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Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
http://nvs.sagepub.com/content/31/3/329
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DOI: 10.1177/0899764002313002
2002 31: 329 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia and Lynn T. White III
Working amid Corporatism and Confusion: Foreign NGOs in China
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What is This?
it must register with the MoCAor another department above the county level.
Organizations that wish to operate nationally must receive the ministrys
approval. The rules do not provide criteria for what types of social organiza-
tion are permissible; instead, the overarching principles of protect[ing] the
unityof the state andthe solidarityof the nation andnot harm[ing] the inter-
ests of the state, the society and the collective or the legitimate freedoms and
rights of other citizens govern the activities of social groups (Guowuyuan,
1998a, Article 31).
Violations of these rules are punishable by the MoCAand its departments.
The lack of a formal definitionof state interest opens the possibility of broad
interpretationof this term. Also, multiple groups withsimilar interests are not
supposedtoexist withinthe same administrative area (Whiting, 1992, p. 25). A
profusion of policies constrains social organizations, including rules on bank
accounts (which are a major source of control), financial auditing standards,
membership fees, personnel arrangements, and business activities. Some
guidelines are ambiguous or vague. For example, the regulation that an
NGOs staff must have expertise appropriate to its activities gives govern-
ment officials broad powers of interpretation. The financial requirements of
the regulations are undoubtedly prohibitive for small organizations because
every proposed social group on the local level must have at least 30,000 yuan
of legitimate assets or funding sourcesa phrase that couldbe construedin
arbitrary wayswhereas those seeking national registration must have a
minimum of 100,000 yuan (Guowuyuan, 1998a, Article 10).
Both sets of regulations permit civil affairs departments to impose unspeci-
fied fees for registration and other services. Article 35 of the regulations on
social groups (Guowuyuan, 1998a) and Article 27 of the provisional regula-
tions for nonenterprise units (Guowuyuan, 1998b) state that NGOs initiating
preparatory activities (e.g., finding a sponsor, drafting necessary docu-
ments) without official permissioncanbe subject to prosecution. Finally, there
is no appeal process for denial of a groups registration.
Religious groups andfoundations are governedmore strictly by additional
limits on their registration. The religious affairs bureau, for example, requires
that such groups have a scripture that is historically associated with a religion
that has existed in China.
11
Other foundations are also constrained by special
rules of the MoCA; they must have a minimum endowment of 100,000 yuan,
as well as approval from the Peoples Bank of China (Guowuyuan, 1998c).
Foreign NGOs in China 339
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DE FACTO: OBSERVATIONS ON THE BUREAUCRATIC MINEFIELD
Although the laws on paper seem somewhat straightforward or merely
strict, actual treatment of social groups depends onthe whims of the responsi-
ble cadres. Many provinces and localities find ways of bending the laws to
their material advantage. Because definitions of state interest and the legal-
ity of various activities canbe appliedarbitrarily, local or central governments
can easily create a repressive environment for NGOs whose interests are
deemed inimical to the state, or whose presence the bureaucrats consider
threatening to Party security.
Development-oriented foreign NGOs, rather than explicitly political NGOs,
are the focus of this analysis. For these groups, the environment is not inten-
tionally repressive so much as it is simply nonconducive. A complex web of
regulations exists to manage NGOs, but many important areas of NGOgover-
nance are still not addressed. The 1989 and 1998 regulations, for example, are
almost completely devoted to what social groups may not do, rather than to
what they may do. They emphasize the needfor a groupto become registered,
but they provide no details about how a group should go about registering,
nor about the benefits of this legal status. Does registration mean an organi-
zation is an entity with certain rights (e.g., tax exemption, the right to rent
property or hire employees) or only that it is authorized to carry out certain
activities for a certain period of time? Perhaps registration of a social group in
China does not give that organizationanyrights whatsoever toworkinChina,
as Steve Juddof the WorldWildlife Fundsuggests, but it onlysignifies that the
Chinese sponsoring units are allowedto work with them(personal communi-
cation, July 31, 1998). Acase study canrecordfieldobservations froma variety
of foreignNGOs inChina, toillustrate problems inthe environment theyface.
