broadsheets spotted the conflict and devoted
relatively extensive attention considering the little relevance
of the event to the British public at time, the tabloids only
rarely mentioned what was happening. Neither felt it necessary
to devote front-page attention to the issue this happened
only rarely. It is also evident that the volume of coverage dif-
fered only by print media type, the political orientation not
having an influence.
Media framing
The actual potential for political impact of this coverage can be
assessed through an examination of the framing of the media
texts. The main questions here are how the Bulgarian and the
British press dealt with the Kosovo war in terms of what mat-
ters were emphasized and what attitudes were adopted with
regard to the war. This is the interpretative aspect of the anal-
ysis that involves exploration of the subject matter of selected
news reports relating to Kosovo. From 725 articles identified
to have made substantial references to the situation in Kosovo
in the period 24 February 1999 to 25 March 1999 in the Bul-
garian press, 105 were selected for the subsequent analysis.
12
The news material was classified in 21 different content cate-
gories and the quantitative shares were compared among the
entire material. Most news concerned two subjects the air
strikes against the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and
Bulgarian security (considering the immediate proximity of
the country to the conflict) with 22 articles containing signif-
icant references to each of the issues. They were closely fol-
lowed by the references made in 20 articles to the Bulgarian
position with regard to the conflict as a whole and the air strikes
in particular. This confirms that the news material devoted
most attention to dramatic events, with concerns over the
security and safety of the country and people in Bulgaria, as
well as the actual position of Bulgaria, a topic that came close
to overtaking the issue of air strikes. Table III offers a look at
the different content categories and their quantitative shares.
In the British case, out of 335 articles discovered to have
made significant reference to the various aspects of the situa-
tion in Kosovo in the period 24 February 1999 to 25 March
1999, 112 were selected for the subsequent analysis (see
Table III).
13
The news material was classified in 17 different
content categories, with the results showing that the news
concerned primarily one topic the air strikes against the FRY
with 50 articles making significant reference to this issue.
A distant second place (29 articles) was occupied by the direct
clashes between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians and the situ-
ation in Kosovo. Almost the same amount of attention was
devoted to the peace talks/negotiations (26 articles). These three
topics clearly dominated the subject matter of the news reports.
It is obvious that once the question of air strikes came on to the
agenda, it received the biggest attention by all the press outlets.
The majority of the topic coverage came in the last several days
of the periodunder review, reflecting the overall increase inKosovo
conflict coverage with the upcoming NATO air campaign.
Turning to the tone of the selected media reports, those
referring to the war, refugees and negotiations tend to be
empathy-framed, both in the British and the Bulgarian media
(see Table IV). In the case of the former, this domination is
much more obvious. Overall, of the 68 articles analysed, 41 are
empathy-framed, 14 are distancing and 13 neutral. This
suggests a clear case for empathy-framing. An example of the
predominant frame is the following extract from the pages of
The Times:
11
The Daily Mail, Mirror and Times articles were obtained via Lexis-Nexis at
http://web.lexis-nexis.com/professional/. The Guardian, Daily Telegraph and
Sun articles were obtained online at respectively http://www.guardian.co.uk,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk and http://www.thesun.co.uk/. Articles from the
Financial Times and the Economist were obtained via the John Rylands Uni-
versity Library electronic resources information, online at http://rylibweb.
man.ac.uk/eres/newspaper.html.
Table II. British press attention by newspaper, 24 February25
March 1999
Newspaper Number of articles Percentage of the total
The Guardian 99 27.5
The Times 72 20
The Daily Telegraph 57 15.8
Financial Times 39 10.8
The Mirror 34 9.4
The Daily Mail 28 7.8
The Sun 22 6.1
The Economist* 9 2.5
* The Economists figure in this table should be interpreted taking into con-
sideration the weekly character of the newspaper.
12
The total number of reports relating to Kosovo in the period 24 February to
25 March was 725. This number of articles was cut to a more manageable
number for reading. The articles were listed chronologically and every
seventh article selected for analysis. That gave a sample of 105 articles. The
method used was systematic random sampling.
13
The total number of reports relating to Kosovo in the period 24 February to
25 March was 335. This number of articles was cut to a more manageable
number for reading. The articles were listed chronologically and every third
article selected for analysis. That gave a sample of 112 articles.
