everything indispens!le "or sustennce# d$elling# clothing# medicl ttendnce# eduction nd trnsporttion# in %eeping $ith the "inncil cpcity o" the "mily. The eduction o" the person entitled to !e supported re"erred to in the preceding prgrph shll include his schooling or trining "or some pro"ession# trde or voction# even !eyond the ge o" m&ority. Trnsporttion shll include e'penses in going to nd "rom school# or to nd "rom plce o" $or%. ()9*+ Support demandable. It is to be noted that under the law the fact that a right to be supported is recognized in favor of the person to be supported such recognition of right does not automatically entitle him to receive support as the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance and support will not be paid except from the date it is extra-judicially demanded. (Art. 203, [par. 1], Family Code). Ap- propriately, therefore, the right to demand support arises from im- perative necessity, without which it cannot be demanded, and the law presumes that such necessity does not exist unless support is demanded. (Jocson, et al. vs. Empire Insurance Co., et al., 50 O.G. 2628). Unborn child entitled to support. In accordance with existing jurisprudence, even an unborn child is entitled to support. This is so, because a conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for purposes favorable to it and correspondingly, the right to support from its progenitors, even if the said child is only en ventre de sa mere; just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations under Article 742, New Civil Code. (Quimiguing vs. Icao, 34 SCRA 132). Ascendants and descendants required to support one another. Under the law, legitimate ascendants and descendants are required to support each other. (Art. 195, Family Code). In this regard, the basis of the right to support is the legitimacy of relationship so that in case the status of a child is denied and placed in issue, no effect can be given to the childs claim for support until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. (Francisco vs. Zandueta, 61 Phil. 752). In Castillo vs. Castillo, O.G., March 27, 1941, p. 968, it has been ruled by the Supreme Court that abandonment of a descendant will deprive the ascendant of the right to receive support from the descendant so abandoned. Thus, where a mother delivered her child to other persons when the child was scarcely two years old, and since then never took care of such child, abandoning her entirely, such mother relinquishes all parental claim and is not entitled to be supported by the child. Right of illegitimate to support. Under the law, illegitimate children are entitled to be supported. (Silva vs. Peralta, 2 SCRA 1025). This grant of right in favor of illegitimate children has been recognized as a form of assistance in order for them to surmount the disadvantages facing them through the misdeeds of their parents, since the transgressions of social conventions committed by the parents should not be visited upon such children. (Report of the Code Commission, Civil Code, p. 89). Insofar as ascendants and descendants are concerned, they are mutually bound to support each other, but in Castillo vs. Castillo, 39 O.G. No. 37, March 27, 1941, p. 968, it was ruled that if the mother brought the child to the custody of another when he was only two years old, and since then, never took care of the child, abandoning the same, the mother relinquishes the right to be supported and parental care. The unfair and unequal situation in Article 291 of the Civil Code has been remedied by Article 195 (Paragraphs 3 and 4) of the Family Code, in that descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, whether they proceed from parents legitimate or illegitimate, are entitled to support. In short, illegitimate descendants, whether from legitimate or illegitimate children, are entitled to support from their grandparents. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or halfblood, are entitled to support to the full extent under Article 194, of the Family Code. This is not similar to the Civil Code, as they were entitled only to natural support or the necessities in life. But suppose, such brother or sister is of age but he is very lazy that he/ she does not want to work, can he/she be entitled to such support? The answer is no, because the law says, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimants fault or negligence. (Art. 196, Family Code). Allowance to widow, etc. who are included. Art. 133 of the Family Code provides that, from the common mass of property, support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventories of property x x. Does the term children include grandchildren? The Supreme Court in Estate of Hilario M. Ruiz, et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 118671, January 29, 1996, 67 SCAD 420, said NO. It limits the allowance to the widow and children and it does not extend to the deceaseds grandchildren regardless of their minority or incapacity. (See also Babao vs. Villavicencio, 44 Phil. 921 Note that support is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority. (See Estate of Hilario Ruiz vs. CA, et al., supra). Married man cannot be required to acknowledge a child of a woman he raped. In People vs. Manahan, 315 SCRA 476, it was said that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. But he can be required to support the child. (citing People vs. Guerrero, 242 SCRA 606). The reason for the rule is the existence of a legal impediment to acknowledge as the accused is married. Article 19,. Su!