ACASE STUDY OF ONE NGO
12
Ahealth-orientedforeignorganizationwithabout 50 staff members received
its registrationin1997 froma recentlyformedsemiofficial agency, a provinces
international nongovernmental organization society. Although all social groups,
including NGOs, are legally under the jurisdiction of CABs, these CABs have
shiftedthe task of dealing with foreign NGOs to the Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Relations (MOFTEC), which is more accustomed to dealing
with foreigners. In 1996, MOFTEC and the CABs together created Provincial
International Non-Governmental Societies (PINGOS), and they have agreed
to refer all foreign social organizations to these joint agencies. Because no spe-
cific regulations yet exist regarding the existence of foreign organizations, the
PINGOS mirror the mixed interests of their parent bureaucracies, whose pur-
pose is to symbolize the authority of government over social groups.
13
The example NGO (which must remain anonymous) is chosen because its
experience in becoming an established foreign organization is typical of what
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other NGOs have confronted. It is also representative in its structure as a local
organization staffed by Westerners, as opposed to larger, international devel-
opment groups that are more recognized, have more funding, and are thus
more well received.
In attempting to register, the example NGO was unable to locate a list of
materials legally needed for registration. Its staff could only resort to asking
various cadres what was required. The director submitted the organizations
charter, an application, and financial forms from the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service to the PINGOS. The PINGOS told the NGO that it should obtain the
consent of an additional government department. Accordingly, the NGO
sought and obtained sanction fromthe provincial public health bureau (PHB)
to carry out health-related activities. The NGO needed to secure the approval
of two sponsoring bodiesthe provinces public health bureau in its func-
tional field and the PINGOS representing the governments more general
interests. MOFTEC, not the PINGOS, nonetheless issued the approval paper
(pizhun wenjian), and the Foreign Enterprise Service Corporation (FESCO)
issuedanadditional approval permit (pizhun zhengshu) so that the NGOcould
hire Chinese employees. The application had to be indirect, and it went to
more than one authority that could have vetoed it.
After obtaining its registration and naming the PINGOS as its sponsoring
body, the NGO assumed that it had achieved the proper legal status to begin
other activities, not necessarilyhealthrelated. The director of the PINGOSear-
lier had claimed that registering through his agency would allow the foreign
NGOa general permit to work ina variety of relatedareas (e.g., health, edu-
cation, welfare) rather than health alone. The NGO has since discovered that
registration with the PINGOS does not legally provide these privileges.
Working in health-related areas, for example, requires authorization fromthe
PHBfor eachproject, whereas working ineducationrequires permissionfrom
the education bureau.
The NGO has been frustrated with the bureaucratic hoop jumping to
obtain the necessary legal status. Its director complains, The law says you
needto be registered. But it doesnt say howyoucando it, or what youneedto
be registered, or even what being registered means. His practical incentives
for obtainingofficial registrationwere two: (a) toobtaintax-exempt status and
(b) to open a bank account. Chinese banks in the region refused to start an
account in the name of the NGO without seeing its registration permitbut
this did not solve the problem. After the NGO was finally given its permit in
1997 and granted tax-exempt status through the PINGOS, banks still rejected
the NGOs applicationto openanaccount because the tax revenue service had
not authorized them to do so. Why? Because the NGO, as a nonprofit society,
was not paying taxes.
The most significant debate surrounding the NGOs relationship with its
PINGOS has been a memorandumof understanding that the director of the
PINGOS pressured the NGOto sign. This memo states that all financial trans-
actions and project proposals must receive the approval from the PINGOS
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director. The NGO head has been hesitant to sign the memo because this
detailedfiscal approval process limits anddelays his organizations activities.