Balabanova 75
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Table III. Content categories, 24 February25 March 1999
Number of references Share of the total (%)
Content category Bulgaria* Britain** Bulgaria Britain
Air strikes 22 50 12.15 28.6
Bulgarian security 22 12.15
Bulgarian position 20 11.05
Bulgarian involvement and participation in the conflict 14 7.73
Peace talks 14 26 7.73 14.9
Implications and consequences for the Balkans 12 6.63
International diplomatic efforts preceding the war 11 6.08
Yugoslav position 9 5 4.97 2.9
Justification and legality of the international involvement 8 17 4.42 9.7
Bulgarian diplomatic efforts preceding the war 7 3.87
Western policy towards the Balkans 6 3.31
Areas history, events preceding the war and the preparation for the war in the region 6 3 3.31 1.7
Devastation of war 5 2.76
Possible scenarios for the development of the crisis 5 2.76
Russian position 5 1 2.76 0.6
Direct clashes between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians 4 29 2.21 16.6
Refugees 3 13 1.66 7.4
Peacekeeping 3 1.66
Economic and environmental costs for Bulgaria 3 1.66
Role of media 1 0.55
Ground intervention 1 8 0.55 4.6
British military involvement 8 4.6
Serbs military build-up before the air strikes 4 2.3
Milosevic 3 1.7
Security of the Balkan countries 2 1.1
NATO and NATO commanders 2 1.1
KLA 2 1.1
Celebrities involvement in the conflict 1 0.6
Serbian & Albanian communities in the UK 1 0.6
* The total number of references is 181, as some of the articles made references to more than one content category.
**
The total number of references is 175, as some of the articles made references to more than one content category.
Table IV. A selection of the descriptors used in relation to people in Kosovo and NATO policy, 24 February25 March 1999, Britain and
Bulgaria
Supportive descriptors Neutral descriptors
Empathy descriptors
Britain Bulgaria Britain Bulgaria
Its time to act The war has started Terrified families Human victims
To curb Serb repression Three scenarios for
bombing
3,000 refugees were forced to
flee shelling
Bloody war
If Mr Milosevic is not ready to make peace, we
are willing to limit his ability to make war
NATO missiles hit the
airport in Podgoriza
Men, women and children . . .
butchered, raped and
tortured
Civilians are injured
Noble job Serbia threatens us with
war
Tuberculosis but . . . no means
of diagnosing it
Enormous number of
human casualties
It is in Britains strategic interest to work for
stability in the region
There is no immediate
threat to Bulgarian
security
The ghost village of Racak Women and children
have died in the
ruins
Not allow war to devastate a part of our
continent
We are ready for 5,000
refugees from
Yugoslavia
A young girl of nine sobbed Families of military
personnel dead
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. . . villagers struggle to survive winter onslaught . . . scratch-
ing an existence in the open and freezing in the sub-zero night
temperatures. (Loyd, 1999)
In the Bulgarian case, of the 37 articles analysed, 14 are
empathy-framed, 12 are neutral simply informing and
11 are distancing. Therefore, the domination of an empathy
frame is less clear. An example of the empathy frame is
contained in the following short passage from Kapital:
Nearly quarter of a million Kosovo Albanians are left
homeless, the victims of the conflict exceed 2000 people.
(Kapital, 27 March 1999)
The empathy in the Bulgarian case was applied not only to
the Kosovo Albanians but also to the Serbians, both in Kosovo
and in Serbia, thus further complicating the understanding of
the press coverage. It is even possible to argue that sympathy in
predominantly Orthodox countries like Bulgaria
14
could be
stirred up for only one of the affected parties, namely the
Serbs, thus suggesting that a solidarity was felt with the Serb
population and the tragedy of the Kosovo Albanians was
downplayed (Milev, 1999: 373).
References to the NATO air strikes, the use of ground
troops, the justification and legality of the international mili-
tary involvement and to the British military participation as
highlighted among the overall NATO effort tended to be
supportively framed in the British press (Table IV). The pre-
dominance of the supportive frame was substantial more
than 60% of the references demonstrated support. Overall,
of the 83 articles making significant reference to the above
issues, 53 were supportive of the decision to launch an air cam-
paign against the former Yugoslavia, 19 were critical and 11
were neutral. An example of the supportive framing is the
following from the Guardian:
The only honourable course for Europe and America is to
use military force to try to protect the people of Kosovo. . . .
