Liberalism and Its Critics

Liberalism and Its Critics
READINGS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY

Edited by William Connolly and Steven Lukes
Legitimacy and the State edited by William Connolly
Power edited by Steven Lukes
Democracy edited by George Kateb
Language and Politics edited by Michael Shapiro
Rat i onal Choice edited by Jon Elster
Liberalism and
Its Critics
Edited by MICHAEL J. SANDEL
n
Ne w York University Press
Ne w York 1984
Tlx
Mi chael J. Sandel, 1984
First published in 1984 in the U.S.A. by
New York University Press, Washington Square,
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Liberalism and its critics.(Readings in social and political
theory)
Bibliography, p.
Includes index.
1. LiberalismAddresses, essays, lectures.
1. Sandel, Michael J. II. Series.
JC571.L536 1984 320.5' 1 84- 16503
New York N.Y. 10003
ISBN 0-8147-7840-2
ISBN 0-8147-7841-0 (pbk.)
A'21
Typeset by Katerprint Co. Ltd, Oxford
Printed and bound in Great Britain
Contents
I nt r oduct i on 1
PART 1 13
1 Isaiah Berlin 15
Two Concept s of Liberty
2 John Rawls 37
The Ri ght and t he Good Cont r ast ed
3 Ronald Dworkin 60
Li beral i sm
4 Friedrich A. Hayek 80
Equal i t y, Val ue, and Mer i t
5 Robert Nozick 100
Mor al Const r ai nt s and Distributive Justice
PART II 123
6 Alasdair Maclntyre 125
The Vi rt ues, t he Unity of a Huma n Life,
and t he Concept of a Tr adi t i on
7 Peter Berger 149
On t he Obsol escence of t he Concept of Honour
8 Michael J. Sandel 159
Just i ce and t he Good
9 Charles Taylor 177
Hegel : Hi st or y and Politics
10 MtchaelWalzer 200
Wel fare, Member s hi p and Need
11 Michael Oakeshott 219
Political Educat i on
VI
Contents
11 Hannah A rendt 239
The Revolutionary Tradi t i on and its Lost
Treasure
Index 265
Introduction
Li beral s often t ake pri de in defendi ng what they oppose -
por nogr aphy, for exampl e, or unpopul ar views. They say the state
shoul d not i mpose a preferred way of life, but shoul d leave its
citizens as free as possi bl e t o choose their own values and ends,
consi st ent wi t h a si mi l ar liberty for ot her s. This commi t ment t o
freedom of choi ce requi res liberals const ant l y t o distinguish
bet ween permi ssi on and prai se, bet ween al l owi ng a practice and
endor si ng it. It is one t hi ng t o al l ow por nogr aphy, they argue,
somet hi ng else t o affirm it.
Conser vat i ves somet i mes expl oi t this distinction by ignoring it.
They char ge t hat t hose who woul d al l ow abort i ons favour abor-
t i on, t hat opponent s of school prayer oppose prayer, t hat t hose
who defend t he rights of Communi st s sympat hi ze with their cause.
And in a pat t er n of ar gument familiar in our politics, liberals reply
by i nvoki ng hi gher pri nci pl es; it is not t hat they dislike, say,
por nogr aphy less, r at her t hat they value t ol erat i on, or freedom of
choi ce, or fair pr ocedur es mor e.
But in cont empor ar y debat e, the liberal rejoinder seems
increasingly fragile, its moral basis increasingly unclear. Why
shoul d t ol er at i on and freedom of choice prevail when ot her
i mpor t ant val ues are also at stake? Too often the answer implies
some version of mor al relativism, the idea t hat it is wr ong t o
' legislate mor al i t y' because all moral i t y is merely subjective. ' Who
is t o say what is l i t erat ure and what is filth? That is a value
j udgement , and whos e values shoul d deci de?'
Rel at i vi sm usual l y appear s less as a claim t han as a quest i on.
( ' Who is t o j udge?' ) But it is a quest i on t hat can also be asked of t he
values t hat liberals defend. Tol er at i on and freedom and fairness
are val ues t oo, and they can hardl y be defended by the claim t hat
no val ues can be defended. So it is a mi st ake t o affirm liberal values
by ar gui ng t hat all val ues are merely subjective. The relativist
defence of l i beral i sm is no defence at all.
2 Introduction
What , then, can be the moral basis of the higher principles t he
liberal invokes? Recent political phi l osophy has offered t wo mai n
alternatives - one utilitarian, the ot her Kant i an. The ut i l i t ari an
view, following John Stuart Mill, defends liberal principles in t he
name of maxi mi zi ng the general welfare. The state shoul d not
impose on its citizens a preferred way of life, even for their own
good, because doi ng so will reduce the sum of human happi ness, at
least in the long run; better that people choose for themselves, even
if, on occasion, they get it wrong. ' The only freedom which deserves
the name' , writes Mill, 'is t hat of pursui ng our own good in our
own way, so long as we do not at t empt to deprive ot hers of t hei rs,
or impede their efforts to obt ai n it.' He adds t hat his ar gument does
not depend on any notion of abstract right, only on the principle of
the greatest good for the greatest number. 'I regard utility as t he
ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in t he
largest sense, grounded on the per manent interests of man as a
progressive bei ng. '
1
Many objections have been raised against utilitarianism as a
general doct ri ne of moral philosophy. Some have quest i oned t he
concept of utility, and the assumpt i on t hat all human goods are in
principle commensurabl e. Ot hers have objected t hat by reduci ng all
values to preferences and desires, utilitarians are unable t o admi t
qualitative distinctions of wor t h, unabl e t o distinguish nobl e desires
from base ones. But most recent debat e has focused on whet her
utilitarianism offers a convincing basis for liberal pri nci pl es,
including respect for individual rights.
In one respect, utilitarianism woul d seem well-suited t o liberal
purposes. Maxi mi zi ng utility does not require judging peopl e' s
values, only aggregating t hem. And the willingness t o aggregat e
preferences wi t hout judging them suggests a t ol erant spirit, even a
democrat i c one. When people go to the polls, we count their vot es
what ever they are.
But the utilitarian calculus is not always as liberal as it first
appears. If enough cheering Romans pack the Col osseum t o wat ch
the lion devour the Christian, the collective pleasure of the Romans
will surely outweigh the pain of the Chri st i an, intense t hough it be.
Or if a big majority abhors a small religion and want s it banned, t he
balance of preferences will favour suppression, not t ol er at i on.
Utilitarians sometimes defend individual rights on t he gr ounds t hat
respecting t hem now will serve utility in the long run. But t hi s
calculation is precarious and contingent. It hardly secures t he
liberal promise not t o impose on some the values of ot hers As t he
majority will is an i nadequat e i nst rument of liberal politics, so
Introduction 3
the ut i l i t ari an phi l osophy is an i nadequat e foundat i on for liberal
pri nci pl es.
The case agai nst ut i l i t ari ani sm was made most powerfully by
Kant . He ar gued t hat empi ri cal principles, such as utility, were unfit
t o serve as basis for t he mor al l aw. A wholly i nst rument al defence
of freedom and ri ght s not onl y leaves rights vul nerabl e, but fails t o
respect t he i nherent dignity of persons. The utilitarian calculus
t reat s peopl e as means t o t he happi ness of ot hers, not as ends in
t hemsel ves, wor t hy of r espect .
2
Cont empor ar y liberals ext end Kant ' s ar gument wi t h t he claim
t hat ut i l i t ar i ani sm fails t o t ake seriously t he distinction bet ween
per sons. In seeki ng above all t o maxi mi ze t he general welfare, t he
ut i l i t ari an t reat s society as a whol e as if it were a single person; it
conflates our many, di verse desires i nt o a single system of desires,
and tries t o maxi mi ze. It is indifferent t o the di st ri but i on of
sat i sfact i ons a mong per sons, except insofar as this may affect the
overall s um. But t hi s fails t o respect our pl ural i t y and distinctness.
It uses some as means t o t he happi ness of all, and so fails t o respect
each as an end in himself.
Moder n- day Kant i ans reject t he ut i l i t ari an appr oach in favour of
an et hi c t hat t akes ri ght s mor e seriously. In their view, certain rights
are so f undament al t hat even t he general welfare cannot override
t hem. As J ohn Rawl s wri t es: ' Each person possesses an inviolability
f ounded on justice t hat even t he welfare of society as a whol e
cannot overri de . . . t he rights secured by justice are not subject t o
political bar gai ni ng or t o t he calculus of social i nt erest s. '
3
So Kant i an liberals need an account of rights t hat does not
depend on ut i l i t ari an consi der at i ons. Mor e t han this, they need an
account t hat does not depend on any part i cul ar concept i on of t he
good, t hat does not pr esuppose t he superi ori t y of one way of life
over ot her s. Onl y a justification neut ral among ends coul d preserve
t he liberal resolve not t o favour any part i cul ar ends, or t o impose
on its citizens a preferred way of life.
But wha t sort of justification coul d this be? Ho w is it possible t o
affirm cert ai n liberties and rights as fundament al wi t hout embrac-
ing s ome vision of t he good life, wi t hout endor si ng some ends over
ot hers? It woul d seem we ar e back t o t he relativist predi cament - t o
affirm liberal pri nci pl es wi t hout embr aci ng any part i cul ar ends.
The sol ut i on pr opos ed by Kant i an liberals is t o dr aw a distinc-
tion bet ween t he ' r i ght ' and t he ' good' - bet ween a framework of
basic ri ght s and l i bert i es, and t he concept i ons of t he good t hat
peopl e may choose t o pur s ue wi t hi n the framework. It is one thing
for t he st at e t o s uppor t a fair f r amewor k, they argue, somet hi ng
4 Introduction
else to affirm some particular ends. For exampl e, it is one t hi ng t o
defend the right t o free speech so t hat people may be free t o form
their own opi ni ons and choose their own ends, but somet hi ng else
t o support it on t he grounds that a life of political discussion is
inherently wort hi er t han a life unconcerned wi t h public affairs, or
on the grounds that free speech will increase the general welfare.
Only the first defence is available on the Kant i an view, resting as it
does on the ideal of a neut ral framework.
Now the commi t ment t o a framework neut ral among ends can be
seen as a kind of value - in this sense t he Kant i an liberal is no
relativist - but its value consists precisely in its refusal t o affirm a
preferred way of life or conception of the good. For Kant i an
liberals, then, the right is prior to the good, and in t wo senses. First,
individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the general
good, and second, the principles of justice t hat specify these rights
cannot be premissed on any part i cul ar vision of tbe good life. Wha t
justifies the rights is not t hat they maxi mi ze the general welfare or
otherwise pr omot e the good, but rat her t hat they compri se a fair
framework within which individuals and groups can choose their
own values and ends, consistent wi t h a similar liberty for ot her s.
Of course, proponent s of the rights-based ethic not ori ousl y
disagree on what rights are fundament al , and on what political
arrangement s the ideal of the neut ral framework requi res. Egali-
tarian liberals support the welfare state, and favour a scheme of
civil liberties t oget her wi t h certain social and economi c rights -
rights t o welfare, educat i on, health care, and so on. Li bert ari an
liberals defend the market economy, and claim t hat redi st ri but i ve
policies violate people' s rights; they favour a scheme of civil liber-
ties combi ned with a strict regime of private propert y ri ght s. But
whet her egalitarian or libertarian, rights-based liberalism begins
with the claim that we are separat e, individual persons, each with
our own ai ms, interests, and concept i ons of the good, and seeks a
framework of rights t hat will enable us t o realize our capaci t y as
free moral agents, consistent with a similar liberty for ot her s.
Wi t hi n academic phi l osophy, the last decade or so has seen t he
ascendance of the rights-based ethic over t he ut i l i t ari an one, due in
large part t o the powerful influence of John Rawl s' A Theory of
Justice. In the debat e between utilitarian and rights-based t heori es,
the rights-based ethic has come to prevail. The legal phi l osopher
H. L. A. Hart recently described the shift from ' t he old faith t hat
some form of utilitarianism must capt ure the essence of political
moral i t y' t o the new faith t hat ' the t r ut h must lie wi t h a doct r i ne of
Introduction 5
basic huma n ri ght s, pr ot ect i ng specific basic liberties and interests
of i ndi vi dual s. . . . Wher eas not so long ago great energy and much
ingenuity of many phi l osopher s were devot ed t o maki ng some form
of ut i l i t ari ani sm wor k, latterly such energies and ingenuity have
been devot ed t o t he art i cul at i on of theories of basic r i ght s. '
4
But in phi l osophy as in life, the new faith becomes the old
or t hodoxy before l ong. Even as it has come t o prevail over its
ut i l i t ari an rival, t he ri ght s-based ethic has recently faced a growing
chal l enge from a different di rect i on, from a view t hat gives fuller
expressi on t o t he cl ai ms of citizenship and communi t y t han the
liberal vision al l ows. Recal l i ng t he ar gument s of Hegel against
Kant , t he communi t ar i an critics of moder n liberalism question the
claim for t he pri ori t y of t he ri ght over the good, and the picture of
the freel y-choosi ng i ndi vi dual it embodi es. Following Aristotle,
they ar gue t hat we cannot justify political arrangement s wi t hout
reference t o c ommon pur poses and ends, and t hat we cannot
conceive our per s onhood wi t hout reference t o our role as citizens,
and as par t i ci pant s in a c ommon life.
This debat e reflects t wo contrasting pictures of the self. The rights-
based et hi c, and t he concept i on of the person it embodi es, were
shaped in large par t in t he encount er wi t h utilitarianism. Where
ut i l i t ari ans conflate our many desires i nt o a single system of desire,
Kant i ans insist on t he separat eness of persons. Where the utilitarian
self is si mpl y defined as t he sum of its desires, the Kant i an self is a
choosi ng self, i ndependent of t he desires and ends it may have at
any moment . As Rawl s wri t es: ' The self is pri or t o the ends which
are affirmed by it; even a domi nant end must be chosen from
among numer ous possi bi l i t i es. '
5
The pr i or i t y of the self over its ends means I am never defined by
my ai ms and at t achment s , but al ways capabl e of st andi ng back t o
survey and assess and possi bl y t o revise t hem. This is what is means
t o be a free and i ndependent self, capabl e of choice. And this is the
vision of t he self t hat finds expressi on in t he ideal of t he state as a
neut ral f r amewor k. On t he ri ght s-based ethic, it is precisely because
we are essentially separ at e, i ndependent selves t hat we need a
neut ral f r amewor k, a f r amewor k of rights t hat refuses t o choose
among compet i ng pur poses and ends. If t he self is pri or t o its ends,
then t he ri ght must be pr i or t o t he good.
Communi t ar i an critics of ri ght s-based liberalism say we cannot
conceive oursel ves as i ndependent in this way, as bearers of selves
whol l y det ached from our ai ms and at t achment s. They say t hat
cert ai n of our roles are par t l y const i t ut i ve of t he persons we are - as
citizens of a count r y, or member s of a movement , or part i sans of a
6 Introduction
cause. But if we are partly defined by the communi t i es we i nhabi t ,
then we must also be implicated in the pur poses and ends
characteristic of those communi t i es. As Alasdair Macl nt yr e wri t es:
' what is good for me has t o be the good for one wh o i nhabi t s these
rol es. '
6
Open-ended t hough it be, t he story of my life is al ways
embedded in the story of those communi t i es from whi ch I derive
my identity - whet her family or city, tribe or nat i on, par t y or cause.
On the communi t ari an view, these stories make a mor al difference,
not only a psychological one. They situate us in the wor l d, and give
our lives their moral particularity.
What is at stake for politics in t he debat e bet ween unencum-
bered selves and situated ones? What are the pract i cal differences
between a politics of rights and a politics of t he common good? On
some issues, the t wo theories may pr oduce different ar gument s for
similar policies. For exampl e, t he civil rights movement of the
1960s might be justified by liberals in the name of human dignity
and respect for persons, and by communi t ar i ans in t he name
of recognizing the full membershi p of fellow citizens wr ongl y
excluded from the common life of t he nat i on. And where liberals
might support public education in hopes. of equi ppi ng st udent s t o
become aut onomous individuals, capabl e of choosi ng t hei r own
ends and pursui ng them effectively, communi t ar i ans mi ght s uppor t
public educat i on in hopes of equi ppi ng st udent s t o become good
citizens, capabl e of cont ri but i ng meaningfully t o publ i c delibera-
tions and pursui t s.
On other issues, the t wo ethics mi ght lead t o different policies.
Communi t ar i ans woul d be mor e likely t han liberals t o al l ow a
t own to ban pornographi c bookst ores, on t he gr ounds t hat
por nogr aphy offends its way of life and t he values t hat sust ai n it.
But a politics of civic virtue does not always par t company wi t h
liberalism in favour of conservative policies. For exampl e, com-
muni t ari ans woul d be more willing t han some ri ght s-ori ent ed
liberals t o see states enact l aws regulating pl ant closings, t o prot ect
their communi t i es from t he di srupt i ve effects of capi t al mobi l i t y
and sudden industrial change. Mor e generally, wher e t he liberal
regards the expansi on of individual rights and ent i t l ement s as
unqualified moral and political progress, t he communi t ar i an is
troubled by the tendency of liberal pr ogr ammes t o displace politics
from smaller forms of associ at i or T' t omor e comprehensi ve ones.
Where libertarian liberals defend t he private economy and egali-
tarian liberals defend t he welfare st at e, communi t ar i ans wor r y
about t he concent rat i on of power in bot h t he corporat e economy
and the bureaucrat i c st at e, and t he erosion of t hose i nt ermedi at e
Introduction 7
forms of communi t y t hat have at times sustained a more vital
publ i c life.
Li beral s often ar gue t hat a politics of t he common good, and the
mor al par t i cul ar i t y it affirms, open t he way t o prejudice and
i nt ol erance. The mode r n nat i on- st at e is not t he At heni an polis, they
poi nt out ; t he scale a nd diversity of moder n life have rendered the
Ari st ot el i an political et hi c nost al gi c at best and dangerous at worst.
Any at t empt t o gover n by a vision of t he good is likely t o lead to a
slippery sl ope of t ot al i t ar i an t empt at i ons.
Communi t ar i ans reply t hat i nt ol erance flourishes most where
forms of life are di sl ocat ed, r oot s unset t l ed, t radi t i ons undone. In
our day, t he t ot al i t ar i an i mpul se has spr ung less from the convic-
tions of confidently si t uat ed selves t han from the confusions of
at omi zed, di sl ocat ed, frust rat ed selves, at sea in a worl d where
common meani ngs have lost t hei r force. As Hannah Arendt has
wr i t t en: ' Wha t makes mass society so difficult t o bear is not the
number of peopl e i nvol ved, or at least not primarily, but the fact
t hat t he wor l d bet ween t hem has lost its power t o gat her them
t oget her, t o rel at e and t o separ at e t he m. '
7
Insofar as our public life
has wi t her ed, our sense of c ommon i nvol vement diminished, to t hat
ext ent we lie vul ner abl e t o t he mass politics of totalitarian
sol ut i ons. So r esponds t he par t y of t he common good t o the party
of ri ght s. If t he par t y of t he common good is right, our most
pressi ng mor al and political project is t o revitalize those civic
republ i can possi bi l i t i es implicit in our t radi t i on but fading in our
t i me.
The wri t i ngs col l ect ed in this vol ume present leading statements of
ri ght s-based l i beral i sm and some exampl es of the communi t ari an,
or r epubl i can al t ernat i ves t o t hat posi t i on. The principle of
selection has been t o shift t he focus from the familiar debat e
bet ween ut i l i t ari ans and Kant i an liberals - a debat e now largely
deci ded - in or der t o consi der a mor e powerful challenge t o the
ri ght s-based et hi c, t he one i ndebt ed, broadl y speaki ng, t o Aristotle,
Hegel , and t he civic r epubl i can t radi t i on.
In ' Two Concept s of Li bert y' , per haps t he most influential essay
of pos t - war pol i t i cal t heor y, Isaiah Berlin gives vi gorous expression
t o a powerful s t r and of moder n liberalism. It is t he claim for the
ul t i mat e pl ural i t y of huma n val ues, and t he impossibility ever
finally of reconci l i ng t hem.
The wor l d t hat we encount er in or di nar y experience is one
in whi ch we ar e faced wi t h choices bet ween ends equally
g ) Introduction
ultimate, and claims equally absol ut e, the realization of some
of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of ot her s.
Indeed, it is because this is their si t uat i on t hat men place such
immense value upon the freedom t o choose; for if they ha d
assurance that in some perfect st at e, realizable by men on
eart h, no ends pursued by t hem woul d ever be in conflict, t he
necessity and agony of choice woul d di sappear, and wi t h it
the central i mport ance of the freedom t o choose.
In view of the ultimate plurality of ends, Berlin concl udes,
freedom of choice is ' a truer and mor e humane ideal' t han t he
alternatives. And he quot es with approval t he view of Joseph
Schumpeter t hat ' t o realise the relative validity of one' s convi ct i ons,
and yet stand for t hem unflinchingly, is what di st i ngui shes
a civilised man from a barbari an. ' Al t hough Berlin is not strictly
speaking a relativist - he affirms the ideal of freedom of choice -
his position comes perilously close t o founderi ng on t he relativist
predicament. If one' s convictions are only relatively valid, why
stand for t hem unfl i nchi ngl y?
(
In a tragically-configured mor al
universe, such as Berlin assumes, is t he ideal of freedom any less
subject t han compet i ng ideals to the ul t i mat e i ncommensurabi l i t y
of values? If so, in what can its privileged status consist? And if
freedom has no morally privileged status, if it is just one val ue
among many, then what can be said for l i ber al i sm^
John Rawl s' A Theory of Justice, t he major t ext of cont empor ar y
liberal political phi l osophy, proposes a way of acknowl edgi ng a
plurality of ends while affirming nonetheless a regulative frame-
wor k of liberties and rights. He woul d avoid the self-refuting
tendency of liberal theories by deriving principles of justice in a way
that does not presuppose any part i cul ar concept i on of t he good.
These principles specify basic rights and liberties, but , owi ng t o t he
design of the ' original posi t i on' , do not choose in advance a mong
compet i ng purposes and ends. The excerpt s of his wor k present ed
here do not concern such widely-discussed topics as t he ori gi nal
position and t he difference principle, but focus i nst ead on t he
structure of his t heory, and in part i cul ar on his claim for t he
priority of the right over the good, and for t he concept i on of t he self
that this entails. These are the aspects of his t heory most char act er -
istic of Kant i an liberalism and most sharply opposed t o the
Aristotelian t radi t i on and ot her teleological concept i ons.
The selections by Ronal d Dwor ki n, Friedrich Hayek, and Rober t
Nozi ck illustrate the similarities and differences wi t hi n ri ght s-based
liberalism. Wher eas Rawl s and Dwor ki n advocat e cert ai n wel fare
Introduction
9
rights t hat Hayek and Nozi ck oppose, all argue in the name of
rights whi ch do not rely on not i ons of moral merit or virtue, or an
intrinsic huma n good. Dwor ki n, sympat het i c t o the welfare state,
holds t hat ' gover nment must be neut ral ' on the question of the
good life, t hat political decisions must be ' i ndependent of any
part i cul ar concept i on of t he good life, or of what gives value to life'
(p. 64). And Nozi ck, ar gui ng for a minimal state, holds that
gover nment must be ' scrupul ousl y neutral between its citizens'
(p. 105). Al t hough Hayek and Nozi ck oppose the redistributive
policies favoured by Rawl s, all reject the idea t hat income and
wealth shoul d be di st r i but ed accordi ng t o moral merit or desert.
For Rawl s, basi ng ent i t l ement s on merit or desert or virtue would
put the good before t he ri ght ; in order t o preserve the priority of
right, he bases ent i t l ement s on ' l egi t i mat e expect at i ons' instead. For
Hayek and Nozi ck, tying ent i t l ement s to merit or desert would
under cut peopl e' s freedom t o bart er and t r ade as they choose, and
to reap t he benefits of t hei r exchanges. All put pri mary emphasis on
what Rawl s calls ' t he di st i nct i on bet ween persons' , and Nozick
terms ' t he fact of our separ at e exi st ences' .
One reason liberals are rel uct ant t o tie peopl e' s entitlements to
their meri t or desert or vi rt ue is t hat , on t he liberal conception of
the per son, t he qual i t i es t hat distinguish peopl e as meritorious or
deserving or vi r t uous are not essential constituents but only
cont i ngent at t r i but es of t he self. As Rawl s argues, the endowment s
and oppor t uni t i es t hat lead t o good charact er and conscientious
effort are ' ar bi t r ar y from a moral poi nt of view' (p. 45). On the
liberal view, t he self is pri or t o its ends - this assures its capacity to
choose it ends - and also pri or t o its roles and dispositions - this
assures its i ndependence from social convent i ons, and hence its
separat eness of per son, its i ndi vi dual i t y.
The wr i t i ngs by Al asdai r Macl nt yr e, Peter Berger, and Michael
Sandel chal l enge t he liberal vi ew by calling i nt o question the picture
of t he self t hat it i mpl i es. In cont r ast t o t he liberal' s unencumbered
self, Macl nt yr e pr opos es a nar r at i ve concept i on of the self, a self
const i t ut ed in par t by a life st ory with a certain telos, or poi nt . As
t he telos is not fixed or fully identifiable in advance, the unity of a
life is t he uni t y of a nar r at i ve quest , a quest whose object is a fuller
and mor e adequat e gr asp of a good onl y i nt i mat ed at the outset. On
t he nar r at i ve vi ew, my identity is not i ndependent of my aims and
at t achment s, but par t l y const i t ut ed by t hem; I am situated from the
start, embedded in a hi st ory whi ch locates me among ot hers, and
implicates my good in t he good of t he communi t i es whose stories 1
share.
10 Introduction
Berger offers an illuminating cont rast bet ween the concept s of
honour and dignity, which corresponds t o t he cont rast bet ween
situated selves and unencumbered ones. The concept of
honour implies t hat identity is essentially linked t o social
roles, he points out , while the concept of dignity, mor e familiar
in the liberal ethic, implies t hat identity is essentially i ndepen-
dent of such roles. In the passage entitled ' Justice and t he
Good' , I try t o argue, along similar lines, t hat t he unencumber ed
self presupposed by rights-based liberalism cannot adequat el y
account for such not i ons as charact er, self-knowledge, and
friendship.
The writings by Charles Tayl or, Mi chael Wal zer, and Mi chael
Oakeshot t illustrate the consequences for political di scourse of
assuming situated selves rather t han unencumber ed selves. In
different ways, each sees political discourse as proceedi ng wi t hi n
the common meanings and t radi t i ons of a political communi t y, not
appealing t o a critical st andpoi nt wholly ext ernal to t hose mean-
ings. Taylor identifies Hegel' s critique of Kant i an liberalism wi t h
Hegel' s distinction bet ween 'Sittlichkeif and
1
Moralitat'. Sittlich-
keit, or ' ethical life', refers t o nor ms embodi ed in a communi t y, and
describes my obligation qua part i ci pant t o realize mor al possibili-
ties already there, implicit in a way of life. Moralitat, by cont r ast ,
refers to abstract principles as yet unrealized in a communi t y,
available t o us qua individuals st andi ng in radical opposi t i on t o
communi t y. As Taylor explains, Hegel runs count er t o t he mor al
instinct of liberalism by hol di ng t hat not Moralitat but Sittlichkeit
is the highest moral aspi rat i on; human freedom can onl y be
achieved in a realized Sittlichkeit, an ethical political communi t y
t hat expresses the identity of its members.
Walzer, a democrat i c socialist, and Oakeshot t , a t r adi t i onal
conservative, bot h conceive moral reasoni ng as an appeal t o
meanings internal t o a political communi t y, not an appeal t o
abstract principles. For Walzer, unlike Rawl s, t he case for t he
welfare state begins with a theory of member shi p, not ri ght s.
Welfare rights are fixed only when a communi t y adopt s some
program of mut ual provision. There are st rong ar gument s t o
be made t hat , under given historical condi t i ons, such-
and-such a pr ogr am should be adopt ed. But t hese are not
argument s about individual rights; they are ar gument s about
the charact er of a part i cul ar political communi t y (p. 204) .
Introduction
11
Similarly for Oakcs hot t , political t radi t i ons.
compose a pat t er n and at t he same time they intimate a
sympat hy for what does not fully appear. Political activity is
the expl or at i on of t hat sympat hy; and consequently, relevant
political r easoni ng will be t he convincing exposure of a
sympat hy, pr esent but not yet followed up, and the convin-
cing demons t r at i on t hat now is the appropri at e moment for
recogni zi ng it. . . . In politics, t hen, every enterprise is a
consequent i al ent er pr i se, the pursui t , not of a dream, or of a
general pri nci pl e, but of an i nt i mat i on (p. 229).
Finally, Hannah Ar cndt consi ders how the framers of the
Ameri can const i t ut i on mi ght have embodi ed freedom in what she
regards as t he onl y i nst i t ut i on capabl e of sustaining it, the ward or
council syst em. She concl udes t hat the West ern democracies have
managed t o represent i nt erest s but not t o cultivate citizenship; they
protect civil liberties but have not secured freedom in the republi-
can sense of a shared publ i c life.
NOTES
1 Mill, On Liberty, ch. J.
2 See Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); and "On
the Common Saying: "This May be True In Theory, But It Does Not
Apply in Practice'."' (1793).
3 Rawls, A Theory of justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971),
pp. 3- 4. '
4 Hart, 'Between Utility and Rights', in Alan Ryan (ed.) The Idea of
Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 77.
5 Rawls, A Theory of justice, p. 560.
6 Maclntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1981), p. 205.
7 Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago I ress,
1958), pp. 52- 3.
PARTI
1
Isaiah Berlin:
Two Concepts of Liberty
51
"
i
To coerce a man is t o depri ve hi m of freedom - freedom from
what ? Al most every moral i st in human hi st ory has praised freedom.
Like happi ness and goodness, like nat ur e and reality, the meani ng
of this t erm is so por ous t hat t here is little i nt erpret at i on t hat it
seems abl e t o resist. I do not pr opose t o discuss either t he hi st ory or
t he mor e t han t wo hundr ed senses of this pr ot ean wor d recorded by
hi st ori ans of ideas. I pr opose t o exami ne no mor e t han t wo of t he
senses but t hose cent ral ones, wi t h a great deal of human hi st ory
behi nd t hem, and, 1 dar e say, still t o come. The first of these
political senses of freedom or liberty (I shall use bot h wor ds t o
mean t he same), whi ch (following much precedent ) I shall call t he
' neât i ve^sense, is involved in t he answer t o the quest i on ' What is
Tfl earea wi t hi n whi ch t he subject - a person or gr oup of persons
is or shoul d be left t o do or be what he is abl e t o do or be, wi t hout
interference by ot her per sons?' The second, which I shall call t he
posi t i ve sense, is involved in t he answer t o t he quest i on ' What , or
who~i s t he source of cont rol or interference t hat can det ermi ne
s omeone t o do, or be, this r at her t han t hat ?' The t wo quest i ons are
clearly different, even t hough t he answers t o t hem may overl ap.
THE NOTI ON OF "NEGATIVE
-
FREEDOM
I am nor mal l y said t o be free t o t he degree t o whi ch no man or body
of men interferes wi t h my activity. Political liberty in this sense is
* Oxford University Press 1969. Reprinted from Four Essays on
Liberty, by Sir Isaiah Berlin (1969), by permission of Oxford University
Press.
16 Two Concepts of Liberty
simply the area within which a man can act unobst r uct ed b y ot her s.
If I am prevented by others from doi ng what I coul d ot herwi se do, 1
am t o t hat degree unfree; and if this area is cont ract ed b y ot her men
beyond a certain mi ni mum, 1 can be described as being coerced, or,
it may be, enslaved. Coercion is not , however, a term t hat covers
every form of inability. If 1 say t hat I am unabl e to j ump mor e t han
ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am bl i nd, or cannot
underst and the darker pages of Hegel, it woul d be eccentric t o say
x
that 1 am to t hat degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the
' deliberate interference of ot her human beings within t he area in
which I could otherwise act. Yo^j ack political liberty or freedom
only if you are prevented from at t ai ni ng a goal by human bei ngs.
Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of political f r eedom.
2
This is brought out by the use of such moder n expressi ons as
' economi c freedom' and its count erpart , ' economi c slavery' . It is
argued, very plausibly, that if a man is t oo poor t o afford somet hi ng
on which there is no legal ban - a loaf of bread, a j ourney r ound the
worl d, recourse to the law courts he is as little free t o have it as he
woul d be if it were forbidden him by l aw. If my poverty were a ki nd
of disease, which prevented me from buyi ng bread, or payi ng for
the journey r ound the worl d or getting my case heard, as l ameness
prevents me from runni ng, this inability woul d not nat ut al l y be
described as a lack of freedom, least of all political freedom. It is
only because I believe t hat my inability t o get a given t hi ng is due t o
the fact that ot her human beings have made ar r angement s wher eby
I am, whereas ot hers are not , prevented from havi ng enough money
with which t o pay for it, t hat I think myself a victim of coerci on or
slavery. In other wor ds, this use of the t erm depends on a par t i cul ar
social and economi c theory about the causes of my povert y or
weakness. If my lack of material means is due t o my lack of ment al
or physical capacity, then I begin t o speak of bei ng depri ved of
freedom (and not simply about poverty) only if I accept t he t heor y. '
If, in addi t i on, I believe t hat I am being kept in want by a specific
arrangement which 1 consider unjust or unfair, I speak of economi c
slavery or oppression. T h e nat ure of things does not madden us,
only ill will does' , said Rousseau. The criterion of oppressi on is t he
part t ha t I believe t o be played by ot her human beings, directly or
indirectly, with or wi t hout the intention of doi ng so, in frust rat i ng
!
m v
wishes. By_bemgjn;e i n this.sen.se..! mean noj
L
be i ng j nt e Tf e j r e . d
i with by others.TJbe wi der the area of non-intcrferenc* "thVwitkr J i i y
i freedom.
! This is what the classical English political phi l osophers meant
\
w h e n t h e
y
u s e d t h i s
wor d.
4
They disagreed about how wi de t he
Isaiah Berlin 17
area coul d or shoul d be. They supposed t hat it could not , as things
were, be unl i mi t ed, because if it were, it woul d entail a state in
whi ch all men coul d boundl essl y interfere with all ot her men; and
this ki nd of ' nat ur al ' freedom woul d lead t o social chaos in which
men' s mi ni mum needs woul d not be satisfied; or else t he liberties
of t he weak woul d be suppressed by t he st rong. Because they
perceived t hat huma n pur poses and activities do not aut omat i cal l y
har moni ze wi t h one anot her , and because (whatever their official
doct ri nes) they put high value on ot her goal s, such as justice, or
happi ness, or cul t ure, or security, or varyi ng degrees of equality,
they wer e pr epar ed t o curtail freedom in t he interests of ot her
values and, i ndeed, of ffeectom itself. For, wi t hout this, it was
i mpossi bl e t o creat e t he ki nd of associ at i on t hat they t hought
desi rabl e. Consequent l y, it is assumed by these t hi nkers t hat the
area of men' s free act i on must be limited by law. But equally it is
assumed, especially by such l i bert ari ans as Locke and. Mill in
Engl and, and Cons t ant and Tocquevi l l e in France, t hat t here ought
t o exist a cert ai n mi ni mum area of personal freedom whi ch must on
no account be vi ol at ed; for if it is overst epped, t he individual will
find himself in an area t oo nar r ow for even t hat mi ni mum
devel opment of his nat ur al faculties whi ch al one makes it possible
t o pur sue, and even t o conceive, the vari ous ends which men hol d
good or right or sacred. It follows t hat a. frontier must be dr awn f
bet ween t he ar ea of pri vat e life and t hat of public aut hori t y. Where :
it is t o be dr awn is a mat t er of ar gument , indeed of haggling. Men
are largely i nt er dependent , and no man' s activity is so completely
pri vat e as never t o obst r uct t he lives of ot her s in any way. ' Freedom
for t he pi ke is deat h for t he mi nnows ' ; t he liberty of some must
depend on t he rest rai nt of ot her s. ' Fr eedom for an Oxford don' ,
ot her s have been known t o add, 'is a very different t hi ng from
freedom for an Egypt i an peasant . '
Thi s pr oposi t i on derives its force from somet hi ng t hat is bot h
t r ue and i mpor t ant , but the phr ase itself remai ns a piece of political
cl apt r ap. It is t rue t hat t o offer political ri ght s, or safeguards against
i nt ervent i on by t he st at e, t o men who are half-naked, illiterate,
underfed, and di seased is t o mock their condi t i on; they need
medi cal hel p or educat i on before they can under st and, or make use
of, an i ncrease in t hei r freedom. What is freedom t o those who
cannot make use of it? Wi t hout adequat e condi t i ons for t he use of
freedom, wha t is t he val ue of freedom? First things come first: t here
are si t uat i ons, as a ni net eent h-cent ury Russi an radical wri t er
decl ared, in whi ch boot s are superi or t o t he wor ks of Shakespeare;
i ndi vi dual freedom is not everyone' s pr i mar y need. For freedom is
not the mere absence of frustration of what ever ki nd; this woul d
inflate the meaning of the wor d until it meant t oo much or t oo little.
The Egyptian peasant needs cl ot hes or medi ci ne before, and more
t han, personal liberty, but the mi ni mum freedom t hat he needs
t oday, and the greater degree of freedom t hat he may need
t omor r ow, is not some species of freedom pecul i ar t o hi m, but
identical with that of professors, art i st s, and mi l l i onai res.
What troubles the consciences of West er n liberals is not , 1 think,
the belief that the freedom t hat men seek differs accor di ng to their
social or economi c condi t i ons, but t hat the mi nor i t y who possess it
have gained it by expl oi t i ng, or, at least, avert i ng their gaze from,
the vast majority who do not . They believe, with good reason, that
if j ndi vi dual liberty is an ul t i mat e end for huma n beings, none
sJiQuld be deprived of it by ot her s; least of all t hat some should
enjoy it at the expense of ot her s. Equality of liberty; not to treat
others as 1 should not wish them t o t reat me; r epayment of my debt
to those who alone have made possi bl e my liberty or prosperi t y or
enlightenment; justice, in its simplest and most universal sense -
these are t hei oundat i ons of liberal fnorality. Liberty is not t he only
-SS^l?*
m e n
-
1
can, like "the Russi an critic Belinsky, say t hat if others
are to be deprived of it - if my br ot her s are t o r emai n in povert y,
squalor, and chains - then 1 do not want it for myself, 1 reject it
with both hands and infinitely prefer t o share t hei r fate. But not hi ng
is gained by a confusion of t erms. To avoi d gl ari ng inequality or
widespread misery 1 am ready to sacrifice some, or all, of my
freedom: 1 may do so willingly and freely: but it is freedom that 1 am
giving up for the sake of justice or equal i t y or t he love of my fellow
men. I should be guilt-stricken, and rightly so, if 1 were not , in some
circumstances, ready t o make this sacrifice. But a sacrifice is not an
increase in what is being sacrificed, namel y freedom, however great
the moral need or the compensat i on for it. Everyt hi ng is what it is:
hjjerty is hbert y, not equality or fairness or justice or cul t ure, or
i Wm^ LS j ^ I n e s s , OJLa .quiet consci ence. If t he liberty of myself or
! my class or nat i on depends on t he misery of a number of other
; human beings, the system whi ch pr omot es this is unjust and
Hu mo r a l . But if I curtail or lose my freedom, in or der to lessen the
shame of such inequality, and do not t hereby mat eri al l y increase
the individual liberty of ot her s, an absol ut e loss of liberty occurs.
i hi s may be compensat ed for by a gain in justice or in happi ness or
in peace, but the loss remai ns, and it is a confusi on of val ues t o say
t nat al t hough my ' l i beral ' , individual freedom may go by t he board,
some ot her ki nd of freedom - ' soci al ' or ' economi c' - is increased.
l et it remains true t hat the freedom of s ome must at t i mes be
Isaiah Berlin 19
curt ai l ed t o secure t he freedom of ot her s. Upon what principle
shoul d this be done? If freedom is a sacred, unt ouchabl e value,
t here can be no such pri nci pl e. One or ot her of these conflicting
rules or principles must , at any rat e in pract i ce, yield: not always
for r easons whi ch can be clearly stated, let alone generalized into
rules or universal maxi ms . Still, a practical compr omi se has t o be
found.
Phi l osophers wi t h an opt i mi st i c view of human nat ur e and a
belief in t he possibility of har moni zi ng human interests, such as
Locke or Adam Smi t h and, in some moods , Mill, believed t hat
social har mony and progress were compat i bl e with reserving a
large area for pri vat e life over whi ch nei t her t he state nor any ot her
aut hor i t y must be al l owed to t respass. Hobbes , and those who
agreed wi t h hi m, especially conservat i ve or reactionary t hi nkers,
argued t hat if men were t o be prevent ed from dest royi ng one
anot her and maki ng social life a jungle or a wilderness, greater
safeguards must be i nst i t ut ed to keep t hem in their places; he
wi shed cor r espondi ngl y t o i ncrease t he area of centralized cont rol
and decrease t hat of t he i ndi vi dual . But bot h sides agreed t hat some
por t i on of human exi st ence must remai n i ndependent of the sphere
of social cont r ol . To i nvade t hat preserve, however small, woul d be
despot i sm. The most el oquent of all defenders of freedom and
privacy, Benj ami n Cons t ant , who had not forgotten the Jacobi n
di ct at or shi p, decl ared t hat at t he very least t he liberty of religion,
opi ni on, expressi on, pr oper t y, mus t be guar ant eed against arbi t rary
i nvasi on. Jefferson, Bur ke, Pai ne, Mill, compi l ed different cata-
logues of i ndi vi dual liberties, but the ar gument for keeping
aut hor i t y at bay is al ways subst ant i al l y t he same. We must preserve
a mi ni mum area of personal freedom if we are not t o ' degrade or
deny our nat ur e' . We cannot remai n absol ut el y free, and must give
up s ome of our liberty t o preserve the rest. But t ot al self-surrender
is self-defeating. Wha t t hen mus t be the mi ni mum be? That which a
man cannot give up wi t hout offending against the essence of his
huma n nat ur e. Wha t is this essence? What are the st andar ds whi ch
it entails? Thi s has been, and per haps al ways will be, a mat t er of
infinite debat e. But what ever t he principle in t erms of which t he
area of non-i nt erference is t o be dr awn, whet her it is t hat of nat ural
l aw or nat ur al ri ght s, or of utility or t he pr onouncement s of a
cat egori cal i mper at i ve, or t he sanctity of t he social cont ract , or any
ot her concept wi t h whi ch men have sought t o clarify and justify
their convi ct i ons, l i bert y in this sense means liberty from; absence
of interf erence beyooc)L.ihe. j hif tiag *. but ajways recogni zabl e
?
frontier. ' The onl y freedom whi ch deserves t he name is t nat of
pursuing our own good in our own way' , said the most cel ebrat ed
of its champi ons. If this is so, is compul si on ever justified? Mill had
no doubt that it was. Since justice demands t hat all i ndi vi dual s be
entitled t o a mi ni mum of freedom, all ot her i ndi vi dual s were of
necessity t o be restrained, if need be by force, from depri vi ng
anyone of it. Indeed, the whol e function of l aw was t he prevent i on
of just such collisions: the st at e was reduced t o what _Lassal l e
cont empt uousl y described as the functions of a ni ght wat chman or
traffic policeman.
What made t hej i rot ect i on of i ndi vi dual liberty so sacred t o Mill?
In his famous essay he declares t hat , unless men are left t o live as
they wish ' in the pat h which merely concerns t hemsel ves' , civiliza-
tion cannot advance; the t rut h will not , for lack of a free mar ket
in ideas, come to light; there will be no scope for spont anei t y,
originality, genius, for ment al energy, for mor al cour age. Society
will be crushed by the weight of ' collective medi ocr i t y' . What ever
is rich and diversified will be crushed by t he wei ght of cust om,
by men' s const ant tendency t o conformi t y, whi ch breeds only
' withered capacities' , ' pi nched and hi debound' , ' cr amped and
warped' human beings. ' Pagan self-assertion is as wor t hy as
Christian self-denial' . 'All the er r or s whi ch a man is likely to
commit against advice and war ni ng are far out wei ghed by t he evil
of allowing others t o const rai n him t o what they deem is good. ' The
defence of liberty consists in t he ' negat i ve' goal of war di ng off
.interference. To t hreat en a man wi t h persecut i on unless he submi t s
t o a life in which he exercises no choices of his goal s; t o block
before him every door but one, no mat t er how nobl e t he prospect
upon which it opens, or how benevol ent t he mot i ves of t hose who
arrange this, is t o sin against the t r ut h t hat he is a man, a bei ng with
a life of his own t o live. This is l i bert y as it has been conceived by
^liberals in the modern "worl d from t he days of Er asmus (some
woul d say of Occam) t o our own. Every plea for civil liberties and
individual rights, every prot est agai nst expl oi t at i on and humi l i a-
tion, against t he encroachment of publ i c aut hor i t y, or t he mass
hypnosis of custom or organi zed pr opaganda, spri ngs from this
individualistic, and much di sput ed, concept i on of man.
* \/i 1 1 T
r e e
/
a c t s a b o u t t n i s
position may be not ed. In t he first place
i Mill confuses t wo distinct not i ons. One is t hat all coerci on is, in so
tar as it frustrates human desires, bad as such, al t hough it may have
t o be applied t o prevent ot her, great er evils; whi l e non-i nt erference,
which is t he opposi t e of coercion, is good as such, al t hough it is not
the only good. This is the. jngâtLv^-coneeption of l i bert y in its
classical form. The otKe? is t hat men shoul d seek-toTif cCOvtf
Isaiah Berlin
21
t he t r ut h, or t o devel op a certain type of charact er of which
Mill appr oved - critical, ori gi nal , i magi nat i ve, i ndependent , non-
conf or mi ng t o the poi nt of eccentricity, and so on - and t hat t rut h
can be found, and such char act er can be bred, only in condi t i ons of
freedom. Bot h t hese ar e liberal views, but they are not identical,
and t he connect i on bet ween t hem is, at best , empirical. No one
woul d argue t hat t r ut h or freedom of self-expression could flourish
where dogma crushes all t hought . But t he evidence of history tends
t o show (as, i ndeed, was argued by fames Stephen in his formidable
at t ack on Mill in his Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) t hat integrity,
love of t r ut h, and fiery i ndi vi dual i sm gr ow at least as often in
severely di sci pl i ned communi t i es among, for exampl e, t he puri t an
Calvinists of Scot l and or Ne w Engl and, or under military disci-
pline, as in mor e t ol er ant or indifferent societies; and if this is so,
Mi l l ' s ar gument for liberty as a necessary condi t i on for t he gr owt h
of human geni us falls t o the gr ound. If his t wo goals proved
i ncompat i bl e, Mill woul d be faced wi t h a cruel di l emma, quite
apar t from t he futher difficulties creat ed by t he inconsistency of his
doct ri nes wi t h strict ut i l i t ari ani sm, even in his own humane version
of i t .
5
In t he second pl ace, the doct r i ne is comparat i vel y moder n. There
seems t o be scarcely any di scussi on of individual liberty as a
consci ous political ideal (as opposed t o its act ual existence) in the
anci ent wor l d. Condor cet had al ready r emar ked t hat the not i on of
individual rights was absent from t he legal concept i ons of t he
J S m a n s and Gr eeks; this seems t o hol d equally of the Jewi sh,
Chi nese, and all ot her anci ent civilizations t hat have since come t o
l i ght .
6
The domi nat i on of this ideal has been the except i on rat her
t han t he rul e, even in t he recent hi st ory of t he West. Nor has liberty
in this sense often formed a rallying cry for the great masses of
manki nd. The desire not t o be i mpi nged upon, t o be left t o oneself,
has been a mar k of high civilization bot h on the part of individuals
and communi t i es. The sense of pri vacy itself, of the area of personal
rel at i onshi ps as somet hi ng sacred in its own right, derives from a
concept i on of freedom whi ch, for all its religious root s, is scarcely
ol der, in its devel oped st at e, t han the Renai ssance or t he Reforma-
t i on.
7
Yet its decline woul d mar k t he deat h of a civilization, of an
entire mor al out l ook.
The t hi r d charact eri st i c of this not i on of liberty is of great er
i mpor t ance. J Li s . t ha t liberty in this sense is not i ncompat i bl e with
some ki nds of aut ocr acy, or at any rat e wi t h the absence of self-
gover nment . . Li bert y In this sense is principally concerned with t he
a r e ToTc ont r ol , not wi t h its source. Just as a democracy may, in
II
THE NOTION OF POSITIVE
FREEDOM
d ^ S 4 ^ - ^ L
t o
b e h i s o w n m a
^ e r . I wish my life and.
^
c
l ^ - t a u i e p ^ o
n
_
m
^ ^
B 5 : i
x l e r n a l T c T r ^ s of whatever
fact, deprive the individual citizen of a great many liberties whi ch
he might have in some other form of society, so it is perfectly
conceivable t hat a liberal-minded despot woul d al l ow his subjects a
large measure of personal freedom. The despot who leaves his
subjects a wide area of liberty may be unjust, or encour age t he
wildest inequalities, care little for order, or vi rt ue, or knowl edge;
but provided he does not curb their liberty, or at least curbs it less
than many other regimes, he meets wi t h Mi l l ' s specification.
Freedom in this sense is not , at any rat e logically, connect ed with
democracy or self-government. Self-government may, on t he whol e,
provide a better guarantee of the preservation of civil liberties t han
other regimes, and has been defended as such by l i ber t ar i ans. But
there is no necessary connection bet ween i ndi vi dual liberty and
democratic rule. The answer t o the quest i on ' Who governs me?' is
logically distinct from the question ' How far does gover nment
interfere with me?' It is in this difference t hat t he great cont r ast
between the t wo concepts of negative and positive l i bert y, in the
-end, consists.
9
For the ' positive' sense of liberty comes t o light if we
try to answer the question, not ' What am I free t o do or be?' , but
'By whom am I ruled?' or ' Who is t o say what I am, and what I am
-nat, t o be or do?' the connection bet ween democr acy and indi-
vidual liberty is a gobd deal more t enuous t han it seemed t o many
advocates of both. The desire to be governed by myself, or at any
rate t o participate in the process by whi ch my life is t o be
controlled, may be as deep a wish as t hat of a free area for act i on,
and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for t he same
thing. So different is it, indeed, as t o have led in t he end t o t he great
\ f
l a s h o f
Ool ogi es that domi nat es our wor l d. For it is this - the
\ / positive' conception of liberty: not freedom from, but freedom t o -
\ t oJeadj ?ne prescribed form of life - whi ch t he adher ent s of the
negative' notion represent as being, at t i mes, no bet t er t han a
specious disguise for brutal t yranny.
Isaiah Berlin
23
J d n d . 1 wi sh t o be t he i nst r ument of my own, not of ot her men' s,
acts of will. I wi sh t o be a subject, not an object; t o be moved by
reasons, by consci ous pur poses, whi ch are my own, not by causes
whi ch affect me, as it wer e, from out si de. 1 wish t o be somebody,
not nobody; a doer - deci di ng, not being decided for, self-directed
and not act ed upon by ext ernal nat ur e or by ot her men as if I were a
t hi ng, or an ani mal , or a slave i ncapabl e of playing a human role,
t hat is, of concei vi ng goal s and policies of my own and realizing
t hem. Thi s is at least par t of what 1 mean when I say t hat 1 am
rat i onal , and t hat it is my reason t hat distinguishes me as a human
being from t he rest of t he wor l d. I wish, above all, t o be conscious
of myself as a t hi nki ng, willing, active being, bearing responsibility
for my choi ces and abl e t o expl ai n t hem by references t o my own
ideas and pur poses. I feel free t o t he degree t hat I believe this to be
t rue, and ensl aved t o t he degree t hat 1 am made t o realize t hat it is
not .
The freedom whi ch consists in being one' s own mast er, and the
freedom whi ch consi st s in not being prevent ed from choosi ng as 1
do by ot her men, may, on t he face of it, seem concepts at no great
logical di st ance from each ot her - no mor e t han negative and
positive ways of sayi ng much t he same t hi ng. Yet the ' positive' and
' negat i ve' not i ons of freedom historically developed in divergent
di rect i ons not al ways by logically reput abl e steps, until, in the end,
they came i nt o di rect conflict wi t h each ot her .
One way of maki ng this clear is in t erms of the i ndependent
mome nt um whi ch t he, initially per haps qui t e harml ess, met aphor
of self-mastery acqui r ed. ' I am my own mast er ' ; T am slave to no
man' ; but may I not (as Pl at oni st s or Hegel i ans t end t o say) be a
slave t o nat ur e? Or t o my own ' unbr i dl ed' passions? Are these not
so many species of t he identical genus ' sl ave' - some political or
legal, ot her s mor al or spi ri t ual ? Have not men had the experience
of l i berat i ng t hemsel ves from spiritual slavery, or slavery t o nat ur e,
and do t hey not in t he course of it become awar e, on t he one hand,
of a self whi ch domi nat es , and, on t he ot her, of somet hi ng in t hem
whi ch is br ought t o heel? Thi s domi nant self is t hen variously
identified wi t h r eason, wi t h my ' hi gher nat ur e' , with the self which
cal cul at es and ai ms at what will satisfy it in t he long run, with my
' real ' , or ' i deal ' , or ' a ut onomous ' self, or wi t h my self ' at its best' ;
whi ch is t hen cont r ast ed wi t h i rrat i onal i mpul se, uncont rol l ed
desires, my ' l ower ' nat ur e, t he pur sui t of i mmedi at e pleasures, my
' empi r i cal ' or ' het er onomous ' self, swept by every gust of desire and
passi on, needi ng t o be rigidly disciplined if it is ever t o rise t o the
full hei ght of its ' r eal ' nat ur e. Presently t he t wo selves may be
represent ed as di vi ded by an even l arger gap: t he real self may be
conceived as somet hi ng wi der t han t he i ndi vi dual (as t he term is
nor mal l y under st ood) , as a social ' whol e' of whi ch t he individual is
an el ement or aspect : a t ri be, a race, a chur ch, a st at e, the great
society of t he living and t he dead a nd t he yet unbor n. Thi s entity
is then identified as bei ng t he ' t r ue' self whi ch, by i mposi ng its
collective, or ' or gani c' , single will upon its recal ci t rant ' member s' ,
achieves its own, and t herefore t hei r, ' hi gher ' f r eedom. The peni s of
using or gani c met aphor s t o justify t he coer ci on of some men by
ot hers in or der t o raise t hem t o a ' hi gher ' level of freedom have
often been poi nt ed out . But what gives such pl ausi bi l i t y as it has to
this ki nd of l anguage is t hat we recogni ze t hat it is possi bl e, and at
times justifiable, to coerce men in t he name of some goal (let us say,
justice or publ i c heal t h) whi ch they woul d, if they wer e more
enl i ght ened, t hemsel ves pur sue, but do not , because t hey are blind
or i gnor ant or cor r upt . Thi s r ender s it easy for me t o conceive of
myself as coerci ng ot her s for t hei r own sake, in t hei r, not my,
interest. I am t hen cl ai mi ng t hat I know what t hey t rul y need better
t han they know it t hemsel ves. What , at most , t hi s entails is that
they woul d not resist me if they wer e r at i onal and as wise as 1 and
under st ood t hei r interests as 1 do. But I may go on t o claim a good
deal more t han t hi s. 1 may decl are t hat t hey are actually aiming at
what in their beni ght ed st at e t hey consci ousl y resist, because there
exists wi t hi n t hem an occul t entity - their l at ent r at i onal will, or
their ' t r ue' pur pose - and t hat t hi s ent i t y, al t hough it is belied by all
t hat they overtly feel and do and say, is t hei r ' r eal ' self, of whi ch the
poor empi ri cal self in space and t i me may know not hi ng or little;
and t hat this inner spirit is t he onl y self t hat deserves t o have its
wishes t aken into a c c ount .
1 0
Once 1 t ake this vi ew, I am in a
posi t i on t o i gnore t he act ual wi shes of men or soci et i es, t o bully,
oppress, t ort ure t hem in t he name, and on behalf, of t hei r ' real '
selves, in t he secure knowl edge t hat what ever is t he t rue goal of
man (happi ness, per f or mance of dut y, wi s dom, a just society, self-
fulfilment) must be i dent i cal wi t h his freedom - t he free choice of
s
' ^
r u e
' '
a l b e i t o f t e n
submer ged and i nart i cul at e, self.
This par adox has been often exposed. It is one t hi ng t o say t hat I
know what is good for X, whi l e he himself does not ; and even t o
i gnore hi s wi shes for its - and his - sake; and a very different one t o
say t hat he has eo ipso chosen it, not i ndeed consci ousl y, not as he
seems in everyday life, but in his role as a r at i onal self whi ch his
empirical self may not know - t he ' r eal ' self whi ch di scerns the
good, and cannot help choosi ng it once it is reveal ed. J J i i s
raonst rous i mper sonat i on, whi ch consists in equat i ng wha t X"
Isaiah Berlin 25
woul d choose if he were somet hi ng he is not, or at least_not_yer,
with what X act ual l y seeks and chooses, is at the heart of all
political t heori es of self-realization. It is one t hi ng to say t h a t ! may
be coerced for my own good whi ch 1 am t oo blind to see: this may,
on occasi on, be for my benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope of ;
my liberty. It is anot her to say t hat if it is my good, then I am not '
being coerced, for I have willed it, whet her I know this or not, and i
am free (or ' t r ul y' free) even while my poor earthly body and /
foolish mi nd bi t t erl y reject it, and struggle against those who seek .'
however benevol ent l y t o i mpose it, wi t h the greatest desperation.
Thi s magi cal t r ansf or mat i on, or sleight of hand (for which
William James so justly mocked t he Hegel i ans), can no doubt be
per pet r at ed just as easily wi t h t he ' negat i ve' concept of freedom,
where t he self t hat shoul d not be interfered with is no longer the
i ndi vi dual wi t h his act ual wishes and needs as they are normally
conceived, but t he "real' man wi t hi n, identified with the pursuit of
some ideal pur pose not dr eamed of by his empirical self. And, as in
t he case of t he ' posi t i vel y' free self, this entity may be inflated into
some super - per sonal entity - a st at e, a class, a nat i on, or the march
of hi st ory itself, r egar ded as a mor e ' real ' subject of attributes than
t he empi ri cal self. But t he ' posi t i ve' concept i on of freedom as self-
mast ery, wi t h its suggest i on of a man divided against himself, has,
in fact, and as a mat t er of hi st ory, of doct ri ne and of practice, lent
itself mor e easily t o this splitting or personality into t wo: the
t r anscendent , domi nant cont rol l er, and t he empirical bundl e of
desires and passi ons t o be disciplined and br ought t o heel. It is this
hi st ori cal fact t hat has been influential. Thi s demonst rat es (if
demons t r at i on of so obvi ous a t r ut h is needed) t hat conceptions of
freedom directly deri ve from views of what constitutes a self, a
person, a man. Enough mani pul at i on wi t h t he definition of man,
and freedom can be made t o mean what ever the mani pul at or
wi shes. Recent hi st ory has made it only t oo clear t hat t he issue is
not merely academi c.
The consequences of di st i ngui shi ng bet ween OwiX_s^yjsvy| ll
becume even cl earer if one consi ders t he t wo major forms which the
desire t o be self-directed - di rect ed by one' s ' t r ue' self - has
historically taken-' the first, t hat of self-abnegation in order t o attain
J Od^ e n d e n c e j t he second, t hat of self-realization, or total self-
identification wi t h a specific pri nci pl e or ideal in order t o attain the
selfsame end.. . .
26
III
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY
The French Revol ut i on, like all great revol ut i ons, was , at least in its
Jacobin form, just such an erupt i on of t he desire f or ' positive
freedom of collective self-direction on t he par t of a large body of
Frenchmen who felt liberated as a nat i on, even thoug h t he result
was, for a good many of t hem, a severe rest ri ct i on of individual
freedoms. Rousseau had spoken exul t ant l y of t he fact t hat the laws
of liberty might prove to be mor e austere t han t he yoke of t yranny.
Tyranny is service t o human mast ers. The l aw cannot be a t yrant .
Rousseau does not mean by liberty t he ' negat i ve' freedom of the
individual not to be interfered with wi t hi n a defined ar ea, but the
possession by all, and not merely by some, of t he fully qualified
members of a society of a share in t he publ i c power whi ch is
entitled t o interfere with every aspect of every citizen' s life. The
liberals of the first half of the ni net eent h cent ury correct l y foresaw
that liberty in this ' positive' sense could easily dest roy t oo many of
the ' negative' liberties t hat t hey held sacred. They poi nt ed out t hat
the sovereignty of the peopl e could easily dest roy t hat of indi-
viduals. Mill explained, patiently and unanswer abl y, t hat govern-
ment by t he people was not , in his sense, necessarily freedom at all.
For those who govern are not necessarily t he same ' peopl e' as t hose
who are governed, and democrat i c sel f-government is not t he
government 'of each by hi msel f but , at best , of ' each by t he rest ' .
Mill and his disciples spoke of t he t yranny of t he maj ori t y and of
the t yranny of ' the prevailing feeling and opi ni on' , and s aw no great
difference between that and any ot her ki nd of t yr anny whi ch
encroaches upon men' s activities beyond t he sacred frontiers of
private life.
No one saw the conflict bet ween t he t wo t ypes of liberty bet t er,
or expressed it mor e clearly, t han Benjamin Const ant . He poi nt ed
out t hat the transference by a successful j i s i ng of t he unl i mi t ed
aut hori t y, commonl y called sovereignty, from one set of hands t o
anot her does not increase liberty, but merely shifts t he bur den of
slavery. He reasonably asked why a man shoul d deeply care
whet her he is crushed by a popul ar gover nment or by a monar ch, or
even by a set of oppressive l aws. He saw t hat th^majn^pxDblem for
^ ^
e
J 5 ! j >
0
^ i r ^ ' n e
g
. a t i v e : , i ndi vi duaLi r eedom i s_nat wh o wi el ds
t hi s . aut hpmj r j i ut how^much a ut hor i t y^MuJ xi J ^r i l a c e i i n My ^ e t
Isaiah Berlin 27
of hands . For unl i mi t ed aut hor i t y in anybody' s grasp was bound,
"hTrjelieved, sooner or later, t o dest roy somebody. He mai nt ai ned
t hat usual l y men pr ot est ed agai nst this or t hat set of governors as
oppressi ve, when t he real cause of oppressi on lay in t he mere fact of
t he accumul at i on of power itself, wherever it mi ght happen t o be,
since l i bert y was endanger ed by t he mere existence of absolute
aut hor i t y as such. ' It is not t he ar m t hat is unj ust ' , he wr ot e, ' but the
weapon t hat is t oo heavy - some wei ght s are t oo heavy for the
huma n hand. ' Democr acy may di sarm a given oligarchy, a given
privileged i ndi vi dual or set of i ndi vi dual s, but it can still crush
i ndi vi dual s as mercilessly as any previ ous ruler. In an essay
compar i ng t he liberty of t he moder ns wi t h t hat of t he ancients he
said t hat an equal r i ght t o oppress - or interfere - is not equivalent
t o l i bert y. No r does uni versal consent t o loss of liberty somehow
mi racul ousl y preserve it merely by being universal, or by being
consent . If I consent t o be oppr essed, or acquiesce in my condition
wi t h det achment or i rony, am I t he less oppressed? If I sell myself
i nt o slavery, am I t he less a slave? If I commi t suicide, am I the less
dead because I have t aken my own life freely? ' Popul ar government
is a s pas modi c t yr anny, monar chy a mor e efficiently centralized
despot i sm. ' Cons t ant saw in Rousseau the most dangerous enemy
of i ndi vi dual liberty, because he had declared t hat ' by giving myself
t o all I give myself t o none' . Const ant coul d not see why, even
t hough t he soverei gn is ' ever ybody' , it shoul d not oppress one of
t he ' member s ' of its indivisible self, if it so decided. I may, of course,
prefer t o be depri ved of my liberties by an assembly, or a family, or
a class, in whi ch I am a mi nor i t y. It may give me an opport uni t y one
day of per suadi ng t he ot her s t o do for me t hat t o which I feel I am
ent i t l ed. But t o be depri ved of my liberty at t he hands of my family
or friends or fellow citizens is t o be depri ved of it just as effectively.
Hobbes was at any r at e mor e candi d: he did not pret end t hat a
sovereign does not ensl ave: he justified this slavery, but at least did
not have t he effrontery t o call it freedom.
Thr oughout t he. ni net eent h century J i bej aUbi nker s . mai nt ai ned
t hat if l i bert y i nvol ved a l i mi t upon t he power s of any man t o force
me t o, do wha t I di d not , or mi ght not , wi sh t o do, t hen, what ever
t he ideal i n t he na me of whi ch I was coerced, I was not free; t hat the
doct ri ne of absol ut e soverei gnt y was a t yranni cal doct ri ne .in itself,.
If I wi sh t o preserve my liberty, it is not enough t o say t hat is must
not be vi ol at ed unl ess someone or ot her - the absol ut e ruler, or the
popul ar assr nbl y, or t he King in Parl i ament , or the judges, or some
combi nat i on of aut hor i t i es, or t he laws themselves - for t he laws
may be oppr essi ve - aut hor i zes its vi ol at i on, I must establish - a
28
society in whi ch t here must bje_somejxoiitiers of freedom whi ch
Tnot3od5~s1S^ld be pelrnirtteTto^cross. Different names or nat ur es
may be given to t he rules t hat det ermi ne t hese front i ers: they may
be called nat ural rights, or t he wor d of God, or Nat ur al Law, or t he
demands of utility or of t he ' per manent interests of ma n' ; I may
believe t hem t o be valid a priori, or j i s s er t t hem t o be my o wn
ultirnatFenas7ofTteTna"s; of my so'ciety or cul t ure. Wha t t hese rules
or a^mTnamenTs"wi l l have in common is t hat they are accept ed so
widely, and are gr ounded so deeply in t he act ual nat ur e of men as
they have developed t hr ough hi st ory, as t o be, by now, an essential
j par t of what we mean by bei ng a nor mal huma n bei ng. Genui ne
/ belief in t he inviolability of a mi ni mum ext ent of i ndi vi dual liberty
I entails some such absol ut e st and. For it is clear t hat it has little t o
hope for from t he rule of majorities; democracy as such is logically
uncommi t t ed t o it, and historically has at t i mes failed t o pr ot ect it,
while remai ni ng faithful t o its own principles. Few gover nment s, it
has been observed, have found much difficulty in causi ng t hei r
subjects t o generat e any will t hat t he gover nment want ed. ' The
t r i umph of despot i sm is t o force t he slaves t o decl are t hemsel ves
free. It may need no force; t he slaves may pr ocl ai m t hei r freedom
qui t e sincerely: but they are none the less slaves. Per haps t he chief
value for liberals of political - ' posi t i ve' - ri ght s, of par t i ci pat i ng in
t he government , is as a means for prot ect i ng what t hey hol d t o be
an ul t i mat e value, namel y individual - ' negat i ve' - liberty.
But if deni ocxaci es. . . ^
suppress f r ei dor r vaLl eas t a s l i b e n i l s ^
woul d make a sodet y truly free? For Cons t ant , N4ill, Tocquevi l l e,
and t he liberal t radi t i on t o whi ch they, bel ongs
unless it is governed by at any r at e t wo i nt errel at ed pri nci pl es: first,
t hat no power , but onl y ri ght s, can. be regarded as absol ut e, so t hat
all men, what ever power governs t hem, have an absol ut e ri ght t o
rejfuse to behave i nhurnanl y; and, . s econd
r
t hat t h e r e a r e front i ers,
not artificially dr awn, wi t hi n whi ch men shoul d be i nvi ol abl e, t hese
frontiers being denned in terms. o rules so. l on&and wi del y accept ed
t hat their observance has ent ered i nt o t he very concept i on of wha t
it is"toi: a nor mal huma n bei ng, and, t herefore, also of what it is t o
act mhumanl y or insanely;,jroles..oi whi ch it woul d: beTrt errxd t o
say, for exampl e, t hat they coul d be abr ogat ed by some f or mal
procedure on' "the"paff of some c o u ^ When I
speak of a man as bei ng nor mal , a par t of what I mean is t hat he
coul d not br eak t hese rules easily, wi t hout a qual m of revul si on, it
is such rules as these t hat are br oken when a man is decl ared guilty
wi t hout t ri al , or puni shed under a ret roact i ve l aw; when chi l dren
Isaiah Berlin
29
are or der ed t o denounce t hei r par ent s, friends t o betray one
anot her , soldiers t o use met hods of bar bar i sm; when men are
t or t ur ed or mur der ed, or mi nori t i es are massacred because they
i rri t at e a maj ori t y or a t yrant . Such act s, even if they are made legal
by t he soverei gn, cause hor r or even in t hese days, and this springs
from t he recogni t i on of t he mor al validity irrespective of the l aws
of some absol ut e barri ers t o t he i mposi t i on of one man' s will on
anot her . The freedom of a society, or a class or a gr oup, in this
sense of freedom, is measur ed by t he st rengt h of these barri ers, and
t he numbe r and i mpor t ance of t he pat hs whi ch they keep open for
t hei r member s - if not for all, for at any rat e a great number of
t h e m.
1 1
. Thi s is al most at t he opposi t e pole from the purposes of t hose
wh o believe in liberty in t he ' posi t i ve' - self-directive - sense J " h e
former want t o curb aut hor i t y as such. The latter want it pl aced
in t hei r own hands . That is a cardi nal issue. These are not t wo
different i nt er pr et at i ons of a single concept , but t wo profoundl y
di vergent and i rreconci l abl e at t i t udes t o t he ends of life. It is as well
t o recogni ze t hi s, even if in pract i ce it is often necessary to strike a
compr omi s e bet ween t hem. For each of t hem makes absol ut e
cl ai ms. These cl ai ms cannot bot h be fully satisfied. But it is a
pr of ound lack of social and mor al under st andi ng not t o recognize
t hat t he satisfaction t hat each of t hem seeks is an ul t i mat e val ue
whi ch, bot h historically and moral l y, has an equal ri ght t o be
classed among t he deepest interests of manki nd.
IV
THE ONE AND THE MANY
One belief, mor e t han any ot her , is responsi bl e for t he sl aught er of
i ndi vi dual s on t he al t ars of t he great historical ideals justice
or pr ogr ess or t he happi ness of future generat i ons, or t he sacred
mi ssi on or emanci pat i on of a nat i on or race or class, or even liberty
itself, whi ch demands t he sacrifice of i ndi vi dual s for t he freedom of
society. Thi s is t he belief t hat somewher e, in t he past or in t he
fut ure, in di vi ne revel at i on or in t he mi nd of an i ndi vi dual t hi nker,
in t he pr onouncement s of hi st ory or science, or in t he simple hear t
of an uncor r upt ed good man, t here is a final sol ut i on. Thi s anci ent
faith rests on t he convi ct i on t hat all t he posi t i ve val ues in whi ch
men have believed must , in t he end, be compat i bl e, and per haps
even entail one anot her. ' Nat ur e binds t r ut h, happi ness, and vi rt ue
together as by an indissoluble chai n' , said one of the best men who
ever lived, and spoke in similar t erms of di hert y, equal i t y, and
j ust i ce.
1 2
But is this true? It is a commonpl ace t hat neither political
equality nor efficient organi zat i on nor social justice is compat i bl e
with mor e t han a modi cum of individual liberty, and certainly not
with unrestricted laissez-faire; t hat justice and generosity, publ i c
and private loyalties, the demands of genius and t he claims of
society, can conflict violently wi t h each ot her. And it is no great
way from t hat t o the generalization t hat not all good t hi ngs are
compat i bl e, still less all the ideals of manki nd. But somewher e, we
shall be t ol d, and in some way, it must be possible for all these
values t o live t oget her, for unless this is so, the universe is not a
cosmos, not a har mony; unless this is so, conflicts of values may
be an intrinsic, i rremovabl e element in human life. To admi t
t hat t he fulfilment of some of our ideals may in principle make
the fulfilment of ot hers impossible is to say t hat t he not i on of
total human fulfilment is a formal cont radi ct i on, a met aphysi cal
chimera. For every rationalist met aphysi ci an, from Plato t o t he last
disciples of Hegel or Mar x, this abandonment of t he not i on of a
final har mony in whi ch all riddles are solved, all cont r adi ct i ons
reconciled, is a piece of crude empiricism, abdi cat i on before brut e
facts, intolerable bankr upt cy of reason before things as t hey are,
failure t o explain and t o justify, t o reduce everyt hi ng t o a syst em,
which ' reason' indignantly rejects. But if we are not armed with an
a priori guarant ee of the proposi t i on t hat a t ot al har mony of t r ue
values is somewhere t o be found - perhaps in some ideal realm t he
characteristics of whi ch we can, in our finite state, not so much as
conceive - we must fall back on t he ordi nary resources of empi ri cal
observat i on and ordi nary human knowl edge. And these cert ai nl y
give us no war r ant for supposi ng (or even under st andi ng what
woul d be meant by saying) t hat all good things, or all bad t hi ngs for
t hat mat t er , are reconcilable with each ot her. The wor l d t hat we
encount er in or di nar y experi ence is one in whi ch we are faced wi t h
choices bet ween ends equally ul t i mat e, and claims equally absol ut e,
t he realization of some of which must inevitably involve t he
sacrif ice of ot hers. Indeed, it is because this is their si t uat i on t hat
men place such i mmense value upon t he freedom t o choose; for if
they had assurance t hat in some perfect state, realizable by men on
earth, no ends pursued by them would ever be in conf lict, t he
necessity and ag ony of choice would disappear, and wi th it t he
central i mport ance of the f reedom to choose. Any method of
Isaiah Berlin
31
bri ngi ng this final st at e nearer woul d t hen seem fully justified, no
mat t er how much freedom were sacrificed t o forward its advance. It
is, I have no doubt , some such dogmat i c cert ai nt y t hat has been
responsi bl e for t he deep, serene, unshakeabl e conviction in the
mi nds of some of t he most merciless t yr ant s and persecut ors in
hi st ory t hat what they did was fully justified by its pur pose. 1 do not
say t hat t he ideal of self-perfection - whet her for individuals or
nat i ons or churches or classes - is t o be condemned in itself, or t hat
t he l anguage whi ch was used in its defence was in all cases the result
of a confused or fraudul ent use of wor ds, or of mor al or intellectual
perversi t y. Indeed, I have tried t o show t hat it is the not i on of
freedom in its ' posi t i ve' sense t hat is at t he hear t of t he demands for
nat i onal or social self-direction whi ch ani mat e t he most powerful
and moral l y just publ i c movement s of our t i me, and t hat not t o
recogni ze this is t o mi sunder st and the most vital facts and ideas of
our age. But equal l y it seems t o me t hat the belief t hat some single
formul a can in pri nci pl e be found wher eby all t he diverse ends of
men can be har moni ousl y realized is demonst r abl y false. If, as I
believe, the ends of men are many, and not all of t hem are in
pri nci pl e compat i bl e wi t h each ot her, t hen t he possibility of conflict
and of t ragedy can never whol l y be el i mi nat ed from human
life, ei t her per sonal or social. The necessity of choosi ng bet ween
absol ut e claims is t hen an i nescapabl e charact eri st i c of t he human
condi t i on. Thi s gives its value t o freedom as Act on had conceived of
it as an end in itself, and not as a t empor ar y need, arising out
of our confused not i ons and i rrat i onal and di sordered lives, a
pr edi cament whi ch a panacea coul d one day put right.
I do not wi sh t o say t hat individual freedom is, even in the most
liberal societies, t he sole, or even t he domi nant , cri t eri on of social
act i on. We compel chi l dren t o be educat ed, and we forbid publ i c
execut i ons. These are certainly curbs t o freedom. We justify t hem
on t he gr ounds t hat i gnor ance, or a bar bar i an upbri ngi ng, or cruel
pl easures and exci t ement s are worse for us t han t he amount of
rest rai nt needed t o repress t hem. Thi s j udgement i n t ur n depends
on how we det er mi ne good and evil, t hat is-txx say,, on our . mor al ,
religious, i nt el l ect ual , economi c, and aest het i c values; whi ch are, in
t hei r t ur n, bound up wi t h our concept i on of man, and of t he basic
demands of his nat ur e. In ot her wor ds , our sol ut i on of such
pr obl ems is based on our vi si on, by whi ch we are consciously or
unconsci ousl y gui ded, of what const i t ut es a fulfilled human life, as
cont r ast ed wi t h Mi l l ' s ' cr amped and war ped' , ' pi nched and hi de-
bound' nat ur es. To pr ot est agai nst t he l aws governi ng censorshi p
or per sonal mor al s as i nt ol erabl e i nfri ngement s of personal liberty
presupposes a belief that t he activities whi ch such laws forbid are
fundamental needs of men as men, in a good (or, i ndeed, any)
society. To defend such l aws is t o hol d t hat t hese needs are not
essential, or t hat they cannot be satisfied wi t hout sacrificing ot her
values which come higher - satisfy deeper needs - t han i ndi vi dual
freedom, det ermi ned by some st andar d t hat is not merely subjec-
tive, a st andard for which some objective st at us - empi ri cal or
a priori is claimed.
The extent of a man' s, or a people' s, liberty t o choose t o live as
they desire must be weighed against t he claims of many ot her
values, of which equality, or justice, or happi ness, or securi t y, or
public order are perhaps t he most obvi ous exampl es. For t hi s
reason, it cannot be unlimited. We are rightly r emi nded by R. H.
Tawney t hat t he liberty of the st rong, whet her t hei r st rengt h is
physical or economi c, must be rest rai ned. Thi s maxi m cl ai ms
respect, not as a consequence of some a priori rule, wher eby t he
respect for the liberty of one man logically entails respect for
the liberty of ot hers like hi m; but simply because respect for t he
principles of justice, or shame at gross inequality of t r eat ment , is
as basic in men as the desire for liberty. That we cannot have
everything is a necessary, not a cont i ngent , t r ut h. Bur ke' s plea for
the constant need t o compensat e, t o reconcile, to bal ance; Mi l l ' s
plea for novel ' experi ment s in living' with their per manent possi -
bility of error, the knowl edge t hat it is not merely in pract i ce but
in principle impossible t o reach clear-cut and cert ai n answer s, even
in an ideal wor l d of wholly good and rat i onal men and whol l y clear
ideas - may madden those who seek for final sol ut i ons and single,
all-embracing systems, guarant eed t o be et ernal . Nevert hel ess, it is
a conclusion t hat cannot be escaped by t hose who, wi t h Kant , have
learnt the t r ut h t hat out of t he crooked t i mber of humani t y no
straight t hi ng was ever made.
There is little need t o stress t he fact t hat moni sm, and faith in a
single criterion, has al ways pr oved a deep source of satisfaction
bot h t o t he intellect and to t he emot i ons. Whet her t he st andar d of
j udgement derives from t he vision of some future perfect i on, as in
the mi nds of t he philosophies in t he eighteenth century and t hei r
t echnocrat i c successors in our own day, or is root ed in t he past - la
terre et les morts - as mai nt ai ned by Ger man historicists or French
t heocrat s, or neo-Conservat i ves in English-speaking count ri es, it
is bound, provi ded it is inflexible enough, t o encount er some
unforeseen and unforeseeable human devel opment , whi ch it will
not fit; and will then be used to justify t he a priori bar bar i t i es of
Procrustes - t he vivisection of act ual human societies i nt o some
Isaiah Berlin 33
fixed pat t er n di ct at ed by our fallible under st andi ng of a largely
i magi nary past or a whol l y i magi nary future. To preserve our
absol ut e cat egori es or ideals at the expense of human lives offends
equal l y agai nst t he pri nci pl es of science and of hi st ory; it is an
at t i t ude found in equal measur e on the ri ght and left wings in our
days, and is not reconci l abl e wi t h the principles accepted by those
who respect t he facts.
Pl ural i sm, wi t h t he measur e of ' negat i ve' liberty that it entails,
seems^to" me a t r uer and mor e huma n ideal t han the goals of those
who seek in t he gr eat , disciplined, aut hor i t ar i an st ruct ures the ideal
of ' posi t i ve' self-mastery by classes, or peopl es, or t he whol e of
manki nd. It is t ruer, because it does, at least, recognize the fact t hat
huma n goal s are many, not all of t hem commensur abl e, and in
perpet ual rivalry wi t h one anot her . To assume t hat all values can be
gr aded on one scale, so t hat it is a mere mat t er of inspection t o
det er mi ne t he hi ghest , seems t o me t o falsify our knowl edge t hat
men are free agent s, t o represent mor al decision as an operat i on
whi ch a slide-rule coul d, in pri nci pl e, perform. To say t hat in some
ul t i mat e, al l -reconci l i ng, yet realizable synthesis, dut y is interest, or
i ndi vi dual freedom is pur e democr acy or an aut hori t ari an state, is
t o t hr ow a met aphysi cal bl anket over ei t her self-deceit or deliberate
hypocri sy. It is mor e humane because it does not (as the system
bui l ders do) depri ve men, in the name of some remot e, or
i ncoher ent , i deal , of much t hat they have found t o be indispensable
t o t hei r life as unpr edi ct abl y self-transforming human bei ngs .
1 3
In
t he end, men choose bet ween ul t i mat e val ues; they choose as they
do, because t hei r life and t hought are det ermi ned by fundament al
mor al cat egori es and concept s t hat are, at any rat e over large
st ret ches of t i me and space, a par t of t hei r being and t hought and
sense of t hei r own i dent i t y; par t of what makes t hem human.