No national, provincial, or local law requires each NGO to sign such a memo
with the PINGOS. At the same time, the NGO head believes that refusing to
signthe memowouldcreate badrelations withthe PINGOSdirector, threaten-
ingrejectionof the NGOs request for registrationrenewal, as requiredyearly.
The more important question is, Are these difficulties of the registration
process deliberately used by the government to forge a corporatist structure,
or are they simply due to a lack of clear directives by the state, allowing gov-
ernment officials to intervene at their whim? The Chinese translator for the
example foreignNGObelieves that muchof the bureaucratic redtape actually
results fromgovernment ignorance. He acknowledges that the Chinese gov-
ernment does a lot of badthings, but often they do badthings because they do
not knowhowto do things at all. In his view, the lack of clearly defined poli-
cies toward foreign NGOs has led to a situation in which the government
takes one step and looks one step (zou yibu, kan yibu) to see hownext to pro-
ceed (Anonymous, personal communication, July 18, 1998).
AGENERALIZED PICTURE: OTHER NGOS
Because no explicit regulation requires each foreign social group to register
with its provincial NGO sponsor, many overseas organizations choose alter-
native paths (International NGOs Find Their Own Space, 1998). Save the
Children (UK), for example, carries out activities in three different provinces:
Yunnan, Xizang (Tibet), and Anhui. Although the Yunnan branch of Save the
Children is affiliated with the Yunnan PINGOS, the Anhui branch works
under the civil affairs bureau (Y. Lu, personal communciation, July 28, 1998).
The Xizang armof Save the Children is not officially registered at all; it works
under different bureaus for different projects. The sponsoring body (guakao
danwei) of Volunteers Services Overseas (VSO), a British NGO with approxi-
mately 150 volunteers in China, is the Technical Department of the State
Bureau of Foreign Experts (SBFE) (F. Qian, personal communication, July 28,
1998). The Philip Hayden Foundation, which mainly funds operations for
physically deformed orphans in China, is under the government-organized
China Charities Federation (M. Tolstead, personal communication, July 27,
1998).
Interestingly, some organizations have one de jure sponsoring body but
have another state agency as their de facto guarantor. The official guakao
danwei of Oxfam Hong Kong is FESCO, which helps the NGO hire Chinese
citizens (as is otherwise illegal for foreign organizations) and also helps
Oxfam administratively (Y. Zhao, personal communication, July 23, 1998). In
its actual development projects, however, Oxfam works with the Aid-the-
Poor Foundation
14
for its Yunnan projects, the Nationalities Commission for
projects inGuangxi, andthe Department of Agriculture for Guizhouprojects.
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An NGO that has a unique relationship with the government is the Ford
Foundation. Ford is frequently singled out as the only NGO in China with
national registration. With a long history of interest in the country, the Ford
Foundation was the first NGO that established an office in China during the
late 1980s. Its guakao danwei, the Chinese Association of Social Sciences,
securedan agreement fromthe State Council that grantedit tax-exempt status
(J. Harkness, personal communication, July 29, 1998).
The Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF)
15
has a somewhat similar status,
originally because of PRCapproval of foreign panda-mania, and WWF has
been issued a tax-exempt permit. Yet Steve Judd, the energy programdirector
of Chinas WWF program office, admits that although this permit solves the
needs of his own organization, it is actually just a short-term solution. Other
NPOs, he suggests, shouldalsohave tax-exempt status (personal communica-
tion, July 31, 1998).
Not every NGO is as lucky as the Ford Foundation or WWF in finding
agreeable Chinese sponsors. It is rumored that the guakao danwei for Wet-
lands International, the China Associationfor International Understanding, is
actually a facade for the public security bureau. Some foreign NGOs select a
completely different survival strategy andchoose not to wager their future on
the whims of government officials who can choose capriciously whether to
applydomestic regulations toforeigngroups. Rather thanregisteringas social
organizations, some NGOs have chosen to register as foreign businesses
instead, because approval policies are more transparent for enterprises. The
Shanxi-based Evergreen Family Foundation Services (Shanxi yongqing zixun
fuwu zhongxin), an American- and Canadian-staffed NGO, has chosen this
mode. It finds that a major advantage of registeringas a whollyownedforeign
business is the privilege to hire Chinese staff members, which foreign social
groups cannot so easily do.