the crisis is upon us and we must respond. (Young, 1999)
This primarily pro-war line of the British newspapers had
some variations. Although in their editorial columns the
press maintained their support for the air strikes and the
British involvement in them, it is possible to identify two
types of support for the NATO attack. Politically conserva-
tive newspapers, such as the Times, Daily Telegraph and
Daily Mail expressed what Hammond (2000: 124) labelled
customary stout support for the British military. At the
same time, however, these newspapers showed a level of
caution about the wisdom and goals of NATO action in the
very beginning of the air campaign. Thus, while the Daily
Mail (25 March) emphasized the unequivocal support for
the British and NATO armed forces, it also claimed it was
difficult to contemplate the way this conflict has lurched
from threat and bluster to outright war with anything but
the deepest unease. In comparison, for the more liberal
section of the press (e.g. the Guardian) NATOs proclaimed
moral mission was the basis for the support. In that
sense, the liberal press ended up being much closer to the
governments line of reasoning that the conflict was fought
for humanitarian reasons rather than national interest
(Hammond, 2000: 124).
In parallel to this are other differences between the broad-
sheets and the tabloids, not in terms of support for the air cam-
paign which was beyond doubt but rather in terms of the
actual language and arguments used to announce this support.
See the following from the Sun:
Few of us know where Kosovo is. Probably even fewer care.
But young British servicemen are about to risk their lives there
. . . Because countries like Britain, some of our European
partners and America are the guardians of liberty and democ-
racy. We fight for the oppressed. (The Sun, 24 March 1999)
In the Bulgarian press, references to the NATO air strikes and
to the Bulgarian position and security tend to be rather neu-
trally framed (see Table IV). Overall, of the 90 articles making
significant reference to the military intervention and the
Bulgarian position, 49 are neutral, 26 are critical and 15 are
supportive of the NATO air campaign and Bulgarias associ-
ated support. See the following example of neutral framing
from Kapital:
After the consecutive failure of Richard Holbrooke to con-
vince Milosevic to accept the Kosovo plan, the NATO Gen-
eral Secretary Javier Solana ordered the beginning of the
military operation against Yugoslavia. The Western allies
stressed the necessity to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe
in Kosovo. While during the Paris talks the Serbs were threat-
ened with a NATO attack in order to sign the offered agree-
ment, now the air strikes already are interpreted as an
alternative to the inaction. (Kapital, 27 March 1999)
In sum, the interpretative part of the analysis shows that the
reports in the British media are framed so as to support the
decision to begin an air campaign and empathize with the suf-
fering people in Kosovo. Bulgarian media frame their reports
dealing with the NATO air strikes and the Bulgarian position
and security in a rather neutral way and demonstrate empathy
with the situation in Kosovo.
The next stage of the analysis involves applying a systematic
test to the interpretative inferences of the supportive/neutral
and empathy frames in order to verify their validity (see
Table V). The same news reports as in the previous part are
analysed for keywords. For the empathy/distance frame, the
number of times the empathizing keywords refugees, people and
women and children and the distancing descriptors rebels,
Muslim, men and soldier are used is quantified. Regarding the
14
The claim is made also with regard to Romania and Macedonia in the
Balkans.
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supportive/critical framing, the number of times the words
prevent, help, protect and save are used to refer to the situation
in Kosovo are counted.
A slightly different set of words is examined in the case of
the Bulgarian media to reflect the different contents of the
news materials prevent, no danger/threat, support and Bulgar-
ian/national interest. It is to be expected that these terms
should dominate the reports that supported the decision to
launch air strikes as they tend to emphasize the positive and
worthy dimensions of intervening. Conversely, the keywords
not legal/illegal, UN Charter, no success and no national interest
are counted. Again, in the case of the Bulgarian media, the set
of words is as follows: not legal/illegal, danger/threat, do not sup-
port and against Bulgarian/national interest. These terms could
be expected most frequently in reports that opposed the
NATO military intervention, as they highlight the absence
of legal justification for the alliances action as well as the lack
of perceived national interest at stake and chances for success.
The identification of a neutral framing in the interpretative
part of the analysis means looking for neutral descriptors. The
following phrases are used: NATO hits Serbia, Bulgaria will not
participate in a war, Bulgaria signs agreement with NATO and
NATO is to undertake a military campaign. The results in
Table V confirm the inferences of a neutral and empathizing
frame being predominant in the Bulgarian press, and a predo-
minantly supportive and empathizing frame for the British
print media.
Policy certainty: NATO to launch air strikes
The policy line over military force was consistently articulated
by NATO. Military options had been considered by the alli-
ance since 1998 to be one part of the wider effort of the inter-
national community to find a solution to the Kosovo conflict.