It may be t hat t he ideal of freedom t o choose ends wi t hout
cl ai mi ng et ernal validity for t hem, and t he pluralism of values
connect ed wi t h t hi s, is only t he late fruit of our declining capitalist
ci vi l i zat i on: an i deal whi ch r emot e ages and primitive societies have
not recogni zed, and one whi ch post eri t y will regard wi t h curiosity,
even sympat hy, but little compr ehensi on. Thi s may be so; but no
sceptical concl usi ons seem t o me t o follow. Principles are not less
sacred because t hei r dur at i on cannot be guarant eed. Indeed, t he
very desi re for guar ant ees t hat our values are eternal and secure in
some obj ect i ve heaven is per haps onl y a craving for the certainties
of chi l dhood or t he absol ut e values of our primitive past . ' To realise
t he relative val i di t y of one' s convi ct i ons' , said an admi rabl e wri t er
of our t i me, ' and yet st and for t hem unflinchingly, is what
NOTES
1
1 do not, of course, mean to imply the truth of the converse.
2
Helvetius made this point very clearly: 'The free man is the man who is
not in irons, nor imprisoned in a gaol, nor terrorized like a slave by the
fear of puni shment . . . it is not lack of freedom not to fly like an eagle
or swim like a whale.'
3
The Marxist conception of social laws is, of course, the best-known
version of this theory, but it forms a large element in some Christian
and utilitarian, and all socialist, doctrines.
4
'A free man', said Hobbes, 'is he that . . . is not hindered to do what he
hath the will to do.' Law is always a 'fetter', even if it protects you from
being bound in chains that are heavier than those of the law, say, some
more repressive law or custom, or arbitrary despotism or chaos.
Bentham says much the same.
5
This is but another illustration of the natural tendency of all but a very
few thinkers to believe that all the things they hold good must be
intimately connected, or at least compatible, with one another. The
history of thought, like the history of nations, is strewn with examples
of inconsistent, or at least disparate, elements artificially yoked together
in a despotic system, or held together by the danger of some common
enemy. In due course the danger passes, and conflicts between the allies
arise, which often disrupt the system, sometimes to the great benefit of
mankind.
6
See the valuable discussion of this in Michel Villey, Lecons d'bistoire de
la philosophie du droit, who traces the embryo of the notion of
subjective rights to Occam.
Christian (and Jewish or Moslem) belief in the absolute authority of
divine or natural laws, or in the equality of all men in the sight of God,
is very different from belief in freedom to live as one prefers.
8
Indeed, it is arguable that in the Prussia of Frederick the Great or in the
Austria of Josef 11 men of imagination, originality, and creative genius,
and, indeed, minorities of all kinds, were less persecuted and felt the
pressure, both of institutions and custom, less heavy upon them than in
many an earlier or later democracy.
9
'Negative liberty' is something the extent of which, in a given case, it is
difficult to estimate. It might, prima facie, seem to depend simply on the
power to choose between at any rate two alternatives. Nevertheless,
not all choices are equally free, or free at all. If in a totalitarian state I
betray my friend under threat of torture, perhaps even if I act from
distinguishes a civilised man from a bar bar i an. ' To demand mor e
t han this is perhaps a deep and incurable met aphysi cal need; but t o
allow it t o determine one' s practice is a sympt om of an equally
deep, and more dangerous, moral and political i mmat ur i t y.
Isaiah Berlin 35
fear of losing my job, I can reasonably say that I did not act freely.
Nevertheless, I did, of course, make a choice, and could, at any rate in
theory, have chosen to be killed or tortured or imprisoned. The mere
existence of alternatives is not, therefore, enough to make my action
free (although it may be voluntary) in the normal sense of the word.
The extent of my freedom seems to depend on (a) how many
possibilities are open to me (although the method of counting these can
never be more than impressionistic. Possibilities of action are not
discrete entities like apples, which can be exhaustively enumerated); (b)
how easy or difficult each of these possibilities is to actualize; (c) how
important in my plan of life, given my character and circumstances,
these possibilities are when compared with each other; (d) how far they
are closed and opened by deliberate human acts; (e) what value not
merely the agent, but the general sentiment of the society in which he
lives, puts on the various possibilities. All these magnitudes must be
' integrated' , and a conclusion, necessarily never precise, or indisput-
able, drawn from this process. It may well be that there are many
incommensurable kinds and degrees of freedom, and that they cannot
be drawn up on any single scale of magnitude. Moreover, in the case of
societies, we are faced by such (logically absurd) questions as 'Would
arrangement X increase the liberty of Mr A more than it would that
of Messrs B, C, and D between them, added together?' The same
difficulties arise in applying utilitarian criteria. Nevertheless, provided
we do not demand precise measurement, we can give valid reasons for
saying that the average subject of the King of Sweden is, on the whole, a
good deal freer today than the average citizen of Spain or Albania.
Total patterns of life must be compared directly as wholes, although
the method by which we make the comparison, and the truth of the
conclusions, are difficult or impossible to demonstrate. But the
vagueness of the concepts, and the multiplicity of the criteria involved,
is an attribute of the subject-matter itself, not of our imperfect methods
of measurement, or incapacity for precise thought.
' The ideal of true freedom is the maximum of power for all the members
of human society alike to make the best of themselves', said T. H. Green
in 1881. Apart from the confusion of freedom with equality, this entails
that if a man chose some immediate pleasure - which (in whose view?)
would not enable him to make the best of himself (what self?) - what he
was exercising was not ' true' freedom: and if deprived of it, would not
lose anything that mattered. Green was a genuine liberal: but many a
tyrant could use this formula to justify his worst acts of oppression.
In Great Britain such legal power is, of course, constitutionally vested
in the absolute sovereign - the King in Parliament. What makes this
country comparatively free, therefore, is the fact that this theoretically
omnipotent entity is restrained by custom or opinion from behaving as
such. It is clear that what matters is not the form of these restraints on
power - whether they are legal, or moral, or constitutional - but their
effectiveness.
1 2
Condorcet, from whose Esquisse these words are quoted, declares that
the task of social science is to show 'by what bonds Nature has united
the progress of enlightenment with that of liberty, virtue, and respect
for the natural rights of man; how these ideals, which alone are truly
good, yet so often separated from each other that they are even believed
to be incompatible, should, on the contrary, become inseparable, as
soon as enlightenment has reached a certain level simultaneously among
a large number of nations'. He goes on to say that: ' Men still preserve
the errors of their childhood, of their country, and of their age long after
having recognized all the truths needed for destroying them.' Ironically
enough, his belief in the need and possibility of uniting all good things
may well be precisely the kind of error he himself so well described.
1
On this also Bentham seems to me to have spoken well: 'Individual
interests are the only real interests . . . can it be conceived that there are
men so absurd as to . . . prefer the man who is not to him who is; to
torment the living, under pretence of promoting the happiness of them
who are not born, and who may never be born?' This is one of the
infrequent occasions when Burke agrees with Bentham; for this passage
is at the heart of the empirical, as against the metaphysical, view of
politics.
2
John Rawls: The Right and
the Good Contrasted *
5. CLASSICAL UTILITARIANISM
. . The st ri ki ng feat ure of t he ut i l i t ari an view of justice is that it
does not mat t er , except i ndi rect l y, how this sum of satisfactions is
di st ri but ed a mong i ndi vi dual s any mor e t han it mat t ers, except
indirectly, how one ma n di st ri but es his satisfactions over time. The
correct di st r i but i on in ei t her case is t hat whi ch yields the maxi mum
fulfillment. Society mus t al l ocat e its means of satisfaction whatever
these ar e, ri ght s a nd dut i es, opport uni t i es and privileges, and
vari ous forms of weal t h, so as t o achieve this maxi mum if it can.
But in itself no di st r i but i on of satisfaction is better t han another
except t hat t he mor e equal di st r i but i on is t o be preferred t o break
ties.
1
It is t r ue t hat cert ai n common sense precepts of justice,
part i cul arl y t hose whi ch concer n t he prot ect i on of liberties and
rights, or whi ch expr ess t he cl ai ms of desert, seem t o contradict this
cont ent i on. But from a ut i l i t ari an st andpoi nt the expl anat i on of
these pr ecept s and of t hei r seemingly st ri ngent character is t hat they
are t hose pr ecept s whi ch experi ence shows should be strictly
respected and depar t ed from onl y under exceptional circumstances
if the sum of advant ages is t o be maxi mi zed.
2
Yet, as wi t h all other
precept s, t hose of j ust i ce are derivative from t he one end of
at t ai ni ng t he gr eat est bal ance of satisfaction. Thus there is no
reason in pri nci pl e why t he great er gains of some should not
compensat e for t he lesser losses of ot her s; or more importantly,
why t he vi ol at i on of t he liberty of a few mi ght not be made right by
the great er good shar ed by many. It simply happens t hat under
most condi t i ons, at l east in a reasonabl y advanced stage of
civilization, t he gr eat est s um of advant ages is not at t ai ned in this
' Reprinted by permission of the publishers from A THEORY OF JUSTICE
b
Y John Rawls, Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press
o f
r vam
University Press, copyright 1971 by the President and Fellows of Harvard
College. Also in Great Britain by permission of Oxford University Press.
38 The Right and the Good Contrasted
way. No doubt the strictness of common sense precept s of justice
has a certain usefulness in limiting men' s propensi t i es t o injustice
and t o socially injurious actions, but the ut i l i t ari an believes t hat t o
affirm this strictness as a first principle of mor al s is a mi st ake. For
just as it is rat i onal for one man t o maxi mi ze t he fulfillment of his
system of desires, it is right for a society t o maxi mi ze t he net
balance of satisfaction taken over all of its member s.
The most nat ural way, t hen, of arri vi ng at ut i l i t ari ani sm
(although not , of course, the onl y way of doi ng so) is t o adopt for
society as a whol e t he principle of rat i onal choice for one man.
Once this is recognized, the place of t he i mpart i al spect at or and t he
emphasis on sympat hy in the history of ut i l i t ari an t hought is readily
underst ood. For it is by t he concept i on of t he i mpart i al spect at or
and the use of sympat het i c identification in gui di ng our i magi nat i on
t hat the principle for one man is applied t o society. It is this
spectator who is conceived as carryi ng out t he requi red or gani za-
tion of t he desires of all persons into one coherent system of desi re;
it is by this const ruct i on t hat many persons are fused i nt o one.
Endowed with ideal powers of sympat hy and i magi nat i on, t he
impartial spectator is t he perfectly rat i onal i ndi vi dual who identi-
fies wi t h and experiences the desires of ot her s as if t hese desires
were his own. In this way he ascertains t he intensity of t hese desires
and assigns t hem their appr opr i at e weight in t he one syst em of
desire the satisfaction of which t he ideal legislator t hen tries t o
maximize by adjusting t he rules of t he social system. On this
conception of society separat e individuals are t hought of as so
many different lines al ong whi ch rights and duties are t o be
assigned and scarce means of satisfaction allocated in accor dance
with rules so as t o give t he greatest fulfillment of want s. The nat ur e
of the decision made by t he ideal legislator is not , t herefore,
materially different from t hat of an ent repreneur deci di ng h o w t o
maximize his profit by pr oduci ng this or t hat commodi t y, or t hat of
a consumer deciding how to maxi mi ze his satisfaction by t he
purchase of this or t hat collection of goods. In each case t her e is a
single person whose system of desires det ermi nes t he best al l ocat i on
of limited means. The correct decision is essentially a quest i on of
efficient admi ni st rat i on. Thi s vi ew of social co- oper at i on is t he
consequence of ext endi ng t o society the principle of choi ce for one
man, and t hen, to make this ext ensi on work, conflating all per sons
into one throug h the imaginative acts of the i mpart i al sympat het i c
spect at or. Utilitarianism does not take seriously the di st i nct i on
between persons.
John Raivls 39
6. SOME RELATED CONTRASTS
It has seemed t o ma ny phi l osopher s, and it appears to be supported
by t he convi ct i ons of c ommon sense, t hat we distinguish as a matter
of pri nci pl e bet ween t he cl ai ms of liberty and right on the one hand
and t he desi rabi l i t y of i ncreasi ng aggregate social welfare on the
ot her; and t hat we give a cert ai n pri ori t y, if not absolute weight,
t o the former. Each member of society is t hought t o have an
inviolability f ounded on justice or, as some say, on natural right,
which even t he wel fare of every one else cannot override. Justice
denies t hat t he loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater
good shar ed by ot her s . The reasoni ng which balances the gains and
losses of different per sons as if they were one person is excluded.
Therefore in a j ust soci et y t he basic liberties are taken for granted
and t he ri ght s secured by justice are not subject t o political
bargai ni ng or t o t he cal cul us of social interests.
Just i ce as fai rness at t empt s t o account for these common sense
convi ct i ons concer ni ng t he pri ori t y of justice by showing t hat they
are the consequence of pri nci pl es whi ch woul d be chosen in the
original posi t i on. These j udgement s reflect t he rational preferences
and t he initial equal i t y of t he cont ract i ng parties. Although the
ut i l i t ari an recogni zes t hat , strictly speaki ng, his doctrine conflicts
with t hese sent i ment s of j ust i ce, he mai nt ai ns t hat common sense
precept s of j ust i ce and not i ons of nat ural right have but a
subor di nat e val i di t y as secondar y rules; they arise from the fact that
under t he condi t i ons of civilized society t here is great social utility
in fol l owi ng t hem for t he mos t par t and in permitting violations
only under except i onal ci rcumst ances. Even t he excessive zeal with
whi ch we ar e apt t o affirm t hese precept s and to appeal to these
rights is itself gr ant ed a cert ai n usefulness, since it counterbalances
a nat ur al h u ma n t endency t o vi ol at e t hem in ways not sanctioned
by utility. Once we under s t and t hi s, t he appar ent disparity between
t he ut i l i t ari an pr i nci pl e and t he st rengt h of these persuasions or
justice is no l onger a phi l osophi cal difficulty. Thus while the
cont r act doct r i ne accept s our convi ct i ons about the priority or
justice as on t he whol e sound, ut i l i t ari ani sm seeks t o account tor
t hem as a socially useful illusion. ,
A second cont r as t is t hat wher eas t he utilitarian extends t o
society t he principle of choice for one man, justice as fai rness, bei ng
a cont ract view, assumes t hat t he pri nci pl es of social choi ce, and so
t he principles of justice, are themselves t he object of an original
agreement. There is no reason t o suppose t hat t he pri nci pl es whi ch
should regulate an association of men is simply an ext ensi on of t he
principle of choice for one man. On t he cont r ar y: if we assume t hat
the correct regulative principle for anyt hi ng depends on t he nat ur e
of that thing, and t hat t he plurality of distinct persons wi t h separ at e
systems of ends is an essential feature of huma n societies, we shoul d
not expect t he principles of social choice t o be ut i l i t ari an. To be
sure, it has not been shown by anything said so far t hat t he parties in
the original position woul d not choose t he pri nci pl e of utility t o
define t he t erms of social co-operat i on. Thi s is a difficult quest i on
which 1 shall exami ne later on. It is perfectly possi bl e, from all t hat
one knows at this poi nt , t hat some form of t he pri nci pl e of utility
woul d be adopt ed, and therefore t hat cont r act t heory leads
eventually to a deeper and mor e r oundabout justification of
utilitarianism. In fact a deri vat i on of t hi s ki nd is somet i mes
suggested by Bent ham and Edgewor t h, al t hough it is not devel oped
by t hem in any systematic way and t o my knowl edge it is not found
in Sidgwick.
3
For the present I shall simply asssume t hat t he per sons
in the original position woul d reject the utility pri nci pl e and t hat
they woul d adopt i nst ead, for t he ki nds of reasons previ ousl y
sketched, the t wo principles of justice already ment i oned. In any
case, from t he st andpoi nt of cont ract theory one cannot arri ve at a
principle of social choice merely by ext endi ng t he pri nci pl e of
rational prudence t o t he system of desires const r uct ed by t he
impartial spect at or. To do this is not t o t ake seriously t he pl ural i t y
and distinctness of individuals, nor t o recognize as t he basis of
justice t hat t o whi ch men woul d consent . Her e we may not e a
curious anomal y. It is cust omary t o t hi nk of ut i l i t ari ani sm as
individualistic, and certainly there are good reasons for t hi s. The
utilitarians were st rong defenders of liberty and freedom of
t hought , and they held t hat the good of society is const i t ut ed by t he
advant ages enjoyed by individuals. Yet ut i l i t ari ani sm is not indi-
vidualistic, at least when arrived at by t he mor e nat ur al cour se of
reflection, in t hat , by conflating all systems of desi res, it appl i es t o
society the principle of choice for one man. And t hus we see t hat t he
second cont rast is related t o t he first, since it is t hi s confl at i on, a nd
t he principle based upon it, whi ch subjects t he rights secured by
justice t o t he calculus of social interests.
The last cont rast t hat I shall ment i on now is t hat ut i l i t ari ani sm is
a i deol ogi cal t heory whereas justice as fairness is not . By definition,
John Rawls 41
then, t he l at t er is a deont ol ogi cal t heory, one t hat either does not
specify t he good i ndependent l y from t he right, or does not interpret
the ri ght as maxi mi zi ng t he good. (It should be noted that
deont ol ogi cal t heori es are defined as non-teleological ones, not
as views t hat char act er i ze t he Tightness of institutions and acts
i ndependent l y from t hei r consequences. All ethical doctrines wort h
our at t ent i on t ake consequences i nt o account in judging Tightness.
One whi ch did not woul d si mpl y be i rrat i onal , crazy.) Justice as
fairness is a deont ol ogi cal t heor y in the second way. For if it is
assumed t hat t he per sons in t he original position woul d choose a
principle of equal l i bert y and restrict economi c and social inequali-
ties t o t hose in ever yone' s i nt erest s, t here is no reason t o think that
just i nst i t ut i ons will maxi mi ze t he good. (Here I suppose with
ut i l i t ari ani sm t hat t he good is defined as t he satisfaction of rational
desire.) Of cour se, it is not i mpossi bl e t hat the most good is
produced but it woul d be a coi nci dence. The question of attaining
the great est net bal ance of satisfaction never arises in justice as
fairness; t hi s ma x i mu m pri nci pl e is not used at all.
Ther e is a furt her poi nt in t hi s connect i on. In utilitarianism the
satisfaction of any desi re has some value in itself which must be
taken i nt o account in deci di ng what is right. In calculating the
greatest bal ance of sat i sfact i on it does not mat t er , except indirectly,
what t he desires are f or .
4
We are t o ar r ange institutions so as t o
obt ai n t he great est s um of sat i sfact i ons; we ask no questions about
their source or qual i t y but onl y how their satisfaction woul d affect
the t ot al of wel l -bei ng. Social wel fare depends directly and solely
upon t he levels of sat i sfact i on or dissatisfaction of individuals. Thus
if men t ake a cert ai n pl easur e in di scri mi nat i ng against one another,
in subjecting ot her s t o a lesser liberty as a means of enhanci ng their
self-respect, t hen t he sat i sfact i on of t hese desires must be weighed
in our del i ber at i ons accor di ng t o t hei r intensity, or what ever, along
with ot her desi res. If society decides t o deny t hem fulfillment, or t o
suppress t hem, it is because t hey t end t o be socially destructive and
a great er wel fare can be achi eved in ot her ways.
In justice as fai rness, on t he ot her hand, persons accept in
advance a pr i nci pl e of equal liberty and t hey do this wi t hout a
knowl edge of t hei r mor e par t i cul ar ends. They implicitly agree,
therefore, t o conf or m t hei r concept i ons of their good t o what the
principles of justice r equi r e, or at least not t o press claims which
directly vi ol at e t hem. An i ndi vi dual who finds t hat he enjoys seeing
ot hers in posi t i ons of lesser l i bert y under st ands t hat he has no claim
what ever t o t hi s enj oyment . The pl easure he t akes in ot he r s
depri vat i ons is wr ong in itself: it is a satisfaction whi ch requires the
violation of a principle t o which he woul d agree in t he original
position. The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on
which satisfactions have value; they i mpose rest ri ct i ons on what are
reasonable conceptions of one' s good. In dr awi ng up pl ans and in
deciding on aspirations men are t o t ake these const r ai nt s into
account. Hence in justice as fairness one does not t ake men s
propensities and inclinations as given, what ever they are, and t hen
seek the best way t o fulfill t hem. Rat her , t hei r desi res and
aspirations are restricted from the out set by t he pri nci pl es of justice
which specify the boundari es t hat men' s syst ems of ends must
respect. We can express this by saying t hat in justice as fairness the
concept of right is prior t o t hat of t he good. A just social system
defines the scope within which develop their ai ms, and it provi des a
framework of rights and opport uni t i es and t he means of satisfac-
tion within and by the use of whi ch these ends may be equi t abl y
pursued. The priority of justice is account ed for, in par t , by hol di ng
that the interests requiring t he violation of justice have no value.
Having no merit in the first place, they cannot overri de its cl ai ms.
This priority of the right over t he good in justice as fairness t urns
out to be a central feature of t he concept i on. It i mposes cert ai n
criteria on the design of the basic st ruct ure as a whol e; these
arrangements must not tend t o generat e propensi t i es and at t i t udes
contrary t o t he t wo principles of justice (that is, t o cert ai n pri nci pl es
which are given from t he first a definite cont ent ) and t hey must
ensure that just institutions are stable. Thus certain initial bounds
are placed upon what is good and what forms of char act er are
morally wort hy, and so upon what ki nds of per sons men shoul d
be. Now any theory of justice will set up some limits of this
kind, namely, those that are required if its first pri nci pl es are t o
be satisfied given the circumstances. Ut i l i t ari ani sm excl udes t hose
desires and propensities which if encour aged or per mi t t ed woul d, in
view of the situation, lead to a lesser net bal ance of sat i sfact i on. But
this restriction is largely formal, and in t he absence of fairly det ai l ed
knowledge of the circumstances it does not give much i ndi cat i on of
what these desires and propensities are. Thi s is not , by itself, an
objection t o utilitarianism. It is simply a feat ure of ut i l i t ari an
doctrine t hat it relies very heavily upon t he nat ur al facts and
contingencies of human life in det ermi ni ng what forms of mor al
character are to be encouraged in a just society. The mor al ideal of
justice as fairness is more deeply embedded in t he first pri nci pl es of
the ethical theory. Thi s is characteristic of nat ur al ri ght s vi ews (the
cont ract ari an tradition) in compari son wi t h t he t heor y of utility,
in setttng forth these cont rast s bet ween justice as fairness and
John Rawls 43
ut i l i t ari ani sm, 1 have had in mi nd only the classical doct ri ne. This is
the view of Bent ham and Sidgwick and of t he utilitarian economists
Edgewor t h and Pi gou. The ki nd of utilitarianism espoused by
Hume woul d not serve my pur pose; i ndeed, it is not strictly
speaki ng ut i l i t ari an. In his wel l - known ar gument s against Locke' s
cont r act t heor y, for exampl e, Hu me mai nt ai ns t hat the principles of
fidelity and allegiance bot h have t he same foundat i on in utility, and
t herefore t hat not hi ng is gai ned from basi ng political obligation on
an ori gi nal cont r act . Locke' s doct ri ne represent s, for Hume, an
unnecessary shuffle: one mi ght as well appeal directly t o ut i l i t y.
6
But all Hume seems t o mean by utility is the general interests and
necessities of society. The pri nci pl es of fidelity and allegiance derive
from utility in t he sense t hat t he mai nt enance of the social order is
i mpossi bl e unless t hese pri nci pl es are generally respected. But then
Hu me assumes t hat each man st ands t o gai n, as judged by his long-
t erm advant age, when l aw and gover nment conform t o t he precepts
founded on utility. No ment i on is made of the gains of some
out wei ghi ng t he di sadvant ages of ot her s. For Hume, t hen, utility
seems t o be i dent i cal wi t h some form of t he common good;
i nst i t ut i ons satisfy its demands when t hey are t o everyone' s
i nt erest s, at least in t he l ong r un. No w if this i nt erpret at i on of
Hume is correct , t her e is offhand no conflict wi t h t he priority of
justice and no i ncompat i bi l i t y wi t h Locke' s cont ract doct ri ne. For
t he role of equal ri ght s in Locke is precisely t o ensure t hat t he only
permi ssi bl e depar t ur es from t he state of nat ur e are t hose which
respect t hese rights and serve t he common interest. It is clear t hat all
t he t r ansf or mat i ons form t he st at e of nat ur e whi ch Locke approves
of satisfy this condi t i on and are such t hat rat i onal men concerned
t o advance t hei r ends coul d consent t o t hem in a state of equality.
Hu me nowher e di sput es t he propri et y of these const rai nt s. Hi s
cri t i que of Locke' s cont r act doct ri ne never denies, or even seems t o
recogni ze, its f undament al cont ent i on.
The mer i t of t he classical view as formul at ed by Bent ham,
Edgewor t h, and Si dgwi ck is t hat it clearly recognizes what is at
st ake, namel y, t he rel at i ve pri ori t y of the principles of justice and of
t he ri ght s deri ved f r om t hese pri nci pl es. The quest i on is whet her t he
i mposi t i on of di sadvant ages on a few can be out wei ghed by a
great er s um of advant ages enjoyed by ot her s; or whet her t he weight
of justice requi res an equal liberty for all and permi t s onl y those
economi c and social i nequal i t i es whi ch are t o each person' s
i nt erest s. Impl i ci t in t he cont rast s bet ween classical utilitarianism
and j ust i ce as fairness is a difference in t he underl yi ng concept i ons
of society. In t he one we t hi nk of a wel l -ordered society as a scheme
48. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND
MORAL DESERT
There is a tendency for common sense t o suppose t hat i ncome and
wealth, and the good things in life generally, shoul d be di st ri but ed
according t o moral desert. Justice is happi ness accor di ng t o vi rt ue.
While it is recognized t hat this ideal can never be fully carri ed
out , it is the appropri at e concept i on of di st ri but i ve justice, at least
as a prima facie principle, and society shoul d try t o realize it as
circumstances per mi t .
7
Now justice as fairness rejects this concep-
tion. Such a principle woul d not be chosen in t he ori gi nal posi t i on.
There seems t o be no way of defining t he requisite cri t eri on in t hat
situation. Moreover, the notion of di st ri but i on accor di ng t o vi rt ue
fails t o distinguish between mor al desert and l egi t i mat e expect a-
tions. Thus it is t rue that as persons and gr oups t ake par t in just
arrangement s, they acquire claims on one anot her defined by t he
publicly recognized rules. Havi ng done vari ous t hi ngs encour aged
by the existing arrangement s, they now have cert ai n ri ght s, and
just distributive shares honour these claims. A just scheme, t hen,
answers to what men are entitled t o; it satisfies their l egi t i mat e
expectations as founded upon social i nst i t ut i ons. But what they are
entitled t o is not proport i onal t o nor dependent upon t hei r i nt ri nsi c
wort h. The principles of justice t hat regul at e t he basi c st r uct ur e and
specify the duties and obligations of i ndi vi dual s do not ment i on
moral desert, and there is no t endency for di st ri but i ve shares t o
correspond t o it.
This contention is borne out by t he pr ecedi ng account of
common sense precepts and their role in pur e pr ocedur al justice.
For exampl e, in determining wages a compet i t i ve economy gives
weight t o the precept of cont ri but i on. But as we have seen, t he
extent of one' s cont ri but i on (estimated by one' s mar gi nal pr oduc-
tivity) depends upon supply and demand. Surely a per son' s mor al
wort h does not vary according t o how many offer si mi l ar skills, or
happen t o want what he can pr oduce. No one supposes t hat when
of co-operation for reciprocal advant age regul at ed by principles
which persons woul d choose in an initial si t uat i on t hat is fair, in t he
other as the efficient admi ni st rat i on of social resources t o maxi mi ze
the satisfaction of the system of desire const ruct ed by t he i mpart i al
spectator from the many individual systems of desi res accept ed as
given. The compari son with classical ut i l i t ari ani sm in its mor e
natural derivation brings out this cont rast .
John Rawls 45
someone' s abilities are less in demand or have det eri orat ed (as in
t he case of singers) his mor al deservingness undergoes a similar
shift. All of this is perfectly obvi ous and has l ong been agreed t o.
8
It
si mpl y reflects t he fact not ed before t hat is one of t he fixed poi nt s
of our mor al j udgement s t hat no one deserves his place in t he
di st r i but i on of nat ur al assets any mor e t han he deserves his initial
st ar t i ng pl ace in society.
Mor eover , none of t he precept s of justice ai ms at r ewar di ng
vi rt ue. The pr emi ums ear ned by scarce nat ur al t al ent s, for exampl e,
are t o cover t he costs of t rai ni ng and t o encour age t he efforts
of l earni ng, as well as t o direct ability t o wher e it best furthers t he
c ommon interest. The di st ri but i ve shares t hat result do not
correl at e wi t h mor al wor t h, since t he initial endowment of nat ur al
assets and t he cont i ngenci es of t hei r gr owt h and nur t ur e in early life
are ar bi t r ar y from a mor al poi nt of view. The precept whi ch seems
intuitively t o come closest t o r ewar di ng mor al desert is t hat of
di st i but i on accordi ng t o effort, or per haps better, consci ent i ous
effort .
9
Once agai n, however , it seems clear t hat t he effort a person
is wi l l i ng t o make is influenced by his nat ur al abilities and skills and
t he al t ernat i ves open t o hi m. The better endowed are mor e likely,
ot her t hi ngs equal , t o strive consci ent i ousl y, and t here seems t o be
no way t o di scount for their great er good fort une. The idea of
r ewar di ng desert is i mpr act i cabl e. And cert ai nl y t o t he ext ent t hat
t he pr ecept of need is emphasi zed, mor al wor t h is i gnored. Nor
does t he basi c st ruct ure t end t o bal ance t he precept s of justice so as
t o achi eve t he requi si t e cor r espondence behi nd t he scenes. It is
r egul at ed by t he t wo pri nci pl es of justice whi ch define ot her ai ms
ent i rel y.
The same concl usi on may be reached in anot her way. In t he
pr ecedi ng r emar ks t he not i on of mor al wor t h as distinct from a
per son' s claims based upon his l egi t i mat e expect at i ons has not
been expl ai ned. Suppose, t hen, t hat we define this not i on and
s how t hat it has no correl at i on wi t h di st ri but i ve shares. We have
onl y t o consi der a wel l -ordered society, t hat is, a society in whi ch
i nst i t ut i ons are just and this fact is publicly recogni zed. Its member s
al so have a st r ong sense of justice, an effective desire t o compl y
wi t h t he exi st i ng rules and t o give one anot her t hat t o whi ch they
ar e ent i t l ed. In t hi s case we may assume t hat everyone is of equal
mor al wor t h. We have now defined this not i on in t er ms of t he sense
of j ust i ce, t he desire t o act in accor dance wi t h t he principles t hat
woul d be chosen in t he ori gi nal posi t i on. But it is evi dent t hat
under s t ood in this way, t he equal mor al wor t h of persons does not
ent ai l t hat di st ri but i ve shares are equal . Each is t o receive what t he
principles of justice say he is entitled t o, and t hese do not require
equality.
The essential point is t hat the concept of mor al wor t h does not
provide a first principle of di st ri but i ve justice. Thi s is because it
cannot be i nt roduced until after t he pri nci pl es of justice and of
natural dut y and obl i gat i on have been acknowl edged. Once these
principles are on hand, moral wor t h can be defined as havi ng a
sense of justice; and as I shall discuss later, t he virtues can be
characterized as desires or tendencies t o act upon t he cor r espondi ng
principles. Thus the concept of mor al wor t h is secondar y t o those
of right and justice, and it plays no role in t he subst ant i ve definition
of distributive shares. The case is anal ogous t o t he rel at i on bet ween
the substantive rules of propert y and t he l aw of r obber y and theft.
These offences and t he demerits they entail pr esuppose t he institu-
tion of propert y which is established for pri or and i ndependent
social ends. For a society t o organi ze itself wi t h t he aim of
rewarding moral desert as a first pri nci pl e woul d be like havi ng t he
institution of propert y in order t o puni sh t hi eves. The cri t eri on to
each according t o his virtue woul d not , t hen, be chosen in the
original position. Since the part i es desire t o advance their con-
ceptions of the good, they have no reason for ar r angi ng their
institutions so t hat distributive shares are det er mi ned by moral
desert, even if they could find an ant ecedent s t andar d for its
definition.
In a well-ordered society i ndi vi dual s acqui r e cl ai ms t o a share of
the social product by doi ng cert ai n t hi ngs encour aged by the
existing arrangement s. The legitimate expect at i ons t hat arise are
the other side, so to speak, of t he pri nci pl e of fairness and the
natural duty of justice. For in the way t hat one has a dut y t o uphol d
just arrangements, and an obl i gat i on t o do one' s par t when one has
accepted a position in t hem, so a per son wh o has compl i ed wi t h the
scheme and done his share has a ri ght t o be t r eat ed accordi ngl y by
others. They are bound t o meet his l egi t i mat e expect at i ons. Thus
when just economic arrangement s exist, t he cl ai ms of i ndi vi dual s
are properly settled by reference t o t he rules and pr ecept s (with
their respective weights) whi ch these pract i ces t ake as rel evant . As
we have seen, it is incorrect t o say t hat just di st ri but i ve shares
reward individuals according t o their mor al wor t h. But wha t we
can say is t hat , in the t radi t i onal phr ase, a just scheme gives each
person his due: t hat is, it allots t o each what he is ent i t l ed t o as
aenned by t he scheme itself. The pri nci pl es of j ust i ce for i nst i t ut i ons
and individuals establish t hat doi ng this is fair.
w "
s h o u l d b e
not ed t hat even t hough a per son' s cl ai ms are
John Rawls 47
regul at ed by t he exi st i ng rules, we can still make a distinction
bet ween bei ng ent i t l ed t o somet hi ng and deserving it in a familar
al t hough non- mor al s e ns e .
1 0
To illustrate, after a game one often
says t hat t he losing side deserved t o wi n. Her e one does not mean
t hat t he vi ct ors are not entitled t o claim t he champi onshi p, or
what ever spoils go t o t he wi nner. One means instead t hat t he losing
t eam di spl ayed t o a hi gher degree t he skills and qualities t hat the
game calls fort h, and t he exercise of whi ch gives t he sport its
appeal . Therefore t he losers truly deserved t o wi n but lost out as a
result of bad luck, or from ot her contingencies that caused the
cont est t o mi scarry. Similarly even t he best economi c ar r angement s
will not al ways lead t o t he mor e preferred out comes. The claims
t hat i ndi vi dual s act ual l y acqui re inevitably deviate mor e or less
widely from t hose t hat t he scheme is designed t o al l ow for. Some
per sons in favoured posi t i ons, for exampl e, may not have to a
hi gher degree t han ot her s t he desired qualities and abilities. All this
is evi dent enough. Its beari ng here is t hat al t hough we can indeed
di st i ngui sh bet ween t he claims t hat existing ar r angement s requi re
us t o honour , given what i ndi vi dual s have done and how things
have t ur ned out , and t he claims t hat woul d have resulted under
mor e ideal ci rcumst ances, none of this implies t hat distributive
shares shoul d be in accor dance wi t h mor al wor t h. Even when
t hi ngs happen in t he best way, t here is still no t endency for
di st r i but i on and vi rt ue t o coi nci de.
No doubt some may still cont end t hat di st ri but i ve shares shoul d
mat ch mor al wor t h at least t o t he ext ent t hat this is feasible. They
may believe t hat unless t hose who are bet t er off have superi or
mor al char act er , t hei r havi ng great er advant ages is an affront t o
our sense of justice. No w this opi ni on may arise from t hi nki ng of
di st ri but i ve justice as s omehow the opposi t e of retributive justice. It
is t rue t hat in a r easonabl y wel l -ordered society t hose who are
puni shed for vi ol at i ng just laws have nor mal l y done somet hi ng
wr ong. Thi s is because t he pur pose of t he cri mi nal l aw is t o uphol d
basi c nat ur al dut i es, t hose whi ch forbid us t o injure ot her persons
in t hei r life and l i mb, or t o deprive t hem of their liberty and
pr oper t y, and puni shment s are t o serve this end. They are not
si mpl y a scheme of t axes and bur dens designed t o put a price on
cert ai n forms of conduct and in this way t o gui de men' s conduct for
mut ual advant age. It woul d be far better if t he acts proscri bed
by penal st at ut es wer e never d o n e .
1 1
Thus a propensi t y t o commi t
such act s is a mar k of bad charact er, and in a just society legal
puni s hment s will onl y fall upon t hose who display these faults.
It is clear t hat t he di st ri but i on of economi c and social advant ages
68. SEVERAL CONTRASTS BETWEEN THE RI GHT
AND THE GOOD
In order t o bri ng out t he st ruct ural features of t he cont r act vi ew, 1
shall now mention several cont rast s bet ween t he concept s of the
right and the good. Since these concept s enabl e us t o expl ai n mor al
wort h, they are the t wo fundament al concept s of t he t heor y. The
structure of an ethical doct ri ne depends upon how it rel at es t hese
t wo notions and defines their differences. The distinctive feat ures of
justice as fairness can be shown by not i ng t hese poi nt s .
One difference is t hat whereas t he pri nci pl es of justice (and t he
principles of right generally) are t hose t hat woul d be chosen in t he
original position, t he principles of rat i onal choi ce and t he criteria
of deliberative rationality are not chosen at all. The first t ask i n
the theory of justice is t o define t he initial si t uat i on so t hat the
principles t hat result express the correct concept i on of justice from
a philosophical poi nt of view. Thi s means t hat t he t ypi cal features
of this situation should represent reasonabl e const r ai nt s on argu-
ments for accepting principles and t hat t he pri nci pl es agr eed t o
should mat ch our considered convi ct i ons of justice in reflective
equilibrium. Now, t he anal ogous pr obl em for t he t heory of t he
is entirely different. These ar r angement s are not t he conver se, so t o
speak, of the criminal l aw, so t hat just as t he one puni shes cert ai n
offences, the ot her rewards moral wo r t h .
1 2
The funct i on of unequal
distributive shares is t o cover the cost s of t r ai ni ng and educat i on, t o
attract individuals t o places and associ at i ons wher e they are most
needed from a social poi nt t o vi ew, and so on. Assumi ng t hat
everyone accepts the propri et y of self- or gr oup- i nt er est ed mot i va-
tion duly regulated by a sense of justice, each decides t o do t hose
things t hat best accord wi t h his ai ms. Var i at i ons in wages and
income and the perquisites of posi t i on are simply t o influence these
choices so t hat the end result accords wi t h efficiency and justice. In
a well-ordered society there woul d be no need for t he penal l aw
except insofar as the assurance pr obl em made it necessary. The
question of criminal justice belongs for t he mos t par t t o part i al
compliance theory, whereas t he account of di st ri but i ve shares
belongs t o strict compliance t heory and so t o t he consi der at i on of
the ideal scheme. To t hi nk of di st ri but i ve and ret ri but i ve justice as
converses of one anot her is completely mi sl eadi ng and suggests a
different justification for distributive shares t han t he one t hey in
fact have.
John Rawls
49
good does not arise. Ther e is, t o begin wi t h, no necessity for an
agr eement upon t he principles of rat i onal choice. Since each person
is free t o pl an his life as he pleases (so l ong as is i nt ent i ons are
consi st ent wi t h t he pri nci pl es of justice), unani mi t y concerni ng the
st andar ds of rat i onal i t y is not requi red. All t he t heory of justice
assumes is t hat , in t he t hi n account of t he good, the evident criteria
of r at i onal choi ce are sufficient t o explain t he preference for the
pr i mar y goods, and t hat such vari at i ons as exist in concept i ons of
rat i onal i t y do not affect the principles of justice adopt ed in the
original posi t i on.
Nevert hel ess, 1 have assumed t hat human beings do recognize
certain pri nci pl es and t hat these st andar ds may be t aken by
enumer at i on t o repl ace t he not i on of rat i onal i t y. We can, if we
wish, al l ow cert ai n var i at i ons in t he list. Thus t here is di sagreement
as t o t he best way t o deal wi t h uncer t ai nt y. " There is no reason,
t hough, why i ndi vi dual s in maki ng their pl ans shoul d not be
t hought of as fol l owi ng their i ncl i nat i ons in this case. Therefore any
pri nci pl e of choi ce under uncert ai nt y whi ch seems plausible can be
added t o t he list, so l ong as decisive ar gument s against it are not
f or t hcomi ng. It is onl y in the thin t heory of t he good t hat we have
t o wor r y about t hese mat t er s. Her e t he not i on of rat i onal i t y must
be i nt erpret ed so t hat t he general desire for t he pr i mar y goods can
be est abl i shed and t he choice of the principles of justice demon-
st rat ed. But even in t hi s case, I have suggested t hat the concept i on
of justice adopt ed is insensitive wi t h respect t o conflicting i nt erpre-
t at i ons of rat i onal i t y. But in any event, once t he principles of justice
are chosen, and we are wor ki ng wi t hi n the full t heory, t here is no
need t o set up t he account of the good so as t o force unani mi t y on
all t he s t andar ds of t he rat i onal choice. In fact, it woul d cont radi ct
t he freedom of choice t hat justice as fairness assures t o individuals
and gr oups wi t hi n t he f r amewor k of just i nst i t ut i ons.
A second cont r ast bet ween t he right and t he good is t hat it is, in
general , a good t hi ng t hat i ndi vi dual s' concept i ons of their good
shoul d differ in significant ways, wher eas this is not so for
concept i ons of right. In a wel l -ordered society citizens hol d the
same pri nci pl es of ri ght and t hey try t o reach t he same j udgement in
par t i cul ar cases. These principles are t o establish a final orderi ng
among t he conflicting cl ai ms t hat persons make upon one anot her
and it is essential t hat t hi s orderi ng be identifiable from everyone' s
poi nt of vi ew, however difficult it may be in pract i ce for everyone t o
accept it. On t he ot her hand, individuals find their good in different
ways, and many t hi ngs may be good for one person t hat woul d
not be good for anot her . Mor eover , t here is no urgency t o reach
publicly accepted judgement as t o what is t he good of part i cul ar
individuals. The reasons that make such an agr eement necessary in
questions of justice do not obt ai n for j udgement s of val ue. Even
when we take up anot her' s point of view and at t empt t o est i mat e
what would be to his advant age, we do so as an adviser, so t o
speak. We try t o put ourselves in t he ot her' s pl ace, and i magi ni ng
that we have his aims and want s, we at t empt to see things from his
standpoint. Cases of paternalism aside, our j udgement is offered
when it is asked for, but there is no conflict of right if our advice is
disputed and our opinion is not acted upon.
In a well-ordered society, t hen, the pl ans of life of i ndi vi dual s are
different in the sense t hat these pl ans give pr omi nence t o different
aims, and persons are left free to det ermi ne their good, t he views
of others being counted as merely advi sory. No w this variety in
conceptions of the good is itself a good t hi ng, t hat is, it is rat i onal
for members of a well-ordered society to want t hei r pl ans to be
different. The reasons for this are obvi ous. Huma n bei ngs have
various talents and abilities the totality of whi ch is unreal i zabl e by
any one person or group of persons. Thus we not onl y benefit from
the complementary nat ure of our developed i ncl i nat i ons but we
take pleasure in one anot her' s activities. It is as if ot hers were
bringing forth a part of ourselves t hat we have not been able t o
cultivate. We have had to devote ourselves t o ot her t hi ngs, t o
only a small part of what we might have done. But t he si t uat i on
is quite otherwise with justice: here we require not onl y c ommon
principles but sufficiently similar ways of appl yi ng t hem in part i cu-
lar cases so that a final orderi ng of conflicting cl ai ms can be defined.
Judgements of justice are advisory onl y in special ci rcumst ances.
The third difference is t hat many appl i cat i ons of t he pri nci pl es of
justice are restricted by the veil of i gnorance, wher eas eval uat i ons
of a persons' s good may rely upon a full knowl edge of t he facts.
Thus, as we have seen, not only must t he pri nci pl es of justice be
chosen in the absence of certain ki nds of part i cul ar i nf or mat i on,
but when these principles are used in designing const i t ut i ons and
basic social arrangement s, and in deci di ng bet ween l aws and
TK !M
W C s u b
'
e c t t o s i m i l
a r al t hough not as strict l i mi t at i ons.
1 he delegates to a const i t ut i onal convent i on, and ideal legislators
and voters, are also required to t ake up a poi nt of vi ew in whi ch
they know only the appropri at e general facts. An i ndi vi dual ' s
conception of his good, on the ot her hand, is t o be adj ust ed from
the start t o his part i cul ar situation. A rat i onal pl an of life t akes i nt o
account our special abilities, i nt erest s, and ci r cumst ances, and
therefore it quite properly depends upon our social posi t i on and
John Rawls
51
nat ural asset s. Ther e is no obj ect i on t o fitting rat i onal pl ans t o these
cont i ngenci es, since t he pri nci pl es of justice have already been
chosen and const rai n t he cont ent of these pl ans, t he ends t hat they
encour age and t he means t hat they use. But in j udgement s of
justice, it is onl y at t he judicial and admi ni st rat i ve stage t hat all
rest ri ct i ons on i nf or mat i on are dr opped, and part i cul ar cases are t o
be deci ded in view of all t he rel evant facts.
In t he light of t hese cont rast s we may further clarify an i mpor t ant
difference bet ween t he cont r act doct ri ne and utilitarianism. Since
t he pri nci pl e of utility is t o maxi mi ze the good under st ood as the
satisfaction of r at i onal desire, we are t o t ake as given existing
preferences and t he possibilities of their cont i nuat i on i nt o the
future, and t hen t o strive for t he great est net bal ance of satisfaction.
But as we have seen, t he det er mi nat i on of rat i onal pl ans is indeter-
mi nat e in i mpor t ant ways. The mor e evident and easily applied
principles of r at i onal choice do not specify the best pl an; a
great deal r emai ns t o be deci ded. Thi s i ndet ermi nacy is no difficulty
for justice as fairness, since the details of pl ans do not affect in any
way what is right or just. Our way of life, what ever our part i cul ar
ci r cumst ances, must al ways conform t o t he principles of justice t hat
are arri ved at i ndependent l y. Thus t he arbi t rary features of pl ans of
life do not affect t hese pri nci pl es, or how t he basic st ruct ure is t o be
ar r anged. The i ndet er mi nacy in t he not i on of rat i onal i t y does not
t ransl at e itself i nt o l egi t i mat e cl ai ms t hat men can i mpose on one
anot her . The pri ori t y of t he right prevent s t hi s.
The ut i l i t ari an, on t he ot her hand, must concede the theoretical
possibility t hat confi gurat i ons of preferences al l owed by this
i ndet er mi nacy may lead t o injustice as ordi nari l y under st ood. For
exampl e, assume t hat t he larger par t of society has an abhorrence
for cert ai n religious or sexual pract i ces, and regards t hem as an
abomi nat i on. Thi s feeling is so intense t hat it is not enough t hat
these pract i ces be kept from t he publ i c view; t he very t hought t hat
these t hi ngs are goi ng on is enough t o arouse the majority t o anger
and hat r ed. Even when t hese at t i t udes are unsuppor t abl e on moral
gr ounds, t here appear s t o be no sure way t o exclude t hem as
i r r at i onal . Seeking t he great est satisfaction of desire may, t hen,
justify har sh repressi ve measur es agai nst act i ons t hat cause no
social injury. To defend i ndi vi dual liberty in this case t he utilitarian
has t o s how t hat given t he ci rcumst ances t he real bal ance of
advant ages in t he l ong r un still lies on the side of freedom; and this
ar gument may or may not be successful.
In justice as fai rness, however , this pr obl em never arises.
The i nt ense convi ct i ons of t he maj ori t y, if they are indeed mere
The Right and the Good Contrasted
pr ef er ences wi t hout any f oundat i on in t he principles of justice
ant ecedent l y est abl i shed, have no wei ght t o begin with. The
sat i sf act i on of t hese feelings has no val ue t hat can be put in the
scal es agai nst t he cl ai ms of equal l i bert y. To have a complaint
agai nst t he conduct and belief of ot her s we must show that their
act i ons i nj ure us, or t hat t he i nst i t ut i ons t hat aut hori ze what they
do t r eat us unj ust l y. And t hi s means t hat we must appeal to the
pr i nci pl es t hat we woul d acknowl edge in t he original position.
Agai nst t hese pr i nci pl es nei t her t he i nt ensi t y of feeling nor its being
s har ed by t he maj or i t y count s for anyt hi ng. On t he contract view,
t hen, t he gr ounds of l i bert y are compl et el y separat e from existing
pr ef er ences. I ndeed, we may t hi nk of t he pri nci pl es of justice as an
agr eement not t o t ake i nt o account cert ai n feelings when assessing
t he c onduc t of ot her s . As I not ed before, t hese poi nt s are familiar
el ement s of t he cl assi cal l i beral doct r i ne. I have ment i oned them
agai n in or der t o s how t hat t he i ndet er mi nacy in t he full theory of
t he good is no cause for obj ect i on. It may leave a person unsettled
as t o wh a t t o do, si nce it c a nnot pr ovi de hi m with instructions as to
h o w t o deci de. But si nce t he ai m of justice is not t o maximize the
fulfilment of r at i onal pl ans , t he cont ent of justice is not in any way
affect ed. Of cour s e, it c a nnot be deni ed t hat prevailing social
at t i t udes tie t he s t a t e s ma n' s ha nds . The convi ct i ons and passions of
t he maj or i t y may ma ke l i bert y i mpossi bl e t o mai nt ai n. But bowing
t o t hese pr act i cal necessi t i es is a di fferent t hi ng from accepting the
j ust i fi cat i on t hat if t hese feelings ar e s t r ong enough and outweigh in
i nt ensi t y any feelings t hat mi ght repl ace t hem, t hey shoul d carry the
deci si on. By cont r as t , t he cont r act vi ew requi res t hat we move
t o wa r d s j ust i nst i t ut i ons as speedi l y as t he ci rcumst ances permit
i r r espect i ve of exi st i ng s ent i ment s . A definite scheme of ideal
i ns t i t ut i ons is e mbe dde d in its pr i nci pl es of justice.
It is evi dent from t hese cont r as t s t hat in justice as fairness the
concept s of t he r i ght and t he good have mar kedl y distinct features.
Thes e di fferences ari se f r om t he st r uct ur e of cont r act t heory and the
pr i or i t y of r i ght a nd j ust i ce t ha t r esul t s. I do not suggest, however,
t hat t he t er ms ' r i ght ' and ' good' ( and t hei r relatives) are normally
used in wa ys t ha t reflect t hese di st i nct i ons. Al t hough our ordinary
speech ma y t end t o s uppor t t he account of t hese concepts, this
c or r e s ponde nc e is not needed for t he cor r ect ness of the contract
doct r i ne. Rat her , t wo t hi ngs suffice. Fi rst , t her e is a way of mapping
our cons i der ed j udgement s i nt o t he t heor y of justice such t hat in
reflective equi l i br i um t he c ount e r pa r t s of t hese convi ct i ons turn out
t o be t r ue, t o expr es s j udgement s t hat we can accept . And second,
onc e we unde r s t a nd t he t heor y, we can acknowl edge these interpre-
John Ratvls 53
84. HEDONI SM AS A METHOD OF CHOICE
Tr adi t i onal l y hedoni sm is i nt erpret ed in one of t wo ways: either as
t he cont ent i on t hat t he sole intrinsic good is pl easurabl e feeling, or
as t he psychol ogi cal thesis t hat t he only t hi ng individuals strive for
is pl easure. However 1 shall under st and hedoni sm in a t hi rd way,
namel y, as t ryi ng t o carry t hr ough t he domi nant - end concept i on of
del i berat i on. It at t empt s t o show how a rat i onal choice is al ways
possi bl e, at least in pri nci pl e. Al t hough this effort fails, I shall
exami ne it briefly for t he light it t hr ows upon t he cont rast between
ut i l i t ari ani sm and t he cont r act doct r i ne.
I i magi ne t he hedoni st t o reason as follows. First he t hi nks t hat , if
human life is t o be gui ded by reason, t here must exist a domi nant
end. Ther e is no r at i onal way t o bal ance our compet i ng aims
agai nst one anot her except as means t o some hi gher end. Second, he
i nt erpret s pl easure nar r owl y as agreeabl e feeling. Pleasantness as an
at t r i but e of feeling and sensat i on is t hought t o be the only plausible
candi dat e for t he role of t he domi nant end, and therefore it is the
onl y t hi ng good in itself. That , so conceived, pl easure al one is good
is not post ul at ed st r ai ght way as a first pri nci pl e and then held to
accord wi t h our consi der ed j udgement s of val ue. Rat her pl easure
is arri ved at as t he domi nant end by a process of el i mi nat i on.
Gr ant i ng t hat r at i onal choi ces are possi bl e, such an end must exist.
At t he same t i me this end cannot be happi ness or any objective
goal . To avoi d t he ci rcul ari t y of t he one and t he i nhumani t y and
t at i ons as sui t abl e r ender i ngs of what on reflection we now wish to
mai nt ai n. Even t hough we woul d not normal l y use these replace-
ment s, per haps because they are t oo cumber some, or woul d be
mi sunder st ood, or what ever , we are pr epar ed t o grant t hat they
cover in subst ance all t hat want s t o be said. Certainly these
subst i t ut es may not mean t he same as t he or di nar y j udgement s with
whi ch they are pai r ed. Ho w far this is the case is a quest i on that 1
shall not exami ne. Mor eover , t he repl acement s may indicate a shift
mor e or less drast i c from our initial moral j udgement s as they
existed pr i or t o phi l osophi cal reflection. Some changes anyway are
bound t o have t aken pl ace as phi l osophi cal criticism and const ruc-
tion lead us t o revise and ext end our views. But what count s
is whet her t he concept i on of justice as fairness, better t han any
ot her t heory present l y known t o us, t urns out t o lead t o true inter-
pr et at i ons of our consi dered j udgement s, and provides a mode of
expressi on for wha t we want to affirm.
fanaticism of the ot her, t he hedoni st t urns i nwar ds. He finds t he
ul t i mat e end in some definite quality of sensation or feeling
identifiable by i nt rospect i on. We can suppose, if we like, t hat
pleasantness can be ostensively defined as t hat at t ri but e whi ch is
common t o t he feelings and experiences t owar ds whi ch we have a
favourable at t i t ude and wish t o pr ol ong, ot her t hi ngs equal . Thus ,
for purposes of illustration, one might say t hat pl easant ness is t hat
feature which is common t o the experience of smelling roses, of
tasting chocol at e, of requi t ed affection, and so on, and anal ogousl y
for the opposi t e at t ri but e of pai nf ul ness.
1 4
The hedonist mai nt ai ns, t hen, t hat a rat i onal agent knows
exactly how to proceed in det ermi ni ng his good: he is t o ascert ai n
which of the plans open t o him promises the greatest net bal ance of
pleasure over pai n. This plan defines his rat i onal choice, t he best
way t o order his compet i ng aims. The count i ng principles now
apply trivially, since all good things are homogeneous and t herefore
comparabl e as means t o the one end of pl easure. Of course t hese
assessments are plagued by uncertainties and lack of i nf or mat i on,
and normally only t he crudest estimates can be made. Yet for
hedoni sm this is not a real difficulty: what count s is t hat t he
maxi mum of pleasure provides a clear idea of the good. We are now
said to know the one t hi ng the pursui t of whi ch gives rat i onal form
t o our life. Largely for these reasons Sidgwick t hi nks t hat pl easur e
must be the single rat i onal end t hat is to guide del i berat i on.
It is i mport ant to note t wo poi nt s. First, when pl easure is
regarded as a special at t ri but e of feeling and sensat i on, it is
conceived as a definite measure on whi ch cal cul at i ons can be based.
By reckoni ng in t erms of t he intensity and dur at i on of pl easant
experiences, t he necessary comput at i ons can theoretically be made.
The met hod of hedoni sm provi des a first-person pr ocedur e of
choice as the st andard of happi ness does not . Second, t aki ng
pleasure as t he domi nant end does not imply t hat we have any
particular objective goals. We find pl easure in t he most var i ed
activities and in t he quest for any number of t hi ngs. Ther ef or e
aiming t o maxi mi ze pl easurabl e feeling seems at least t o avoi d t he
appearance of fanaticism and i nhumani t y while still defining a
rat i onal met hod for first-person choi ce. Fur t her mor e, t he t wo
t radi t i onal i nt erpret at i ons of hedoni sm are now easily account ed
for. If pleasure is indeed t he only end t he pursui t of whi ch enabl es
us t o identify rat i onal pl ans, then surely pl easure woul d appear t o
be the sole intrinsic good, and so we woul d have arri ved at t he
principle of hedoni sm by an argument from t he condi t i ons of
rat i onal del i berat i on. A vari ant of psychological hedoni sm al so
John Rawls 55
follows: for al t hough it is goi ng t oo far t o say t hat rational conduct
woul d al ways consci ousl y aim at pleasure, it woul d in any case be
regulated by a schedul e of activities designed to maximize the net
bal ance of pl easur abl e feeling. Since it leads t o the more familiar
i nt er pr et at i ons, t he thesis t hat t he pursui t of pleasure provides the
only rat i onal met hod of del i berat i on seems t o be the fundamental
idea of hedoni s m.
It seems obvi ous t hat hedoni sm fails t o define a reasonable
domi nant end. We need onl y not e t hat once pl easure is conceived,
as it must be, in a sufficiently definite way so t hat its intensity and
dur at i on can ent er i nt o t he agent ' s cal cul at i ons, then it is no longer
plausible t hat it shoul d be t aken as t he sole rat i onal a i m.
1 6
Surely
t he preference for a cert ai n at t r i but e of feeling or sensation above
all else is as unbal anced and i nhuman as an overriding desire to
maxi mi ze one' s power over ot her s or one' s material weal t h. No
doubt it is for this r eason t hat Sidgwick is rel uct ant to grant that
pl easant ness is a par t i cul ar qual i t y of feeling; yet he must concede
this if pl easure is t o serve, as he want s it t o, as the ul t i mat e criterion
t o weigh ideal val ues such as knowl edge, beaut y, and friendship
agai nst one a n o t h e r .
1 7
And t hen t oo t here is t he fact t hat t here are different sorts of
agreeabl e feelings t hemsel ves i ncompar abl e, as well as the quant i t a-
tive di mensi ons of pl easur e, intensity and dur at i on. How are we to
bal ance t hese when t hey conflict? Are we t o choose a brief but
i nt ense pl easant experi ence of one ki nd of feeling over a less intense
but l onger pl easant experi ence of anot her? Aristotle says t hat the
good ma n if necessary lays down his life for his friends, since he
prefers a shor t per i od of i nt ense pl easure t o a long one of mild
enj oyment , a t wel vemont h of nobl e life t o many years of humdr um
exi s t ence.
1 8
But how does he decide this? Furt her, as Sant ayana
observes, we mus t settle t he relative wor t h of pleasure and pain.
When Pet rarch says t hat a t housand pleasures are not wor t h one
pai n, he adopt s a s t andar d for compar i ng t hem t hat is mor e basic
t han ei t her. The per son himself must make this decision, t aki ng
i nt o account t he full r ange of i ncl i nat i ons and desires, present
and fut ure. Cl earl y we have made no advance beyond deliberate
rat i onal i t y. The pr obl em of a pl ural i t y of ends arises all over again
wi t hi n t he class of subjective f eel i ngs.
1 9
It may be obj ect ed t hat in economi cs and decision t heory these
pr obl ems are over come. But this cont ent i on is based on a misunder-
st andi ng. In t he t heor y of demand, for exampl e, it is assumed t hat
t he cons umer ' s preferences satisfy vari ous post ul at es: they define a
compl et e or der i ng over t he set of al t ernat i ves and exhibit the
properties of convexity and cont i nui t y, and t he like. Gi ven t hese
assumpt i ons, it can be shown t hat a utility function exists whi ch
mat ches these preferences in t he sense t hat one al t ernat i ve is chosen
over anot her if and only if the value of t he function for t he selected
alternative is greater. This function characterizes t he i ndi vi dual ' s
choices, what he in fact prefers, grant ed t hat his preferences meet
certain stipulations. It asserts not hi ng at all about how a per son
arranges his decisions in such a coherent order t o begin wi t h, nor
clearly can it claim t o be a first-person pr ocedur e of choi ce t hat
someone might reasonabl y follow, since it only records t he
out come of his deliberations. At best t he principles t hat economi st s
have supposed the choices of rat i onal individuals t o satisfy can be
presented as guidelines for us t o consi der when we make our
decisions. But so underst ood, these criteria are just t he pri nci pl es of
rational choice (or their analogues) and we are back once agai n
with deliberative r at i onal i t y.
2 0
It seems i ndi sput abl e, t hen, t hat t here is no domi nant end t he
pursuit of whi ch accords wi t h our consi dered j udgement s of val ue.
The inclusive end of realizing a rat i onal pl an of life is an entirely
different thing. But the failure of hedoni sm t o provi de a r at i onal
procedure of choice shoul d occasion no surpri se. Wi t t genst ei n
showed that it is a mi st ake t o post ul at e certain special experi ences
t o explain how we distinguish memori es from i magi ni ngs, beliefs
from supposi t i ons, and so on for ot her ment al act s. Similarly, it is
antecedently unlikely t hat certain ki nds of agreeabl e feeling can
define a unit of account the use of whi ch expl ai ns t he possibility of
rational deliberation. Nei t her pl easure nor any ot her det er mi nat e
end can play the role t hat t he hedoni st woul d assign i t .
2 1
Now philosophers have supposed t hat charact eri st i c experi ences
exist and guide our ment al life for many different reasons. So whi l e
it seems a simple mat t er t o show t hat hedoni sm gets us nowher e,
the i mpor t ant t hi ng is t o see why one mi ght be driven t o r esor t t o
such a desperate expedi ent . I have al ready not ed one possi bl e
reason: t he desire t o nar r ow down t he scope of purel y preferent i al
choice in det ermi ni ng our good. In a teleological t heor y any
vagueness or ambi gui t y in t he concept i on of t he good is t ransferred
t o that of the right. Hence if t he good of i ndi vi dual s is somet hi ng
t hat , so t o speak, is just up t o t hem t o deci de as i ndi vi dual s, so
likewise wi t hi n certain limits is t hat whi ch is right. But it is nat ur al
t o t hi nk t hat what is right is not a mat t er of mere preference, a nd
therefore one tries t o find a definite concept i on of t he good.
There is, however, anot her reason: a teleological t heory needs a
way t o compare t he diverse goods of different i ndi vi dual s so t hat
John Raivls 57
NOTES
On this point see Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 416 f.
^ See J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. 5, last two paras.
For Bentham see The Principles of International Law, Essay I, in The
Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh, 1838-43),
vol. II, p. 537; for Edgeworth see Mathematical Psychics, pp. 52-6, and
also the first pages of The Pure Theory of Taxation', Economic
Journal, vol. 7 (1897), where the same argument is presented more
briefly.
Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. I, sec. IV.
the total good can be maxi mi zed. Ho w can these assessments be
made? Even if cert ai n ends serve t o organi ze the plans of individuals
taken singly, they do not suffice t o define a conception of right. It
woul d appear , t hen, t hat t he t urn i nwards t o the st andard of
agreeable feeling is an at t empt t o find a common denomi nat or
among t he pl ural i t y of per sons, an i nt erpersonal currency as it
were, by means of whi ch t he social orderi ng can be specified. And
this suggest i on is all t he mor e compel l i ng if it is already maintained
t hat this s t andar d is t he ai m of each person t o the extent t hat he is
rat i onal .
By way of concl usi on, 1 shoul d not say t hat a teleological
doct ri ne is necessarily dri ven t o some form of hedonism in order to
define a coher ent t heor y. Yet it does seem t hat the tendency in this
direction has a cert ai n nat ur al ness. Hedoni sm is, one might say, the
sympt omat i c drift of teleological t heori es insofar as they try to
formul at e a clear and appl i cabl e met hod of moral reasoning. The
weakness of hedoni sm reflects t he impossibility of defining an
appr opr i at e definite end t o be maxi mi zed. And this suggests that
the st ruct ure of teleological doct ri nes is radically misconceived:
from t he st art t hey rel at e t he right and the good in the wr ong way.
We shoul d not at t empt t o give form t o our life by first looking to
the good i ndependent l y defined. It is not our aims t hat primarily
reveal our nat ur e but r at her the principles t hat we woul d acknowl -
edge t o govern t he backgr ound condi t i ons under which these aims
are t o be formed and t he manner in which they are t o be pursued.
For the self is pr i or t o t he ends whi ch are affirmed by it; even a
domi nant end must be chosen from among numer ous possibilities.
There is no way t o get beyond deliberative rationality. We should
therefore reverse t he rel at i on bet ween the right and the good
pr oposed by teleological doct ri nes and view the right as pri or. The
moral t heor y is t hen devel oped by wor ki ng in the opposite
di rect i on.
5
The priority of right is a central feature of Kant' s ethics. See, for
example, The Critique of Practical Reason, ch. II, bk I of pt I, especially
pp. 62-5 of vol. 5 of Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Preussische
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin, 1913). A clear statement is to
be found in 'Theory and Practice' (to abbreviate the title), Political
Writings, pp. 67 f.
6
'Of the Original Contract', Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, ed.
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, vol. 1 (London, 1875), pp. 454 f.
7
See, for example, W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford, The
Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 21, 26- 8, 35, 57 f. Similarly, Leibniz in
' On the Ultimate Origin of Things' (1697) speaks of the law of justice
which 'declares that each one [each individual] participate in the
perfection of the universe and in a happiness of his own in proportion
to his own virtue and to the good will he entertains toward the common
good.' Leibniz, ed. P. P. Wiener (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons,
1951), p. 353.
s
See F. H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition (New York, Harper and
Brothers, 1935), pp. 54- 7.
9
See Knight, ibid., p. 56 n.
1 0
Here I borrow from Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 64 f.
1 1
See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford, The Clarendon Press,
1961), p. 39; and Feinberg, Doing and Deserving, ch. 5.
1 2
On this point, see Feinberg, ibid., pp. 62, 69 n.
1 3
See the discussion in R. D. Luce and Howard Raiffa, Games and
Decisions (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 278-306.
1 4
The illustration is from C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory
(London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930), pp. 186 f.
15
The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn (London, Macmillan, 1907),
pp. 405- 7, 479.
1 6
As Broad observes in Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 187.
In Methods of Ethics, p. 127, Sidgwick denies that pleasure is a
measurable quality of feeling independent of its relation from volition.
This is the view of some writers, he says, but one he cannot accept. He
defines pleasure 'as a feeling which, when experienced by intelligent
beings, is at least apprehended as desirable or - in cases of comparison -
preferable'. It would seem that the view he here rejects is the one he
relies upon later as the final criterion to introduce coherence among
ends. See pp. 405- 7, 479. Otherwise the hedonist method of choice no
longer provides instructions that can be followed.
18
Nicomachean Ethics, 1169al 7-26.
19
The Life of Reason in Common Sense (New York, Charles Scribner's,
Sons 1905), pp. 237 f.
Thus to the objection that price theory must fail because it seeks t o
predict the unpredictable, the decisions of persons with free will, Walras
says: 'Actually, we have never attempted to predict decisions made
under conditions of perfect freedom; we have only tried to express the
John Rawls 59
effects of such decisions in terms of mathematics. In our theory each
trader may be assumed to determine his utility or want curves as he
pleases.' Elements of Pure Economics, trans. William Jaffe (Home-
wood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, 1954), p. 256. See also P. A. Samuelson,
Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1947), the remarks pp. 90- 2, 97 f; and R.D. Luce and Howard
Raiffa, Games and Decisions (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1957),
pp. 16, 21- 4, 38.
See the Philosophical Investigations (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953).
The argument against postulating special experiences is made through-
out for many different cases. For the application to pleasure, see the
remarks of G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1957). Anscombe says: ' We might adapt a remark of Wittgenstein's
about meaning and say "Pleasure cannot be an impression; for no
impression could have the consequences of pleasure." They [the British
Empiricists] were saying that something which they thought of as like a
particular tickle or itch was quite obviously the point of doing anything
whatsoever' (p. 77). See also Gilbert Ryle, 'Pleasure', Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 28 (1954), and Dilemmas (Cambridge,
The University Press, 1954), ch. 4; Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion
and Will (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), ch. 6; and
C. C. W. Taylor, ' Pleasure' , Analysis, supp. vol. (1963). These studies
present what seems to be the more correct view. In the text I try to
explain the motivation from the standpoint of moral philosophy of the
so-called British Empiricist conception of pleasure. That it is fallacious I
pretty much take for granted, as the writers mentioned have, I believe,
shown.
3
i
. . . Is t here a t hread of principle t hat runs t hr ough t he core liberal
positions, and t hat distinguishes these from t he cor r espondi ng
conservative positions? There is a familiar answer t o this quest i on
that is mi st aken, but mi st aken in an i l l umi nat i ng way. The politics
of democraci es, according t o this answer, recognizes several
i ndependent constitutive political ideals, t he most i mpor t ant of
which are the ideals of liberty and equality. Unfort unat el y, liberty
and equality often conflict: somet i mes t he only effective means t o
pr omot e equality require some l i mi t at i on of liberty, and somet i mes
t he consequences of pr omot i ng liberty are det ri ment al t o equal i t y.
In these cases, good government consists in t he best compr omi se
bet ween t he compet i ng ideals, but different politicians and citizens
will make t hat compr omi se differently. Liberals t end relatively t o
favour equal i t y mor e and liberty less t han conservat i ves do, and t he
core set of liberal posi t i ons I described is t he result of st ri ki ng t he
balance t hat way.
This account offers a t heory about what liberalism is. Li beral i sm
shares the same constitutive principles with many other political
theories, including conservat i sm, but is distinguished from t hese by
at t achi ng different relative i mpor t ance t o different pri nci pl es. The
t heory therefore leaves r oom, on t he spect rum it describes, for t he
radical who cares even more for equality and less for liberty t han the
liberal, and therefore st ands even further away from t he ext r eme
conservative. The liberal becomes t he man in t he mi ddl e, whi ch
explains why liberalism is so often now consi dered wi sh- washy, an
unt enabl e compr omi se bet ween t wo mor e fort hri ght posi t i ons.
No doubt t hi s descri pt i on of Ameri can politics coul d be made
* Reprinted from Liberalism by Ronald Dworkin, in Public and Private
Morality by Stuart Hampshire (ed.), 1978, by permission of Cambridge
University Press.
\
Ronald Dworkin: Liberalism
51
'
Ronald Dworkin
61
mor e sophi st i cat ed. It mi ght make r oom for ot her i ndependent
const i t ut i ve ideals shared by liberalism and its opponent s, like
stability or securi t y, so t hat t he compr omi ses involved in part i cul ar
deci si ons are made out t o be mor e compl ex. But if t he nerve of t he
t heory r emai ns t he compet i t i on bet ween liberty and equality as
const i t ut i ve ideals, t hen t he t heory cannot succeed. . . . It seems t o
appl y, at best, t o only a limited number of t he political
cont roversi es it tries t o expl ai n. It is designed for economi c
cont roversi es, but is ei t her i rrel evant or mi sl eadi ng in t he case of
censorshi p and por nogr aphy, and i ndeed, in t he criminal l aw
general l y.
But t here is a much mor e i mpor t ant defect in this expl anat i on. It
assumes t hat liberty is measur abl e so t hat , if t wo political decisions
each i nvades t he liberty of a citizen, we can sensibly say t hat one
decision t akes mor e liberty away from hi m t han t he ot her. Tha t
assumpt i on is necessary, because ot herwi se the post ul at e, t hat
liberty is a const i t ut i ve ideal of bot h t he liberal and conservat i ve
political st ruct ures, cannot be mai nt ai ned. Even firm conservatives
are cont ent t hat t hei r liberty t o drive as t hey wish (for exampl e t o
dri ve upt own on Lexi ngt on Avenue) may be i nvaded for t he sake,
not of some i mpor t ant compet i ng political ideal, but only for
mar gi nal gains in conveni ence or orderl y traffic pat t er ns. But since
traffic regul at i on pl ai nl y involves some loss of liberty, t he conserva-
tive cannot be said t o value liberty as such unless he is able t o s how
t hat , for some r eason, less liberty is lost by traffic regul at i on t han by
rest ri ct i ons on, for exampl e, free speech, or t he liberty t o sell for
prices ot her s are willing t o pay, or what ever ot her liberty he t akes
t o be f undament al .
But t hat is precisely what he cannot show, because we do not
have a concept of liberty t hat is quantifiable in t he way t hat
demonst r at i on woul d requi re. He cannot say, for exampl e, t hat
traffic regul at i ons interfere less wi t h what most men and women
want t o do t han woul d a l aw forbi ddi ng t hem t o speak out in
favour of Communi s m, or a l aw requi ri ng t hem not t o fix t hei r
prices as t hey t hi nk best. Mos t peopl e care mor e about driving t han
speaki ng for Communi s m, and have no occasi on t o fix prices even
if t hey wa nt t o. I do not mean t hat we can make no sense of t he idea
of f undament al liberties, like freedom of speech. But we cannot
argue in t hei r favour by showi ng t hat t hey prot ect mor e liberty,
t aken t o be an even roughl y measur abl e commodi t y, t han does t he
right t o dri ve as we wi sh; t he f undament al liberties are i mpor t ant
because we val ue somet hi ng else t hat t hey prot ect . But if t hat is so,
t hen we cannot expl ai n t he difference bet ween liberal and conserva-
62 Liberalism
tive political positions by supposi ng t hat t he l at t er prot ect t he
commodi t y of liberty, valued for its own sake, mor e effectively t han
the former.
1
It mi ght now be said, however, t hat t he ot her half of t he
l i bert y-equal i t y expl anat i on may be salvaged. Even if we cannot
say t hat conservatives value liberty, as such, mor e t han liberals, we
can still say t hat they value equality less, and t hat t he different
political posi t i ons may be expl ai ned in t hat way. Conservat i ves
tend t o di scount t he i mpor t ance of equality when set besi de ot her
goals, like general prosperi t y or even security; while l i beral s, in
cont rast , value equality relatively mor e, and radicals mor e still.
Once again, it is appar ent that this expl anat i on is t ai l ored t o the
economi c cont roversi es, and fits poorl y wi t h t he non- economi c
controversies. Once again, however, its defects are mor e general
and more i mpor t ant . We must identify mor e clearly t he sense in
which equality coul d be a constitutive ideal for either liberals or
conservatives. Once we do so we shall see t hat it is mi sl eadi ng t o
say t hat t he conservative values equal i t y, in t hat sense, less t han
the liberal. We shall want t o say, i nst ead, t hat he has a different
conception of what equal i t y requi res.
We must distinguish between t wo different pri nci pl es t hat t ake
equality t o be a political i deal .
2
The first requi res t hat t he
government t reat all those in its charge as equals, t hat is, as ent i t l ed
to its equal concern and respect. That is not an empt y r equi r ement :
most of us do not suppose t hat we must , as i ndi vi dual s, t r eat our
nei ghbour' s children with the same concern as our own, or t reat
everyone we meet wi t h t he same respect. It is nevert hel ess pl ausi bl e
t o think t hat any government shoul d t reat all its citizens as equal s in
t hat way. The second principle requi res t hat t he gover nment t reat
all those in its charge equally in t he di st ri but i on of some resource of
oppor t uni t y, or at least wor k t o secure the state of affairs i n whi ch
they all are equal or mor e nearly equal in t hat respect. It is, of
course, conceded by everyone t hat the gover nment cannot make
everyone equal in every respect, but peopl e do disagree about how
far government shoul d try t o secure equality in some par t i cul ar
resource; for exampl e, in monet ary weal t h.
If we l ook only at t he economi c-pol i t i cal cont roversi es, t hen we
mi ght well be justified in saying t hat liberals want mor e equal i t y
in the sense of t he second principle t han conservatives do. But it
woul d be a mi st ake t o concl ude t hat they val ue equal i t y in t he sense
of the first and more fundament al pri nci pl e any mor e highly. I say
t hat the first principle is more fundament al because I assume t hat ,
for bot h liberals and conservatives, t he first is const i t ut i ve and t he
Ronald Dworkin
63
second deri vat i ve. Somet i mes t reat i ng peopl e equally is the only
way t o t reat t hem as equal s; but somet i mes not . Suppose a limited
amount of emergency relief is available for t wo equally popul ous
areas injured by floods; t reat i ng t he citizens of both areas as equals
requi res giving mor e aid t o the mor e seriously devast at ed area
r at her t han spl i t t i ng t he available funds equally. The conservative
believes t hat in many ot her, less appar ent , cases t reat i ng citizens
equal l y amount s t o not t reat i ng t hem as equal s. He mi ght concede,
for exampl e, t hat positive di scri mi nat i on in university admi ssi ons
will wor k t o make t he t wo races mor e nearl y equal in weal t h, but
nevert hel ess mai nt ai n t hat such pr ogr ammes do not t reat black
and whi t e uni versi t y appl i cant s as equal s. If he is a utilitarian he
will have a similar, t hough much mor e general , ar gument against
any r edi st r i but i on of weal t h t hat reduces economi c efficiency. He
will say t hat t he onl y way t o t reat peopl e as equals is to maxi mi ze
t he average wel fare of all member s of communi t y, count i ng gains
and losses t o all in the same scales, and t hat a free mar ket is the
onl y, or best, i nst r ument for achieving t hat goal. This is not
(I t hi nk) a good ar gument , but if t he conservat i ve who makes it is
sincere he cannot be said t o have di scount ed t he i mpor t ance of
t reat i ng all citizens as equal s.
So we must reject t he simple idea t hat liberalism consists in a
distinctive wei ght i ng bet ween const i t ut i ve principles of equality
and liberty. But our discussion of t he idea of equal i t y suggests a
mor e fruitful line. I assume (as I said) t hat t here is br oad agreement
wi t hi n moder n politics t hat the gover nment must treat all its
citizens wi t h equal concern and respect. 1 do not mean t o deny the
great power of prej udi ce in, for exampl e, Ameri can politics. But
few citizens, and even fewer pol i t i ci ans, woul d now admi t t o
political convi ct i ons t hat cont r adi ct t he abst ract pri nci pl e of equal
concer n and respect . Different peopl e hol d, however, as our
di scussi on made pl ai n, very different concept i ons of what t hat
abst r act pri nci pl e requi res in par t i cul ar cases.
II
What does it mean for t he gover nment t o t reat its citizens as_e_quals?
Tha t is, I t hi nk, t he same quest i on as t he quest i on of what it means
for t he gover nment t o t reat all its citizens as free, or as i ndependent ,
or wi t h equal di gni t y. In any case, it is a quest i on t hat has been
cent ral t o political t heor y at least since Kant .
It may be answer ed in t wo fundament al l y different ways. The
64 Liberalism
first supposes t hat government must be neut ral on what mi ght be
' called the question of the good life. The second supposes t hat
government cannot be neut ral on t hat quest i on, because it cannot
<* treat its citizens as equal human beings wi t hout a t heory of what
human beings ought t o be. I must expl ai n t hat di st i nct i on furt her.
Each person follows a more-or-less art i cul at e concept i on of what
gives value to life. The scholar who values a life of cont empl at i on
has such a concept i on; so does t he t el evi si on-wat chi ng, beer-
dri nki ng citizen who is fond of saying ' Thi s is t he life', t hough of
course he has t hought less about t he issue and is less able t o
describe or defend his concept i on.
, The first t heory of equality supposes t hat political decisions must
j s be,"so far as is possible, i ndependent of any par t i cul ar concept i on of
the good life, or of what gives val ue t o life. Since t he citizens of a
i society differ in t hei r concept i ons, t he gover nment does not t reat
t hem as equals if it prefers one concept i on t o anot her , ei t her
because t he officials believe t hat one is intrinsically superi or, or
because one is held by t he more numer ous or mor e powerful gr oup.
The second t heory argues, on the cont r ar y, t hat t he cont ent of equal
t reat ment cannot be i ndependent of some t heory about t he good for
man or the good of life, because t reat i ng a person as an equal means
treating hi m t he way t he^good or truly wise person woul d wish
t o be treated. Good government consists in fostering or at least
recognizing good lives; t r eat ment as an equal consists in t r eat i ng
each person as if he were desi rous of l eadi ng t he life t hat is in fact
good, at least so far as this is possible.
Thi s distinction is very abst ract , but it is also very i mpor t ant . I
shall now argue t hat liberalism t akes, as its const i t ut i ve political
moral i t y, the first concept i on of equality. I shall try t o s uppor t t hat
claim in this way. In t he next section of this essay I shall s how how
it is plausible, and even likely, t hat a t hought ful person who
accepted t he first concept i on of equal i t y woul d, given t he economi c
and political circumstances of Ameri ca in t he last several decades,
reach t he positions I identified as t he familiar cor e of liberal
positions. If so, t hen t he hypot hesi s satisfies t he second of t he
condi t i ons I described for a successful t heory. In t he fol l owi ng
section I shall try t o satisfy the t hi rd condi t i on by showi ng how it is
plausible and even likely t hat someone wh o hel d a par t i cul ar
version of t he second t heory of equality woul d reach what are
normal l y regarded as t he core of Amer i can conservat i ve posi t i ons. I
say *a part i cul ar version o f because Ameri can conservat i sm does
not follow aut omat i cal l y from rejecting t he liberal t heor y of
equality. The second (or non-l i beral ) t heory of equal i t y hol ds
Ronald Dworkin
65
merely t hat t he t r eat ment gover nment owes citizens is at least partly
det er mi ned by some concept i on of the good life. Many political
t heori es shar e t hat thesis, i ncl udi ng t heori es as far apar t as, for
exampl e, Amer i can conservat i sm and vari ous forms of socialism or
Mar xi s m, t hough t hese will of course differ in the concept i on of the
good life t hey adopt , and hence in t he political institutions and
decisions they endor se. In this respect, liberalism is decidedly not
some compr omi s e or hal f-way house bet ween mor e forceful
posi t i ons, but st ands on one side of an i mpor t ant line t hat
di st i ngui shes it from all compet i t or s t aken as a gr oup.
