Laurel v.

Desierto
G.R. No. 145368
April 12, 2002
Petitioner: Salvador H. Laurel
Respondent: Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, in his capacity as Ombudsman

Facts:
On June 13, 1991, Pres. Aquino issued Aministrative Order No. 223 which creates a Committee
for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration. This was however, renamed by President
Fidel Ramos as the National Centennial Commission through EO 128 with petitioner and vice-president
Salvador Laurel as chair. Having the same purpose as its predecessor committee, the said committee will
be terminated when the activities for the centennial celebrations have been completed. In order to
fulfill this, they also formed the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corp with the petitioner as one of the 9
incorporators. On August 5, 1998, Senator Coseteng raised anomalies regarding the Centennial
Exposition Project. It was then that President Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 35 to look into the
facts and circumstances regarding the Philippine Centennial Projects. After the investigation of both the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and the Saguisag Committee, they found probable cause to believe that
petitioner Laurel as chair of the NCC is liable for violating the anti-graft law by avoiding to follow the
rules on public bidding. The case was brought to the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner contends that he is not a public officer and should not be under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because: (1) he is not delegated sovereign functions, (2) he did not receive salary as NCC
chair, and (3) there is no continuance of position because tenure of the NCC is just temporary. He
contends that such reasons does not qualify him as a public officer as defined by Mechem.


Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, as chairman of the NCC is not a public officer.

Held:
No, petitioner is a public officer. According to the jurisprudence provided by Mechem, a public
office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public. The individual so vested is a public officer. In such case, Mechem includes the delegation of
sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position,
scope of duties and the designation of the position as an office.

The petitioner fits the category of a public officer because the NCC is formed to perform
executive functions which are to carry out and enforce laws. The NCCs function to hold a nationwide
celebration is not a mere fiesta, but a celebration that played a role in the countrys economic
development and commemorated our history, patriotism and independence. Salary is not a criterion
to determine the nature of ones position, nor is the continuance of the tenure a bar to assert that
petitioner is a public officer. In his case he is one who holds an honorary office, as opposed to a
continuing or lucrative one.

Heirs of L and C Venturillo v. Quintain
G.R. No. 157972
October 30, 2006
Petitioners: Heirs of Sps. Luciano and Consolacion Venturillo, Represented by Rowena B. Venturillo-
Sucaldito
Respondents: Hon. Jesus V. Quitain, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 15, 11
th
Judicial Region, Davao City and
Engr. Meinrado R. Metran, City Engineer and Building Official of the City of Davao

Facts:
In 1942, Luciano and Consolacion Venturillo occupied a public land and built a house therein. In
2000, Rowena Venturillo, their representative, filed a sales application with the DENR which the DENR
upon reading, wrote to the City Government regarding the application. The respondent City Engineer
sent an inspection team and found out that such property had no building permit. In order to secure
such, the petitioners hired an engineer to prepare the necessary documents. It was submitted to the
respondent City Engineer, but no action was done by the latter.
On October 27, 2002, the Sangguniang Barangay passed a resolution making such property part
of suppressed road being a proposed extension of Mayon St. The City Engineer sent a Notice of Order of
Removal and informed them that the land they were occupying was a road right of way. The petitioners
filed a petition for mandamus to compel the City Engineer to issue their building permit.

Issue: Whether or not the issuance of a building permit is a ministerial duty.

Held:
Yes, it is a ministerial duty. Hence, the petitioners were correct in filing a petition for mandamus
to compel the exercise of the ministerial duty of the City Engineer to issue the building permit. A
ministerial duty is defined as an act or performance that is vested upon an officer or tribunal to perform
a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Such duty or function exists in the issuance of a building permit only when the application
submitted is in accordance with the requirements of the laws such as zoning and land use, sanitary and
sewerage, environment health and such other rules and regulations required under the provisions of the
National Building Code.
In the case at bar, it appears that the petitioner complied with the requirements of
procurement. Hence, the respondent City Engineer has no discretion to refuse to perform an act that
the law requires him to do.

Garvida v. Sales
G.R. No. 124893
April 18, 1997
Petitioner: Lynette G. Garvida
Respondents: Florencio G. Sales, Jr., The Honorable Commission on Elections, Election Officer Dionisio F.
Rios and Provincial Supervisor Noli Pipo

Facts:
On March 16, 1996, Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan for the upcoming Sangguniang Kabataan Elections to be held on May 6, 1996. The Board of
Election Tellers denied her application because at the time she applied, she was already 21 years and 10
months old which exceeded the age limit under Sec.3(b) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. The
petitioner filed a case with the MCTC to allow her inclusion as registered kabataan member and voter
which was approved by court. On April 23, 1996, her certificate of candidacy was disapproved by the
Election Officer due to her age, but it was later on set aside by the COMELEC Regional Director.
Florencio Sales, her opponent for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan filed with the
COMELEC a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Garvida by falsely representing her age in
her certificate of candidacy. On the same day, Election Officer Rios suspended the petitioners
proclamation as winner in the election.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be validly declared as the winner despite her ineligibility as
elective official of the SK.

Held:
No, the law speaks of eligibility which requires not only legal qualification, but capacity of being
legally chosen. She cannot be a voter or member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan because Section 3 (b) of
Resolution No. 2824 requires that a qualified voter must be 15 but not more than 21 years of age on
election day. In this case, the petitioner must be born between May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981. Section
428 of the Local Government Code of 1991 has also made it clear that in order to be qualified as a
candidate for SK elections, one must be 21 years of age on the day of his election. The provision is very
clear that an elective official cannot be more than 21 years old on the day of election. Hence, even if the
petitioner is 21 years of age and has no turned 22 years old on the day of elections, she is no longer
qualified as a candidate for the SK elections. The law speaks of years, not of days or weeks.
Furthermore, despite having the highest number of votes, such is not an excuse for the court to ignore
what the law requires.