Effect on the period to file a responsive pleading
Secs. 5 & 6, Rule 12
G.R. No. L-47574 January 29, 1988 FILIPINAS FABRICATORS & SALES INC., FELIPE V. PESTANO, and BENITO UNCHUAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE CELSO L. MAGSINO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AND ATLAS COPCO (PHILIPPINES), INC.
Background: Filipinas had a dealership agreement with Atlas, to which they purchased several products on credit, which accumulated to P620,266.70. To settle that account, Filipinas, with Pestano and Unchuan as sureties, entered into an agreement with Atlas, assigning with recourse in favor of the latter, some of its accounts receivables from personal debtors amounting to P361,745.98, to be deducted from their outstanding balance. They further agreed to settle the balance in equal monthly instalments and the total outstanding balance will earn 14% interest per annum, plus attorneys fees, expenses and costs in case of litigation.
Facts: Atlas commenced a collection suit against Filipinas and its sureties for failure to pay the outstanding balance of P139,295.95.
Filipinas and Pestano were duly served with summons WHILE that issued to Unchuan were returned UNSERVED.
Counsel for Filipinas, et al. requested a 10-day extension to file Answer. However, before the CFI could act on said motion, the petitioners filed a motion for bill of particulars alleging insufficiency of the complaint and requested for a more precise statement of the matters alleged therein.
On March 15, 1977, the lower court issued an order granting the 10-day extension period to file answer (until March 14, 1977).
Another order was issued on April 6, 1977, requiring the petitioners to set the motion for bill of particulars for hearing with notice to adverse party, otherwise said motion will be treated as a mere scrap of paper.
On April 21, 1977, summons was served to Unchuan, and on the same day, Atlas filed an ex- parte motion to declare Filipinas and Pestano in default, with prayer to present its evidence ex- parte.
The petitioners filed a Manifestation in compliance with the order, setting the hearing of the motion for bill of particulars on May 15, 1977 (a Sunday).
The court held in abeyance the resolution of Atas ex-parte motion pending expiration of Unchuans period to file answer.
Another ex-parte motion was filed by Atlas to declare all defendants in default since Unchuans period had already expired.
The trial court issued an omnibus order denying the motion for bill of particulars for lack of merit, considering that the matters sought to be alleged in the complaint are evidentiary in nature which may be presented in the trial; and declaring all petitioners in default, authorizing Atlas to present evidence ex- parte.
The petitioners subsequent motion to set aside the omnibus order was denied by the trial court, holding that when the defendants (Filipinas, et al) attempted to cure their motion for bill of particulars by setting said motion for hearing, Atlas had already filed a motion to declare them in default, and the period granted to them to file their responsive pleading had already expired on March 14, 1977 without them having filed any responsive pleading, the court denies the aforesaid motion to set aside the order of default for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition seeking to set aside and annul both orders.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the motion for bill of particulars suspended the period within which to file their answer
2 Ruling: YES. Section 1 (b) Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Stay of period to file responsive pleading.- After service of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of denial of his motion, the moving party shall have the same time to serve his responsive pleading, if any is permitted by these rules, as that to which he was entitled at the time of serving his motion, but not less than five (5) days in any event.
We agree with the petitioners' premise that a filed motion for bill of particulars renders the running of the reglementary period to answer, suspended. This statement is, of course, accurate only if the filed motion is sufficient in form and substance, meaning, it complies with the general requirements of motions under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court, which explicitly require a motion to accompanied by a notice of hearing, to be served by the movant on the adverse parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing, and to state therein the exact time and place of hearing. Section 6 of the same Rule further commands that "no motion shall be acted upon by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected." These requirements under Rule 15, as we have often held, are mandatory, and the failure of the movant to comply with them renders his motion fatal.
Significantly, the fact that the court had taken cognizance of the defective motion first, by requiring the parties to set it for hearing and second, when it denied the same for lack of merit in its omnibus motion, did not cure the defect nor alter the nature of the defective motion. In Andrada v. Court of Appeals (60 SCRA 379, 382), we held: "[T]he subsequent action of the court hereon does not cure the flaw, for a motion with a notice fatally defective is a "useless piece of paper."
Even on the assumption that the respondent court's omnibus order was irregular for denying the petitioners' defective motion and at the same time declaring them in default, still, we find the default order valid. The petitioners, who admit in paragraph 6 of their petition that a copy of the omnibus order denying the motion for bill of particulars was received on August 30, 1977, again failed to file their answer within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned orders are AFFIRMED.