I shall not pr ovi de ar gument s in this essay t hat my theory of
liberalism meets t he first condi t i on 1 described - t hat the theory
must pr ovi de a political moral i t y t hat it makes sense t o suppose
peopl e in our cul t ure hol d - t hough I t hi nk it plain t hat the theory
does meet this condi t i on. The fourt h condi t i on requires t hat a
t heory be as abst r act and general as t he first t hree condi t i ons al l ow.
I doubt t here will be obj ect i ons t o my t heory on that account .
HI
I now define a liberal as someone who hol ds the first, or liberal,
t heory of what equal i t y requi res. Suppose t hat a liberal is asked
t o f ound a new st at e. He is requi red t o di ct at e its const i t ut i on and
f undament al i nst i t ut i ons. He must pr opose a general t heory
of political di st r i but i on, t hat is, a t heory of how what ever t he
communi t y has t o assign, by way of goods or resources or
oppor t uni t i es, shoul d be assi gned. He will arrive initially at
somet hi ng like t hi s pri nci pl e of rough equal i t y: resources and
oppor t uni t i es shoul d be di st ri but ed, so far as possible, equally, so
t hat r oughl y t he same shar e of what ever is available is devot ed
t o satisfying t he ambi t i ons of each. Any ot her general aim of
di st ri but i on will assume ei t her t hat the fate of some peopl e shoul d
be of great er concer n t han t hat of ot hers, or t hat t he ambi t i ons or
t al ent s of some are mor e wor t hy, and shoul d be suppor t ed mor e
generousl y on t hat account .
Someone may obj ect t hat this pri nci pl e of rough equal i t y is unfair
because it i gnores t he fact t hat peopl e have different t ast es, and t hat
some of t hese are mor e expensi ve t o satisfy t han ot hers, so t hat , for
exampl e, t he ma n wh o prefers champagne will need mor e funds if
he is not t o be frust rat ed t han t he man satisfied wi t h beer. But t he
liberal may reply t hat t ast es as t o whi ch peopl e differ are, by and
l arge, not afflictions, like diseases, but are rat her cultivated, in
66 Liberalism
accordance with each person' s t heory of what his life shoul d be
l i ke.
3
The most effective neutrality, therefore, requi res t hat the
same share be devot ed t o each, so t hat t he choi ce bet ween
expensive and less expensive tastes can be made by each per son for
himself, with no sense t hat his overall share will be enl arged by
choosing a more expensive life, or t hat , what ever he chooses, his
choice will subsidize those who have chosen mor e expensively.
But what does the principle of rough equal i t y of di st r i but i on
require in practice? If all resources were di st ri but ed directly by t he
government t hrough grant s of food, housi ng, and so fort h; if every
opport uni t y citizens have were provi ded directly by t he gover nment
t hrough the provisions of civil and criminal l aw; if every citizen had
exactly the same talents; if every citizen st art ed his life wi t h no
more than what any ot her citizen had at t he st art ; and if every
citizen had exactly the same t heory of t he good life and hence
exactly the same scheme of preferences as every ot her citizen,
including preferences bet ween product i ve activity of different forms
and leisure, then the principle of rough equal i t y of t r eat ment coul d
be satisfied simply by equal di st ri but i ons of everyt hi ng t o be
distributed and by civil and criminal l aws of universal appl i cat i on.
Gover nment woul d arrange for pr oduct i on t hat maxi mi zed t he mix
of goods, including jobs and leisure, t hat everyone favoured,
distributing t he product equally.
Of course, none of these condi t i ons of similarity hol ds. But t he
moral relevance of different sorts of diversity are very different, as
may be shown by t he following exercise. Suppose all t he condi t i ons
of similarity I ment i oned did hol d except t he l ast : citizens have
different theories of the good and hence different preferences. They
therefore disagree about what pr oduct t he r aw mat eri al s and
l abour and savings of t he communi t y should be used t o pr oduce,
and about whi ch activities shoul d be pr ohi bi t ed or regul at ed so as
t o make ot hers possible or easier. The Hberal, as l awgi ver, now
needs mechani sms t o satisfy t he principles of equal t r eat ment in
spite of these di sagreement s. He will decide t hat t her e are no bet t er
mechani sms available, as general political i nst i t ut i ons, t han t he t wo
mai n institutions of our own political economy: t he economi c
market , for decisions about what goods shall be pr oduced and how
they shall be di st ri but ed, and represent at i ve democr acy, for collec-
tive decisions about what conduct shall be prohi bi t ed or regul at ed
so t hat ot her conduct mi ght be made possible or conveni ent . Each
of these familiar i nst i t ut i ons may be expect ed t o provi de a" mor e
egalitarian division t han any ot her general ar r angement . The
mar ket , if it can be made t o function efficiently, will det er mi ne for
Ronald Dworkin 67
each pr oduct a pri ce t hat reflects the cost in resources of material,
l abour and capi t al t hat mi ght have been applied t o produce
somet hi ng different t hat someone else want s. That cost determines,
for anyone who consumes t hat pr oduct , how much his account
shoul d be char ged in comput i ng t he egalitarian division of social
resources. It pr ovi des a measur e of how much more his account
shoul d be char ged for a house t han a book, and for one book rather
t han anot her . The mar ket will also provi de, for the l abourer, a
measur e of how much shoul d be credited t o his account for his
choice of pr oduct i ve activity over leisure, and for one activity rather
t han anot her . It will tell us, t hr ough t he price it put s on his labour,
how much he woul d gai n or lose by his decision t o pursue one
career r at her t han anot her . These measurement s make a citizen' s
own di st r i but i on a funct i on of the personal preferences of others as
well as of his own, and it is t he sum of these personal preferences
t hat fixes t he t r ue cost t o t he communi t y of meeting his own
preferences for goods and activities. The egalitarian distribution,
whi ch requi res t hat t he cost of satisfying one person' s preferences
shoul d as far as is possi bl e be equal t o t he cost of satisfying
anot her ' s, cannot be enforced unless t hose measurement s are made.
We are familiar wi t h t he ant i -egal i t ari an consequences of free
ent erpri se in pr act i ce; it may therefore seem paradoxi cal t hat t he
liberal as l awgi ver shoul d choose a mar ket economy for reasons of
equal i t y r at her t han efficiency. But , under t he special condi t i on t hat
peopl e differ onl y in preferences for goods and activities, the
mar ket is mor e egal i t ari an t han any alternative of comparabl e
generality. The mos t pl ausi bl e al t ernat i ve woul d be t o allow
decisions of pr oduct i on, i nvest ment , pri ce and wage t o be made by
elected officials in a socialist economy. But what principles should
officials use in maki ng t hose decisions? The liberal mi ght tell t hem
t o mi mi c t he deci si ons t hat a mar ket woul d make if it was worki ng
efficiently under pr oper compet i t i on and full knowl edge. This
mi mi cry woul d be, in pract i ce, much less efficient t han an actual
mar ket woul d be. In any case, unless t he liberal had reason t o think
it woul d be much mor e efficient, he woul d have good reason t o
reject it. Any mi ni mal l y efficient mi mi cki ng of a hypothetical
mar ket woul d requi re i nvasi ons of pri vacy t o det ermi ne what
decisions i ndi vi dual s woul d make if forced actually t o pay for their
i nvest ment , cons umpt i on and empl oyment decisions at mar ket
rat es, and this i nf or mat i on gat heri ng woul d be, in many ot her
ways, much mor e expensi ve t han an act ual market . Inevitably,
mor eover , t he assumpt i ons officials make about how peopl e woul d
behave in a hypot het i cal mar ket reflect t he officials' own beliefs
^ Liberalism
a bout h o w peopl e s houl d behave. So t her e woul d be, for the liberal,
little t o g a m a nd muc h t o l ose in a socialist economy in which
officials wer e asked t o mi mi c a hypot het i cal mar ket .
But any ot he r i ns t r uct i ons woul d be a direct violation of the
l i beral t heor y of wha t equal i t y r equi r es, because if a decision is
ma d e t o pr oduc e a nd sell goods at a pri ce bel ow t he price a market
woul d fix, t hen t hose who prefer t hose goods are, pro tanto,
recei vi ng mor e t han an equal shar e of t he resources of the
c ommuni t y at t he expens e of t hose wh o woul d prefer some other
use of t he r es our ces . Suppos e t he limited demand for books,
ma t c he d agai ns t t he d e ma n d for compet i ng uses for wood-pulp,
woul d fix t he pr i ce of books at a poi nt hi gher t han the socialist
ma na ge r s of t he e c onomy will char ge; t hose who want books are
havi ng less char ged t o t hei r account t han t he egalitarian principle
woul d r equi r e. It mi ght be sai d t hat in a socialist economy books
ar e si mpl y val ued mor e , becaus e t hey are i nherent l y more worthy
uses of soci al r esour ces, qui t e a pa r t from t he popul ar demand for
books . But t he l i beral t heor y of equal i t y rules out t hat appeal to the
i nher ent val ue of one t heor y of wh a t is good in life.
In a soci et y in whi ch peopl e differed onl y in preferences, then,
a ma r ke t woul d be f avour ed for its egal i t ari an consequences.
I nequal i t y of mone t a r y weal t h woul d be t he consequence only of
t he fact t ha t s ome pr ef er ences ar e mor e expensi ve than others,
i ncl udi ng t he pr ef er ence for l ei sure t i me r at her t han the most
l ucr at i ve pr oduc t i ve act i vi t y. But we mus t now ret urn to the real
wor l d. In t he act ual soci et y for whi ch t he liberal must construct
pol i t i cal i ns t i t ut i ons , t her e ar e all t he ot her differences. Talents are
not di s t r i but ed equal l y, so t he deci si on of one person t o work in a
f act or y r a t he r t ha n a l aw firm, or not t o wor k at all, will be
gove r ne d in l ar ge pa r t by his abi l i t i es r at her t han his preferences for
wo r k or bet ween wo r k and l ei sure. The i nst i t ut i ons of wealth,
whi ch al l ow peopl e t o di spose of wha t t hey receive by gift,
me a n t ha t chi l dr en of t he successful will st ar t with mor e wealth
t han t he chi l dr en of t he unsuccessful . Some peopl e have special
needs , becaus e t hey ar e ha ndi c a ppe d; t hei r handi cap will not only
di sabl e t he m f r om t he mos t pr oduct i ve and lucrative employment,
but will i ncapaci t at e t he m f r om usi ng t he proceeds of whatever
e mp l o y me n t t hey find as efficiently, so t hat they will need more
t h a n t hos e wh o ar e not ha ndi c a ppe d t o satisfy identical ambitions.
Thes e i nequal i t i es will have gr eat , oft en cat ast r ophi c, effects on
t he di s t r i but i on t ha t a ma r ke t e c onomy will pr ovi de. But, unlike
di fferences in pr ef er ences, t he differences t hese inequalities make
ar e i ndef ensi bl e accor di ng t o t he l i beral concept i on of equality. It is
Ronald Dworkin 69
obvi ousl y obnoxi ous t o the liberal concept i on, for exampl e, that
someone shoul d have mor e of what the communi t y as a whol e has
t o di st ri but e because he or his father had superi or skill or luck. The
liberal l awgi ver t herefore faces a difficult t ask. His concept i on of
equal i t y requi res an economi c system t hat produces certain ine-
qual i t i es (t hose t hat reflect t he t rue differential costs of goods and
oppor t uni t i es) but not ot her s (those t hat follow from differences in
ability, i nher i t ance, etc. ). The mar ket pr oduces bot h t he required
and t he forbi dden i nequal i t i es, and t here is no alternative system
t hat can be relied upon t o pr oduce t he former wi t hout the latter.
The liberal must be t empt ed, therefore, t o a reform of the market
t hr ough a scheme of redi st ri but i on t hat leaves its pricing system
relatively i nt act but sharpl y limits, at least, the inequalities in
welfare t hat his initial pri nci pl e prohi bi t s. No solution will seem
perfect. The liberal may find t he best answer in a scheme of welfare
rights financed t hr ough redi st ri but i ve i ncome and inheritance taxes
of t he convent i onal sort , whi ch redi st ri but es just t o the Rawlsian
poi nt , t hat is, t o t he poi nt at whi ch t he worst-off gr oup woul d be
har med r at her t han benefited by further transfers. In t hat case, he
will r emai n a r el uct ant capitalist, believing t hat a market economy
so r ef or med is super i or , from t he st andpoi nt of his conception of
equal i t y, t o any pract i cal socialist al t ernat i ve. Or he may believe
t hat t he redi st ri but i on t hat is possi bl e in a capitalist economy will
be so i nadequat e, or will be pur chased at the cost of such
inefficiency, t hat it is bet t er t o proceed in a more radical way, by
subst i t ut i ng socialist for mar ket decisions over a large part of t he
economy, and t hen relying on t he political process t o i nsut e t hat
prices ar e set in a manner at least roughl y consistent with his
concept i on of equal i t y. In t hat case he will be a rel uct ant socialist,
who acknowl edges t he egal i t ari an defects of socialism but count s
t hem as less severe t han t he practical al t ernat i ves. In either case, he
chooses a mi xed economi c syst em - either redistributive capitalism
or l i mi t ed soci al i sm - not in or der t o compr omi se ant agoni st i c
ideals of efficiency and equal i t y, but t o achieve t he best practical
real i zat i on of t he demands of equal i t y itself.
Let us assume t hat in this manner t he liberal either refines or
part i al l y ret ract s his ori gi nal selection of a mar ket economy. He
must now consi der t he second of the t wo familiar institutions he
first selected, whi ch is represent at i ve democracy. Democracy is
justified because it enforces the ri ght of each person t o respect and
concer n as an i ndi vi dual ; but in pract i ce the decisions of a
democr at i c maj or i t y may often violate that right, accordi ng t o the
liberal t heor y of what the ri ght requi res. Suppose a legislature
70 Liberalism
elected by a majority decides t o make cri mi nal s ome act (like
speaki ng in favour of an unpopul ar political posi t i on, or part i ci pat -
ing in eccentric sexual practices) not because t he act depri ves ot hers
of opport uni t i es they want , but because t he maj ori t y di sappr oves of
those views or t hat sexual mor al i t y. The political deci si on, in ot her
wor ds, reflects not si mpl y s ome accommodat i on of t he personal
preferences of everyone, in such a way as t o make t he oppor t uni t i es
of all as nearly equal as may be, but t he domi nat i on of one set of
external preferences, t hat is, preferences peopl e have about what
ot hers shall do or have.
5
The decision i nvades rat her t han enforces
t he right of citizens t o be t reat ed as equal s.
Ho w can t he liberal prot ect citizens agai nst t hat sort of vi ol at i on
of their fundament al right? It will not do for t he liberal si mpl y t o
instruct legislators, in some const i t ut i onal exhor t at i on, t o di sregard
t he ext ernal preferences of their const i t uent s. Ci t i zens will vot e
these preferences in electing their represent at i ves, and a legislator
who chooses to ignore t hem will not survi ve. In any case, it is
sometimes impossible t o di st i ngui sh, even by i nt r ospect i on, t he
external and personal component s of a political posi t i on: t hi s is
t he case, for exampl e, wi t h associ at i onal preferences, whi ch are t he
preferences some peopl e have for oppor t uni t i es, like t he oppor t un-
ity t o at t end publ i c schools, but only wi t h ot her s of t he same
' backgr ound' .
The liberal, therefore, needs a scheme of civil ri ght s, whose effect
will be t o det ermi ne t hose political decisions IK'aFaTe ant ecedent l y
likely t o reflect st rong ext ernal preferences, and t o r emove t hose
decisions from maj ori t ari an political i nst i t ut i ons al t oget her. Of
course, t he scheme of rights necessary t o do this will depend on
general facts about t he prejudices and ot her ext er nal preferences of
t he majority at any given t i me, and different liberals will di sagree
about what is needed at any part i cul ar t i me.
6
But t he ri ght s encoded
in t he Bill of Ri ght s of t he United States Const i t ut i on, as i nt erpret ed
(on the whol e) by t he Supreme Cour t , are t hose t hat a subst ant i al
number of liberals woul d t hi nk reasonabl y well sui t ed t o what t he
Uni t ed States now requi res (t hough most woul d t hi nk t hat t he
prot ect i on of t he individual in cert ai n i mpor t ant areas, i ncl udi ng
sexual publ i cat i on and pract i ce, are much t oo weak) .
The mai n part s of t he criminal l aw, . however, present a special
probl em not easily met by a scheme of civil rights t hat di sabl e t he
legislature from taking certain political decisions. The liberal
knows that many of the most important decisions requi red by an
effective criminal law are not made by legislators at all, but by
prosecutors deciding whom to prosecute for what crime, and by
Ronald Dworkin
71
juries and j udges deci di ng whom t o convict and what sentences to
i mpose. He al so knows t hat these decisions are antecedently very
likely t o be cor r upt ed by t he ext ernal preferences of those who
make t hese deci si ons because t hose they judge, typically, have
at t i t udes and ways of life very different from their own. The liberal
does not have avai l abl e, as pr ot ect i on agai nst these decisions, any
strategy compar abl e t o t he strategy of civil rights t hat simply
remove a deci si on from an i nst i t ut i on. Decisions t o prosecute,
convict and sent ence mus t be made by someone. But he has
avai l abl e, in t he not i on of pr ocedur al ri ght s, a different device to
prot ect equal i t y in a different way. He will insist that criminal
pr ocedur e be st r uct ur ed t o achieve a margi n of safety in decisions,
so t hat t he pr ocess is bi ased st rongl y against t he conviction of the
i nnocent . It woul d be a mi st ake t o suppose t hat the liberal thinks
t hat t hese pr ocedur al rights will i mprove t he accuracy of the
criminal process, t hat is, t he probabi l i t y t hat any part i cul ar decision
about gui l t or i nnocence will be t he right one. Procedural rights
intervene in the pr ocess, even at the cost of inaccuracy, to
compensat e in a r ough way for t he ant ecedent risk t hat a criminal
process, especially if it is largely admi ni st ered by one class against
anot her , will be cor r upt ed by t he i mpact of external preferences
t hat cannot be el i mi nat ed directly. Thi s is, of course, only the
briefest sket ch of how vari ous subst ant i ve and procedural civil
rights follow from t he l i beral ' s initial concept i on of equality; it
is meant t o suggest , r at her t han demonst r at e, the more precise
ar gument t hat woul d be avai l abl e for more part i cul ar rights.
So t he l i beral , dr a wn t o t he economi c mar ket and to political
democr acy for di st i nct l y egal i t ari an reasons, finds t hat these
i nst i t ut i ons will pr oduce i negal i t ari an results unless he adds t o his
scheme different sort s of i ndi vi dual ri ght s. These rights will
funct i on as t r ump car ds hel d by i ndi vi dual s; they will enable
i ndi vi dual s t o resist par t i cul ar decisions in spite of the fact t hat
these deci si ons ar e or woul d be reached t hr ough the normal
wor ki ngs of gener al i nst i t ut i ons t hat are not themselves challenged.
The ul t i mat e justification for t hese rights is t hat they are necessary
t o pr ot ect equal concer n a nd respect ; but they are not to be
under s t ood as r epr esent i ng equal i t y in cont rast t o some ot her goal
or pri nci pl e served by democr acy or t he economi c market . The
fami l i ar i dea, for exampl e, t hat rights of redi st ri but i on are justified
by an i deal of equal i t y t hat overri des t he efficiency ideals of t he
mar ket in cert ai n cases, has no pl ace in liberal t heory. For the
liberal, ri ght s are justified, not by some principle in competition
wi t h an i ndependent justification of t he political and economi c
72 Liberalism
IV
I said t hat the conservative hol ds one among a number of possi bl e
alternatives t o^t he "liberal" concept i on of equal i t y. Each of these
alternatives shares t he opi ni on t hat t reat i ng a per son wi t h respect
requires t reat i ng hi m as t he good man woul d wi sh t o be t reat ed.
The conservative supposes t hat t he good man woul d wi sh t o be
treated in accordance with t he principles of a special sort of society,
whi ch I shall call t he vi rt uous society. A vi rt uous society has these
general features. Its members share a sound concept i on of vi rt ue,
t hat is, of the qualities and di sposi t i ons peopl e shoul d strive t o have
and exhibit. They share this concept i on in virtue not onl y pri vat el y,
as individuals, but publicly: they believe t hei r communi t y, in its
social and political activity, exhi bi t s vi rt ues, and t hat they have a
responsibility, as citizens, t o pr omot e t hese vi rt ues. In t hat sense
they t reat the lives of ot her members of t hei r communi t y as par t of
their own lives. The conservative posi t i on is not t he onl y posi t i on
t hat relies on this ideal of the vi rt uous society (some forms of
socialism rely on it as well). But t he conservat i ve is di st i nct in
believing t hat his own society, wi t h its present i nst i t ut i ons, is a
vi rt uous society for the special reason t hat its hi st ory and c ommon
experience at e better guides t o sound virtue t han any non-hi st ori cal
and therefore abst ract deduct i on of virtue from first pri nci pl es
could provi de.
Suppose a conservative is asked t o draft a const i t ut i on for a
society generally like our s, whi ch he believes t o be vi r t uous. Like
t he liberal, he will see great meri t in t he familiar i nst i t ut i ons of
political democracy and an economi c mar ket . The appeal of t hese
institutions will be very different for t he conservat i ve, however . The
economi c mar ket , in pract i ce, assigns great er r ewar ds t o t hose who,
because they have the virtues of t al ent and i ndust ry, suppl y mor e of
what is want ed by t he ot her member s of t he vi r t uous soci et y; and
t hat is, for t he conservative, t he par adi gm of fairness in distri-
but i on. Political democracy di st ri but es oppor t uni t i es, t hr ough t he
provisions of civil and criminal l aw, as t he citizens of a vi r t uous
institutions they qualify, but in order t o make mor e perfect t he only
justification on whi ch these ot her i nst i t ut i ons may t hemsel ves rely.
If the liberal argument s for a part i cul ar right are sound, t hen t he
right is an unqualified i mpr ovement in political mor al i t y, not a
necessary but regrettable compr omi se of some ot her i ndependent
goal, like economi c efficiency.
Ronald Dworkin 73
society wi sh it t o be di st r i but ed, and t hat process will provi de more
scope for vi rt uous activity and less for vice t han any less democratic
t echni que. Democr acy has a further advant age, moreover, t hat no
ot her t echni que coul d have. It allows t he communi t y t o use the
processes of legislation t o reaffirm, as a communi t y, its public
concept i on of vi r t ue.
The appeal of t he familiar i nst i t ut i ons t o t he conservative is,
therefore, very different from t hei r appeal t o the liberal. Since the
conservat i ve and t he liberal bot h find t he familiar institutions
useful, t hough for different reasons, t he existence of these institu-
t i ons, as i nst i t ut i ons, will not necessarily be a poi nt of controversy
bet ween t hem. But t hey will di sagree sharply over which corrective
devices, in t he f or m of i ndi vi dual rights, are necessary in order t o
mai nt ai n justice, and t he di sagreement will not be a mat t er of
degree. The l i beral , as 1 said, finds t he mar ket defective principally
because it al l ows mor al l y i rrel evant differences, like differences in
talent, t o affect di st r i but i on, and he therefore considers t hat those
who have less t al ent , as t he mar ket judges talent, have a right
t o some form of redi st ri but i on in the name of justice. But the
conservat i ve prizes just t he feature of t he market t hat puts a
pr emi um on t al ent s pri zed in t he communi t y, because these are, in a
vi rt uous communi t y, vi rt ues. So he will find no genuine merit, but
only expedi ency, in t he idea of redi st ri but i on. He will al l ow room,
of course, for t he vi r t ue of chari t y, for it is a vi rt ue t hat is par t of the
publ i c cat al ogue; but he will prefer pri vat e charity t o public,
because it is a pur er expressi on of t hat vi rt ue. He may accept public
chari t y as well, par t i cul ar l y when it seems necessary to retain the
political allegiance of t hose who woul d ot her wi se suffer t oo much
t o t ol erat e a capi t al i st society at all. But publ i c charity, justified
either on gr ounds of vi rt ue or expedi ency, will seem to the
conservat i ve a compr omi s e wi t h a pr i mar y justification of the
mar ket , r at her t han, as redi st ri but i on seems t o t he liberal, an
i mpr ovement in t hat pr i mar y justification.
Nor will t he conservat i ve find t he same defects in representative
democr acy t hat t he liberal finds t here. The conservative will not
ai m t o excl ude mor al i st i c or ot her ext ernal preferences from the
democr at i c process by any scheme of civil ri ght s; on the cont rary, it
is t he pr i de of democr acy, for hi m, t hat ext ernal preferences are
legislated i nt o a publ i c moral i t y. But t he conservative will find
different defects in democr acy, and he will cont empl at e a different
scheme of ri ght s t o di mi ni sh t he injustice they wor k.
The economi c mar ket di st ri but es r ewar ds for talents valued in
t he vi r t uous soci et y, but since t hese t al ent s are unequal l y di st n-
74 Liberalism
but ed, weal t h will be concent rat ed, and t he weal t hy will be at the
mercy of an envious political maj ori t y anxi ous t o t ake by l aw what
it cannot t ake by talent. Justice requi res some pr ot ect i on for the
successful. The conservative will be (as historically he has been)
anxi ous t o hold some line against ext ensi ons of t he vot e t o t hose
groups most likely t o be envi ous, but t here is an appar ent conflict
between the ideals of abst ract equal i t y, even in t he conservat i ve
concept i on, and disenfranchisement of large par t s of t he popul a-
tion. In any case, if conservatism is t o be politically power f ul , it
must not t hreat en to exclude from political power t hose who woul d
be asked t o consent, formally or tacitly, t o t hei r own excl usi on. The
conservative will find mor e appeal in t he different, and politically
much more feasible, idea of rights t o pr oper t y.
These rights have t he same force, t hough of course radi cal l y
different cont ent , as t he liberal' s civil rights. The liberal will, for his
own purposes, accept some ri ght t o pr oper t y, because he will count
some sovereignty over a range of per sonal possessi ons essential t o
dignity. But t he conservative will strive for rights t o pr oper t y of a
very different order; he will want rights t hat pr ot ect , not some
mi ni mum domi ni on over a range of possessi ons i ndependent l y
shown t o be desirable, but an unl i mi t ed domi ni on over what ever
has been acqui red t hr ough an i nst i t ut i on t hat defines and r ewar ds
talent.
The conservative will not , of course, follow t he liberal in t he
latter' s concern for procedural rights in t he cri mi nal process. He
will accept t he basic institutions of cri mi nal legislation and t ri al as
proper; but he will see, in the possible acqui t t al of t he guilty, not
simply an inefficiency in t he strategy of det errence, but an affront t o
the basic principle t hat the censure of vice is i ndi spensabl e t o t he
honour of vi rt ue. He will believe, therefore, t hat just cri mi nal
procedures are t hose t hat i mprove t he ant ecedent pr obabi l i t y t hat
particular decisions of guilt or i nnocence will be accur at e. He will
support rights agai nst i nt errogat i on or sel f-i ncri mi nat i on, for
exampl e, when such rights seem necessary t o prot ect agai nst t or t ur e
or ot her means likely t o elicit a confession from t he i nnocent ; but
he will lose his concern for such rights when non- coer ci on can be
guarant eed in other ways.
The fair-minded conservative will be concerned about racial
di scri mi nat i on, but his concern will differ from t he concer n of t he
liberal, and the remedies he will count enance will also be different.
The distinction between equality of oppor t uni t y and equal i t y of
result is crucial to the conservat i ve: the institutions of the economi c
market and representative democracy cannot achieve what he
Ronald Dworkin
75
supposes they do unl ess each citizen has an equal oppor t uni t y t o
capitalize on his genui ne t al ent s and ot her vi rt ues in t he contest
these i nst i t ut i ons pr ovi de. But since t he conservat i ve knows t hat
these virtues are unequal l y di st r i but ed, he also knows t hat equality
of oppor t uni t y mus t have been deni ed if t he out come of t he contest
is equality of result.
The fair conser vat i ve must , t herefore, at t end t o t he charge t hat
prejudice denies equal i t y of oppor t uni t y bet ween member s of
different races, and he mus t accept t he justice of remedies designed
to reinstate t hat equal i t y, so far as t hi s may be possible. But he will
steadily oppose any f or m of ' affirmative act i on' t hat offers special
opport uni t i es, like pl aces in medi cal school or j obs, on criteria
other t han some pr oper concept i on of t he vi rt ue appr opr i at e t o t he
reward.
The issue of gun cont r ol , whi ch I have t hus far not ment i oned, is
an excellent i l l ust rat i on of t he powe r of t he conservat i ve' s constitu-
tive political mor al i t y. He favours strict cont r ol of sexual publica-
tion and pract i ce, but he oppos es paral l el cont r ol of t he ownershi p
or use of guns, t hough of cour se guns are mor e danger ous t han sex.
President For d, in t he second Ca r t e r - For d debat e, put t he conserva-
tive posi t i on of gun cont r ol especially clearly. Sensible conserva-
tives do not di sput e t hat pr i vat e and uncont r ol l ed owner shi p of
guns leads t o vi ol ence, because it put s guns in ci rcul at i on t hat bad
men may use badl y. But (Presi dent For d said) if we meet t hat
probl em by not al l owi ng good men t o have guns, we are puni shi ng
the wr ong peopl e. It is, of cour se, distinctive t o t he conservat i ve' s
position t o r egar d r egul at i on as condemnat i on and hence as
puni shment . But he mus t r egar d regul at i on t hat way, because he
believes t hat oppor t uni t i es shoul d be di st ri but ed, in a vi rt uous
society, so as t o pr omot e vi r t uous act s at t he expense of vicious
ones.
V
In place of a concl usi on, I shall say somet hi ng, t hough not much,
about t wo of t he ma ny i mpor t ant quest i ons raised by what I have
said. The first is t he quest i on posed in t he first section of t he essay
Does t h e t heor y of l i beral i sm I descri bed answer t he sceptical
t Ks i s r Do e s i t expl ai n our pr esent uncer t ai nt y about what liberal-
ism now r equi r es, a nd whet her it is a genui ne and t enabl e political
theory? A great par t of t hat uncer t ai nt y can be t raced, as I said, t o
doubt s about t he connect i ons bet ween l i beral i sm and t he suddenly
76
Liberalism
unfashi onabl e idea of economi c gr owt h. The opi ni on is popul ar
t hat some form of ut i l i t ari ani sm, whi ch does t ake gr owt h t o be a
va f uTi n. l t î l L^xons t i t ut i ve of l i beral i sm; but my ar gument s, if
Successful, show t hat this opi ni on is a mi st ake. Economi c gr owt h,
1Ts~c6nvefttibnally measured, was a deri vat i ve el ement in Ne w Deal
liberalism. It seemed t o play a useful role in achieving t he compl ex
egalitarian di st ri but i on of resources t hat liberalism requi res. If it
now appears t hat economi c gr owt h injures mor e t han it ai ds t he
liberal concept i on of equal i t y, t hen t he liberal is free t o reject or
curtail growt h as a strategy. If t he effect of gr owt h is debat abl e, as I
believe it is, t hen liberals will be uncert ai n, and appear t o st raddl e
t he issue.
But the mat t er is mor e compl i cat ed t han t hat analysis makes
it seem, because economi c gr owt h may be depl ored for many
different reasons, some of whi ch are plainly not avai l abl e t o t he
liberal. There is a powerful sent i ment t hat a si mpl er way of life is
better, in itself, t han t he life of consumpt i on mos t Ameri cans have
recently preferred; this simpler life requires living in har mony wi t h
nat ur e, and is therefore di st urbed when, for exampl e, a beautiful
mount ai nsi de is spoiled by strip mi ni ng for t he coal t hat lies wi t hi n
it. Shoul d t he mount ai nsi de be saved, in order t o prot ect a way of
life t hat depends upon it, either by regul at i on t hat prohi bi t s mi ni ng,
or by acquisition wi t h t axpayers' money of a nat i onal par k? May
a liberal suppor t such policies, consistently wi t h his const i t ut i ve
political morality? If he believes t hat gover nment i nt ervent i on is
necessary t o achieve a fair di st ri but i on of resources, on t he gr ound
t hat the mar ket does not fairly reflect t he preferences of t hose who
want a par k against t hose who want what t he coal will pr oduce,
t hen he has a st andar d, egalitarian reason for suppor t i ng i nt erven-
t i on. But suppose he does not believe t hat , but rat her believes t hat
t hose who want the par k have a superi or concept i on of what a truly
wor t hwhi l e life is. A non-l i beral may suppor t conservat i on on t hat
t heory; but a liberal may not .
Suppose, however, t hat the liberal hol ds a different, mor e
compl ex, belief about t he i mpor t ance of preservi ng nat ur al re-
sources. He believes t hat t he conquest of unspoi l t t errai n by t he
consumer economy is self-fuelling and irreversible, and t hat this
process will make a way of life t hat has been desi red and found
satisfying in t he past unavai l abl e t o future gener at i ons, and i ndeed
t o the future of t hose who now seem unawar e of its appeal . He
fears t hat this way of life will become unknown, so t hat t he process
is not neut r al amongst compet i ng ideas of t he good life, but in fact
Ronald Dworkin
77
dest ruct i ve of t he very possibility of some of these. In t hat case t he
liberal has reasons for a pr ogr amme of conservat i on t hat are not
onl y consi st ent wi t h his const i t ut i ve moral i t y, but in fact sponsored
by it.
I raise t hese possi bl e lines of ar gument , not t o provi de t he liberal
wi t h an easier pat h t o a popul ar political posi t i on, but t o illustrate
t he compl exi t y of t he issues t hat t he new politics has provi ded.
Li beral i sm seems preci se and powerful when it is relatively clear
what pract i cal pol i t i cal posi t i ons are derivative from its funda-
ment al const i t ut i ve moral i t y; on these occasi ons politics allows
what I called a liberal set t l ement of political posi t i ons. But such a
set t l ement is fragile, and when it dissolves liberals must r egr oup,
first t hr ough st udy and anal ysi s, whi ch will encourage a fresh and
deeper under st andi ng of what liberalism is, and t hen t hr ough t he
f or mat i on of a new and cont empor ar y pr ogr amme for liberals. The
st udy and t heory are not yet in progress, and t he new pr ogr amme is
not yet in sight.
The second quest i on I wi sh t o ment i on, finally, is a quest i on I
have not t ouched at all. Wh a t is t o be said in favour of liberalism? I
do not suppose t hat I have made liberalism mor e at t ract i ve By
ar gui ng t hat its const i t ut i ve mor al i t y is a t heory of equal i t y t hat
requi res official neut ral i t y amongst t heori es of what is val uabl e in
life. The ar gument will pr ovoke a variety of obj ect i ons. It mi ght be
said t hat liberalism so conceived rests on scepticism about theories
of t he good, or t hat it is based on a mean view of human nat ur e t hat
assumes t hat huma n beings are at oms who can exist and find
self-fulfillment apar t from political communi t y, or t hat it is self-
cont r adi ct or y because liberalism must itself be a t heory of t he good,
or t hat it denies t o political society its hi ghest function and ul t i mat e
justification, whi ch is t hat society must help its members t o achieve
what is in fact good. The first t hree of these objections need not
concer n us for l ong, because t hey are based on phi l osophi cal
mi st akes whi ch I can qui ckl y name if not refute. Liberalism cannot
be based on scept i ci sm. Its const i t ut i ve moral i t y provi des t hat
huma n bei ngs must be t reat ed as equal s by t hei r government , not
because t here is no ri ght and wr ong in political moral i t y, but
because t hat is what is right. Liberalism does not rest on any special
t heory of personal i t y, nor does it deny t hat most human beings will
t hi nk t hat what is good for t hem is t hat they be active in society.
Li beral i sm is not sel f-cont radi ct ory: t he liberal concept i on of
equal i t y is a pri nci pl e of political organi zat i on t hat is requi red by
justice, not a way of life for i ndi vi dual s, and liberals, as such, are
78
Liberalism
indifferent as t o whet her peopl e choose t o speak out on political
mat t ers, or t o lead eccentric lives, or ot her wi se t o behave as liberals
are supposed t o prefer.
But t he fourt h obj ect i on cannot so easily be set asi de. Ther e is no
easy way t o demonst r at e t he pr oper role in i nst i t ut i ons t hat have a
monopol y of power over t he lives of ot her s; r easonabl e and mor al
men will disagree. The issue is at bot t om t he issue I identified: what
is t he cont ent of t he respect t hat is necessary t o dignity and
i ndependence?
That raises pr obl ems in moral phi l osophy and in t he phi l osophy
of mi nd t hat are fundament al for political t heory t hough not
discussed here; but this essay does bear on one issue somet i mes
t hought t o be relevant. It is somet i mes said t hat l i beral i sm mus t be
wr ong because it assumes t hat t he opi ni ons peopl e have about t he
sort of lives they want are self-generated, wher eas t hese opi ni ons
are in fact t he pr oduct s of t he economi c syst em or ot her aspect s of
t he society in whi ch they live. That woul d be an obj ect i on t o
liberalism if liberalism wer e based on some form of preference-
utilitarianism whi ch ar gued t hat justice in di st r i but i on consi st s in
maxi mi zi ng t he ext ent t o whi ch peopl e have wha t t hey happen t o
want . It is useful t o poi nt out , agai nst t hat preference-ut i l i t ari an-
ism, t hat since t he preferences peopl e have are f or med by t he system
of di st ri but i on already in place, t hese preferences will t end t o
suppor t t hat system, whi ch is bot h ci rcul ar and unfai r. But
liberalism, as I have descri bed it, does not make t he cont ent of
preferences t he test of fairness in di st ri but i on. On t he cont r ar y, it is
anxi ous t o prot ect individuals whose needs are special or whose
ambi t i ons are eccentric from the fact t hat mor e popul ar preferences
are institutionally and socially reinforced, for t hat is t he effect and
justification of t he liberal' s scheme of economi c and political ri ght s.
Liberalism r esponds t o t he claim, t hat preferences are caused by
systems of di st ri but i on, wi t h t he sensible answer t hat in t hat case it
is all t he mor e i mpor t ant t hat di st ri but i on be fair in itself, not as
tested by t he preferences it pr oduces.
NOTES
1
See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, ch. 12.
2
See Taking Rights Seriously, p. 227.
3
See Scanlon,'Preference and Urgency' ,/ . Phil., Lxxu,p. 655.
A very different objection calls attention to the fact that some people are
afflicted with incapacities like blindness or mental disease, so that they
require more resources to satisfy the same scheme of preferences. That
Ronald Divorkin 79
is a more appealing objection to my principle of rough equality of
treatment, but it calls, not for choosing a different basic principle of
distribution, but for corrections in the application of the principle like
those 1 considered later.
^ Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 234 ff, 275.
6
See Dworkin, 'Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights', The Edu-
cational Forum, XLI (March, 1977), p. 271.
Friedrich A. Hayek: Equality,
Value, and Merit
51
"
/ have no respect for the passion for equality,
which seems to me merely idealizing envy.
Oliver Wendel l Hol mes , Jr.
(1) The great aim of t he struggle for liberty has been equal i t y
before t he l aw. Thi s equality under t he rules whi ch t he state
enforces may be suppl ement ed by a similar equal i t y of t he rules t hat
men vol unt ari l y obey in their rel at i ons wi t h one anot her . Thi s
extension of t he principle of equality t o t he rules of mor al and
social conduct is t he chief expressi on of what is commonl y called
t he democrat i c spirit - and pr obabl y t hat aspect of it t hat does
most t o make inoffensive t he inequalities t hat l i bert y necessarily
produces.
Equality of t he general rules of l aw and conduct , however , is t he
onl y ki nd of equality conduct i ve t o liberty and t he onl y equal i t y
which we can secure wi t hout dest royi ng liberty. Not onl y has
liberty not hi ng t o do wi t h any ot her sort of equal i t y, but it is even
bound t o pr oduce inequality in many respect s. Thi s is t he necessary
result and par t of t he justification of i ndi vi dual liberty: if t he result
of individual liberty did not demonst r at e t hat some manner s of
living are mor e successful t han ot her s, much of t he case for it woul d
vanish.
It is neither because it assumes t hat peopl e are in fact equal nor
because it at t empt s t o make t hem equal t hat t he ar gument for
liberty demands t hat government t reat t hem equally. Thi s ar gument
* Reprinted from Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty by per-
mission of Chicago University Press. 1960 by The University of
Chicago. In Great Britain, published by permission of Routledge and
Kegan Paul Ltd.
Friedrich A. Hayek 81
not only recogni zes t hat i ndi vi dual s are very different but in a great
measur e rests on t hat assumpt i on. It insists t hat these individual
differences pr ovi de no justification for government to treat them
differently. And it obj ect s t o t he differences in t reat ment by the
state t hat woul d be necessary if persons who are in fact very
different wer e t o be assured equal posi t i ons in life.
Mode r n advocat es of a mor e far-reaching material equality
usually deny t hat t hei r demands are based on any assumpt i on of the
factual equal i t y of all me n.
1
It is nevertheless still widely believed
t hat this is t he mai n justification for such demands. Not hi ng,
however, is mor e damagi ng t o t he demand for equal t reat ment t han
t o base i t on so obvi ousl y unt r ue an assumpt i on as t hat of the
factual equal i t y of all men. To rest t he case for equal t reat ment of
nat i onal or racial mi nori t i es on t he assertion t hat they do not differ
from ot her men is implicitly t o admi t t hat factual inequality woul d
justify unequal t r eat ment ; and t he proof t hat some differences do,
in fact, exist woul d not be l ong in fort hcomi ng. It is of the essence
of t he demand for equal i t y before t he l aw t hat people should be
t reat ed alike in spite of t he fact t hat they are different.
(2) The boundl ess vari et y of human nat ur e - the wide range of
differences in i ndi vi dual capaci t i es and potentialities - is one of the
most distinctive facts about the human species. Its evolution has
made it pr obabl y t he mos t vari abl e among all ki nds of creatures. It
has been well said t hat
bi ol ogy, wi t h vari abi l i t y as its cornerst one, confers on every
huma n i ndi vi dual a uni que set of at t ri but es whi ch give him a
di gni t y he coul d not ot her wi se possess. Every newbor n baby
is an unknown quant i t y so far as potentialities are concerned
because t here ar e many t housands of unknown interrelated
genes and gene- pat t er ns whi ch cont ri but e t o his make- up. As
a result of nat ur e and nur t ur e the newbor n infant may
become one of t he great est of men or women ever t o have
lived. In every case he or she has the maki ng of a distinctive
i ndi vi dual . . . . If t he differences are not very i mpor t ant , then
freedom is not very i mpor t ant and t he idea of individual
wor t h is not very i mpor t a nt .
2
The wr i t er justly adds t hat t he widely held uniformity theory of
huma n nat ur e, ' whi ch on t he surface appear s t o accord with
democr acy . . . woul d in t i me under mi ne t he very basic ideals of
freedom and i ndi vi dual wor t h and render life as we know it
meani ngl ess. '
3
82 Equality, Value, and Merit
It has been the fashion in moder n t i mes t o mi ni mi ze t he
i mport ance of congenital differences bet ween men and t o ascri be all
the i mport ant differences t o the influence of envi r onment . How-
ever i mport ant the latter may be, we must not over l ook t he fact t hat
individuals are very different from t he out set . The i mpor t ance of
individual differences woul d hardl y be less if all peopl e were
brought up in very similar envi r onment s. As a st at ement of fact, it
just is not true t hat ' all men are bor n equal ' . We may cont i nue t o
use this hal l owed phrase t o express t he ideal t hat legally and
morally all men ought to be t reat ed alike. But if we want t o
underst and what this ideal of equality can or shoul d mean, t he first
requirement is t hat we free ourselves from t he belief in factual
equality.
From t he fact t hat people are very different it follows t hat , if we
t reat t hem equally, t he result must be i nequal i t y in their actual
posi t i on,
5
and t hat the only way t o pl ace t hem in an equal posi t i on
woul d be t o treat t hem differently. Equality before t he law and
material equality are therefore not only different but ar e in conflict
with each ot her; and we can achieve either t he one or t he ot her , but
not both at the same t i me. The equality before t he law whi ch
freedom requires leads t o material i nequal i t y. Our ar gument will be
t hat , t hough where the st at e must use coerci on for ot her r easons,
it should t reat all people alike, the desire of maki ng peopl e mor e
alike in their condi t i on cannot be accept ed in a free society as a
justification for further and di scri mi nat ory coerci on.
We do not object t o equality as such. It merely happens t o be t he
case t hat a demand for equality is t he professed mot i ve of mos t of
those who desire to impose upon society a preconcei ved pat t er n of
di st ri but i on. Our objection is agai nst all at t empt s t o i mpress upon
society a deliberately chosen pat t ern of di st ri but i on, whet her it be
an order of equality or of inequality. We shall indeed see t hat many
of those who demand an extension of equal i t y do not really
demand equality but a di st ri but i on t hat conforms mor e closely t o
human concept i ons of individual merit and t hat their desires are
as irreconcilable wi t h freedom as t he mor e strictly egal i t ari an
demands.
If one objects t o t he use of coerci on in order to bri ng about a
more even or a mor e just di st ri but i on, this does not mean t hat one
does not regard these as desirable. But if we wi sh to preserve a free
society, it is essential that we recognize that the desirability of a
particular object is not sufficient justification for t he use of
coercion. One may well feel attracted to a communi t y in whi ch
there are no extreme cont rast s between rich and poor and may
welcome t he fact t hat t he general increase in wealth seems
gradually t o reduce t hose differences. I fully share these feelings and
certainly regard t he degr ee of social equal i t y t hat the United States
has achieved as whol l y admi r abl e.
There also seems no reason why these widely felt preferences
should not gui de pol i cy in some respects. Wherever t here is a
legitimate need for gover nment act i on and we have to choose
between different met hods of satisfying such a need, those t hat
incidentally al so r educe i nequal i t y may well be preferable. If, for
exampl e, in t he l aw of i nt est at e succession one kind of provision
will be mor e conduci ve t o equal i t y t han anot her , this may be a
strong ar gument in its favour. It is a different mat t er, however, if it
is demanded t hat , in or der t o pr oduce subst ant i ve equality, we
should a ba ndon t he basi c post ul at e of a free society, namel y, the
limitation of all coer ci on by equal l aw. Agai nst this we shall hold
t hat economi c i nequal i t y is not one of t he evils which justify our
resorting t o di scr i mi nat or y coerci on or privilege as a remedy.
(3) Our cont ent i on rests on t wo basic proposi t i ons which probabl y
need only be st at ed t o wi n fairly general assent. The first of them is
an expressi on of t he belief in a cert ai n similarity of all human
beings: it is t he pr oposi t i on t hat no man or gr oup of men possesses
t he capaci t y t o det er mi ne conclusively the potentialities of other
human beings and t hat we shoul d certainly never t rust anyone
invariably t o exerci se such a capaci t y. However great the differ-
ences bet ween men ma y be, we have no gr ound for believing t hat
they will ever be so gr eat as t o enabl e one man' s mi nd in a
part i cul ar i nst ance t o compr ehend fully all t hat anot her responsible
man' s mi nd is capabl e of.
The second basi c pr oposi t i on is t hat t he acquisition by any
member of t he communi t y of addi t i onal capacities t o do things
whi ch may be val uabl e mus t al ways be regarded as a gain for t hat
communi t y. It is t r ue t hat par t i cul ar peopl e may be worse off
because of t he super i or ability of some new compet i t or in their
field; but any such addi t i onal ability in t he communi t y is likely t o
benefit t he maj ori t y. Thi s i mpl i es t hat t he desirability of increasing
the abilities and oppor t uni t i es of any i ndi vi dual does not depend on
whet her t he s ame can al so be done for t he ot hers - provi ded, of
course, t hat ot her s ar e not t hereby depri ved of t he opport uni t y of
acqui ri ng t he s ame or ot her abilities whi ch might have been
accessible t o t hem had t hey not been secured by t hat individual.
Egal i t ari ans general l y regard differently t hose differences in
i ndi vi dual capaci t i es whi ch are i nbor n and t hose whi ch are due t o
t he influences of envi ronment , or t hose whi ch are t he resul t of
' nat ur e' and t hose whi ch are t he result of ' nur t ur e' . Nei t her , be it
said at once, has anyt hi ng t o do wi t h mor al mer i t .
6
Though either
may greatly affect the value whi ch an i ndi vi dual has for his fellows,
no mor e credit bel ongs t o hi m for havi ng been bor n wi t h desi rabl e
qualities t han for havi ng gr own up under favourabl e ci r cumst ances.
The distinction bet ween t he t wo is i mpor t ant onl y because t he
former advant ages are due t o ci rcumst ances clearly beyond huma n
cont rol , while t he latter are due t o factors whi ch we mi ght be abl e
t o alter. The i mpor t ant quest i on is whet her t here is a case for so
changi ng our i nst i t ut i ons as t o el i mi nat e as much as possi bl e t hose
advant ages due t o envi ronment . Are we t o agree t hat ' all i nequal i -
ties t hat rest on birth and inherited pr oper t y ought t o be abol i shed
and none remai n unless it is an effect of superi or t al ent and
i ndust r y' ?
7
The fact t hat certain advant ages rest on huma n ar r angement s
does not necessarily mean t hat we coul d pr ovi de t he same
advant ages for all or t hat , if they are given t o some, s omebody else
is thereby deprived of t hem. The most i mpor t ant fact ors t o be
considered in this connect i on are t he family, i nheri t ance, and
educat i on, and it is agai nst t he i nequal i t y whi ch they pr oduce t hat
criticism is mai nl y directed. They ar e, however , not t he only
i mpor t ant factors of envi ronment . Geogr aphi c condi t i ons such as
climate and l andscape, not t o speak of local and sectional
differences in cultural and mor al t r adi t i ons, are scarcely less
i mpor t ant . We can, however, consi der her e onl y t he t hree factors
whose effects are most commonl y i mpugned.
So far as the family is concerned, t here exists a curi ous cont r ast
bet ween the esteem most people profess for t he i nst i t ut i on and t hei r
dislike of t he fact t hat bei ng born i nt o a par t i cul ar family shoul d
confer on a person special advant ages. It seems t o be wi del y
believed t hat , whi l e useful qualities whi ch a per son acqui res
because of his native gifts under condi t i ons whi ch are t he same for
all are socially beneficial, t he same qualities become s omehow
undesi rabl e if they are t he result of envi r onment al advant ages not
available t o ot hers. Yet it is difficult t o see why t he same useful
qual i t y whi ch is wel comed when it is t he result of a per son' s nat ur al
endowment shoul d be less val uabl e when it is t he pr oduct of such
ci rcumst ances as intelligent parent s or a good home.
The value whi ch most peopl e at t ach t o the i nst i t ut i on of t he
family rests on t he belief t hat , as a rul e, par ent s can do mor e t o
pr epar e their chi l dren for a satisfactory life t han anyone else. Thi s
means not onl y t hat t he benefits whi ch part i cul ar peopl e derive
from their family envi r onment will be different but also that these
benefits may oper at e cumul at i vel y t hr ough several generations.
What reason can t her e be for believing t hat a desirable quality in a
person is less val uabl e t o society if it has been t he result of family
backgr ound t han if it has not ? Ther e is, i ndeed, good reason t o
think t hat t her e are s ome socially val uabl e qualities which will be
rarely acqui r ed in a single generat i on but whi ch will generally be
formed onl y by t he cont i nuous efforts of t wo or three. Thi s means
simply t hat t here are par t s of t he cul t ural heri t age of a society that
are mor e effectively t r ansmi t t ed t hr ough t he family. Grant ed this, it
woul d be unr eas onabl e t o deny t hat a society is likely t o get a better
elite if ascent is not l i mi t ed t o one generat i on, if individuals are not
deliberately made t o st ar t from t he same level, and if children are
not depri ved of t he chance t o benefit from t he better educat i on and
materia] envi r onment whi ch their par ent s may be able t o provide.
To admi t t hi s is merel y t o recogni ze t hat bel ongi ng t o a particular
family is par t of t he i ndi vi dual personal i t y, t hat society is made up
as much of families as of i ndi vi dual s, and t hat t he transmission of
the heri t age of ci vi l i zat i on wi t hi n t he family is as i mport ant a tool
in man' s st ri vi ng t owa r ds bet t er things as is the heredity of
beneficial physi cal at t r i but es.
(4) Ma ny peopl e wh o agree t hat t he family is desirable as an
i nst r ument for t he t r ansmi ssi on of mor al s, tastes, and knowl edge,
still quest i on t he desi rabi l i t y of t he t ransmi ssi on of material
pr oper t y. Yet t her e can be little doubt t hat , in order t hat t he former
may be possi bl e, s ome cont i nui t y of st andar ds, of t he external
forms of life, is essent i al , and t hat this will be achieved only if it is
possible t o t r ansmi t not onl y i mmat eri al but also material advan-
tages. Ther e is, of cour se, nei t her great er meri t nor any greater
injustice i nvol ved in s ome peopl e bei ng bor n t o wealthy parent s
t han t here is in ot her s bei ng bor n t o ki nd or intelligent parent s. The
fact is t hat it is no less of an advant age t o t he communi t y if at least
some chi l dren can st ar t wi t h t he advant ages whi ch at any given
time only weal t hy home s can offer t han if some children inherit
great intelligence or are t aught bet t er moral s at home.
We are not concer ned her e wi t h t he chief ar gument for private
i nheri t ance, namel y, t hat it seems essential as a means t o preserve
t he di spersal in t he cont r ol of capi t al and as an i nducement for its
accumul at i on. Rat her , our concer n here is whet her t he fact t hat it
confers unmer i t ed benefits on some is a valid ar gument against the
i nst i t ut i on. It is unquest i onabl y one of t he i nst i t ut i onal causes of
i nequal i t y. In t he pr esent cont ext we need not enquire whether
liberty demands unlimited freedom of bequest . Ou r pr obl em here
is merely whet her peopl e ought t o be free t o pass on t o chi l dren or
ot hers such material possessions as will cause subst ant i al
inequality.
Once we agree t hat it is desirable t o harness t he nat ur al instincts
of parent s t o equi p t he new generat i on as well as they can, t here
seems no sensible gr ound for limiting this t o non- mat er i al benefits.
The family' s function of passi ng on st andar ds and t r adi t i ons is
closely tied up wi t h t he possibility of t r ansmi t t i ng mat er i al goods.
And it is difficult t o see how it woul d serve t he t rue interest of
society t o limit t he gain in mat eri al condi t i ons t o one gener at i on.
There is also anot her consi derat i on whi ch, t hough it may appear
somewhat cynical, strongly suggests t hat if we wi sh t o make the
best use of the nat ural partiality of par ent s for t hei r chi l dren, we
ought not t o precl ude t he t ransmi ssi on of pr oper t y. It seems certain
t hat among t he many ways in whi ch t hose who have gai ned power
and influence might provi de for t hei r chi l dren, t he bequest of a
fort une is socially by far the cheapest . Wi t hout t hi s out l et , these
men woul d l ook for ot her ways of pr ovi di ng for t hei r chi l dren, such
as placing t hem i n positions whi ch mi ght bri ng t hem t he i ncome
and the prestige t hat a fort une woul d have done; and this woul d
cause a wast e of resources and an injustice much great er t han is
caused by t he inheritance of pr oper t y. Such is t he case wi t h all
societies in whi ch inheritance of pr oper t y does not exist, i ncl udi ng
t he communi st . Those who dislike t he i nequal i t i es caused by
i nheri t ance shoul d therefore recognize t hat , men bei ng what they
are, it is t he least of evils, even from their poi nt of vi ew.
(5) Though i nheri t ance used t o be t he most wi del y criticized source
of inequality, it is t oday pr obabl y no longer so. Egal i t ari an
agitation now t ends t o concent rat e on t he unequal advant ages due
to differences in educat i on. There is a gr owi ng t endency t o express
t he desire t o secure equal i t y of condi t i ons in t he cl ai m t hat t he best
educat i on we have l earned t o pr ovi de for some shoul d be ma de
grat ui t ousl y available for all and t hat , if this is not possi bl e, one
shoul d not be al l owed t o get a bet t er educat i on t han t he rest merel y
because one's par ent s are able t o pay for it, but only t hose and all
t hose who can pass a uni form test of ability shoul d be admi t t ed t o
t he benefits of t he limited resources of hi gher educat i on.
The problem of educat i onal policy raises too many issues t o
allow of their being discussed incidentally under t he general
heading of equality. For the present we shall only point out t hat
enforced equality in this field can hardly avoid prevent i ng some
from get t i ng t he educat i on they ot herwi se mi ght . What ever we
might do, t here is no way of prevent i ng t hose advant ages which
only some can have, and whi ch it is desirable t hat some should
have, from goi ng t o peopl e who nei t her individually merit t hem nor
will make as good a use of t hem as some ot her person mi ght have
done. Such a pr obl em cannot be satisfactorily solved by the
exclusive and coerci ve power s of t he st at e.
It is i nst ruct i ve at t hi s poi nt t o glance briefly at the change that
t he ideal of equal i t y has under gone in this field in moder n times. A
hundr ed years ago, at t he hei ght of the classical liberal movement ,
the demand was general l y expressed by t he phrase la carriere
ouverte aux talents. It was a demand t hat all man- made obstacles to
the rise of s ome shoul d be r emoved, t hat all privileges of individuals
shoul d be abol i shed, and t hat what the state cont ri but ed t o the
chance of i mpr ovi ng one' s condi t i ons shoul d be the same for all.
That so l ong as peopl e were different and grew up in different
families t hi s coul d not assure an equal st art was fairly generally
accept ed. It was under s t ood t hat t he dut y of government was not t o
ensure t hat ever ybody had the same prospect of reaching a given
position but merel y t o make avai l abl e t o all on equal t erms those
facilities whi ch in t hei r nat ur e depended on government action.
That t he resul t s wer e bound to be different, not only because the
i ndi vi dual s wer e different, but al so because only a small part of the
relevant ci r cumst ances depended on gover nment action, was taken
for gr ant ed.
Thi s concept i on t hat all shoul d be al l owed t o try has been largely
replaced by t he al t oget her different concept i on t hat all must be
assured an equal st ar t and t he same prospect s. This means little less
t han t hat t he gover nment , i nst ead of provi di ng t he same circum-
stances for all, shoul d ai m at cont rol l i ng all condi t i ons relevant t o a
part i cul ar i ndi vi dual ' s pr ospect s and so adjust t hem t o his capaci-
ties as t o assure hi m of t he same prospect s as everybody else. Such
del i berat e adapt at i on of oppor t uni t i es t o individual aims and
capacities woul d, of cour se, be t he opposi t e of freedom. Nor could
it be justified as a means of maki ng t he best use of all available
knowl edge except on t he assumpt i on t hat government knows best
how i ndi vi dual capaci t i es can be used.
When we enqui r e i nt o t he justification of these demands, we find
t hat t hey rest on t he di scont ent t hat t he success of some people
often pr oduces in t hose t hat ar e less successful, or , t o put it bluntly,
on envy. The moder n t endency t o gratify this passion and t o
disguise :t in t he r espect abl e gar ment of social justice is developing
i nt o a seri ous t hr eat t o freedom. Recently an at t empt was made t o
base these demands on t he ar gument t hat it ought t o be t he aim of
politics t o remove all sources of di scont ent .
8
Thi s woul d, of course,
necessarily mean t hat it is t he responsibility of gover nment t o see
t hat nobody is heal t hi er or possesses a happi er t emper ament , a
better-suited spouse or mor e pr osper i ng chi l dren, t han anybody
else. If really all unfulfilled desires have a claim on t he communi t y,
individual responsibility is at an end. However huma n, envy is
certainly not one of t he sources of di scont ent t hat a free society can
eliminate. It is pr obabl y one of t he essential condi t i ons for t he
preservat i on of such a society t hat we do not count enance envy, not
sanction its demands by camoufl agi ng it as social j ust i ce, but t reat
it, in the wor ds of John St uart Mill, as ' t he most ant i -soci al and evil
of all passi ons' .
9
(6) While most of t he strictly egal i t ari an demands are based on
not hi ng better t han envy, we must recogni ze t hat much t hat on t he
surface appears as a demand for great er equal i t y is in fact a demand
for a juster di st ri but i on of t he good t hi ngs of t hi s wor l d and spri ngs
therefore from much mor e credi t abl e mot i ves. Mos t peopl e will
object not t o t he bare fact of i nequal i t y but t o t he fact t hat t he
differences in r ewar d do not cor r espond t o any recogni zabl e
differences in t he merits of t hose who receive t hem. The answer
commonl y given t o this is t hat a free society on t he whol e achieves
this kind of j ust i ce.
1 0
Thi s, however, is an indefensible cont ent i on if
by justice is meant pr opor t i onal i t y of r ewar d t o mor al mer i t . Any
at t empt to found t he case for freedom on this ar gument is very
damagi ng t o it, since it concedes t hat mat eri al r ewar ds ought t o be
made t o correspond t o recognizable merit and t hen opposes t he
conclusion t hat most peopl e will dr a w from this by an assert i on
whi ch is unt rue. The pr oper answer is t hat in a free syst em it is
neither desirable nor pract i cabl e t hat mat eri al r ewar ds shoul d be
. made generally t o correspond t o what men recogni ze as meri t and
t hat it is an essential charact eri st i c of a free society t hat an
individual' s posi t i on shoul d not necessarily depend on t he vi ews
t hat his fellows hol d about t he merit he has acqui red.
Thi s cont ent i on may appear at first so st range and even shocki ng
t hat I will ask t he reader t o suspend j udgement unt i l I have further
expl ai ned t he distinction bet ween val ue and me r i t .
1 1
The difficulty
in maki ng t he poi nt clear is due t o t he fact t hat t he t er m ' mer i t ' ,
whi ch is t he only one available t o descri be what I mean, is also used
in a wi der and vaguer sense. It will be used here exclusively t o
describe t he at t ri but es of conduct t hat make it deservi ng of prai se,
Frtedricb A. Hayek 89
that is, t he mor al char act er of t he action and not the value of the
achi evement .
1 2
As we have seen t hr oughout our discussion, the value t hat the
performance or capaci t y of a person has t o his fellows has no
neccessary connect i on wi t h its ascert ai nabl e meri t in this sense. The
i nborn as well as t he acqui r ed gifts of a person clearly have a value
to his fellows whi ch does not depend on any credit due t o him for
possessing t hem. Ther e is little a man can do t o alter the fact that
his special t al ent s are very common or exceedingly rare. A good
mi nd or a fine voi ce, a beautiful face or a skilful hand, and a ready
wit or an at t r act i ve personal i t y ar e in a large measure as indepen-
dent of a per son' s efforts as t he oppor t uni t i es or t he experiences he
has had. In all t hese i nst ances t he val ue whi ch a person' s capacities
or services have for us and for whi ch he is recompensed has
little rel at i on t o anyt hi ng t hat we can call moral merit or deserts.
Our pr obl em is whet her it is desi rabl e t hat peopl e should enjoy
advant ages in pr opor t i on t o t he benefits whi ch their fellows derive
from their activities or whet her t he di st ri but i on of these advantages
should be based on ot her men' s views of their merits.
Rewar d accor di ng t o meri t must in pract i ce mean reward
accordi ng t o assessabl e meri t , meri t t hat ot her peopl e can recognize
and agree upon and not meri t merel y in t he sight of some higher
power. Assessabl e mer i t in this sense presupposes t hat we can
ascertain t hat a ma n has done wha t some accepted rule of conduct
demanded of hi m and t hat this has cost hi m some pain and effort.
Whet her this has been t he case cannot be judged by the result: merit
is not a mat t er of t he obj ect i ve out come but of subjective effort. The
at t empt t o achi eve a val uabl e result may be highly meritorious but a
compl et e failure, and full success may be entirely the result of
accident and t hus wi t hout meri t . If we know t hat a man has done
his best we will often wi sh to see hi m r ewar ded irrespective of the
result; and if we know t hat a most val uabl e achievement is almost
entirely due t o luck or favourabl e ci rcumst ances, we will give little
credit t o t he aut hor .
We may wi sh t hat we wer e abl e t o dr aw this distinction in every
instance. In fact, we can do so onl y rarely wi t h any degree of
assurance. It is possi bl e onl y wher e we possess ail the knowl edge
which was at t he di sposal of t he acting person, including a
knowl edge of his skill a nd confidence, his st at e of mind and his
feelings, his capaci t y for at t ent i on, his energy and persistence, etc.
The possibility of a t r ue j udgement of merit t hus depends on the
presence of precisely t hose condi t i ons whose general absence is the
mai n ar gument for liberty. It is because we wa nt peopl e t o use
knowl edge whi ch we do not possess t hat we let t hem decide for
themselves. But insofar as we want t hem t o be free t o use capacities
and knowl edge of facts whi ch we do not have, we are not in a
position t o judge t he meri t of t hei r achi evement s. To decide on
merit presupposes t hat we can j udge whet her peopl e have made
such use of their opport uni t i es as they ought t o have made and how
much effort of will or self-denial this has cost t hem; it presupposes
also t hat we can distinguish bet ween t hat par t of t hei r achi evement
which is due t o ci rcumst ances wi t hi n t hei r cont r ol and t hat part
whi ch is not .
(7) The i ncompat i bi l i t y of r ewar d accor di ng t o meri t wi t h freedom
t o choose one' s pursui t is most evi dent in t hose areas wher e the
uncert ai nt y of the out come is part i cul arl y great and our individual
estimates of the changes of vari ous ki nds of effort very different.
In t hose speculative efforts whi ch we call ' research' or ' expl ora-
t i on' , or in economi c activities whi ch we commonl y descri be as
' specul at i on' , we cannot expect t o at t r act t hose best qualified for
t hem unless we give t he successful ones all t he credit or gain,
t hough many ot hers may have striven as mer i t or i ousl y. For the
same reason that nobody can know bef or ehand who will be the
successful ones, nobody can say who has ear ned great er meri t . It
woul d clearly not serve our pur pose if we let all wh o have honest l y
striven share in the prize. Mor eover , t o do so woul d make it
necessary t hat somebody have t he ri ght t o deci de wh o is t o be
al l owed t o strive for it. If in their pursui t of uncert ai n goal s peopl e
are t o use t hei r own knowl edge and capaci t i es, they mus t be gui ded,
not by what ot her peopl e t hi nk t hey ought t o do, but by t he value
ot hers at t ach to t he result at whi ch they ai m.
What is so- obviously true about t hose under t aki ngs whi ch we
commonl y regard as risky is scarcely less t rue of any chosen object
we decide t o pursue. Any such decision is beset with uncert ai nt y,
and if the choice is t o be as wi se as it is humanl y possi bl e t o make it,
the alternative results ant i ci pat ed must be labelled accor di ng to
their val ue. If t he r emuner at i on did not cor r espond t o t he val ue t hat
the pr oduct of a man' s efforts has for his fellows, he woul d have no
basis for deciding whet her the pursui t of a given object is wor t h t he
effort and risk. He woul d necessarily have t o be t ol d wha t t o do,
and some ot her per son' s est i mat e of what was t he best use of
his capacities woul d have to det ermi ne bot h his dut i es and his
r emuner at i on.
1 4
The fact is, of course, t hat we do not wi sh peopl e t o earn a
maximum of meri t but t o achi eve a ma x i mu m of usefulness at a
minimum of pai n and sacrifice and t herefore a mi ni mum of meri t .
Not only woul d it be i mpossi bl e for us t o r ewar d all meri t justly,
but it woul d not even be desi r abl e t hat peopl e s houl d aim chiefly at
earning a maxi mum of mer i t . Any at t empt t o i nduce t hem t o do this
would necessarily result in peopl e bei ng r ewar ded differently for
the same service. And it is onl y t he val ue of t he resul t t hat we can
judge with any degree of confi dence, not t he different degrees of
effort and care t hat it has cost di fferent peopl e t o achi eve it.
The prizes t hat a free society offers for t he resul t serve t o tell
those who strive for t hem how muc h effort t hey are wor t h.
However, t he same pri zes will go t o all t hose wh o pr oduce t he same
result, regardless of effort. Wh a t is t r ue her e of t he r emuner at i on
for the same services r ender ed by di fferent peopl e is even mor e t rue
of the relative r emuner at i on for different services r equi r i ng differ-
ent gifts and capaci t i es: t hey will have little r el at i on t o mer i t . The
matket will generally offer for services of any ki nd t he val ue t hey
will have for t hose wh o benefit f r om t he m; but it will rarel y be
known whet her it was necessary t o offer so much in or der t o obt ai n
these services, and oft en, no doubt , t he c ommuni t y coul d have had
them for much less. The pi ani st wh o was r epor t ed not l ong ago t o
have said t hat he woul d per f or m even if he ha d t o pay for t he
privilege pr obabl y descri bed t he posi t i on of many wh o ear n l arge
incomes from activities whi ch ar e al so t hei r chief pl easur e.
(8) Though most peopl e r egar d as very nat ur al t he cl ai m t hat
nobody shoul d be r ewar ded mor e t han he deserves for his pai n
and effort, it is nevert hel ess based on a col ossal pr es umpt i on. It
presumes t hat we are abl e t o j udge in every i ndi vi dual i nst ance how
well people use t he di fferent oppor t uni t i es a nd t al ent s given t o t hem
and how mer i t or i ous t hei r achi evement s ar e in t he light of all t he
circumstances whi ch have t hem possi bl e. It pr esumes t hat some
human beings are in a posi t i on t o det er mi ne concl usi vel y what a
Person is wor t h and ar e ent i t l ed t o det er mi ne wha t he ma y achi eve.
It presumes, t hen, wha t t he ar gument for l i bert y specifically rejects:
that we can a nd d o k n o w all t ha t gui des a per s on' s act i on.
A society in whi ch t he posi t i on of t he i ndi vi dual s was ma de t o
correspond t o huma n i deas of mor al mer i t woul d t herefore be t he
exact opposi t e of a free soci et y. It woul d be a society in whi ch
People were r ewar ded for dut y per f or med i nst ead of for success, in
which every move of every i ndi vi dual was gui ded by wha t ot her
People t hought he ought t o do, and i n whi ch t he i ndi vi dual was
t h u s
relieved of t he responsi bi l i t y and t he ri sk of deci si on. But if
nobody' s knowl edge is sufficient t o guide all human act i on, t here
is also no human bei ng wh o is compet ent t o r ewar d all efforts
accordi ng t o merit.
In our individual conduct we generally act on t he assumpt i on
t hat it is t he value of a person' s performance and not his meri t t hat
determines our obl i gat i on t o hi m. What ever may be t rue in mor e
i nt i mat e rel at i ons, in the or di nar y business of life we do not feel
t hat , because a man has rendered us a service at a great sacrifice,
our debt t o hi m is det ermi ned by this, so l ong as we coul d have ha d
t he same service provi ded wi t h ease by somebody else. In our
dealings wi t h ot her men we feel t ht we are doi ng justice if we
recompense value rendered wi t h equal val ue, wi t hout enqui r i ng
what it mi ght have cost the part i cul ar i ndi vi dual t o suppl y us wi t h
these services. Wha t det ermi nes our responsibility is t he advant age
we derive from what ot hers offer us, not their meri t in pr ovi di ng it.
We also expect in our dealings wi t h ot hers t o be r emuner at ed not
accordi ng t o our subjective meri t but accor di ng t o what our
services are wor t h t o t hem. Indeed, so l ong as we t hi nk in t er ms of
our rel at i ons t o part i cul ar peopl e, we are generally qui t e awar e t hat
the mar k of t he free man is t o be dependent for his l i vel i hood not on
ot her peopl e' s views of his meri t but solely on what he has t o
offer t hem. It is only when we t hi nk of our posi t i on or our i ncome
as det ermi ned by ' society' as a whol e t hat we demand r ewar d
accordi ng t o merit.
Though mor al val ue or meri t is a species of val ue, not all val ue is
moral val ue, and most of our j udgement s of val ue are not mor al
j udgement s. That this must be so in a free society is a poi nt of
cardi nal i mpor t ance; and t he failure t o distinguish bet ween val ue
and meri t has been t he source of serious confusi on. We do not
necessarily admi r e all activities whose pr oduct we val ue; and in
most instances wher e we val ue what we get, we are in no posi t i on
t o assess t he merit of those who have pr ovi ded it for us. If a ma n' s
ability in a given field is mor e val uabl e after t hi rt y years' wor k t han
it was earlier, this is i ndependent of whet her these t hi rt y years wer e
most profitable and enjoyable or whet her t hey wer e a t i me of
unceasi ng sacrifice and wor r y. If t he pursui t of a hobby pr oduces a
special skill or an accidental invention t ur ns out t o be ext remel y
useful t o ot her s, t he fact t hat t here is little meri t in it does make it
any less val uabl e t han if t he result had been pr oduced by painful
effort.
Thi s difference bet ween value and meri t is not pecul i ar t o any
one type of society - it woul d exist anywher e. We mi ght , of course,
at t empt t o make r ewar ds cor r espond t o meri t instead of value, but
we are not likely t o succeed in this. In at t empt i ng it, we woul d
dest roy t he i ncent i ves whi ch enabl e peopl e t o decide for themselves
what t hey shoul d do. Mor eover , it is mor e t han doubtful whet her
even a fairly successful at t empt t o make rewards correspond t o
merit woul d pr oduce a mor e at t ract i ve or even a tolerable social
order. A society in whi ch it was generally presumed t hat a high
i ncome was pr oof of mer i t and a l ow i ncome of the lack of it, in
whi ch it was uni versal l y believed t hat posi t i on and remunerat i on
cor r esponded t o mer i t , in whi ch t here was no ot her r oad t o success
t han t he appr oval of one' s conduct by t he maj ori t y of one' s fellows,
woul d pr obabl y be much mor e unbear abl e t o the unsuccessful ones
t han one in whi ch it was frankly recognized t hat t here was no
necessary connect i on bet ween meri t and s ucces s .
1 5
It woul d pr obabl y cont r i but e mor e t o human happi ness if,
i nst ead of t ryi ng t o make r emuner at i on correspond t o merit, we
made clearer how uncer t ai n is t he connect i on bet ween value and
meri t . We ar e pr obabl y all much t oo ready t o ascribe personal merit
wher e t her e is, in fact, only superi or val ue. The possession by
an i ndi vi dual or a gr oup of a superi or civilization or educat i on
cert ai nl y represent s an i mpor t ant value and constitutes as asset for
t he communi t y t o whi ch they bel ong; but it usually constitutes little
meri t . Popul ar i t y a nd est eem do not depend more on merit t han
does financial success. It is, in fact, largely because we are so used t o
assumi ng an often non- exi st ent meri t wherever we find value t hat
we bal k when, in par t i cul ar i nst ances, t he discrepancy is t oo large
to be i gnored.
Ther e is every r eason why we ought t o endeavour t o honour
special meri t wher e it has gone wi t hout adequat e r ewar d. But t he
pr obl em of r ewar di ng act i on of out st andi ng merit which we wish t o
be wi del y known as an exampl e is different from t hat of t he
incentives on whi ch t he or di nar y funct i oni ng of society rests. A free
society pr oduces i nst i t ut i ons in whi ch, for t hose who prefer it, a
man' s advancement depends on t he j udgement of some superior or
of t he maj ori t y of his fellows. Indeed, as organi zat i ons grow larger
and mor e compl ex, t he t ask of ascert ai ni ng the individual' s
cont r i but i on will become mor e difficult; and it will become
i ncreasi ngl y necessary t hat , for many, meri t in t he eyes of t he
manager s r at her t han t he ascert ai nabl e val ue of t he cont ri but i on
shoul d det er mi ne t he r ewar ds. So l ong as this does not pr oduce a
si t uat i on in whi ch a single comprehensi ve scale of meri t is i mposed
upon t he whol e soci et y, so l ong as a multiplicity of organi zat i ons
compet e wi t h one anot her in offering different pr ospect s, t hi s is not
merely compat i bl e wi t h freedom but ext ends t he range of choice
open t o t he individual.
(9) Justice, like liberty and coerci on, is a concept whi ch, for t he
sake of clarity, ought t o be confined t o t he del i berat e t r eat ment of
men by ot her men. It is an aspect of t he i nt ent i onal det er mi nat i on
of t hose condi t i ons of peopl e' s lives t hat are subject t o such cont r ol .
Insofar as we want the efforts of individuals t o be gui ded by t hei r
own views about prospect s and chances, t he resul t s of the
individual' s efforts are necessarily unpr edi ct abl e, and t he quest i on
as to whet her t he resulting di st ri but i on of i ncomes is just has no
me a ni ng.
1 6
Justice does require t hat t hose condi t i ons of peopl e' s
lives t hat are det ermi ned by gover nment be provi ded equal l y for all.
But equal i t y of those condi t i ons must lead t o i nequal i t y of resul t s.
Nei t her t he equal provision of part i cul ar publ i c facilities nor the
equal t r eat ment of different par t ner s in our vol unt ary deal i ngs wi t h
one anot her will secure r ewar d t hat is pr opor t i onal t o meri t .
Rewar d for merit is r ewar d for obeyi ng t he wi shes of ot her s in what
we do, not compensat i on for t he benefits we have conferred upon
t hem by doi ng what we t hought best.
It is, in fact, one of t he objections agai nst at t empt s by govern-
ment t o fix i ncome scales t hat t he state must at t empt t o be just in all
it does. Once t he principle of r ewar d accor di ng t o meri t is accept ed
as t he just foundat i on for t he di st ri but i on of i ncomes, justice woul d
requi re t hat all who desire it shoul d be r ewar ded accor di ng t o t hat
principle. Soon it woul d also be demanded t hat t he same pri nci pl e
be appl i ed t o all and t hat i ncomes not in pr opor t i on t o recogni zabl e
merit not be t ol erat ed. Even an at t empt merely t o di st i ngui sh
bet ween t hose i ncomes or gai ns whi ch are ' ear ned' and t hose whi ch
are not will set up a pri nci pl e whi ch t he st at e will have t o try t o
apply but cannot in fact apply gener al l y.
1 7
And every such at t empt
at del i berat e cont rol of some r emuner at i ons is bound t o creat e
further demands for new cont rol s. The principle of di st ri but i ve
justice, once i nt roduced, woul d not be fulfilled unt i l t he whol e of
society was organi zed in accordance wi t h it. Thi s woul d pr oduce a
ki nd of society whi ch in all essential respects woul d be t he opposi t e
of a free society - a society i n whi ch aut hori t y decided what t he
individual was t o do and how he was t o do it.
(10) In concl usi on we must briefly l ook at anot her ar gument on
which t he demands for a mor e equal di st ri but i on are frequently
based, t hough it is rarely explicitly st at ed. Thi s is t he cont ent i on
t hat member shi p in a par t i cul ar communi t y or nat i on entitles the
individual t o a par t i cul ar mat eri al st andar d t hat is determined by
the general weal t h of t he gr oup t o whi ch he belongs. This demand
is in curi ous conflict wi t h the desire t o base di st ri but i on on personal
merit. Ther e is clearly no meri t in being born into a part i cul ar
communi t y, and no ar gument of justice can be based on the
accident of a par t i cul ar i ndi vi dual ' s being bor n in one place rat her
t han anot her . A relatively weal t hy communi t y in fact regularly
confers advant ages on its poor est member s unknown t o those born
in poor communi t i es. In a weal t hy communi t y the only justification
its member s can have for insisting on further advant ages is t hat
there is much pri vat e weal t h t hat the government can confiscate
and redi st ri but e and t hat men who const ant l y see such wealth being
enjoyed by ot her s will have a st ronger desire for it t han those who
know of it only abst ract l y, if at all.
Ther e is no obvi ous reason why t he joint efforts of the members
of any gr oup t o ensure t he mai nt enance of law and order and t o
organi ze t he provi si on of cert ai n services shoul d give the members a
claim t o a par t i cul ar share in t he weal t h of this gr oup. Such claims
woul d be especially difficult t o defend where those who advanced
t hem wer e unwi l l i ng t o concede t he same rights to those who did
not bel ong t o t he same nat i on or communi t y. The recognition of
such cl ai ms on a nat i onal scale woul d in fact only create a new ki nd
of collective (but not less exclusive) pr oper t y right in the resources
of t he nat i on t hat coul d not be justified on the same grounds as
i ndi vi dual pr oper t y. Few peopl e woul d be prepared t o recognize the
justice of t hese demands on a worl d scale. And the bare fact t hat
wi t hi n a given nat i on t he maj ori t y had t he act ual power t o enforce
such demands , whi l e in t he wor l d as a whol e it did not yet have it,
woul d hardl y make t hem mor e just.
Ther e are good reasons why we shoul d endeavour t o use
what ever political or gani zat i on we have at our disposal t o make
provi si on for t he weak or infirm or for the victims of unforeseeable
disaster. It may well be t r ue t hat t he most effective met hod of
pr ovi di ng agai nst cert ai n risks common t o all citizens of a state is t o
give every citizen pr ot ect i on agai nst t hose risks. The level on which
such pr ovi si ons agai nst common risks can be made will necessarily
depend on t he general weal t h of t he communi t y.
It is an ent i rel y different mat t er , however, t o suggest t hat t hose
who ar e poor , merel y in t he sense t hat t here are t hose in the same
communi t y who ar e ri cher, are entitled t o a share in t he weal t h of
t he l at t er or t hat bei ng bor n i nt o a gr oup t hat has reached a
par t i cul ar level of civilization and comfort confers a title t o a share
NOTES
The quotation at the head of the chapter is taken from The Holmes-Laski
Letters: The Correspondence of Mr Justice Holmes and Harold ]. Laski,
1916-35 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), n, p. 942. A
German translation of an earlier version of this chapter has appeared in
Ordo, vol. x (1958).