&ect to the provisions o" the succeeding r- ticles# the "ollo$ing re o!liged to support ech other to the $hole e'tent set "orth in the preceding rticle. . (1+ The spouses/ . ()+ 0egitimte scendnts nd descendnts/ . (1+ Prents nd their legitimte children nd the legitimte nd illegitimte children o" the ltter/ (4+ Prents nd their illegitimte children nd the legitimte nd illegitimte children o" the ltter/ nd (,+ 0egitimte !rothers nd sisters# $hether o" "ull or hl"- !lood. ()91+ Article 192. 3rothers nd sisters not legitimtely relted# $hether o" the "ull or hl"-!lood# re li%e$ise !ound to support ech other to the "ull e'tent set "orth in Article 194# e'cept only $hen the need "or support o" the !rother or sister# !eing o" ge# is due to cuse imput!le to the climnt4s "ult or negligence. ()91+ Spouses: The right and obligation to support arises from law, life Article 68 of the Family Code which obliges the spouses to held and support one another. It has been recognized that the marriage relation imposes upon the spouses the obligation to support. (Santos vs. Sweeney, 4 Phil. 79; Lerma vs. Mamaril, 9 Phil. 118; Clausen vs. Cabrera, 72 Phil. 252). Thus, if the wife is forced to leave the conjugal dwelling by causes justifying her establishment of a separate domicile, she is entitled to separate maintenance from the husband. (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252; Garcia vs. Santiago, 53 Phil. 952; Dadivas de Villanueva vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92; Panuncio vs. Sula, 34 O.G. 1291). In this regard, the right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such (Yangco vs. Rhoda, 1 Phil. 404), so that once the marriage has been annulled, the right ceases, even during the pendency of the action filed by her for the liquidation of their conjugal property. (Mendoza vs. Parugao, 49 Phil. 271). The right to support exists even pendente lite. (Hashim vs. Concepcion, 42 Phil. 694; Yabut vs. Agrava, 62 O.G. 3595). But there is a defense that if there was adultery of the woman, support would not be given. (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285). 684 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Arts. 197- 198 Article 195. 6or the support o" legitimte scendnts/ descen- dnts# $hether legitimte or illegitimte/ nd !rothers nd sisters# $hether legitimtely or illegitimtely relted# only the seprte property o" the person o!liged to give support shll !e ns$er!le provided tht in cse the o!ligor hs no seprte property# the !solute community or the con&ugl prtnership# i" "inncilly c- p!le# shll dvnce the support# $hich shll !e deducted "rom the shre o" the spouse o!liged upon the li7uidtion o" the !so- lute community or o" the con&ugl prtnership. (n+ Support of illegitimate children of a spouse. If a person who is married has ascendants, or descendants whether legitimate or illegitimate, or brothers and sisters, and he is obliged to support them, such support shall come from the separate properties of such spouse. If he has no separate properties, the absolute community or conjugal partnership shall advance the support. Upon the liquidation of the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, such advances shall be deducted from the share of such spouse. The reason for the law is that there is no obligation of the lawful spouse to support the children of the other spouse with another person, unless they have been adopted by them. If that is so, the properties of the husband and wife are not bound to answer for their support. Article 198. 9uring the proceedings "or legl seprtion or "or nnulment o" mrrige# nd "or declrtion o" nullity o" mrrige# the spouses nd their children shll !e supported "rom the properties o" the !solute community or the con&ugl prtnership. A"ter the "inl &udgment grnting the petition# the o!ligtion o" mutul support !et$een the spouses ceses. :o$ever# in cse o" legl seprtion# the court my order tht the guilty spouse shll give support to the innocent one# speci"ying the terms o" such order. ()9)+ The law is in conformity with Article 49 of the Family Code mandating that during the pendency of an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage, the court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the children. The same is true in Article 62 in cases of legal separation. The reason for the law is that, of utmost