As far as the British foreign policy line is concerned, air strikes
were supported from the very beginning. Indeed, the interna-
tional military response both during and after the Kosovo crisis
was driven mainly by the United States and Britain, with the
latter the most aggressive in favouring a ground option
(Brown, 2003: 50). Prime Minister Tony Blair constantly
Table V. British and Bulgarian media coverage, 24 February25 March 1999
Empathy frame Distance frame
Frequency Frequency
Descriptor UK Bulgaria Descriptor UK Bulgaria
Refugee/flee 68 13 Rebels 36 8
People 67 13 Muslim 3 11
Women 23 3 Men 32 2
Children 30 4 Soldier 34 5
Total 188 33 Total 105 26
UK
Supportive Frame Critical Frame
Descriptor Frequency Descriptor Frequency
Prevent 13 Not legal/illegal 3
Help 16 UN Charter 2
Protect 19 No national interest 4
Save 10 No success 7
Total 58 Total 16
Bulgaria
Supportive frame Critical frame Neutral frame
Descriptor Frequency Descriptor Frequency Descriptor Frequency
Prevent 4 Not legal/illegal 7 NATO hits Serbia 10
No danger/threat 12 Danger/threat 8 Bulgaria signs agreement with NATO 7
Support 10 Do not support 10 NATO is to undertake a military
campaign
8
Bulgarian/national
interest
4 Against Bulgarian/
national interest
6 Bulgaria will not participate in a war 10
Total 28 Total 31 Total 35
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reiterated the British governments moral commitment to the
conflict. This can be linked to the concept of the ethical for-
eign policy associated with Blairs Foreign Minister Robin
Cook (1997), along with the Prime Ministers own doctrine
of international community (Blair, 1999d).
This is supported by the analysis of daily bulletins,
speeches, parliamentary statements, news items and FCO
background briefings. British policy never deviated signifi-
cantly from the line that the air strikes should be launched if
Serbian repression in Kosovo continued in order to avert a
humanitarian disaster. Official documents maintained that
Kosovo matters to Britain, although it is clear that there is
no direct and immediate threat to Britains own national
security from the situation in Kosovo (UKSCD, cited in
Chandler, 2005: 65). Therefore, claims that the British invol-
vement was a moral crusade fought for moral values, for a
just cause, as Blair himself put it, followed (cited in Chandler,
2005: 65; Blair, 1999a). Very often throughout the whole
campaign, the PM felt the need to use this kind of language
this is not a battle for NATO, this is not a battle for terri-
tory; this is a battle for humanity, it is a just cause, it is a right-
ful cause (Blair, 1999b). His conviction was portrayed as the
conviction of the whole British public:
The British people are engaged in this struggle because they
see it as more than a fight for justice and fairness for the
victims of Milosevics policies in the former Yugoslavia. They
see that our values are being abused. They see that the stability
of our continent is at stake. (Blair, 1999c)
Apart from the humanitarian logic of the air strikes, a geopo-
litical one was identified and articulated as well. This meant
the recognition of, to quote Blair (cited in Duke, Ehrhart &
Karadi, 2000: 137), the possibility of re-igniting unrest in
Albania, of a destabilized Macedonia, of almost certain
knock-off effects in Bosnia, and of further tension between
Greece and Turkey. Therefore, it was argued that strategic
interests for the whole Europe are at stake. Overall, there were
no indications of policy uncertainty and the option of an air
campaign was consistently articulated. This indicates the exis-
tence of a high level of policy certainty.
The crisis in Kosovo was perceived by the Bulgarian gov-
ernment as the main challenge to the security of the country
in 1999, as it had a direct impact on fundamental above all
economic components of Bulgarias national security. The
evidence presented here shows the Bulgarian government was
certain in its support for the NATO action in Kosovo and the
non-involvement of Bulgarian troops either directly or indir-
ectly in the conflict. Parliamentary opposition to this was pro-
vided by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), which refused to
support NATO strikes and insisted that Bulgarian authorities
should not allow the use of the countrys territory or air space.
In view of the parliamentary majority enjoyed by the govern-
ment, this position could not affect the final governmental
decision. The head of the Bulgarian delegation to the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe at the time
of the events and a member of the Parliamentary Commission
on Foreign Affairs, Toshev (2002) explained the policy line by
stating that if Albanians are forced out of Kosovo, this will,
first, destabilize Macedonia, and second, with the likelihood
of the process continuing, the whole region. This was per-
ceived as the worst possible development the situation spirals
out of control and with refugee issues for the whole region, and
for Bulgaria in particular. Government policy was guided by
the clear intention to prevent this happening, limiting the con-
flict in order to avoid destabilizing the Balkan region.