1
See, e.g., R. H. Tawney, Equality (London, 1931), p. 47.
2
Roger J. Williams, Free and Unequal: The Biological Basis of Indi-
vidual Liberty (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953), pp. 23 and 70;
cf. also J. B. S. Haldane, The Inequality of Man (London, 1932), and
P. B. Medawar, The Uniqueness of the Individual (London, 1957).
3
Williams, Free and Unequal, p. 152.
See the description of this fashionable view in H. M. Kallen's article
'Behaviorism', 55, n, p. 498: 'At birth human infants, regardless of
their heredity, are as equal as Fords.'
Cf. Plato Laws vi. 757A: ' To unequals equals become unequal.'
6
Cf. F. H. Knight, Freedom and Reform (New York, 1947), p. 151:
'There is no visible reason why anyone is more or less entitled to the
earnings of inherited personal capacities than to those of inherited
property in any other form'; and the discussion in W. Roepke, Mass
und Mitte (Erlenbach and Zurich, 1950), pp. 65- 75.
in all its benefits. The fact t hat all citizens have an i nt erest in the
common provision of some services is no justification for anyone' s
claiming as a right a share in all t he benefits. It may set a st andar d
for what some ought t o be willing t o give, but not for what anyone
can demand.
Nat i onal groups will become mor e and mor e exclusive as t he
acceptance of this view that we have been cont endi ng agai nst
spreads. Rat her t han admi t peopl e t o the advant ages t hat living in
their count ry offers, a nat i on will prefer t o keep t hem out
altogether; for, once admi t t ed, they will soon claim as a right a
part i cul ar share in its weal t h. The concept i on t hat citizenship or
even residence in a count ry confers a claim t o a part i cul ar st andar d
of living is becomi ng a serious source of i nt ernat i onal friction. And
since the only justification for appl yi ng t he principle wi t hi n a given
count ry is t hat its government has t he power t o enforce it, we must
not be surprised if we find the same principle bei ng appl i ed by force
on an i nt ernat i onal scale. Once t he right of t he majority t o t he
benefits t hat minorities enjoy is recognized on a nat i onal scale,
there is no reason why this shoul d st op at t he boundar i es of t he
existing states.
This is the position of R. H. Tawney as summarized by J. P. Plamenatz,
'Equality of Opportunity' , in Aspects of Human Equality, ed. L. Bryson
and others (New York, 1956), p. 100.
C. A. R. Crosland, The Future of Socialism (London, 1956), p. 205.
J. S. Mill, On Liberty, ed. R. B. McCallum (Oxford, 1946), p. 70.
Cf. W. B. Gallie, 'Liberal Morality and Socialist Morality', in Philoso-
phy, Politics, and Society, ed. P. Lasletr (Oxford, 1956), pp. 123-5. The
author represents it as the essence of 'liberal morality' that it claims that
rewards are equal to merit in a free society. This was the position of
some nineteenth-century liberals which often weakened their argument.
A characteristic example is W. G. Sumner, who argued (What Social
Classes Owe to Each Other, reprinted in Freeman, vi (Los Angeles,
n.d.), 141) that if all 'have equal chances so far as chances are provided
or limited by society', this will ' produce unequal results - that is results
which shall be proportioned to the merits of individuals.' This is true
only if ' merit' is used in the sense in which we have used 'value', without
any moral connotations, but certainly not if it is meant to suggest
proportionality to any endeavour to do the good or right thing, or to
any subjective effort to conform to an ideal standard.
But, as we shall presently see, Mr Gallie is right that, in the
Aristotelian terms he uses, liberalism aims at commutative justice and
socialism at distributive justice. But, like most socialists, he does not see
that distributive justice is irreconcilable with freedom in the choice of
one's activities: it is the justice of a hierarchic organization, not of a free
society.
Although I believe that this distinction between merit and value is the
same as that which Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas had in mind when
they distinguished 'distributive justice' from 'commutative justice', 1
prefer not to tie up the discussion with all the difficulties and confusions
which in the course of time have become associated with these
traditional concepts. That what we call here 'reward according to merit'
corresponds to the Aristotelian distributive justice seems clear. The
difficult concept is that of 'commutative justice', and to speak of justice
in this sense seems always to cause a little confusion. Cf. M. Solomon,
Der Begriffder Gerechtigkeit bei Aristoteles (Leiden, 1937); and for a
survey of the extensive literature G. del Vecchio, Die Gerechtigkeit (2nd
ed.: Basel, 1950).
The terminological difficulties arise from the fact that we use the word
merit also in an objective sense and will speak of the 'merit' of an idea, a
book, or a picture, irrespective of the merit acquired by the person who
has created them. Sometimes the word is also used to describe what we
regard as the ' true' value of some achievement as distinguished from its
market value. Yet even a human achievement which has the greatest
value or merit in this sense is not necessarily proof of moral merit on the
part of him to whom it is due. It seems that our use has the sanction of
philosophical tradition. Cf., for instance, D. Hume, Treatise, n, p. 252:
'The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find
the moral quality. . . . The ultimate object of our praise and approba-
tion is the motive, that produc' d them.'
1 3
Cf. the important essay by A. A. Alchian, 'Uncertainty, Evolution, and
Economic Theory' , JPE, LVUI (1950), especially pp. 213- 14, Sec, n,
headed 'Success Is Based on Results, Not Motivation' . It probably is
also no accident that the American economist who has done most to
advance our understanding of a free society, F. H. Knight, began his
professional career with a study of Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Cf.
also B. de Jouvenel, Power (London, 1948), p. 298.
1 4
It is often maintained that justice requires that remuneration be
proportional to the unpleasantness of the job and that for this reason
the street cleaner or the sewage worker ought to be paid more than the
doctor or office worker. This, indeed, would seem to be the consequence
of the principle of remuneration according to merit (or 'distributive
justice'). In a market such a result would come about only if all people
were equally skilful in all jobs so that those who could earn as much as
others in the more pleasant occupations would have to be paid more to
undertake the distasteful ones. In the actual world those unpleasant jobs
provide those whose usefulness in the more attractive jobs is small an
opportunity to earn more than they could elsewhere. That persons who
have little to offer their fellows should be able to earn an income similar
to that of the rest only at a much greater sacrifice is inevitable in any
arrangement under which the individual is allowed to choose his own
sphere of usefulness.
1 5
Cf. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, p. 235: 'Even if all the failures
could be convinced that they had an equal chance, their discontent
would still not be assuaged; indeed it might actually be intensified.
When opportunities are known to be unequal, and the selection clearly
biased towards wealth or lineage, people can comfort themselves for
failure by saying that they never had a proper chance - the system was
unfair, the scales too heavily weighted against them. But if the selection
is obviously by merit, this source of comfort disappears, and failure
induces a total sense of inferiority, with no excuse or consolation; and
this, by a natural quirk of human nature, actually increases the envy and
resentment at the success of others.' Cf. also ch. 24, at n. 8.1 have not
yet seen Michael Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy (London, 1958),
which, judging from reviews, appears to bring out these problems very
clearly.
1 6
See the interesting discussion in R. G. Collingwood, 'Economics as a
Philosophical Science', Ethics, vol. xxxvi (1926), who concludes
(p. 174): 'A just price, a just wage, a just rate of interest, is a
contradiction in terms. The question what a person ought t o get in
return for his goods and labor is a question absolutely devoid of
meaning. The only valid questions are what he can get in return for his
goods or labor, and whether he ought to sell them at all.'
It is, of course, possible to give the distinction between ' earned' and
' unearned' incomes, gains, or increments a fairly precise legal meaning,
but it then rapidly ceases to correspond to the moral distinction which
provides its justification. Any serious attempt to apply the moral
distinction in practice soon meets the same insuperable difficulties as
any attempt to assess subjective merit. How little these difficulties are
generally understood by philosophers (except in rare instances, as that
quoted in the preceding note) is well illustrated by a discussion in L. S.
Stebbing, Thinking to Some Purpose (Pelican Books-. London, 1939),
p. 184, in which, as an illustration of a distinction which is clear but not
sharp, she chooses that between 'legitimate' and 'excess' profits and
asserts: ' The distinction is clear between "excess profits" (or "profiteer-
ing") and "legitimate profits", although it is not a sharp distinction.'
5
Robert Nozick: Moral Constraints
and Distributive Justice*
i
THE MI NI MAL STATE AND THE
ULTRAMI NI MAL STATE
The ni ght - wat chman state of classical liberal t heory, limited t o t he
functions of prot ect i ng all its citizens agai nst vi ol ence, theft, and
fraud, and t o t he enforcement of cont r act s, and so on, appear s t o
be redi st ri but i ve.
1
We can imagine at least one social ar r angement
i nt ermedi at e bet ween t he scheme of pri vat e prot ect i ve associa-
tions and the ni ght - wat chman st at e. Since t he ni ght - wat chman
state is often called a minimal st at e, we shall call this ot her ar r ange-
ment t he ultraminimal state. An ul t r ami ni mal st at e mai nt ai ns a
monopol y over all use of force except t hat necessary in i mmedi at e
self-defence, and so excludes pri vat e (or agency) ret al i at i on for
wr ong and exact i on of compensat i on; but it provi des pr ot ect i on
and enforcement services only t o t hose who pur chase its prot ec-
tion and enforcement policies. Peopl e who don' t buy a pr ot ect i on
cont ract from t he monopol y don' t get pr ot ect ed. The mi ni mal
(ni ght -wat chman) state is equi val ent t o t he ul t r ami ni mal st at e
conjoined wi t h a (clearly redistributive) Fr i edmanesque voucher
pl an, financed from t ax r evenues.
2
Under this pl an all peopl e, or
some (for exampl e, t hose in need), are given t ax- f unded voucher s
t hat can be used only for their pur chase of a pr ot ect i on policy from
the ul t rami ni mal st at e.
Since t he ni ght - wat chman state appear s redi st ri but i ve t o t he
ext ent t hat it compel s some peopl e t o pay for t he pr ot ect i on of
ot her s, its pr oponent s must explain why t hi s redi st ri but i ve funct i on
* From Anarchy, State and Utopia, by Robert Nozick 1974 by Basic
Books, Inc., Publishers. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
Robert Nozick 101
MORAL CONSTRAI NTS AND MORAL GOALS
This question assumes t hat a mor al concer n can funct i on onl y as a
moral goal, as an end st at e for s ome activities t o achi eve as t he n
result. It may, i ndeed, seem t o be a necessary t r ut h t hat ' r i ght ,
' ought' , ' shoul d' , a nd s o on, ar e t o be expl ai ned i n t er ms of wha t is,
or is i nt ended t o be, pr oduct i ve of t he gr eat est good, wi t h all goal s
huilt into t he g o o d / T h u s it is oft en t hought t hat wha t is wr ong
with ut i l i t ari ani sm (whi ch is of t hi s form) is its t oo na r r ow
conception of good. Ut i l i t ar i ani sm does n' t , it is sai d, pr oper l y t ake
ngnt s and t hei r non- vi ol at i on i nt o account ; it i nst ead leaves t hem a
of the state is uni que. If some r edi st r i but i on is l egi t i mat e in or der t o
protect everyone, why is r edi st r i but i on not l egi t i mat e for ot her
attractive and desi rabl e pur pos es as well? Wh a t r at i onal e speci-
fically selects pr ot ect i ve services as t he sole subj ect of l egi t i mat e
redistributive activities? A r at i onal e, once f ound, may s how t hat
this provision of pr ot ect i ve service is not redi st ri but i ve. Mor e
precisely, t he t er m ' r edi st r i but i ve' appl i es t o t ypes of reasons for an
arrangement, r at her t han t o an ar r angement itself. We mi ght
elliptically call an ar r angement ' r edi st r i but i ve' if its maj or (only
possible) suppor t i ng r easons ar e t hemsel ves redi st ri but i ve. (' Pater-
nalistic' functions si mi l arl y. ) Fi ndi ng compel l i ng non- r edi st r i but i ve
reasons woul d cause us t o d r o p t hi s l abel . Whet her we say an
institution t hat t akes money f r om s ome a nd gives it t o ot her s is
redistributive will depend upon why we t hi nk it does so. Ret ur ni ng
stolen money or compens at i ng for vi ol at i ons of ri ght s are not
redistributive r easons. I have s poken unt i l now of t he night-
wat chman st at e' s appearing t o be r edi st r i but i ve, t o leave open t he
possibility t hat non- r edi st r i but i ve t ypes of r easons mi ght be f ound
to justify t he provi si on of pr ot ect i ve services for some by ot her s.
A pr oponent of t he ul t r ami ni mal st at e may seem t o occupy an
inconsistent posi t i on, even t hough he avoi ds t he quest i on of wha t
makes pr ot ect i on uni quel y sui t abl e for redi st ri but i ve pr ovi si on.
Greatly concerned t o pr ot ect ri ght s agai nst vi ol at i on, he makes this
the sole funct i on of t he st at e; and he pr ot est s t hat all ot her
functions are i l l egi t i mat e because t hey t hemsel ves i nvol ve t he
violation of ri ght s. Since he accor ds pa r a mount pl ace t o t he
protection and non- vi ol at i on of ri ght s, h o w can he s uppor t t he
ultraminimal st at e, whi ch woul d seem t o leave some per son' s ri ght s
unprotected or i l l -prot ect ed? Ho w can he s uppor t this in the name
of the non-vi ol at i on of ri ght s?
102 Moral Constraints and Distributive justice
derivative st at us. Many of the count er - exampl e cases t o utilitarian-
ism fit under this obj ect i on, for exampl e, puni shi ng an innocent
man t o save a nei ghbour hood from a vengeful r ampage. But a
theory may include in a pri mary way t he non- vi ol at i on of ri ght s, yet
include it in t he wr ong place and t he wr ong manner . For suppose
some condi t i on about mi ni mi zi ng t he t ot al (wei ght ed) amount of
violations of rights is built i nt o t he desi rabl e end st at e t o be
achieved. We then woul d have somet hi ng like a ' ut i l i t ari ani sm of
rights' ; vi ol at i ons of rights (to be minimized) merely woul d replace
the t ot al happi ness as t he relevant end st at e in t he ut i l i t ari an
st ruct ure. (Not e t hat we do not hol d t he non- vi ol at i on of our rights
as our sole greatest good or even r ank it first l exi cographi cal l y t o
exclude trade-offs, if t here is some desi rabl e society we woul d
choose t o i nhabi t even t hough in it some ri ght s of our s somet i mes
are violated, rat her t han move t o a desert island wher e we could
survive alone.) Thi s still woul d requi re us t o vi ol at e someone' s
rights when doi ng so minimizes t he t ot al (wei ght ed) amount of
violation of rights in t he society. For exampl e, vi ol at i ng someone' s
rights mi ght deflect ot hers from their i nt ended act i on of gravely
violating rights, or mi ght remove t hei r mot i ve for doi ng so, or
might divert their at t ent i on, and so on. A mob r ampagi ng t hr ough a
part of t own killing and bur ni ng will vi ol at e t he rights of t hose
living there. Therefore, someone mi ght try t o justify his puni shi ng
anot her he knows t o be i nnocent of a cri me t hat enr aged a mob, on
the gr ounds t hat puni shi ng this i nnocent per son woul d help t o
avoid even greater violations of rights by ot her s, and so woul d lead
t o a mi ni mum wei ght ed score of rights vi ol at i ons in t he soci et y.
In cont rast t o i ncorporat i ng ri ght s i nt o t he end st at e t o be
achieved, one mi ght place t hem as side const rai nt s upon t he act i ons
t o be done: don' t violate const rai nt s C. The ri ght s of ot her s
det ermi ne t he const rai nt s upon your act i ons. (A goal-directed view
wi t h const rai nt s added woul d be: among t hose acts avai l abl e t o you
that don' t violate const rai nt s C, act so as t o maxi mi ze goal G. Her e,
t he rights of ot her s woul d const rai n your goal -di rect ed behavi our .
1 do not mean t o imply t hat t he correct moral vi ew i ncl udes
mandatory goals that must be pursued, even wi t hi n t he con-
straints.) This view differs from one t hat tries t o bui l d t he side
constraints C into the goal G. The side-constraint view forbi ds you
to violate these moral constraints in the pursuit of your goals;
whereas the view whose objective is too minimize the violation of
these rights allows you to violate the rights (the constraints) in
order to lessen their total violation in the society.
4
The claim that the proponent of the ultraminimal state is
Robert Nozick 103
WHY SIDE CONSTRAINTS.'
1
Isn't it irrational t o accept a si de cons t r ai nt C, r at her t h a n a vi ew
that directs mi ni mi zi ng t he vi ol at i ons of C? (The l at t er vi ew t reat s
C as a condi t i on r at her t ha n a const r ai nt . ) If non- vi ol at i on of C is
so important, shoul dn' t t hat be t he goal ? Ho w can a concer n for t he
non-violation of C l ead t o t he refusal t o vi ol at e C even whe n t hi s
would prevent ot her mor e ext ensi ve vi ol at i ons of C? Wh a t is t he
rationale for pl aci ng t he non- vi ol at i on of ri ght s as a side const r ai nt
upon action i nst ead of i ncl udi ng it solely as a goal of one' s act i ons?
Side const rai nt s upon act i on reflect t he under l yi ng Kant i an
principle t hat i ndi vi dual s are ends and not mer el y means ; t hey may
not be sacrificed or used for t he achi evi ng of ot her ends wi t hout
their consent. Indi vi dual s ar e i nvi ol abl e. Mo r e shoul d be sai d t o
illuminate this t al k of ends and means . Cons i der a pr i me exampl e
of a means, a t ool . Ther e is no side cons t r ai nt on how we may use a
tool, other t han t he mor a l const r ai nt s on h o w we may use it upon
others. There are pr ocedur es t o be f ol l owed t o pr eser ve it for fut ure
use (' don' t leave it out in t he r ai n' ) , and t her e ar e mor e and less
efficient ways of usi ng it. But t her e is no l i mi t on wha t we may do
to it to best achieve our goal s. N o w i magi ne t hat t her e wa s an
overrideable const r ai nt C on s ome t ool ' s use. For exampl e, t he t ool
might have been l ent t o you onl y on t he condi t i on t hat C not be
violated unless t he gai n from doi ng so wa s above a cer t ai n specified
inconsistent, we now can see, assumes t hat he is a ' ut i l i t ar i an of
rights'. It assumes t hat hi s goal is, for exampl e, t o mi ni mi ze t he
weighted amount of t he vi ol at i on of ri ght s i n t he soci et y, a nd t hat
he should pur sue t hi s goal even t hr ough me a ns t hat t hemsel ves
violate peopl e' s ri ght s. I nst ead, he ma y pl ace t he non- vi ol at i on of
rights as a const r ai nt upon act i on, r at her t ha n (or in addi t i on to)
building it i nt o t he end st at e t o be real i zed. The posi t i on hel d by this
proponent of t he ul t r ami ni mal st at e will be a consi st ent one if his
conception of rights hol ds t hat your bei ng forced t o cont r i but e
to another' s welfare vi ol at es your ri ght s, wher eas s ome one else' s
not providing you wi t h t hi ngs you need gr eat l y, i ncl udi ng t hi ngs
essential t o t he pr ot ect i on of your r i ght s, does not itself viol at e your
rights, even t hough it avoi ds ma ki ng it mor e difficult for s omeone
else to violate t hem. ( That concept i on will be consi st ent pr ovi ded it
does not const rue t he monopol y el ement of t he ul t r ami ni mal st at e
as itself a vi ol at i on of rights. ) Tha t it is a consi st ent posi t i on does
not, of course, show t hat it is an accept abl e one.
104 Moral Constraints and Distributive Justice
amount , or unless it was necessary t o achi eve a cert ai n specified
goal . Her e t he object is not completely your t ool , for use according
t o your wish or whi m. But it is a t ool nevert hel ess, even wi t h regard
t o the overri deabl e const rai nt . If we add const r ai nt s on its use that
may not be overri dden, t hen t he obj ect may not be used as a tool in
those ways. In those respects, it is not a t ool at all. Ca n one add
enough const rai nt s so t hat an obj ect cannot be used as a t ool at all,
in any respect?
Can behavi our t owar ds a person be const r ai ned so t hat he is not
t o be used for any end except as he chooses? Thi s is an impossibly
stringent condi t i on if it requires everyone wh o pr ovi des us wi t h a
good t o appr ove positively of every use t o whi ch we wi sh t o put it.
Even t he requi rement t hat he merel y shoul d not obj ect t o any use
we pl an woul d seriously curtail bi l at eral exchange, not t o ment i on
sequences of such exchanges. It is sufficient t hat t he ot her part y
st ands t o gai n enough from t he exchange so t hat he is willing t o go
t hr ough wi t h it, even t hough he obj ect s t o one or mor e of t he uses
t o which you shall put the good. Under such condi t i ons, t he ot her
part y is not bei ng used solely as a means , in t hat respect . Anot her
part y, however, who woul d not choose t o i nt eract wi t h you if he
knew of t he uses t o whi ch you intend t o put hi s act i ons or good, is
being used as a means, even if he receives enough t o choose (in his
ignorance) t o interact wi t h you. ('All al ong, you wer e just using me'
can be said by someone wh o chose t o i nt eract onl y because he was
i gnorant of anot her ' s goals and of t he uses t o whi ch he himself
woul d be put . ) Is it moral l y i ncumbent upon someone t o reveal his
intended uses of an i nt eract i on if he has good r eason t o believe t he
ot her woul d refuse t o i nt eract if he knew? Is he using t he ot her
person, if he does not reveal this? And what of t he cases wher e the
ot her does not choose t o be of use at all? In get t i ng pl easure from
seeing an at t ract i ve person go by, does one use t he ot her solely as
a means ?
5
Does someone so use an object of sexual fantasies?
These and related quest i ons raise very i nt erest i ng issues for mor al
phi l osophy; but not , I t hi nk, for political phi l osophy.
Political phi l osophy is concerned only wi t h certain ways t hat
persons may not use others; pri mari l y, physically aggressi ng agai nst
them. A specific side const rai nt upon act i on t owar ds ot her s
expresses the fact t hat others may not be used in the specific ways
t he side const rai nt excludes. Side const r ai nt s express t he inviolabil-
ity of others, in the ways they specify. These modes of inviolability
are expressed by the following injunction: 'Don't use people in
specified ways.' An end-state view, on the other hand, would
express the vtew that people are ends and not merely means (if it
Robert Nozick 105
LIBERTARIAN CONSTRAINTS
The moral side const r ai nt s upon wha t we may do, 1 cl ai m, reflect
the fact of our separ at e exi st ences. They reflect t he fact t hat no
moral bal anci ng act can t ake pl ace a mong us ; t her e is no mor al
outweighing of one of our lives by ot her s so as t o l ead t o a great er
overall social good. The r e i s no justified sacrifice of some of us t or
others. Thi s r oot i dea, namel y, t hat t her e ar e different i ndi vi dual s
chooses t o express t hi s vi ew at al l ), by a different i nj unct i on:
' Minimize t he use in specified ways of per sons as means . ' Fol l owi ng
this precept itself may i nvol ve usi ng s omeone as a means in one of
the ways specified. Ha d Kant hel d t hi s vi ew, he woul d have given
the second f or mul a of t he cat egori cal i mper at i ve as, ' So act as t o
minimize t he use of humani t y si mpl y as a me a ns ' , r at her t han t he
one he actually used: ' Act in such a way t hat you al ways t reat
humanity, whet her in your o wn per s on or in t he per son of any
other, never simply as a means , but al ways at t he same t i me as an
end. '
6
Side const rai nt s expr ess t he i nvi ol abi l i t y of ot her per s ons . But
why may not one vi ol at e per s ons for t he gr eat er social good?
Individually, we each s omet i mes choose t o under go some pai n or
sacrifice for a great er benefit or t o avoi d a gr eat er ha r m: we go t o
the dentist t o avoi d wor s e suffering l at er; we do some unpl easant
work for its resul t s; s ome per s ons di et t o i mpr ove t hei r heal t h or
looks; some save money t o s uppor t t hemsel ves when they are ol der.
In each case, some cost is bor ne for t he sake of t he great er overall
good. Why not , similarly, hol d t hat s ome per s ons have t o bear
some costs t hat benefit ot her per sons mor e, for t he sake of t he
overall social good? But t her e is no social entity wi t h a good t hat
undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. Ther e ar e onl y
individual peopl e, different i ndi vi dual peopl e, wi t h t hei r own
individual lives. Usi ng one of t hese peopl e for t he benefit of ot her s,
uses him and benefits t he ot her s . Not hi ng mor e. Wh a t happens is
that somet hi ng is done t o hi m for t he sake of ot her s . Tal k of an
overall social good covers t hi s up. (Int ent i onal l y?) To use a person
in this way does not sufficiently respect and t ake account of t he fact
that he is a separ at e pe r s on,
7
t hat his is t he onl y life he has. He does
not get some over bal anci ng good f r om his sacrifice, and no one is
entitled t o force t hi s upon hi m - l east of all a st at e or gover nment
that claims his al l egi ance (as ot her i ndi vi dual s do not ) and t hat
therefore scrupul ousl y mus t be neutral bet ween its citizens.
II
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
The mi ni mal state is t he most ext ensi ve st at e t hat can be justified.
Any st at e mor e ext ensi ve violates peopl e' s ri ght s. Yet many persons
have put forth reasons pur por t i ng t o justify a mor e extensive state.
It is impossible wi t hi n t he compass of this book t o exami ne all the
reasons t hat have been put fort h. Ther ef or e, I shall focus upon
t hose generally acknowl edged t o be most wei ght y and influential,
t o see precisely wherei n they fail. Her e we consi der t he claim t hat
a more extensive st at e is justified, because necessary (or t he best
i nst rument ) t o achieve di st ri but i ve justice; t hen we shall t ake up
diverse ot her claims.
The t erm ' di st ri but i ve j ust i ce' is not a neut r al one. Heari ng
t he t erm ' di st ri but i on' , most peopl e pr esume t hat some t hi ng or
mechani sm uses some pri nci pl e or cri t eri on t o give out a suppl y of
t hi ngs. Into this process of di st ri but i ng shares some er r or may have
crept. So it is an open quest i on, at least, whet her redi st ri but i on
shoul d t ake pl ace; whet her we shoul d do agai n wha t has already
been done once, t hough poor l y. However , we ar e not in t he
posi t i on of children who have been given por t i ons of pie by
someone who now makes last mi nut e adj ust ment s t o rectify
careless cut t i ng. Ther e is no central di st r i but i on, no person or
gr oup entitled t o cont rol all t he resources, jointly deci di ng how they
are to be dol ed out . What each person gets, he gets from ot her s who
give t o him in exchange for somet hi ng, or as a gift. In a free society,
diverse persons cont rol different resources, and new hol di ngs arise
out of the vol unt ary exchanges and act i ons of per sons. Ther e is no
mor e a di st ri but i ng or di st ri but i on of shares t han t here is a
di st ri but i ng of mates in a society in whi ch persons choose whom
they shall marry. The total result is t he product of many i ndi vi dual
decisions which the different individuals involved are ent i t l ed t o
make. Some uses of the term 'distribution', it is true, do not imply a
previous distributing appropriately judged by some cri t eri on (for
example, 'probability distribution'); nevertheless, despite the title of
this chapter, it would be best to use a terminology that clearly is
wi t h separat e lives and so no one may be sacrificed for others,
underlies t he existence of mor al side const r ai nt s, but it also, 1
believe, leads to a l i bert ari an side const r ai nt t hat prohi bi t s aggres-
sion against anot her . . . .
Robert Nozick
1 0 7
neutral. We shall speak of peopl e' s hol di ngs ; a pr i nci pl e of j ust i ce in
holdings describes (part of) wha t j ust i ce tells us (requi res) a bout
holdings. 1 shall state first wh a t 1 t ake t o be t he cor r ect vi ew a bout
justice in hol di ngs, and t hen t ur n t o t he di scussi on ot al t er nat e
views.
8
THE ENTI TLEMENT THEORY
The subject of justice in hol di ngs consi st s of t hr ee maj or t opi cs. The
first is the original acquisition of holdings, t he a ppr opr i a t i on of
unheld things. Thi s i ncl udes t he issues of h o w unhel d t hi ngs ma y
come to be held, t he pr ocess, or pr ocesses, by whi c h unhel d t hi ngs
may come t o be hel d, t he t hi ngs t hat may come t o be hel d by t hese
processes, the ext ent of wha t comes t o be hel d by a par t i cul ar
process, and so on. We shall refer t o t he compl i cat ed t r ut h a bout
this topic, whi ch we shall not f or mul at e her e, as t he pr i nci pl e of
justice in acqui si t i on. The second t opi c concer ns t he transfer of
holdings from one per son t o anot her . By wh a t pr ocesses ma y a
person transfer hol di ngs t o anot her ? Ho w may a per s on acqui r e a
holding from anot her wh o hol ds it? Under t hi s t opi c come gener al
descriptions of vol unt ar y exchange, and gift a nd (on t he ot her
hand) fraud, as well as reference t o par t i cul ar convent i onal det ai l s
fixed upon in a given soci et y. The compl i cat ed t r ut h a bout t hi s
subject (with pl acehol der s for convent i onal det ai l s) we shal l
call the principle of justice in t r ansf er . ( And we shall s uppos e it
also includes principles gover ni ng h o w a per s on ma y di vest hi msel f
of a holding, passi ng it i nt o an unhel d st at e. )
If the worl d were whol l y j ust , t he f ol l owi ng i nduct i ve defi ni t i on
would exhaustively cover t he subj ect of j ust i ce in hol di ngs .
(1) A person who acqui r es a hol di ng in accor dance wi t h t he
principle of justice in acqui si t i on is ent i t l ed t o t hat hol di ng.
U) A person who acqui r es a hol di ng in accor dance wi t h t he
principle of justice in t r ansf er , | f r om s ome one else ent i t l ed t o
the hol di ng, is ent i t l ed t o t he hol di ng.
(3) No one is ent i t l ed t o a hol di ng except by ( r epeat ed)
applications of 1 and 2.
a j -
C o m p l e t e
Principle of di st r i but i ve j ust i ce wo u l d say si mpl y t hat
istnbution is just if ever yone is ent i t l ed t o t he hol di ngs t hey
Possess under t he di st r i but i on.
distribution is just if it ari ses f r om a not he r j ust di s t r i but i on
distrih
t
'-
l i a t e m e a n s
- The l egi t i mat e means of movi ng f r om one
button to anot her are specified by the pr i nci pl e of j ust i ce in
transfer. The legitimate first ' moves' are specified by t he pri nci pl e of
justice in acqui si t i on.
9
What ever arises from a just si t uat i on by just
steps is itself just. The means of change specified by t he pri nci pl e of
justice in transfer preserve justice. As correct rules of inference are
t rut h-preservi ng, and any conclusion deduced via r epeat ed appl i ca-
tion of such rules from only t r ue premi sses is itself t r ue, so the
means of t ransi t i on from one si t uat i on t o anot her specified by t he
principle of justice in transfer are justice-preserving, and any
si t uat i on actually arising from repeat ed t ransi t i ons in accor dance
with the principle from a just si t uat i on is itself just. The parallel
bet ween justice-preserving t r ansf or mat i ons and t r ut h- pr eser vi ng
t ransformat i ons illuminates wher e it fails as well as wher e it hol ds.
That a conclusion could have been deduced by t rut h-preservi ng
means from premisses t hat are t r ue suffices t o show its t r ut h. That
from a just si t uat i on a si t uat i on could have arisen via justice-
preserving means does not suffice t o show its justice. The fact t hat a
thief' s victims voluntarily could have present ed hi m wi t h gifts does
not entitle t he thief t o his ill-gotten gains. Just i ce in hol di ngs is
historical; it depends upon what act ual l y has happened. We shall
ret urn t o this poi nt later.
Not all actual si t uat i ons are generat ed in accor dance wi t h t he
t wo principles of justice in hol di ngs: t he pri nci pl e of justice in
acquisition and the principle of justice in t ransfer. Some peopl e
steal from ot hers, or defraud t hem, or enslave t hem, seizing t hei r
pr oduct and prevent i ng t hem from living as they choose, or forcibly
exclude ot hers from compet i ng in exchanges. None of t hese are
permissible modes of t ransi t i on from one si t uat i on t o anot her . And
some persons acqui re holdings by means not sanct i oned by t he
principle of justice in acqui si t i on. The existence of past injustice
(previous violations of t he first t wo principles of justice in hol di ngs)
raises the t hi rd maj or t opi c under justice in hol di ngs: t he rectifica-
tion of injustice in hol di ngs. If past injustice has shaped present
holdings in vari ous ways, some identifiable and some not , what
now, if anyt hi ng, ought t o be done t o rectify these injustices? Wha t
obl i gat i ons do the performers of injustice have t owar ds t hose
whose posi t i on is worse t han it woul d have been ha d t he injustice
not been done? Or , t han it woul d have been had compensat i on
been paid prompt l y? How, if at all, do t hi ngs change if t he
beneficiaries and those made wor se off are not t he di rect par t i es in
t he act of injustice, but , for exampl e, t hei r descendant s? Is an
injustice done t o someone whose hol di ng was itself based upon an
unrectified injustice? How far back must one go in wi pi ng clean t he
historical slate of injustices? What may victims of injustice permi ss-
Robert Nozick 109
ibly do in or der t o rectify t he injustices bei ng done t o t hem,
i ncl udi ng t he many injustices done by persons acting t hrough
their gover nment ? 1 do not know of a t hor ough or theoretically
sophi st i cat ed t r eat ment of such i s s ues .
1 0
idealizing greatly, let us
suppose t heoret i cal i nvest i gat i on will pr oduce a principle of
rectification. Thi s pri nci pl e uses historical i nformat i on about
previ ous si t uat i ons and injustices done in t hem (as defined by the
first t wo pri nci pl es of justice and rights agai nst interference), and
i nf or mat i on about t he act ual course of events t hat flowed from
these injustices, unt i l t he present , and it yields a description (or
descri pt i ons) of hol di ngs in t he society. The principle of rectifica-
tion pr esumabl y will make use of its best est i mat e of subjunctive
i nformat i on about wha t woul d have occurred (or a probability
di st ri but i on over what mi ght have occurred, using t he expected
value) if t he injustice ha d not t aken place. If t he act ual description
of hol di ngs t ur ns out not t o be one of the descriptions yielded by
t he pri nci pl e, t hen one of t he descri pt i ons yielded must be
r eal i zed.
1 1
The general out l i nes of t he t heory of justice in holdings are t hat
the hol di ngs of a per son are just if he is entitled to t hem by the
principles of justice in acqui si t i on and transfer, or by the principle
of rectification of injustice (as specified by t he first t wo principles).
If each per son' s hol di ngs are just, t hen the t ot al set (distribution) of
hol di ngs is j ust . To t ur n t hese general outlines into a specific theory
we woul d have t o specify t he details of each of t he three principles
of justice in hol di ngs: t he pri nci pl e of acquisition of hol di ngs, the
principle of t ransfer of hol di ngs, and t he pri nci pl e of rectification of
vi ol at i ons of t he first t wo pri nci pl es. I shall not at t empt t hat task
here.
HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES
AND END-RESULT PRINCIPLES
The general out l i nes of t he ent i t l ement t heory i l l umi nat e t he nat ur e
and defects of ot her concept i ons of distributive justice. The
ent i t l ement t heor y of justice in di st ri but i on is historical; whet her a
di st ri but i on is just depends upon how it came about . In cont rast ,
current time-slice principles of justice hol d t hat the justice of a
di st ri but i on is det er mi ned by how t hi ngs are di st ri but ed (who has
what ) as j udged by s ome structural principle(s) of just di st ri but i on.
A ut i l i t ari an wh o j udges bet ween any t wo di st ri but i ons by seeing
whi ch has t he great er sum of utility and, if t he sums tie, applies
some fixed equal i t y cri t eri on t o choose the mor e equal di st ri but i on,
1 1 0 Moral Constraints and Distributive Justice
woul d hol d a current time-slice principle of justice. As woul d
someone who had a fixed schedule of trade-offs bet ween t he sum
of happi ness and equal i t y. Accor di ng t o a cur r ent time-slice
principle, all t hat needs t o be l ooked at , in j udgi ng t he justice of
a di st ri but i on, is who ends up wi t h wha t ; in compar i ng any t wo
di st ri but i ons one need l ook onl y at t he mat r i x present i ng the
di st ri but i ons. No further i nformat i on need be fed i nt o a pri nci pl e of
justice. It is a consequence of such principles of justice t hat any t wo
structurally identical di st ri but i ons are equal l y just. ( Two distri-
but i ons are st ruct ural l y identical if t hey present t he same profile,
but perhaps have different persons occupyi ng t he par t i cul ar slots.
My havi ng ten and your havi ng five, and my havi ng five and your
havi ng ten are st ruct ural l y identical di st ri but i ons. ) "Welfare econ-
omics is t he t heory of current time-slice pri nci pl es of justice. The
subject is conceived as operat i ng on mat ri ces represent i ng onl y
current i nformat i on about di st ri but i on. Thi s, as well as some of t he
usual condi t i ons (for exampl e, t he choice of di st r i but i on is
i nvari ant under relabelling of col umns) , guar ant ees t hat wel fare
economi cs will be a current time-slice t heory, wi t h all of its
i nadequaci es.
Mos t persons do not accept cur r ent time-slice principles as
const i t ut i ng t he whol e st ory about di st ri but i ve shares. They t hi nk it
relevant in assessing t he justice of a si t uat i on t o consi der not onl y
t he di st ri but i on it embodi es, but also how t hat di st ri but i on came
about . If some persons are in pri son for mur der or war cri mes, we
do not say t hat t o assess t he justice of t he di st ri but i on in t he society
we must look onl y at what this person has, and t hat person has , and
t hat person has . . . at t he current t i me. We t hi nk it rel evant t o ask
whet her someone did somet hi ng so t hat he deserved t o be puni shed,
deserved t o have a l ower share. Mos t will agree t o t he rel evance of
further i nformat i on wi t h regard t o puni shment s and penal t i es.
Consi der also desired t hi ngs. One t r adi t i onal socialist vi ew is t hat
wor ker s are entitled t o t he pr oduct and full fruits of their l abour ;
they have earned it; a di st ri but i on is unj ust if it does not give t he
workers what t hey are ent i t l ed t o. Such ent i t l ement s are based upon
some past hi st ory. No socialist hol di ng t hi s vi ew woul d find it
comfort i ng t o be t ol d t hat because t he act ual di st ri but i on A
happens t o coi nci de st ruct ural l y wi t h t he one he desires D, A.
therefore is no less just t han D; it differs only in t hat t he ' par asi t i c'
owner s of capital receive under A wha t t he wor ker s are ent i t l ed t o
under D, and t he wor ker s receive under A what t he owner s are
entitled t o under D, namel y very little. Thi s socialist ri ght l y, i n my
view, hol ds on t o t he not i ons of ear ni ng, pr oduci ng, ent i t l ement ,
Robert Nozick
111
desert, and so fort h, and he rejects current time-slice principles that
look only t o t he st r uct ur e of t he resulting set of holdings. (The set
of hol di ngs resul t i ng from what ? Isn' t it implausible that how
holdings are pr oduced a nd come t o exist has no effect at all on who
should hol d what ?) Hi s mi st ake lies in his view of what entitlements
arise out of wha t sort s of pr oduct i ve processes.
We const r ue t he posi t i on we discuss t oo narrowl y by speaking of
current time-slice pri nci pl es. Not hi ng is changed if structural prin-
ciples oper at e upon a t i me sequence of current time-slice profiles
and, for exampl e, give someone mor e now t o count erbal ance the
less he has had earlier. A ut i l i t ari an or an egalitarian or any mi xt ure
of the t wo over t i me will i nheri t t he difficulties of his more myopic
comrades. He is not hel ped by t he fact t hat some of the information
others consi der rel evant in assessing a di st ri but i on is reflected,
unrecoverabl y, in past mat r i ces. Hencefort h, we shall refer t o such
unhistorical pri nci pl es of di st ri but i ve justice, including the current
time-slice pri nci pl es, as end-result principles or end-state principles.
In cont r ast t o end- r esul t pri nci pl es of justice, historical principles
of justice hol d t hat past ci rcumst ances or act i ons of people can
create differential ent i t l ement s or differential deserts t o things. An
injustice can be wor ked by movi ng from one distribution t o anot her
structurally identical one, for t he second, in profile the same, may
violate peopl e' s ent i t l ement s or desert s; it may not fit the actual
history.
PATTERNING
The ent i t l ement pri nci pl es of justice in hol di ngs t hat we have
sketched are hi st ori cal pri nci pl es of justice. To better underst and
their precise char act er , we shall distinguish t hem from anot her
subclass of t he hi st ori cal pri nci pl es. Consi der, as an exampl e, the
principle of di st r i but i on accordi ng t o moral meri t . This principle
requires t hat t ot al di st ri but i ve shares vary directly with moral
merit; no per son shoul d have a great er share t han anyone whose
moral mer i t is great er. (If mor al mer i t coul d be not merely ordered
but measur ed on an i nt erval or rat i o scale, st ronger principles could
be formul at ed. ) Or consi der t he pri nci pl e t hat results by substitut-
ing ' usefulness t o soci et y' for ' mor al meri t ' in the previous
pri nci pl e. Or i nst ead of ' di st ri but e accordi ng t o moral meri t ' , or
^distribute accor di ng t o usefulness t o society' , we might consider
' di st ri but e accor di ng t o t he wei ght ed sum of mor al merit, useful-
ness t o society, and need' , wi t h t he wei ght s of t he different
di mensi ons equal . Let us call a pri nci pl e of di st ri but i on patterned if
it specifies t hat a di st ri but i on is t o vary al ong wi t h some nat ur al
di mensi on, wei ght ed sum of nat ur al di mensi ons, or l exi cographi c
orderi ng of nat ur al di mensi ons. And let us say a di st r i but i on is
pat t erned if it accords wi t h some pat t er ned pri nci pl e. (I speak
of nat ural di mensi ons, admi t t edl y wi t hout a general cri t eri on for
t hem, because for any set of hol di ngs some artificial di mensi ons can
be gi mmi cked up t o vary al ong wi t h t he di st r i but i on of t he set.) The
principle of di st ri but i on in accor dance wi t h mor al meri t is a
pat t erned historical principle, whi ch specifies a pat t er ned distri-
but i on. ' Di st ri but e accor di ng t o I Q' is a pat t er ned pri nci pl e t hat
l ooks t o i nformat i on not cont ai ned in di st ri but i onal mat ri ces. It is
not historical, however, in t hat it does not l ook t o any past act i ons
creating differential ent i t l ement s t o eval uat e a di st r i but i on; it
requires only di st ri but i onal mat ri ces whose col umns are labeled
by IQ scores. The di st ri but i on in a society, however , may be
composed of such simple pat t er ned di st r i but i ons, wi t hout itself
being simply pat t erned. Different sect ors may oper at e different
pat t er ns, or some combi nat i on of pat t er ns may oper at e in different
pr opor t i ons across a society. A di st ri but i on composed in this
manner , from a small number of pat t er ned di st r i but i ons, we also
shall t erm ' pat t er ned' . And we ext end t he use of ' pat t er n' t o
include t he overall designs put forth by combi nat i ons of end-st at e
principles.
Al most every suggested principle of di st ri but i ve justice is pat -
t erned: t o each accordi ng t o his mor al meri t , or needs, or mar gi nal
pr oduct , or how har d he tries, or t he wei ght ed sum of t he
foregoing, and so on. The pri nci pl e of ent i t l ement we have sket ched
is not pat t er ned.
1 2
Ther e is no one nat ur al di mensi on or wei ght ed
sum or combi nat i on of a small number of nat ur al di mensi ons t hat
yields the di st ri but i ons generat ed i n accor dance wi t h t he pri nci pl e
of ent i t l ement . The set of hol di ngs t hat results when some per sons
receive t hei r margi nal pr oduct s, ot her s wi n at gambl i ng, ot her s
receive a share of t hei r mat e' s i ncome, ot hers receive gifts from
foundat i ons, ot hers receive interest on l oans, ot her s receive gifts
from admi rers, ot her s receive ret urns on i nvest ment , ot her s make
for themselves much of what t hey have, ot her s find t hi ngs, and
so on, will not be pat t er ned. Heavy st rands of pat t er ns will r un
t hr ough it; significant por t i ons of t he vari ance in hol di ngs will be
account ed for by pat t ern-vari abl es. If most peopl e most of t he t i me
choose t o transfer some of their ent i t l ement s t o ot hers onl y in
exchange for somet hi ng from t hem, t hen a large par t of wha t many
peopl e hol d will var y wi t h what t hey hel d t hat ot her s want ed. Mo r e
details are provi ded by t he t heory of mar gi nal product i vi t y. But
Robert Nozick 113
gifts to relatives, char i t abl e donat i ons , bequest s t o chi l dren, and t he
like, are not best concei ved, in t he first i nst ance, in this manner .
Ignoring the st r ands of pat t er n, let us suppose for t he moment t hat
a distribution act ual l y ar r i ved at by t he oper at i on of the principle of
entitlement is r a ndom wi t h respect t o any pat t er n. Though the
resulting set of hol di ngs will be unpat t er ned, it will not be
incomprehensible, for it can be seen as ari si ng from t he oper at i on of
a small number of pri nci pl es. These pri nci pl es specify how an initial
distribution may arise (the pri nci pl e of acqui si t i on of holdings) and
how di st ri but i ons may be t r ans f or med i nt o ot her s (the principle of
transfer of hol di ngs). The process wher eby t he set of hol di ngs is
generated will be intelligible, t hough t he set of hol di ngs itself t hat
results from this process will be unpat t er ned.
The writings of F. A. Ha ye k focus less t han is usually done upon
what pat t erni ng di st ri but i ve justice requi res. Hayek argues t hat we
cannot know enough about each per son' s si t uat i on t o di st ri but e t o
each accordi ng t o his mor al meri t (but woul d justice demand we
do so if we did have t hi s knowl edge?) ; and he goes on t o say, ' our
objection is agai nst all at t empt s t o i mpress upon society a
deliberately chosen pat t er n of di st r i but i on, whet her it be an order
of equality or of i ne qua l i t y. ' '
3
However , Hayek concl udes t hat in a
free society t here will be di st r i but i on in accor dance with value
rather t han mor al mer i t ; t hat is, in accor dance wi t h the perceived
value of a per son' s act i ons and services t o ot her s. Despite his
rejection of a pat t er ned concept i on of di st ri but i ve justice, Hayek
himself suggests a pat t er n he t hi nks justifiable: di st ri but i on in
accordance wi t h t he percei ved benefits given t o ot hers, leaving
room for t he compl ai nt t hat a free society does not realize exactly
this pat t ern. St at i ng t hi s pat t er n st r and of a free capitalist society
more precisely, we get ' To each accor di ng t o how much he benefits
others who have t he resources for benefiting t hose who benefit
them. ' Thi s will seem ar bi t r ar y unless some accept abl e initial set of
holdings is specified, or unl ess it is hel d t hat t he oper at i on of the
system over t i me washes out any significant effects from t he initial
set of hol di ngs. As an exampl e of t he l at t er, if al most anyone woul d
have bought a car from Henr y For d, t he supposi t i on t hat it was an
arbitrary mat t er wh o hel d t he money (and so bought ) woul d not
Place Henry For d' s ear ni ngs under a cl oud. In any event , his comi ng
to hold it is not ar bi t r ar y. Di st r i but i on accor di ng t o benefits t o
others is a maj or pat t er ned st r and in a free capitalist society, as
Hayek correct l y poi nt s out , but it is onl y a st r and and does not
constitute t he whol e pat t er n of a syst em of ent i t l ement s (namely,
' nheri t ance, gifts for ar bi t r ar y r easons, chari t y, and so on) or a
st andar d t hat one shoul d insist a society fit. Wi l l peopl e t ol erat e for
long a system yielding di st ri but i ons t hat they believe are unpat-
terned? No doubt peopl e will not l ong accept a di st ri but i on they
believe is unjust. People want t hei r society t o be and t o l ook just.
But must the l ook of justice reside in a resul t i ng pat t er n rat her than
in the underl yi ng generat i ng pri nci pl es? We are in no posi t i on to
conclude t hat t he i nhabi t ant s of a society embodyi ng an entitlement
concept i on of justice in hol di ngs will find it unaccept abl e. Still, it
must be grant ed t hat were peopl e' s reasons for t ransferri ng some of
their holdings t o ot hers al ways i rrat i onal or ar bi t r ar y, we woul d
find this di st urbi ng. (Suppose peopl e al ways det er mi ned what
holdings they woul d t ransfer, and t o whom, by usi ng a r andom
device.) We feel mor e comfort abl e uphol di ng t he justice of an
entitlement system if most of t he transfers under it are done for
reasons. Thi s does not mean necessarily t hat all deserve what
holdings they receive. It means onl y t hat t here is a pur pose or point
to someone' s transferring a hol di ng t o one per son r at her t han t o
anot her; t hat usually we can see what t he t ransferrer t hi nks he' s
gaining, what cause he t hi nks he' s servi ng, what goal s he t hi nks he' s
helping t o achieve, and so fort h. Since in a capi t al i st society peopl e
often transfer hol di ngs t o ot hers in accor dance wi t h how much they
perceive these ot hers benefiting t hem, t he fabric const i t ut ed by
t he individual t ransact i ons and transfers is largely reasonabl e and
i nt el l i gi bl e.
1 5
(Gifts t o loved ones, bequest s t o chi l dren, chari t y t o
the needy also are non-arbi t rary component s of t he fabric.) In
stressing t he large st rand of di st ri but i on in accor dance wi t h benefit
t o ot hers, Hayek shows t he poi nt of many t ransfers, and so shows
that the system of transfer of ent i t l ement s is not just spi nni ng its
gears aimlessly. The system of ent i t l ement s is defensible when
const i t ut ed by t he i ndi vi dual ai ms of i ndi vi dual t r ansact i ons. No
overarchi ng aim is needed, no di st ri but i onal pat t er n is requi red.
To think t hat t he t ask of a t heory of di st ri but i ve justice is t o fill in
the bl ank in ' t o each accordi ng t o his ' is t o be pr edi sposed t o
search for a pat t er n; and t he separ at e t r eat ment of ' from each
according t o his ' t reat s pr oduct i on and di st r i but i on as t wo
separat e and i ndependent issues. On an ent i t l ement vi ew t hese are
not two separat e quest i ons. Whoever makes somet hi ng, havi ng
bought or cont ract ed for all other hel d resources used in t he process
(transferring some of his hol di ngs for these co- oper at i ng fact ors), is
k
l
s i t u a
t i o n is not one of somet hi ng' s get t i ng made,
and there being an open quest i on of who is to get it. Thi ngs come
into the world already at t ached to people havi ng ent i t l ement s over
them. From the point of view of the hi st ori cal ent i t l ement
Robert Nozick 1 1 5
HOW LIBERTY UPSETS PATTERNS
It is not clear how t hos e hol di ng al t er nat i ve concept i ons of
distributive justice can reject t he ent i t l ement concept i on of j ust i ce in
holdings. For suppose a di st r i but i on f avour ed by one of t hese non-
entitlement concept i ons is real i zed. Let us suppose it is your
favourite one and let us call t hi s di st r i but i on D l ; per haps everyone
has an equal shar e, per haps shar es var y in accor dance wi t h some
dimension you t r easur e. No w s uppos e t hat Wi l t Chamber l ai n is
greatly in demand by basket bal l t eams , bei ng a great gat e at t r ac-
tion. (Also suppose cont r act s r un onl y for a year , wi t h pl ayers bei ng
free agents.) He signs t he f ol l owi ng sor t of cont r act wi t h a t eam: In
each home game, t went y-fi ve cent s f r om t he pr i ce of each t i cket of
admission goes t o hi m. ( We i gnor e t he quest i on of whet her he is
' gouging' t he owner s , l et t i ng t he m l ook out for t hemsel ves. ) The
season st art s, and peopl e cheerfully at t end his t eam' s games ; t hey
huy their t i cket s, each t i me dr oppi ng a separ at e twenty-five cent s of
their admi ssi on pri ce i nt o a speci al b o x wi t h Chamber l ai n' s name
on it. They are exci t ed a bout seei ng hi m pl ay; it is wor t h t he t ot al
admission pri ce t o t he m. Let us suppose t hat in one season one
conception of justice in hol di ngs, t hose wh o st ar t afresh t o
complete ' t o each accor di ng t o hi s ' t r eat obj ect s as if t hey
appeared from nowher e, out of not hi ng. A compl et e t heor y of
justice might cover t hi s l i mi t case as wel l ; per haps her e is a use for
the usual concept i ons of di st r i but i ve j us t i c e .
1 6
So ent renched ar e ma xi ms of t he usual f or m t hat per haps we
should present t he ent i t l ement concept i on as a compet i t or . I gnor i ng
acquisition and rect i fi cat i on, we mi ght say:
From each accor di ng t o wha t he chooses t o do, t o each
according t o wha t he makes for himself ( per haps wi t h t he
contracted aid of ot her s) and wh a t ot her s choose t o do for
him and choose t o give hi m of wha t t hey' ve been gi ven
previously (under t hi s ma xi m) a nd haven' t yet expended or
transferred.
This, the di scerni ng r eader will have not i ced, has its defects as a
slogan. So as a s umma r y and gr eat si mpl i fi cat i on (and not as a
maxim with any i ndependent meani ng) we have:
From each as they choose, to each as they are chosen.
million persons at t end his home games, and Wi l t Chamber l ai n
wi nds up wi t h $250, 000, a much larger sum t han t he average
i ncome and larger even t han anyone else has. Is he entitled t o this
income? Is this new di st ri but i on D2, unjust? If so, why? Ther e is no
quest i on about whet her each of t he peopl e was entitled to t he
cont rol over the resources t hey hel d in D l ; because t hat was t he
distribution (your favourite) t hat (for t he pur poses of ar gument ) we
assumed was accept abl e. Each of t hese per sons chose t o give
twenty-five cents of their money t o Chamber l ai n. They coul d have
spent it on going t o t he movi es, or on candy bar s, or on copies of
Dissent magazi ne, or of Monthly Review. But t hey all, at least one
million of t hem, converged on giving it t o Wi l t Chamber l ai n in
exchange for wat chi ng hi m pl ay basket bal l . If Dl was a just
distribution, and peopl e vol unt ari l y moved from it t o D2, transfer-
ring part s of their shares they were given under Dl (what was it for
if not t o do somet hi ng wi t h?), i sn' t D2 al so just? If t he peopl e wer e
entitled t o dispose of t he resources t o whi ch they wer e entitled
(under Dl ) , di dn' t this include their bei ng ent i t l ed t o give it t o, or
exchange it wi t h, Wi l t Chamber l ai n? Can anyone else compl ai n on
gr ounds of justice? Each ot her person al ready has l egi t i mat e share
under Dl . Under Dl , t here is not hi ng t hat anyone has t hat anyone
else has a claim of justice against. After someone t ransfers
somet hi ng t o Wi l t Chamber l ai n, t hi rd parties still have t hei r
legitimate shares; their shares are not changed. By what process
could such a transfer among t wo persons give rise t o a l egi t i mat e
claim of distributive justice of what was t ransferred, by a t hi rd
part y who had no claim of justice on any hol di ng of t he ot her s
before the t r ans f er ?
1 7
To cut off obj ect i ons i rrel evant here, we
might i magi ne t he exchanges occurri ng in a socialist society, after
hour s. After pl ayi ng what ever basket bal l he does i n his daily wor k,
or doi ng what ever ot her daily wor k he does, Wi l t Chamber l ai n
decides to put in overtime t o earn addi t i onal money. (First his wor k
quot a is set; he wor ks time over that. ) Or i magi ne it is a skilled
juggler peopl e like t o see, who put s on shows after hour s .
Why might someone wor k overt i me in a society in whi ch it is
assumed their needs are satisfied? Perhaps because t hey care about
things ot her t han needs. I like t o wr i t e in books t hat I read, and t o
have easy access t o books for br owsi ng at odd hour s. It woul d be
very pl easant and conveni ent t o have t he resources of Wi dener
Library in my back yard. No society, I assume, will pr ovi de such
resources close t o each person who woul d like t hem as part of his
regular al l ot ment (under Dl ) . Thus , per sons either mus t do wi t hout
some ext ra things t hat they want , or be al l owed t o do somet hi ng
Robert Nozick 117
extra to get some of t hese t hi ngs. On wh a t basis coul d t he
inequalities t hat woul d event uat e be f or bi dden? Not i ce al so t hat
small factories woul d spr i ng up in a soci al i st soci et y, unl ess
forbidden. I mel t down s ome of my per sonal possessi ons ( under
Dl ) and build a machi ne out of t he mat er i al . I offer you, and
others, a phi l osophy l ect ure once a week in exchange for your
cranking the handl e on my machi ne, whos e pr oduct s I exchange for
yet other t hi ngs, and so on. (The r aw mat er i al s used by t he machi ne
are given t o me by ot her s wh o possess t hem unde r D l , in exchange
for hearing lectures.) Each per son mi ght par t i ci pat e t o gai n t hi ngs
over and above t hei r al l ot ment under D l . Some per sons even mi ght
want to leave t hei r j ob in soci al i st i ndust r y and wo r k full t i me in
this private sect or. I shall say s omet hi ng mor e about t hese issues
elsewhere. Her e I wi sh merel y t o not e h o w pri vat e pr oper t y
even in means of pr oduct i on woul d occur in a soci al i st soci et y t hat
did not forbid peopl e t o use as t hey wi shed s ome of t he r esour ces
they are given under t he soci al i st di st r i but i on D l .
1 8
The socialist
society woul d have t o forbi d capi t al i st act s bet ween consent i ng
adults.
The general poi nt i l l ust rat ed by t he Wi l t Chamber l ai n exampl e
and the exampl e of t he ent r epr eneur in a soci al i st society is t hat no
end-state pri nci pl e or di st r i but i onal pat t er ned pri nci pl e of justice
can be cont i nuousl y real i zed wi t hout cont i nuous i nt erference wi t h
people' s lives. Any f avour ed pat t er n woul d be t r ans f or med i nt o one
unfavoured by t he pr i nci pl e, by peopl e choos i ng t o act in var i ous
ways; for exampl e, by peopl e exchangi ng goods and services wi t h
other peopl e, or gi vi ng t hi ngs t o ot her peopl e, t hi ngs t he t ransfer-
rers are entitled t o under t he f avour ed di st r i but i onal pat t er n. To
maintain a pat t er n one mus t ei t her cont i nual l y interfere t o st op
people from t ransferri ng r esour ces as t hey wi sh t o, or cont i nual l y
(or periodically) interfere t o t ake from s ome per s ons r esour ces t hat
others for some reason chose t o t r ansf er t o t hem. (But if s ome t i me
limit is t o be set on how l ong peopl e may keep r esour ces ot her s
voluntarily t ransfer t o t hem, why let t hem keep t hese resources for
ay period of t i me? Wh y not have i mmedi at e confi scat i on?) It
might be obj ect ed t hat all per sons vol unt ar i l y will choose t o refrain
from actions whi ch woul d upset t he pat t er n. Thi s pr esupposes
unrealistically (1) t hat all will mos t wa nt t o mai nt ai n t he pat t er n
(are those who don' t , t o be ' r e- educat ed' or forced t o under go 'self-
cnticism' ?), (2) t hat each can gat her enough i nf or mat i on about his
own actions and t he ongoi ng act i vi t i es of ot her s t o di scover whi ch
of his act i ons will upset t he pat t er n, and (3) t hat di verse and
far-flung persons can co- or di nat e t hei r act i ons t o dovet ai l i nt o t he
pat t ern. Compar e the manner in whi ch t he mar ket is neut ral among
persons' desires, as it reflects and t r ansmi t s wi del y scattered
information via prices, and co-ordi nat es per sons' activities.
It puts things per haps a bit t oo st rongl y t o say t hat every
pat t erned (or end-state) principle is liable t o be t hwar t ed by the
vol unt ary actions of t he individual part i es t ransferri ng some of
their shares they receive under the pri nci pl e. For per haps some very
weak pat t erns are not so t hwa r t e d.
1 9
Any di st r i but i onal pat t er n
with any egalitarian component is over t ur nabl e by t he vol unt ar y
actions of individual persons over t i me; as is every pat t er ned
condi t i on with sufficient cont ent so as actually t o have been
proposed as present i ng the central core of di st ri but i ve justice. Still,
given t he possibility t hat some weak condi t i ons or pat t er ns may not
be unst abl e in this way, it woul d be bet t er t o f or mul at e an explicit
description of t he ki nd of interesting and cont ent ful pat t er ns under
discussion, and t o prove a t heorem about t hei r i nst abi l i t y. Since the
weaker the pat t erni ng, t he more likely it is t hat the ent i t l ement
system itself satisfies it, a plausible conj ect ure is t hat any pat t er ni ng
either is unst abl e or is satisfied by t he ent i t l ement syst em.
NOTES
1
Here and in the next section 1 draw upon and amplify my discussion
of these issues in footnote 4 of ' On the Randian Argument' , The
Personalist, Spring, 1971.
2
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962), ch. 6. Friedman's school vouchers, of course,
allow a choice about who is to supply the product, and so differ from
the protection vouchers imagined here.
For a clear statement that this view is mistaken, see John Rawls, A
Theory of justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971),
pp. 30, 565- 6.
Unfortunately, too few models of the structure of moral views have
been specified heretofore, though there are surely other interesting
structures. Hence an argument for a side-constraint structure that
consists largely in arguing against an end-state maximization structure
is i iconclusive, for these alternatives are not exhaustive. An array of
structures must be precisely formulated and investigated; perhaps some
novel structure then will seem most appropriate.
The issue of whether a side-constraint view can be put in the form of
the goal-without-side-constraint view is a tricky one. One might think,
for example, that each person could distinguish in his goal between his
violating rights and someone else's doing it. Give the former infinite
(negative) weight in his goal, and no amount of stopping others from
Robert Nozick 1 1 9
violating rights can outweigh his violating someone' s rights. In addition
to a component of a goal receiving infinite weight, indexical expressions
also appear, for example, ' my doing something' . A careful statement
delimiting 'constraint views' would exclude these gimmicky ways of
transforming side constraints into the form of an end-state view as
sufficient to constitute a view as end state. Mathematical methods of
transforming a constrained minimization problem into a sequence of
unconstrained minimizations of an auxiliary function are presented
in Anthony Fiacco and Garth McCormick, Nonlinear Programming:
Sequential Unconstrained Minimization Techniques (New York:
Wiley, 1968). The book is interesting both for its methods and for their
limitations in illuminating our area of concern; note the way in which
the penalty functions include the constraints, the variation in weights of
penalty functions (sec. 7.1), and so on.
The question of whether these side constraints are absolute, or
whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral
horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure might look like, is
one I hope largely to avoid.
5
Which does which? Often a useful question to ask, as in the following:
'What is the difference between a Zen master and an analytic
philosopher?'
'One talks riddles and the other riddles talks.'
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. Translated by H. J. Paton,
^ The Moral Law (London: Hutchinson, 1956), p. 96.
8
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sects 5, 6, 30.
The reader who has looked ahead and seen that the second part of this
chapter discusses Rawls' theory mistakenly may think that every
remark or argument in the first part against alternative theories of
justice is meant to apply to, or anticipate, a criticism of Rawls' theory.
9
This is not so; there are other theories also worth criticizing.
Applications of the principle of justice in acquisition may also occur as
part of the move from one distribution to another. You may find an
unheld thing now and appropriate it. Acquisitions also are t o be
understood as included when, to simplify, I speak only of transitions by
transfers.
See, however, the useful book by Boris Bittker, The Case for Black
u
^rations (New York: Random House, 1973).
\ A
p n n c
' P '
e
f rectification of violations of the first t wo principles
yields more than one description of holdings, then some choice must be
made as to which of these is to be realized. Perhaps the sort of
considerations about distributive justice and equality that 1 argue
against play a legitimate role in this subsidiary choice. Similarly, there
may be room for such considerations in deciding which otherwise
arbitrary features a statute will embody, when such features are
unavoidable because other considerations do not specify a precise line;
n
Y
Q
a h n e
must be drawn.
ne might try to squeeze a patterned conception of distributive justice
12 0 Moral Constraints and Distributive Justice
into the framework of the entitlement conception, by formulating a
gimmicky obligatory 'principle of transfer' that would lead to the
pattern. For example, the principle that if one has more than the mean
income one must transfer everything one holds above the mean to
persons below the mean so as to bring them up to (but not over) the
mean. We can formulate a criterion for a 'principle of transfer' to rule
out such obligatory transfers, or we can say that no correct principle of
transfer, no principle of transfer in a free society will be like this. The
former is probably the better course, though the latter also is true.
Alternatively, one might think to make the entitlement conception
instantiate a pattern, by using matrix entries that express the relative
strength of a person's entitlements as measured by some real-valued
function. But even if the limitation to natural dimensions failed to
exclude this function, the resulting edifice would not capture our system
of entitlements to particular things.
" F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960), p. 87.
1 4
This question does not imply that they will tolerate any and every
patterned distribution. In discussing Hayek' s views, Irving Kristol has
recently speculated that people will not long tolerate a system that yields
distributions patterned in accordance with value rather than merit.
(' "When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness" - Some Reflections on
Capitalism and "The Free Society' " The Public Interest, Fall, 1970,
pp. 3-15.) Kristol, following some remarks of Hayek' s, equates the
merit system with justice. Since some case can be made for the external
standard of distribution in accordance with benefit to others, we ask
about a weaker (and therefore more plausible) hypothesis.
We certainly benefit because great economic incentives operate to get
others to spend much time and energy t o figure out how to serve us by
providing things we will want to pay for. It is not mere paradox
mongenng to wonder whether capitalism should be criticized for most
rewarding and hence encouraging, not individualists like Thoreau who
go about their own lives, but people who are occupied with serving
others and winning them as customers. But to defend capitalism one
need not think businessmen are the finest human types. (I do not mean
to join here the general maligning of businessmen, either.) Those who
think the finest should acquire the most can try to convince their fellows
l 6
t o t r a n s t e r
resources in accordance with that principle.
Varying situations continuously from that limit situation to our own
would force us to make explicit the underlying rationale of entitlements
and to consider whether entitlement considerations lexicographically
precede the considerations of the usual theories of distributive justice, so
that the slightest strand of entitlement outweighs the considerations of
^ the usual theories of distributive justice.
Might not a transfer have instrumental effects on a third party,
changing his feasible options? (But what if the two parties to the
transfer independently had used their holdings in this fashion?) 1 discuss
Robert Nozick
l 2 1
this question below, but note here that this question concedes the point
for distributions of ultimate intrinsic non-instrumental goods (pure
utility experiences, so to speak) that are transferable. It also might be
objected that the transfer might make a third party more envious
because it worsens his position relative t o someone else. 1 nnd it
incomprehensible how this can be thought to involve a claim of justice.
Here and elsewhere in this chapter, a theory which incorporates
elements of pure procedural justice might find what 1 say acceptable, if
kept in its proper place; that is, if background institutions exist t o
ensure the satisfaction of certain conditions on distributive shares. But it
these institutions are not themselves the sum or invisible-hand result of
people's voluntary (non-aggressive) actions, the constraints they impose
require justification. At no point does our argument assume any
background institutions more extensive than those of the minimal
night-watchman state, a state limited t o protecting persons against
murder, assault, theft, fraud, and so forth.
8
See the selection from John Henry MacKay' s novel, The Anarchists,
reprinted in Leonard Krimmerman and Lewis Perry, eds, Patterns of
Anarchy (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966), in which an
individualist anarchist presses upon a communist anarchist the follow-
ing question: ' Would you, in the system of society which you call "free
Communism" prevent individuals from exchanging their labour among
themselves by means of their own medium of exchange? And further:
Would you prevent them from occupying land for the purpose of
personal use?' The novel continues: '[the] question was not t o be
escaped. If he answered "Yes!" he admitted that society had the right of
control over the individual and threw overboard the autonomy of the
individual which he had always zealously defended; if on the other
hand, he answered "No! " he admitted the right of private property
which he had just denied so emphatically. . . . Then he answered "In
Anarchy any number of men must have the right of forming a voluntary
association, and so realizing their ideas in practice. Nor can 1
understand how any one could justly be driven from the land and house
which he uses and occupies . . . every serious man must declare himself:
tor Socialism, and thereby for force and against liberty or for
Anarchism, and thereby for liberty and against force." ' In contrast, we
nd Noam Chomsky writing, ' Any consistent anarchist must oppose
private ownership of the means of production' , ' the consistent anarchist
wen .
w n
j
D e a s o c
j
a
i j
s t D
f
a
p
a r n C
u l a r sort.' Introduction to
paniel Guerin, Anarchism: From Theory to Practice (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1970), pp. xiii, xv.
^ e patterned principle stable that requires merely that a distribution
th
a r e t o
"
0
P
t
'
m a
l - '
1
One person might give another a gift or bequest that
the
S e C O n c
*
c o u
^
e x c n a
n g e with a third to their mutual benefit. Before
e
, ^
e c
nd makes this exchange, there is not Pareto-optimality. Is a
ODti
6
^
a t t e r n
. P
r e s e n t e
d by a principle choosing that among the Pareto-
P mal positions that satisfies some further condition C? It may seem
that there cannot be a counter-example, for won' t any voluntary
exchange made away from a situation show that the first situation
wasn' t Pareto-optimal? (Ignore the implausibility of this last claim for
the case of bequests.) But principles are to be satisfied over time, during
which new possibilities arise. A distribution that at one time satisfies the
criterion of Pareto-optimality might not do so when some new possibili-
ties arise (Wilt Chamberlain grows up and starts playing basketball);
and though people's activities will tend to move then to a new Pareto-
optimal position, this new one need not satisfy the contentful condition
C. Continual interference will be needed to ensure the continual
satisfaction of C. (The theoretical possibility of a pattern' s being
maintained by some invisible-hand process that brings it back to an
equilibrium that fits the pattern when deviations occur should be
investigated.)
PART II
6
Alasdair Maclntyre: The Virtues,
the Unity of a Human Life and the
Concept of a Tradition *
Any cont empor ar y at t empt t o envisage each human life as a whol e,
as a uni t y, whose char act er provi des the virtues with an adequat e
telos encount er s t wo different ki nds of obst acl e, one social and one
phi l osophi cal . The social obst acl es derive from the way in which
moder ni t y par t i t i ons each huma n life i nt o a variety of segments,
each wi t h its own nor ms and modes of behavi our. So wor k is
divided from leisure, pr i vat e life from publ i c, t he cor por at e from
t he per sonal . So bot h chi l dhood and old age have been wrenched
away from t he rest of human life and made over i nt o distinct
real ms. And all t hese separ at i ons have been achieved so t hat it is
t he distinctiveness of each and not t he uni t y of t he life of the
i ndi vi dual who passes t hr ough t hose part s in t erms of which we are
t aught t o t hi nk and t o feel.
The phi l osophi cal obst acl es derive from t wo distinct tendencies,
one chiefly, t hough not onl y, domest i cat ed in analytical phi l osophy
and one at home in bot h sociological t heory and in existentialism.
The former is t he t endency t o t hi nk atomistically about human
act i on and t o anal yse compl ex act i ons and t ransact i ons in t erms of
si mpl e component s . Hence t he recurrence in mor e t han one cont ext
of t he not i on of ' a basi c act i on' . That par t i cul ar act i ons derive their
char act er as part s of larger whol es is a poi nt of view alien t o our
domi nant ways of t hi nki ng and yet one whi ch it is necessary at least
t o consi der if we are t o begin t o under st and how a life may be mor e
t han a sequence of i ndi vi dual act i ons and epi sodes.
Equal l y t he uni t y of a huma n life becomes invisible t o us when a
shar p separ at i on is made either bet ween t he individual and the roles
*Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre
Dame, Indiana 46556. Copyright, 1981.
1 2 6
Concept of a Tradition
t hat he or she plays - a separat i on charact eri st i c not only of Sart re' s
existentialism, but also of t he sociological t heory of Ralf Dahr en-
dorf - or bet ween the different role- and quasi - r ol e- enact ment s of
an individual life so t hat life comes t o appear as not hi ng but a series
of unconnect ed epi sodes - a l i qui dat i on of t he self charact eri st i c, as
I not i ced earlier, of Goffman' s sociological t heor y. I al ready also
suggested t hat bot h t he Sartrian and t he Gof f manesque concept i ons
of selfhood are highly charact eri st i c of t he modes of t hought
and pract i ce of moder ni t y. It is per haps therefore unsurpri si ng t o
realize t hat the self as t hus conceived cannot be envisaged as a
bearer of the Ari st ot el i an virtues.
For a self separat ed from its roles in t he Sart ri an mode loses t hat
arena of social rel at i onshi ps in whi ch t he Ari st ot el i an vi rt ues
function if they function at all. The pat t er ns of a vi rt uous life woul d
fall under t hose condemnat i ons of convent i onal i t y whi ch Sart re put
i nt o a mout h of Ant oi ne Roquent i n in La Nausee and whi ch he
ut t ered in his own person in L'Etre et le neant. Indeed t he self's
refusal of t he i naut hent i ci t y of convent i onal i zed social rel at i onshi ps
becomes what integrity is di mi ni shed i nt o in Sart re' s account .
At the same t i me t he l i qui dat i on of t he self i nt o a set of
demar cat ed areas of role-playing al l ows no scope for t he exercise of
di sposi t i ons whi ch coul d genuinely be account ed virtues in any
sense remotely Ari st ot el i an. For a virtue is not a di sposi t i on t hat
makes for success onl y in some one part i cul ar type of si t uat i on.
What are spoken of as t he virtues of a good commi t t ee man or of a
good admi ni st r at or or of a gambl er or a pool hust l er are profes-
sional skills professionally depl oyed in t hose si t uat i ons wher e they
can be effective, not virtues. Someone who genui nel y possesses a
virtue can be expected t o manifest it in very different t ypes of
si t uat i on, many of t hem si t uat i ons wher e t he pract i ce of a vi rt ue
cannot be expect ed to be effective i n t he way t hat we expect a
professi onal skill t o be. Hect or exhi bi t ed one and t he same cour age
in his par t i ng from Andr omache and on t he battlefield wi t h
Achilles; El eanor Ma r x exhi bi t ed one and t he same compassi on in
her rel at i onshi p wi t h her father, in her wor k wi t h t r ade uni oni st s
and in her ent angl ement wi t h Aveling. And t he uni t y of a vi rt ue in
someone' s life is intelligible only as a charact eri st i c of a uni t ary life,
a life t hat can be conceived and eval uat ed as a whol e. Hence just as
in t he discussion of t he changes in and fragment at i on of mor al i t y
whi ch accompani ed t he rise of moder ni t y in the earl i er par t s of this
book, each stage in t he emergence of t he characteristically moder n
views of t he mor al j udgement was accompani ed by a cor r espondi ng
st age in t he emergence of t he charact eri st i cal l y moder n concept i ons
Alasdair Maclntyre 12 7
of sel fhood; so now, in defining t he part i cul ar pr e- moder n concept
of t he vi rt ues wi t h whi ch I have been preoccupi ed, it has become
necessary t o say somet hi ng of the concomi t ant concept of selfhood,
a concept of a self whose uni t y resides in t he unity of a narrat i ve
whi ch links bi rt h t o life t o deat h as narrat i ve beginning t o middle to
end.
Such a concept i on of t he self is per haps less unfamiliar t han it
may appear at first sight. Just because it has played a key part in the
cul t ures whi ch are historically t he predecessors of our own, it
woul d not be surpri si ng if it t ur ned out to be still an unacknow-
ledged presence in many of our ways of t hi nki ng and acting. Hence
it is not i nappr opr i at e t o begin by scrutinizing some of our most
t aken-for-grant ed, but clearly correct concept ual insights about
human act i ons and selfhood in or der t o show how nat ural it is t o
t hi nk of t he self in a nar r at i ve mode.
It is a concept ual commonpl ace, bot h for phi l osophers and
for or di nar y agent s, t hat one and the same segment of human
behavi our may be correct l y charact eri zed in a number of different
ways. To t he quest i on ' Wha t is he doi ng?' the answers may with
equal t r ut h and appr opr i at eness be ' Di ggi ng' , ' Gar deni ng' , ' Taki ng
exerci se' , ' Pr epar i ng for wi nt er' or ' Pleasing his wife' . Some of these
answers will charact eri ze t he agent ' s i nt ent i ons, others uni nt ended
consequences of his act i ons, and of these uni nt ended consequences
some may be such t hat t he agent is awar e of t hem and ot hers not .
Wha t is i mpor t ant t o not i ce i mmedi at el y is t hat any answer to the
quest i ons of how we are t o under st and or t o explain a given
segment of behavi our will pr esuppose some pri or answer t o the
quest i on of how t hese different correct answers to the question
' What is he doi ng?' are related t o each ot her. For if someone' s
pr i mar y i nt ent i on is t o put t he garden in or der before the wi nt er
and it is onl y i nci dent al l y t he case t hat in so doi ng he is t aki ng
exercise and pl easi ng his wife, we have one t ype of behavi our t o be
expl ai ned; but if t he agent ' s pr i mar y i nt ent i on is t o please his wife
by t aki ng exercise, we have qui t e anot her t ype of behavi our t o be
expl ai ned and we will have t o l ook in a different direction for
under st andi ng and expl anat i on.
In t he first pl ace t he epi sode has been si t uat ed in an annual cycle
of domest i c act i vi t y, and t he behavi our embodi es an intention
whi ch pr esupposes a part i cul ar t ype of househol d-cum-garden
set t i ng wi t h t he pecul i ar nar r at i ve hi st ory of t hat setting in which
this segment of behavi our now becomes an epi sode. In t he second
i nst ance t he epi sode has been si t uat ed in t he narrat i ve hi st ory of a
mar r i age, a very different, even if rel at ed, social setting. We cannot ,
12 8 Concept of a Tradition
t hat is t o say, charact eri ze behavi our i ndependent l y of i nt ent i ons,
and we cannot charact eri ze i nt ent i ons i ndependent l y of t he settings
whi ch make t hose i nt ent i ons intelligible bot h t o agent s themselves
and t o ot her s.
I use t he wor d ' set t i ng' here as a relatively inclusive t erm. A social
setting may be an i nst i t ut i on, it may be what I have called a
pract i ce, or it may be a milieu of some ot her human ki nd. But it is
central t o t he not i on of a setting as I am goi ng t o under st and it t hat
a setting has a hi st ory, a hi st ory wi t hi n whi ch t he hi st ori es of
individual agent s not only are, but have t o be, si t uat ed, just because
wi t hout t he setting and its changes t hr ough t i me t he hi st ory of the
individual agent and his changes t hr ough t i me will be unintelligible.
Of course one and t he same piece of behavi our may bel ong t o mor e
t han one setting. There are at least t wo different ways in whi ch this
may be so.
In my earlier exampl e t he agent ' s activity may be par t of the
history bot h of t he cycle of househol d activity and of his mar r i age,
t wo histories whi ch have happened t o intersect. The househol d may
have its own hi st ory stretching back t hr ough hundr eds of years, as
do t he histories of some Eur opean farms, wher e t he farm has had a
life of its own, even t hough different famdies have in different
peri ods i nhabi t ed it; and t he mar r i age will certainly have its own
history, a hi st ory whi ch itself pr esupposes t hat a part i cul ar poi nt
has been reached in t he history of t he i nst i t ut i on of mar r i age. If we
are t o relate some part i cul ar segment of behavi our in any precise
way t o an agent ' s i nt ent i ons and t hus t o t he settings whi ch t hat
agent i nhabi t s, we shall have to under st and in a precise way how
t he variety of correct charact eri zat i ons of t he agent ' s behavi our
relate t o each ot her first by identifying whi ch charact eri st i cs refer us
t o an i nt ent i on and whi ch do not and t hen by classifying furt her t he
items in bot h categories.
Wher e i nt ent i ons are concerned, we need t o know whi ch
i nt ent i on or i nt ent i ons were pr i mar y, t hat is t o say, of whi ch it is
t he case t hat , had the agent i nt ended ot herwi se, he woul d not have
performed t hat act i on. Thus if we know t hat a man is gar deni ng
wi t h t he self-avowed purposes of healthful exercise and of pl easi ng
his wife, we do not yet know how t o under st and what he is doi ng
until we know t he answer t o such quest i ons as whet her he woul d
cont i nue gardeni ng if he cont i nued t o believe t hat gar deni ng was
healthful exercise, but discovered t hat his gar deni ng no l onger
pl eased his wife, and whet her he woul d cont i nue gardeni ng, if he
ceased t o believe t hat gardeni ng was healthful exercise, but
cont i nued t o believe t hat it pleased his wife, and whet her he woul d
Alasdair Maclntyre 129
cont i nue gar deni ng if he changed his beliefs on bot h points. That is
to say, we need t o know bot h what certain of his beliefs are and
which of t hem are causal l y effective; and, t hat is t o say, we need to
know whet her cert ai n cont rary-t o-fact hypot het i cal statements are
true or false. And unt i l we know t hi s, we shall not know how to
charact eri ze correct l y what t he agent is doi ng.
Consi der anot her equal l y trivial exampl e of a set of compatibly
correct answer s t o t he quest i on ' What is he doi ng?' ' Wri t i ng a
sent ence' ; ' Fi ni shi ng his book' ; ' Cont r i but i ng t o the debat e on the
theory of act i on' ; ' Tr yi ng t o get t enur e' . Here t he intentions can be
ordered in t er ms of t he st ret ch of t i me t o which reference is made.