consideration is the welfare, moral or maternal, of the children. The support shall come from the conjugal properties or the absolute community of properties. The support given is known as support pendente lite, but the moment there is declaration of nullity of the marriage, the obligation to support and the right to be supported cease to exist. The reason is that, after annulment or declaration of nullity of the marriage, the relationship ceases to exist. But in legal separation, the court may still order the guilty spouse to support the other, but it is discretionary on the part of the court and as such, it cannot be demanded as a matter of right. In an action by a wife against her husband for support the defendant may set up as a special defense that the wife had forfeited her right to support by committing adultery, the special defense of adultery set up by the defendant is a good defense and if properly proved and sustained, will defeat the action. Article 199. ;henever t$o or more persons re o!liged to give support# the li!ility shll devolve upon the "ollo$ing persons in the order herein provided. 1.The spouse/ ).The descendnts in the nerest degree/ 1.The scendnts in the nerest degree/ nd 4.The !rothers nd sisters. ()94+ This is an enumeration of the order of liability in matters of support. Manresa reasoned out by saying that, since the obligation to support certain relatives rests primarily upon the requirements of human nature and the ties created by family relations, it is only logical that the obligation should first be imposed upon those who are closely related to the recipient and it is only in default of those nearer in degree of relationship that those more remote are called upon to discharge the obligation. (1 Manresa 674). The action for support may be brought against any of those obliged to give it, but the plaintiff must show that those who are called upon to furnish the support before the defendant are without means to give such support. If the defendant can prove that another person who is ahead of him in the order of liability can give the support, the obligation must fall upon the latter. Thus, a rich brother will not be obliged to give support if he proves that the father has enough means to give for support. (1 Manresa 679). Article )**. ;hen the o!ligtion to give support "lls upon t$o or more persons# the pyment o" the sme shll !e divided !et$een them in proportion to the resources o" ech. :o$ever# in cse o" urgent need nd !y specil circumstnces# the &udge my order only one o" them to "urnish the support provisionlly# $ithout pre&udice to his right to clim "rom the other o!ligors the shre due "rom them. ;hen t$o or more recipients t the sme time clim support "rom one nd the sme person leglly o!liged to give it# should the ltter not hve su""icient mens to stis"y ll clims# the order est!lished in the preceding rticle shll !e "ollo$ed# unless the concurrent o!ligees should !e the spouse nd child su!&ect to prentl uthority# in $hich cse the child shll !e pre"erred. ()9,+ This article makes the obligation of several obligors in the same grade a joint and not a solidary one. The proportionate share of each will depend upon his means as compared to the others. It may happen, however, that some obligors may be absent and their domiciles unknown, or for some other reason they cannot immediately furnish their shares. In such case, the law provides that any obligor may be compelled to give the full amount of support, without prejudice to his right to recover the proportionate shares of the others. Thus, although the general rule is that the recipient should claim his support from all those obliged to give it, under special circumstances he may bring his action against any of them. If the court finds that there is ground for the action against the defendant, it will oblige him to provisionally give the full support deserving his rights against the others. (1 Manresa 677-678). In matters of support, the law gives preference to children under patria potestas over all other relatives including the spouse. (Dela Cruz vs. Santillan, [CA] G.R. No. 8491, February 12, 1943). This is irrespective of whether they are legitimates, legitimated, or illegitimate. Such an adopted child is entitled to the same right and preference because he has the same rights as a legitimate child. Article )*1. The mount o" support# in the cses re"erred to in Articles 19, nd 192# shll !e in proportion to the resources or mens o" the giver nd to the necessities o" the recipient. ()92+ Article )*). Support in the cses re"erred to in the preceding rticle shll !e reduced or incresed proportiontely# ccording to the reduction or increse o" the necessities o" the recipient nd the resources or mens o" the person o!liged to "urnish the sme. ()95+ Judgment of support is always subject to modification. In determining the amount of support to be awarded, such amount should be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It