Some organizations are small enough that they can work without register-
ing as social groups at all. One foreign worker who directs an orphanage pro-
gram obtains visas for his volunteers through a local university. Although
only some of the volunteers are actually enrolled at the university, the institu-
tion continues to grant them visas as a personal favor to the director of the
orphanage program, who has taught English at the university for several
years. According to him, There are ways you can do it officially, and then
there are semi-official ways to do things (Anonymous, personal interview,
July 23, 1998).
CORPORATIST GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
Besides the ambiguous environment created by diverse regulations, the
corporatismof the state canbe foundinits top-downstructure of government.
China has longbeenknownfor its vertical (tiaotiao) political structure, derived
partly from the Stalinist model, and for its concurrent horizontal (kuaikuai)
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structure (Lieberthal, 1995, p. 169; Schurmann, 1966, pp. 85-90). In the vertical
hierarchy, policies formed by the Party or State Council filter down through
the power structure until they arrive at the intended level, where officials are
supposed to mobilize people together. The chain of command means that
communication between local officials may require involvement of the next
higher level.
One NGO director opines that the vertical bureaucratic structure hinders
cooperation among bureaus at any horizontal level, and this creates problems
for his organizations work. Amedical education bureau andPHBat the same
level, for example, are completely separate and rarely collaborate on issues
that demand their joint attention. So if the NGO needs accreditation of its vil-
lage health doctor training programs, it must negotiate with two bureaus sep-
arately. The medical education bureau is the only body that can recognize the
training program as a legitimate phase of medical certification, and the PHB
oversees this NGOs other health work. In addition, the NGOneeds approval
from the PINGOS, its guakao danwei. Multiple lines of authority are articu-
lated in Chinas complicated tiao/kuai bureaucracy (Lieberthal, 1995, p. 170),
and foreign organizations are expected to obey them all.
CO-OPTING THE CORPORATIST CONFUSION
As more money is directed to NGOs in China and elsewhere, many in the
international community continue to ask how to defend foreign NGOs from
Chinas corporatist hold. Perhaps this question is misdirected. Instead of just
analyzing government attitudes toward foreign NGOs, some attention is also
due the attitude of foreign NGOs toward the Chinese government.
The prevailing notion in many foreign NGO circles is that the government
dilutes or subverts their efforts. This belief is not always true, and it is usually
detrimental to teamwork between the two sides. Foreign NGOs might under-
stand that some PRC leaders remain convinced that some noncitizens in
China threatenthe securityof the state. It maywell take decades before foreign
NGOs and the Chinese government build sufficient mutual trust to adopt a
more laissez-faire model of cooperation. To expect China, with its traditional
pride and recent revolution, already to adhere to Western concepts of civil
society and its forms of social organization is nave.
Foreign NGOs can seek honest government agencies that are willing to
collaborate with them to meet mutual goals. Although purist anti-
governmentalists may abhor even the idea of collaboration with the state,
government-NGOrelationships are often indispensable for progress in coun-
tries such as China. It is well accepted that sustainable projects usually come
from working with existing structures. Most of these in the PRC are govern-
ment owned or influenced, so that maintaining good relations with various
levels of the state is essential. Evergreen, for example, even though its activi-
ties generate no profits, chose to register as a foreignbusiness because of a lack
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of clear government directives on foreign NGOs. It is one instance of an NGO
that beganits workat the invitationof provincial officials andhas foundwork-
ing with government officials most effective. It is discussed here as a possible
model for other NGOs that may not desire to register as a foreign business but
can learn from Evergreens experience of maximizing their own organiza-
tional interests while working within a corporatist structure.
