052 CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION,

petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNEST E. SIMKE,
respondents.
[G.R. No. L-51806 November 8, 1988]
TOPIC:
PONENTE: CORTES, J.

AUTHOR: Kikoy
NOTES: Si respondent nadapa sa NAIA, was there
negligence on CAAs part that caused this incident.


FACTS:

1. In the afternoon of December 13, 1968, private respondent with several other persons went to the Manila
International Airport to meet his future son-in-law. In order to get a better view of the incoming passengers,
he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport. While walking on the terrace, then
filled with other people, private respondent slipped over an elevation about four (4) inches high at the far
end of the terrace. As a result, private respondent fell on his back and broke his thigh bone. The next day,
December 14, 1968, private respondent was operated on for about three hours.
2. Private respondent then filed an action for damages based on quasi-delict gainst petitioner Civil
Aeronautics Administration or CAA as the entity empowered "to administer, operate, manage, control,
maintain and develop the Manila International Airport.
3. Trial court ruled in favor of private respondent, the court of appeals affirmed the lower courts decision.

ISSUE(S): Was the petitioner negligent?
HELD: YES, The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for it is neither a ramp because a ramp is an inclined
surface in such a way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from sliding. But if, it is a step then it will not serve its
purpose, for pedestrian purposes.
RATIO:
The legal foundation of CAA's liability for quasi-delict can be found in Article 2176 of the Civil Code. As the CAA knew
of the existence of the dangerous elevation which it claims though, was made precisely in accordance with the plans and
specifications of the building for proper drainage of the open terrace, its failure to have it repaired or altered in order to
eliminate the existing hazard constitutes such negligence as to warrant a finding of liability based on quasi-delict upon
CAA.
Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the
plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs own injury being the defendant's lack of due care. In the instant case, no contributory negligence can be imputed
to the private respondent, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809
(1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows:Did the defendant
in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations
cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future.
Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty
of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Simke could not have reasonably foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances.
Even if he had been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its
construction. As the trial court found:
In connection with the incident testified to, a sketch, shows a section of the floorings oil which plaintiff had tripped, This
sketch reveals two pavements adjoining each other, one being elevated by four and one-fourth inches than the other. From
the architectural standpoint the higher, pavement is a step. However, unlike a step commonly seen around, the edge of the
elevated pavement slanted outward as one walks to one interior of the terrace. The length of the inclination between the
edges of the two pavements is three inches. Obviously, plaintiff had stepped on the inclination because had his foot landed
on the lower pavement he would not have lost his balance. The same sketch shows that both pavements including the
inclined portion are tiled in red cement, the lines of the tilings are continuous. It would therefore be difficult for a
pedestrian to see the inclination especially where there are plenty of persons in the terrace as was the situation when
plaintiff fell down. There was no warning sign to direct one's attention to the change in the elevation of the floorings.
Wherefore, decision of lower court is affirmed.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):