is incumbent upon the trial court to base its award of support on the evidence presented before it. The evidence must prove the capacity or resources of both parents who are jointly obligated to support their children as provided for under Article 195 of the Family Code; and the monthly expenses incurred for the sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation of the child. In this case, the only evidence presented by the plaintiff regarding her claim for support of the child was her testimony. The same does not establish the amount needed by the child nor the amount that the parents are reasonably able to give. (Jose Lam vs. Adriana Chua, G.R. No. 131286, March 18, 2004). The amount of support is by no means permanent. In Advincula vs. Advincula, 10 SCRA 189 (1964), it was held that another action for support could be filed again by the same plaintiff notwithstanding the fact that the previous case for support filed against the same defendant was dismissed. It was further held that: Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the same means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. Thus, there is no merit to the claim that the compromise agreement between the husband and wife embodied in a decision in the case for voluntary dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is a bar to any further award of support in favor of their child. The provision for a common fund for the benefit of their child as embodied in the compromise agreement between the parties which had been approved by the court cannot be considered final and res judicata since any judgment for support is always subject to modification, depending upon the needs of the child and the capabilities of the parents to give support. Article )*1. The o!ligtion to give support shll !e demnd!le "rom the time the person $ho hs right to receive the sme needs it "or mintennce# !ut it shll not !e pid e'cept "rom the dte o" &udicil or e'tr- &udicil demnd. Support pendente lite my !e climed in ccordnce $ith the Rules o" <ourt. Pyment shll !e mde $ithin the "irst "ive dys o" ech corresponding month. ;hen the recipient dies# his heirs shll not !e o!liged to return $ht he hs received in dvnce. ()98+ Article )*4. The person o!liged to give support shll hve the option to "ul"ill the o!ligtion either !y pying the llo$nce "i'ed# or !y receiving nd mintining in the "mily d$elling the person $ho hs right to receive support. The ltter lterntive cnnot !e viled o" in cse there is morl or legl o!stcle thereto. ()99+ No finality of support judgment. A judgment for support does not become final at all. The reason for this is that, it can be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the giver. Illustration: If a person is obliged to give support by virtue of a decision of the court and such decision mandates that he should give the recipient P1,000.00 per month and later on gets demoted in his work and receives a lesser com- pensation, he can ask for a reduction because his resources or means of the said person has diminished. Appropriately, however, the reduction of means as a defense does not apply to support of spouses for it refers more to a case where the recipient is a stranger to the family of the obligor. (Corral vs. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3158). Support, judgment for support is immediately executory. A judgment for support is immediately executory because it is needed by the person to be supported. Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance execution will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefore. The provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. The rule has to be so because in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a traversity of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. (Gan vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 145527, May 28, 2002, citing De Leon vs. Soriano, 95 Phil. 806). Demand is necessary. The provisions of Article 203, Family Code requires that before support is paid, there must be judicial or extrajudicial demand. This is so because the right to demand support arises from imperative necessity, without which, it cannot be demanded, and the law presumes that such necessity does not exist unless support is demanded. (Jocson, et al. vs. Empire Insurance Co., et al., 50 O.G. 2628). When obligation ceases. According to law, the obligation to give support shall cease when the recipient engages in a trade, profession or industry, or has obtained work or has improved his fortune in such a way that he no longer needs the allowance for his subsistence. Thus, if in spite of the ability to practice the profession, art or trade, or even its actual practice, the necessities of the recipient continue without his fault, the obligation to give what is needed subsists. (Corral vs. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3158). Appropriately, it is the sufficiency of income derived from the practice of the profession, art or trade that determines the necessity for support and so a father is not obliged to give support to his children if they have their own properties or profession or indus- try, from which they get sufficient income for their subsistence. (Manresa, Comentario al Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, p. 697). The person obliged to give support has the option to give it by either paying a fixed allowance to the person entitled to it or maintaining him in the family dwelling the person entitled to the support, but maintaining and receiving him in the family dwelling cannot be done if there is a moral or legal obstacle. Some of these moral or legal obstacles may be: . (1) when a daughter is already married as she has to live with the husband; . (2) where the defendant abducted the plaintiff and married her to avoid prosecution but never lived with her; (Sentencia [Cuba] of February 15, 1937). . (3) if the natural father of a child has already married a woman, not the mother of the child. (US vs. Alvin, 576; Pascual vs. Martinez, 37 O.G. 2418). Article )*,. The right to receive support under this Title s $ell s ny money or property o!tined s such support shll not !e levied upon on ttchment or e'ecution. (1*)+ The right to receive support is exempt from attachment or levy. The reason is obvious in that it would defeat the purpose of the law in giving protection to the recipient against misery. This is a situation which accepts certain exceptions like when support is founded on contract or will, the excess of which is subject to attachment or levy. Article )*2. ;hen# $ithout the %no$ledge o" the person o!liged to give support# it is given !y strnger# the ltter shll hve right to clim the sme "rom the "ormer# unless it ppers tht he gve it $ithout intention o" !eing reim!ursed. ()124+ Article )*5. ;hen the person o!liged to support nother un&ustly re"uses or "ils to give support $hen urgently needed !y the ltter# ny third person my "urnish support to the needy individul# $ith right o" reim!ursement "rom the person o!liged to give support. This Article shll pply prticulrly $hen the "ther or mother o" child under the ge o" m&ority un&ustly re"uses to support or "ils to give support to the child $hen urgently needed. ()122+ . (1) The provisions of Articles 206 and 207 of the Family Code are similar to the provisions of Article 1236 of the New Civil Code which states that the creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. Whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the debtor. (1158a) . (2) X is obliged to support Y. Without Xs knowledge or consent, Z paid the amount of support to Y. The right of Z is to ask for reimbursement from X, unless there is a showing that Z did not intend to be reimbursed. If there is no evidence of such intention, Z can ask for reimbursement from X. The rule is also true in case the person obliged to give support fails or refuses to give support. . (3) In order that the stranger under Article 206, Family Code may recover what he gave to another by way of support, the following must concur: . (a) the person obliged to give support failed to give it; . (b) support was needed; . (c) support was given without the knowledge and consent of the person who is required to give it; . (d) support was given with the intention of being reimbursed. The stranger referred to in the law means one who is not under obligation to support another, like for example, X, who is not even related to Y but he voluntarily gives support to Y on account of his parents failure or inability to give him support. It must be recalled that when a person obliged to support an orphan or an insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. The provisions of this article apply when the father or mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to support him. (Art. 2166, New Civil Code). The aforementioned law is a form of a quasi- contract which requires the one who is obligated to support another but who fails to do so to reimburse a third person who voluntarily gave support to the one entitled to it, otherwise, he would be unduly enriching himself at the expense of another person. Article )*8. In cse o" contrctul support or tht given !y $ill# the e'cess in mount !eyond tht re7uired "or legl support shll !e su!&ect to levy on ttchment or e'ecution. 6urthermore# contrctul support shll !e su!&ect to d&ustment $henever modi"iction is necessry due to chnges in circumstnces mni"estly !eyond the contempltion o" the prties. (n+ The law contemplates of a contractual support or that support which is given through a will. While the law does not allow the attachment or levy on legal support, however, it allows attachment or levy of the excess of a contractual support over and above legal support. It also says that contractual support can be adjusted when necessary due to changes in the circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.