Evergreens Well Baby Program illustrates the importance of the principle
of integration, whichenhances a projects prospects for sustainabilityandrep-
lication. Evergreen initiated this venture in 1996, after an exploratory investi-
gation of health conditions in YangquCounty, for which the local government
gave permission. The study revealed that although there were enough health
workers in each village, most of them performed their tasks either perfuncto-
rily or not at all. Maternal and Child Health (MCH) workers, for example,
were requiredto submit annual reports withinformationregarding the health
status of children in their areas. Mark Strand, the director of Evergreen,
observed that MCH workers at the end of the year would feverishly fill in
cards with fabricated information. As a result, the health of hundreds of chil-
dren was not properly monitored.
Rather than initiating an independent program of its own, Evergreens
medical team discussed their ideas to remedy this situation with the Yangqu
CountyPublic HealthBureau. Insteadof employingits owndoctors to visit all
the townships and perform examinations, Evergreen contracted with the
health bureaus MCH department as its partner to carry out this work in the
Nitun and Houcun townships first. Evergreen began the programby training
two MCH workers along with all the village doctors in the townships for the
study. After discovering the inability of village clinics to pay the salaries of
these MCH workers (300 RMB, or U.S.$37.50 per month), Evergreen moti-
vated themby offering a salary of 20 RMB (U.S.$2.50) per half day, which was
gladly accepted by the MCH workers.
Three years later, this project has flourished with the continued involve-
ment of Evergreen. To ensure that MCHworkers successfully graspthe neces-
sary skills, Evergreens medical teamspends half a day in each township once
a month to work side-by-side with the MCHworkers who are examining chil-
dren. Evergreens medical personnel take suchopportunities not only to men-
tor andtutor the MCHworkers but alsotoassess their skills andascertaintheir
effectiveness in parent education. Evergreen also follows up with daylong
refresher courses at each site once every 3 months. To provide an incentive for
monitoring at-risk children, Evergreen pays an extra stipend to workers for
additional home visits to them (Strand, 1998).
The most important result of the Well Baby Programis its replication by the
PHB without any direct influence fromEvergreen staff members. The Yangqu
County PHBhas designeda similar programto monitor the prenatal health of
approximately 300 women in four other townships. Progress in both projects
demonstrates the value of partnership; while Evergreen itself has financial
resources andmedical expertise, the Chinese government provides astructured
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health care systemthat facilitates management of staff workers and programs
and provides access to people (Strand, personal communication, August 4,
1998).
If community or government institutions are already in place, it is often
wiser for foreign NGOs to work to improve them rather than create an inde-
pendent structure that will ultimately compete with the existing structure.
Whenever possible, foreign NGOs should, Strand notes, build on islands of
strength that are already there (Keys in Working, 1997). Besides the eco-
nomic benefits of working with programs that are already in place, working
withestablishedstructures usuallyincreases sustainability(Keys inWorking,
1997).
Ideal partnerships do not always exist, however. Often government offi-
cials are more interested in self-gain than in the idealistic goals of a foreign
NGO. The earlier case study of a health-oriented NGO and its PINGOS is an
example. The NGOcommunitycancome together to increase horizontal com-
munication among themselves and share their solutions for solving such
problems. In a particular province, what have other groups done to become
registered? Withwhomdidtheypartner? Didtheyregister as a foreignorgani-
zation, a social organization, or a business? Although foreign NGOs often
fault the vertical nature of the Chinese government for impeding real change,
the NGOs themselves have not emphasized their own horizontal networks.
Almost none of the NGOs interviewed for this study knew how other groups
in the past hadregisteredor hadbeen grantedpermission to work in the same
provinces. NGOs canimpart their experiences toother groups. Theycanbene-
fit from sharing their local links to officials with whom they have earned
mutual trust, andthey can provide suggestions on howto replicate successful
projects in new locations.