Each of t he shor t er - t er m i nt ent i ons is, and can only be made,
intelligible by reference t o some l onger-t erm i nt ent i ons; and the
charact eri zat i on of t he behavi our in t erms of the longer-term
i nt ent i ons can only be correct if some of the characterizations in
t erms of shor t er - t er m i nt ent i ons are also correct. Hence the
behavi our is onl y charact eri zed adequat el y when we know what
t he l onger and l ongest -t erm i nt ent i ons i nvoked are and how the
short er-t erm i nt ent i ons are related t o the longer. Once again we are
involved in wr i t i ng a nar r at i ve hi st ory.
Int ent i ons t hus need t o be or der ed bot h causally and temporally
and bot h or der i ngs will make references t o settings, references
already made obl i quel y by such el ement ary t erms as ' gardeni ng' ,
' wife' , ' book' and ' t enur e' . Mor eover the correct identification of
t he agent ' s beliefs will be an essential const i t uent of this t ask;
failure at t hi s poi nt woul d mean failure in t he whol e enterprise.
(The concl usi on may seem obvi ous; but it already entails one
i mpor t ant consequence. Ther e is no such t hi ng as ' behavi our' , t o be
identified pr i or t o and i ndependent l y of i nt ent i ons, beliefs and
settings. Hence t he proj ect of a science of behavi our takes on a
myst eri ous and s omewhat out r e charact er. It is not t hat such a
science is i mpossi bl e; but t here is not hi ng for it t o be but a science
of uni nt er pr et ed physical movement such as B. E. Skinner aspires
t o. It is no par t of my t ask here t o exami ne Skinner' s probl ems; but
it is wor t h not i ci ng t hat it is not at all clear what a scientific
experi ment coul d be, if one were a Ski nneri an; since t he conception
of an exper i ment is cert ai nl y one of i nt ent i on- and belief-informed
behavi our . And wha t woul d be utterly doomed t o failure woul d be
t he proj ect of a science of, say, political behavi our, detached from a
st udy of i nt ent i ons, beliefs and settings. It is perhaps wort h noting
t hat when t he expressi on ' t he behavi oural sciences' was given its
first influential use i n a Ford Foundat i on Repor t of 1953, t be t e r m
' behavi our ' was defined so as t o include what were called ' such
130 Concept of a Tradition
subjective behavi our as at t i t udes, beliefs, expect at i ons, mot i vat i ons
and aspi rat i ons' as well as ' overt act s' . But what t he Report ' s
wor di ng seems t o imply is t hat it is cat al ogui ng t wo distinct sets of
items, available for i ndependent st udy. If t he ar gument so far is
correct, then t here is only one set of items.)
Consi der what t he ar gument so far implies about t he inter-
relationships of the i nt ent i onal , t he social a nd t he hi st ori cal . We
identify a part i cul ar action only by i nvoki ng t wo ki nds of cont ext ,
implicitly if not explicitly. We place t he agent ' s i nt ent i ons, I have
suggested, in causal and t empor al or der wi t h reference t o t hei t role
in his or her hi st ory; and we also pl ace t hem wi t h reference t o their
role in t he hi st ory of t he setting or settings t o whi ch t hey bel ong. In
doi ng t hi s, in det er mi ni ng what causal efficacy t he agent ' s inten-
tions had in one or more di rect i ons, and how his shor t - t er m
i nt ent i ons succeeded or failed t o be const i t ut i ve of l ong-t erm
i nt ent i ons, we ourselves wri t e a further par t of t hese hi st ori es.
Nar r at i ve hi st ory of a cert ai n ki nd t ur ns out t o be t he basi c and
essential genre for the charact eri zat i on of huma n act i ons.
It is i mpor t ant t o be clear how different t he s t andpoi nt pr e-
supposed by the ar gument so far is from t hat of t hose anal yt i cal
phi l osophers who have const ruct ed account s of huma n act i ons
whi ch make cent ral t he not i on of ' a' h u ma n act i on. A course of
human events is then seen as a compl ex sequence of i ndi vi dual
act i ons, and a nat ural quest i on is: Ho w do we i ndi vi duat e huma n
actions? No w t here are cont ext s in whi ch such not i ons are at home.
In t he recipes of a cookery book for i nst ance act i ons are i ndi vi du-
at ed in just t he way t hat some anal yt i cal phi l osopher s have
supposed t o be possi bl e of all act i ons. ' Take six eggs. The n br eak
t hen i nt o a bowl . Add flour, salt, sugar, e t c ' But t he poi nt about
such sequences is t hat each el ement in t hem is intelligible as an
act i on only as a-possi bl e-el ement -i n-a-sequence. Mor eover even
such a sequence requi res a cont ext t o be intelligible. If in t he mi ddl e
of my lecture on Kant ' s ethics I suddenl y br oke six eggs i nt o a bowl
and added flour and sugar, proceedi ng all t he whi l e wi t h my
Kant i an exegesis, I have not, simply in virtue of t he fact t hat I was
following a sequence prescri bed by Fanny Far mer , per f or med an
intelligible act i on.
To this it mi ght be related t hat I certainly performed an act i on or
a set of act i ons, if not an intelligible act i on. But t o this I wa nt t o
reply t hat t he concept of an intelligible action is a mor e funda-
ment al concept t han t hat of an act i on as such. Unintelligible act i ons
are failed candidates for the status of intelligible action; and t o l ump
unintelligible act i ons and intelligible act i ons t oget her in a single
class of act i ons and t hen t o charact eri ze act i on in t erms of what
items of bot h sets have in c ommon is t o make t he mi st ake of
ignoring t hi s. It is al so t o neglect t he cent ral i mpor t ance of the
concept of intelligibility.
The i mpor t ance of t he concept of intelligibility is closely related
to the fact t hat t he mos t basi c di st i nct i on of all embedded in our
discourse and our pr act i ce in t hi s area is t hat between human
beings and ot her bei ngs. Hu ma n beings can be held t o account for
that of whi ch they are t he aut hor s ; ot her beings cannot . To identify
an occurrence as an act i on is in t he par adi gmat i c instances t o
identify it under a t ype of descri pt i on whi ch enabl es us t o see t hat
occurrence as flowing intelligibly from a huma n agent ' s i nt ent i ons,
motives, passi ons and pur poses. It is t herefore t o under st and an
action as somet hi ng for whi ch someone is account abl e, about
which it is al ways appr opr i at e t o ask t he agent for an intelligible
account. When an occur r ence is appar ent l y t he i nt ended act i on of a
human agent , but nonet hel ess we cannot so identify it, we are both
intellectually and pract i cal l y baffled. We do not know how t o
respond; we do not know how t o expl ai n; we do not even know
how t o charact eri ze mi ni mal l y as an intelligible act i on; our
distinction bet ween t he humanl y account abl e and the merely
natural seems t o have br oken down. And this ki nd of bafflement
does indeed occur in a numbe r of different ki nds of si t uat i on; when
we enter alien cul t ures or even alien social st ruct ures wi t hi n our
own cul t ure, in our encount er s wi t h cert ai n types of neurot i c or
psychotic pat i ent (it is i ndeed t he unintelligibility of such pat i ent ' s
actions t hat leads t o t hei r bei ng t reat ed as pat i ent s; actions
unintelligible t o t he agent as well as t o everyone else are underst ood
- rightly - as a ki nd of suffering), but also in everyday si t uat i ons.
Consider an exampl e.
I am st andi ng wai t i ng for a bus and t he young man st andi ng next
to me suddenl y says: ' The name of t he common wild duck is
Histrionicus histrionicus histrionicus.'' Ther e is no probl em as t o
the meani ng of t he sent ence he ut t er ed: t he pr obl em is, how t o
answer t he quest i on, wha t was he doi ng in ut t eri ng it? Suppose he
just ut t ered such sent ences at r a ndom i nt erval s; this woul d be one
possible form of madnes s . We woul d render his act of ut t erance
intelligible if one of t he fol l owi ng t ur ned out t o be t rue. He has
mistaken me for s omeone who yest erday had appr oached hi m in
t he l i brary a nd asked: ' Do you by any chance know t he Lat i n name
of t he c ommon wi l d duck?' Or he has just come from a session with
his psychot her api st wh o has urged hi m t o br eak down his shyness
by t al ki ng t o st r anger s. ' But wha t shall 1 say?' ' Oh, anyt hi ng at all.
1 3 2 Concept of a Tradition
Or he is a Soviet spy wai t i ng at a pr ear r anged rendezvous and
ut t eri ng the ill-chosen code sentence whi ch will identify hi m t o his
cont act . In each case t he act of ut t er ance becomes intelligible by
finding its place i n a narrat i ve.
To this it may be replied t hat t he suppl yi ng of a nar r at i ve is not
necessary t o make such an act intelligible. All t hat is r equi r ed is t hat
we can identify t he relevant type of speech-act (e.g. ' He was
answeri ng a quest i on' ) or some pur pose served by his ut t erance
(e.g. ' He was t ryi ng to at t r act your at t ent i on' ) . But speech-act s and
purposes t oo can be intelligible or unintelligible. Suppose t hat the
man at t he bus st op expl ai ns his act of ut t er ance by sayi ng T was
answeri ng a quest i on. ' I reply: ' But I never asked you any quest i on
t o whi ch t hat could have been t he answer . ' He says, ' Oh, I know
that.'' Once again his act i on becomes unintelligible. And a parallel
exampl e could easily be const ruct ed t o s how t hat t he mere fact t hat
an action serves some pur pose of a recogni zed t ype is not sufficient
to render an act i on intelligible. Bot h purposes and speech-act s
requi re cont ext s.
The most familiar type of cont ext in and by reference t o whi ch
speech-acts and purposes are rendered intelligible is t he conversa-
t i on. Conver sat i on is so all-pervasive a feat ure of t he huma n wor l d
t hat it t ends t o escape phi l osophi cal at t ent i on. Yet r emove con-
versat i on from huma n life and what woul d be left? Consi der
t hen what is involved in fol l owi ng a conver sat i on and finding it
intelligible or unintelligible. (To find a conversat i on intelligible is
not t he same as t o under st and it; for a conver sat i on whi ch I
overhear may be intelligible, but I may fail t o under s t and it.) If I
listen t o a conversat i on bet ween t wo ot her peopl e my ability t o
grasp t he t hread of t he conversat i on will involve an ability t o bri ng
it under some one out of a set of descri pt i ons in whi ch t he degree
and ki nd of coherence in the conversat i on is br ought out : ' a
dr unken, rambl i ng quar r el ' , ' a seri ous intellectual di sagr eement ' , ' a
tragic mi sunder st andi ng of each ot her ' , ' a comi c, even farcical
mi sconst rual of each ot her ' s mot i ves' , ' a penet r at i ng i nt er change of
vi ews' , ' a st ruggl e t o domi nat e each ot her ' , ' a t ri vi al exchange of
gossi p' .
The use of wor ds such as ' t ragi c' , ' comi c' , and ' farci cal ' is not
margi nal t o such eval uat i ons. We al l ocat e conver sat i ons t o genres,
just as we do literary narrat i ves. Indeed a conversat i on is a dr amat i c
wor k, even if a very short one, in whi ch t he par t i ci pant s are not
onl y t he act ors, but al so t he j oi nt aut hor s, wor ki ng out in
agr eement or di sagreement t he mode of t hei r pr oduct i on. For it is
not just t hat conversat i ons bel ong t o genres in just t he way t hat
plays and novel s d o ; but t hey have begi nni ngs, mi ddl es a nd endi ngs
just as do l i t erary wor ks . They embody reversal s and r ecogni t i ons;
they move t owar ds and away from cl i maxes. Ther e may wi t hi n a
longer conversat i on be di gressi ons and subpl ot s, i ndeed di gressi ons
within digressions and subpl ot s wi t hi n subpl ot s.
But if this is t r ue of conver sat i ons, it is t r ue also mutatis mutandis
of battles, chess games, cour t s hi ps , phi l osophy semi nar s, families
at the di nner t abl e, busi nessmen negot i at i ng cont r act s - t hat is, of
human t r ansact i ons in gener al . For conver sat i on, under s t ood
widely enough, is t he f or m of huma n t r ansact i ons in general .
Conversational behavi our is not a special sort or aspect of huma n
behaviour, even t hough t he f or ms of l anguage- usi ng and of huma n
life are such t hat t he deeds of ot her s speak for t hem as much as do
their wor ds. For t hat is possi bl e onl y because t hey are t he deeds of
those who have wor ds .
I am present i ng bot h conser vat i ons in par t i cul ar t hen and huma n
actions in general as enact ed nar r at i ves. Nar r at i ve is not t he wor k
of poet s, dr amat i st s and novel i st s reflecting upon event s whi ch had
no narrat i ve or der before one was i mposed by t he singer or the
writer; nar r at i ve form is nei t her di sgui se nor decor at i on. Bar bar a
Hardy has wr i t t en t hat ' we dr eam in nar r at i ve, day- dr eam in
narrative, r emember , ant i ci pat e, hope, despai r , believe, doubt ,
plan, revise, criticise, const r uct , gossi p, l ear n, hat e and l ove by
narrative' in ar gui ng t he s ame poi nt ( Har dy, 1968, p. 5).
At the begi nni ng of t hi s chapt er 1 ar gued t hat in successfully
identifying and under s t andi ng wha t s omeone else is doi ng we
always move t owar ds pl aci ng a par t i cul ar epi sode in t he cont ext of
a set of nar r at i ve hi st or i es, hi st ori es bot h of t he i ndi vi dual s
concerned and of t he set t i ngs in whi ch they act and suffer. It is now
becoming clear t hat we r ender t he act i ons of ot her s intelligible in
this way because act i on itself has a basically hi st ori cal char act er . It
is because we all live out nar r at i ves in our lives and because we
underst and our own lives in t er ms of t he nar r at i ves t hat we live out
that the form of nar r at i ve is appr opr i at e for under s t andi ng t he
actions of ot her s. St ori es are lived before t hey ar e t ol d - except in
the case of fiction.
This has of cour se been deni ed in recent debat es. Loui s O. Mi nk,
quarrelling wi t h Bar bar a Ha r dy' s vi ew, has assert ed: ' St ori es are
not lived but t ol d. Life has no begi nni ngs, mi ddl es, or ends; t here
are meetings, but t he st ar t of an affair bel ongs t o t he st ory we tell
ourselves l at er, and t her e are par t i ngs, but final par t i ngs only in
the story. Ther e are hope s , pl ans, bat t l es and i deas, but onl y in
retrospective st ori es ar e hopes unfulfilled, pl ans mi scarri ed, bat t l es
134
decisive, and ideas semi nal . Onl y in t he st ory is it Ameri ca whi ch
Col umbus discovers and onl y in t he st ory is t he ki ngdom lost for
want of a nai l ' (Mi nk, 1970, pp. 557- 8) .
What are we t o say t o this? Cert ai nl y we must agree t hat it is only
retrospectively t hat hopes can be charact eri zed as unfulfilled or
battles as decisive and so on. But we so charact eri ze t hem in life as
much as in art . And t o someone who says t hat in life t here are no
endings, or t hat final part i ngs t ake pl ace only in st ori es, one is
t empt ed t o reply, ' But have you never hear d of deat h?' Home r di d
not have t o tell t he tale of Hect or before Andr omache coul d l ament
unfulfilled hope and final part i ng. Ther e are count l ess Hect or s and
countless Andr omaches whose lives embodi ed t he form of their
Homer i c namesakes, but who never came t o t he at t ent i on of any
poet . What is t r ue is t hat in t aki ng an event as a begi nni ng or an
endi ng we best ow a significance upon it whi ch may be debat abl e.
Di d t he Roman republ i c end wi t h t he deat h of Jul i us Caesar, or at
Philippi, or with the foundi ng of t he pri nci pat e? The answer is
surely t hat , like Charl es II, it was a l ong t i me a-dyi ng; but this
answer implies t he reality of its endi ng as much as do any of t he
former. There is a crucial sense in whi ch t he pri nci pat e of August us,
or t he t aki ng of t he oat h in t he t enni s court , or t he deci si on t o
const ruct an at omi c bomb at Los Al amos const i t ut e begi nni ngs; t he
peace of 404 B. C. , t he abol i t i on of t he Scottish Par l i ament and t he
bat t l e of Wat er l oo equally const i t ut e endi ngs; whi l e t here are many
events whi ch are bot h endi ngs and begi nni ngs.
As wi t h begi nni ngs, mi ddl es and endi ngs, so also wi t h genres and
wi t h the phenomenon of embeddi ng. Consi der t he quest i on of t o
what genre t he life of Thomas Becket bel ongs, a quest i on whi ch has
t o be asked and answered before we can decide how it is t o be
wri t t en. ( On Mi nk' s par adoxi cal vi ew t hi s quest i on coul d not be
asked until after t he life had been wri t t en. ) In some of t he medi eval
versi ons, Thomas ' s career is present ed in t er ms of t he canons
of medieval hagi ogr aphy. In t he Icelandic Thomas Saga he is
present ed as a saga her o. In Do m Davi d Knowl es' s moder n
bi ogr aphy t he st ory is a t ragedy, t he t ragi c rel at i onshi p of Thoma s
and Henry II, each of whom satisfies Aristotle' s demand t hat t he
her o be a great man wi t h a fatal flaw. No w it clearly makes sense t o
ask who is right, if anyone: the monk Wi l l i am of Cant er bur y, t he
aut hor of t he saga, or t he Cambr i dge Regius Professor Emeri t us?
The answer appear s to be clearly t he l ast . The t rue genre of t he life
is neither hagi ogr aphy nor saga, but t ragedy. So of such moder n
narrat i ve subjects as t he life of Tr ot sky or t hat of Leni n, of t he
hi st ory of t he Soviet Communi s t Part y or t he Amer i can presi dency,
we may also ask: To wha t genr e does t hei r hi st or y bel ong? And t hi s
is the same quest i on as: Wh a t t ype of account of t hei r hi st ory will
be both true and intelligible?
Or consider agai n h o w one nar r at i ve may be embedded in
another. In bot h pl ays and novel s t her e are wel l - known exampl es:
the play wi t hi n t he pl ay in Hamlet, Wa nde r i ng Wi l l i e' s Tal e in
Redgauntlet, Aeneas' nar r at i ve t o Di do in book 2 of t he Aeneid,
and so on. But t here are equal l y wel l - known exampl es in real life.
Consider again t he way i n whi ch t he career of Becket as ar chbi shop
and chancellor is embedded wi t hi n t he reign of Henr y II, or t he way
in which t he t ragi c life of Ma r y St uar t is embedded in t hat of
Elizabeth I, or t he hi st ory of t he Conf eder acy wi t hi n t he hi st or y of
the United States. Someone may di scover (or not di scover) t hat he
or she is a char act er in a numbe r of nar r at i ves at t he same t i me,
some of t hem embedded in ot her s. Or agai n, wha t seemed t o be
an intelligible nar r at i ve in whi ch one was pl ayi ng a par t may be
transformed whol l y or par t l y i nt o a st or y of uni nt el l i gi bl e epi sodes.
This last is what happened t o Kaf ka' s char act er K. in bot h The
Trial and The Castle. (It is no acci dent t hat Kafka coul d not end
his novels, for t he not i on of an endi ng like t hat of a begi nni ng has
its sense only in t er ms of i nt el l i gi bl e nar r at i ve. )
I spoke earlier of t he agent as not onl y an act or , but an aut hor .
Now I must emphasi ze t hat wha t t he agent is abl e t o do and say
intelligibly as an act or is deepl y affected by t he fact t hat we are
never more (and somet i mes less) t han t he co- aut hor s of our own
narratives. Onl y in fant asy do we live wh a t st or y we pl ease. In life,
as both Aristotle and Engel s not ed, we are al ways under cert ai n
constraints. We ent er upon a st age whi ch we did not desi gn and we
find ourselves par t of an act i on t hat was not of our maki ng. Each of
us being a mai n char act er in his own dr a ma pl ays s ubor di nat e par t s
in the dr amas of ot her s, a nd each d r a ma const r ai ns t he ot her s. In
my dr ama, per haps , 1 a m Ha ml e t or I ago or at l east t he swi neher d
who may yet become a pr i nce, but t o you I a m onl y A Gent l eman
or at best Second Mur de r e r , whi l e you ar e my Pol oni us or my
Gravedigger, but your o wn her o. Each of our dr amas exert s
constraints on each ot her ' s , maki ng t he whol e different from t he
Parts, but still dr amat i c.
It is consi derat i ons as compl ex as t hese whi ch are i nvol ved in
making t he not i on of intelligibility t he concept ual connect i ng link
between t he not i on of act i on a nd t ha t of nar r at i ve. Once we have
underst ood its i mpor t ance t he cl ai m t hat t he concept of an act i on is
secondary t o t hat of an intelligible act i on will per haps appear less
bizarre and so t oo will t he cl ai m t hat t he not i on of ' an' act i on,
while of t he highest pract i cal i mpor t ance, is al ways a potentially
misleading abst ract i on. An act i on is a moment in a possi bl e or
act ual history or in a number of such hi st ori es. The not i on of a
hi st ory is as fundament al a not i on as t he not i on of an act i on. Each
requires the ot her. But I cannot say this wi t hout not i ci ng t hat it is
precisely this t hat Sartre denies as i ndeed his whol e t heory of the
self, whi ch capt ures so well t he spirit of moder ni t y, requi res t hat he
shoul d. In La Nausee, Sartre makes Ant oi ne Roquent i n ar gue not
just what Mi nk argues, t hat narrat i ve is very different from life, but
t hat t o present human life in t he form of a nar r at i ve is al ways to
falsify it. There are not and t here cannot be any t r ue st ori es. Huma n
life is composed of discrete actions whi ch lead nowher e, whi ch have
no or der ; the story-teller imposes on huma n event s retrospectively
an order whi ch they did not have while they were lived. Clearly if
Sart re/ Roquent i n is right - I speak of Sar t r e/ Roquent i n t o distin-
guish hi m from such ot her wel l - known charact ers as Sart re/ Hei deg-
ger and Sar t r e/ Mar x - my central cont ent i on must be mi st aken.
Ther e is nonet hel ess an i mpor t ant poi nt of agr eement bet ween my
thesis and t hat of Sart re/ Roquent i n. We agree in identifying t he
intelligibility of an act i on with its place in a nar r at i ve sequence.
Onl y Sart re/ Roquent i n t akes it t hat human act i ons are as such
unintelligible occurrences: it is t o a real i zat i on of t he met aphysi cal
i mpl i cat i ons of this t hat Roquent i n is br ought in t he course of t he
novel and t he pract i cal effect upon ht m is t o bri ng t o an end his own
project of wri t i ng an historical bi ogr aphy. Thi s proj ect no l onger
makes sense. Either he will wri t e what is t r ue or he will wr i t e an
intelligible hi st ory, but the one possibility excl udes t he ot her . Is
Sart re/ Roquent i n right?
We can discover what is wr ong wi t h Sart re' s thesis in ei t her of
t wo ways. One is to ask: what woul d human act i ons depri ved of
any falsifying narrat i ve order be like? Sart re himself never answer s
this quest i on; it is striking t hat in or der t o show t hat t here are no
t rue narrat i ves, he himself writes a narrat i ve albeit a fictional one.
But t he only pi ct ure t hat I find myself abl e t o form of huma n nat ur e
an-sich, pri or t o t he alleged mi si nt erpret at i on by nar r at i ve is t he
ki nd of dislocated sequence whi ch Dr Johnson offers us in his not es
of his travels in France: ' Ther e we wai t ed on t he ladies - Mor vi l l e' s.
- Spai n. Count r y t owns all beggars. At Dijon he coul d not find t he
way t o Orl eans. - Cross r oads of France very bad. - Five sol di ers. -
Women. - Soldiers escaped. - The Col onel woul d not lose five men
for t he sake of one woman. - The magi st r at e cannot seize a soldier
but by t he Col onel ' s permi ssi on, etc. , e t c ' (quot ed in Hobs ba um,
1973, p. 32) . What this suggests is what I t ake t o be t r ue, namel y
Alasdair Maclntyre
1 3 7
that the charact eri zat i on of act i ons allegedly pr i or t o any nar r at i ve
form being i mposed upon t hem will al ways t ur n out t o be t he
presentation of what ar e pl ai nl y t he di sj oi nt ed par t s of s ome
possible narrat i ve. ,
We can also appr oach t he quest i on in anot her wa y. Wh a t 1 have
called a history is an enact ed dr amat i c nar r at i ve in whi ch t he
characters are also t he aut hor s . The char act er s of cour s e never s t ar t
literally ab initio; they pl unge in medias res, t he begi nni ngs of t hei r
story already made for t hem by wha t a nd wh o has gone bef or e. But
when Julian Grenfell or Edwa r d Th o ma s went off t o Fr ance in t he
1914-18 war they no less enact ed a nar r at i ve t ha n di d Me ne l a us or
Odysseus when they went off. Th e di fference bet ween i magi nar y
characters and real ones is not in t he nar r at i ve f or m of wh a t t hey
do; it is in the degree of t hei r aut hor s hi p of t hat form and of t hei r
own deeds. Of course just as t hey do not begi n whe r e t hey pl ease,
they cannot go on exact l y as t hey pl ease ei t her ; each char act er is
constrained by t he act i ons of ot her s and by t he social set t i ngs
presupposed in his and t hei r act i ons, a poi nt forci bl y ma de by Ma r x
in the classical, if not ent i rel y sat i sfact ory account of h u ma n
life as enacted dr amat i c nar r at i ve, The Eighteenth Brumaire of
Louis Bonaparte.
I call Mar x' s account less t han sat i sfact ory par t l y because he
wishes to present t he nar r at i ve of h u ma n soci al life in a way t hat
will be compat i bl e wi t h a vi ew of t ha t life as l aw- gover ned a nd
predictable in a par t i cul ar way. But it is cruci al t hat at any given
point in an enact ed dr amat i c nar r at i ve we do not k n o w wh a t will
happen next. The ki nd of unpr edi ct abi l i t y for whi ch i ar gued [in
chapter 8, After Virtue] is r equi r ed by t he nar r at i ve s t r uct ur e of
human life, and t he empi ri cal gener al i zat i ons and expl or at i ons
which social scientists di scover pr ovi de a ki nd of unde r s t a ndi ng of
human life whi ch is perfectly compat i bl e wi t h t hat s t r uct ur e.
This unpredictability coexi st s wi t h a second cruci al char act er i st i c
of all lived narrat i ves, a cer t ai n t el eol ogi cal char act er . We live out
our lives, bot h i ndi vi dual l y and in our r el at i onshi ps wi t h each
other, in the light of cert ai n concept i ons of a possi bl e shar ed f ut ur e,
a r u
t ur e in whi ch cert ai n possi bi l i t i es beckon us f or war d and ot her s
r e
Pel us, some seem al r eady forecl osed and ot her s per haps inevit-
a
e. There is no present whi ch is not i nf or med by s ome i mage of
some future and an i mage of t he fut ure whi ch al ways pr esent s itself
the form of a telos - or of a vari et y of ends or goal s - t owa r ds
men
W
e ar e ei t her movi ng or fai l i ng t o move in t he pr esent ,
^pr edi ct abi l i t y and t el eol ogy t her ef or e coexi st as par t of our lives;
e characters in a fictional nar r at i ve we do not k n o w wh a t will
happen next , but none t he less our lives have a cert ai n form which
projects itself t owar ds our future. Thus t he nar r at i ves whi ch we live
out have bot h an unpredi ct abl e and a part i al l y teleological charac-
ter. If the narrat i ve of our i ndi vi dual and social lives is t o cont i nue
intelligibly - and either t ype of nar r at i ve may l apse i nt o unintel-
ligibility - it is al ways bot h the case t hat t her e are const r ai nt s on
how t he story can cont i nue and t hat wi t hi n t hose const r ai nt s t here
are indefinitely many ways t hat it can cont i nue.
A central thesis t hen begins t o emerge: man is in his act i ons and
pract i ce, as well as in his fictions, essentially a st ory-t el l i ng ani mal .
He is not essentially, but becomes t hr ough his hi st ory, a teller of
stories t hat aspire t o t r ut h. But t he key quest i on for men is not
about t hei r own aut hor shi p; 1 can onl y answer t he quest i on ' What
am I t o do?' if I can answer the pr i or quest i on ' Of what st ory or
stories do I find myself a par t ?' We ent er huma n soci et y, t hat is,
with one or mor e i mput ed charact ers - roles i nt o whi ch we have
been drafted - and we have t o l earn what t hey are in or der t o be
able t o under st and how ot hers r espond t o us and how our
responses t o t hem are apt t o be const r ued. It is t hr ough hear i ng
stories about wi cked st epmot her s, lost chi l dren, good but mi s-
guided kings, wol ves t hat suckle t wi n boys, youngest sons who
receive no i nheri t ance but must make t hei r own way in t he wor l d
and eldest sons who wast e their i nheri t ance on r i ot ous living and go
into exile t o live wi t h the swi ne, t hat chi l dren learn or mi sl earn bot h
what a child and what a par ent is, what t he cast of char act er s may
be in t he dr ama i nt o whi ch t hey have been bor n and what t he ways
of t he wor l d are. Depri ve chi l dren of stories and you leave t hem
unscri pt ed, anxi ous st ut t erers in their act i ons as in t hei r wor ds .
Hence t here is no way to give us an under st andi ng of any society,
including our own, except t hr ough t he st ock of stories whi ch
const i t ut e its initial dr amat i c resources. Myt hol ogy, in its ori gi nal
sense, is at t he hear t of t hi ngs. Vi co was right and so was Joyce.
And so t oo of course is t hat mor al t radi t i on from heroi c society t o
its medieval heirs accordi ng t o whi ch t he telling of stories has a key
part in educat i ng us i nt o t he vi rt ues.
1 suggested earlier t hat ' an' act i on is al ways an epi sode in a
possible hi st ory: I woul d now like t o make a related suggest i on
about anot her concept , t hat of per sonal i dent i t y. Der ek Parfit and
ot hers have recently dr awn our at t ent i on t o t he cont r ast bet ween
the criteria of strict i dent i t y, whi ch is an al l -or-not hi ng mat t er
[either t he Ti chbor ne cl ai mant is t he last Ti chbor ne hei r; either all
t he propert i es of the last heir bel ong t o t he cl ai mant or t he cl ai mant
is not t he heir - Leibniz' s Law applies) and t he psychol ogi cal
Alasdair Maclntyre
1 3 9
continuities of personal i t y whi ch are a mat t er of mor e or less. (Am
I the same man as fifty I was at forty in respect of memor y,
intellectual power s, critical responses? Mo r e or less.) But what is
crucial to human bei ngs as char act er s in enact ed narrat i ves is t hat ,
possessing only t he r esour ces of psychol ogi cal cont i nui t y, we have
to be able t o r espond t o t he i mput at i on of strict i dent i t y. I am
forever what ever I have been at any t i me for ot her s - and I may at
any time be called upon t o ans wer for it - no mat t er how changed I
may be now. Ther e is no wa y of founding my i dent i t y - or l ack of it
- on the psychol ogi cal cont i nui t y or di scont i nui t y of t he self. The
self inhabits a char act er whos e uni t y is given as t he uni t y of a
character. Once agai n t her e is a crucial di sagr eement wi t h empi r i -
cist or analytical phi l osopher s on t he one hand and wi t h exi st ent i al -
ists on the ot her.
Empiricists, such as Locke or Hu me , t ri ed t o give an account of
personal identity solely in t er ms of psychol ogi cal st at es or event s.
Analytical phi l osopher s, in so many ways t hei r hei rs as well as t hei r
critics, have wrest l ed wi t h t he connect i on bet ween t hose st at es and
events and strict i dent i t y under s t ood in t er ms of Lei bni z' s Law.
Both have failed t o see t hat a ba c kgr ound has been omi t t ed, t he
lack of whi ch makes t he pr obl ems i nsol ubl e. Tha t backgr ound is
provided by t he concept of a st ory and of t hat ki nd of uni t y of
character whi ch a st ory r equi r es. Just as a hi st ory is not a sequence
of actions, but t he concept of an act i on is t hat of a mome nt in an
actual or possible hi st ory abst r act ed for some pur pose from t hat
history, so t he char act er s in a hi st or y are not a col l ect i on of
persons, but t he concept of a per s on is t hat of a char act er
abstracted from a hi st ory.
What t he nar r at i ve concept of sel fhood requi res is t hus t wof ol d.
On the one hand, I am wh a t I may justifiably be t aken by ot her s t o
be in the course of living out a st ory t hat r uns f r om my bi r t h t o my
death; I am t he subject of a hi st ory t hat is my own and no one
else's, that has its own pecul i ar meani ng. Whe n s omeone compl ai ns
- as do some of t hose wh o at t empt or commi t sui ci de - t hat his c r
her life is meani ngl ess, he or she is often and per haps charact eri st i -
cally compl ai ni ng t hat t he nar r at i ve of t hei r life has become
unintelligible t o t hem, t hat it l acks any poi nt , any movement
towards a cl i max or a telos. Hence t he poi nt of doi ng any one t hi ng
rather t han anot her at cruci al j unct ur es in t hei r lives seems t o such a
Person t o have been l ost .
To be t he subject of a nar r at i ve t hat r uns f r om one' s bi r t h t o
ne s deat h is, I r emar ked earl i er, t o be account abl e for t he act i ons
and experiences whi ch compos e a nar r at abl e life. It is, t hat is, t o be
1 4 0
open t o bei ng asked t o give a certain ki nd of account of what one
did or what happened t o one or what one wi t nessed at any earlier
poi nt in one' s life t he t i me at whi ch t he quest i on is posed. Of course
someone may have forgot t en or suffered brai n damage or simply
not at t ended sufficiently at t he rel evant t i mes t o be able t o give the
relevant account . But t o say of someone under some one descrip-
t i on (' The pri soner of t he Chat eau d' l f ) t hat he is t he same person
as someone charact eri zed qui t e differently (' The Count of Mont e
Cri st o' ) is precisely t o say t hat it makes sense t o ask him t o give an
intelligible narrat i ve account enabl i ng us t o under st and how he
could at different times and different places be one and t he same
person and yet be so differently charact eri zed. Thus personal
identity is just t hat identity pr esupposed by t he uni t y of the
charact er whi ch t he uni t y of a nar r at i ve requi res. Wi t hout such
unity t here woul d not be subjects of whom stories coul d be t ol d.
The ot her aspect of narrat i ve selfhood is correl at i ve: I am not
onl y account abl e, I am one who can al ways ask ot hers for an
account , who can put ot hers to t he quest i on. I am par t of their
st ory, as t hey are par t of mi ne. The nar r at i ve of any one life is par t
of an i nt erl ocki ng set of narrat i ves. Mor eover this aski ng for and
giving of account s itself plays an i mpor t ant par t in const i t ut i ng
narrat i ves. Aski ng you wha t you did and why, sayi ng what I did
and why, ponder i ng t he differences bet ween your account of what I
did and my account of what I did, and vice versa, these ar e essential
const i t uent s of all but t he very simplest and barest of narrat i ves.
Thus wi t hout t he account abi l i t y of t he self t hose t rai ns of events
t hat const i t ut e all but t he simplest and barest of narrat i ves coul d
not occur; and wi t hout t hat same account abi l i t y narrat i ves woul d
lack t hat cont i nui t y requi red t o make bot h t hem and t he act i ons
t hat const i t ut e t hem intelligible.
It is i mpor t ant t o notice t hat I am not argui ng t hat t he con-
cepts of nar r at i ve or of intelligibility or of account abi l i t y are more
fundament al t han t hat of personal identity. The concept s of
narrat i ve, intelligibility and account abi l i t y pr esuppose t he appl i c-
ability of t he concept of personal i dent i t y, just as it pr esup-
poses t hei r applicability and just as i ndeed each of t hese t hr ee
presupposes t he applicability of t he t wo ot hers. The rel at i onshi p is
one of mut ual pr esupposi t i on. It does follow of course t hat all
at t empt s t o el uci dat e t he not i on of personal i dent i t y i ndependent l y
of and in i sol at i on from t he not i ons of narrat i ve, intelligibility and
account abi l i t y are bound t o fail. As all such at t empt s have.
It is now possi bl e t o r et ur n t o t he quest i on from whi ch t hi s
enqui ry i nt o t he nat ur e of huma n act i on and identity st art ed: In
what does t he uni t y of an i ndi vi dual life consist? The answer is t hat
its unity is t he uni t y of a nar r at i ve embodi ed in a single life. To ask
' What is t he good for me?' is t o ask how best I mi ght live out t hat
unity and br i ng it t o compl et i on. To ask ' What is t he good for
man?' is t o ask what all answer s t o t he former quest i on must have
in common. But now it is i mpor t ant t o emphasi ze t hat it is the
systematic aski ng of t hese t wo quest i ons and t he at t empt t o answer
t hem in deed as well as in wor d whi ch provi de t he moral life with
its unity. The uni t y of a huma n life is t he uni t y of a narrat i ve quest.
Quest s somet i mes fail, ar e frust rat ed, abandoned or dissipated into
di st ract i ons; and huma n lives may in all these ways also fail. But the
only criteria for success or failure in a human life as a whole are the
criteria of success or failure in a nar r at ed or t o-be-narrat ed quest. A
quest for what ?
Two key feat ures of t he medi eval concept i on of a quest need to
be recalled. The first is t hat wi t hout some at least partly determin-
ate concept i on of t he final telos t here coul d not be any beginning t o
a quest . Some concept i on of t he good for man is required. Whence
is such a concept i on t o be dr awn? Precisely from those questions
whi ch led us t o at t empt t o t r anscend t hat limited conception of the
virtues whi ch is avai l abl e in and t hr ough pract i ces. It is in l ooki ng
for a concept i on of the good whi ch will enabl e us to order ot her
goods, for a concept i on of the good whi ch will enabl e us t o ext end
our under st andi ng of t he pur pose and cont ent of t he virtues, for a
concept i on of the good whi ch will enabl e us t o underst and the place
of integrity and const ancy in life, t hat we initially define t he ki nd of
life whi ch is a quest for t he good. But secondly it is clear the
medieval concept i on of a quest is not at all t hat of a search for
somet hi ng al ready adequat el y charact eri zed, as miners search for
gold or geol ogi st s for oil. It is in t he course of t he quest and only
t hr ough encount er i ng and copi ng wi t h the various part i cul ar
har ms, danger s, t empt at i ons and di st ract i ons whi ch provi de any
quest wi t h its epi sodes and incidents t hat t he goal of t he quest is
finally t o be under s t ood. A quest is al ways an educat i on bot h as to
t he char act er of t hat whi ch is sought and in self-knowledge.
The virtues t herefore ar e t o be under st ood as those dispositions
whi ch will not onl y sust ai n pract i ces and enabl e us t o achieve
t he goods i nt ernal t o pr act i ces, but whi ch will also sustain us in the
relevant ki nd of quest for t he good, by enabl i ng us to overcome the
har ms, danger s, t empt at i ons and di st ract i ons whi ch we encount er,
and whi ch will furnish us wi t h increasing self-knowledge and
increasing knowl edge of t he good. The cat al ogue of the virtues will
therefore i ncl ude t he vi rt ues requi red t o sust ai n t he ki nd of
househol ds and t he ki nd of political communi t i es in whi ch men and
women can seek for the good t oget her and t he vi rt ues necessary for
phi l osophi cal enqui ry about t he char act er of t he good. We have
t hen arrived at a provi si onal concl usi on about t he good life for
man: t he good life for man is t he life spent in seeki ng for t he good
life for man, and t he vi rt ues necessary for t he seeking are t hose
whi ch will enabl e us t o under st and what mor e and what else t he
good life for man is. We have also compl et ed t he second stage in
our account of t he virtues, by si t uat i ng t hem in rel at i on t o t he good
life for man and not only in rel at i on t o pract i ces. But our enqui ry
requires a t hi rd stage.
For I am never able t o seek for t he good or exercise t he virtues
onl y qua i ndi vi dual . Thi s is part l y because what it is t o live t he good
life concretely varies from ci rcumst ance t o ci rcumst ances even
when it is one and the same concept i on of the good life and one and
t he same set of virtues whi ch are bei ng embodi ed i n a huma n life.
Wha t t he good life is for a fifth-century At heni an general will not be
t he same as what it was for a medieval nun or a sevent eent h-cent ury
farmer. But it is not just t hat different i ndi vi dual s live in different
social ci rcumst ances; it is also t hat we all appr oach our own
ci rcumst ances as bearers of a par t i cul ar social i dent i t y. I am
someone' s son or daught er , someone else' s cousi n or uncl e; 1 am a
citizen of this or t hat city, a member of this or t hat guild or
professi on; I bel ong t o this clan, t hat t ri be, this nat i on. Hence what
is good for me has t o be t he good for one who i nhabi t s t hese roles.
As such, I inherit from t he past of my family, my city, my t r i be, my
nat i on, a variety of debt s, i nheri t ances, rightful expect at i ons and
obl i gat i ons. These const i t ut e the given of my life, my mor al st art i ng
poi nt . Thi s is in par t what gives my life its own mor al part i cul ari t y.
Thi s t hought is likely t o appear alien and even surpri si ng from
t he st andpoi nt of moder n i ndi vi dual i sm. Fr om t he st andpoi nt of
i ndi vi dual i sm I am wha t I myself choose t o be. I can al ways, if I
wi sh t o, put in quest i on what are t aken t o be t he merel y cont i ngent
social features of my existence. I may biologically be my fat her' s
son; but I cannot be hel d responsi bl e for wha t he did unl ess 1
choose implicitly or explicitly t o assume such responsi bi l i t y. I may
legally be a citizen of a cert ai n count r y; but I cannot be held
responsi bl e for what my count ry does or has done unless I choose
implicitly or explicitly t o assume such responsi bi l i t y. Such indi-
vi dual i sm is expressed by t hose moder n Ameri cans wh o deny any
responsibility for t he effects of slavery upon bl ack Amer i cans,
saying 'I never owned any slaves' . It is mor e subt l y t he st andpoi nt
of t hose ot her moder n Ameri cans who accept a nicely cal cul at ed
responsibility for such effects measured precisely by the benefits
they themselves as i ndi vi dual s have indirectly received from slavery.
In bot h cases ' bei ng an Amer i can' is not in itself t aken t o be par t of
the mor al i dent i t y of t he i ndi vi dual . And of course there is not hi ng
peculiar t o moder n Amer i cans in this at t i t ude: t he Englishman who
says. '7 never did any wr ong t o Irel and; why bring up t hat old
history as t hough it had somet hi ng t o do with meV or the young
Ger man who believes t hat being bor n after 1945 means t hat what
Nazis did t o Jews has no mor al relevance t o his relationship t o his
Jewish cont empor ar i es, exhi bi t t he same at t i t ude, t hat according to
which the self is det achabl e from its social and historical roles and
statuses. And t he self so det ached is of course a self very much at
home in ei t her Sart re' s or Goffman' s perspective, a self t hat can
have no hi st ory. The cont r ast wi t h t he narrat i ve view of the self is
clear. For t he st ory of my life is al ways embedded in the story of
those communi t i es from whi ch I derive my identity. I am born with
a past ; and t o try t o cut myself off from t hat past, in the
individualist mode, is t o deform my present relationships. The
possession of an hi st ori cal identity and t he possession of a social
identity coi nci de. Not i ce t hat rebellion against my identity is always
one possi bl e mode of expressi ng it.
Not i ce also t hat t he fact t hat t he self has t o find its moral identity
in and t hr ough its member s hi p in communi t i es such as those of the
family, t he nei ghbour hood, t he city and the tribe does not entail
t hat t he self has t o accept t he mor al limitations of the particularity
of t hose f or ms of communi t y. Wi t hout those moral particularities
t o begin from t here woul d never be anywher e t o begin; but it is in
movi ng f or war d from such part i cul ari t y t hat t he search for the
good, for t he uni versal , consists. Yet part i cul ari t y can never be
simply left behi nd or obl i t erat ed. The not i on of escaping from it
i nt o a real m of entirely uni versal maxi ms whi ch belong t o man as
such, whet her in its ei ght eent h-cent ury Kant i an form or in the
pr esent at i on of some moder n analytical mor al philosophies, is an
illusion and an illusion wi t h painful consequences. When men and
women identify wha t ar e in fact t hei r part i al and part i cul ar causes
t oo easily and t oo compl et el y wi t h t he cause of some universal
pri nci pl e, t hey usually behave wor se t han they woul d otherwise do.
Wha t I am, t herefore, is in key par t what I inherit, a specific past
t hat is pr esent t o s ome degree in my present . I find myself part of a
hi st ory and t hat is general l y t o say, whet her I like it or not , whet her
I recognize it or not , one of t he bearers of a tradition. It was
i mpor t ant when I charact eri zed t he concept of a practice t o notice
t hat pract i ces al ways have hi st ori es and t hat at any given moment
what a practice is depends on a mode of under st andi ng it whi ch has
been t ransmi t t ed often t hr ough many gener at i ons. And t hus,
insofar as t he virtues sust ai n t he rel at i onshi ps r equi r ed for prac-
tices, they have t o sustain rel at i onshi ps t o t he past - and t o t he
future - as well as in t he present . But t he t radi t i ons t hr ough whi ch
part i cul ar pract i ces are t r ansmi t t ed and reshaped never exi st in
i sol at i on for larger social t r adi t i ons. Wha t const i t ut es such t radi -
tions?
We are apt t o be misled here by t he i deol ogi cal uses t o whi ch
t he concept of a t radi t i on has been put by conservat i ve political
t heori st s. Characteristically such t heori st s have fol l owed Burke in
cont rast i ng t radi t i on wi t h reason and t he stability of t r adi t i on wi t h
conflict. Both cont rast s obfuscat e. For all reasoni ng t akes place
wi t hi n t he cont ext of some t r adi t i onal mode of t hought , t r anscend-
ing t hr ough criticism and i nvent i on t he l i mi t at i ons of wha t had
hi t hert o been reasoned in t hat t radi t i on; t hi s is as t r ue of moder n
physics as of medieval logic. Mor eover when a t r adi t i on is in good
or der it is al ways partially const i t ut ed by an ar gument about t he
goods t he pursui t of whi ch gives t o t hat t r adi t i on its par t i cul ar
poi nt and pur pose.
So when an i nst i t ut i on a university, say, or a farm, or a hospi t al
- is t he bearer of a t radi t i on of pract i ce or pract i ces, its c ommon life
will be part l y, but in a centrally i mpor t ant way, const i t ut ed by a
cont i nuous ar gument as t o what a university is and ought t o be or
what good farmi ng is or what good medi ci ne is. Tr adi t i ons, when
vital, embody cont i nui t i es of conflict. Indeed when a t r adi t i on
becomes Burkean, it is al ways dying or dead.
The i ndi vi dual i sm of moder ni t y coul d of course find no use for
t he not i on of t radi t i on wi t hi n its own concept ual scheme except as
an adversary not i on; it therefore all t oo willingly abandoned it t o
t he Bur keans, wh o , faithful t o Bur ke' s own allegiance, t ri ed t o
combi ne adherence in politics t o a concept i on of t radi t i on whi ch
woul d vindicate t he oligarchical revol ut i on of pr oper t y of 1688 and
adherence in economi cs t o t he doct ri ne and i nst i t ut i ons of t he free
mar ket . The theoretical i ncoherence of this mi smat ch did not
deprive it of ideological usefulness. But t he out come has been t hat
moder n conservatives are for the most par t engaged in conservi ng
only ol der rat her t han later versions of liberal i ndi vi dual i sm. Thei r
own core doct ri ne is as liberal and as i ndi vi dual i st as t hat of self-
avowed liberals.
A living t r adi t i on t hen is an historically ext ended, socially
embodi ed ar gument , and an ar gument precisely in par t about
t he goods whi ch const i t ut e t hat t r adi t i on. Wi t hi n a t radi t i on t he
pursuit of goods ext ends t hr ough gener at i ons, somet i mes t hr ough
many generat i ons. Hence t he i ndi vi dual ' s search for his or her good
is generally and charact eri st i cal l y conduct ed wi t hi n a cont ext
defined by t hose t r adi t i ons of whi ch t he i ndi vi dual ' s life is a par t ,
and this is t r ue bot h of t hose goods whi ch are i nt ernal t o pract i ces
and of t he goods of a single life. Once agai n t he narrat i ve
phenomenon of embeddi ng is cruci al : t he hi st ory of a pract i ce in
our time is generally and charact eri st i cal l y embedded in and made
intelligible in t er ms of t he l arger and l onger hi st ory of t he t radi t i on
through whi ch t he pract i ce in its pr esent form was conveyed t o us;
the history of each of our own lives is general l y and charact eri st i -
cally embedded in and ma de intelligible in t er ms of t he larger and
longer histories of a numbe r of t r adi t i ons. I have t o say ' general l y
and charact eri st i cal l y' r at her t han ' al ways ' , for t r adi t i ons decay,
disintegrate and di sappear . Wh a t t hen sust ai ns and st rengt hens
traditions? Wha t weakens and dest roys t hem?
The answer in key par t is: t he exerci se or t he lack of exercise of
the relevant vi rt ues. The vi rt ues find t hei r poi nt and pur pose not
only in sust ai ni ng t hose r el at i onshi ps necessary if t he vari et y of
goods i nt ernal t o pract i ces are t o be achi eved and not onl y in
sustaining t he form of an i ndi vi dual life in whi ch t hat i ndi vi dual
may seek out his or her good as t he good of his or her whol e life,
but also in sust ai ni ng t hose t r adi t i ons whi ch pr ovi de bot h pract i ces
and individual lives wi t h t hei r necessary hi st ori cal cont ext . Lack of
justice, lack of t rut hful ness, lack of cour age, lack of t he rel evant
intellectual vi rt ues - t hese cor r upt t r adi t i ons, just as they do t hose
institutions and pract i ces whi ch deri ve t hei r life from t he t r adi t i ons
of which t hey are t he cont empor ar y embodi ment s . To recognize
this is of course also t o recogni ze t he exi st ence of an addi t i onal
virtue, one whos e i mpor t ance is per haps mos t obvi ous when it is
least present , t he vi r t ue of havi ng an adequat e sense of t he
traditions t o whi ch one bel ongs or whi ch conf r ont one. Thi s vi rt ue
is not t o be confused wi t h any form of conservat i ve ant i quanani s m;
I am not prai si ng t hose wh o choose t he convent i onal conservat i ve
role of laudator temporis acti. It is r at her t he case t hat an adequat e
sense of t r adi t i on mani f est s itself in a gr asp of t hose future
possibilities whi ch t he past has made avai l abl e t o t he present .
Living t r adi t i ons, just because t hey cont i nue a not -yet -compl et ed
narrative, conf r ont a fut ure whos e det er mi nat e and det er mi nabl e
character, so far as it possesses any, deri ves from t he past .
In practical r easoni ng t he possessi on of t hi s virtue is not
manifested so much in t he knowl edge of a set of general i zat i ons or
maxi ms whi ch may pr ovi de our pract i cal inferences wi t h maj or
premi ses; its presence or absence rat her appear s on t he ki nd of
capaci t y for j udgement whi ch t he agent possesses in knowi ng how
to select among t he rel evant stack of maxi ms and how t o apply
t hem in part i cul ar si t uat i ons. Cardi nal Pole possessed it, Mar y
Tudor did not ; Mont r os e possessed it, Charl es I did not . What
Cardi nal Pole and t he Mar qui s of Mont r os e possessed were in fact
t hose virtues whi ch enabl e their possessors t o pur sue bot h t hei r
own good and t he good of the t r adi t i on of whi ch they are the
bearers even in si t uat i ons denned by the necessity of t ragi c,
di l emmat i c choice.
It has often been suggested - by J. L. Aust i n, for exampl e - t hat
cither we can admi t t he existence of rival and cont i ngent l y
i ncompat i bl e goods whi ch make i ncompat i bl e cl ai ms t o our
practical allegiance or we can believe in some det er mi nat e concep-
tion of the good life for man, but t hat t hese are mut ual l y exclusive
alternatives. No one can consistently hol d bot h t hese vi ews. What
this cont ent i on is blind t o is t hat t here may be bet t er or wor se ways
for individuals t o live t hr ough the tragic conf r ont at i on of good wi t h
good. And t hat t o know what the good life for man is may requi re
knowi ng what are the bet t er and what are the wor se ways of living
in and t hrough such si t uat i ons. Not hi ng a priori rules out this
possibility; and this suggests t hat wi t hi n a view such as Aust i n' s
there is conceal ed an unacknowl edged empi ri cal pr emi se about t he
charact er of tragic si t uat i ons.
One way in whi ch t he choice bet ween rival goods in a tragic
si t uat i on differs from the moder n choi ce bet ween i ncommensur abl e
moral premises is t hat both of t he al t ernat i ve courses of act i on
which confront t he individual have t o be recogni zed as l eadi ng t o
some aut hent i c and subst ant i al good. By choosi ng one I do not hi ng
t o diminish or derogat e from t he cl ai ms upon me of t he ot her ; and
therefore, what ever I do, I shall have left undone what I ought t o
have done. The t ragi c pr ot agoni st , unl i ke t he mor al agent as
depicted by Sartre or Har e, is not choosi ng bet ween allegiance t o
one moral principle rat her t han anot her , nor is he or she deci di ng
upon some principle of pri ori t y bet ween mor al pri nci pl es. Hence
t he ' ought ' involved has a different meani ng and force from t hat of
the ' ought ' in moral principles under st ood in a moder n way. For
t he tragic pr ot agoni st cannot do everyt hi ng t hat he or she ought t o
do. Thi s ' ought ' , unl i ke Kant ' s, does not imply ' can' . Mor eover any
at t empt t o map t he logic of such ' ought ' assert i ons on t o some
modal calculus so as t o pr oduce a version of deont i c logic has t o
fail. (See, from a very different point of vi ew, Bas C. Van Fraasen,
1973.)
Alasdair Maclntyre
1 4 7
Yet it is clear t hat t he mor al t ask of t he t r agi c pr ot agoni s t ma y be
performed better or wor se, i ndependent l y of t he choi ce bet ween
alternatives that he or she makes - ex hypothesise or she has no
right choice to make. The t ragi c pr ot agoni s t may behave her oi cal l y
or unheroically, generousl y or ungener ousl y, graceful l y or gr ace-
lessly, prudently or i mpr udent l y. T o per f or m hi s or her t ask
better rather t han wor se will be t o do bot h wha t is bet t er for ht m or
ha qua individual or qua par ent or chi l d or qua ci t i zen or me mbe r
of a profession, or per haps qua some or all of t hese. The exi st ence
of tragic dilemmas casts no doubt upon and pr ovi des no count er -
examples to the thesis t hat assert i ons of t he form ' To do t hi s in t hi s
way would be bet t er for X and/ or for his or her fami l y, ci t y or
profession' are susceptible of obj ect i ve t r ut h and falsity, any mor e
than the existence of al t ernat i ve and cont i ngent l y i ncompat i bl e
forms of medical t r eat ment cast s doubt on t he t hesi s t hat asser t i ons
of the form ' To under go t hi s medi cal t r eat ment in t hi s way
would be better for X and/ or his or her fami l y' ar e suscept i bl e of
objective truth and falsity. (See, from a different poi nt of vi ew, t he
illuminating discussion in Samuel Gut t e npl a n, 1 9 7 9 - 8 0 ,
PP. 61-80.)
The presupposition of t hi s obj ect i vi t y is of cour s e t hat we can
understand the not i on of ' good for X' a nd cognat e not i ons in t e r ms
of some conception of t he uni t y of X' s life. Wh a t is bet t er or wor s e
for X depends upon t he char act er of t hat i nt el l i gi bl e nar r at i ve
which provides X' s life wi t h its uni t y. Unsur pr i si ngl y it is t he l ack of
any such unifying concept i on of a h u ma n life whi ch under l i es
modern denials of t he fact ual char act er of mor al j udgement s and
more especially of t hose j udgement s whi ch ascr i be vi r t ues or vices
to individuals.
I argued earlier t hat every mor al phi l os ophy has s ome par t i cul ar
sociology as its count er par t . Wh a t 1 have t r i ed t o spell out her e
s the kind of under st andi ng of social life whi ch t he t r adi t i on of t he
virtues requires, a ki nd of under s t andi ng very di fferent from t hos e
ominant in t he cul t ure of bur eaucr at i c i ndi vi dual i sm. Wi t hi n
at culture concept i ons of t he vi r t ues become mar gi nal a n d t he
tion *
t n e
vi rt ues r emai ns cent r al onl y in t he lives of soci al
^ ,
o u
P
s
whose existence is on t he mar gi ns of t he cent r al cul t ur e,
new
c e n t r U
cul t ure of l i beral or bur e a uc r a t i c i ndi vi dual i sm
i c ^ " ^ P t i o n s of t he vi rt ues emer ge a nd t he concept of a vi r t ue
l s
"self transformed.
148
BI BLI OGRAPHY
Samuel Guttenplan, ' Moral Realism and Moral Dilemmas' , Proceedings of
the Aristotelian Society, 1979-80: pp. 61- 80.
Barbara Hardy, ' Towards a Poetics of Fiction: An Approach Through
Narrative' , Novel, 2, 1968: pp. 5-14.
Philip Hobsbaum, A Reader's Guide to Charles Dickens, 1973.
Louis O. Mink, 'History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension' , New
Literary History, 1, 1970: pp. 541-58.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971.
Bas C. Van Frassen, 'Values and the Heart' s Command' , Journal of
Philosophy, 70, 1973: pp. 5-19.
7
Honour occupies about the same place in cont empor ar y us ^ .
chastity. An individual asserting it har dl y invites admi r at i on .u
one who claims t o have lost it is an object of amus ement r at her nan
sympathy. Both concepts have an unambi guousl y out da t e d st ai ns
in the Weltanschauung of moder ni t y. Especially i n t e l l e c t u a l m
definition in the vanguard of moder ni t y, arc about as likely t o
admit to honour as t o be found out as chast e. At best , honour ani l
chastity are seen as ideological leftovers in t he consci ousness u |
obsolete classes,such as military officers or et hni c gr a ndmot he r s .
The obsolescence of the concept of honour is reveal ed very
sharply in the inability of most cont empor ar i es t o unde r s t a nd
insult, which in essence is an assaul t on honour . In t hi s, at least in
America, there is a close paral l el bet ween mo d e m consci ousness
and modern law. Motives of honour have no s t andi ng in Amer i can
law and legal codes t hat still admi t t hem, as in s ome count r i es of
Southern Europe, are perceived as ar chai c. In mode r n cons ci ous
ness, as in American law (shaped mor e t han any ot her by t hat pr une
force of modernization whi ch is capi t al i sm) , i nsul t in itself is not
actionable, is not recognized as a real i nj ury. Th e i nsul t ed par t y
must be able to prove mat eri al damage. Ther e arc cases, n u k e d ,
where psychic harm may be t he basi s for a legal cl ai m, but t hat t oo
*
3 r C f y
^
r o m a n o
"
o n O T
offence agai nst h o n o u r . Th e
Weltanschauung of everyday life closely conf or ms in t hi s t o t he
legal definitions of reality. If an i ndi vi dual is i nsul t ed a nd, as a
r e
sul t , is harmed in his career or his capaci t y t o ear n an i nc ome , he
may not only have recourse t o t he cour t s but may count on t he
sympathy of his friends. Hi s fri ends, and i n s ome cases t he c our t s
The complete text of the above article has been previously printed i
v3S>x!
0Umal
^
S o d o i o
^ '
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1 9 7 0
) ' PP- 339- 47. Reprinted wit
Peter Berger: On the Obsolescence
of the Concept of Honour
150 On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour
will come to his suppor t if, say, the insult so unset t l es hi m t hat he
loses his self-esteem or has a ner vous br e a kdown. If, however,
neither ki nd of injury per t ai ns, he will al most cert ai nl y be advised
by lawyers and friends alike t o just forget t he whol e t hi ng. In ot her
wor ds, the reality of t he offence will be deni ed. If t he individual
persists in mai nt ai ni ng it, he will be negatively cat egori zed, most
pr obabl y in psychi at ri c t erms (as ' neur ot i c' , ' overl y sensi t i ve' , or the
like), or if appl i cabl e in t erms t hat refer t o cul t ural lag (as
' hopelessly Eur opean' , per haps, or as t he victim of a ' provi nci al
ment al i t y' ).
The cont empor ar y denial of the reality of honour and of offences
against honour is so much par t of a t aken- f or - gr ant ed wor l d that a
del i berat e effort is r equi r ed t o even see it as a pr obl em. The effort is
wor t hwhi l e, for it can result in some, per haps unexpect ed, new-
insights into the st ruct ure of moder n consci ousness.
The probl em of t he obsol escence of t he concept of honour can be
br ought into bet t er focus by compar i ng it wi t h a most timely
concept - t hat of di gni t y. Taken by itself, t he demi se of honour
mi ght be i nt erpret ed as par t of a process of mor al coarseni ng, of a
lessening of respect for persons, even of dehumani zat i on. Indeed,
this is exactly how it l ooked t o a conservat i ve mi nd at t he begi nni ng
of the moder n era - for exampl e, t o t he fifteenth-century French
poet Eust ache Deschamps: ' Age of decl i ne ni gh t o t he end, / Ti me
of hor r or whi ch does all things falsely, / Lying age, full of pri de and
of envy, / Time without honour and without true judgement.
11
Yet
it seems qui t e clear in ret rospect t hat t hi s pessimistic est i mat e was ,
vo say the least, very one-si ded. The age t hat saw t he decline of
honour also saw t he rise of new moral i t i es and of a new humani s m,
and most specifically of a historically unpr ecedent ed concern for
the dignity and t he rights of the i ndi vi dual . The same moder n men
who fail to under st and an issue of honour are i mmedi at el y di sposed
t o concede t he demands for dignity and for equal ri ght s by al most
every new gr oup t hat makes t hem - racial or religious mi nori t i es,
expl oi t ed classes, the poor , t he devi ant , and so on. Nor woul d it be
just t o quest i on t he genui neness of this di sposi t i on. A little t hought ,
then, shoul d make clear that t he pr obl em is not clarified by et hi cal
pessimism. It is necessary to ask mor e fundament al l y: What is
honour ? What is dignity? What can be l earned about moder n
consci ousness by the obsol escence of t he one and the uni que sway
of the ot her?
Honour is commonl y under st ood as an ari st ocrat i c concept , or at
least associ at ed with a hi erarchi cal order of society. It is cert ai nl y
true that West ern not i ons of honour have been st rongl y influenced
1 C 1
by the medieval codes of chi val ry and t hat t hese wer e rootec1 in t he
social structures of feudal i sm. It is al so t r ue t hat concept s of h o n o u r
have survived i nt o t he moder n era best in gr oups
r
^
a i m n
^
hierarchical view of society, such as t he nobi l i t y, t he mi l i t ar y, and
traditional professions like l aw a nd medi ci ne In such gr oups
honour is a direct expr ess. on of s t at us , a sour ce of sol i dar i t y a mo n g
social equals and a demar cat i on l i ne agai nst soci al i nt er i or s .
Honour, indeed, also di ct at es cer t ai n s t a nda r ds of behavi our in
dealing with inferiors, but t he full code of h o n o u r onl y appl i es
among those who share t he same s t at us in t he hi er ar chy. In a
hierarchically ordered society t he et i quet t e of ever yday life consi st s
of ongoing t ransact i ons of honour , a nd di fferent gr oups r el at e
differently to this process accor di ng t o t he pr i nci pl e of ' To each hi s
due'. It would be a mi st ake, however , t o unde r s t a nd h o n o u r only in
terms of hierarchy and its del i neat i ons. T o t ake t he mos t obvi ous
example, the honour of wome n in ma ny t r adi t i onal soci et i es, whi l e
usually differentiated al ong class lines, may per t ai n in pr i nci pl e t o
women of all classes.
J. K. Campbell, in his st udy of c ont e mpor a r y r ur al cul t ur e in
Greece,
2
makes this very cl ear. Whi l e t he obl i gat i ons of h o n o u r
[timi) differ as bet ween different cat egor i es of i ndi vi dual s , not abl y
between men and women, ever yone wi t hi n t he c o mmu n i t y exi st s
within the same al l -embraci ng syst em of honour . Th o s e wh o have
high status in t he communi t y have par t i cul ar obl i gat i ons of h o n o u r ,
but even the lowly are di fferent i at ed in t er ms of h o n o u r a nd
dishonour. Men shoul d exhi bi t manl i ness and wo me n s ha me , but
the failure of either implies di s honour for t he i ndi vi dual , t he fami l y
and, in some cases, the ent i re c ommuni t y. For al l , t he qual i t i es
enjoined by honour pr ovi de t he l i nk, not onl y bet ween self and
community, but bet ween self and t he i deal i zed nor ms of t he
community: ' Honour consi der ed as t he possessi on by men and
women of these qualities is t he at t empt t o rel at e exi st ence t o cer t ai n
archetypal pat t erns of behavi our . '
3
Conver sel y, di s honour is a fall
torn grace in the most compr ehensi ve sense - l oss of face in t he
community, but also loss of self a nd s epar at i on f r om t he basi c
norms that govern huma n life.
t is valid t o view such a cul t ur e as essent i al l y pr e - mode r n, j ust as
mod
a U S U
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t o predi ct its di si nt egr at i on unde r t he i mpact of
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H i s t o r i c a
H y > t her e ar e several st ages in t he l at t er
a w f ' l ?
d e c l i n e o f
medi eval codes of h o n o u r di d not l ead
mea ^ \
c o n t e
m p o r a r y si t uat i on i n whi ch h o n o u r is an all but
of h ^
C S S c o n c e
P
t
- Ther e t ook pl ace first t he embourgeoisement
onour, which has been defined by No r b e r t El i as as t he pr oces s
Peter Berger
1 5 2 On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour
of ' civilization' , bot h a br oadeni ng and a mel l owi ng pr oces s .
4
The
cont ent s had changed, but t here was still a concept i on of honour in
the age of the t r i umphant bourgeoi si e. Yet it was wi t h t he rise of t he
bourgeoi si e, part i cul arl y in t he consci ousness of its critical intellec-
t ual s, t hat not only t he honour of t he ancien regime and its
hierarchical pr ot ot ypes was debunked, but t hat an under st andi ng
of man and society emerged t hat woul d event ual l y l i qui dat e any
concept i on of honour .
Thus Cervant es' Quixote is t he t r agi - comedy of a part i cul ar
obsolescence, t hat of t he kni ght - er r ant in an age in whi ch chivalry
has become an empt y rhet ori c. Th e great ness of t he Quixote,
however, t ranscends this par t i cul ar t i me- bound debunki ng j ob. It
unmasks not onl y t he ' madness' of chivalry but , by ext ensi on, t he
folly of any identification of self wi t h ' ar chet ypal pat t er ns of
behavi our' . Put differently, Don Qui xot e' s ' enchant er s' (whose
task, paradoxi cal l y, is precisely what Ma x Weber had in mi nd as
' d/ senchant ment ' ) cannot be st opped so easily once they have
st art ed t hei r terrible t ask. As Don Qui xot e tells Sancho i n one of his
i nnumer abl e homi l i es:
Is it possi bl e t hat in t he time you have been wi t h me you have
not yet found out t hat all t he advent ur es of a kni ght - er r ant
appear t o be illusion, follies, and dr eams, and t ur n out t o be
t he reverse? Not because things are really so, but because in
our mi dst t her e is a host of enchant er s, forever changi ng,
disguising and t ransformi ng our affairs as t hey pl ease, accord-
ing t o whet her they wi sh t o favor or dest roy us. So, wha t you
call a bar ber ' s basi n is t o me Mambr i no' s hel met , and t o
anot her person it will appear t o be somet hi ng el se.
s
These ' enchant er s' , alas, have not st opped wi t h chivalry. Every
huma n advent ur e, in whi ch t he self and its act i ons have been
identified and endowed wi t h the honour of collective pr ot ot ypes
has, finally, been debunked as ' illusion, follies, and dr eams' .
Moder n man is Don Qui xot e on his deat hbed, denuded of t he
mul t i col oured banner s t hat previ ousl y envel oped t he self and
revealed t o be nothing but a man: T was mad, but I am now in my
senses; I was once Don Qui xot e of La Mancha, but I am now, as I
said before, Al onso Qut xano t he Go o d . '
6
The same self, depri ved
or, if one prefers, freed from the mystifications of honour is hai l ed
in Falstaff' s ' cat echi sm' : ' Honour is a mere s cut cheon. '
7
It is
moder n consciousness t hat unmasks it as such, t hat , ' enchant s' or
' di senchant s' it (dependi ng on one' s poi nt of view) unt i l it is s hown
Peter Berger 1^3
honour and dignity become goal s of mor al ent er pr i se. Thei r loss,
always a possibility, has f ar - r eachi ng consequences for t he self,
finally, bot h honour and di gni t y have an i nfect i ous qual i t y t hat
as nothing but a pai nt ed art i fact . Behi nd t he ' mer e s cut cheon' is t he
face of modern man - ma n bereft of t he cons ol at i on of pr ot ot ypes ,
man alone.
It is i mport ant t o under s t and t hat it is preci sel y t hi s sol i t ary self
that modern consci ousness has percei ved as t he bear er of h u ma n
dignity and of i nal i enabl e h u ma n r i ght s. The mode r n di scovery
of dignity t ook pl ace precisely ami d t he wr e c ka ge of de bunke d
conceptions of honour . No w, it woul d be a mi s t ake t o ascri be t o
modern consciousness al one t he di scovery of a f undament al
dignity underlying all possi bl e social di sgui ses. The same di scovery
can be found in t he He br e w Bible, as in t he conf r ont at i on bet ween
Nathan and Davi d ( T h o u ar t t he ma n ' ) ; in Sophocl es, in t he
confrontation bet ween Ant i gone a nd Cr e on; a nd, in a different
form, in Menci us' par abl e of a cr i mi nal s t oppi ng a chi l d from
falling into a well. The under s t andi ng t hat t her e is a humani t y
behind or beneat h t he roles and t he nor ms i mpos ed by soci et y, and
that this humani t y has pr of ound di gni t y, is not a mode r n pr er oga-
tive. What is peculiarly mode r n is t he ma nne r in whi ch t he reality of
this intrinsic humani t y is r el at ed t o t he realities of soci et y.
Dignity, as agai nst honour , al ways rel at es t o t he i nt ri nsi c
humanity divested of all socially i mpos ed rol es or nor ms . It per t ai ns
to the self as such, t o t he i ndi vi dual r egar dl ess of his posi t i on in
society. This becomes very clear in t he classic f or mul at i ons of
human rights, from t he Pr eambl e t o t he Decl ar at i on of I ndepend-
ence t o the Universal Decl ar at i on of Hu ma n Ri ght s of t he Uni t ed
Nations. These rights al ways per t ai n t o t he i ndi vi dual ' i rrespect i ve
of race, col our or creed' - or , i ndeed, of sex, age, physi cal condi t i on
or any conceivable soci al st at us. Ther e is an i mpl i ci t soci ol ogy
and an implicit ant hr opol ogy her e. The i mpl i ci t soci ol ogy vi ews all
biological and hi st ori cal di fferent i at i ons a mo n g men as ei t her
downright unreal or essent i al l y i r r el evant . The i mpl i ci t ant hr opol -
ogy locates t he real self over and beyond all t hese di fferent i at i ons.
It should now be possi bl e t o see t hese t wo concept s s ome wha t mor e
clearly. Both honour and di gni t y ar e concept s t hat br i dge self and
society. Whi l e either per t ai ns t o t he i ndi vi dual in a very i nt i mat e
w a
y , it is in rel at i ons wi t h ot her s t hat bot h honour and di gni t y
are at t ai ned, exchanged, pr eser ved or t hr eat ened. Bot h r equi r e a
deliberate effort of t he will for t hei r mai nt enance - one mus t strive
| or them, often agai nst t he mal evol ent oppos i t i on of ot her s - t hus
n n n n i i ^ i j ! _ - i ,
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ext ends beyond t he mor al per son of t he i ndi vi dual possessing t hem.
The infection i nvol ves his body ('a dignified gai t ' ), his material
ambi ence (from cl ot hi ng t o t he furni shi ngs of his house) and other
i ndi vi dual s closely associ at ed wi t h hi m (' He br ought honour on his
whol e fami l y' ). Wha t , t hen, is t he difference bet ween these t wo
concept s of t he social self? Or , - subst i t ut i ng a mor e current term to
avoi d t he met aphysi cal associ at i ons of ' sel f, how do these t wo
concept i ons of i dent i t y differ?
The concept of honour implies that identity is essentially, or at
least importantly, linked to institutional roles. The modern concept
of dignity, by contrast, implies that identity is essentially indepen-
dent of institutional roles. To r et ur n t o Falstaff' s i mage, in a worl d
of honour t he i ndi vi dual is t he soci al symbol s embl azoned on his
escut cheon. The t rue self of t he kni ght is reveal ed as he rides out to
do bat t l e in t he full regalia of his r ol e; by compar i son, the naked
man in bed wi t h a woma n represent s a lesser reality of t he self. In
a worl d of di gni t y, in t he mode r n sense, t he social symbolism
governi ng t he i nt er act i on of men is a disguise. The escut cheons hide
t he t rue self. It is precisely t he naked ma n, and even more
specifically t he naked man expressi ng his sexual i t y, who represents
himself mor e t rut hful l y. Consequent l y, t he under st andi ng of self-
discovery and self-mystification is reversed as bet ween these t wo
wor l ds. In a wor l d of honour , t he i ndi vi dual discovers his t rue
identity in his rol es, and t o t ur n away from t he roles is t o t urn away
from himself - in ' false consci ousness' , one is t empt ed t o add. In a
wor l d of di gni t y, t he i ndi vi dual can onl y di scover his t rue identity
by emanci pat i ng himself from his socially i mposed roles - t he latter
are only masks, ent angl i ng hi m in i l l usi on, ' al i enat i on' and ' bad
faith' . It follows t ha t t he t wo wor l ds have a different relation to
hi st ory. It is t hr ough t he per f or mance of i nst i t ut i onal roles t hat
the i ndi vi dual part i ci pat es in hi st or y, not onl y t he hi st ory of a
part i cul ar i nst i t ut i on but t hat of his society as a whol e. It is
precisely for this r eason t hat moder n consci ousness, in its concep-
tion of t he self, t ends t owar ds a cur i ous ahi st ori ci t y. In a wor l d of
honour, identity is firmly l i nked t o t he past t hr ough t he reiterated
performance of prot ot ypi cal act s. In a wor l d of di gni t y, history is
the succession of mystifications from whi ch t he i ndi vi dual must free
himself to attain ' aut hent i ci t y' .
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t to lose si ght her e of cont i nui t i es in the
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hTs i n t r i n s , c ? L 25
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s i o n o f a r c h a i c m a n k n o w n t o U S b
t h
his intrinsic sociality and the reci procal process wi t h society
Peter Berger ^ 5
through which his var i ous i dent i t i es are f or med, mai nt ai ned and
changed. All t he same, wi t hi n t he par amet er s set by his fun-
damental const i t ut i on, ma n has consi der abl e l eeway in const ruc-
ting, dismantling and r eassembl i ng t he wor l ds in whi ch he lives.
Inasmuch as identity is al ways par t of a compr ehensi ve wor l d, and
a humanly constructed wor l d at t hat , t her e are far-reachi ng
differences in t he ways in whi ch i dent i t y is concei ved and,
consequently, exper i enced. Defi ni t i ons of i dent i t y vary wi t h overall
definitions of reality. Each such defi ni t i on, however , has reality-
generating power : Me n not onl y define t hemsel ves, but they
actualize these definitions in real exper i ence - they live them.
No monocausal t heor y is likely t o do justice t o t he t r ansf or m-
ation t hat has t aken pl ace. Very pr obabl y mos t of t he factors
commonly cited have in fact pl ayed a par t in t he process -
technology and i ndust r i al i zat i on, bur eaucr acy, ur bani zat i on and
population gr owt h, t he vast i ncrease in communi cat i on bet ween
every conceivable h u ma n gr oup, social mobi l i t y, t he pl ural i zat i on
of social wor l ds and t he pr of ound met amor phos i s in t he social
contexts in whi ch chi l dr en are r ear ed. Be t hi s as it may, t he
resultant si t uat i on has been apt l y char act er i zed by Ar nol d Gehl en
with the t er ms ' dei nst i t ut i onal i zat i on' and ' subj ect i vi zat i on' . The
former t erm refers t o a gl obal weakeni ng in t he hol di ng power of
institutions over t he i ndi vi dual . The i nst i t ut i onal fabric, whose
basic function has al ways been t o pr ovi de meani ng and stability for
the i ndi vi dual , has become i ncohesi ve, f r agment ed and t hus pr o-
gressively depri ved of pl ausi bi l i t y. The i nst i t ut i ons t hen confront
the individual as fluid and unr el i abl e, in t he ext r eme case as unreal .
Inevitably, t he i ndi vi dual is t hr own back upon himself, on his own
subjectivity, from whi ch he mus t dr edge up t he meani ng and t he
stability t hat he r equi r es t o exist. Precisely because of man' s
intrinsic sociality, this is a very unsat i sf act or y condi t i on. Stable
identities (and this al so means i dent i t i es t hat will be subjectively
plausible) can onl y emer ge in reci proci t y wi t h st abl e social cont ext s
(and this means cont ext s t hat ar e st r uct ur ed by st abl e i nst i t ut i ons).
Therefore, t here is a deep uncer t ai nt y a bout cont empor ar y i dent i t y.
Put differently, t her e is a bui l t -i n i dent i t y crisis in t he cont empor ar y
situation.
It is in this connect i on t hat one begi ns t o under st and t he implicit
sociology and t he i mpl i ci t ant hr opol ogy ment i oned above. Bot h are
rooted in act ual exper i ence of t he moder n wor l d. The literary,
Philosophical and even social-scientific f or mul at i ons are ex post
facto at t empt s t o come t o t er ms wi t h this experi ence. Gehl en has
shown t hi s convi nci ngl y for t he rise of t he moder n novel as t he
literary form most fully reflecting t he new subjectivism. But the
concept ual i zat i ons of man and society of, for i nst ance, Mar xi sm
and existentialism are equally r oot ed in this experi ence. So is the
perspective of moder n social science, especially of soci ol ogy.
Mar x' s ' al i enat i on' and 'false consci ousness' , Hei degger' s ' aut h-
enticity' and Sart re' s ' bad faith' , and such current sociological
not i ons as Davi d Rei sman' s ' ot her - di r ect i on' or Ervi ng Gof f man' s
' i mpressi on management ' coul d onl y arise and cl ai m credibility in a
si t uat i on in whi ch t he identity-defining power of i nst i t ut i ons has
been greatly weakened.
The obsol escence of t he concept of honour may now be seen in a
much mor e comprehensi ve perspective. The social l ocat i on of
honour lies in a wor l d of relatively i nt act , stable i nst i t ut i ons, a
wor l d in whi ch individuals can wi t h subjective cert ai nt y at t ach
their identities t o t he i nst i t ut i onal roles t hat society assigns t o t hem.
The di si nt egrat i on of this wor l d as a result of t he forces of
moderni t y has not onl y made honour an increasingly meani ngl ess
not i on, but has served as t he occasi on for a redefinition of i dent i t y
and its intrinsic dignity apar t from and often against t he i nst i t u-
t i onal roles t hr ough whi ch the i ndi vi dual expresses himself in
society. The reciprocity bet ween i ndi vi dual and society, bet ween
subjective identity and objective identification t hr ough rol es, now
comes t o be experi enced as a sort of struggle. Inst i t ut i ons cease t o
be t he ' home' of t he self; instead they become oppressi ve realities
t hat di st ort and est range t he self. Roles no l onger act ual i ze t he self,
but serve as a ' veil of mayd hi di ng t he self not onl y from ot her s but
from t he i ndi vi dual ' s own consci ousness. Onl y in t he interstitial
areas left vacant , as it wer e, by t he i nst i t ut i ons (such as t he so-called
pri vat e sphere of social life) can t he i ndi vi dual hope t o discover or
define himself. Ident i t y ceases t o be an objectively and subjectively
given fact, and i nst ead becomes t he goal of an often devi ous and
difficult quest . Mode r n man, al most inevitably it seems, is ever in
search of himself. If this is under st ood, it will al so be clear why bot h
t he sense of ' al i enat i on' and t he concomi t ant i dent i t y crisis are most
vehement among t he young t oday. Indeed, ' yout h' itself, whi ch is a
mat t er of social definition rat her t han biological fact, will be seen as
an interstitial area vacat ed or ' left over' by t he l arge i nst i t ut i onal
st ruct ures of moder n society. For t hi s reason it is, si mul t aneousl y,
t he locale of t he most acut e experi ences of sel f-est rangement and of
t he most intensive quest for reliable identities.
A lot will depend, nat ural l y, on one' s basic assumpt i ons about
man whet her one will bemoan or wel come t hese t r ansf or mat i ons.
Wha t t o one will appear as a pr of ound loss will be seen by anot her
Peter Berger 157
as t he pr el ude t o l i berat i on. Among intellectuals t oday, of course, it
is the l at t er vi ewpoi nt t hat prevails and t hat forms the implicit
ant hr opol ogi cal f oundat i on for the generally 'left' mood of the
t i me. The t hr eat of chaos, bot h social and psychic, whichever lurks
behi nd t he di si nt egrat i on of i nst i t ut i ons, will then be seen as a
necessary st age t hat mus t precede t he great ' l eap into freedom' t hat
is t o come. It is also possi bl e, in a conservative perspective, t o view
the same process as precisely t he r oot pat hol ogy of the moder n era,
as a di sast rous loss of t he very st ruct ures t hat enable men t o be
free and t o be t hemsel ves. Such pessimism is expressed forcefully, if
s omewhat pet ul ant l y, in Gehl en' s latest book, a conservative
mani fest o in whi ch moder ni t y appear s as an all-engulfing pesti-
l ence.