The policy of the Bulgarian government should be under-
stood in the context of the overall foreign policy priorities of
the country, which were clearly stated and agreed upon as
membership of NATO and the EU. Having in mind these
priorities, the statements of the politicians throughout the
campaign seem less surprising and easier to predict and
explain. In this context, guarantees from NATO on Bulgarian
security, as well as the possibility that support for the alliance
could be interpreted by FRY as an aggressive act, were of
extreme importance. Prime Minister Kostov argued that
there is no reason to fear the conflict spilling over into Bulgaria
. . . The only thing required of Bulgaria is to show its solidar-
ity for a quick resolution to the conflict, to take a principled
position for a peaceful settling of the problem (GIS, 1999: 1)
and
there will be no risk for Bulgaria from its neighbour FRY. Still,
there will be guarantees. These guarantees are already given
and we expect them to be reconfirmed in the future agreement
and explicitly included in it. (Kostov, 1999)
It is obvious that the general debate in Bulgaria differed from
that in Western Europe. It did not address the issue of whether
there should be NATO involvement or not, and the suffering
of people in Kosovo (although mentioned by the officials)
never became the focus of debate. The stress was instead on
possible implications for Bulgaria following the position the
country chose to adopt. Despite this, once the government
position was taken, it was maintained throughout regardless
of political and public debates in the country, or lack of pop-
ular support.
Conclusions: Assessing causation and drawing
parallels
In brief, the foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Bulgarian
press devoted more attention to the Kosovo conflict than
the British press did. In its coverage, it often dealt with the
Bulgarian position on the conflict, the threats to its security,
the overall implications of the conflict for Bulgaria and the
Balkans. It is obvious that no matter how significant the
NATO air campaign seemed to the press, it could not match
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the overall attention devoted to the Bulgarian position, secu-
rity and involvement quite understandable, considering the
countrys geographical proximity. They also focused more on
the Russian position, as well as that of FRY, than the British
media did.
British media coverage of the conflict was overwhelmingly
in support of the decision to intervene militarily. This was not
necessarily undertaken by arguing overtly in favour of the
intervention. Rather, news reports generally empathized with
the suffering people in Kosovo and thus produced somewhat
more nuanced coverage that favoured the policy to intervene
in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, which was
in any case the official explanation of the policy line. This is
not to say that there was no reporting of views both for and
against the intervention. But in general, as the findings indi-
cate, the news media did not function very effectively as a
watchdog and certainly did not seriously challenge the govern-
ments policy.
On the other side, references to the NATO air strikes and
to the Bulgarian position and security tended to be rather neu-
trally framed in the Bulgarian media. They reported the air
campaign as the option considered and subsequently chosen
by the NATO countries. They reported the Bulgarian posi-
tion, while indicating different opinions among the Bulgarian
political elite, and they also offered information on the various
security implications. However, this was done in a primarily
informative and neutral way. Considering that the press gen-
erally tends to display more public attitudes and opinions in
comparison to electronic media, then this coverage is more
indicative of the moods and interpretations of the situation
among the public. It can be explained with the approach to the
conflict taking place next door. The government and, subse-
quently, the Bulgarian people were mainly concerned with the
implications of the conflict for the country: the security of
the state, the political, economic and environmental costs, and
the effects on the eagerly sought membership of EU and
NATO. Observed through this prism, therefore, it makes
sense that air strikes would not receive significant support or
even provoke much of a debate along the lines of legality/illeg-
ality. They were mainly seen as a very real threat to national
security but at the same time as a clear way to show Bulgaria
as belonging to Europe and European ideals. The media
coverage simultaneously empathized with the suffering people
in Kosovo, and Serbians both in Kosovo and in Serbia, thus
further complicating the understanding of the press coverage
of the conflict. There was a strong case of certainty in both
countries in terms of their choice of policies and their imple-
mentation. There was no evidence at any stage throughout the
observed period that these policies changed.