Motion to dismiss Rule 16
G.R. No. L-48315 February 27, 1979 ATTY. DOMINADOR B. BORJE petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH II, VIOLETA GALICINAO MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL WATER DISTRICT, and THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, respondents.
Facts: Petitioner is allegedly the counsel of the water consuming public of Ozamiz City who resorted to court action for redress and/or remedy against the respondent water district on account of the increase in water rates imposed by the respondent. Due to consequent representation of the consumers in debates and discussions in the air, he allegedly received blank water bills (without indication of the meter readings, number of cubic meters consumed and the amounts to be paid) from the respondent. So he refused to pay the "blank bills." For such failure, petitioner's water service was cut on February 6, 1978.
By reason of these acts of "harassment" of private respondents resulting in his "humiliation" as well as unlawful deprivation of a life's necessity, petitioner brought an action for damages with mandatory injunction, before the CFI.
The court issued an order enjoining the respondents from disconnecting the water service of petitioner, but upon learning that the same was already cut, the court issued another order directing to reconnect it immediately.
Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds, namely: a lack of 3 jurisdiction of respondent Court allegedly because the "Main thrust of the subject and nature of the action or suit appearing in the complaint is clearly within the field of special civil action or suit action or special proceeding 1 and (b) there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, referring to Special Civil Case No. 0390.
On February 27, 1978, petitioner filed an opposition thereto stating that the issues raised are justiciable and a court of general jurisdiction has the authority to try the case. He further contended that Special Civil Case No. 0390, which questioned the increased water rates unilaterally imposed by the Misamis Occidental Water District, the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 198 and the selection of the members of the Board of Directors, is entirely different from Civil Case No. OZ-686, which is an action for damages due to the harassment committed by private respondents on petitioner.
Surprisingly though, respondent Court, through Hon. Melecio A. Genato, a temporary judge issued an order dated March 9, 1978 dismissing the case not on the basis of the grounds alleged by private respondents in their motion to dismiss but on the grounds that there was no malice or bad faith in the severance of the water coon of petitioner and that private respondent had already reconnected the same.
A motion for reconsideration was filed assailing the order for having been rendered in violation of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Court; and that the order is denominated to be as midnight order because on March 9, 1978, "the Clerk of Court officially showed Hon. Melecio A. Genato the telegram of Hon. Bienvenido A. Ebarle to schedule trials from March 10, 1978 to March 17, 1978 indicating that he has already and previously taken his oath. An opposition thereto was also filed disputing only the claim of petitioner that the order was a midnight order. A rejoinder was also filed by the petitioner reiterating that it is a midnight order.
The CFI through Judge Ebarle, denied the MR, considering that the MR is mainly anchored on the lack of authority of Judge Genato in dismissing the complaint. Hence, the present petition
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint on grounds not alleged in the motion to dismiss or not in accordance with the grounds specifically provided under Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is proper.
Ruling: NO. For the respondent Court to make a finding of lack of malice or bad faith on the part of private respondents from those controverted facts and then decreed the dismissal of the case is, therefore, violative of due process. In view of the doubtful question of facts presented herein, respondent court, in the exercise of sound discretion, should have refused to consider and decide in a summary manner and should have allowed the parties to present proof in support of their respective stand. This is because the right to a hearing, which is the right of the parties interested or affected to present their respective cases and submit evidence in support thereof, is one of the primary cardinal rights of litigants.
To all intents and purposes, respondent Court decreed the dismissal on its own initiative. The SC ruled in the case of De Leon vs. Henson, that the dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of due process, if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it appears that there are issues of fact which cannot be decided without trial on the merits.
Similarly, the SC ruled in other cases, as follows:
... Summary or outright dismissals of actions are not proper where there are factual matters in dispute which need presentation and appreciation of evidence. The demands of a fair and wise administration of justice call for faithful adherence to legal precepts on procedure which ensure to litigants the opportunity to present their evidence and secure a ruling on all the issues presented in their respective pleadings. 'Short cuts in judicial processes are to be avoided where they impede rather than promote a judicious dispensation of justice.