8
We woul d cont end her e t hat bot h perspectives - t he liberation
myt h of t he ' left' and t he nost al gi a of the ' ri ght ' for an intact world
- fail t o do justice t o t he ant hropol ogi cal and indeed t he ethical
di mensi ons of t he pr obl em. It seems clear t o us t hat t he unre-
st rai ned ent husi asm for t ot al l i berat i on of t he self from the
' r epr essi on' of i nst i t ut i ons fails t o t ake account of certain funda-
ment al r equi r ement s of man, not abl y t hose of order t hat
i nst i t ut i onal or der of society wi t hout whi ch bot h collectivities and
i ndi vi dual s mus t descend i nt o dehumani zi ng chaos. In ot her wor ds,
t he demi se of honour has been a very costly price t o pay for
what ever l i berat i ons moder n man may have achieved. On t he ot her
hand, t he unqualified denunci at i on of the cont empor ar y constella-
tion of i nst i t ut i ons and identities fails t o perceive t he vast moral
achi evement s made possi bl e by just this constellation - t he dis-
covery of t he aut onomous i ndi vi dual , with a dignity deriving from
his very bei ng, over and above all and any social identifications.
Anyone denounci ng t he moder n wor l d tout court shoul d pause and
quest i on whet her he wishes t o include in t hat denunci at i on the
specifically moder n discoveries of human dignity and human rights.
The convi ct i on t hat even t he weakest member s of society have an
i nherent ri ght t o pr ot ect i on and di gni t y; t he proscri pt i on of slavery
in all its forms, of racial and et hni c oppressi on; t he staggering
di scovery of t he di gni t y and rights of the child; the new sensitivity
t o cruel t y, from the abhor r ence of t ort ure t o t he codification of the
cri me of genoci de - a sensitivity t hat has become politically
significant in t he out r age agai nst t he cruelties of t he war in
Vi et nam; t he new recogni t i on of i ndi vi dual responsibility for all
act i ons, even t hose assigned t o t he i ndi vi dual wi t h specific institu-
t i onal rol es, a recogni t i on t hat at t ai ned t he force of l aw at
Nur ember g - all t hese, and ot her s, are mor al achi evement s t hat
NOTES
1
Cited in J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (New York:
Doubleday-Anchor, 1954), p. 33 (my italics).
2
J. K. Campbell, Honour, Family and Patronage (Oxford, 1964).
3
Ibid., pp. 271.
4
Norbert Elias, DerProzess der Zivilisation (Bern: Francke, 1969).
5
Cervantes, Don Quixote, trans. Walter Starkie (New York: New
American Library, 1964), 1:25, p. 243.
6
Ibid., n: 74.
7
W. Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part I, v:i.
8
Arnold Gehlen, Moral and Hypermoral (Frankfurt: Athenaum, 1969).
9
Anton Zijderveld, Abstract Society (New York: Doubleday, 1970).
woul d be unt hi nkabl e wi t hout t he pecul i ar const el l at i ons of t he
moder n wor l d. To reject t hem is unt hi nkabl e ethically. By t he same
t oken, it is not possible t o si mpl y t race t hem t o a false
ant hr opol ogy.
The t ask before us, rat her, is t o under st and t he empi ri cal
processes t hat have made moder n man lose sight of honour at t he
expense of dignity and t hen t o t hi nk t hr ough bot h t he ant hr o-
pological and t he ethical i mpl i cat i ons of t hi s. Obvi ousl y these
r emar ks can do no mor e t han poi nt up some di mensi ons of t he
pr obl em. It may be al l owed, t hough, t o specul at e t hat a redi scovery
of honour in t he future devel opment of moder n society is bot h
empirically plausible and moral l y desirable. Needl ess t o say, t hi s
will hardl y t ake t he form of a regressive rest orat i on of t r adi t i onal
codes. But t he cont empor ar y mood of ant i -i nst i t ut i onal i sm is
unlikely t o last, as Ant on Zijderveld i mpl i es.
9
Ma n ' s f undament al
const i t ut i on is such t hat , just about inevitably, he will once mor e
const ruct i nst i t ut i ons t o provi de an or der ed reality for himself. A
r et ur n t o i nst i t ut i ons will ipso facto be a r et ur n t o honour . It will
t hen be possible again for i ndi vi dual s t o identify t hemsel ves wi t h
t he escut cheons of their institutional roles, experi enced now not as
self-estranging t yranni es but as freely chosen vehicles of self-
real i zat i on. The ethical quest i on, of course, is what t hese institu-
t i ons will be like. Specifically, t he ethical test of any fut ure
i nst i t ut i ons, and of t he codes of honour they will ent ai l , will be
whet her they succeed in embodyi ng and in stabilizing t he di s-
coveries of human dignity t hat are t he pri nci pl e achi evement s of
moder n man.
8
Michael J. Sandel: Justice
and the Good*
i
THE STATUS OF THE GOOD
The difficulty wi t h Rawl s ' t heory of the good is epistemological
as well as mor al , and in this it recalls a pr obl em t hat arose in
connect i on wi t h t he concept of right - t hat of distinguishing a
st andar d of assessment from t he thing being assessed. If my
f undament al val ues and final ends are t o enabl e me, as surely they
must , t o eval uat e and regul at e my i mmedi at e want s and desires,
these values and ends must have a sanct i on i ndependent of t he mere
fact t hat I happen t o hol d t hem wi t h a certain intensity. But if my
concept i on of t he good is si mpl y t he pr oduct of my i mmedi at e
want s and desi res, t her e is no reason t o suppose t hat the critical
st andpoi nt it provi des is any mor e wor t hy or valid t han the desires
it seeks t o assess; as t he pr oduct of t hose desires, it woul d be
governed by t he same cont i ngenci es.
Rawl s r esponds t o this difficulty in t he case of the right by
seeking in justice as fairness an Archi medean poi nt t hat 'is not at
t he mercy, so t o speak, of existing want s and interests' ( 1971,
p. 261) . But as we have seen, Rawl s' concept of right does not
ext end t o pri vat e mor al i t y, nor does any ot her i nst rument of
det achment save t he good from t hor oughgoi ng implication in the
agent ' s exi st i ng want s and desires. ' Purely preferential choi ce' is
t hor oughl y het er onomous choice, and no person' s values or
concept i on of t he good can possibly reach beyond it. As Rawls
strikingly concedes, ' That we have one concept i on of t he good
rat her t han anot her is not rel evant from a mor al st andpoi nt . In
* 1982 Cambridge University Press. Reprinted from Liberalism and the
Limits of Justice by Michael Sandel, by permission of the publishers.
160
Justice and the Good
acqui ri ng it we are influenced by t he same sort of cont i ngenci es t hat
lead us t o rule out a knowl edge of our sex and class' ( 1975, p. 537).
The limited scope for reflection on Rawl s' account , and t he
probl emat i c, even i mpoveri shed t heory of t he good t hat results
reveal t he ext ent t o whi ch deont ol ogi cal liberalism accept s an
essentially ut i l i t ari an account of t he good, however its t heory of
right may differ. This ut i l i t ari an backgr ound first appear ed in our
' di scussi on of Dwor ki n' s defence of affirmative act i on; once no
individual rights were seen to be at st ake, ut i l i t ari an consi der at i ons
aut omat i cal l y prevailed. Al t hough Dwor ki n defends what he calls
an ' ant i -ut i l i t ari an concept of ri ght ' , t he scope of t hi s ri ght is strictly
(if elusively) ci rcumscri bed, such t hat ' t he vast bul k of t he l aws t hat
diminish my liberty are justified on ut i l i t ari an gr ounds as bei ng in
t he general interest or for t he general wel fare' ( 1977, p. 269) .
1
The ut i l i t ari an backgr ound t o Rawl s ' concept i on most clearly
appears in his references to individual moral life. Wher e justice
as fairness rejects ut i l i t ari ani sm as t he basis of soci al , or publ i c
moral i t y, it has no appar ent ar gument wi t h ut i l i t ari ani sm as t he
basis of i ndi vi dual , or pri vat e moral i t y, t he Kant i an not i on of ' dut y
t o onesel f t o t he cont r ar y. Rawl s describes t he ut i l i t ari an account
of pri vat e moral i t y, wi t hout discernible obj ect i on, as follows:
A person qui t e pr oper l y act s, at least when ot hers are not
affected, t o achieve his own great est good, t o advance his
rat i onal ends as far as possible. . . . [T]he pri nci pl e for an
individual is t o advance as far as possible his own wel fare, his
own syst em of desires' ( 1971, p. 23) .
To be sure t here is one formal principle t hat seems t o provi de
a general answer [to an i ndi vi dual ' s choice of life pl an] . Thi s is
t he principle t o adopt t hat pl an whi ch maxi mi zes t he expect ed
net bal ance of satisfaction ( 1971, p. 416) .
For Rawl s, ut i l i t ari ani sm goes wr ong not in concei vi ng t he good
as t he satisfaction of arbitrarily-given desires undi fferent i at ed as t o
wor t h - for justice as fairness shares in this - but onl y in bei ng
indifferent t o t he way t hese consummat i ons are spread across
i ndi vi dual s. Its mi st ake as he sees it is t o adopt ' for society as a
whol e t he pri nci pl e of rat i onal choice for one man' , t o combi ne ' t he
desires of all persons i nt o one coher ent system of desi re' , and t o
seek its overall satisfaction ( 1971, pp. 26- 7) . In so doi ng, it ' fuses'
or ' conflates' all persons into one, it reduces social choice t o
' essentially a quest i on of efficient admi ni st r at i on' (as, pr esumabl y,
Michael J. Sandel 161
individual choi ce can pr oper l y be reduced), and so fails t o take
seriously t he di st i nct i on bet ween persons ( 1971, pp. 27, 33).
Justice as fairness seeks to remedy these shortcomings by
emphasi zi ng t he di st i nct i on bet ween persons and by insisting on the
separat eness of t hose diverse ' systems of desires' t hat utilitarianism
conflates. But t he gr ounds for Rawl s' depar t ur e from utilitarianism
in this respect are not i mmedi at el y appar ent . Although he seems
firm in his vi ew t hat t o each individual human being there
cor r esponds exactly one ' syst em of desires' , he never says why this
must be so, or what exact l y a ' syst em of desires' consists in, or why
it is wr ong t o conflate t hem. Is a ' system of desires' a set of desires
ordered in a cert ai n way, ar r anged in a hi erarchy of relative wort h
or essential connect i on wi t h the identity of t he agent, or is it simply
a concat enat i on of desires arbi t rari l y arrayed, distinguishable only
by their relative i nt ensi t y and accidental l ocat i on? If it is the second,
if a system of desires means not hi ng mor e t han an arbitrary
collection of desires acci dent al l y embodi ed in some particular
human bei ng, t hen it is uncl ear why t he integrity of such a ' system'
shoul d be t aken so moral l y and metaphysically seriously. If desires
can pr oper l y be conflated wi t hi n persons, why not between persons
as well?
If, on t he ot her hand, what makes a system of desires is a
hi erarchi cal or der i ng of qualitatively distinguishable desires, then it
woul d be no mor e justifiable t o ' conflate' desires within a person
t han bet ween per sons, and what is wr ong wi t h utilitarianism woul d
also be wr ong, in t hi s respect at least, with justice as fairness. The
t endency t o conflate desires, whet her wi t hi n persons or between
t hem, woul d reflect t he failure t o order t hem, or t o acknowl edge the
qual i t at i ve di st i nct i ons bet ween t hem. But this failure cuts across
t he di st i nct i on bet ween i ndi vi dual and social choice, for there is no
reason t o suppose t hat a ' syst em of desires' in this sense corres-
ponds in all cases t o t he empirically-individuated person. Com-
muni t i es of var i ous sort s coul d count as distinct ' systems of desires'
in this sense, so l ong as they were identifiable in part by an order or
st ruct ure of shar ed val ues part l y constitutive of a common identity
or form of life. Fr om this poi nt of view, the utilitarian failure to
take seriously t he di st i nct i on bet ween persons woul d appear a mere
sympt om of its l arger failure t o t ake seriously the qualitative
di st i nct i ons of wor t h bet ween different orders of desires, a failure
root ed in an i mpover i shed account of t he good which justice as
fairness has been seen t o share.
For a deont ol ogi cal doct ri ne such as Rawl s' it mi ght be t hought
t hat vi ewi ng t he good as whol l y mi red in contingency, despite its
162 Justice and the Good
THE MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF JUSTICE
Our discussion of the good t hus bri ngs us back t o t he quest i on of
justice and t he claim for its pri ori t y, and wi t h t hi s we r et ur n t o t he
circumstances of justice in t he ori gi nal posi t i on. Her e, t he distinct-
ness or separat eness of persons on whi ch Rawl s insists as a
corrective t o ut i l i t ari ani sm is installed as t he key assumpt i on of
mut ual disinterest, the not i on t hat i ndi vi dual s t ake no interest in
one anot her ' s interests ( 1971, p. 218) . When first we surveyed t he
condi t i ons in t he original posi t i on, this assumpt i on in part i cul ar
and t he empiricist renderi ng of t he ci rcumst ances of justice in
general seemed t o under mi ne t he pr i macy of justice in vari ous
ways. Wher e justice depended for its vi rt ue on t he existence of
cert ai n empirical pre-condi t i ons, t he virtue of justice was no l onger
absol ut e, as t r ut h t o t heori es, but onl y condi t i onal , as physical
courage t o a war zone; it pr esupposed a rival vi rt ue or set of vi rt ues
of at least correl at i ve st at us; it assumed in cert ai n ci rcumst ances a
remedial di mens i on; " finally, wher e i nappr opr i at el y di spl ayed,
justice appear ed as a vice rat her t han a vi rt ue. In s um, a Hume a n
account of t he ci rcumst ances of justice such as Rawl s explicitly
adopt s - seemed i ncompat i bl e wi t h t he privileged st at us of justice
requi red by Rawl s and defended by Kant only by recourse t o a
moral met aphysi c Rawl s found unaccept abl e.
Hume' s own view of justice confirms its part i al i t y, at least in so
far as it is deri ved from premi ses whi ch Hume and Rawl s seem t o
share. For Hume , t he ci rcumst ances of justice descri be cert ai n
unf or t unat e if unavoi dabl e mat eri al and mot i vat i onal condi t i ons
of act ual human societies, most not abl y moder at e scarcity and
' limited generosi t y' . Toget her , these ci rcumst ances demonst r at e t he
implausibility generally, woul d have at least t he redeeming
advant age of maki ng t he pri macy of ri ght all t he mor e compel l i ng.
If t he good is not hi ng mor e t han t he i ndi scri mi nat e satisfaction of
arbitrarily-given preferences, regardless of wor t h, it is not difficult
t o imagine t hat t he right (and for t hat mat t er a good many ot her
sorts of claims) must out wei gh it. But in fact t he mor al l y di mi ni shed
st at us of t he good must inevitably call i nt o quest i on t he st at us of
justice as well. For once it is conceded t hat our concept i ons of t he
good are moral l y arbi t rary, it becomes difficult t o see why the
highest of all (social) virtues shoul d be t he one t hat enabl es us to
pursue these arbi t rary concept i ons ' as fully as ci rcumst ances
permi t ' .
sense in whi ch t he arrival of justice signifies the absence ol certain
nobler but r ar er vi rt ues.
'If every man had a t ender regard for anot her , or if nat ure
supplied abundant l y all our want s and desires . . . the jealousy of
interest, whi ch justice supposes, coul d no l onger have pl ace' ; nor,
says Hume, woul d t her e be any occasi on for distinctions of
propert y and possessi on. ' Encrease t o a sufficient degree the
benevolence of men, or t he bount y of nat ur e, and you render justice
useless, by suppl yi ng its pl ace wi t h much nobl er virtues, and more
valuable bl essi ngs. ' If mat er i al scarcity were replaced with abund-
ance, ' or if everyone had t he same affection and t ender regard for
everyone as for himself; justice and injustice woul d be equally
unknown among manki nd. ' And so, Hume concl udes, ' ' tis only
from t he scant y provi si on nat ur e has made for his want s, that
justice derives its or i gi n' ( 1739, pp. 494- 5) .
For Hume , justice cannot be t he first virtue of social institutions
(at least not in any cat egori cal sense), and in some cases is doubt -
fully a vi rt ue at all. In t he i nst i t ut i on of the family, for exampl e,
affections may be enl ar ged t o such an ext ent t hat justice is scarcely
engaged, much less as ' t he first vi rt ue' . And even in the wider
society, wher e generosi t y is mor e limited and justice more exten-
sively engaged, its vi rt ue can onl y be account ed for against a
backgr ound of hi gher or nobl er vi rt ues whose absence calls justice
into being. In so far as mut ual benevol ence and enlarged affections
could be cul t i vat ed mor e wi del y, t he need for ' t he caut i ous, jealous
virtue of j ust i ce' woul d di mi ni sh in pr opor t i on, and manki nd
woul d be t he bet t er for it. Wer e scarcity or selfishness overcome
altogether, t hen ' justice, being totally useless . . . could never
possibly have place in t he cat al ogue of vi rt ue' (1777, p. 16), much
less the first pl ace t o whi ch Rawl s woul d assign it.
But despi t e t he paral l el Rawl s himself invites between Hume' s
account and his own, t he assumpt i on of mut ual disinterest has a
different meani ng for Rawl s. It does not imply t hat human beings
are typically governed by ' selfishness and confined generosity' ;
indeed it is not meant as a claim about human mot i vat i ons at all.
It is r at her a claim about t he subject of mot i vat i ons. It assumes
interests of a self, not necessarily in a self, a subject of possession
i ndi vi duat ed in advance and given pr i or t o its ends.
From this t her e fol l ow i mpor t ant consequences for the status of
justice. No l onger is benevol ence pri or t o justice and in some cases
able t o s uppl ant it. Since for Rawl s, t he virtue of justice does not
presuppose egoistic mot i vat i ons t o begin wi t h, it need not awai t the
fading of benevol ence t o find its occasi on, and even the full
flowering of ' enl arged affections' cannot di spl ace it. Just i ce ceases
t o be merely remedi al wi t h respect t o t he ' nobl er vi rt ues' , for its
vi rt ue no l onger depends on their absence. To t he cont r ar y, where
per sons are i ndi vi duat ed in Rawl s' sense, justice not only wi ns its
i ndependence from prevai l i ng sent i ment s and mot i vat i ons, but
comes t o st and above t hem as pr i mar y. For given t he nat ur e of the
subject as Rawl s conceives it, justice is not merel y a sent i ment or a
feeling like ot her , lesser vi rt ues, but above all a f r amewor k t hat
const rai ns t hese vi rt ues and is ' regul at i ve' wi t h respect t o t hem.
Therefore in or der t o realize our nat ur e we have no al t erna-
tive but t o pl an t o preserve our sense of justice as governi ng
our ot her ai ms. Thi s sent i ment cannot be fulfilled if it is
compr omi sed and bal anced agai nst ot her ends as but one
desire among t he rest. . . . To t he cont r ar y, how far we
succeed in expressi ng our nat ur e depends on h o w consi st ent l y
we act from our sense of justice as finally regul at i ve. Wha t we
cannot do is express our nat ur e by fol l owi ng a pl an t hat views
t he sense of justice as but one desire t o be wei ghed agai nst
ot her s. For this sent i ment reveals wha t t he per son is, and t o
compr omi se it is not t o achieve for t he self free reign but t o
give way t o t he cont i ngenci es and acci dent s of t he wor l d
( 1971, pp. 5 7 4 - 5 ) .
We have seen h o w t he pri ori t y of justice, like t he pri ori t y of t he
self, derives in large par t from its freedom from t he cont i ngenci es
and accidents of t he wor l d. Thi s much emerged in our discussion of
! ri ght and t he bounds of t he self. In t he light of our di scussi on of t he
good we can now also see why on Rawl s' t heory of t he subject, such
vi rt ues as benevol ence and even love are not self-sufficient mor al
ideals but mus t awai t justice for t hei r compl et i on.
Given t he limited role for reflection on Rawl s ' account , t he
vi rt ues of benevol ence and love, as features of t he good, ar e forms
of sent i ment r at her t han insight, ways of feeling r at her t han
knowi ng. Unl i ke personal or first-order sent i ment s and feelings,
whose objects are given mor e or less directly t o my awar eness,
benevol ence and love are desires whos e object is t he good of
I
anot her . But given t he separat eness of per sons and t he i nt ract abi l i t y
of t he bounds bet ween t hem, t he cont ent of this good (t hat is, t he
good I wi sh anot her ) must be largely opaque t o me. On Rawl s'
vi ew, love is bl i nd, not for its intensity but r at her for t he opaci t y of
t he good t hat is t he object of its concer n. ' The r eason why t he
situation r emai ns obs cur e is t hat love and benevolence are second-
order not i ons: t hey seek t o further t he good of beloved individuals
that is al ready gi ven' ( 1971, p. 191).
If arri vi ng at one' s own good is pri mari l y a mat t er of surveying
existing preferences and assessing their relative intensities, it is not
the sort of enqui r y in whi ch anot her , even an intimate ot her, can
readily par t i ci pat e. Onl y t he person himself can ' know' what he
really want s or ' deci de' wha t he most prefers. ' Even when we take
up anot her ' s poi nt of vi ew and at t empt t o est i mat e what woul d be
t o his advant age, we do so as an adviser, so to speak' ( 1971,
p. 448) , and given t he limited cognitive access Rawl s' conception
al l ows, a r at her unpri vi l eged adviser at t hat .
Al t hough we may at t i mes over come the difficulty of knowi ng the
good of a bel oved i ndi vi dual whose interests we woul d advance, the
probl em becomes hopel essl y compounded when we woul d extend
our love or benevol ence t o a pl ural i t y of persons whose interests
may conflict. For we coul d not hope t o know their respective goods
well enough t o sort t hem out and assess their relative claims. Even if
benevol ence coul d be as widely cultivated as Hume in his hypot h-
etical vision suggest s, its vi rt ue woul d still not be self-sufficient, for
it woul d r emai n uncl ear , wi t hout mor e, what t he love of manki nd
woul d enjoin, i t is qui t e poi nt l ess t o say t hat one is t o judge the
si t uat i on as benevol ence di ct at es. Thi s assumes t hat we are wrongly
swayed by sel f-concern. Ou r pr obl em lies elsewhere. Benevolence is
at sea as l ong as its many loves are in opposi t i on in the persons of
its many obj ect s' ( 1971, p. 190). Not surprisingly, the anchor this
benevol ence requi res is suppl i ed by t he virtue of justice; benevo-
lence, even at its mos t expansi ve, depends on justice for its
compl et i on. ' A love of manki nd t hat wishes t o preserve the
distinction of per sons, t o recognize the separateness of life and
experi ence, will use t he t wo principles of justice t o det ermi ne its
aims when t he many goods it cherishes are in opposi t i on' (
l 9 7
j '
P- 191). Even in t he face of so nobl e a virtue as t he love of manki nd,
t he pr i macy of justice prevai l s, al t hough the love that remains is of
an oddl y judicial spirit.
This love is gui ded by what individuals themselves woul d
consent t o in a fair initial si t uat i on whi ch gives t hem equal
r epr esent at i on as mor al persons ( 1971, p. 191).
Thus we see t hat t he assumpt i on of the mut ual disinterested-
ness of t he part i es does not prevent a reasonabl e interpreta-
166 justice and the Good
t i on of benevolence and of t he love of manki nd within the
framework of justice as fairness [emphasi s added] ( 1971,
p. 192).
For Rawl s, t he consequences of t aki ng seriously the di st i nct i on
bet ween persons are not directly mor al but mor e decisively
epi st emol ogi cal . Wha t t he bounds bet ween per sons confine is less
t he reach of our sent i ment s - this t hey do not prej udge - t han the
reach of our under st andi ng, of our cognitive access t o ot hers. And
it is this epistemic deficit (which deri ves from t he nat ur e of the
subject) mor e t han any short age of benevol ence (which is in any
case vari abl e and cont i ngent ) t hat requi res justice for its remedy
and so account s for its pre-emi nence. Wher e for Hume , we need
justice because we do not love each ot her well enough, for Rawl s
we need justice because we cannot know each ot her well enough for
even love t o serve al one.
But as our discussion of agency and reflection suggest s, we are
nei t her as t r anspar ent to ourselves nor as opaque t o ot her s as
Rawl s ' mor al epi st emol ogy requi res. If our agency is t o consist in
somet hi ng more t han t he exercise in 'efficient admi ni st r at i on'
whi ch Rawl s' account implies, we^must be capabl e of a deeper
i nt rospect i on t han a ' direct sel f-knowl edge' of our i mmedi at e want s
and desires al l ows. But t o be capabl e of a mor e t hor oughgoi ng
reflection, we cannot be whol l y unencumber ed subjects of posses-
si on, i ndi vi duat ed in advance and given pri or t o our ends, but must
be subjects const i t ut ed in par t by our central aspi rat i ons and
at t achment s, al ways open, i ndeed vul nerabl e, t o gr owt h and
t r ansf or mat i on in t he light of revised sel f-underst andi ngs. And in so
' far as our const i t ut i ve sel f-underst andi ngs compr ehend a wi der
subject t han t he i ndi vi dual al one, whet her a family or t ri be or city
or class or nat i on or peopl e, t o this ext ent they define a communi t y
in t he const i t ut i ve sense. And what mar ks such a communi t y is not
merel y a spirit of benevol ence, or t he preval ence of communi t ar i an
val ues, or even cert ai n ' shared final ends' al one, but a common
vocabul ary of di scourse and a backgr ound of i mpl i ci t pract i ces and
under st andi ngs wi t hi n whi ch t he opaci t y of t he par t i ci pant s is
reduced if never finally dissolved. In so far as justice depends for its
pre-emi nence on t he separat eness or boundedness of per sons i n t he
cognitive sense, its pri ori t y woul d di mi ni sh as t hat opaci t y faded
and this communi t y deepened.
Michael J. Sandel
167
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY
Of any society it can al ways be asked t o what ext ent it is just, or
' wel l -ordered' in Rawl s ' sense, and t o what ext ent it is a com-
munity, and t he answer can in nei t her case fully be given by
reference t o t he sent i ment s and desires of the part i ci pant s alone. As
Rawls observes, t o ask whet her a part i cul ar society is just is not
simply t o ask whet her a l arge number of its members happen to
have among t hei r var i ous desires t he desire t o act justly - although
this may be one feat ure of a just society - but whet her the society is
itself a society of a cert ai n ki nd, or der ed in a certain way, such that
justice descri bes its ' basi c st r uct ur e' and not merely the dispositions
of persons wi t hi n t he st r uct ur e. Thus Rawl s writes that although
we call t he at t i t udes and di sposi t i ons of persons just and unjust,
for justice as fairness t he ' pr i mar y subject of justice is the basic
structure of soci et y' ( 1971, p. 7). For a society t o be just in this
st rong sense, justice mus t be const i t ut i ve of its framework and not
simply an at t r i but e of cert ai n of t he part i ci pant s' pl ans of life.
Similarly, t o ask whet her a part i cul ar society is a communi t y is
not simply t o ask whet her a large number of its members happen to
have among t hei r var i ous desires t he desire t o associate with others
or t o pr omot e communi t ar i an ai ms - al t hough this may be one
feature of a communi t y - but whet her the society is itself a society
of a cert ai n ki nd, or der ed in a cert ai n way, such that communi t y
describes its basi c st r uct ur e and not merely t he dispositions of
persons wi t hi n t he st r uct ur e. For a society t o be a communi t y in this
st rong sense, communi t y must be constitutive of the shared self-
under st andi ngs of t he par t i ci pant s and embodi ed in their institu-
tional ar r angement s, not simply an at t ri but e of certain of the
par t i ci pant s' pl ans of life.
Rawl s mi ght obj ect t hat a const i t ut i ve concept i on of communi t y
such as this shoul d be rejected ' for reasons of clarity among ot hers' ,
or on t he gr ounds t hat it supposes society t o be ' an organic whole
wi t h a life of its own di st i nct from and superi or t o t hat of all its
member s in t hei r rel at i ons wi t h one anot her ' ( 1971, p. 264). But a
const i t ut i ve concept i on of communi t y is no mor e metaphysically
Probl emat i c t han a const i t ut i ve concept i on of justice such as Rawls
defends. For if t hi s not i on of communi t y describes a framework ot
sel f-underst andi ngs t hat is di st i ngui shabl e from and in some sense
Prior t o t he sent i ment s and di sposi t i ons of individuals within the
f r amewor k, it is onl y i n t he same sense t hat justice as fairness
describes a ' basi c st r uct ur e' or f r amewor k t hat is likewise distm-
gui shabl e from and prior t o the sent i ment s and di sposi t i ons of
i ndi vi dual s wi t hi n it.
If ut i l i t ari ani sm fails t o t ake seriously our di st i nct ness, justice as
fairness fails t o t ake seriously our commonal i t y. In regardi ng the
bounds of t he self as pri or, fixed once and for all, it relegates our
commonal i t y t o an aspect of t he good, and relegates t he good t o a
mere cont i ngency, a pr oduct of i ndi scri mi nat e want s and desires
' not rel evant from a mor al st andpoi nt ' . Gi ven a concept i on of the
good t hat is di mi ni shed in this way, t he pri ori t y of ri ght woul d seem
an unexcept i onabl e claim i ndeed. But ut i l i t ari ani sm gave the good
a bad name, and in adopt i ng it uncri t i cal l y, justice as fairness wins
for deont ol ogy a false victory.
II
For justice t o be t he first vi rt ue, cert ai n t hi ngs mus t be t r ue of us.
We must be creat ures of a cert ai n ki nd, rel at ed t o human
ci rcumst ance in a cert ai n way. We mus t st and at a cert ai n di st ance
from our ci rcumst ance, whet her as t r anscendent al subject in the
case of Kant , or as essentially unencumber ed subject of possession
in t he case of Rawl s. Ei t her way, we must regard ourselves as
i ndependent : i ndependent from t he interests and at t achment s we
may have at any moment , never identified by our ai ms but al ways
capabl e of st andi ng back t o survey and asssess and possi bl y t o
revise t hem (Rawl s, 1979, p . 7; 1980, pp. 544- 5) .
DEONTOLOGY'S LIBERATING PROJECT
Bound up wi t h t he not i on of an i ndependent self is a vision of the
mor al universe this self must i nhabi t . Unlike classical Gr eek and
medi eval Chri st i an concept i ons, t he uni verse of t he deont ol ogi cal
et hi c is a place devoi d of i nherent meani ng, a wor l d ' di senchant ed'
in Ma x Weber ' s phr ase, a wor l d wi t hout an objective mor al order.
Onl y in a uni verse empt y of telos, such as sevent eent h-cent ury
science and phi l osophy affi rmed,
2
is it possi bl e t o conceive a subject
apar t from and pr i or t o its purposes and ends. Onl y a wor l d
ungover ned by a purposi ve order leaves principles of justice open t o
huma n const r uct i on and concept i ons of t he good t o i ndi vi dual
choi ce. In t hi s t he dept h of opposi t i on bet ween deont ol ogi cal
liberalism and teleological wor l d views most fully appear s.
Wher e nei t her nat ur e nor cosmos supplies a meani ngful or der t o
be grasped or appr ehended, it falls t o huma n subjects t o const i t ut e
meaning on t hei r own. Thi s woul d expl ai n t he promi nence of
contract t heory from Hobbe s onwar d, and t he correspondi ng
emphasis on vol unt ar i st as agai nst cognitive ethics cul mi nat i ng in
Kant. What can no l onger be found remai ns somehow t o be
created.
3
Rawl s descri bes his own view in this connect i on as a
version of Kant i an ' const r uct i vi sm' .
The part i es t o t he ori gi nal posi t i on do not agree on what t he
moral facts ar e, as if t her e wer e al ready such facts. It is not
t hat , being si t uat ed i mpart i al l y, they have a clear and
undi st ort ed vi ew of a pr i or and i ndependent moral order.
Rat her (for const r uct i vi sm) , there is no such order, and
therefore no such facts apar t from t he pr ocedur e as a whol e
[emphasis added] ( 1980, p. 568) .
Similarly for Kant , t he mor al l aw is not a discovery of theoretical
reason but a del i verance of pract i cal reason, t he pr oduct of pure
will. ' The el ement ar y pract i cal concept s have as their foundat i on
the form of a pur e will given in r eason' , and what makes this will
aut hori t at i ve is t hat it legislates in a wor l d wher e meani ng has yet
t o arrive. Pract i cal r eason finds its advant age over theoretical
reason precisely in t hi s vol unt ar i st faculty, in its capacity to
generate pract i cal pr ecept s di rect l y, wi t hout recourse t o cognition.
'Since in all precept s of t he pur e will it is only a question of the
det ermi nat i on of wi l l ' , t her e is no need for these precepts ' t o wai t
upon i nt ui t i ons in or der t o acqui re a meani ng. This occurs for the
not ewort hy r eason t hat they themselves produce the reality of that
to which they refer' [emphasi s added] ( 1788, pp. 67- 8) .
It is i mpor t ant t o recall t hat , on t he deont ol ogi cal view, the
notion of a self bar r en of essential ai ms and at t achment s does not
imply t hat we are bei ngs whol l y wi t hout pur pose or i ncapabl e of
moral ties, but r at her t hat t he val ues and rel at i ons we have are the
product s of choi ce, t he possessi ons of a self given pri or t o its ends.
It is similar wi t h deont ol ogy' s universe. Though it rejects the
possibility of an obj ect i ve mor al or der , this liberalism does not hol d
t hat just anyt hi ng goes. It affirms justice, not nihilism. The not i on
of a uni verse empt y of i nt ri nsi c meani ng does not , on the
deont ol ogi cal vi ew, i mpl y a wor l d whol l y ungoverned by regulative
Principles, but r at her a mor al uni verse i nhabi t ed by subjects
capable of const i t ut i ng meani ng on t hei r own - as agents of
construction in case of t he ri ght , as agent s of choice in the case of
the good. Qua noumenal selves, or part i es t o t he original position,
we arrive at principles of justice; qua act ual , i ndi vi dual selves, we
arrive at concept i ons of t he good. And t he pri nci pl es we const ruct
as noumenal selves const rai n (but do not det ermi ne) t he pur poses
we choose as i ndi vi dual selves. Thi s reflects t he pri ori t y of t he right
over t he good.
The deont ol ogi cal universe and t he i ndependent self t hat moves
wi t hi n it, t aken t oget her, hol d out a l i berat i ng vision. Freed from
t he dictates of nat ur e and t he sanct i on of social rol es, t he
deont ol ogi cal subject is installed as soverei gn, cast as t he aut hor of
t he only mor al meani ngs t here are. As i nhabi t ant s of a wor l d
wi t hout telos, we are free t o const r uct principles of justice
unconst r ai ned by an or der of val ue ant ecedent l y given. Al t hough
t he principles of justice are not strictly speaki ng a mat t er of choi ce,
the society they define ' comes as close as a society can t o bei ng a
voluntary scheme' (1976, p. 13), for they arise from a pure will or act
of const ruct i on not answerabl e t o a pri or mor al order. And as
i ndependent selves, we are free t o choose our pur poses and ends
unconst rai ned by such an order, or by cust om or t radi t i on or
i nheri t ed st at us. So l ong as they are not unjust, our concept i ons of
t he good carry wei ght , what ever t hey are, simply in vi rt ue of our
havi ng chosen t hem. We are ' self-originating sources of valid
cl ai ms' (Rawl s, 1980, p. 543) .
No w justice is the vi rt ue t hat embodi es deont ol ogy' s l i berat i ng
vision and al l ows it t o unfol d. It embodi es this vision by descri bi ng
t hose principles t he sovereign subject is said t o const ruct whi l e
si t uat ed pri or t o t he const i t ut i on of all val ue. It al l ows t he vision t o
unfol d in t hat , equi pped with t hese pri nci pl es, t he j ust society
regulates each per son' s choice of ends in a way compat i bl e wi t h a
similar liberty for all. Ci t i zens governed by justice are t hus enabl ed
t o realize deont ol ogy' s l i berat i ng proj ect - t o exercise their capaci t y
as ' self-originating sources of valid cl ai ms' - as fully as ci rcum-
st ances per mi t . So t he pri macy of justice at once expresses and
advances the l i berat i ng aspi rat i ons of t he deont ol ogi cal wor l d view
and concept i on of t he self.
But t he deont ol ogi cal vision is flawed, bot h wi t hi n its own t erms
and mor e generally as an account of our moral experi ence. Wi t hi n
its own t erms, the deont ol ogi cal self, st ri pped of all possi bl e
const i t ut i ve at t achment s, is less l i berat ed t han di sempower ed. As
we have seen, nei t her the right nor the good admi t s of t he
vol unt ari st deri vat i on deont ol ogy requi res. As agent s of const r uc-
tion we do not really const ruct (Sandel, 1982, chapt er 3) and as
agent s of choice we do not really choose (Sandel, 1982, chapt er 4) .
What goes on behi nd t he veil of i gnorance is not a cont r act or
Michael J. Sandel 1 7 1
an agreement but if anyt hi ng a ki nd of di scovery; and what goes on
in ' purely preferent i al choi ce
1
is less a choosi ng of ends t han a
matching of pre-exi st i ng desi res, undi fferent i at ed as t o wor t h, wi t h
the best available means of satisfying t hem. For t he part i es t o the
original posi t i on, as for t he par t i es t o or di nar y del i berat i ve
rationality, t he l i berat i ng mome nt fades before it arri ves; the
sovereign subject is left at sea in t he ci r cumst ances it was t hought t o
command.
The moral frailty of t he deont ol ogi cal self al so appear s at t he
level of first-order pri nci pl es. Her e we found t hat the i ndepen-
dent self, bei ng essentially di spossessed, was t oo t hi n t o be
capable of desert in t he or di nar y sense (Sandel, 1982, chapt er 2).
For claims of desert pr es uppos e t hi ckl y- const i t ut ed selves, beings
capable of possessi on in t he const i t ut i ve sense, but the deont o-
logical self is whol l y wi t hout possessi ons of this ki nd. Acknowl edg-
ing this l ack, Rawl s woul d f ound ent i t l ement s on legitimate
expectations i nst ead. If we are i ncapabl e of desert , at least we
are entitled t hat i nst i t ut i ons honour t he expect at i ons t o whi ch they
give rise.
But the difference pr i nci pl e requi res mor e. It begins wi t h the
t hought , congeni al t o t he deont ol ogi cal vi ew, t hat t he assets I have
are only acci dent al l y mi ne. But it ends by assumi ng t hat these assets
are therefore c ommon assets and t hat society has a pri or claim on
the fruits of t hei r exerci se. Thi s ei t her di sempower s the deont ol ogW
cal self or deni es its i ndependence. Ei t her my pr ospect s are left at
the mercy of i nst i t ut i ons est abl i shed for ' pr i or and i ndependent
social ends' {Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p. 313), ends
which may or may not coi nci de wi t h my own, or I must count
myself a member of a communi t y defined in par t by t hose ends, in
which case I cease t o be unencumber ed by const i t ut i ve at t achment s.
Either way, t he difference pr i nci pl e cont r adi ct s t he l i berat i ng
aspiration of t he deont ol ogi cal proj ect . We cannot be. per sons for
whom justice is pr i mar y and al so be per sons for whom t he
difference pri nci pl e is a pri nci pl e of justice.
CHARACTER, SELF-KNOWLEDGE, AND FRIENDSHIP
If the deont ol ogi cal et hi c fails t o r edeem its own l i berat i ng promi se,
" also fails pl ausi bl y t o account for cert ai n i ndi spensabl e aspect s of
ur moral experi ence. For deont ol ogy KSststEat we view ourselves
as i ndependent selves, i ndependent in t he sense t hat our identity is
never tied t o our ai ms and at t achment s . Gi ven our ' mor al power to
l orm, t o revise, and r at i onal l y t o pur s ue a concept i on of t he good
172
Justice and the Good
(Rawl s, 1980, p. 544) , t he cont i nui t y of our i dent i t y is unpr obl ema-
tically assured. No t r ansf or mat i on of my ai ms and at t achment s
coul d call i nt o quest i on t he per son I am, for no such allegiances,
however deeply hel d, coul d possibly engage my i dent i t y t o begin
wi t h.
But we cannot regard ourselves as i ndependent in this way
wi t hout great cost t o t hose loyalties and convi ct i ons whose mor al
force consists part l y in t he fact t hat living by t hem is i nseparabl e
from under st andi ng ourselves as t he par t i cul ar per sons we are -
as member s of this family or communi t y or nat i on or peopl e, as
bearers of this hi st ory, as sons and daught er s of t hat revol ut i on, as
citizens of this republ i c. Allegiances such as t hese are mor e t han
val ues I happen t o have or aims I ' espouse at any given t i me' . They
go beyond t he obl i gat i ons 1 vol unt ari l y i ncur and t he ' nat ur al
dut i es' I owe t o huma n beings as such. They al l ow t hat t o some I
owe mor e t han justice requires or even per mi t s, not by reason of
agreement s I have made but i nst ead in vi rt ue of t hose mor e or less
endur i ng at t achment s and commi t ment s whi ch t aken t oget her
part l y define t he person I am.
To i magi ne a person i ncapabl e of const i t ut i ve at t achment s such
as t hese is not t o conceive an ideally free and rat i onal agent , but t o
i magi ne aj person whol l y wi t hout char act er , wi t hout mor al dept h.
For t o have charact erTs t o know t hat I move in a hi st ory I neither
s ummon nor command, whi ch carri es consequences none t he less
for my choices and conduct . It dr aws me closer t o some and mor e
di st ant from ot her s; it makes some ai ms mor e appr opr i at e, ot her s
less so. As a sel f-i nt erpret i ng. bei ng, I am able t o reflect on my
hi st ory and in this sense t o di st ance myself from it, but t he di st ance
is al ways precari ous and provi si onal , t he poi nt of reflection never
finally secured out si de t he hi st ory itself. A person wi t h char act er
t hus knows t hat he is i mpl i cat ed in var i ous ways even as he reflects,
and feels t he mor al wei ght of what he knows .
Thi s makes a difference for agency and sel f-knowl edge. For, as
we have seen, t he deont ol ogi cal self, bei ng whol l y wi t hout charac-
t er, is i ncapabl e of self-knowledge in any moral l y seri ous sense.
Wher e t he self is unencumber ed and essentially di spossessed, no
per son is left for sef/ '-reflection t o reflect upon. Thi s is why, on t he
deont ol ogi cal vi ew, del i berat i on about ends can onl y be an exercise
in arbi t rari ness. In t he absence of const i t ut i ve at t achment s,
del i berat i on issues in ' purel y preferential choi ce' , whi ch means t he
ends we seek, bei ng mi red in cont i ngency, ' ar e not rel evant from a
mor al st andpoi nt ' (Rawl s, 1975, p. 537) .
When I act out of mor e or less endur i ng qualities of char act er , by
Michael J. Sandel
173
cont rast , my choice of ends is not arbi t rary in the same way. In
consul t i ng my preferences, I have not only t o weigh their intensity
but also t o assess t hei r suitability t o the person I (already) am. I ask,
as I del i berat e, not only what I really want but who I really am, j i nd
this last quest i on t akes me beyond an at t ent i on t o my desires alone
t o reflect on my i dent i t y itself. Whi l e t he cont our s of my identity
will in some ways be open and subject t o revision, they are not
whol l y wi t hout shape. And t he fact t hat they are not enables me to
di scri mi nat e among my mor e i mmedi at e want s and desires; some
now appear essential, ot her s merely incidental to my defining
projects and commi t ment s. Al t hough t here may be a certain
ul t i mat e cont i ngency in my havi ng wound up the person I am
only t heol ogy can say for sure it makes a mor al difference none
t he less t hat , bei ng t he per son I am, I affirm these ends rat her than
t hose, t ur n this way r at her t han t hat . While the not i on of
const i t ut i ve at t achment s may at first seem an obstacle t o agency -
t he self, now encumber ed, is no l onger strictly pri or some relative
fixity of char act er appear s essential t o prevent the lapse into
arbi t rari ness whi ch t he deont ol ogi cal self is unabl e t o avoid.
The possibility of charact er in t he constitutive sense is also
i ndi spensabl e t o a cert ai n ki nd of friendship, a friendship marked
by mut ual insight as well as sent i ment . By any account , friendship is
bound up wi t h cert ai n feelings. We like our friends; we have
affection for t hem, and wi sh t hem well. We hope t hat their desires
find sat i sfact i on, t hat t hei r pl ans meet with success, and we commi t
oursel ves in vari ous ways t o advanci ng their ends.
But for per sons pr esumed i ncapabl e of constitutive at t achment s,
act s of fri endshi p such as t hese face a powerful const rai nt . However
much I mi ght hope for t he good of a friend and stand ready t o
advance it, onl y t he friend himself can know what t hat good is^ This
rest ri ct ed access t o t he good ofJ>thers
L
follows from i f i ej i mi t ed
scope for self-reflection, whi ch bet rays in t urn t he thinness of the
deont ol ogi cal self t o begin wi t h. Wher e deliberating about my good
means no mor e t han at t endi ng t o want s and desires given directly
t o my awar eness, I mus t do it on my own; it neither requires nor
admi t s t he par t i ci pat i on of ot hers. Every act of friendship thus
becomes parasi t i c on a good identifiable in advance. ' Benevolence
and love are second- or der not i ons: they seek to further the good of
bel oved i ndi vi dual s t hat is al ready given' (Rawls, 1971, p. 191).
Even t he friendliest sent i ment s must awai t a moment of introspec-
tion itself inaccessible t o friendship. To expect mor e of any friend,
or t o offer mor e, can onl y be a pr esumpt i on against the ul t i mat e
pri vacy of sel f-knowl edge.
For_persons encumber ed in par t by a hi st ory t hey share wi t h
ot her s, by cont r ast , knowi ng oneself is a mor e compl i cat ed t hi ng. It
is also a less strictly pri vat e t hi ng. Wher e seeki ng my good is bound
up~with expUifirig my identity and I nt er pr et i ng my life hi st ory, t he
knowl edge I seek is less t r anspar ent t o me and less opaque t o
ot her s. Fri endshi p becomes a way of knowi ng as well as liking.
Uncert ai n whi ch pat h t o t ake, I consul t a friend who knows me
well, and t oget her we del i berat e, offering and assessing by t ur ns
compet i ng descri pt i ons of t he person I am, and of t he al t ernat i ves I
face as they bear on my identity. To t ake seriously such del i berat i on
is t o al l ow t hat my friend may gr asp somet hi ng I have mi ssed, may
offer a mor e adequat e account of t he way my i dent i t y is engaged in
t he alternatives before me. To adopt t hi s new descri pt i on is t o see
myself "In a new way; my old self-image now seems part i al or
occl uded, and I may say in ret rospect t hat my friend knew me bet t er
t han I knew myself. To del i berat e wi t h friends is t o admi t this
possibility, whi ch pr esupposes in t ur n a mor e ri chl y-const i t ut ed self
t han deont ol ogy al l ows. Whi l e t here will of course r emai n t i mes
when friendship requi res deference t o t he self-image of a friend,
however flawed, this t oo requires i nsi ght ; here t he need t o defer
implies t he ability t o know.
So t o see ourselves as deont ol ogy woul d see us is t o depri ve us
of t hose qualities of charact er, reflectiveness, and friendship t hat
depend on t he possibility of const i t ut i ve projects and at t achment s.
And t o see ourselves as given t o commi t ment s such as t hese is t o
admi t a deeper commonal i t y t han benevol ence descri bes, a com-
monal i t y of shared sel f-underst andi ng as well as ' enl arged affec-
t i ons' . As t he i nde pe nde nt self finds its limits in t hose ai ms and
at t achment s from whi ch it cannot st and apar t , so j ust i ce finds its
limits In t hose Forms of communi t y t hat engajge t he identity as well
as t he interests of t he par t i cmal i t s
-
^
To all of t hi s, deont ol ogy mi ght finally reply wi t h a concessi on
and a di st i nct i on: it is one t hi ng t o al l ow t hat ' citizens in t hei r
per sonal affairs . . . have at t achment s and loves t hat they believe
t hey woul d not , or coul d not , st and apar t from' , t hat t hey ' r egar d it
as unt hi nkabl e . . . t o view themselves wi t hout cert ai n religious and
phi l osophi cal convi ct i ons and commi t ment s ' (Rawl s, 1980,
p. 545) . But wi t h publ i c. life it is different. Therej^ no loyalty or
allegiance coul d be similarly essential t o our sense of who we are.
Unl i ke our ties t o family and friends, no devot i on t o city or nat i on,
t o par t y or cause, coul d possibly r un deep enough t o be defining. By
cont r ast wi t h our pri vat e identity, our ' publ i c i dent i t y' as mor al
persons ' is not affected by changes over t i me
1
in our concept i ons of
Michael ]. Sandel 175
the good (Rawl s, 1980, pp. 544- 5) . While we may be thickly-
const i t ut ed selves in pri vat e, we must be whol l y unencumbered
selves in publ i c, and it is t here t hat t he pri macy of justice prevails.
But once we recall t he special st at us of t he deontological claim, it
is uncl ear wha t t he gr ounds for this distinction could be. It might
seem at first gl ance a psychol ogi cal distinction; det achment conies
more easily in publ i c life, wher e the ties we have are typically less
compel l i ng; I can mor e easily st ep back from, say, my partisan
allegiances t han cert ai n per sonal loyalties and affections. But as we
have seen from t he st art , deont ol ogy' s claim for the independence
of the self must be mor e t han a claim of psychology or sociology.
Ot her wi se, t he pr i macy of justice woul d hang on the degree of
benevol ence and fellow-feeling any part i cul ar society managed to
inspire. The i ndependence of the self does not mean that I can, as a
psychol ogi cal mat t er , s ummon in this or t hat circumstance the
det achment r equi r ed t o st and out si de my values and ends, rather
t hat I must regard myself as the bearer of a self distinct from my
values and ends, what ever they may be. It is above all an
epi st emol ogi cal cl ai m, and has little t o do wi t h t he relative intensity
of feeling associ at ed wi t h publ i c or pri vat e relations.
Under st ood as an epi st emol ogi cal claim, however, the deont o-
logical concept i on of t he self cannot admi t t he distinction required.
Al l owi ng const i t ut i ve possibilities where ' pri vat e' ends are at stake
woul d seem unavoi dabl y t o a l l o wj n least the possibility t hat
' publ i c' ends coul d be constiTijt7v^sjyje}I Once t he bounds of the
self are no l onger fixed, i ndi vi duat ed in advance and given prior t o
experi ence, t her e is no sayi ng in pri nci pl e what sort s of experiences
coul d shape or reshape t hem, no guar ant ee t hat only ' pri vat e' and
never ' publ i c' events coul d conceivably be decisive.
Not egoists but st r anger s, somet i mes benevolent, make for citizens
of t he deont ol ogi cal r epubl i c; justice finds its occasion because we
cannot k n o w each ot her , or our ends, well enough t o govern by the
common good al one. Thi s condi t i on is not likely t o fade altogether,
and so l ong as it does not , justice will be necessary. But neither is it
guar ant eed al ways t o pr edomi nat e, and in so far as it does not ,
communi t y will be possi bl e, and an unsettling presence for justice.
Li beral i sm teaches respect for t he di st ance of self and ends, and
when this di st ance is lost, we are submerged in a circumstance that
ceases t o be our s. But by seeking t o secure this distance t oo
compl et el y, l i beral i sm under mi nes its own insight. Bj^putting the
self beyond t he r each of pol i t i cs, it makes human agency an article
of faith r at her t han an obj ect of cont i nui ng at t ent i on and concern, a
1 7 6 Justice and the Good
premi se of politics r at her t han its pr ecar i ous achi evement . This
misses t he pat hos of politics and also its mos t i nspi ri ng possibilities.
It over l ooks t he danger t hat when politics goes badl y, not only
di sappoi nt ment s but also di sl ocat i ons ar e likely t o result. And it
forgets t he possibility t hat when politics goes wel l , we can know a
good in c ommon t hat we cannot know al one.
NOTES
For a compelling critique of Dworkin' s view in this respect, see H. L. A.
Hart (1979, pp. 86-9).
For discussion of the moral, political, and epistemological consequences
of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution and world-view, see
Strauss, 1953; Arendt, 1958, pp. 248- 325; Wolin, 1960, pp. 239-85;
and Taylor, 1975, pp. 3- 50.
As one liberal writer boldly asserts, 'The hard truth is this: There is no
moral meaning hidden in the bowels of the universe. . . . Yet there is no
need to be overwhelmed by the void. We may create our own meanings,
you and I' (Ackerman, 1980, p. 368). Oddly enough, he insists none
the less that liberalism is committed to no particular metaphysic or
epistemology, nor any 'Big Questions of a highly controversial character'
(pp. 356- 7, 361) .
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ackerman, B.A. 1980. Social Justice in the Liberal State, New Haven.
Arendt, H. 1958. The Human Condition, Chicago.
Dworkin, R. 1977. Taking Rights Seriously, London.
Hart, H.L.A. 1979. Between utility and rights. In The Idea of Freedom,
ed. A. Ryan, pp. 77-98. Oxford.
Hume, D. 1739. A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edn, ed. L. A. Selby-
Bigge, 1978. Oxford.
Hume, D. 1777. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, 1966
edn, La Salle, Illinois.
Kant, I. 1788. Critique of Practical Reason, translated by L. W. Beck,
1956. Indianapolis.
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice, Oxford.
Rawls, J. 1975. Fairness to goodness, Philosophical Review, 84,
pp. 536-54.
Rawls, J. 1979. A well-ordered society. In Philosophy, Politics, and
Society, 5th series, eds P. Laslett and J. Fishkin, pp. 6- 20. Oxford.
Rawls, J. 1980. Kantian constructivism in moral theory, Journal of
Philosophy, 77, pp.5 I S- 72.
Sandel, M. 1982. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge.
Strauss, L. 1953. Natural Right and History, Chicago.
Taylor, C. 1975. Hegel, Cambridge.
Wolin, S. 1960. Politics and Vision, Boston.
Charles Taylor: Hegel: History
and Politics*
i
. . Kant ' s mor al t heor y r emai ned at the edges of politics, as it were,
setting limits beyond whi ch st at es or individuals should not tread.
For Hegel , in cont r ast , moral i t y can only receive a concrete content
in politics, in t he desi gn of t he society we have to further and
sustain.
Thi s set of obl i gat i ons whi ch we have t o further and sustain a
society f ounded on t he Idea is what Hegel calls 'Sittlichkeif. This
has been vari ousl y t r ansl at ed in English, as ' ethical life', ' objective
et hi cs' , ' concr et e et hi cs' , but no t ransl at i on can capt ure the sense of
this t erm of ar t , and I pr opos e t o use t he original here. 'Sittlichkeif
is t he usual Ger man t er m for ' et hi cs' , wi t h the same kind of
et ymol ogi cal ori gi n, in t he t erm 'Sitten' which we might translate
' cust oms' . But Hegel gives it a special sense, in cont rast to
'Moralitat' (whi ch of course has a parallel etymological origin in
' mor es' , al t hough bei ng Latin it woul d not be so evident t o German
readers).
'Sittlichkeif refers t o t he moral obl i gat i ons I have t o an ongoing
communi t y of whi ch I am par t . These obligations are based on
est abl i shed nor ms and uses, and t hat is why t he etymological root
in 'Sitten' is i mpor t ant for Hegel ' s use.
1
The crucial characteristic of
Sittlicbkeit is t hat it enj oi ns us t o bri ng about what already is. This
is a par adoxi cal way of put t i ng it, but in fact the common life which
is t he basis of my sittlich obl i gat i on is al ready there in existence.
It is in vi r t ue of its bei ng an ongoi ng affair that I have these
obl i gat i ons; and my fulfilment of these obl i gat i ons is what sustains
* 1975 Cambridge University Press. Reprinted from Hegel by Charles
Tayl or 1975, by permission of the publisher.
178 Hegel: History and Politics
it and keeps it in being. Hence in Sittlichkeit, t here is no gap
bet ween what ought t o be and what is, bet ween Sollen and Sein.
Wi t h Moralitdt, the opposi t e hol ds. Her e we have an obl i gat i on
t o realize somet hi ng whi ch does not exist. Wha t ought t o be
cont rast s wi t h what is. And connect ed wi t h t hi s, t he obl i gat i on
hol ds of me not in vi rt ue of bei ng par t of a l arger communi t y life,
but as an i ndi vi dual r at i onal will.
Hegel ' s critique of Kant can t hen be put in this way: Kant
identifies ethical obl i gat i on wi t h Moralitdt' and cannot get beyond
this. For he present s an abst ract , formal not i on of mor al obl i gat i on,
whi ch hol ds of man as an i ndi vi dual , and whi ch being defined in
cont rast t o nat ur e is in endless opposi t i on t o what is.
We can see how all of Hegel ' s r epr oaches agai nst Kant ' s moral
phi l osophy are systematically connect ed. Because it r emai ned with
a purely formal not i on of reason, it coul d not pr ovi de a cont ent to
mor al obl i gat i on. Because it woul d not accept t he onl y valid
cont ent , whi ch comes from an ongoi ng society t o whi ch we bel ong,
it remai ned an ethic of t he i ndi vi dual . Because it shied away from
t hat larger life of whi ch we are a par t , it saw t he ri ght as forever
opposed t o t he real ; moral i t y and nat ur e are al ways at l oggerheads.
The doct ri ne of Sittlichkeit is t hat moral i t y reaches its compl et i on
in a communi t y. Thi s bot h give obl i gat i on its definitive cont ent , as
well as realizing it, so t hat t he gap bet ween Sollen and Sein is made
up. Hegel st art ed off as we saw, fol l owi ng Kant in di st i ngui shi ng
will and freedom from nat ur e. But t he fulfilment of freedom is
when nat ur e (here society, whi ch st art ed i n a r aw, pri mi t i ve form) is
made over t o t he demands of reason.
Because t he real i zat i on of the Idea requires t hat man be par t of a
larger life in a society, mor al life reaches its hi ghest real i zat i on in
Sittlichkeit. Thi s highest realization is an achi evement , of course, it
is not present t hr oughout hi st ory, and t here are even per i ods where
publ i c life has been so empt i ed of spirit, t hat Moralitdt expresses
somet hi ng higher. But the fulfilment of moral i t y comes in a realized
Sittlichkeit.
Thi s is t he poi nt wher e Hegel r uns count er t o t he mor al instinct
of liberalism then and now. Between obl i gat i ons whi ch are founded
on our member shi p of some communi t y and t hose whi ch are not so
cont i ngent we t end t o think of t he latter as t r anscendi ng t he former,
as t he truly uni versal mor al obl i gat i ons. Hegel ' s reversal of t he
or der and his exal t ed view of political society is what has i nspi red
accusat i ons of ' Prussi ani sm' , st at e-worshi p, even prot o-Fasci sm.
We can see al ready how wi de of t he mar k t hese are. We t end t o
t hi nk of Moralitdt as mor e fundament al because we see t he mor al
Charles Taylor 179
man as being ever in danger of bei ng asked by his communi t y t o do
the unconsci onabl e. And par t i cul ar l y so in an age of nat i onal i sm.
We are pr obabl y ri ght in feeling this in our age, but it was not what
Hegel foresaw. The communi t y whi ch is t he locus of our fullest
moral life is a st at e whi ch comes close t o a t r ue embodi ment of the
Idea. Hegel t hought t hat t he st at es of his day wer e bui l di ng t owar ds
that. He was wr ong, and we shall di scuss this mor e later on. But it
is ludicrous t o at t r i but e a vi ew like ' my gover nment right or wr ong'
to Hegel, or t o t hi nk t hat he woul d have appr oved t he ki nd of blind
following of or der s of Ge r ma n soldiers and funct i onari es under the
Third Reich, whi ch was a t i me if ever t her e was one when Moralitat
had the hi gher cl ai m.
We shoul d not forget t hat t wo of Hegel ' s ' her oes' , i.e. pi vot al
figures, in hi st ory are Socrat es and Jesus, bot h of whom under-
mined or br oke wi t h t he Sittlichkeit of t hei r peopl e, and st ruck off
on their own. Hegel ' s poi nt is, however , t hat ma n' s (and Geist's)
true realization cannot come like t hi s. No mat t er what great
spiritual t r ut hs a man di scovered, t hey coul d not be made real, i.e.
embodied, if he r emai ns on his own. As an i ndi vi dual he depends on
his society in a host of ways , and if it is unr egener at e, t hen he
cannot realize t he good. If he does not want t o compr omi se his
truth and cor r upt his message, t hen he must either wi t hdr aw,
and/ or offer a chal l enge t o his society whi ch will earn hi m t he fate
of Christ or Socrat es.
Full real i zat i on of f r eedom requi res a society for t he Ari st ot el i an
reason t hat a society is t he mi ni mum self-sufficient human reality.
In put t i ng Sittlichkeit at t he apex, Hegel is - consciously - fol-
lowing Ari st ot l e. And in fol l owi ng Ari st ot l e, t he anci ent Greek
worl d. For t he last t i me t hat t he wor l d saw an effortless and
undivided Sittlichkeit wa s among t he Gr eeks. Hegel ' s not i on of
Sittlichkeit is in par t a r ender i ng of t hat expressive uni t y whi ch his
whol e gener at i on saw in t he Gr eek pol i s, wher e - it was believed -
men had seen t he collective life of t hei r city as the essence and
meani ng of t hei r own lives, had sought t hei r gl ory in its publ i c life,
their r ewar ds in power and r eput at i on wi t hi n it, and i mmort al i t y in
its memor y. It was his expressi on for t hat vertu whi ch Mont esqui eu
had seen as t he mai ns pr i ng of republ i cs. In common wi t h his
generation he recogni zed t hat t hi s Sittlichkeit was lost forever in its
original f or m, but al ong wi t h many of his cont empor ar i es he
aspired t o see it r ebor n in a new way.
The idea t hat our hi ghest and mos t compl et e mor al existence is one
we can onl y at t ai n t o as member s of a communi t y obvi ousl y takes
us beyond t he cont r act t heory of moder n nat ur al l aw, or the
ut i l i t ari an concept i on of society as an i nst r ument of t he general
happi ness. For these societies are not t he focus of i ndependent
obl i gat i ons, let al one t he highest cl ai ms whi ch can be made on us.
Thei r existence si mpl y gives a par t i cul ar shape t o pre-existing
mor al obl i gat i ons, e.g. t he keepi ng of pr omi ses, or t he furt herance
of t he great est happi ness of t he great est number . The doct ri ne
whi ch put s Sittlichkeit at t he apex of mor al life requi res a not i on of
society as a l arger communi t y life, t o recall t he expressi on used
above, in whi ch ma n part i ci pat es as a member .
No w this not i on displaces t he cent re of gravi t y, as it were,
from t he i ndi vi dual on t o t he communi t y, whi ch is seen as t he locus
of a life or subjectivity, of whi ch t he i ndi vi dual s are phases. The
communi t y is an embodi ment of Geist, and a fuller, more
subst ant i al embodi ment t han t he i ndi vi dual . Thi s idea of a subjec-
tive life beyond t he i ndi vi dual has been t he source of much
resistance t o Hegel ' s phi l osophy. For it has seemed t o t he common
sense at least of t he Angl o-Saxon wor l d ( nur t ur ed by a certain
phi l osophi cal t radi t i on) as bot h wildly ext r avagant in a speculative
sense, and moral l y very danger ous i n its ' Pr ussi an' or even ' Fascist
consequences, sacrificing t he i ndi vi dual and his freedom on the
al t ar of some ' hi gher ' communal dei t y. Before goi ng further,
t herefore, we shoul d exami ne this not i on of t he society and t he
rel at i on of i ndi vi dual s t o it. We shall see, i ndeed, t hat Hegel ' s
not i on of objective Geist is not wi t hout difficulty; but t he ext rava-
gance is not wher e t he at omi st i c ment al i t y of t he empi ri ci st wor l d
t hought it was.
Hegel uses a number of t er ms t o charact eri ze this rel at i on of man
t o t he communi t y.
One of t he most common is ' subst ance' . The st at e, or t he peopl e
is t he ' subst ance' of i ndi vi dual s. Thi s idea is clearly expressed in the
Encyclopaedia.
The subst ance whi ch knows itself free, in whi ch absol ut e
'Ought' is equally well being, has reality as t he spirit of a
people. The abst r act di r empt i on of t hi s spirit is t he i ndi vi dua-
tion into persons, of whose i ndependent exi st ence spirit is
t he inner power and necessity. But t he person as t hi nki ng
intelligence knows t hi s subst ance as his own essence - in this
convi ct i on [Gesi nnung] he ceases t o be a mere acci dent of it -
r at her he l ooks on it at his absol ut e and final goal exi st i ng in
reality, as somet hi ng whi ch is at t ai ned in t he here and now,
Charles Taylor
1 8 1
while at the same t i me he brings it about through his activity^
but as somet hi ng whi ch in fact si mpl y is. ( EG, 514) '
We can notice here at t he end a reference t o t ha t basi c feat ure of
Sittlichkeit, t hat it pr ovi des a goal whi ch is at t he s ame t i me al r eady
realized, whi ch is br ought about , and yet is. But wha t is wor t h
noticing here is t he set of rel at ed concept s whi ch hel p t o expl ai n
' substance' . The communi t y, says Hegel , is al so ' essence' , and also
'final goal' for t he i ndi vi dual s.
The not i on behi nd ' s ubs t ance' and ' essence' is t hat t he i ndi -
viduals only are what t hey ar e by t hei r i nher ence in t he communi t y.
This idea is put in a passage of VG. ' Ever yt hi ng t hat ma n is he owes
to the state; onl y in it can he find hi s essence. All val ue t hat a man
has, all spiritual reality, he has onl y t hr ough t he st at e' ( VG, 111) .
Or more directly ' t he i ndi vi dual is an i ndi vi dual in t hi s subst ance.
No individual can st ep beyond [it]; he can separ at e himself
certainly from ot her par t i cul ar i ndi vi dual s, but not from t he
Volksgeisf ( VG, 5 9 - 6 0 ) .
The not i on behi nd ' final goal ' [ Endzweck] seems t o be mor e
sinister, for it seems t o i mpl y t hat i ndi vi dual s onl y exi st t o serve t he
state as some pitiless Mol oc h. Thi s seems even mor e cl earl y t o be
the message of PR, $25S, ' t hi s subst ant i al uni t y is an absol ut e
unmoved end in itself, in whi ch freedom comes i nt o its s upr eme
right. On t he ot her hand t hi s final end has s upr eme ri ght agai nst t he
individual, whose s upr eme dut y is t o be a me mbe r of t he st at e. ' But
this reading is based on a seri ous mi si nt er pr et at i on. Hegel deni es
that the st at e exists for t he i ndi vi dual s, in ot her wor ds he rejects
the Enl i ght enment ut i l i t ar i an idea t hat t he st at e has onl y an
instrumental funct i on, t hat t he ends it mus t serve are t hose of
individuals. But he cannot really accept t he i nverse pr opos i t i on.
The state is not t her e for t he sake of t he ci t i zens; one coul d
say, it is t he goal and t hey are its i ns t r ument s . But t hi s r el at i on
of ends and means is qui t e i nappr opr i at e her e. For t he st at e is
not somet hi ng abst r act , s t andi ng over agai nst t he ci t i zens; but
rather they are mome nt s as in or gani c life, wher e no me mbe r
is end and none means . . . . The essence of t he st at e is et hi cal
life [die sittliche Lebendi gkei t ] [VG, 112) .
Rather we see her e t hat t he not i on of ends a nd means gives wa y t o
the image of a living bei ng. The st at e or t he communi t y has a hi gher
nte; its par t s are rel at ed as t he par t s of an or ga ni s m.
4
Thus t he
i ndi vi dual is not serving an end separ at e from hi m, rat her he is
serving a large goal whi ch is t he gr ound of his i dent i t y, for he only
is t he i ndi vi dual he is in t hi s larger life. We have gone beyond the
opposi t i on sel f-goal / ot her-goal .
Hegel adds t o t hi s not i on of t he communi t y as living t hat of the
communi t y as ' sel f-consci ousness' . And it is t hi s, t oget her wi t h the
use of the wor ds 'Geist', 'Volksgeist' whi ch has given rise to
t he idea t hat t he Hegel i an st at e or communi t y is a super-i ndi vi dual .
But in t he passage of VG wher e he i nt r oduces t he t er ms 'self-
consci ousness' , Hegel makes clear t hat he is not t al ki ng about it in
connect i on wi t h Volksgeister in t he sense t hat it appl i es to
i ndi vi dual s. Rat her it is a ' phi l osophi cal concept ' (VG, 61). Like
any Geist larger t han t he i ndi vi dual it only has exi st ence t hr ough
t he vehicle of i ndi vi dual concret e subj ect s.
5
It is t hus not a subject
like t hem.
But why does Hegel want t o speak of a spirit whi ch is l arger t han
t he individual? What does it mean t o say t hat t he i ndi vi dual is part
of, i nheres in, a larger life; and t hat he is onl y what he is by
doi ng so?
These i deas onl y appear myst eri ous because of t he powerful hol d
on us of at omi st i c prej udi ces, whi ch have been very i mpor t ant in
moder n political t hought and cul t ure. We can t hi nk t hat t he
i ndi vi dual is what he is in abst r act i on from his communi t y only if
we are t hi nki ng of hi m qua or gani sm. But when we t hi nk of a
human bei ng, we do not si mpl y mean a living or gani s m, but a being
who can t hi nk, feel, deci de, be moved, r espond, ent er i nt o rel at i ons
wi t h ot her s; and all this implies a l anguage, a rel at ed set of ways of
experi enci ng t he wor l d, of i nt erpret i ng his feelings, under st andi ng
his rel at i on t o ot her s, t o t he past , t he fut ure, t he absol ut e, and so
on. It is t he par t i cul ar way he situates himself wi t hi n t hi s cul t ural
wor l d t hat we call his i dent i t y.
But now a l anguage, and t he rel at ed set of di st i nct i ons under l yi ng
our experi ence and i nt er pr et at i on, is somet hi ng t hat can onl y gr ow
in and be sust ai ned by a communi t y. In t hat sense, what we are as
human beings, we are only in a cul t ural communi t y. Per haps, once
we have fully grown up in a cul t ure, we can leave it and still retain
much of it. But this ki nd of case is except i onal , and in an i mpor t ant
sense marginal. Emi gres cannot fully live their cul t ur e, and are
always forced to take on somet hi ng of the ways of t he new society
they have entered. The life of a language and cul t ure is one whos e
locus is larger than that of the individual. It happens in t he
community. The individual possesses this culture, and hence his
identity, by participating in this larger life.
Charles Taylor 183
case.
But of course Hegel is sayi ng s omet hi ng mor e t ha n t hi s. For t hi s
inescapable relation t o t he cul t ur e of my soci et y does not rul e out
the most ext reme al i enat i on. Thi s comes a bout whe n t he publ i c
experience of my society ceases t o have any me a ni ng for me.
Far from wi shi ng t o deny t hi s possi bi l i t y, Hegel was one of t he
first to develop a t heory of al i enat i on. The poi nt is t hat t he obj ect s
of public experi ence, ri t e, festival, el ect i on, et c. , ar e not like fact s of
nature. For they are not ent i rel y separ abl e f r om t he exper i ence t hey
give rise t o. They ar e par t l y cons t i t ut ed by t he i deas a nd i nt er pr et a-
tions which underl i e t hem. A given soci al pr act i ce, like vot i ng in t he
ecclesia, or in a moder n el ect i on, is wh a t it is because of a set of
commonly under st ood i deas a nd meani ngs , by whi ch t he deposi t i ng
of stones in an ur n, or t he mar ki ng of bi t s of paper , count s as t he
making of a social deci si on. These i deas a bout wh a t is goi ng on are
essential t o define t he i nst i t ut i on. The y ar e essent i al if t her e is t o be
voting here, and not s ome qui t e ot her act i vi t y whi ch coul d be
carried on by put t i ng st ones i n t he ur ns .
Now these i deas are not uni versal l y accept abl e or even under -
standable. They i nvol ve a cer t ai n vi ew of ma n , soci et y, and
decision, for i nst ance, whi c h ma y seem evil or uni nt el l i gi bl e t o
other societies. To t ake a soci al deci si on by vot i ng i mpl i es t hat it is
When 1 say t hat a l anguage and t he r el at ed di st i nct i ons can onl y
be sustained by a communi t y, I a m not t hi nki ng onl y of l anguage as
a medium of communi cat i on; so t hat our exper i ence coul d be
entirely private, and just need a publ i c me di um t o be c ommuni c a t e d
from one to anot her . Rat her t he fact is t hat our exper i ence is wha t
it is, is shaped in par t , by t he wa y we i nt er pr et it; and this has a l ot
to do with t he t er ms whi ch ar e avai l abl e t o us in o u r cul t ur e. But
there is more; many of our mos t i mpor t a nt exper i ences woul d be
impossible out si de of soci et y, for t hey rel at e t o obj ect s whi ch ar e
social. Such are, for i nst ance, t he exper i ence of par t i ci pat i ng in a
rite, or of t aki ng par t in t he pol i t i cal life of our soci et y, or of
rejoicing at t he vi ct ory of t he home t e a m, or of nat i onal mour ni ng
for a dead her o; and so on. All t hese exper i ences a nd emot i ons have
objects which are essentially soci al , i.e. woul d not be out si de of
(this) society.
So the culture whi ch lives in our soci et y s hapes our pr i vat e
experience and const i t ut es our publ i c exper i ence, whi ch in t ur n
interacts profoundl y wi t h t he pr i vat e. So t hat it is no ext r avagant
proposition t o say t hat we ar e wha t we ar e in vi r t ue of par t i ci pat i ng
in the larger life of our soci et y - or at l east , bei ng i mmer s ed i n it, if
our relationship t o it is uncons ci ous and passi ve, as is oft en t he
right, appr opr i at e and intelligible t o build t he communi t y decision
out of a concat enat i on of i ndi vi dual deci si ons. In some societies,
e.g. many t radi t i onal village societies t hr oughout t he wor l d, social
decisions can (could) only be t aken by consensus. An at omi st i c
decision pr ocedur e of this ki nd is t ant amount t o dissolving the
social bond. What ever else it is it coul d not be a social decision.
Thus a certain view of man and his rel at i on t o society is
embedded in some of t he pract i ces and i nst i t ut i ons of a society. So
t hat we can t hi nk of t hese as expressi ng cert ai n i deas. And indeed,
they may be t he onl y, or t he most adequat e expressi on of these
i deas, if t he society has not devel oped a relatively art i cul at e and
accurat e t heory about itself. The i deas whi ch underl i e a certain
pract i ce and make it what it is, e.g. t hose whi ch make t he mar ki ng
of papers the t aki ng of a social deci si on, may not be spelled
out adequat el y in pr oposi t i ons about ma n, will, soci et y, and so on.
Indeed, an adequat e theoretical l anguage may be as yet unde-
vel oped.
In this sense we can t hi nk of t he i nst i t ut i ons and pract i ces of a
society as a ki nd of l anguage in whi ch its f undament al ideas are
expressed. But what is ' sai d' in t hi s l anguage is not ideas whi ch
could be in t he mi nds of certain i ndi vi dual s onl y, t hey are rat her
common t o a society, because embedded in its collective life, in
practices and i nst i t ut i ons whi ch are of t he society indivisibly. In
these t he spirit of t he society is in a sense objectified. They are, t o
use Hegel ' s t er m, ' objective spi ri t ' .
These i nst i t ut i ons and practices make up t he publ i c life of a
society. Cert ai n nor ms are implicit in t hem, whi ch t hey demand t o
be mai nt ai ned and properl y lived out . Because of wha t vot i ng is as a
concat enat i ng pr ocedur e of social deci si on, cert ai n nor ms about
falsification, t he aut onomy of the i ndi vi dual deci si on, et c. , flow
i nescapabl y from it. The nor ms of a soci et y' s publ i c life are t he
cont ent of Sittlichkeit.
We can now see bet t er what Hegel means when he speaks of the
nor ms or ends of society as sust ai ned by our act i on, and yet as
al ready t here, so t hat t he member of society ' bri ngs t hem about
t hr ough his activity, but as somet hi ng whi ch rat her si mpl y is' (EG,
514) . For t hese pract i ces and i nst i t ut i ons are mai nt ai ned onl y by
ongoi ng human activity in conformi t y t o t hem; and yet they are in a
sense t here al ready before this activity, and must be, for it is only
t he ongoi ng pract i ce whi ch defines what t he nor m is our future
act i on must seek t o sust ai n. This is especially t he case if t her e is as
yet no t heoret i cal f or mul at i on of t he nor m, as t here was not in
Hegel ' s view in t he Greek city-states at t hei r apogee. The At heni an
Charles Taylor
1 8 5
acted ' as it were, out of i nst i nct ' ( VG, 115) his Sittlichkeit was a
'second nature' . But even if t her e is a t heor y, it c a nnot subst i t ut e t or
the practice as a cri t eri on, for it is unl i kel y t hat any f or mu at i on can
entirely render what is i nvol ved in a soci al pr act i ce of t hi s ki nd.
Societies refer t o t heoret i cal ' val ue' f or mul at i ons as t hei r nor ms
rather than t o pract i ces, when t hey ar e t r yi ng t o ma ke t hemsel ves
over to meet an unreal i zed s t andar d; e.g. t hey ar e t r yi ng t o ' bui l d
socialism', or become fully ' democr at i c' . But t hese goal s ar e, of
course, of the domai n of Moralitat. Sittlichkeit pr es uppos es t hat t he
living practices are an adequat e ' s t at ement ' of t he basi c nor ms ,
although in the limit case of t he mode r n phi l os ophy of t he st at e,
Hegel sees the t heoret i cal f or mul at i on as cat chi ng u p . Hence we see
the importance of Hegel ' s i nsi st ence t hat t he end s ought by t he
highest ethics is al ready real i zed. It means t hat t he hi ghest nor ms
are to be discovered in t he real , t hat t he real is r at i onal , and t ha t we
are to turn away from chi maer i c at t empt s t o cons t r uct a new
society from a bl ue-pri nt . Hegel st r ongl y oppos es t hos e wh o hol d
that a philosophy of st at e . . . [has] . . . t he t ask of di scover i ng
and promul gat i ng still anot her t heor y. . . . In exami ni ng t hi s
idea and the activity in conf or mi t y wi t h it, we mi ght s uppos e
that no state or const i t ut i on has ever exi st ed in t he wor l d
at all, but t hat nowadays . . . we ha d t o st ar t all over agai n
from the begi nni ng, and t hat t he et hi cal wor l d ha d just been
waiting for such pr esent - day pr oj ect s, pr oof s a nd i nvest i ga-
tions.
( PR, pr ef ace, 4)
The happiest, unal i enat ed life for ma n, whi ch t he Gr eeks
enjoyed, is where t he nor ms a nd ends expr essed in t he publ i c life of
a society are t he most i mpor t ant ones by whi ch its me mbe r s define
their identity as human bei ngs. For t hen t he i nst i t ut i onal mat r i x in
which they cannot hel p living is not felt t o be forei gn. Rat her it is
the essence, t he ' subst ance' of t he self. ' Thus in uni ver sal spi ri t each
man has self-certainty, t he cert ai nt y t ha t he will find not hi ng ot her
m existing reality t han hi ms el f (PhG, 258) .
And because t hi s subst ance is sust ai ned by t he act i vi t y of t he
zens, they see it as t hei r wor k. ' Thi s s ubs t ance is al so t he
universal
w
r k [ Wer k] , whi ch creat es itself t hr ough t he act i on of
acn and all as t hei r uni t y and equal i t y, because it is Being-for-self
It-ursichsein], t he self, t he act of doi ng [das Tu n ] ' [PhG, 314) .
k <> live in a st at e of t hi s ki nd is t o be free. Th e oppos i t i on
een social necessity a nd i ndi vi dual f r eedom di s appear s . ' The
rat i onal is necessary as what belongs t o subst ance, and we are free
in so far as we recognize it as l aw and follow it as t he subst ance of
our own essence; objective and subjective will are t hen reconciled
and form one and t he same unt r oubl ed whol e' ( VG, 115).
But al i enat i on arises when t he goal s, nor ms or ends whi ch define
t he common practices or i nst i t ut i ons begin t o seem i rrel evant or
even monst r ous, or when the nor ms are redefined so t hat the
practices appear a t ravest y of t hem. A number of publ i c religious
pract i ces have suffered t he first fate in hi st ory; they have ' gone
dead' on subsequent generat i ons, and may even be seen as
i rrat i onal or bl asphemous. To t he ext ent t hat they remai n par t of
t he publ i c ritual t here is wi despr ead al i enat i on in society we can
t hi nk of cont empor ar y societies like Spai n, whi ch remai ns officially
Catholic while a good part of the popul at i on is rabidly anti-clerical;
or communi st societies, whi ch have a publ i c religion of at hei sm,
even t hough many of their citizens believe in God.