What could have been the possible effects of this coverage
on policymaking? The application of the policymedia inter-
action model, as outlined earlier, suggests the following. In the
British case, there co-existed a clear policy, supportive and
empathizing media coverage, and a NATO decision to launch
an air campaign against Yugoslavia, one fully supported by
Britain. The theoretical insight of the policymedia interac-
tion model suggests that policymakers, in the presence of pol-
icy certainty, would be resistant to media influence (Robinson,
2000: 631). As such, the findings here support that aspect of
the model which predicts that when there exists policy cer-
tainty, media coverage is unlikely to influence policy out-
comes. In short, rather than helping cause the decision to
launch air strikes in the case of Kosovo, media coverage actu-
ally seems to have manufactured consent for the policy of
intervention. It could even be argued that the way the media
coverage was framed enabled British policymakers to pursue
their policy objectives, therefore suggesting the occurrence of
an enabling media effect.
In the Bulgarian case, the data showed neutral and
empathy-framed coverage together with a policy certainty in
the Bulgarian government that the country should support the
NATO military intervention. In terms of assessing the impact
of the press coverage, these results do not provide convincing
evidence for any possible influence. For example, the press
covered the debate over support or non-support for NATO
strikes but apparently failed to put serious pressure on the
policymakers by framing its reports in a primarily neutral way.
Reports questioned the governments position and presented
arguments against it, and showed empathy when covering
the refugees' fate and the devastation of war. The govern-
ment on its side never altered its firm commitment to support
the international community in its policy on Yugoslavia.
Thus, by choosing the neutral frame (either by concentrating
on the information function: facts, facts and facts' or by
presenting all the contradicting arguments without taking a posi-
tion on them) the press would seem to have left itself with less
chance of influencing policymaking. Or so we would be led to
think having applied the policymedia interaction model.
The policymedia interaction model generally highlights
three frames of coverage critical, supportive and neutral
and additionally cases of mixed coverage where critical framing
is followed or preceded by a supportive one over a certain time-
frame (see Robinson, 2002). However, the effects of neutral
coverage in times of conflict are not seriously explored, leaving
this open to speculation. This absence could be, first of all, a
result of the assumption that if the media reports are neutrally
framed then they have no potential whatsoever of influencing
policymaking in any direction. Another interpretation could
be the perceived impossibility that the media in general could
be neutral in their coverage of any topic even more so in
times of war, when taking a stand is assumed to be quite nat-
ural, meaning there is no need to investigate the occurrence of
neutral framing. This, however, would clash, at least partially,
with the principles of objectivity and balanced coverage, which
are central to the self-perception of much of the Western
media. Still, even if we assume that the Western media cannot
be neutral in their coverage in the analysed circumstances, it
would appear that working with the same presumption outside
of the West European context might not be very successful. It
could be the case that the assumptions on the basis of which
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the policymedia interaction model is built are not necessarily
equally valid for Eastern Europe. As the analysis here shows,
the dominant press coverage in Bulgaria leading up to the air
campaign was neutrally framed, so interpreting it within the
models framework does not offer an adequate answer. It could
be argued that by being neutral, the coverage had no chance of
influencing policymaking. But it also could be that the East
European mediapolicy interaction follows a different
dynamic from the West European logic, with the role of the
media generally less powerful.
A further insight into the Bulgarian case comes from taking
into account a plausible counterfactual. As media coverage of
the suffering in the conflict has shown, the empathy on the
pages of papers went beyond Albanian victims and included
the Serbian population. This could be explained by the logical
assumption that Bulgaria would be expected to be predisposed
to take Serbias side because of the affinity between the two
countries, historically, linguistically, culturally and religiously.
But as the data have shown, Bulgaria did not take the side of
Serbia. The most plausible explanation for this is the Bulgarian
governments expectation that to be accepted into the Western
organizations (NATO and EU), it should take their side in the
conflict. This was clearly highlighted by Bulgarian politicians
at the time and most likely was the driving force behind the
policymaking. Hence, the assumption that media had some-
thing to do with this decision, that is, that they pushed the
government into favouring intervention against Serbia, seems
less plausible.
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Sofia: Citizen.
EKATERINA BALABANOVA, b. 1975, PhD in International
Relations (University of Manchester, 2005); Lecturer in Political
Communication, School of Politics & Communication Studies,
University of Liverpool (2007). Current researchinterests: interaction
between global news media and world politics, media coverage of
humanitarian crises, role of media in Eastern Europe, media and
human rights. Most recent book: Media, Wars and Politics: Comparing
the Incomparable in Western and Eastern Europe (Ashgate, 2007).
82 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 47(1)
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