Petition granted, ordering CFI to try the case on the merits after conducting pre-trial conference. 4 Grounds Sec. 1, Rule 16
DR. MELANIO MALICDEM and ROY C. FERRER vs. ROMEO FLORES G.R. No. 151001 - SEPTEMBER 8, 2006
Background: Respondent Flores and a certain Lotivio entered into a contract of agreement for a 6-year term subject to extension by agreement, with former dean Dr. Bautista as PSUs (Pangasinan State University) representative, allowing the former to lease the canteen building and general merchandise store for a monthly rental of P1,200, and obligating them to shoulder in advance the cost of the required repair/renovation of the said building, to be deducted from the monthly rental until the amount they spent was paid.
Respondent and Lotivio repaired and renovated the building and started its canteen operation. Lotivio withdrew from his partnership with respondent.
Before the expiration of the contract, PSU assured the respondent that the contract would be renewed for another 6 years to enable him to recover the expenses incurred in the repair. However, when respondent formally informed the new dean, Dr. Malicdem, of his intention to renew the contract, he received a letter from the latter notifying him that PSU President Dr. Asanion will not going to renew the contract, and that the extension of the contract is only up to October 31, 1999 only (contract: Sept. 16, 1993 to Sept. 15, 1999). A reply-letter was also sent by the respondent but to no avail.
Facts: Respondent Flores instituted an action for specific performance and damages with prayer for TRO against PSU represented by Dr. Asanion, Dr. Malicdem and Roy Ferrer (Special Director for Administrative Services)
During the hearing on TRO, the petitioners asked to be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), consequently, the hearing was reset on another date.
Dr. Asanion, as PSU representative filed an answer alleging that the contract was unauthorized for it was never approved by the PSU President. This move was meant to comply with COAs recommendation to nullify the contract of lease for being defective (no public bidding, 6-yr term is violative of the 2-yr limit allowed by GAAM (Gen. Acctg. and Auditing Manual).
Respondent filed a motion for issuance of TRO asserting that despite the status quo, petitioners started the construction of a new canteen near the disputed premises.
On the same date, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss (w/ opposition to prayer for TRO) for the respondent had no cause of action against them as they were not legally bound to renew the contract of lease, allegedly for violation of several provisions of the lease (failing to pay rentals and to settle the water and electric bills, using the canteen as dwelling place, and making improvements without prior approval).
A comment and/or opposition was filed maintaining the assurances made to him that the contract would be renewed.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in accordance with Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court which mandates the filing of the motion to dismiss BEFORE the filing of an answer.
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied.
The CA also dismissed the special civil action for certiorari filed by the petitioners and likewise denied the MR. Hence, this petition for review
Issue: Whether or not the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper
Ruling: YES. The motion to dismiss was clearly dismissible because petitioners had already filed an answer before they filed the motion to dismiss. Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court provides that the motion to dismiss must be filed within the time 5 for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. The records undeniably show that petitioners, through Dr. Asanion, filed an answer dated December 20, 1999, a month before they filed the motion to dismiss on January 21, 2000. The answer filed by Dr. Asanion as PSUs representative was binding on petitioners because they were not sued in their personal capacities but as PSU officials.
Petition is denied.
Grounds: (j) that a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with
G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967 CECILIO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA, respondents.
Facts: Luisa was married to Cecilio and lived together as husband and wife until he departed for US to further his studies and practice his profession. That since then, without justifiable cause or reason, Cecilio abandoned and neglected her despite repeated demands, and refused to provide for maintenance and support to Luisa, who was allegedly pregnant and sickly, and without any source of revenue.
Luisa then instituted a case against Cecilio. Cecilio moved for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. The motion having been denied, he filed an answer with counterclaim, putting in issue the validity of his marriage to Luisa, which was duly replied by the plaintiff.
A second motion to dismiss was filed predicated on the complaints failure to state a cause of action, because it contained no allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made before the filing of the suit.
The CFI refused to entertain the 2 nd motion to dismiss. Cecilio filed a petition for writ of prohibition with prelim. injunction before the CA to stop the CFI for further proceeding with the case. The CA issued the writ prayed for but dissolved the injunction after hearing and consideration on the merits. The MR having been denied, the filing of the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not earnest efforts toward a compromise is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action
Ruling: YES. Petitioner argues that Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (jam. quot.) requires that before a suit between members of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated (filed) or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.
While we agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines cannot be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies.
Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise them would be superfluous.
It may be that the complaint asks for both future support and support in arrears, as petitioner contends. But, the possibility of compromise on the latter does not negate the existence of a valid cause of action for future support, to which Article 222 can not apply. CA affirmed.