But t he democr at i c pract i ces of West ern society seem to be
suffering somet hi ng like t he second fate in our t i me. Many peopl e
can no l onger accept t he legitimacy of vot i ng and t he sur r oundi ng
i nst i t ut i ons, elections, par l i ament s, et c. , as vehicles of social
decision. They have r edr awn t hei r concept i on of t he relation of
individual t o society, so t hat t he medi at i on and di st ance whi ch any
large-scale vot i ng system pr oduces bet ween i ndi vi dual decision and
social out come seems unaccept abl e. Not hi ng can claim t o be a
real social decision whi ch is not arrived at in a full and intense
discussion in whi ch all part i ci pant s ar e fully consci ous of what is at
st ake. Decisions made by elected represent at i ves are br anded as
sham, as mani pul at i on masquer adi ng as consensus. Wi t h this
redefinition of t he nor m of collective decision (t hat is, of a decision
made by peopl e, and not just for t hem) , our present represent at i ve
i nst i t ut i ons begin t o be por t r ayed as an i mpost ur e; and a subst an-
tial pr opor t i on of t he popul at i on is al i enat ed from t hem.
In either case, nor ms as expressed in publ i c pract i ces cease t o
hol d our allegiance. They are ei t her seen as i rrel evant or are decried
as usur pat i on. Thi s is al i enat i on. Whe n this happens men have t o
t ur n elsewhere t o define wha t is cent ral l y i mpor t ant t o t hem.
Somet i mes t hey t ur n t o anot her society, for i nst ance a smaller,
mor e intense religious communi t y. But anot her possibility, whi ch
had great hi st ori cal i mpor t ance in Hegel ' s eyes, is t hat t hey strike
out on t hei r own and define t hei r i dent i t y as i ndi vi dual s. Individual-
ism comes, as Hegel put s it in t he VG, when men cease t o identify
wi t h the communi t y' s life, when t hey ' reflect' , t hat is, t ur n back on
themselves, and see themselves mos t i mpor t ant l y as individuals
Charles Taylor 187
with i ndi vi dual goal s. Thi s is t he moment of dissolution of a Volk
and its life.
What happens here is t hat t he individual ceases to define his
identity pri nci pal l y by t he publ i c experi ence of t he society. On the
cont rary, t he mos t meani ngful experi ence, whi ch seems to him
most vital, t o t ouch most t he core of his being, is private. Public
experience seems t o hi m secondar y, nar r ow, and parochial, merely
t ouchi ng a par t of himself. Shoul d t hat experience try to make good
its claim t o cent ral i t y as before, t he individual enters into conflict
with it and has t o fight it.
Thi s ki nd of shift has of course been i nst ant i at ed many times in
history, but t he par adi gm event of this ki nd for Hegel occurs with
the br eak- up of t he Gr eek city-state. Thus in t he Greek polis, men
identified t hemsel ves wi t h its publ i c life; its common experiences
were for t hem t he par adi gm ones. Thei r most basic, unchallenge-
able val ues wer e t hose embodi ed in this publ i c life, and hence their
major dut y and vi rt ue was t o cont i nue and sustain this life. In other
wor ds, they lived fully by t hei r Sittlichkeit. But the public life of
each of t hese pol i s was nar r ow and parochi al . It was not in
conformi t y wi t h uni versal r eason. Wi t h Socrates arises the chal-
lenge of a ma n wh o cannot agree t o base his life on the parochial,
on t he merel y given, but requi res a foundat i on in universal reason.
Socrates himself expresses a deep cont radi ct i on since he accepts the
idea of Sittlichkeit, of l aws t hat one should hol d allegiance t o; he
derives t hi s from uni versal reason as well. And yet because of his
allegiance t o r eason he cannot live wi t h t he act ual l aw of Athens.
Rat her he under mi nes t hem, he cor r upt s t he yout h not t o t ake them
as final, but t o quest i on t hem. He has t o be put t o death, a death
whi ch he accept s because of his allegiance t o the l aws.
But now a new t ype of man arises who cannot identify with this
publ i c life. He begi ns t o rel at e principally not t o t he public life but
t o his o wn gr asp of uni versal reason. The nor ms t hat he now feels
compel l i ng are qui t e unsubst ant i at ed in any reality; they are ideas
t hat go beyond t he real . The reflecting individual is in the domai n of
Moralitat.
Of course, even t he self-conscious individual related t o some
society. Me n t hought of themselves qua moral beings as belonging
t o some communi t y, t he city of men and Gods of the Stoics, the
city of God of t he Chr i st i an. But they saw this city as quite other
t han and beyond t he eart hl y city. And the actual communi t y of
phi l osopher s or believers in whi ch they wor ked out and sustained
t he l anguage by whi ch t hey identified themselves was scattered and
powerl ess. The c ommon life on whi ch their identity as rational or
God-feari ng i ndi vi dual s was founded was or coul d be very at t enu-
at ed. So t hat what was most i mpor t ant in a man' s life was t hat he
di d or t hought as an i ndi vi dual , not his par t i ci pat i on in t he publ i c
life of a real hi st ori cal communi t y. (This was not really t rue of t he
Chri st i an chur ch for whi ch t he Euchar i st was of cent ral i mpor t -
ance, but cert ai nl y applies t o t he sage of t he late anci ent worl d. )
In any case, t he communi t y of t he wi se, as t hat of t he sai nt s, was
wi t hout ext er nal , self-subsistent exi st ence in hi st ory. Rat her , the
publ i c real m was given over t o pri vat e, unjustified power . Thi s is
Hegel ' s usual descri pt i on of t he anci ent peri od of uni versal empi res
whi ch succeeded the city-state, part i cul arl y t he Roma n empi r e. The
uni t y and fulfilment of Sittlichkeit, lost from t hi s wor l d, was
t ransposed out of it i nt o an et hereal beyond.
Wha t t hen is Hegel saying wi t h his thesis of t he pr i macy of
Sittlichkeit, and t he related not i on of t he communi t y as ' ethical
subst ance' , a spiritual life in whi ch man must t ake part ? We can
express it in t hr ee pr oposi t i ons, put in ascendi ng or der of cont est a-
bility. First, t hat what is most i mpor t ant for man can onl y be
at t ai ned in rel at i on t o t he publ i c life of a communi t y, not in the
pri vat e self-definition of t he al i enat ed i ndi vi dual . Second, t hi s
communi t y must not be a merely part i al one, e.g. a convent i cl e or
pri vat e associ at i on, whose life is condi t i oned, cont rol l ed and
limited by a larger society. It must be co- t er mi nous wi t h the
mi ni mum self-sufficient huma n real i t y, t he st at e. The publ i c life
whi ch expresses at least some of our i mpor t ant nor ms mus t be t hat
of a st at e.
Thi r dl y, t he publ i c life of t he st at e has this crucial i mpor t ance for
men because t he nor ms and ideas it expresses are not just huma n
i nvent i ons. On t he cont r ar y, t he st at e expresses t he Idea, t he
ont ol ogi cal st r uct ur e of t hi ngs. In t he final analysis it is of vital
i mpor t ance because it is one of t he i ndi spensabl e ways in whi ch
ma n recovers his essential relation t o this ont ol ogi cal st ruct ure, t he
ot her bei ng in t he modes of consci ousness whi ch Hegel calls
' absol ut e spi ri t ' , and t hi s real rel at i on t hr ough t he life of t he
communi t y is essential t o t he compl et i on of t he r et ur n t o consci ous
identity bet ween man and t he Absol ut e (which means also t he
Absol ut e' s self-identity).
Obvi ousl y t hese t hree proposi t i ons are l i nked. The t hi r d gives the
underl yi ng gr ound of t he first and second. If man achieves his t r ue
identity as a vehicle of cosmi c spirit, a nd if one of t he i ndi spensabl e
medi a i n whi ch this i dent i t y is expressed is t he publ i c life of his
political society, t hen evidently, it is essential t hat he come t o
identify himself i n rel at i on t o this publ i c life. He must t r anscend t he
Charles Taylor 189
al i enat i on of a pri vat e or sectarian identity, since these can never
link hi m fully t o t he Absol ut e.
This is t he compl ex of ideas which lies behi nd t he Hegelian use
of t er ms like ' subst ance' , ' essence' , 'Endzweck\ 'Selbstzweck' in
speaki ng of t he communi t y. First of all t hat t he set of practices and
i nst i t ut i ons whi ch make up t he publ i c life of t he communi t y express
t he most i mpor t ant nor ms , most central t o its member s' identity, so
t hat they ar e onl y sust ai ned in their identity by t hei r part i ci pat i on in
these pract i ces and i nst i t ut i ons, whi ch in their t ur n they perpet uat e
by this par t i ci pat i on. Secondly, t hat the communi t y concerned is
t he st at e, t hat is, a really self-sufficient communi t y. And thirdly,
t hat this communi t y has this central role because it expresses the
Idea, t he f or mul a of rat i onal necessity underl yi ng man and his
wor l d.
Thus wha t is st range and cont est abl e in Hegel ' s theory of the
st at e is not t he idea of a larger life in whi ch men are immersed, or
t he not i on t hat t he publ i c life of a society expresses certain ideas,
whi ch are t hus in a sense t he ideas of t he society as a whol e and not
just of t he i ndi vi dual s, so t hat we can speak of a people as havi ng a
cert ai n ' spi ri t ' . For t hr oughout most of human history men have
lived mos t intensely in relation t o t he meani ngs expressed in the
publ i c life of t hei r societies. Onl y an exaggerat ed at omi sm could
make t he condi t i on of al i enat ed men seem t he inescapable human
nor m.
But wher e Hegel does make a subst ant i al claim whi ch is not
easy t o gr ant is in his basi c ont ol ogi cal view, t hat man is the vehicle
of cosmi c spirit, and t he corol l ary, t hat the state expresses the
underl yi ng formul a of necessity by whi ch this spirit posits the
wor l d.
In ot her wor ds , t he idea of a 'Volksgeist\ t he spirit of a people,
whose i deas are expressed in their common institutions, by which
t hey define t hei r i dent i t y, this is intelligible enough. And somet hi ng
like it is essential if we are t o under st and what has gone on in
huma n hi st or y. Wha t is har der t o credit is the thesis t hat men - and
hence in t hei r own way t hese Volksgeister - are vehicles of a cosmic
spirit whi ch is r et ur ni ng t o self-consciousness t hr ough man.
Thus t her e is no specially odd Hegelian doct ri ne of a super-
i ndi vi dual subject of society, as is often believed. There is only a
very difficult doct r i ne of a cosmi c subject whose vehicle is man.
Thi s is woven i nt o a t heor y of man in society whi ch by itself is far
from i mpl ausi bl e or bi zarre. Indeed, it is much superior t o t he
at omi st i c concept i ons of some of Hegel ' s liberal opponent s.
But it is his ont ol ogi cal view whi ch makes Hegel t ake a t urn
whi ch goes agai nst t he mai nst r eam of liberal t hought . Thi s l at t er
t ends t o assume t hat i ndi vi dual i sm is the ul t i mat e in huma n
evol ut i on. Even if civilized men are not al i enat ed from t he st at e, still
t hei r highest foci of identity are t hought t o be beyond it, in religion,
or some per sonal mor al ideal, or t he huma n race as a whol e. Thus
t he condi t i on in whi ch men identify t hemsel ves pri mari l y in rel at i on
t o t he common life of their society mus t be a mor e pri mi t i ve st age,
and especially wher e this common life is t hought t o embody cosmi c
or religious significance. For this ki nd of society t o succeed an age
of i ndi vi dual i sm coul d onl y represent regressi on. And t hi s is, of
course, why Hegel has been harshl y j udged by t hose in this st r and
of liberalism (which does not exhaust what can justifiably be
called liberal t hought : Mont esqui eu, de Tocquevi l l e, Her der , von
Humbol dt , and ot her s have been concerned about t he qual i t y of
publ i c life, wi t h whi ch men must identify t hemsel ves).
But t he at t empt to under st and Hegel wi t hi n t he t er ms of this
liberal t radi t i on has just led t o di st ort i on. A not or i ous exampl e is
Hegel ' s doct ri ne of t he st at e. In t he at omi st liberal t r adi t i on, ' st at e'
can onl y mean somet hi ng like ' organs of gover nment ' . To t al k of
t hese as ' essence' or 'final goal ' of t he citizens can only mean
subjection t o i rresponsi bl e t yr anny. But what Hegel means by
' st at e' is t he politically organi zed communi t y. Hi s model is not t he
Machstaat of Frederi ck t he Great , whi ch he never a dmi r e d,
6
but t he
Gr eek pol i s. Thus his ideal is not a condi t i on in whi ch i ndi vi dual s
are means t o an end, but r at her a communi t y in whi ch like a living
or gani sm, t he di st i nct i on bet ween means and ends is over come,
everyt hi ng is bot h means and end. In ot her wor ds t he st at e shoul d
be an appl i cat i on of t he cat egory of i nt ernal teleology (cf. quot e
from VG, 112, p. 388) .
Thus t he st at e whi ch is fully rat i onal will be one whi ch expresses
in its i nst i t ut i ons and pract i ces t he most i mpor t ant ideas and nor ms
whi ch its citizens recogni ze, and by whi ch they define their i dent i t y.
And t hi s will be t he case because t he st at e expresses t he art i cul a-
t i ons of t he Idea, whi ch rat i onal man comes t o see as t he f or mul a of
necessity under l yi ng all t hi ngs, whi ch is dest i ned t o come t o self-
consci ousness in ma n. So t hat t he rat i onal st at e will rest ore
Sittlichkeit, t he embodi ment of t he hi ghest nor ms in an ongoi ng
publ i c life. It will recover what was l ost wi t h t he Gr eeks, but on a
hi gher level. For t he fully devel oped st at e will i ncor por at e t he
pri nci pl e of t he i ndi vi dual r at i onal will j udgi ng by uni versal
cri t eri a, t he very pri nci pl e t hat under mi ned and event ual l y
dest r oyed t he Gr eek polis.
Thi s i nt egr at i on of i ndi vi dual i t y and Sittlichkeit is a r equi r ement
Charles Taylor 191
we can deduce from t he Idea. But this is also Hegel' s way of
formul at i ng and answer i ng the yearning of his age to unite
s omehow t he radical mor al aut onomy of Kant and the expressive
uni t y of t he Gr eek pol i s. Hegel ' s answer t o this conundr um was, as
we saw, an ext r aor di nar y and original combi nat i on of the ultra-
moder n aspi r at i on t o aut onomy, and a renewed vision of cosmic
or der as t he f oundat i on of society; a deri vat i on, we might say,
of cosmi c or der from t he idea of radical aut onomy itself, via a
di spl acement of its cent re of gravi t y from man to Geist. This
synthesis he s aw as t he goal of hi st or y. . . .
II
We can see t he aspi r at i on t o what Hegel calls ' absol ut e freedom' , or
uni versal and t ot al part i ci pat i on, as the at t empt t o meet an endemic
need of moder n society. Tr adi t i onal societies were founded on
di fferent i at i on: royal t y, ari st ocracy, common folk; priests and
l aymen; free and serf, and so on. Thi s differentiation was justified
as a reflection of a hi erarchi cal order of things. After the revolution
of moder n, self-defining subjectivity, these concept i ons of cosmic
or der came t o be seen as fictions, and were denounced as fraudulent
i nvent i ons of ki ngs, pri est s, ari st ocrat s, etc. , t o keep their subjects
submi ssi ve. But however much t hey may have been used, con-
sciously or not , as justifications of t he st at us quo, these conceptions
al so were t he gr ound of men' s identification wi t h the society in
whi ch t hey lived. Ma n coul d onl y be himself in relation t o a cosmic
or der ; t he st at e cl ai med t o body forth this order and hence t o be
one of men' s pri nci pal channel s of cont act wi t h it. Hence the power
of or gani c and holistic met aphor s: men saw themselves as par t s of
society in somet hi ng like t he way t hat a hand, for instance, is part
of t he body.
The r evol ut i on of moder n subjectivity gave rise t o anot her type
of political t heor y. Society was justified not by what it was or
expressed, but by what it achieved, t he fulfilment of men' s needs,
desires a nd pur poses. Society came t o be seen as an i nst rument and
its different modes and st ruct ures were t o be studied scientifically
for t hei r effects on huma n happi ness. Political t heory woul d banish
myt h and fable. Thi s r eached clearest expression in utilitarianism.
But t hi s moder n t heor y has not provi ded a basis for men' s
identification wi t h t hei r society. In t he i nt ermi t t ent crises of
al i enat i on whi ch have followed t he br eakdown of t radi t i onal
society, ut i l i t ari an t heori es have been powerl ess t o fill the gap. So
1 9 2
Hegel: History and Politics
t hat moder n societies have act ual l y funct i oned wi t h a large par t of
t hei r t r adi t i onal out l ook i nt act , or onl y sl owl y recedi ng, as in t he
case of Bri t ai n, for i nst ance. Or when some radi cal br eak is sought ,
t hey have had recourse t o mor e powerful stuff, some vari ant of t he
general will t r adi t i on (Jacobi ni sm, Mar xi s m, anar chi sm) as a
revol ut i onary i deol ogy. Or moder n societies have had recourse
either in r evol ut i onar y or ' nor mal ' t i mes t o t he powerful secul ar
religion of nat i onal i sm. And even societies whi ch seem t o be
f ounded on t he ut i l i t ari an t radi t i on, or an earlier, Lockei an var i ant ,
like t he Uni t ed States, in fact have recourse t o ' myt h' , e.g. t he myt h
of t he frontier, of t he perpet ual new begi nni ng, t he fut ure as
boundl essl y open t o self-creation.
Thi s last is t he great est i rony of all, in t hat t he ut i l i t ari an t heor y
itself leaves no pl ace for myt h of t hi s ki nd, t hat is, specul at i ve
i nt er pr et at i on of t he ends of human life in their rel at i on to society,
nat ur e and hi st ory, as par t of t he justifying beliefs of a mat ur e
society. These are t hought t o bel ong t o earlier, less evol ved ages.
Ma t ur e men are at t ached t o their society because of wha t it
pr oduces for t hem. As recently as a decade ago t hi s perspect i ve was
wi del y believed in by t he liberal intelligentsia of Ameri ca and t he
West er n wor l d, wh o announced an i mmi nent ' end of i deol ogy' . But
t hey t ur ned out t o be l at t er-day, i nvert ed vari ant s of Mons i eur
J our dai n, who were speaki ng not pr ose, but myt h wi t hout knowi ng
it. It is now cl earer t hat t he ut i l i t ari an perspect i ve is no less an
i deol ogy t han its maj or rivals, and no mor e pl ausi bl e. Ut i l i t ari an
ma n whose loyalty t o his society woul d be cont i ngent onl y on t he
satisfactions it secured for him is a species virtually wi t hout
member s . And t he very not i on of satisfaction is now not so firmly
anchor ed, once we see t hat it is i nt er woven wi t h ' expect at i ons' , and
beliefs about what is appr opr i at e and just. Some of t he richest
societies in our day are among t he mos t t eemi ng wi t h dissatisfac-
t i on, for i nst ance, t he USA.
The aspi rat i on t o absol ut e freedom can be seen as an at t empt
t o fill t hi s l ack in moder n political t heory, t o find gr ounds for
identification wi t h one' s soci et y whi ch are fully in t he spirit of
moder n subjectivity. We have gr ounds for identifying ourselves
wi t h our society and giving our full allegiance t o i t when it is our s in
t he st r ong sense of bei ng our creat i on, and mor eover t he creat i on of
what is best i n us and most l y t rul y oursel ves: our mor al will
(Rousseau, Fi cht e), or our creative activity ( Mar x) . Fr om Rousseau
t hr ough Ma r x and t he anar chi st t hi nkers t o cont empor ar y t heori es
of par t i ci pat or y democr acy, t her e have been r ecur r ent demands t o
r econst r uct society, so as t o do away wi t h het er onomy, or
ti
si
i
Charles Taylor 193
overcome al i enat i on, or recover spont anei t y. Onl y a society which
was an emanat i on of free mor al will could recover a claim on our
allegiance compar abl e t o t hat of t radi t i onal society. For once more
society woul d reflect or embody somet hi ng of absolute value. Only
this woul d no l onger be a cosmi c order, but in keeping with the
moder n r evol ut i on, t he absol ut e woul d be human freedom itself.
The aspi r at i on t o absol ut e freedom is therefore born of a deep
dissatisfaction wi t h t he ut i l i t ari an model of society as an instrument
for t he f ur t her ance/ adj ust ment of interests. Societies built on this
model are experi enced as a spiritual desert, or as a machine. They
express not hi ng spi ri t ual , and t hei r regulations and discipline are
felt as an i nt ol erabl e i mposi t i on by t hose who aspire to absolute
freedom. It is t herefore not surpri si ng t hat the theorists of absolute
freedom have often been close t o t he react i onary critics of liberal
society, and have often themselves expressed admi rat i on for earlier
societies.
Hegel under st ood this aspi rat i on. As we saw he made the
demand for radi cal aut onomy a central par t of his theory. He had
i ndeed, an i mpor t ant pl ace in the line of devel opment of this
aspi rat i on t o absol ut e freedom as it develops from Rousseau
t hr ough Ma r x and beyond. For he wove the demand for radical
aut onomy of Rousseau and Kant together with the expressivist
t heory whi ch came from Her der , and this provi ded the indispens-
able backgr ound for Ma r x' s t hought . And yet he was a st rong critic
of radical freedom. Thi s al one woul d make it wort hwhi l e to
exami ne his obj ect i ons.
Di sent angl ed from Hegel ' s part i cul ar theory of social differentia-
t i on, t he basi c poi nt of this critique is this: absolute freedom
requi res homogenei t y. It cannot br ook differences which would
prevent everyone part i ci pat i ng totally in t he decisions of the
society. And wha t is even mor e, it requires some near unani mi t y of
will t o emer ge from this del i berat i on, for otherwise the majority
woul d j ust be i mposi ng its will on t he mi nori t y, and freedom woul d
not be uni versal . But differentiation of some fairly essential kinds
are i neradi cabl e. (Let us leave aside for the moment the objection
t hat Hegel di d not identify t he right ones.) And moreover, they are
recogni zed in our post - Romant i c climate as essential t o human
i dent i t y. Me n cannot si mpl y identify themselves as men, but they
define t hemsel ves mor e i mmedi at el y by their partial communi t y,
cul t ural , linguistic, confessi onal , etc. Moder n democracy is there-
fore in a bi nd.
I t hi nk a di l emma of t hi s ki nd can be seen in cont emporary
society. Mode r n societies have moved t owar ds much greater
homogenei t y and great er i nt er dependence, so t hat part i al com-
muni t i es lose t hei r aut onomy and t o some ext ent t hei r identity.
But great differences r emai n; onl y because of t he ideology of
homogenei t y, t hese differential charact eri st i cs no l onger have
meani ng and val ue for t hose wh o have t hem. Thus t he rural
popul at i on is t aught by t he mass medi a t o see itself as just l acki ng in
some of t he advant ages of a mor e advanced life style. The poor are
seen as margi nal t o t he society, for i nst ance, in Ameri ca, and in
some ways have a wor se l ot t han in mor e recogni zedl y class-divided
societies.
Homogeni zat i on t hus increases mi nor i t y al i enat i on and resent-
ment . And t he first response of liberal society is t o t ry even mor e of
t he same: pr ogr ammes t o el i mi nat e pover t y, or assi mi l at e Indi ans,
move popul at i on out of decl i ni ng regi ons, br i ng an ur ban way of
life t o the count rysi de, etc. But t he radi cal r esponse is t o convert
this sense of al i enat i on i nt o a demand for ' absol ut e freedom' . The
idea is t o over come al i enat i on by creat i ng a soci et y in whi ch
everyone, i ncl udi ng t he present ' out ' gr oups, par t i ci pat e fully in t he
decisions.
But bot h t hese sol ut i ons woul d si mpl y aggr avat e t he pr obl em,
whi ch is t hat homogeni zat i on has under mi ned t he communi t i es or
charact eri st i cs by whi ch peopl e formerl y identified t hemsel ves and
put not hi ng in t hei r pl ace. Wha t does step i nt o t he gap al most
everywhere is et hni c or nat i onal i dent i t y. Nat i onal i sm has become
t he most powerful focus of i dent i t y in moder n soci et y. The demand
for radical freedom can and frequently does join up wi t h nat i onal -
i sm, and is given a definite i mpet us and di rect i on from this.
But unless this happens , t he aspi rat i on t o absol ut e freedom is
unabl e t o resolve t he di l emma. It at t empt s t o over come t he
al i enat i on of a mass society by mass par t i ci pat i on. But t he very size,
compl exi t y and i nt er-dependence of moder n society makes t hi s
increasingly difficult on t echni cal gr ounds al one. Wha t is mor e
seri ous, t he i ncreasi ng al i enat i on in a society whi ch has eroded its
t radi t i onal foci of allegiance makes it har der and har der t o achieve
t he basic consensus, t o br i ng everyone t o t he ' general wi l l ' , whi ch is
essential for radi cal democr acy. As t he t r adi t i onal limits fade wi t h
t he gr ounds for accept i ng t hem, society t ends t o fragment , part i al
gr oups become increasingly t rucul ent in t hei r demands , as t hey see
less reason t o compr omi se wi t h t he ' syst em' .
But t he radi cal demand for par t i ci pat i on can do not hi ng t o st em
t hi s f r agment at i on. Part i ci pat i on of all in a decision is onl y possi bl e
if t her e is a gr ound of agr eement , or of under l yi ng c ommon
pur pose. Radi cal par t i ci pat i on cannot creat e t hi s; it pr esupposes it.
Charles Taylor 195
This is the poi nt whi ch Hegel repeat edl y makes. The demand for
absolute freedom by itself is empt y. Hegel stresses one line of
possible consequences, t hat empt i ness leads t o pur e destructiveness.
But he also ment i ons anot her in his discussion in t he PhG. For in
fact some di rect i on has t o be given t o society, and hence a gr oup
can take over and i mpr i nt its own pur pose on society claiming t o
represent t he general will. They t hus ' sol ve' t he pr obl em of diversity
by force. Cont empor ar y communi s t societies pr ovi de exampl es of
this. And what ever can be sai d for t hem they can certainly not be
t hought of as model s of freedom. Mor eover t hei r solution t o t he
emptiness of absol ut e freedom is in a sense onl y provi si onal . The
probl em of wh a t social goal s t o choose or st ruct ures t o adopt is
solved by t he exigencies of mobi l i zat i on and combat t owar ds the
free society. Society can be set a definite t ask because it has t o build
the preconditions of communi s m, ei t her in defeating class enemies
or in const r uct i ng a moder n economy. Such societies woul d be in
disarray if ever t he per i od of mobi l i zat i on were t o end (which is
why it woul d end onl y over t he dead bodi es of t he ruling part y).
But an i deol ogy of par t i ci pat i on whi ch does not want t o t ake this
totalitarian r oad of general mobilization cannot cope with the com-
plexity and f r agment at i on of a large-scale cont empor ar y society.
Many of its pr ot agoni st s see t hi s, and r et ur n t o t he original
Rousseaui an i dea of a hi ghl y decent ral i zed federation of communi -
ties. But in t he meant i me t he gr owt h of a large homogeneous
society has ma de t hi s muc h less feasible. It is not just t hat wi t h our
massive concent r at i ons of popul at i on and economi c i nt erdepend-
ence a l ot of deci si ons have t o be t aken for t he whol e society, and
decent ral i zat i on gives us no way of copi ng wi t h these. Mor e serious
is t he fact t hat homogeni zat i on has under mi ned the part i al
communi t i es whi ch woul d nat ur al l y have been t he basis of such a
decentralized federat i on in t he past . Ther e is no advant age in an
artificial car vi ng up of soci et y i nt o manageabl e uni t s. If in fact no
one identifies st rongl y wi t h t hese uni t s, part i ci pat i on will be
mi ni mal , as we see in much of our ur ban politics t oday.
Thus Hegel ' s di l emma for moder n democr acy, put as its simplest,
is t hi s: The moder n i deol ogy of equal i t y and of t ot al part i ci pat i on
leads t o a homogeni zat i on of society. Thi s shakes men loose from
their t r adi t i onal communi t i es , but cannot replace t hem as a focus or
identity. Or r at her , it can onl y replace t hem as such a focus under
t he i mpet us of mi l i t ant nat i onal i sm or some t ot al i t ari an ideology
whi ch woul d depr eci at e or even crush diversity and individuality. It
woul d be a focus for s ome and woul d reduce t he others t o mut e
al i enat i on. Hegel const ant l y stresses t hat t he tight unity ot the
Greek city-state cannot be r ecapt ur ed in t he moder n wor l d t hat has
known t he pri nci pl e of i ndi vi dual freedom.
Thus t he at t empt t o fill t he gap by movi ng t owa r ds a society of
uni versal and t ot al part i ci pat i on, wher e it is not act ual l y har mf ul in
suppressi ng freedom, is vai n. It can onl y aggr avat e t he pr obl em by
intensifying homogeni zat i on, whi l e offering no relief since absol ut e
freedom by itself is empt y and cannot offer a focus of i dent i t y. And
besides, t ot al par t i ci pat i on is unreal i zabl e in a large-scale soci et y. In
fact ideologies of absol ut e freedom onl y pr oduce somet hi ng in t he
hands of a mi nori t y wi t h a powerful vision whi ch it is wi l l i ng t o
i mpose.
The only real cure for t hi s mal ady, a recovery of meani ngful
differentiation, is closed for moder n society precisely because of its
commi t ment t o ideologies whi ch const ant l y press it t owar ds great er
homogenei t y. Some of t he differences whi ch r emai n are depreci -
at ed, and are breedi ng gr ounds for al i enat i on and r esent ment .
Ot her s in fact fill t he gap and become foci of i dent i t y. These are
pri nci pal l y et hni c or nat i onal differences. But t hey t end t o be
exclusive and divisive. They can onl y wi t h difficulty form t he basi s
'i of a differentiated society. On t he cont r ar y, mul t i - nat i onal st at es
have great t r oubl e survi vi ng in t he moder n wor l d. Nat i onal i s m
t ends t o lead t o single homogeneous st at es. Wher e nat i onal i sm is
st rong, it t ends t o pr ovi de t he common focus of i de nt i t yj nd t o fend
off fragment at i on, 'But t hen it is in^d^nêTliTSuxJpressing di ssent
"ancT'dTversity and falling over i nt o a na r r ow and i r r at i onal
, chauvi ni sm.
Hegel gave, as we shall see agai n bel ow, little i mpor t ance t o
nat i onal i sm. And t hi s was t he cause of his failure t o foresee its
pi vot al role in t he moder n wor l d. As an allegiance it was not
rat i onal enough, t oo close t o pur e sent i ment , t o have an i mpor t ant
pl ace in t he f oundat i ons of t he st at e. But it is al so t r ue t hat it cannot
provi de what moder n society needs in his vi ew. And this is a gr ound
for differentiation, meaningful t o t he peopl e concer ned, but whi ch
at t he same t i me does not set t he par t i al communi t i es agai nst each
ot her , but r at her kni t s t hem t oget her in a larger whol e.
Thi s in a single formul a is what moder n society woul d r equi r e t o
resolve its di l emma. It is somet hi ng whi ch t r adi t i onal societies had.
For t he poi nt about concept i ons of cosmi c or der or or gani c
anal ogi es is t hat they gave a meani ng t o differences bet ween social
gr oups whi ch also bound t hem i nt o one. But how t o recover t hi s in
moder n society? Hegel ' s answer , as we saw it, is t o give social and
political differentiation a meani ng by seeing t hem as expressi ve of
cosmi c or der , but he conceives t hi s or der as t he final and compl et e
Charles Taylor 197
fulfilment of t he mode r r n aspi r at i on t o aut onomy. It is an or der
founded on r eason al one, and hence is t he ul t i mat e object of t he
free will.
We can see now mor e clearly h o w t he t wo levels of Hegel ' s
thought on t he necessary di fferent i at i on of society meshed wi t h
each ot her. On one level, t her e is t he set of consi der at i ons dr a wn
from a compar i son wi t h t he Gr eek pol i s: t he size of t he moder n
state, the great differences whi ch a st at e must encompass once all
the functions are t o be per f or med by citizens, t he moder n not i on of
individuality. These will be general l y accept ed by everyone t hough
their significance mi ght be di sput ed. On t he ot her level, t here is t he
necessary ar t i cul at i on of t he Idea whi ch has t o be reflected in
society. In Hegel ' s mi nd t hese do not oper at e as qui t e separ at e
orders of consi der at i on, as I have set t hem out here. They are
intricated in each ot her , so t hat Hegel sees t he existing social
differentiations of his t i me as reflecting t he art i cul at i ons of t he Idea,
or rat her as pr epar i ng a perfectly adequat e reflection as t he Idea
realizes itself in hi st ory. And t hat is of course why he did not see
these differences as r emnant s of earl i er hi st ory dest i ned t o wi t her
away, as t he radi cal t hi nker s of t hi s t i me t hought , but r at her as
approachi ng t he l i neament s of a st at e whi ch woul d finally be
' adequat e t o t he concept ' .
We cannot accept Hegel ' s sol ut i on t oday. But t he di l emma it was
meant t o solve r emai ns. It was t he di l emma whi ch de Tocquevi l l e
tried t o gr appl e wi t h in different t er ms, when he saw t he i mmense
i mport ance t o a democr at i c pol i t y of vi gor ous const i t uent com-
munities in a decent r al i zed st r uct ur e of power , whi l e at t he same
time the pull of equal i t y t ended t o t ake moder n society t owar ds
uniformity, and per haps al so submi ssi on under an omni pot ent
government . Thi s conver gence is per haps not all t hat surpri si ng in
t wo t hi nkers wh o wer e bot h deepl y influenced by Mont esqui eu,
and bot h had a deep a nd s ympat het i c under st andi ng of t he past as
well as of t he wave of t he fut ure. But whet her we t ake it in Hegel ' s
reading or in de Tocquevi l l e' s, one of t he great needs of t he moder n
democrat i c pol i t y is t o r ecover a sense of significant differentiation,
so t hat its par t i al communi t i es , be t hey geogr aphi cal , or cul t ural , or
occupat i onal , can become agai n i mpor t ant cent res of concern and
activity for t hei r member s in a way whi ch connect s t hem t o t he
whol e.
NOTES
1
Cf. Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, ed. G. Lasson (Leipzig,
1923), p. 388.
2
Once again, this is Hegel's term of art; Kant himself used the usual word
'Sittlichkeit' in his works on ethics.
3
Cf. also PR, 145, 156, 258.
4
In the language of the Logic, the category of External Teleology is
inadequate here. The state can only be understood by Internal Teleology.
5
Thus in PR, 258, Hegel speaks of the state possessing ' the actuality of
the substantial will . . . in the particular self-consciousness once that
consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality' (my
italics).
6
In a work of the early 1800s, which has been published since his death
under the title, The German Constitution, Hegel expresses his opposition
to the modern theory that a state should be a ' machine with a single
spring which imparts movement to all the rest of the infinite wheelwork'
(Schriften zur Politik und Rechtsphilosophie, ed. G. Lasson, Leipzig
1923, p. 28; Hegel's Political Writings, translated T. M. Knox, ed. Z. A.
Pelczynski, Oxford, 1964, p. 161). Prussia, as well as revolutionary
France, is cited as an example later in this passage. (Schriften p. 31,
Political Writings pp. 163-4. Cf. discussion in Schlomo Avineri, Hegel's
Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 47-9).
REFERENCES GIVEN IN ABBREVIATED FORM
Abbre-
viation
Work Comment
PhG
Phdnomenologie des The Phenomenology of Spirit
Geistes, published by Hegel in 1807 at the
G. Lasson edition, end of his Jena period.
Hamburg,
1952
EG
System der Philosophic, References are t o paragraph
dritter teil. Die Philosophic numbers ( . . . ) . Hegel's
des Geistes, SW x. paragraphs consisted of a
principal statement, sometimes
followed by an explanatory-
remark, sometimes in turn
followed by an addition inserted
by the later editors. Where useful
I distinguish in my references
between the principal statement
Charles Taylor 199
Grundlinien der
Philosophic des Rechts, ed.
J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg,
1955, or Hegel's
Philosophy of Right, trans.
T. M. Knox (Oxford,
1942).
Die Vernunft in der
Geschichte, ed.
J. Hoffmeister
(Hamburg, 1955).
and the remark, and where
remark or addition are very long,
I give the page reference in the
SW edition.
References to this work, first
published in 1821, are also to
paragraph numbers ( . . . ) . Here
also the main text of a paragraph
is sometimes followed by an
explanatory remark (sometimes
referred to with an ' E' after the
paragraph number), and also
sometimes by an addition inserted
by later editors on the basis of
lecture notes. 1 have usually
quoted the text of Knox's edition,
but the references to paragraph
number makes it easy to find the
texts in the German edition as
well. Where remarks or additions
are long, I have given page
references to the Knox edition.
The introductory part of Hegel's
lectures on the philosophy of
history, put together from various
cycles of lecture notes after his
death.
10
Michael Walzer: Welfare,
Membership and Need*
Member shi p is i mpor t ant because of what t he member s of a
political communi t y owe t o one anot her and t o no one else, or t o no
one else in t he same degree. And t he first t hi ng t hey owe is the
communal provi si on of security and wel fare. Thi s claim mi ght be
reversed: communal provi si on is i mpor t ant because it t eaches us
t he value of member shi p. If we did not provi de for one anot her , if
we recogni zed no di st i nct i on bet ween member s and st rangers, we
woul d have no reason t o form and mai nt ai n pol i t i cal communi t i es.
' Ho w shall men love their count r y' , Rousseau asked, 'if it is not hi ng
mor e for t hem t han for st rangers, and best ows on t hem onl y t hat
whi ch it can refuse t o none ? '
1
Rousseau believed t hat citizens ought
t o love t hei r count r y and t herefore t hat t hei r count r y ought t o give
t hem part i cul ar reasons t o do so. Member s hi p (like ki nshi p) is a
special rel at i on. It ' s not enough t o say, as Edmund Burke di d, t hat
' t o make us love our count r y, our count r y ought t o be l ovel y. '
2
The
crucial t hi ng is t hat it be lovely for us t hough we al ways hope t hat
it will be lovely for ot her s (we also love its reflected loveliness).
Political communi t y for t he sake of pr ovi si on, pr ovi si on for t he
sake of communi t y: t he process wor ks bot h ways, and t hat is
per haps its crucial feat ure. Phi l osophers and political t heori st s have
been t oo qui ck t o t ur n it i nt o a simple cal cul at i on. I ndeed, we are
rat i onal i st s of everyday life; we come t oget her, we sign t he social
cont r act or rei t erat e t he signing of it, in or der t o pr ovi de for our
needs. And we val ue t he cont r act insofar as t hose needs are met .
But one of our needs is communi t y itself: cul t ur e, rel i gi on, and
politics. It is onl y under t he aegis of t hese t hree t hat all t he ot her
t hi ngs we need become socially recognized needs, t ake on hi st ori cal
and det er mi nat e form. The social cont r act is an agr eement t o reach
deci si ons t oget her about wha t goods are necessary t o our c ommon
life, and t hen t o pr ovi de t hose goods for one anot her . The signers
* From Spheres of Justice by Michael Walzer. 1983 by Basic Books,
Inc., Publishers. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.
Michael Walzer 201
own one anot her mor e t han mut ual ai d, for t hat t hey owe or can
owe t o anyone. They owe mut ual pr ovi si on of all t hose t hi ngs for
the sake of whi ch t hey have separ at ed t hemsel ves from ma nki nd as
a whole and j oi ned forces in a par t i cul ar communi t y. Amour social
is one of t hose t hi ngs; but t hough it is a di st r i but ed good - often
unevenly di st ri but ed - it ari ses onl y in t he cour se of ot her
distributions (and of t he pol i t i cal choi ces t hat t he ot her di st ri -
butions requi re). Mut ua l pr ovi si on breeds mut ual i t y. So t he
common life is si mul t aneoul sy t he pr er equi si t e of pr ovi si on and one
of its product s.
Men and wome n come t oget her because t hey literally cannot live
apart. But they can live t oget her in many different ways . Thei r
survival and t hen their wel l -bei ng requi re a c o mmo n effort: agai nst
the wr at h of t he gods, t he host i l i t y of ot her peopl e, t he indifference
and malevolence of nat ur e (fami ne, flood, fire, and di sease), t he
brief transit of a huma n life. No t ar my camps al one, as Davi d
Hume wr ot e, but t empl es, s t or ehous es , i r r i gat i on wo r k s , and bur i al
grounds are t he t r ue mot her s of ci t i es.
3
As t he list suggest s, ori gi ns
are not singular in char act er . Cities differ from one anot her , par t l y
because of t he nat ur al envi r onment s in whi ch t hey are bui l t and t he
immediate danger s t hei r bui l der s encount er , par t l y because of t he
conceptions of social goods t hat t he bui l der s hol d. They recogni ze
but also create one anot her ' s needs and so give a par t i cul ar s hape t o
what 1 will call t he ' spher e of securi t y and wel fare' . The spher e itself
is as old as t he ol dest h u ma n communi t y. I ndeed, one mi ght say
that the original communi t y is a spher e of securi t y and wel fare, a
system of communal pr ovi si on, di st or t ed, no doubt , by gross
inequalities of st rengt h a nd cunni ng. But t he syst em has , in any
case, no nat ur al form. Di fferent exper i ences and different concep-
tions lead t o different pat t er ns of pr ovi si on. Th o u g h t her e ar e s ome
goods t hat are needed absol ut el y, t her e is no good such t hat once
we see it, we know how it st ands vis-d-vis all ot her goods and h o w
much of it we owe t o one anot her . The nat ur e of a need is not self-
evident.
Communal pr ovi si on is bot h gener al a nd par t i cul ar . It is general
whenever publ i c funds ar e spent so as t o benefit al l or most of the
members wi t hout any di st r i but i on t o i ndi vi dual s. It is par t i cul ar
whenever goods are act ual l y ha nde d over t o all or any of t he
members. * Wat er , for exampl e, is one of ' t he bar e r equi r ement s of
1 don' t mean t o reiterate here the technical distinction that economists
make between public and private goods. General provision is always
Public, at least on the less stringent definitions of that term (which specify
202 Welfare, Membership and Need
civil life', and t he bui l di ng of reservoi rs is a form of general
pr ovi si on.
4
But t he delivery of wat er t o one r at her t han t o anot her
nei ghbour hood (where, say, t he weal t hi er citizens live) is part i cul ar.
The securing of t he food suppl y is gener al ; t he di st r i but i on of food
t o wi dows and or phans is par t i cul ar . Publ i c heal t h is most often
general , t he care of t he sick, mos t often par t i cul ar . Somet i mes the
criteria for general and par t i cul ar pr ovi si on will differ radically.
The bui l di ng of t empl es and t he or gani zat i on of religious services is
an exampl e of general provi si on desi gned t o meet t he needs of the
communi t y as a whol e, but c ommuni on wi t h t he gods may be
al l owed onl y t o part i cul arl y mer i t or i ous member s (or it may be
sought privately in secret or in nonconf or mi st sects). The system of
justice is a general good, meet i ng c ommon needs; but t he act ual
di st ri but i on of r ewar ds and puni shment s may serve t he part i cul ar
needs of a ruling class, or it may be organi zed, as we commonl y
t hi nk it shoul d be, t o give i ndi vi dual s what t hey individually
deserve. Si mone Weil has argued t hat , wi t h regard t o justice, need
operat es at bot h t he general and t he par t i cul ar levels, since
criminals need t o be puni s hed.
5
But t hat is an i di osyncrat i c use of
t he wor d need. Mor e likely, t he puni s hment of cri mi nal s is
somet hi ng onl y t he rest of us need. But need does oper at e bot h
generally and part i cul arl y for ot her goods : heal t h care is an obvi ous
exampl e t hat I will later consi der in some det ai l .
Despi t e t he i nher ent forcefulness of t he wor d, needs are elusive.
People don' t just have needs, they have i deas about t hei r needs;
they have pri ori t i es, t hey have degrees of need; and these
priorities and degrees ar e related not onl y t o t hei r huma n nat ur e
but also t o their hi st ory and cul t ure. Since resources are al ways
scarce, har d choices have to be made. I suspect t hat these
can onl y be political choices. They ar e subj ect t o a cert ai n
phi l osophi cal el uci dat i on, but t he i dea of need and t he commi t ment
t o communal provi si on do not by t hemsel ves yield any clear
det er mi nat i on of priorities or degrees. Clearly we can' t meet , and
we don' t have t o meet , every need t o t he same degree or any need t o
only that public goods are those that can' t be provided t o some and not to
other members of the community). So are most forms of particular
provision, for even goods delivered to individuals generate non-exclusive
benefits for the community as a whole. Scholarships to orphans, for
example, are private t o the orphans, public to the community of citizens
within which the orphans will one day work and vote. But public goods of
this latter sort, which depend upon prior distributions to particular persons
or groups, have been controversial in many societies; and I have designed
my categories so as to enable me to examine them closely.
Michael Walzer 203
the ultimate degree. The anci ent At heni ans , for exampl e, pr ovi ded
public bat hs and gymnas i ums for t he citizens but never pr ovi ded
anything remot el y r esembl i ng unempl oyment i nsur ance or social
security. They made a choi ce about h o w t o spend publ i c funds, a
choice shaped pr es umabl y by t hei r under s t andi ng of wha t t he
common life r equi r ed. It woul d be har d t o ar gue t hat t hey ma de a
mi st ake. I suppose t her e ar e not i ons of need t hat woul d yield such a
conclusion, but t hese woul d not be not i ons accept abl e t o - t hey
might not even be compr ehensi bl e t o - t he At heni ans t hemsel ves.
The quest i on of degree suggest s even mor e cl earl y t he i mpor t ance
of political choi ce and t he i rrel evance of any merel y phi l osophi cal
st i pul at i on. Needs are not onl y el usi ve; t hey are al so expansi ve. In
the phr ase of t he cont empor ar y phi l osopher Char l es Fri ed, needs
are vor aci ous; t hey eat up r es our ces .
6
But it woul d be wr ong t o
suggest t hat t herefore need cannot be a di st ri but i ve pri nci pl e. It is,
rat her, a pri nci pl e subj ect t o pol i t i cal l i mi t at i on; and t he limits
(within limits) can be ar bi t r ar y, fixed by some t empor ar y coal i t i on
of interests or maj or i t y of vot er s. Consi der t he case of physi cal
security in a moder n Amer i can city. We coul d pr ovi de absol ut e
security, el i mi nat e every sour ce of vi ol ence except domest i c vi o-
lence, if we put a st reet light every t en yar ds and st at i oned a
pol i ceman every t hi rt y yar ds t hr oughout t he city. But t hat woul d be
very expensi ve, and so we settle for somet hi ng less. Ho w much less
can onl y be deci ded pol i t i cal l y. * One can i magi ne t he sort s of
t hi ngs t hat woul d figure in t he debat es. Above all, I t hi nk, t her e
woul d be a cer t ai n under s t andi ng mor e or less wi del y shar ed,
cont roversi al onl y at t he mar gi ns of wha t const i t ut es ' enough'
security or of wha t level of i nsecuri t y is si mpl y i nt ol er abl e. The
decision woul d al so be affected by ot her fact ors: al t ernat i ve needs,
t he st at e of t he economy, t he agi t at i on of t he pol i cemen' s uni on,
and so on. But what ever deci si on is ul t i mat el y r eached, for
what ever r easons, security is pr ovi ded because t he citizens need it.
And because, at some level, t hey all need it, t he cri t eri on of need
r emai ns a critical s t andar d (as we shall see) even t hough it cannot
det er mi ne pr i or i t y and degr ee. . . .
And should be decided politically: that is what democratic political
arrangements are for. Any philosophical effort to stipulate in detail the
rights or the entitlements of individuals would radically constrain the scope
of democratic decision making. I have argued this point elsewhere.
7
THE EXTENT OF PROVI SI ON
Di st ri but i ve justice in t he sphere of welfare and security has a
t wofol d meani ng: it refers, first t o t he recogni t i on of need and,
second, t o t he recogni t i on of member shi p. Goods mus t be pr ovi ded
t o needy member s because of their needi ness, but t hey must also be
pr ovi ded in such a way as t o sustain t hei r member shi p. It' s not t he
case, however , t hat member s have a claim on any specific set of
goods. Welfare rights are fixed onl y when a communi t y adopt s
some pr ogr amme of mut ual provi si on. Ther e are st r ong ar gument s
t o be made t hat , under given hi st ori cal condi t i ons, such- and- such a
pr ogr amme shoul d be adopt ed. But t hese are not ar gument s about
i ndi vi dual ri ght s; they are ar gument s about t he char act er of a
part i cul ar political communi t y. No one' s rights were vi ol at ed
because t he At heni ans did not al l ocat e publ i c funds for t he
educat i on of chi l dren. Per haps they believed, and per haps they were
ri ght , t hat t he publ i c life of t he city was educat i on enough.
The ri ght t hat member s can legitimately claim is of a mor e
general sort . It undoubt edl y includes some version of t he Hobbes -
ian right t o life, some claim on communal resources for bar e
subsi st ence. No communi t y can al l ow its member s t o st arve t o
deat h when t here is food available t o feed t hem; no gover nment can
st and passively by at such a time - not if it cl ai ms t o be a
gover nment of or by or for t he communi t y. The indifference of
Bri t ai n' s rulers dur i ng t he Irish pot at o famine in t he 1840s is a sure
sign t hat Ireland was a col ony, a conquer ed l and, no real par t of
Gr eat Br i t ai n.
8
Thi s is not t o justify the indifference - one has
obl i gat i ons t o colonies and t o conquer ed peopl es - but only t o
suggest t hat t he Irish woul d have been bet t er served by a
gover nment , vi rt ual l y any gover nment , of their own. Per haps Bur ke
came closest t o descri bi ng t he f undament al right t hat is at st ake
here when he wr ot e: ' Gover nment is a cont ri vance of huma n
wi s dom t o pr ovi de for huma n want s . Me n have a ri ght t hat t hese
want s shoul d be pr ovi ded for by this wi s dom.
9
It onl y has t o be said
t hat t he wi sdom in quest i on is t he wi s dom not of a ruling class, as
Burke seems t o have t hought , but of t he communi t y as a whol e.
Onl y its cul t ure, its charact er, its c ommon under st andi ngs can
define t he ' want s ' t hat are t o be provi ded for. But cul t ure,
char act er , and c ommon under st andi ngs are not givens; they don' t
oper at e aut omat i cal l y; at any part i cul ar moment , t he citizens must
argue about t he ext ent of mut ual provi si on.
They argue about t he meani ng of t he social cont r act , t he ori gi nal
Michael Walzer
205
and rei t erat ed concept i on of the sphere of security and welfare.
Thi s is not a hypot het i cal or an ideal cont ract of the sort John
Rawl s has descri bed. Rat i onal men and women in the original
posi t i on, depri ved of all part i cul ar knowl edge of their social
st andi ng and cul t ural under st andi ng, woul d pr obabl y opt , as Rawl s
has argued, for an equal di st ri but i on of what ever goods they were
t ol d t hey ne e de d.
1 0
But t hi s formul a doesn' t help very much in
det er mi ni ng what choices peopl e will make, or what choices they
shoul d make, once they know who and where they are. In a worl d
of par t i cul ar cul t ures, compet i ng concept i ons of the good, scarce
resources, elusive and expansi ve needs, there isn' t going t o be a
single f or mul a, universally appl i cabl e. There isn' t going t o be a
single uni versal l y appr oved pat h t hat carries us from a not i on like,
say, ' fair shar es' t o a comprehensi ve list of the goods t o which t hat
not i on appl i es. Fair shares of what ?
Just i ce, t ranqui l l i t y, defence, welfare, and liberty: t hat is t he list
pr ovi ded by t he United States Const i t ut i on. One could const rue it
as an exhaust i ve list, but t he t erms are vague; they provi de at best a
st ar t i ng poi nt for publ i c debat e. The st andar d appeal in t hat debat e
is t o a l arger idea: t he Burkei an general right, which takes on
det er mi nat e force only under det ermi nat e condi t i ons and requires
different sort s of provi si on in different times and places. The idea is
si mpl y t hat we have come t oget her, shaped a communi t y, in order
t o cope wi t h difficulties and dangers t hat we coul d not cope with
al one. And so whenever we find ourselves confront ed wi t h difficul-
ties and danger s of t hat sort , we l ook for communal assistance. As
t he bal ance of i ndi vi dual and collective capaci t y changes, so the
ki nds of assi st ance t hat ar e l ooked for change, t oo.
The hi st ory of publ i c heal t h in t he West mi ght usefully be t ol d in
t hese t er ms. Some mi ni mal provi si on is very old, as t he Greek and
Jewi sh exampl es suggest; t he measures adopt ed were a function of
t he communi t y' s sense of danger and t he ext ent of its medical
knowl edge. Over t he years, living arrangement s on a larger scale
br ed new danger s, and scientific advance generat ed a new sense of
danger and a new awareness of t he possibilities of coping. And then
gr oups of citizens pressed for a wi der pr ogr amme of communal
pr ovi si on, expl oi t i ng t he new science t o reduce t he risks of urban
life. That , t hey mi ght rightly say, is what t he communi t y is for. A
si mi l ar ar gument can be made in t he case of social security. The
very success of general provi si on in t he field of publ i c health has
great l y ext ended t he span of a nor mal human life and t hen also the
span of years dur i ng whi ch men and women are unabl e t o suppor t
t hemsel ves, dur i ng whi ch t hey are physically but most often not
socially, politically, or moral l y i ncapaci t at ed. Once agai n, s uppor t
for t he di sabl ed is one of t he ol dest and most c ommon forms of
part i cul ar pr ovi si on. But now it is requi red on a much l arger scale
t han ever before. Families ar e over whel med by t he costs of old age
and l ook for hel p t o t he political communi t y. Exactly what ought t o
be done will be a mat t er of di sput e. Wor ds like health, danger,
science, even old age, have very different meani ngs in different
cul t ures; no ext er nal specification is possi bl e. But t hi s is not t o say
t hat it won' t be clear enough t o t he peopl e involved t hat somet hi ng
some par t i cul ar set of t hi ngs - ought t o be done.
Perhaps t hese exampl es are t oo easy. Disease is a general t hr eat ;
ol d age, a general prospect . Not so unempl oyment and pover t y,
whi ch pr obabl y lie beyond t he ken of many wel l -t o-do peopl e. The
poor can al ways be isolated, locked i nt o ghet t os, bl amed and
puni shed for t hei r own mi sfort une. At t hi s poi nt , it mi ght be said,
provi si on can no l onger be defended by i nvoki ng anyt hi ng like t he
' meani ng' of t he social cont r act . But let us l ook mor e closely at t he
easy cases; for, in fact, t hey involve all t he difficulties of t he difficult
ones. Public heal t h and social security invite us t o t hi nk of t he
political communi t y, in T. H. Mar shal l ' s phr ase, as a ' mut ual
benefit c l u b ' .
1 1
All provi si on is reci procal ; t he member s t ake t ur ns
pr ovi di ng and bei ng provi ded for, much as Ari st ot l e' s citizens t ake
t ur ns rul i ng and bei ng rul ed. Thi s is a happy pi ct ur e, and one t hat is
really under st andabl e in cont ract ual i st t er ms. It is not only t he case
t hat rat i onal agent s, knowi ng not hi ng of their specific si t uat i on,
woul d agree t o t hese t wo forms of pr ovi si on; t he real agent s, t he
or di nar y citizens, of every moder n democr acy have in fact agreed t o
t hem. The t wo are, or so it appear s, equal l y in t he interests of
hypot het i cal and of act ual peopl e. Coer ci on is onl y necessary in
pract i ce because some mi nor i t y of act ual peopl e don' t under s t and,
or don' t consi st ent l y under st and, t hei r real i nt erest s. Onl y t he
reckless and t he i mpr ovi dent need t o be forced t o cont r i but e and
it can al ways be sai d of t hem t hat t hey j oi ned in t he social cont r act
precisely in or der t o prot ect themselves agai nst t hei r own reckless-
ness and i mpr ovi dence. In fact, however , t he r easons for coerci on
go much deeper t han t hi s; t he political communi t y is somet hi ng
mor e t han a mut ual benefit cl ub; and t he ext ent of communal
provi si on in any given case what it is and what it shoul d be is
det er mi ned by concept i ons of need t hat ar e mor e pr obl emat i c t han
t he ar gument t hus far suggests.
Consi der agai n t he case of publ i c heal t h. No communal pr ovi -
si on is possi bl e her e wi t hout t he const r ai nt of a wi de r ange of
activities profitable t o i ndi vi dual member s of t he communi t y but
Michael Walzer 207
t hr eat eni ng t o some l arger number . Even somet hi ng so simple, for
exampl e, as t he provi si on of uncont ami nat ed milk t o large urban
popul at i ons requi res ext ensi ve publ i c cont rol ; and control is a
political achi evement , t he result (in t he United States) of bitter
struggles, over many years, in one city after anot her .
1 2
When the
farmers or t he mi ddl emen of the dairy i ndust ry defended free
ent erpri se, t hey were certainly acting rationally in their own
i nt erest s. The same t hi ng can be said of ot her ent repreneurs who
defend t hemsel ves agai nst the const rai nt s of inspection, regulation,
and enforcement . Public activities of these sorts may be of the
highest val ue t o t he rest of us; they are not of t he highest value t o all
of us. Though I have t aken publ i c health as an exampl e of general
provi si on, it is pr ovi ded only at the expense of some members of the
communi t y. Mor eover , it benefits most the most vulnerable of the
ot her s: t hus, t he special i mpor t ance of the building code for those
wh o live in cr owded t enement s, and of ant i -pol l ut i on laws for those
who live i n t he i mmedi at e vicinity of factory smokestacks or wat er
dr ai ns. Social security, t oo, benefits t he most vulnerable members,
even if, for reasons I have already suggested, t he actual payment s
are t he same for everyone. For t he well-to-do can, or many of them
t hi nk they can, hel p themselves even in time of t roubl e and woul d
much prefer not t o be forced t o help anyone else. The t rut h is t hat
every seri ous effort at communal provision (insofar as t he income
of t he communi t y derives from the wealth of its members) is
redi st ri but i ve in char act er .
1 3
The benefits it provides are not , strictly
speaki ng mut ual .
Once agai n, rat i onal agent s i gnorant of their own social st andi ng
woul d agree t o such a redi st ri but i on. But they woul d agree t oo
easily, and t hei r agr eement doesn' t help us underst and what sort of
a r edi st r i but i on is requi red: Ho w much? For what purposes? In
pract i ce, redi st ri but i on is a political mat t er, and the coercion it
involves is f or eshadowed by t he conflicts t hat rage over its
char act er and ext ent . Every part i cul ar measure is pushed t hrough
by s ome coal i t i on of par t i cul ar interests. But t he ultimate appeal in
t hese conflicts is not t o t he part i cul ar interests, not even t o a public
i nt erest concei ved as t hei r sum, but t o collective values, shared
under st andi ngs of member shi p, heal t h, food and shelter, wor k and
leisure. The conflicts themselves are often focused, at least overtly,
on quest i ons of fact; t he underst andi ngs are assumed. Thus the
ent r epr eneur s of t he dai ry i ndust ry denied as long as they could the
connect i on bet ween cont ami nat ed mi l k and tuberculosis. But once
t hat connect i on was established, it was difficult for t hem t o deny
t hat mi l k shoul d be i nspect ed: caveat emptor was not , in such a
case, a pl ausi bl e doct ri ne. Similarly, in t he debat es over ol d-age
pensi ons in Gr eat Britain, pol i t i ci ans most l y agreed on t he t radi -
t i onal British val ue of self-help but di sagreed sharpl y about whet her
self-help was still possi bl e t hr ough t he est abl i shed worki ng-cl ass
friendly societies. These wer e real mut ual -benefi t cl ubs organi zed
on a strictly vol unt ar y basis, but they seemed about t o be
over whel med by t he gr owi ng number s of t he aged. It became
increasingly appar ent t hat t he member s si mpl y di d not have t he
resources t o pr ot ect themselves and one anot her from povert y in
ol d age. And few British pol i t i ci ans wer e pr epar ed t o say t hat they
shoul d be left unpr ot ect ed.
1 4
Her e, t hen, is a mor e precise account of the social cont r act : it is
an agreement t o redi st ri but e t he resources of t he member s in
accordance wi t h some shar ed under st andi ng of t hei r needs, subject
t o ongoi ng political det ermi nat i on in det ai l . The cont r act is a mor al
bond. It connect s t he st r ong and t he weak, t he lucky and t he
unl ucky, the rich and t he poor , creat i ng a uni on t hat t r anscends all
differences of interest, dr awi ng its st rengt h from hi st ory, cul t ure,
religion, l anguage, and so on. Ar gument s about communal provi -
sion ar e, at t he deepest level i nt erpret at i ons of t hat uni on. The
closer and mor e inclusive it is, t he wi der t he recogni t i on of needs,
t he greater t he number of social goods t hat are dr awn i nt o t he
sphere of security and wel f ar e.
1 5
I don' t doubt t hat many political
communi t i es have redi st ri but ed resources on very different pri nci -
pl es, not in accordance wi t h t he needs of t he member s generally but
in accor dance wi t h t he power of t he wel l bor n or t he weal t hy. But
t hat , as Rousseau suggested in his Discourse on Inequality, makes a
fraud of t he social c ont r a c t .
1 6
In any communi t y, wher e resources
are t aken away from t he poor and given t o t he rich, t he rights of t he
poor are bei ng vi ol at ed. The wi sdom of t he communi t y is not
engaged in provi di ng for their want s. Political debat e about t he
nat ur e of t hose want s will have t o be repressed, else t he fraud will
qui ckl y be exposed. When all t he member s share in t he busi ness of
i nt erpret i ng t he social cont r act , t he resul t will be a mor e or less
ext ensi ve system of communal provi si on. If all st at es are in
pri nci pl e welfare states, democraci es are most likely t o be wel fare
st at es in pract i ce. Even t he i mi t at i on of democr acy breeds welfar-
i sm, as in t he ' peopl e' s democraci es' , wher e t he st at e prot ect s t he
peopl e agai nst every disaster except t hose t hat it inflicts on t hem
itself.
So democr at i c citizens ar gue among t hemsel ves and opt for many
different sorts of security and wel fare, ext endi ng far beyond my
' easy' exampl es of publ i c heal t h and ol d-age pensi ons. The cat egor y
Michael Walzer
209
of socially recogni zed needs is open-ended. For the people' s sense of
what they need encompasses not only life itself but also the good
life, and t he appr opr i at e bal ance bet ween these t wo is itself a mat t er
of di sput e. The At heni an dr ama and the Jewish academies were
bot h financed wi t h money t hat could have been spent on housing,
say, or on medi ci ne. But dr ama and education were taken by
Greeks and J ews t o be not merely enhancement s of the common life
but vital aspect s of communal welfare. 1 want to stress again that
these are not j udgement s t hat can easily be called incorrect.
AN AMERICAN WELFARE STATE
What sort of communal provi si on is appropri at e in a society like
our own? It ' s not my pur pose here t o anticipate the outcomes of
democr at i c debat e or t o st i pul at e in detail the ext ent or the forms of
provi si on. But it can be argued, I t hi nk, t hat the citizens of a
moder n i ndust ri al democr acy owe a great deal t o one another, and
t he ar gument will pr ovi de a useful oppor t uni t y t o test the critical
force of t he pri nci pl es I have defended up until now: t hat every
political communi t y must at t end t o t he needs of its members as they
collectively under st and t hose needs; t hat the goods t hat are
di st ri but ed mus t be di st ri but ed in pr opor t i on t o need; and t hat the
di st ri but i on must recogni ze and uphol d the underlying equality of
member shi p. These are very general principles; they are meant to
appl y t o a wi de range of communi t i es - t o any communi t y, in fact,
wher e t he member s are each ot her' s equals (before God or the law),
or wher e it can pl ausi bl y be said t hat , however they are treated in
fact, they ought t o be each ot her ' s equal s. The principles probabl y
don' t appl y t o a communi t y organi zed hierarchically, as in tradi-
t i onal Indi a, wher e t he fruits of t he harvest are distributed not
accordi ng t o need but accordi ng t o caste - or rather, as Louis
Dut nont has wr i t t en, wher e ' the needs of each are conceived t o be
different, dependi ng on [his] cast e. ' Everyone is guaranteed a share,
so Dumont ' s I ndi an village is still a welfare state, ' a sort of co-
operat i ve wher e t he mai n aim is to ensure t he subsistence of
everyone in accor dance wi t h his social function' , but not a welfare
st at e or a co- oper at i ve whose principles we can readily
u n d e r
"
s t a n d .
1 7
(But Dumont does not tell us how food is supposed t o be
di st ri but ed in t i me of scarcity. If t he subsistence st andard is the
same for ever yone, t hen we are back in a familiar world. )
Cl earl y, t he t hree pri nci pl es apply t o the citizens of the United
St at es; and t hey have consi derabl e force here because of t he
affluence of t he communi t y and t he expansi ve under st andi ng of
individual need. On t he ot her hand t he Uni t ed States current l y
mai nt ai ns one of t he shabbi er systems of communal provi si on in
t he West er n wor l d. Thi s is so for a vari et y of r easons: t he
communi t y of citizens is loosely or gani zed; var i ous et hni c and
religious groups r un welfare pr ogr ammes of t hei r own; t he i deol ogy
of self-reliance and ent repreneuri al oppor t uni t y is wi del y accept ed;
and t he movement s of t he left, part i cul arl y t he l abour movement ,
are relatively we a k .
1 8
Democr at i c deci si on-maki ng reflects these
realities, and t here is not hi ng in pri nci pl e wr ong wi t h t hat .
Nevert hel ess, t he established pat t ern of provi si on doesn' t measur e
up t o t he internal requi rement s of t he sphere of security and
welfare, and t he c ommon under st andi ngs of t he citizens poi nt
t owar d a mor e el abor at e pat t er n. One mi ght al so argue t hat
Ameri can citizens shoul d wor k t o bui l d a st ronger and mor e
intensely experi enced political communi t y. But t hi s ar gument ,
t hough it woul d have di st ri but i ve consequences, is not , pr oper l y
speaki ng, an ar gument about di st ri but i ve justice. The quest i on is,
What do t he citizens owe one anot her , given t he communi t y they
act ual l y i nhabi t ?
Consi der t he exampl e of cri mi nal justice. The act ual di st ri but i on
of puni shment s is an issue I will t ake up in a later chapt er . But t he
aut onomy of puni shment , t he cert ai nt y t hat peopl e are bei ng
puni shed for t he ri ght reasons (what ever t hose ar e) , depends upon
t he di st ri but i on of resources wi t hi n t he legal system. If accused men
and women are t o receive their rightful shar e of justice, they must
first have a rightful shar e of legal ai d. Hence t he i nst i t ut i on of t he
publ i c defender and t he assigned counsel : just as t he hungr y must
be fed, so t he accused must be defended; and they must be defended
in pr opor t i on t o t hei r needs. But no i mpar t i al observer of t he
Ameri can legal syst em t oday can doubt t hat t he resources necessary
t o meet t hi s s t andar d are not generally avai l abl e.
1 9
The rich and
t he poor are t reat ed differently in Amer i can court s, t hough it is t he
publ i c commi t ment of t he court s t o t r eat t hem t he same. The
ar gument for a mor e generous provi si on follows from t hat commi t -
ment . If justice is t o be provi ded at all, it must be provi ded equally
for all accused citizens wi t hout regard t o t hei r weal t h (or t hei r race,
religion, political par t i sanshi p, and so on) . I don' t mean t o
under est i mat e t he pract i cal difficulties her e; but t hi s, agai n, is t he
i nner logic of pr ovi si on, and it makes for an i l l umi nat i ng exampl e
of compl ex equal i t y. For t he i nner logic of r ewar d and puni shment
Michael Walzer
211
is different, r equi r i ng, as I shall argue later, t hat distributions be
pr opor t i onal t o desert and not t o need. Puni shment is a negative
good t hat ought t o be monopol i zed by those who have acted badly
- and who have been found guilty of acting badly (after a
resourceful defence).
Legal ai d raises no t heoret i cal pr obl ems because the institutional
stuctures for pr ovi di ng it al ready exist, and what is at stake is only
the readiness of t he communi t y t o live up t o the logic of its own
i nst i t ut i ons. I wa nt t o t ur n now t o an area where American
i nst i t ut i ons ar e relatively underdevel oped, and where communal
commi t ment is pr obl emat i c, t he subject of continuing political
debat e: t he area of medi cal care. But here the argument for a more
extensive pr ovi si on mus t move mor e slowly. It isn' t enough to
summon up a ' ri ght t o t r eat ment ' . I shall have t o recount something
of t he hi st ory of medi cal care as a social good.
The Case of Medical Care
Until recent t i mes, t he pract i ce of medicine was mostly a matter of
free ent erpri se. Doct or s made their diagnosis, gave their advice,
healed or di dn' t heal t hei r pat i ent s, for a fee. Perhaps the private
charact er of t he economi c rel at i onshi p was connected to the
i nt i mat e char act er of t he professi onal rel at i onshi p. Mor e likely, I
t hi nk, it had t o do wi t h t he relative marginality of medicine itself.
Doct or s coul d, in fact, do very little for their patients; and the
common at t i t ude in t he face of disease (as in t he face of poverty)
was a stoical fatalism. Or , popul ar remedies were developed that
were not much less effective, somet i mes more effective, t han those
prescri bed by est abl i shed physi ci ans. Folk medicine sometimes
pr oduced a ki nd of communal provi si on at t he local level, but it
was equal l y likely t o gener at e new pract i t i oners, charging fees in
their t ur n. Fai t h heal i ng fol l owed a similar pat t ern.
Leaving t hese t wo asi de, we can say t hat the distribution of
medical care has hi st ori cal l y rested in the hands of the medical
professi on, a guild of physi ci ans t hat dat es at least from the time
of Hi ppocr at es in t he fifth cent ury BC. The guild has functioned
t o excl ude unconvent i onal pract i t i oners and t o regulate the number
of physi ci ans in any given communi t y. A genuinely tree
mar ket has never been in t he interest of its members. But
is in t he i nt erest of t he member s t o sell their services to
2 1 2 Welfare, Membership and Need
i ndi vi dual pat i ent s; and t hus, by and l arge, t he wel l -t o-do have
been well cared for (in accor dance wi t h t he cur r ent under st andi ng
of good care) and t he poor hardl y car ed for at all. In a few
ur ban communi t i es - in t he medi eval Jewi sh communi t i es, for
exampl e - medi cal services wer e mor e wi del y avai l abl e. But they
wer e vi rt ual l y unknown for mos t peopl e mos t of t he t i me. Doct or s
wer e t he servant s of t he ri ch, often at t ached t o nobl e houses and
royal cour t s. Wi t h regard t o t hi s pract i cal out come, however , t he
professi on has al ways had a collective bad consci ence. For t he
di st ri but i ve logic of t he pract i ce of medi ci ne seems t o be t hi s: t hat
care shoul d be pr opor t i onat e t o illness and not t o weal t h. Hence,
t her e have al ways been doct or s, like t hose honour ed in ancient
Greece, wh o served t he poor on t he side, as it wer e, even whi l e they
ear ned their living from payi ng pat i ent s. Mos t doct or s , present in
an emergency, still feel bound t o help t he victim wi t hout regard to
his mat eri al st at us. It is a mat t er of professi onal Good Samar i t an-
ism t hat t he call 'Is t here a doct or in t he house?' shoul d not go
unanswer ed if t here is a doct or t o answer it. In or di nar y t i mes,
however , t here was little call for medi cal hel p, largely because t here
was little faith in its act ual helpfulness. And so t he bad consci ence
of t he professi on was not echoed by any political demand for t he
repl acement of free ent erpri se by communal provi si on.
In Eur ope dur i ng t he Mi ddl e Ages, t he cure of soul s was publ i c,
t he cure of bodi es pri vat e. Today, in mos t Eur opean count r i es, t he
si t uat i on is reversed. The reversal is best expl ai ned in t er ms of a
maj or shift in t he common under st andi ng of souls and bodi es: we
have lost confidence in t he cure of soul s, and we have come
increasingly t o believe, even t o be obsessed wi t h, t he cure of bodi es.
Descart es' s f amous decl ar at i on t hat t he ' pr eser vat i on of heal t h' was
t he ' chief of all goods' may be t aken t o symbol i ze t he shift - or t o
heral d it, for in t he hi st ory of popul ar at t i t udes, Descart es' s
Discourse on Method came very ear l y.
2 0
Then, as et erni t y receded
in t he popul ar consci ousness, longevity moved t o t he fore. Among
medi eval Chri st i ans, et erni t y was a socially recogni zed need; and
every effort was made t o see t hat it was wi del y and equally
di st ri but ed, t hat every Chri st i an had an equal chance at sal vat i on
and et ernal life: hence, a church in every par i sh, regul ar services,
cat echi sm for t he young, compul sor y communi on, and so on.
Among moder n citizens, longevity is a socially recogni zed need;
and increasingly every effort is made t o see t hat it is wi del y and
equal l y di st ri but ed, t hat every citizen has an equal chance at a l ong
Michael Walzer
213
and heal t hy life: hence doct or s and hospitals in every district,
regular check- ups, heal t h educat i on for the young, compulsory
vacci nat i on, and so on.
Parallel t o t he shift in at t i t udes, and following naturally from it,
was a shift in i nst i t ut i ons: from t he church t o t he clinic and the
hospi t al . But t he shift has been gr adual : a slow development of
communal i nt erest in medi cal care, a slow erosion of interest in
religious care. The first maj or form of medical provision came in
the area of pr event i on, not of t r eat ment , pr obabl y because the
former i nvol ved no i nt erference wi t h t he prerogatives of the guild
of physi ci ans. But t he begi nni ngs of provision in the area of
t r eat ment wer e r oughl y si mul t aneous wi t h the great public health
campai gns of t he late ni net eent h cent ury, and the t wo undoubt edl y
reflect t he same sensitivity t o quest i ons of physical survival. The
licensing of physi ci ans, t he est abl i shment of state medical schools
and ur ban clinics, t he filtering of t ax money into t he great voluntary
hospi t al s: t hese measur es i nvol ved, per haps, only marginal interfer-
ence wi t h t he professi on - some of t hem, in fact, reinforced its
guildlike char act er ; but t hey al ready represent an i mpor t ant public
c ommi t me nt .
2 1
Indeed, t hey represent a commi t ment that ulti-
mately can be fulfilled onl y by t ur ni ng physicians, or some
subst ant i al numbe r of t hem, i nt o publ i c physicians (as a smaller
number once t ur ned t hemsel ves i nt o court physicians) and by
abol i shi ng or const r ai ni ng t he mar ket in medical care. But before I
defend t hat t r ans f or mat i on, I want t o stress the unavoidability of
the commi t ment from whi ch it follows.
What has happened in t he moder n wor l d is simply t hat disease
itself, even when it is endemi c rat her t han epidemic, has come t o be
seen as a pl ague. And since t he pl ague can be deal t with, it must be
dealt wi t h. Peopl e will not endur e what they no longer believe they
have t o endur e. Deal i ng wi t h t ubercul osi s, cancer, or heart failure,
however, r equi r es a c ommon effort. Medi cal research is expensive,
and t he t r eat ment of many par t i cul ar diseases lies far beyond the
resources of or di nar y ci t i zens. So t he communi t y must step in, and
any democr at i c communi t y will in fact step in, more or less
vi gorousl y, mor e or less effectively, dependi ng on t he out come of
part i cul ar pol i t i cal bat t l es. Thus , t he role of t he Ameri can Govern-
ment (or gover nment s , for much of t he activity is at the state and
local levels): subsi di zi ng research, t rai ni ng doct ors, providing
hospi t al s a nd equi pment , regul at i ng vol unt ary i nsurance schemes,
under wr i t i ng t he t r eat ment of t he very ol d. All this represents the
cont ri vance of huma n wi s dom t o pr ovi de for huma n want s . ' And
all t hat is requi red t o make it moral l y necessary is t he devel opment
of a ' want ' so wi del y and deeply felt t hat it can pl ausi bl y be said
t hat it is the want not of this or t hat person al one but of t he
communi t y generally - a ' human wa nt ' even t hough culturally
shaped and stressed. *
But once communal provi si on begi ns, it is subject t o further
mor al const r ai nt s: it must provi de what is ' want ed' equal l y t o all
t he member s of t he communi t y; and it must do so in ways t hat
respect t hei r member shi p. No w, even t he pat t er n of medical
provi si on in t he Uni t ed States, t hough it st ops far short of a
nat i onal heal t h service, is i nt ended t o pr ovi de mi ni mal l y decent
care t o all who need it. Once publ i c funds are commi t t ed, publ i c
officials can har dl y i nt end anyt hi ng less. At t he same t i me, however,
no political decision has yet been made t o chal l enge directly t he
system of free ent erpri se in medi cal care. And so l ong as t hat system
exists, weal t h will be domi nant in (this par t of) t he sphere of
security and wel fare; i ndi vi dual s will be cared for in pr opor t i on t o
t hei r ability t o pay and not t o their need for care. In fact, t he
si t uat i on is mor e compl ex t han t hat f or mul a suggest s, for commu-
nal provi si on al ready encroaches upon t he free mar ket , and t he very
sick and t he very ol d somet i mes receive exactly t he t r eat ment they
shoul d receive. But it is clear t hat povert y remai ns a significant bar
t o adequat e and consi st ent t r eat ment . Perhaps t he most telling
statistic about cont empor ar y Amer i can medi ci ne is t he correl at i on
of visits t o doct or s and hospi t al s wi t h social class r at her t han wi t h
degree or incidence of illness. Mi ddl e- and upper-cl ass Amer i cans
are consi derabl y mor e likely t o have a pri vat e physi ci an and t o see
hi m often, and consi derabl y less likely t o be seriously ill, t han are
t hei r poor er fellow ci t i zens.
2 5
Wer e medi cal care a l uxur y, t hese
* Arguing against Bernard Williams's claim that the only proper criterion
for the distribution of medical care is medical need,
2 2
Robert Nozick asks
why it doesn't then follow ' that the only proper criterion for the
distribution of barbering services is barbering need' ?
2 3
Perhaps it does
follow if one attends only to be the ' internal goal' of the activity, conceived
in universal terms. But it doesn' t follow if one attends to the social meaning
of the activity, the place of the good it distributes in the life of a particular
group of people. One can conceive of a society in which haircuts took on
such central cultural significance that communal provision would be
morally required, but it is something more than an interesting fact that no
such society has ever existed. I have been helped in thinking about these
issues by an article of Thomas Scanlon's; I adopt here his 'conventionalist'
alternative.
2 4
Michael Walzer 215
discrepancies woul d not mat t er much; but as soon as medical care
becomes a socially recogni zed need, and as soon as the community
invests in its pr ovi si on, they mat t er a great deal. For then
depri vat i on is a doubl e loss - t o one' s health and t o one' s social
st andi ng. Doct or s and hospi t al s have become such massively
i mpor t ant feat ures of cont empor ar y life t hat to be cut off from the
help t hey pr ovi de is not onl y danger ous but also degrading.
But any fully devel oped system of medical provision will require
the const r ai nt of t he guild of physicians. Indeed, this is more
generally t r ue: t he provi si on of security and welfare requires the
const rai nt of t hose men and women who had previously controlled
the goods in quest i on and sol d t hem on the market (assuming, what
is by no means al ways t r ue, t hat the mar ket predates communal
provi si on). For what we do when we declare this or that good t o be
a needed good is t o bl ock or const rai n its free exchange. We also
block any ot her di st ri but i ve pr ocedur e t hat doesn' t attend t o need -
popul ar el ect i on, mer i t ocr at i c compet i t i on, personal or familiar
preference, and so on. But t he mar ket is, at least in the United States
t oday, t he chief rival of t he sphere of security and welfare; and it is
most i mpor t ant l y t he mar ket t hat is pre-empt ed by the welfare
state. Needed goods cannot be left t o the whi m, or distributed in
t he i nt erest , of some powerful gr oup of owners or practitioners.
Mos t oft en, owner s hi p is abol i shed, and practitioners are effect-
ively conscr i pt ed or , at least, ' signed up' in the public service. They
serve for t he sake of t he social need and not , or not simply, for their
own sakes: t hus, pri est s for t he sake of eternal life, soldiers for the
sake of nat i onal defence, publ i c [state] school teachers for the sake
of their pupi l s' educat i on. Priests act wrongl y if they sell salvation;
soldiers, if t hey set up as mercenari es; teachers, if they cater t o the
children of t he weal t hy. Somet i mes t he conscription is only partial,
as when l awyer s are r equi r ed t o be officers of the court, serving the
cause of j ust i ce even whi l e they also serve their clients and
t hemsel ves. Somet i mes t he conscri pt i on is occasional and tempor-
ary, as when l awyers ar e requi red t o act as ' assigned counsels' for
defendant s unabl e t o pay. In these cases, a special effort is made to
respect t he per sonal char act er of t he lawyer-client relationship. I
woul d l ook for a si mi l ar effort in any fully developed national
heal t h service. But I see no reason t o respect the doct or' s market
freedom. Needed goods are not commodi t i es. Or , more precisely,
they can be bought and sol d onl y insofar as they are available above
and beyond what ever level of provi si on is fixed by democratic
decision maki ng (and onl y insofar as t he buying and selling doesn t
di st ort di st r i but i ons bel ow t hat level).
2 1 6 Welfare, Membership and Need
It mi ght be ar gued, however , t hat t he refusal t hus far t o finance a
nat i onal heal t h service const i t ut es a political decision by t he
Amer i can peopl e about t he level of communal care (and about the
relative i mpor t ance of ot her goods) : a mi ni mal s t andar d for
everyone - namel y, t he s t andar d of t he ur ban clinics; and free
ent erpri se beyond t hat . Tha t woul d seem t o me an i nadequat e
st andar d, but it woul d not necessarily be an unj ust deci si on. It is
not , however , t he decision t he Ameri can peopl e have made. The
common appr eci at i on of t he i mpor t ance of medi cal care has carried
t hem well beyond t hat . In fact, federal, st at e, and local gover nment s
now subsidize different levels of care for different classes of citizens.