Many NGO workersincluding the husband of the director of Save the
Children (UK) in Kunminghave recognized that disseminating such infor-
mation should be a top priority for all NGOs. In 1996, Nick Young initiated a
quarterlynewsletter, China Development Briefing, withseveral colleagues at the
Asia Pacific Social Development Research Centre in Hong Kong. Nownamed
Chinabrief, this newsletter tracks many development projects inChina andhas
increased the awareness in foreign NGOs about similar work being done
around the country. It also includes the names, addresses, telephone and fac-
simile numbers, and e-mail addresses of those in charge of development pro-
jects. By using subscriptions frominternational organizations, Young can also
distribute Chinabrief free of charge to mainland Chinese NPOs, government
agencies, and research institutes.
Well-resourced and well-connected NGOs can make similar efforts at
increasing communication through sponsoring conferences, workshops, and
seminars for NGOs in related activities. NGOs could make their financial
reports, annual reports, and project evaluations readily available to others.
They couldcandidly share mistakes they have made indevelopment work for
the benefit of other NGOs. Publishing this kind of information on the Web or
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distributing it through electronic mail would be a relatively inexpensive
option for NGOs that increasingly have these resources available to them.
CONCLUSION
The traditional Party-state structure of corporatist China is not the sole rea-
son for the ills that foreign NGOs face in dealing with the PRC government.
Although still maintaining norms of corporatism, the Chinese bureaucracys
main obstacle in dealing with foreign NGOs is its lack of clear policy for for-
eign social groups. As a result, these NGOs are at the mercy of cadres who
have no unambiguous mandates and decide for themselves whether to help
development agencies that come from abroad. For the NGOs, this combina-
tion of corporatismand confusion allows various levels of the state to become
involved in their daily affairs. As the two case studies show, this relation can
be either a boon or a bane. The latter case of Evergreen is hopeful in the sense
that one sees a trend toward negotiation between the social organization and
the state when their social and development priorities overlap.
What does this tell us of state-society relations? This depends, of course, on
the understanding of civil societywhether as a powerful force against the
state, as it is often seen in the West, or as a powerful force working with the
state, to provide services the state cannot. In either case, the role of foreign
NGOs is minimal. Whether seen fromthe Tocqueville (or more recent Putnam)
model of associationalism or European liberal model of state opposition,
17
political or social space is not yet in view for foreign organizations. Even in
models of the state-led civil society proposed by political scientist Michael
Frolic that incorporates the authoritarian tradition common in many Asian
political cultures (Frolic, 1997, pp. 46-68), foreignNGOs are unlikelyat present
to affect interactions of Chinese citizens with the state or affect the state itself.
The legitimacy and existence of foreign organizations continues to be subject
to the whims of a controlling state that has not yet developed the administra-
tive footing to manage them effectively.
Until the presence of foreign organizations is more secure, Western donors
can benefit by seeing foreign NGOsat least those that are development
orientedand the Chinese government as partners, rather than visualizing
NGOs as development alternatives to government. Abelief that the aims of
NGOs and the government are mutually exclusive will only delay any open-
ing of social space for foreign organizations. Most NGOs in China will fall
under the category of either government-organized NGOs (GONGOS) or
quasi-official NGOs (QUANGOS). Although these terms are often used pejo-
ratively by the development community to indicate a relationship with the
government that is too close for comfort, for development-oriented NGOs,
at least, it is reasonable to assume that the government shares many of their
development objectives.
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Foreign NGOs should understand that the historical links of the Chinese
government withsocial organizations is closer thaninthe West. Foreignsocial
groups can recognize that although working in isolation of the government is
scarcely an option, choosing helpful government agencies as partners is
vitally important. They must hone their abilities to identify these associates
anddiscover howto fit into existing structures without creating a competitive
atmosphere. This is not always easy, and in some places even well-laid plans
will not work. For most foreign NGOs, however, government agencies can be
either partners or rivals. The difference is mainly in the eye of the beholder.
Notes
1. Technically, any agency that is not controlled by government can be regarded as a
nongovernmental organization(NGO). This wouldinclude chambers of commerce, trade unions,
clubs, professional associations, and private enterprises. However, the term NGO traditionally
connotes those formal or informal entities that are dedicated to equitable development and the
eradication of poverty. This discussion will be confined to NGOs as development agents who
workwiththe poor. For a discussiononthe taxonomyof NGOs, see SalamonandAnheier (1992).
2. Of course, many mission agencies enter China as nonreligious social groups to evade tight
government surveillance or bans on entry.
3. How was the Chinese government able to implement such corporatist policies? Political
scientist Alfred Stepan, who writes primarily on the state and society in Peru, hypothesizes that
the ability of a state to create co-optive environments is directly related to its organizational
strength and ideological unity. Stepans model suggests that the Chinese Party-state ranked high
in ideological cohesiveness and institutional power. In addition, Chinas elaborate and central-
ized bureaucracy of government departments reinforced the states power. Finally, the states
extensive control over basic resources enabled it to check the power of NGOs. For more on this
topic, see Stepan (1978, pp. 83, 88).
4. The derogatorytermmangliuhas beenrenamedas mingongchao, or tide of civilian(migrant)
workers. Solinger (1999), documents the ambivalent attitude of officials toward this urban
immigration.
5. It could be hypothesized that the growth of foreign social organizations could be extrapo-
lated from the trends of the aggregate. There is, however, little to determine the validity of this
hypothesis. For further readingonthe growthof social organizations inthe aggregate, please refer
to Zhongguo falu nianjian (Law Yearbook of China) (1997, p. 1077) or Minxin Pei (1998, pp. 24,
301).
6. His total estimate of 200 international NGOs does not include small, Christian missionary
groups that engage insmall development andsocial service projects (N. Young, personal commu-
nication, March 5, 1999).
7. The 57%, however, is likely an undercount. Many state workers moonlighted during this
period as well.
8. See Xiaobo and Perry (1997) and many previous books. On the creation of this urban sys-
tem in the 1950s, see Lynn White (1978).
9. These departments are also known as yequ guikou bumen, or guikou, for short. The guikou
bureau that extends approval is not to be confused with the guakao danwei that sponsors an NGO.
See Whiting (1992, p. 25).
10. Mother-in-law (popo) is also used informally for the supervising units of state economic
companies.
11. Only the following religions qualify officially inChina: Daoism, Buddhism, Islam, Catholi-
cism, and Protestantism. See Lynn White (2000, pp. 40-85).
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12. The directors of this NGOhave specifically requestedthat their organization remain anon-
ymous in this study.
13. Several NGO workers in China have surmised that the PINGOS are temporary holding
places for surplus government workers and that MOFTECs aim is eventually to make the
PINGOS 100% private to reduce state burdens. This would explain why PINGOS are so eager to
register foreign NGOs because they can generate revenue for themselves by acting as brokers for
management fees.
14. This is different fromthe Foundationfor the Poor, whichis not anofficial state agencybut is
composed of retired government officials.
15. The official name of this organization has been changed to the World Wildlife Fund. In
China, however, the original name of Worldwide Fund for Nature has not been changed.
16. A lengthy discussion of the different concepts of civil society is beyond the scope of this
article. For a fuller description of civil society as nonpolitical autonomous organizations among
citizens, see Tocqueville (1835/1969, pp. 513-517) andPutnam(1993). For more onthe Habermasian
view of civil society as political consciousness, see Foley and Edwards (1996).
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Renee Yuen-Jan Hsia is a graduate of Princetons WoodrowWilson School who is nowstudying at Harvard
Medical School. After most recently having worked for the International Rescue Committee in Rwanda and
serving as a consultant in Senegal to the Harvard AIDS Institute, her current interests include investigat-
ing how donor agencies can be a more effective vehicle for international aid.
Lynn T. White III is a professor in Princetons WoodrowWilson School, where he was exceptionally lucky to
have Renee Hsia as a senior thesis advisee. His most recent book, UnstatelyPower, wonthe Associationfor
Asian Studies Levenson Prize.
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