Thi s mi ght be all right, t oo, if t he classification wer e connect ed t o
t he pur poses of t he care if, for exampl e, soldiers and defence
wor ker s wer e given special t r eat ment in t i me of war . But t he poor ,
t he mi ddl e class, and t he rich make an indefensible t ri age. So long
as communal funds are spent , as they current l y are, t o finance
research, build hospi t al s, and pay t he fees of doct or s in pri vat e
pract i ce, t he services t hat these expendi t ures under wr i t e must be
equal l y avai l abl e t o all citizens.
Thi s, t hen, is t he ar gument for an expanded Amer i can welfare
st at e. It follows from t he t hree principles wi t h whi ch I began, and it
suggests t hat t he t endency of t hose pri nci pl es is t o free security and
wel fare from t he prevai l i ng pat t er ns of domi nance. Though a
variety of i nst i t ut i onal ar r angement s is possi bl e, t he t hree principles
woul d seem t o favour provi si on in ki nd; t hey suggest an i mpor t ant
ar gument against cur r ent pr oposal s t o di st ri but e money i nst ead of
educat i on, legal ai d, or medical care. The negat i ve i ncome t ax, for
exampl e, is a pl an t o increase t he pur chasi ng power of t he poor a
modified versi on of si mpl e equal i t y.
2 6
Thi s pl an woul d not ,
however , abolish t he domi nance of weal t h in t he spher e of need.
Short of a radi cal equal i zat i on, men and women wi t h great er
pur chasi ng power coul d still, and surely woul d, bid up t he pri ce of
needed services. So t he communi t y woul d be investing, t hough now
onl y i ndi rect l y, in i ndi vi dual welfare but wi t hout fitting provi si on
t o t he shape of need. Even wi t h equal i ncomes, heal t h care delivered
t hr ough t he mar ket woul d not be responsi ve t o need; nor woul d t he
mar ket pr ovi de adequat el y for medi cal research. Thi s is not an
ar gument agai nst t he negat i ve i ncome t ax, however , for it may be
t he case t hat money itself, in a mar ket economy, is one of t he t hi ngs
t hat peopl e need. And t hen it t oo, per haps , shoul d be provi ded in
ki nd.
I want t o stress agai n t hat no a priori st i pul at i on of what needs
ought t o be recogni zed is possi bl e; nor is t here any a priori way of
Michael Walzer 217
det ermi ni ng appr opr i at e levels of provision. Our attitudes t oward
medical care have a hi st or y; they have been different; they will be
different agai n. The forms of communal provision have changed in
the past and will cont i nue t o change. But they don' t change
aut omat i cal l y as at t i t udes change. The old order has its clients;
there is a l et hargy in i nst i t ut i ons as in individuals. Moreover,
popul ar at t i t udes are rarel y so clear as they are in the case of
medical care. So change is al ways a mat t er of political argument,
organi zat i on, and st ruggl e. All t hat the phi l osopher can do is to
describe t he basi c st r uct ur e of the argument s and the constraints
they ent ai l . Hence t he t hree pri nci pl es, which can be summed up in
a revised versi on of Ma r x' s famous maxi m: From each according t o
his ability (or his resources); t o each according to his socially
recognized needs. Thi s, I t hi nk, is t he deepest meani ng of the social
cont ract . It onl y remai ns t o wor k out t he details - but in everyday
life, t he details ar e everyt hi ng.
NOTES
1
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'A Discourse on Political Economy', The Social
Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole (New York, 1950),
2
pp. 302- 3.
Edmund Burke, Reflections on the French Revolution (London, 1910),
3
P
-
7 5
-
Cf. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. i n, part n, ch. 8.
The quotation is from the Greek geographer Pausanias, in George
Rosen, A History of Public Health (New York, 1958), p. 41.
Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, trans. Arthur Wills (Boston, 1955),
p. 21.
6
Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass, 1978), p. 122.
Michael Walzer, 'Philosophy and Democracy', Political Theory 9
(1981), pp. 379- 99. See also the thoughtful discussion in Amy Gut-
mann, Liberal Equality (Cambridge, England, 1980) especially
8
PP. 197-202.
For an account of the famine and the British response, see C. B.
Woodham-Smith, The Great Hunger: Ireland 1845-1849 (London,
9
Burke, French Revolution [2], p. 57.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass, 1971), part i, chs. I
and 3.
1 1
T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Garden
City, New York, 1965), p. 298. , .
See Judith Walzer Leavitt, The Healthiest City: Milwaukee and We
Politics of Health Reform (Princeton, 1982), ch. 5.
218
Welfare, Membership and Need
1 3
See the careful discussion in Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and
Equality (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 87-96.
1 4
P. H. J. H. Gosden, Self-Help: Voluntary Association in the Nineteenth
Century (London, 1973), ch. 9.
1 5
See, for example, Harry Eckstein's discussion of conceptions of com-
munity and welfare policies in Norway. Division and Cohesion in
Democracry: A Study of Norway (Princeton, 1966), pp. 857.
1 6
Rousseau, Social Contract (1), pp. 2502.
1 7
Louis Dumont, Humo Hierarchus: The Caste System and Its Implica-
tions (revised English ed., Chicago, 1980), p. 105.
1 8
Wilensky, Welfare State (32), chs. 2 and 3.
1 9
See Whitney North Seymour, Why Justice Fails (New York, 1973),
especially ch. 4.
2 0
Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, trans. Arthur Wollaston (Har-
mondsworth, England, 1960), p. 85.
2 1
For a brief account of these developments, see Odin W. Anderson, The
Uneasy Equilibrium: Private and Public Financing of Health Services in
the United States, 1875-1965 (New Haven, 1968).
2 2
Bernard Williams, ' The Idea of Equality', in Problems of the Self
(Cambridge, England, 1973), p. 240.
2 3
See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York, 1974),
pp. 233- 5.
2 4
Thomas Scanlon, 'Preference and Urgency', Journal of Philosophy, 57
(1975), pp. 655- 70.
2 5
Monroe Lerner, 'Social Differences in Physical Health' , John B. McKin-
ley, 'The Help-Seeking Behavior of the Poor' , and Julius Roth, ' The
Treatment of the Sick', in Poverty and Health: A Sociological Analysis,
ed. John Kosa and Irving Kenneth Zola (Cambridge, Mass, 1969),
summary statements at pp. 103, 265, adn 280- 1.
2 6
Also, supposedly, cheaper form of welfare: see Colin Clark, Poverty
before Politics: A Proposal for a Reverse Income Tax (Hobart Paper 73,
London, 1977).
11
i
The expression ' pol i t i cal educat i on' has fallen on evil days; in t he
wilful and di si ngenuous cor r upt i on of l anguage whi ch is charact er-
istic of our t i me it has acqui r ed a sinister meani ng. In places ot her
than this, it is associ at ed wi t h t hat soft eni ng of t he mi nd, by force,
by al arm, or by t he hypnot i s m of t he endl ess repet i t i on of what was
scarcely wor t h sayi ng once, by means of whi ch whol e popul at i ons
have been r educed t o submi ssi on. It is, t herefore, an ent erpri se
wort h under t aki ng t o consi der agai n, in a qui et mome nt , how we
should under st and t hi s expr essi on, whi ch j oi ns t oget her t wo
laudable activities, and in doi ng so pl ay a smal l par t in rescui ng it
from abuse.
Politics I t ake t o be t he act i vi t y of at t endi ng t o t he general
arrangement s of a set of peopl e wh o m chance or choi ce have
brought t oget her. In t hi s sense, families, cl ubs, and l ear ned societies
have their ' pol i t i es' . But t he communi t i es in whi ch this manner of
activity is pr e- emi nent ar e t he her edi t ar y co- oper at i ve gr oups, many
of t hem of anci ent l i neage, all of t hem awar e of a past , a pr esent ,
and a future, whi ch we call ' st at es' . For mos t peopl e, political
activity is a secondar y act i vi t y - t hat is t o say, t hey have somet hi ng
else t o do besi des at t endi ng t o t hese ar r angement s . But , as we have
come t o under s t and it, t he act i vi t y is one in whi ch every member of
the gr oup wh o is nei t her a chi l d nor a l unat i c has some par t and
some responsi bi l i t y. Wi t h us it is, at one level or anot her , a
universal activity.
I speak of t hi s activity as ' at t endi ng t o ar r angement s ' , r at her t han
as ' maki ng ar r angement s ' , because in t hese her edi t ar y co-operat i ve
* 1977 Permission granted by Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Michael Oakeshott: Political
Education*
220
Political Education
gr oups t he activity is never offered t he bl ank sheet of infinite
possibility. In any gener at i on, even t he most r evol ut i onar y, the
ar r angement s whi ch are enjoyed al ways far exceed t hose whi ch are
recogni zed t o st and in need of at t ent i on, and t hose whi ch are bei ng
pr epar ed for enj oyment are few in compar i son wi t h t hose whi ch
receive amendment : t he new is an insignificant pr opor t i on of t he
whol e. Ther e are some peopl e, of course, who al l ow t hemsel ves t o
speak
As if arrangements were intended
For nothing else but to be mended
but , for most of us, our det er mi nat i on t o i mpr ove our conduct does
not prevent us from recogni zi ng t hat t he great er par t of what we
have is not a bur den t o be carri ed or an i ncubus t o be t hr own off,
but an i nheri t ance t o be enjoyed. And a certain degree of shabbi ness
is joined wi t h every real conveni ence.
Now, at t endi ng to t he ar r angement s of a society is an activity
whi ch, iike every ot her , has t o be l earned. Politics make a call upon
knowl edge. Consequent l y, it is not i rrel evant t o enqui r e i nt o t he
ki nd of knowl edge whi ch is i nvol ved, and t o i nvest i gat e t he nat ur e
of political educat i on. I do not , however , pr opose t o ask what
i nf or mat i on we shoul d equi p oursel ves wi t h before we begin t o be
politically active, or wha t we need t o know in or der t o be successful
pol i t i ci ans, but t o enqui r e i nt o t he ki nd of knowl edge we unavoi d-
ably call upon whenever we are engaged in political activity and t o
get from t hi s an under st andi ng of t he nat ur e of political educat i on.
Our t hought s on political educat i on, t hen, mi ght be supposed t o
spri ng from our under st andi ng of political activity and t he ki nd of
knowl edge it i nvol ves. And it woul d appear t hat what is want ed at
this poi nt is a definition of political activity from whi ch t o dr a w
some concl usi ons. But t hi s, I t hi nk, woul d be a mi st aken way of
goi ng about our busi ness. Wha t we requi re is not so much a
definition of politics from whi ch t o deduce t he char act er of political
educat i on, as an under st andi ng of political activity whi ch i ncl udes a
recogni t i on of t he sor t of educat i on it i nvol ves. For, t o under s t and
an activity is t o know it as a concret e whol e; it is t o recogni ze t he
activity as havi ng t he source of its movement wi t hi n itself. An
under st andi ng whi ch leaves t he activity in debt t o somet hi ng
out si de itself is, for t hat r eason, an i nadequat e under st andi ng. And
if political activity is i mpossi bl e wi t hout a cert ai n ki nd of knowl -
edge and a cert ai n sort of educat i on, t hen t hi s knowl edge and
educat i on are not mere appendages t o t he activity but are par t of
Michael Oakeshott
221
t he activity itself and must be i ncorporat ed in our underst andi ng of
it. We shoul d not , t herefore, seek a definition of politics in order t o
deduce from it t he char act er of political knowl edge and educat i on,
but r at her obser ve t he ki nd of knowl edge and educat i on whi ch is
i nher ent in any under st andi ng of political activity, and use this
obser vat i on as a means of i mprovi ng our underst andi ng of politics.
My pr opos al , t hen, is t o consider the adequacy of t wo current
under st andi ngs of pol i t i cs, t oget her wi t h t he sort of knowl edge and
ki nd of educat i on they i mpl y, and by i mprovi ng upon them t o reach
wha t may per haps be a mor e adequat e underst andi ng at once of
pol i t i cal activity itself and t he knowl edge and educat i on which
bel ongs t o it.
In t he under st andi ng of some peopl e, politics are what may be
called an empi ri cal activity. At t endi ng t o t he arrangement s of a
society is waki ng up each mor ni ng and considering, ' What woul d I
like t o do? ' or ' Wha t woul d somebody else (whom I desire to
please) like t o see done?' , and doi ng it. This underst andi ng of
political activity may be called politics wi t hout a policy. On the
briefest i nspect i on it will appear a concept of politics difficult t o
subst ant i at e; it does not l ook like a possible manner of activity at
all. But a near appr oach t o it is, per haps, t o be detected in the
politics of t he proverbi al ori ent al despot , or in the politics of the
wal l -scri bbl er and t he vot e-cat cher. And the result may be supposed
t o be chaos modified by what ever consistency is allowed t o creep
i nt o capri ce. They are t he politics at t ri but ed t o t he first Lord
Li verpool , of whom Act on said, ' The secret of his policy was t hat
he had none' , and of wh o m a Fr enchman r emar ked t hat if he had
been pr esent at t he creat i on of t he wor l d he woul d have said, ' Mo
Dieu, conservons le chaos'. It seems, then, t hat a concrete activity,
whi ch may be descri bed as an appr oxi mat i on t o empirical politics,
is possi bl e. But it is clear t hat , al t hough knowl edge of a sort belongs
t o t hi s style of political activity (knowl edge, as t he French say, not
of oursel ves but only of our appet i t es), t he only ki nd of educat i on
appr opr i at e t o it woul d be an educat i on in l unacy - learning t o be
rul ed solely by passi ng desires. And this reveals the i mpor t ant
poi nt ; namel y, t hat t o under st and politics as a purely empirical
activity is t o mi sunder st and it, because empiricism by itself is not a
concret e manner of activity at all, and can become a part ner in a
concr et e manner of activity only when it is joined with somet hi ng
else - in science, for exampl e, when it is j oi ned with hypot hesi s.
Wha t is significant about this underst andi ng of politics is not t hat
s ome sor t of appr oach t o it can appear , but t hat it mistakes for a
222 Political Education
concret e, self-moved manner of activity what is never mor e t han an
abst r act mome nt in any manner of bei ng active. Of cour se, politics
are t he pursui t of what is desired and of what is desired at the
moment ; but precisely because they are t hi s, they can never be t he
pur sui t of merel y what r ecommends itself from moment t o
moment . The activity of desi ri ng does not t ake this cour se; capri ce
is never absol ut e. Fr om a practical poi nt of vi ew, t hen, we may
decry t he style of politics whi ch appr oxi mat es t o pur e empi ri ci sm
because we can observe in it an appr oach t o l unacy. But from a
t heoret i cal poi nt of vi ew, purely empi ri cal politics are not some-
t hi ng difficult t o achieve or pr oper t o be avoi ded, they are merel y
i mpossi bl e; t he pr oduct of a mi sunder st andi ng.
The under st andi ng of politics as an empi ri cal activity is, t hen,
i nadequat e because it fails t o reveal a concret e manner of activity at
all. And it has t he i nci dent al defect of seeming t o encour age t he
t hought l ess t o pur sue a style of at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of
t hei r society whi ch is likely t o have unf or t unat e resul t s; t o t ry t o do
somet hi ng whi ch is i nherent l y i mpossi bl e is al ways a cor r upt i ng
ent erpri se. We must , if we can, i mpr ove upon it. And t he i mpul se t o
i mpr ove may be given a di rect i on by aski ng, ' Wha t is it t hat t hi s
under st andi ng of politics has neglected t o obser ve?' Wha t (to put it
crudely) has it left out whi ch, if added in, woul d compose an
under st andi ng in whi ch politics are revealed as a self-moved (or
concret e) manner of activity? And t he answer t o t he quest i on is, or
seems t o be, avai l abl e as soon as t he quest i on is f or mul at ed. It
woul d appear t hat what this under st andi ng of politics l acks is
somet hi ng t o set empi ri ci sm t o wor k, somet hi ng t o cor r espond wi t h
specific hypot hesi s i n science, an end t o be pur sued mor e ext ensi ve
t han a merely i nst ant desire. And t hi s, it shoul d be observed, is not
merel y a good compani on for empi ri ci sm; it is somet hi ng wi t hout
whi ch empi ri ci sm in act i on is i mpossi bl e. Let us expl or e t hi s
suggest i on, and i n or der t o br i ng it t o a poi nt I will st at e it in t he
form of a pr oposi t i on: t hat politics appear as a self-moved manner
of activity when empi ri ci sm is preceded a nd gui ded by an i deol ogi -
cal activity. I am not concer ned wi t h t he so-called i deol ogi cal style
of politics as a desi rabl e or undesi rabl e manner of at t endi ng t o t he
ar r angement s of a society; I am concer ned onl y wi t h t he cont ent i on
t hat when t o t he i nel uct abl e el ement of empi ri ci sm (doi ng wha t one
want s t o do) is added a political i deol ogy, a self-moved manner of
activity appear s, and t hat consequent l y t hi s may be r egar ded in
pri nci pl e as an adequat e under st andi ng of political activity.
As I under st and it, a political i deol ogy pur por t s t o be an abst r act
Michael Oakeshott
223
pri nci pl e, or set of related abst ract principles, which has been
i ndependent l y pr emedi t at ed. It supplies in advance of the activity of
at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of a society a formulated end to be
pur sued, and in so doi ng it provi des a means of distinguishing
bet ween t hose desires whi ch ought t o be encouraged and those
whi ch ought t o be suppressed or redirected.
The si mpl est sort of political ideology is a single abst ract idea,
such as Fr eedom, Equal i t y, Ma xi mum Productivity, Racial Purity,
or Happi ness. And in t hat case political activity is underst ood as the
ent erpri se of seeing t hat the arrangement s of a society conform t o
or reflect t he chosen abst r act idea. It is usual, however, t o recognize
t he need for a compl ex scheme of related ideas, rat her than a single
i dea, and t he exampl es poi nt ed t o will be such systems of ideas as:
' t he pri nci pl es of 1789' , ' Li beral i sm' , ' Democracy' , ' Mar xi sm' , or
t he At l ant i c Char t er . These principles need not be considered
absol ut e or i mmune from change (though they are frequently so
consi dered), but their value lies in their having been premedi t at ed.
They compose an under st andi ng of what is t o be pursued indepen-
dent of how it is t o be pursued. A political ideology pur por t s t o
suppl y in advance knowl edge of what ' Freedom' or ' Democracy' or
' Just i ce' is, and in this manner sets empiricism t o wor k. Such a set
of pri nci pl es is, of course, capabl e of being argued about and
reflected upon; it is somet hi ng t hat men compose for themselves,
and they may later r emember it or wri t e it down. But the condition
upon whi ch it can perform t he service assigned t o it is t hat it owes
not hi ng t o t he activity it cont rol s. ' To know t he t rue good of the
communi t y is what const i t ut es the science of legislation,' said
Bent ham; ' t he art consists in finding the means t o realize t hat good. '
The cont ent i on we have before us, t hen, is t hat empiricism can be
set t o wor k (and a concret e, self-moved manner of activity appear)
when t here is added t o it a guide of this sort: desire and somet hi ng
not generat ed by desire.
No w, t here is no doubt about the sort of knowl edge which
pol i t i cal activity, under st ood in this manner, calls upon. What is
r equi r ed, in t he first pl ace, is knowl edge of t he chosen political
i deol ogy - a knowl edge of t he ends t o be pursued, a knowl edge of
wha t we wa nt t o do. Of course, if we are t o be successful in
pur sui ng t hese ends we shall need knowl edge of anot her sort also -
a knowl edge, shall we say, of economi cs and psychology. But the
c ommon charact eri st i c of all t he ki nds of knowl edge required is
t hat t hey may be, and shoul d be, gat hered in advance of the activity
of at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of a society. Moreover, the
appr opr i at e sor t of educat i on will be an educat i on in whi ch the
chosen political i deol ogy is t aught and l earned, in whi ch t he
t echni ques necessary for success are acqui red, and (if we are so
unf or t unat e as t o find oursel ves empt y- handed in t he mat t er of an
ideology) an educat i on in t he skill of abst r act t hought and
pr emedi t at i on necessary t o compose one for oursel ves. The edu-
cat i on we shall need is one whi ch enabl es us t o expound, defend,
i mpl ement , and possi bl y i nvent a political i deol ogy.
In cast i ng ar ound for some convi nci ng demons t r at i on t hat this
under st andi ng of politics reveals a self-moved manner of activity,
we shoul d no doubt consi der ourselves r ewar ded if we coul d find an
exampl e of politics bei ng conduct ed precisely in this manner . Thi s
at least woul d const i t ut e a sign t hat we wer e on t he ri ght t r ack. The
defect, it will be r emember ed, of t he under st andi ng of politics as a
purel y empi ri cal activity was t hat it reveal ed, not a manner of
activity at all, but an abst r act i on; and this defect made itself
mani fest in our inability t o find a style of politics whi ch was
anyt hi ng mor e t han an appr oxi mat i on t o it. Ho w does t he
under st andi ng of politics as empi ri ci sm j oi ned wi t h an i deol ogy fare
in this respect? And wi t hout being over-confi dent , we may per haps
t hi nk t hat this is wher e we wade ashore. For we woul d appear t o be
in no difficulty what ever in finding an exampl e of political activity
whi ch cor r esponds t o t hi s under st andi ng of it: half t he wor l d, at a
conservat i ve est i mat e, seems t o conduct its affairs in precisely t hi s
manner . And furt her, is it not so manifestly a possi bl e style of
politics t hat , even if we di sagree wi t h a par t i cul ar i deol ogy, we find
not hi ng technically absur d in t he wri t i ngs of t hose wh o urge it upon
us as an admi r abl e style of politics? At least its advocat es seem t o
know what they are t al ki ng about : t hey under st and not onl y t he
manner of t he activity but also t he sort of knowl edge and t he ki nd
of educat i on it involves. ' Every school boy in Russi a' , wr ot e Sir
No r ma n Angel, ' is fami l i ar wi t h t he doct r i ne of Ma r x a nd can
recite its cat echi sm. Ho w many British school boys have any
cor r espondi ng knowl edge of t he pri nci pl es enunci at ed by Mill in
his i ncompar abl e essay on Li bert y?' ' Few peopl e' , says Mr E. H.
Car r , ' any l onger cont est t he thesis t hat t he child shoul d be
educat ed in t he official i deol ogy of his count r y. ' In shor t , if we ar e
l ooki ng for a sign t o i ndi cat e t hat t he under st andi ng of politics as
empi ri cal activity pr eceded by i deol ogi cal activity is an adequat e
under st andi ng, we can scarcely be mi st aken in supposi ng t hat we
have it t o hand.
And yet t here is per haps r oom for doubt : doubt first of all
whet her in pri nci pl e this under st andi ng of politics reveals a self-
moved manner of act i vi t y; and doubt , consequent i al l y, whet her
Michael Oakeshott 225
what have been identified as examples of a style of politics
cor r espondi ng exact l y t o this underst andi ng have been properly
indentified.
The cont ent i on we ar e investigating is t hat attending t o the
ar r angement s of a society can begin wi t h a premeditated ideology,
can begin wi t h i ndependent l y acquired knowl edge of the ends to be
pur s ued.
1
It is supposed t hat a political ideology is the product of
intellectual pr emedi t at i on and t hat , because it is a body of
principles not itself in debt t o t he activity of attending t o the
ar r angement s of a society, it is able t o determine and guide the
di rect i on of t hat activity. If, however, we consider more closely
t he char act er of a political ideology, we find at once t hat this
supposi t i on is falsified. So far from a political ideology being the
quasi -di vi ne par ent of political activity, it t urns out to be its earthly
stepchild. Inst ead of an i ndependent l y premedi t at ed scheme of ends
t o be pur sued, it is a syst em of ideas abstracted from the manner in
whi ch peopl e have been accust omed t o go about the business of
at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of their societies. The pedigree of
every political i deol ogy shows it t o be the creature, not of
pr emedi t at i on in advance of political activity, but of meditation
upon a manner of politics. In short , political activity comes first and
a political i deol ogy follows after; and t he underst andi ng of politics
we are i nvest i gat i ng has t he di sadvant age of being, in the strict
sense, pr epost er ous.
Let us consi der t he mat t er first in relation t o scientific hypothesis,
whi ch I have t aken t o play a role in scientific activity in some
respects si mi l ar t o t hat of an ideology in politics. If a scientific
hypot hesi s wer e a self-generated bri ght idea which owed not hi ng to
scientific act i vi t y, t hen empi ri ci sm governed by hypothesis could be
consi dered t o compose a self-contained manner of activity; but this
cert ai nl y is not its char act er . The t rut h is t hat only a man who is
al ready a scientist can formul at e a scientific hypothesis; t hat is, an
hypot hesi s is not an i ndependent invention capable of guiding
scientific enqui r y, but a dependent supposi t i on which arises as an
abst r act i on from wi t hi n already existing scientific activity.
Mor eover , even when t he specific hypothesis has in this manner
been f or mul at ed, it is i noperat i ve as a guide to research wi t hout
const ant reference t o t he t radi t i ons of scientific enquiry from which
it was abst r act ed. The concret e si t uat i on does not appear until the
specific hypot hesi s, whi ch is t he occasi on of empiricism being set to
wor k, is recogni zed as itself t he creature of knowi ng how t o
conduct a scientific enqui r y. , ,
Or consi der t he exampl e of cookery. It mi ght be supposed t hat an
226
Political Education
i gnor ant man, some edible mat eri al s, and a cooker y book compose
t oget her t he necessities of a self-moved (or concret e) activity called
cooki ng. But not hi ng is further from t he t r ut h. The cooker y book is
not an i ndependent l y generat ed begi nni ng from whi ch cooki ng can
spr i ng; it is not hi ng mor e t han an abst r act of s omebody' s knowl -
edge of how t o cook: it is t he st epchi l d, not t he par ent of the
activity. The book, i n its t ur n, may help t o set a ma n on t o dressing
a di nner, but if it were his sole gui de he coul d never, in fact, begi n:
t he book speaks onl y t o t hose who know al ready t he ki nd of t hi ng
t o expect from it and consequent l y how t o i nt erpret it.
No w, just as a cookery book pr esupposes s omebody wh o knows
h o w t o cook, and its use pr esupposes s omebody who al ready
knows how t o use it, and just as a scientific hypot hesi s spri ngs from
a knowl edge of how to conduct a scientific i nvest i gat i on and separ-
at ed from t hat knowl edge is powerl ess t o set empi ri ci sm profit-
abl y t o wor k, so a political ideology mus t be under s t ood, not as an
i ndependent l y pr emedi t at ed begi nni ng for political activity, but as
knowl edge (abst ract and generalized) of a concret e manner of
at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of a soci et y. The cat echi sm whi ch
sets out t he pur poses t o be pur sued merely abri dges a concret e
manner of behavi our in whi ch t hose pur poses are al ready hi dden. It
does not exist in advance of political activity, and by itself it is
al ways an insufficient gui de. Political ent erpri ses, t he ends t o be
pur sued, t he ar r angement s to be est abl i shed (all t he nor mal
i ngredi ent s of a political ideology), cannot be pr emedi t at ed in
advance of a manner of at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of a society;
what we do, and mor eover wha t we want t o do, is t he cr eat ur e of
how we are accust omed t o conduct our affairs. Indeed, it often
reflects no mor e t han a di scovered ability t o do somet hi ng whi ch is
t hen t ransl at ed i nt o an aut hor i t y t o do it.
On 4 August 1789, for t he compl ex and bankr upt social and
political system of France was subst i t ut ed t he Ri ght s of Ma n.
Readi ng this document we come t o t he concl usi on t hat somebody
has done some t hi nki ng. Her e, di spl ayed in a few sent ences, is a
political i deol ogy: a system of rights and dut i es, a scheme of ends -
justice, freedom, equal i t y, securi t y, pr oper t y, and t he rest ready
and wai t i ng t o be put i nt o practice for t he first t i me. ' For t he first
t i me?' No t a bi t of it. Thi s ideology no mor e exi st ed i n advance of
political pract i ce t han a cookery book exists in advance of knowi ng
h o w t o cook. Cert ai nl y it was t he pr oduct of somebody' s reflection,
but it was not t he pr oduct of reflection in advance of political
act i vi t y. For her e, in fact, are disclosed, abst ract ed and abri dged,
t he c ommon l aw rights of Engl i shmen, t he gift not of i ndependent
premedi t at i on or divine muni fi cence, but of centuries of the day-t o-
day at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of an hi st ori c society. Or
consider Locke' s Second Treatise of Civil Government, read in
America and in Fr ance in t he ei ght eent h cent ury as a st at ement of
abst ract pri nci pl es t o be put i nt o pract i ce, regarded t here as a
preface t o pol i t i cal act i vi t y. But so far from bei ng a preface, it has
all the mar ks of a post scr i pt , and its power t o guide derived from its
roots in act ual political experi ence. Her e, set down in abst ract
terms, is a brief conspect us of t he manner in whi ch Englishmen
were accust omed t o go a bout t he business of at t endi ng t o their
arrangement s - a bri l l i ant abr i dgment of t he political habits of
Englishmen. Or consi der t hi s passage from a cont empor ar y con-
tinental wr i t er : ' Fr eedom keeps Eur opeans in unrest and move-
ment. They wi sh t o have freedom, and at t he same time they know
they have not got it. They know also t hat freedom belongs t o man
as a human ri ght . ' And havi ng est abl i shed t he end t o be pursued,
political activity is r epr esent ed as the real i zat i on of this end. But the
' freedom' whi ch can be pur s ued is not an i ndependent l y premedi -
tated ' i deal ' or a dr eam; like scientific hypot hesi s, it is somet hi ng
which is al ready i nt i mat ed in a concret e manner of behaving.
Freedom, like a reci pe for game pie, is not a bri ght idea; it is not a
' human ri ght ' t o be deduced from some speculative concept of
human nat ur e. The freedom whi ch we enjoy is not hi ng mor e t han
ar r angement s, pr ocedur es of a cert ai n ki nd: t he freedom of an
Engl i shman is not somet hi ng exemplified in t he procedure of
habeas corpus, it is, at t hat poi nt , t he availability of t hat procedure.
And t he freedom whi ch we wi sh t o enjoy is not an ' i deal ' whi ch we
premedi t at e i ndependent l y of our political experi ence, it is what is
already i nt i mat ed in t hat exper i ence.
2
^ On this r eadi ng, t hen, t he syst ems of abst ract ideas we call
' ideologies' ar e abst r act s of some ki nd of concret e activity. Mos t
political i deol ogi es, and cert ai nl y t he most useful of t hem (because
they unquest i onabl y have t hei r use), are abst ract s of t he political
t radi t i ons of some soci et y. But it somet i mes happens t hat an
ideology is offered as a gui de t o politics whi ch is an abst ract , not of
political experi ence, but of some ot her manner of activity - war ,
religion, or t he conduct of i ndust r y, for exampl e. And here the
model we ar e s hown is not onl y abst r act , but is also i nappropri at e
on account of t he i rrel evance of t he activity from whi ch it has been
abst ract ed. Thi s, I t hi nk, is one of t he defects of t he model provi ded
by t he Mar xi s t i deol ogy. But t he i mpor t ant poi nt is t hat , at most ,
an ideology is an abbr evi at i on of some manner of concret e activity.
We are now, per haps , i n a posi t i on t o perceive mor e accurately
228
Political Education
t he char act er of wha t may be called t he i deol ogi cal style of politics,
a nd t o observe t hat its existence offers no gr ound for supposi ng
t hat t he under st andi ng of political act i vi t y as empi ri ci sm guided
solely by an i deol ogy is an adequat e under s t andi ng. The ideological
style of politics is a confused style. Properl y speaki ng, it is a
t r adi t i onal manner of at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of a society
whi ch has been abr i dged i nt o a doct r i ne of ends t o be pur sued, the
abr i dgment (t oget her wi t h t he necessary t echni cal knowl edge)
bei ng erroneousl y r egar ded as t he sol e gui de relied upon. In cert ai n
ci rcumst ances an abr i dgment of this ki nd may be val uabl e; it gives
shar pness of out l i ne and preci si on t o a pol i t i cal t r adi t i on whi ch t he
occasi on may make seem appr opr i at e. Whe n a ma nne r of at t endi ng
t o ar r angement s is t o be t r anspl ant ed from t he society in whi ch it
has gr own up i nt o anot her society (al ways a quest i onabl e enter-
pri se), t he simplification of an i deol ogy may appear as an asset. If,
for exampl e, t he English manner of politics is t o be pl ant ed
el sewhere in t he wor l d, it is per haps appr opr i at e t hat it shoul d first
be abr i dged i nt o somet hi ng called ' democr acy' before it is packed
up and shi pped abr oad. Ther e is, of cour se, an al t ernat i ve met hod:
t he met hod by whi ch wha t is expor t ed is t he det ai l and not t he
abr i dgment of t he t r adi t i on and t he wor kme n t ravel wi t h t he t ool s
- t he met hod whi ch made t he British Empi r e. But it is a sl ow and
costly met hod. And, part i cul arl y wi t h me n in a hur r y, I'homme a
programme wi t h hi s abr i dgment wi ns every t i me; his sl ogans
enchant , whi l e t he resi dent magi st r at e is seen onl y as a sign of
servility. But what ever t he appar ent appr opr i at eness on occasi on of
t he ideological style of pol i t i cs, t he defect of t he expl anat i on of
pol i t i cal activity connect ed wi t h it becomes appar ent when we
consi der t he sort of knowl edge and t he ki nd of educat i on it
encourages us t o believe is sufficient for under s t andi ng t he activity
of at t endi ng t o t he ar r angement s of a society. For it suggests t hat a
knowl edge of t he chosen political i deol ogy can t ake t he pl ace of
under st andi ng a t r adi t i on of political behavi our . The wa nd and t he
book come t o be r egar ded as themselves pot ent , and not merely t he
symbol s of pot ency. The ar r angement s of a society ar e made t o
appear , not as manner s of behavi our , but as pieces of machi ner y t o
be t r anspor t ed about t he wor l d i ndi scri mi nat el y. The compl exi t i es
of t he t r adi t i on whi ch have been squeezed out in t he process of
abr i dgment are t aken t o be uni mpor t ant : t he ' ri ght s of ma n ' are
under s t ood t o exi st i nsul at ed from a manner of at t endi ng t o
ar r angement s. And because, i n pract i ce, t he abr i dgment is never by
itself a sufficient gui de, we are encour aged t o fill it out , not wi t h our
suspect political experi ence, but wi t h experi ence dr a wn from ot her
(often irrelevant) concret el y under s t ood activities, such as war , t he
conduct of i ndust r y, or t r ade uni on negot i at i on.
The under st andi ng of pol i t i cs as t he activity of at t endi ng t o t he
arrangement s of a soci et y under t he gui dance of an i ndependent l y
premedi t at ed i deol ogy is, t hen, no less a mi s under s t andi ng t han t he
underst andi ng of it as a pur el y empi r i cal activity. Wher ever else
politics may begi n, t hey c a nnot begi n in i deol ogi cal activity. And in
an at t empt t o i mpr ove upon t hi s under s t andi ng of pol i t i cs, we have
already observed in pri nci pl e wha t needs t o be recogni zed in or der
to have an intelligent concept . Just as scientific hypot hesi s cannot
appear, and is i mpossi bl e t o oper at e, except wi t hi n an al ready
existing t radi t i on of scientific i nvest i gat i on, so a scheme of ends for
political activity appear s wi t hi n, and can be eval uat ed onl y whe n it
is related t o, an al r eady exi st i ng t r adi t i on of h o w t o at t end t o our
arrangement s. In pol i t i cs, t he onl y concr et e ma nne r of activity
detectable is one in whi ch empi r i ci sm and t he ends t o be pur s ued
are recognized as dependent , al i ke for t hei r exi st ence and t hei r
operat i on, upon a t r adi t i onal ma nne r of behavi our .
Politics is t he activity of at t endi ng t o t he general ar r angement s of
a collection of peopl e wh o , in respect of t hei r c ommon recogni t i on
of a manner of at t endi ng t o its ar r angement s , compose a single
communi t y. To suppose a col l ect i on of peopl e wi t hout recogni zed
traditions of behavi our , or one whi ch enj oyed ar r angement s whi ch
intimated no di rect i on for change a nd needed no at t ent i on, is t o
suppose a peopl e i ncapabl e of pol i t i cs. Thi s act i vi t y, t hen, spri ngs
neither from i nst ant desi res, nor from general pri nci pl es, but from
the existing t r adi t i ons of behavi our t hemsel ves. And t he form it
takes, because it can t ake no ot her , is t he a me ndme nt of exi st i ng
arrangement s by expl or i ng a nd pur s ui ng wha t is i nt i mat ed in t hem.
The ar r angement s whi ch const i t ut e a society capabl e of pol i t i cal
activity, whet her t hey ar e cus t oms or i nst i t ut i ons or l aws or
diplomatic deci si ons, ar e at once coher ent and i ncoher ent ; t hey
compose a pat t er n a nd at t he same t i me t hey i nt i mat e a sympat hy
for what does not fully appear . Pol i t i cal activity is t he expl or at i on
of t hat sympat hy; and consequent l y, rel evant pol i t i cal r easoni ng
will be t he convi nci ng expos ur e of a s ympat hy, pr esent but not yet
followed up, and t he convi nci ng demons t r at i on t hat n o w is t he
appropri at e mome nt for r ecogni zi ng it. For exampl e, t he legal
status of wome n in our soci et y was for a l ong t i me (and per haps
still is) in compar at i ve conf usi on, because t he ri ght s and dut i es
which compos ed it i nt i mat ed ri ght s a nd dut i es whi ch wer e never-
theless not r ecogni zed. And, on t he vi ew of t hi ngs I am suggest i ng,
230
Political Education
t he onl y cogent reason t o be advanced for t he technical
' enfranchi sement ' of women was t hat in all or most ot her i mpor-
t ant respects they had al ready been enfranchi sed. Ar gument s dr awn
from abst ract nat ur al right, from ' j ust i ce' , or from some general
concept of feminine personal i t y, must be regarded as either
i rrel evant , or as unfort unat el y disguised forms of t he one valid
ar gument ; namel y, t hat t here was an i ncoherence in t he ar r ange-
ment s of t he society whi ch pressed convi nci ngl y for r emedy. In
pol i t i cs, t hen, every ent erpri se is a consequent i al ent erpri se, t he
pur sui t , not of a dr eam, or of a general pri nci pl e, but of an
i nt i mat i on. Wha t we have t o do wi t h is somet hi ng less i mposi ng
t han logical i mpl i cat i ons or necessary consequences: but if t he
i nt i mat i ons of a t radi t i on of behavi our ar e less dignified or mor e
elusive t han t hese, they are not on t hat account less i mpor t ant . Of
course, t here is no piece of mi st ake-proof appar at us by means of
whi ch we can elicit the i nt i mat i on most wor t hwhi l e pur sui ng; and
not only do we often make gross errors of j udgement in this mat t er ,
but also t he t ot al effect of a desire satisfied is so little t o be forecast,
t hat our activity of amendment is often found t o lead us wher e we
woul d not go. Mor eover , t he whol e ent erpri se is liable at any
mome nt t o be pervert ed by t he i ncursi on of an appr oxi mat i on t o
empi ri ci sm in t he pursui t of power . These are feat ures whi ch can
never be el i mi nat ed; they bel ong t o t he char act er of political
activity. But it may be believed t hat our mi st akes of under st andi ng
will be less frequent and less di sast rous if we escape t he illusion t hat
politics is ever anyt hi ng mor e t han t he pursui t of i nt i mat i ons; a
conversi on, not an ar gument .
No w, every society whi ch is intellectually alive is liable, from
t i me t o t i me, t o abri dge its t radi t i on of behavi our i nt o a scheme of
abst r act i deas; and on occasi on political discussion will be con-
cerned, not (like t he debat es in t he Iliad) wi t h i sol at ed t r ansact i ons,
nor (like t he speeches in Thucydi des) wi t h policies and t radi t i ons of
activity, but wi t h general pri nci pl es. And in this t her e is no ha r m;
per haps even some posi t i ve benefit. It is possi bl e t hat t he di st ort i ng
mi r r or of an i deol ogy will reveal i mpor t ant hi dden passages i n t he
t r adi t i on, as a cari cat ure reveals t he pot ent i al i t i es of a face; and if
this is so, t he intellectual ent erpri se of seeing what a t r adi t i on l ooks
like when it is r educed t o an i deol ogy will be a useful par t of
pol i t i cal educat i on. But t o make use of abr i dgment as a t echni que
for expl or i ng t he i nt i mat i ons of a political t r adi t i on, t o use it, t hat
is, as a scientist uses hypot hesi s, is one t hi ng; it is somet hi ng
different, and somet hi ng i nappr opr i at e, t o under st and pol i t i cal
activity itself as t he activity of amendi ng t he ar r angement s of a
society so as t o ma ke t hem agree with the provisions of an ideology.
For t hen a char act er has been at t ri but ed t o an ideology which it is
unabl e t o sust ai n, and we may find ourselves, in practice, directed
by a false and a mi sl eadi ng gui de: false, because in the abridgment,
however skilfully it has been performed, a single intimation is apt t o
be exagger at ed and pr opos ed for uncondi t i onal pursuit and the
benefit t o be ha d from observi ng what the distortion reveals is lost
when t he di st or t i on itself is given t he office of a criterion;
mi sl eadi ng, because t he abr i dgment itself never, in fact, provides
the whol e of t he knowl edge used in political activity.
Ther e will be some peopl e who, t hough in general agreement
wi t h t hi s under s t andi ng of political activity, will suspect that it
confuses wha t is, per haps, nor mal wi t h what is necessary, and t hat
i mpor t ant except i ons (of great cont empor ar y relevance) have been
lost in a hazy general i t y. It is all very well, it may be said, t o observe
in politics t he activity of expl ori ng and pursui ng the intimations of
a t radi t i on of behavi our , but what light does this t hrow upon a
political crisis such as t he Nor ma n Conquest of England, or the
est abl i shment of t he Soviet regime in Russia? It woul d be foolish, of
course, t o deny t he possibility of serious political crisis. But if we
excl ude (as we must ) a genui ne cat acl ysm which for the time being
made an end of politics by al t oget her obliterating a current
t radi t i on of behavi our (whi ch is not what happened in Anglo-
Saxon Engl and or in Rus s i a) ,
4
t here is little t o suppor t the view that
even t he mos t seri ous political upheaval carries us outside this
under st andi ng of pol i t i cs. A t radi t i on of behavi our is not a fixed
and inflexible manner of doi ng t hi ngs; it is a flow of sympathy. It
may be t empor ar i l y di sr upt ed by t he incursion of a foreign
influence, it may be di vert ed, restricted, arrested, or become dried-
up, and it may reveal so deep-seat ed an incoherence t hat (even
wi t hout foreign assi st ance) a crisis appear s. And if, in order t o meet
these crises, t her e wer e some st eady, unchangi ng, independent
guide t o whi ch a soci et y-mi ght resort, it woul d no doubt be well
advised t o do so. But no such guide exists; we have no resources
out si de t he fragment s, t he vestiges, t he relics of its own tradition of
behavi our whi ch t he crisis has left unt ouched. For even the help we
may get from t he t r adi t i ons of anot her society (or from a t radi t i on
of a vaguer sor t whi ch is shared by a number of societies) is
condi t i onal upon our bei ng able t o assimilate t hem t o our own
ar r angement s. The hungr y and helpless man is mistaken if he
supposes t hat he over comes t he crisis by means of a tin-opener:
what saves hi m is s omebody else' s knowl edge of how t o cook,
which he can ma ke use of onl y because he is not himself entirely
i gnor ant . In short , political crisis (even when it seems t o be i mposed
upon a society by changes beyond its cont rol ) al ways appear s
within a t radi t i on of pol i t i cal activity; and ' sal vat i on' comes from
t he uni mpai r ed resources of t he t r adi t i on itself. Those societies
whi ch ret ai n, in changi ng ci rcumst ances, a lively sense of t hei r own
- i dent i t y and cont i nui t y (which are wi t hout t hat hat r ed of t hei r o wn
experi ence whi ch makes t hem desire t o efface it) are t o be count ed
f or t unat e, not because they possess what ot her s l ack, but because
t hey have al ready mobi l i zed what none is wi t hout and all, in fact,
rely upon.
In political activity, t hen, men sail a boundl ess and bot t oml ess
sea; t her e is nei t her har bour for shelter nor floor for anchor age,
nei t her st art i ng-pl ace nor appoi nt ed dest i nat i on. The ent erpri se is
t o keep afloat on an even keel; t he sea is bot h friend and enemy;
and t he seamanshi p consists in using t he resources of a t r adi t i onal
manner of behavi our in or der t o make a friend of every host i l e
occasi on.
5
A depressi ng doct r i ne, it will be said even by t hose wh o do not
make t he mi st ake of addi ng in an el ement of cr ude det ermi ni sm
whi ch, in fact, it has no place for. A t r adi t i on of behavi our is not a
gr oove wi t hi n whi ch we are destined t o gri nd out our helpless and
unsatisfying lives: Spartam nactus es; hanc exorna. But in t he mai n
t he depressi on spri ngs from t he excl usi on of hopes t hat wer e false
and t he di scovery t hat gui des, reput ed t o be of s uper human wi sdom
and skill, are, in fact, of a s omewhat different char act er . If t he
doct r i ne deprives us of a model l ai d up in heaven t o whi ch we
shoul d appr oxi mat e our behavi our , at least it does not lead us i nt o
a mor ass wher e every choice is equal l y good or equal l y t o be
depl or ed. And if it suggests t hat politics are nur fur die Schwindel-
freie, t hat shoul d depress onl y t hose wh o have lost t hei r nerve.
The sin of t he academi c is t hat he t akes so l ong in comi ng t o t he
poi nt . Nevert hel ess, t here is some vi rt ue in his di l at ori ness; wha t he
has t o offer may, in t he end, be no great mat t er , but at least it is not
unr i pe fruit, and t o pl uck i t is t he wor k of a moment . We set out t o
consi der t he ki nd of knowl edge involved in political activity and t he
appr opr i at e sort of educat i on. And if t he under st andi ng of pol i t i cs I
have r ecommended is not a mi sunder st andi ng, t her e is little doubt
about t he ki nd of knowl edge and t he sort of educat i on whi ch
bel ongs t o it. It is knowl edge, as pr of ound as we can make it, of our
t r adi t i on of pol i t i cal behavi our . Ot her knowl edge, cert ai nl y, is
desi rabl e in addi t i on; but t hi s is t he knowl edge wi t hout whi ch we
cannot make use of what ever else we may have l earned.
Now, a t r adi t i on of behavi our is a tricky thing t o get to know.
Indeed, it may even appear t o be essentially unintelligible. It is
nei t her fixed nor finished; it has no changeless centre t o which
under st andi ng can anchor itself; t here is no sovereign purpose t o be
perceived or i nvari abl e di rect i on t o be detected; there is no model
t o be copi ed, i dea t o be realized, or rule t o be followed. Some part s
of it may change mor e sl owl y t han ot hers, but none is i mmune from
change. Ever yt hi ng is t empor ar y. Nevertheless, t hough a tradition
of behavi our is flimsy and elusive; it is not wi t hout identity, and
what makes it a possi bl e object of knowl edge is the fact t hat all its
par t s do not change at t he same t i me and t hat the changes it
undergoes are pot ent i al wi t hi n it. Its principle is a principle of
continuity: aut hor i t y is diffused bet ween past , present, and future;
bet ween t he ol d, t he new, and what is t o come. It is steady because,
t hough it moves, it is never whol l y in mot i on; and t hough it is
t ranqui l , it is never whol l y at r est .
6
Not hi ng t hat ever belonged t o it
is compl et el y lost; we are al ways swervi ng back t o recover and
make somet hi ng t opi cal out of even its remot est moment s: and
not hi ng for l ong r emai ns unmodi fi ed. Everything is t emporary, but
not hi ng is ar bi t r ar y. Everyt hi ng figures by compari son, not with
what st ands next t o it, but wi t h t he whol e. And since a t radi t i on of
behavi our is not suscept i bl e of t he distinction between essence and
accident, knowl edge of it is unavoi dabl y knowl edge of its detail: t o
know only t he gist is t o know not hi ng. What has t o be learned is
not an abst r act i dea, or a set of t ri cks, not even a ritual, but a
concrete, coher ent ma nne r of living in all its intricateness.
It is clear, t hen, t hat we mus t not ent ert ai n t he hope of acquiring
this difficult under s t andi ng by easy met hods. Though the knowl -
edge we see is muni ci pal , not uni versal , t here is no short cut t o it.
Mor eover , pol i t i cal educat i on is not merely a mat t er of comi ng t o
under st and a t r adi t i on, it is l earni ng how t o participate in a
conversat i on: it is at once i ni t i at i on i nt o an i nheri t ance in whi ch we
have a life i nt erest , and t he expl or at i on of its i nt i mat i ons. There
will al ways r emai n somet hi ng of a myst ery about how a t radi t i on of
political behavi our is l ear ned, and per haps t he only certainty is t hat
there is no poi nt at whi ch l earni ng it can properl y be said t o begin.
The politics of a communi t y are not less individual (and not more
so) t han its l anguage, and t hey are l earned and practised in the same
manner . We d o not begi n t o l earn our native l anguage by learning
the al phabet , or by l ear ni ng its gr ammar ; we do not begin by
learning wor ds , but wor ds in use; we do not begin (as we begin in
reading) wi t h wha t is easy and go on t o what is mor e difficult; we
do not begin at school , but i n t he cradl e; and what we say springs
al ways from our manner of speaki ng. And this is t rue also of our
political educat i on; it begi ns in t he enj oyment of a t r adi t i on, in t he
obser vat i on and i mi t at i on of t he behavi our of our el ders, and t here
is little or not hi ng in t he wor l d whi ch comes before us as we open
our eyes whi ch does not cont r i but e t o it. We are awar e of a past and
a future as soon as we are awar e of a present . Long before we are of
an age t o t ake i nt erest in a book about our politics we are acqui r i ng
t hat compl ex and i nt ri cat e knowl edge of our political t r adi t i on
wi t hout whi ch we coul d not make sense of a book when we come
t o open it. And t he projects we ent ert ai n are t he creat ures of our
t r adi t i on. The great er par t , then - per haps t he most i mpor t ant par t
- of our political educat i on we acqui re haphazar d in finding our
way about t he nat ural -art i fi ci al wor l d i nt o whi ch we are bor n, and
t here is no ot her way of acqui ri ng it. Ther e will, of course, be mor e
t o acqui re, and it will be mor e readily acqui red, if we have t he good
fort une t o be bor n into a rich and lively political t r adi t i on and
a mong t hose wh o are well educat ed politically; t he l i neament s of
political activity will earlier become di st i nct : but even t he most
needy society and t he most cr amped sur r oundi ngs have some
political educat i on t o offer, and we t ake what we can get.
But if this is t he manner of our begi nni ng, t her e are deeper
recesses t o expl or e. Politics are a pr oper subject for academi c st udy;
t here is somet hi ng t o t hi nk about and it is i mpor t ant t hat we shoul d
t hi nk about t he appr opr i at e t hi ngs. Her e al so, and everywhere, t he
gover ni ng consi der at i on is t hat what we are l earni ng t o under s t and
is a political t r adi t i on, a concret e manner of behavi our . And for t hi s
reason it is pr oper t hat , at t he academi c level, t he st udy of politics
shoul d be an hi st ori cal st udy - not , in t he first pl ace, hecause it is
pr oper t o be concer ned wi t h t he past , but because we need t o be
concer ned wi t h t he detail of t he concr et e. It is t r ue t hat not hi ng
appear s on t he present surface of a t r adi t i on of political activity
whi ch has not its root s deep in t he past , and t hat not t o observe it
comi ng i nt o bei ng is often t o be denied t he clue t o its significance;
and for this reason genui ne historical st udy is an i ndi spensabl e par t
of a political educat i on. But what is equal l y i mpor t ant is not what
happened, here or t her e, but what peopl e have t hought and said
about what happened: t he hi st ory, not of political i deas, but of t he
manner of our political t hi nki ng. Every society, by t he underl i ni ngs
it makes in t he book of its hi st ory, const r uct s a legend of its own
fort unes whi ch it keeps up to dat e and in whi ch is hi dden its own
under st andi ng of pol i t i cs; and t he hi st ori cal i nvest i gat i on of t hi s
legend - not to expose its er r or s but to under s t and its prej udi ces -
must be a pr e- emi nent par t of a political educat i on. It is, t hen, in t he
Michael Oakeshott 2 3 5
study of genuine hi st ory, and of this quasi - hi st or y whi ch reveal s in
its backward glances t he t endenci es whi ch are af oot , t hat we may
hope to escape one of t he mos t i nsi di ous cur r ent mi s under s t andi ngs
of political activity - t he mi s under s t andi ng in whi ch i nst i t ut i ons
and procedures appear as pieces of machi ner y desi gned t o achi eve a
putpose settled in advance, i nst ead of as ma nne r s of behavi our
which are meaningless when separ at ed from t hei r cont ext : t he
misunderstanding, for exampl e, in whi ch Mi l l convi nced hi msel f
that something called ' Repr esent at i ve Gove r nme nt ' wa s a ' f or m' of
politics which coul d be r egar ded as pr oper t o any soci et y whi ch ha d
reached a certain level of wha t he cal l ed ' ci vi l i zat i on' ; in s hor t , t he
misunderstanding in whi ch we r egar d our a r r a nge me nt s a nd
institutions as somet hi ng mor e significant t han t he f oot pr i nt s of
thinkers and st at esmen wh o knew whi ch way t o t ur n t hei r feet
without knowi ng anyt hi ng a bout a final des t i nat i on.
Nevertheless, t o be concer ned onl y wi t h one' s o wn t r adi t i on of
political activity is not enough. A pol i t i cal educat i on wor t h t he
name must embrace, al so, knowl edge of t he pol i t i cs of ot he r
contemporary societies. It mus t do t hi s because s ome at l east of our
political activity is related t o t hat of ot her peopl e' s , and not t o
know how they go about at t endi ng t o t hei r o wn a r r a nge me nt s is
not to know the course t hey will pur s ue and not t o k n o w wh a t
resources to call upon in our o wn t r adi t i on; and becaus e t o k n o w
only one' s own t radi t i on is not t o know even t hat . But her e agai n
two observations must be ma de . We di d not begi n yest er day t o
nave relations wi t h our nei ghbour s ; and we do not r equi r e
constantly t o be hunt i ng out si de t he t r adi t i on of our pol i t i cs t o find
some special formul a or s ome merel y ad hoc expedi ent t o di r ect
those relations. It is onl y when wilfully or negl i gent l y we forget t he
resources of under st andi ng and i ni t i at i ve whi ch bel ongs t o our
tt
L,. ?
n t n a t
' " ke act or s wh o have f or got t en t hei r par t , we ar e
h u
g a g
'
A n d s e c o n c l l
y '
t n e o n l
y knowl e dge wor t h ha vi ng
about the politics of anot her society is t he s ame ki nd of knowl e dge
n
S w e s e e l c
f ur own t r adi t i on. Her e al so, la verite reste dans les
^
n
f
e
\
a n d a
compar at i ve st udy of i ns t i t ut i ons , for e xa mpl e ,
und j
U r e d t h i s w
u l d pr ovi de onl y an i l l usory sense of ha vi ng
anon?
W h a t n e v e r t n e l e
s s r emai ns a secret . The s t udv of
ôt ner people' s politics, like t he st udy of our o wn , s houl d be an
study* f
S t
u
o i a t r a d i t i o n o f
behavi our , not an a na t omi c a l
Andnnl
m
f
c h a n i c a l
devices or t he i nvest i gat i on of an i deol ogy,
way ^ [
w h e n o u r
s t u d y is of t hi s sort shal l we find our sel ves in t he
others T ^
8 s t l m u l a t e d
> but not i nt oxi cat ed, by t he ma nne r s of
o range t he wor l d i n or der t o select t he ' bes t ' of t he
236
Political Education
pract i ces and purposes of ot hers (as t he eclectic Zeuxi s is said t o
have t ri ed t o compose a figure mor e beautiful t han Hel en' s by
put t i ng t oget her features each not abl e for its perfection) is a
cor r upt i ng ent erpri se and one of t he surest ways of losing one' s
political bal ance; but t o investigate t he concret e manner in whi ch
anot her peopl e goes about t he busi ness of at t endi ng t o its ar r ange-
ment s may reveal significant passages in our own t r adi t i on whi ch
mi ght ot herwi se remai n hi dden.
Ther e is a t hi rd depar t ment in t he academi c st udy of politics
whi ch must be consi dered what , for want of a bet t er name, 1 shall
call a phi l osophi cal st udy. Reflection on political activity may t ake
place at vari ous levels: we may consi der what resources our
political t r adi t i on offers for deal i ng wi t h a certain si t uat i on, or we
may abri dge our political experi ence i nt o a doct ri ne, whi ch may be
used, as a scientist uses hypot hesi s, t o expl or e its i nt i mat i ons. But
beyond t hese, and ot her manner s of political t hi nki ng, t her e is a
range of reflection t he object of whi ch is t o consi der t he pl ace of
political activity itself on t he map of our t ot al experi ence. Reflec-
t i on of this sort has gone on in every society whi ch is politically
consci ous and intellectually alive; and so far as Eur opean societies
ar e concerned, the enqui ry has uncovered a vari et y of intellectual
pr obl ems whi ch each generat i on has f or mul at ed in its own way and
has t ackl ed wi t h t he technical resources at its di sposal . And because
political phi l osophy is not what may be called a ' progressi ve'
science, accumul at i ng solid results and reachi ng concl usi ons upon
whi ch further i nvest i gat i on may be based wi t h confidence, its
hi st ory is specially i mpor t ant : i ndeed, in a sense, it has not hi ng but
a hi st ory, whi ch is a hi st ory of t he i ncoherences phi l osopher s have
det ect ed in c ommon ways of t hi nki ng and t he manner of sol ut i on
t hey have pr oposed, rat her t han a hi st ory of doct ri nes and syst ems.
The st udy of this hi st ory may be supposed t o have a consi derabl e
pl ace in a political educat i on, and t he ent erpri se of under st andi ng
t he t ur n whi ch cont empor ar y reflection has given t o it, an even
mor e consi derabl e pl ace. Political phi l osophy cannot be expect ed t o
increase our ability t o be successful in political activity. It will not
hel p us t o di st i ngui sh bet ween good and ba d political proj ect s; it
has no power t o gui de or t o direct us in t he ent erpri se of pur sui ng
t he i nt i mat i ons of our t r adi t i on. But t he pat i ent analysis of t he
general ideas whi ch have come t o be connect ed wi t h political
activity ideas such as nat ur e, artifice, r eason, will, l aw, aut hor i t y,
obl i gat i on, et c. in so far as it succeeds in r emovi ng some of t he
cr ookedness from our t hi nki ng and leads t o a mor e economi cal use
of concept s, is an activity nei t her t o be over r at ed nor despi sed. But
Michael Oakeshott
237
it must be under s t ood as an expl anat ory, not a practical, activity,
and if we pur s ue it, we may hope only t o be less often cheated by
ambi guous st at ement and irrelevant argument .
Abeunt studia in mores. The fruits of a political education will
appear in t he manner in whi ch we think and speak about politics
and per haps in t he manner in which we conduct our political
activity. To select i t ems from this prospective harvest must always
be hazar dous , and opi ni ons will differ about what is most impor-
t ant . But for myself I shoul d hope for t wo things. The more
pr of ound our under st andi ng of political activity, the less we shall
be at the mercy of pl ausi bl e but mi st aken analogy, t he less we shall
be t empt ed by a false or irrelevant model . And the more thoroughly
we under st and our own political t radi t i on, the more readily its
whol e resources are avai l abl e to us, the less likely we shall be to
embr ace t he illusions whi ch wai t for the i gnorant and the unwary:
t he illusion t hat in politics we can get on wi t hout a tradition of
behavi our , t he illusion t hat the abri dgement of a tradition is itself a
sufficient gui de, and t he illusion t hat in politics there is anywhere a
safe har bour , a dest i nat i on t o be reached or even a detectable
st r and of pr ogr ess. ' The wor l d is t he best of all possible worlds, and
everything in it is a necessary evil.'
NOTES
This is the case, for example, with Natural Law; whether it is taken to be
an explanation of political activity or (improperly) as a guide to political
conduct.
Cf. 'Substantive law has the first look of being gradually secreted in the
interstices of procedure.' Maine, Early Law and Customs, p. 389.
E.g. a society in which law was believed to be a divine gift.
The Russian Revolution (what actually happened in Russia) was not the
implementation of an abstract design worked out by Lenin and others in
Switzerland: it was a modification of Russian circumstances. And the
French Revolution was far more closely connected with the ancien
regime than with Locke or America.
To those who seem to themselves to have a clear view of an immediate
destination (that is, of a condition of human circumstance to be
achieved), and who are confident that this condition is proper to be
imposed upon everybody, this will seem an unduly sceptical understand-
ing of political activity; but they may be asked where they have got it
from, and whether they imagine that 'political activity' will come to an
end with the achievement of this condition? And if they agree that some
more distant destination may then be expected to disclose itself, does not
this situation entail an understanding of politics as an open-ended
activity such as 1 have described? Or do they understand politics as
making the necessary arrangements for a set of castaways who have
always in reserve the thought that they are going to be ' rescued?'
A
The critic who found 'some mystical qualities' in this passage leaves me
puzzled: it seems to me an exceedingly matter-of-fact description of the
characteristics of any tradition the Common Law of England, for
example, the so-called British Constitution, the Christian religion,
modern physics, the game of cricket, shipbuilding.
12
. . ' As Cat o concl uded every speech with the words. Carthago
delenda est, so do I every opi ni on, with the injunction, "divide the
count i es i nt o wa r ds . " Thus Jefferson once summed up an
exposi t i on of hi s most cheri shed political idea, which, alas, turned
out t o be as i ncompr ehensi bl e t o posterity as it had been to his
cont empor ar i es. The reference t o Cat o was no idle slip of a tongue
used t o Lat i n quot at i ons ; it was meant t o emphasize that Jefferson
t hought t he absence of such a subdivision of the country consti-
t ut ed a vital t hr eat t o t he very existence of the republic. Just as
Rome, accor di ng t o Cat o, coul d not be safe so long as Carthage
existed, so t he republ i c, accordi ng to Jefferson, woul d not be secure
in its very f oundat i ons wi t hout the war d system. ' Could I once see
this I shoul d consi der it was as the dawn of the salvation of the
republ i c, and say wi t h ol d Si meon, " Nunc dimittis Domi ne. " '
2
Ha d Jefferson' s pl an of ' el ement ary republics' been carried out, it
woul d have exceeded by far the feeble germs of a new form of
gover nment whi ch we ar e abl e t o detect in the sections of the
Parisian Co mmu n e and t he popul ar societies during the French
Revol ut i on. However , if Jefferson' s political imagination surpassed
t hem in i nsi ght and in scope, his t hought s were still travelling in the
same di rect i on. Bot h Jefferson' s plan and the French soaetes
revolutionnaires ant i ci pat ed with an almost weird precision those
counci l s, Soviets and Rate, whi ch were t o make their appearance m
every genui ne r evol ut i on t hr oughout the nineteenth and twentieth
cent uri es. Each t i me t hey appeared, they sprang up as the spon-
*From On Revolution by Hannah Arendt. Copyright 1963, 1965
by Hannah Arendt. Reprinted by permission of Viking Penguin Inc. Also m
Great Britain by permission of Faber and Faber Ltd.
Hannah Arendt: The Revolutionary
Tradition and its Lost Treasure*
240 The Revolutionary Tradition and its Lost Treasure
t aneous or gans of t he peopl e, not only out si de of all revol ut i onary
part i es but entirely unexpect ed by t hem and t hei r l eaders. Like
Jefferson' s pr oposal s, they were ut t erl y neglected by st at esmen,
hi st or i ans, political t heori st s, and, most i mpor t ant l y, by t he revol u-
t i onar y t r adi t i on itself. Even t hose hi st ori ans whose sympat hi es
were clearly on t he side of revol ut i on and who coul d not hel p
wr i t i ng t he emergence of popul ar counci l s i nt o t he record of t hei r
st ory r egar ded t hem as not hi ng mor e t han essentially t empor ar y
or gans in t he r evol ut i onar y struggle for l i berat i on; t hat is t o say,
t hey failed t o under st and t o what an ext ent t he council system
confront ed t hem wi t h an entirely new form of gover nment , wi t h a
new publ i c space for freedom whi ch was const i t ut ed and organi zed
dur i ng t he course of t he revol ut i on itself.
Thi s st at ement must be qualified. Ther e are t wo rel evant
except i ons t o it, namel y a few r emar ks by Ma r x at t he occasi on of
t he revival of t he Parisian Commune dur i ng t he short -l i ved
revol ut i on of 1871, and some reflections by Lenin based not on t he
t ext by Ma r x, but on t he act ual course of t he Revol ut i on of 1905 in
Russi a. But before we t ur n our at t ent i on t o these mat t er s, we had
bet t er try t o under s t and what Jefferson had in mi nd when he said
wi t h ut mos t sel f-assurance, ' The wi t of man cannot devise a mor e
solid basi s for a free, dur abl e, and wel l -admi ni st ered republic.' "
1
It is per haps not ewor t hy t hat we find no ment i on of t he war d
syst em in any of Jefferson' s formal wor ks , and it may be even mor e
i mpor t ant t hat t he few letters in whi ch he wr ot e of it with such
emphat i c insistence all dat e from t he last peri od of his life. It is t rue,
at one time he hoped t hat Virginia, because it was ' t he first of t he
nat i ons of t he ear t h whi ch assembled its wise men peaceabl y
t oget her t o form a f undament al const i t ut i on' , woul d al so be t he
first ' t o adopt t he subdi vi si on of our count i es i nt o wa r d s ' ,
4
but t he
poi nt of t he mat t er is t hat t he whol e idea seems t o have occur r ed t o
hi m onl y at a t i me when he himself was ret i red from publ i c life and
when he had wi t hdr awn from t he affairs of st at e. He wh o had been
so explicit in his criticism of t he Const i t ut i on because it ha d not
i ncor por at ed a Bill of Ri ght s, never t ouched on its failure t o
i ncor por at e t he t ownshi ps whi ch so obvi ousl y were t he ori gi nal
model s of his ' el ement ar y republ i cs' wher e ' t he voice of t he whol e
peopl e woul d be fairly, fully, and peaceabl y expressed, discussed,
and deci ded by t he c ommon r eason' of all ci t i zens.
5
In t erms of his
own rol e in t he affairs of his count r y and t he out come of t he
Revol ut i on, t he i dea of t he war d syst em clearly was an after-
t hought ; and, in t er ms of his own bi ographi cal devel opment , t he
repeat ed insistence on t he ' peaceabl e' char act er of these war ds
Hannah Arendt
241
demonst r at es t hat this system was t o him the only possible non-
violent al t ernat i ve t o his earlier not i ons about the desirability of
recurri ng revol ut i ons. At any event, we find the only detailed
descri pt i ons of what he had in mi nd in letters written in the year
1816, and t hese letters repeat rat her t han suppl ement one anot her.
Jefferson himself knew well enough t hat what he proposed as the
' sal vat i on of t he r epubl i c' actually was the salvation of the
r evol ut i onar y spirit t hr ough the republic. Hi s expositions of the
war d syst em al ways began wi t h a remi nder of how ' the vigor given
t o our revol ut i on in its commencement ' was due t o t he ' little
republ i cs' , how t hey had ' t hr own t he whol e nat i on into energetic
act i on' , and how, at a l at er occasi on, he had felt ' t he foundat i ons of
t he gover nment shaken under [his] feet by t he New England
t ownshi ps' , ' t he energy of this organi zat i on' being so great t hat
' t here was not an i ndi vi dual in their States whose body was not
t hr own wi t h all its mome nt um i nt o act i on. ' Hence, he expected the
war ds t o per mi t t he citizens t o cont i nue t o do what they had been
abl e t o do dur i ng t he years of revol ut i on, namel y, t o act on their
own and t hus t o part i ci pat e in publ i c business as it was being
t r ansact ed from day t o day. By virtue of t he Const i t ut i on, the
publ i c business of the nat i on as a whol e had been transferred to
Washi ngt on and was being t ransact ed by t he federal government ,
of whi ch Jefferson still t hought as ' t he foreign branch' of the
republ i c, whose domest i c affairs were t aken care of by t he state
gover nment s .
6
But st at e government and even t he administrative
machi ner y of t he count y were by far t oo large and unwieldy to
per mi t i mmedi at e par t i ci pat i on; in all these institutions, it was the
delegates of the peopl e rat her t han t he peopl e themselves who
const i t ut ed t he publ i c real m, whereas those who delegated them
and who, t heoret i cal l y, were t he source and t he seat of power
r emai ned forever out si de its door s. Thi s order of things shoul d have
sufficed if Jefferson had actually believed (as he sometimes profes-
sed) t hat t he happi ness of t he peopl e lay exclusively in their private
wel fare; for because of t he way t he government of the union was
const i t ut ed - wi t h its division and separat i on of powers, wi t h
cont r ol s, checks and bal ances, built into its very centre - it was
highly unlikely, t hough of course not impossible, t hat a t yranny
coul d arise out of it. Wha t could happen, and what indeed has
happened over and over again since, was t hat ' t he representative
or gans shoul d become cor r upt and per ver t ed' ,
7
but such corrupt i on
was not likely t o be due (and hardl y ever has been due) t o a
conspi racy of t he represent at i ve organs against t he people whom
t hey represent ed. Cor r upt i on in this ki nd of government is much
mor e likely t o spri ng from t he mi dst of society, t hat is, from the
peopl e t hemsel ves.
Cor r upt i on and perversi on are mor e per ni ci ous, and at t he same
t i me mor e likely t o occur, in an egal i t ari an republ i c t han in any
ot her form of gover nment . Schemat i cal l y speaki ng, they come t o
pass when pri vat e i nt erest s i nvade t he publ i c domai n, t hat is, t hey
spri ng from bel ow and not from above. It is precisely because the
republ i c excl uded on pri nci pl e t he ol d di chot omy of rul er and ruled
t hat cor r upt i on of t he body politic di d not leave t he peopl e
unt ouched, as in ot her forms of gover nment , wher e onl y t he rulers
or t he rul i ng classes needed t o be affected, and wher e t herefore an
' i nnocent ' peopl e mi ght indeed first suffer and t hen, one day, effect
a dreadful but necessary i nsurrect i on. Cor r upt i on of t he peopl e
t hemsel ves as di st i ngui shed from cor r upt i on of t hei r represent a-
tives or a rul i ng class is possi bl e onl y under a gover nment t hat has
gr ant ed t hem a shar e in publ i c power and has t aught t hem how t o
mani pul at e it. Wher e t he rift bet ween ruler and rul ed has been
cl osed, it is al ways possible t hat t he di vi di ng line bet ween publ i c
and pri vat e may become bl ur r ed and, event ual l y, obl i t er at ed. Prior
t o t he moder n age and t he rise of society, this danger , i nher ent in
republ i can gover nment , used to arise from t he publ i c real m, from
t he t endency of publ i c power to expand and t o t respass upon
pr i vat e i nt erest s. The age-old remedy agai nst t hi s danger was
respect for pri vat e pr oper t y, t hat is, t he frami ng of a syst em of l aws
t hr ough whi ch t he rights of pri vacy wer e publ i cl y guar ant eed and
t he dividing line bet ween publ i c and pr i vat e legally pr ot ect ed. The
Bill of Ri ght s in t he Amer i can Const i t ut i on forms t he last, and t he
mos t exhaust i ve, legal bul war k for t he pri vat e real m agai nst publ i c
power , and Jefferson' s pr eoccupat i on wi t h t he danger s of publ i c
power and t hi s remedy agai nst t hem is sufficiently well known.
However , under condi t i ons, not of pr osper i t y as such, but of a
rapi d and const ant economi c gr owt h, t hat is, of a const ant l y
i ncreasi ng expansi on of t he private real m - and t hese wer e of
course t he condi t i ons of t he moder n age t he danger s of cor r upt i on
and perversi on wer e much mor e likely t o ari se from pri vat e
i nt erest s t han from publ i c power . And it speaks for t he high cal i bre
of Jefferson' s st at esmanshi p t hat he was abl e t o percei ve this danger
despi t e his pr eoccupat i on wi t h t he ol der and bet t er - known t hr eat s
of cor r upt i on in bodi es pol i t i c.
The only remedi es agai nst t he mi suse of publ i c power by pri vat e
i ndi vi dual s lie in t he publ i c real m itself, in t he light whi ch exhi bi t s
each deed enact ed wi t hi n its boundar i es, in t he very visibility t o
whi ch it exposes all t hose wh o ent er it. Jefferson, t hough t he secret
Hannah Arendt
243
vot e was still unknown at the time, had at least a foreboding of how
danger ous it mi ght be t o allow the people a share in public power
wi t hout pr ovi di ng t hem at the same time with more public space
t han t he bal l ot box and wi t h more opport uni t y to make their voices
hear d in publ i c t han election day. What he perceived to be the
mor t al danger t o t he republ i c was rhat the Const i t ut i on had given
all power t o t he citizens, wi t hout giving t hem the opport uni t y of
. being republ i cans and of acting as citizens. In other words, the
danger was t hat all power had been given t o the people in their
pri vat e capaci t y, and t hat t here was no space established for them
in t hei r capaci t y of being citizens. When, at the end of his life, he
summed up what to him clearly was the gist of private and public
moral i t y, ' Love your nei ghbor as yourself, and your country more
t han yoursel f' ,
8
he knew t hat this maxi m remained an empt y
exhor t at i on unless the ' count r y' could be made as present to the
' l ove' of its citizens as the ' nei ghbor' was to the love of his fellow
men. For just as t here coul d not be much subst ance t o neighbourly
love if one' s nei ghbour should make a brief appari t i on once every
t wo years, so t here coul d not be much subst ance t o the admoni t i on
t o love one' s count r y mor e t han oneself unless t he country was a
living presence in t he mi dst of its citizens.
Hence, accordi ng t o Jefferson, it was the very principle of
republ i can gover nment t o demand ' t he subdivision of the counties
i nt o war ds ' , namel y, t he creation of ' small republics' t hrough which
' every man in t he St at e' could become ' an acting member of the
Common gover nment , t ransact i ng in person a great port i on of its
rights and dut i es, subor di nat e indeed, yet i mpor t ant , and entirely
wi t hi n his compet ence. '
9
It was ' these little republics [that] woul d
be t he mai n st rengt h of t he great o n e ' ;
1 0
for inasmuch as the
republ i can gover nment of t he Uni on was based on the assumpt i on
t hat t he seat of power was in the peopl e, the very condition for its
pr oper funct i oni ng lay in a scheme ' t o divide [government] among
t he many, di st ri but i ng t o every one exactly t he functions he [was]
compet ent t o. ' Wi t hout this, the very principle of republican
gover nment could never be actualized, and t he government of the
Uni t ed States woul d be republican in name only.
Thi nki ng in t erms of t he safety of the republic, the question was
how t o prevent ' t he degeneracy of our government ' , and Jefferson
called every gover nment degenerat e in which all powers were
concent r at ed ' in the hands of the one, the few, t he well-born or the
many. ' Hence, t he war d system was not meant t o strengthen the
power of t he many but t he power of ' every one' within the limits of
his compet ence; and onl y by breaki ng up ' t he many' into assemblies
wher e every one coul d count and be count ed upon ' shall we be as
republ i can as a large society can be. ' In t erms of t he safety of t he
citizens of t he republ i c, t he quest i on was how t o make everybody
feel
t hat he is a par t i ci pat or in t he gover nment of affairs, not
merel y at an election one day in t he year, but every day; when
t her e shall not be a ma n in t he State who will not be a member
of some one of its counci l s, great or smal l , he will let t he hear t
be t or n out of his body sooner t han his power wrest ed from
hi m by a Caesar or a Bonapar t e.
Finally, as t o t he quest i on of how t o i nt egrat e these smallest or gans,
desi gned for everyone, i nt o the gover nment al st r uct ur e of t he
Uni on, designed for all, his answer was: ' The el ement ary republ i cs
of t he war ds , t he count y republics, the State republ i cs, and t he
republ i c of t he Uni on woul d form a gr adat i on of aut hor i t i es,
st andi ng each on t he basi s of law, hol di ng every one its del egat ed
share of power s, and const i t ut i ng truly a system of f undament al
bal ances and checks for t he gover nment . ' On one poi nt , however ,
Jefferson remai ned curi ousl y silent, and t hat is t he quest i on of what
t he specific funct i ons of t he el ement ary republ i cs shoul d be. He
ment i oned occasi onal l y as ' one of t he advant ages of t he war d
divisions I have pr opos ed' t hat they woul d offer a bet t er way t o
collect t he voice of t he peopl e t han t he mechani cs of represent at i ve
gover nment ; but in the mai n, he was convi nced t hat if one woul d
' begi n t hem onl y for a single pur pose' t hey woul d ' soon s how for
what ot her s they [were] t he best i ns t r ume nt s ' . "
Thi s vagueness of pur pose, far from bei ng due t o a l ack of clarity,
i ndi cat es per haps mor e tellingly t han any ot her single aspect of
Jefferson' s pr oposal t hat t he aft ert hought in whi ch he clarified and
gave subst ance t o hi s mos t cheri shed recollections from t he
Revol ut i on in fact concerned a new form of gover nment r at her t han
a mere reform of it or a mer e suppl ement t o t he exi st i ng
i nst i t ut i ons. If t he ul t i mat e end of revol ut i on was freedom and t he
const i t ut i on of a publ i c space wher e freedom coul d appear , t he
constitutio libertatis, t hen t he el ement ary republ i cs of t he war ds ,
t he only t angi bl e place wher e everyone coul d be free, act ual l y were
t he end of t he great republ i c whose chief pur pose in domest i c
affairs shoul d have been t o pr ovi de t he peopl e wi t h such pl aces of
freedom and t o pr ot ect t hem. The basi c assumpt i on of t he war d
syst em, whet her Jefferson knew it or not , was t hat no one coul d be
called happy wi t hout his share in publ i c happi ness, t hat no one
Hannah Arendt 245
coul d be called free wi t hout his experience in public freedom, and
t hat no one coul d be called either happy or free wi t hout participat-
ing, and havi ng a shar e, in publ i c power.
II
It is a st r ange and sad story t hat remains t o be told and
r emember ed. It is not t he story of revolution on whose thread the
hi st ori an mi ght string t he history of the nineteenth century in
Eur ope, whos e ori gi ns coul d be t raced back into the Middle Ages,
whose progress had been irresistible ' for centuries in spite of every
obst acl e' , accor di ng t o Tocqueville, and which Mar x, generalizing
t he experi ences of several generat i ons, called ' t he locomotive of all
hi s t or y' .
1 1
I do not doubt t hat revolution was the hidden leitmotif
of t he cent ur y precedi ng our s, al t hough I doubt both Tocqueville' s
and Ma r x' s general i zat i ons, especially their conviction t hat revolu-
tion had been t he result of an irresistible force rather than the
out come of specific deeds and events. What seems to be beyond
doubt and belief is t hat no hi st ori an will ever be able to tell the tale
of our cent ury wi t hout stringing it ' on the t hread of revolutions' ;
but this tale, since its end still lies hi dden in the mists of the future,
is not yet fit t o be t ol d.
The same, t o an ext ent , is true for the part i cul ar aspect of
r evol ut i on wi t h whi ch we now must concern ourselves. This aspect
is t he regul ar emergence, duri ng the course of revolution, of a new
form of gover nment t hat resembled in an amazi ng fashion Jeffer-
son' s war d syst em and seemed t o repeat, under no mat t er what
ci r cumst ances, t he revol ut i onary societies and municipal councils
whi ch had spr ead all over France after 1789. Among the reasons
t hat r ecommended this aspect to our at t ent i on must first be
ment i oned t hat we deal her e with t he phenomenon t hat impressed
mos t t he t wo great est revolutionists of the whol e period, Mar x and
Leni n, when t hey were witnessing its spont aneous rise, the former
dur i ng t he Pari si an Commune of 1871 and the latter in 1905,
dur i ng t he first Russi an Revol ut i on. What struck them was not only
t he fact t hat t hey themselves were entirely unprepared for these
event s, but also t hat they knew they were confronted with a
repet i t i on unaccount ed for by any conscious imitation or even mere
r emembr ance of t he past . To be sure, they had hardl y any
knowl edge of Jefferson' s war d system, but they knew well enough
t he r evol ut i onar y role t he sections of t he first Parisian Commune
had pl ayed in t he French Revol ut i on, except t hat they had never
t hought of t hem as possi bl e germs for a new form of gover nment
but had r egar ded t hem as mere i nst r ument s t o be di spensed with
once t he revol ut i on came t o an end. No w, however , they were
confront ed wi t h popul ar or gans - t he communes , t he counci l s, t he
Rate, t he Soviets - whi ch clearly i nt ended t o survive t he revol ut i on.
Thi s cont r adi ct ed all their t heori es and, even mor e i mpor t ant l y,
was in flagrant conflict wi t h t hose assumpt i ons about t he nat ur e of
power and violence whi ch they shar ed, al bei t unconsci ousl y, wi t h
t he rulers of t he doomed or defunct regi mes. Firmly anchor ed in t he
t r adi t i on of the nat i on- st at e, they concei ved of revol ut i on as a
means t o seize power , and t hey identified power wi t h t he monopol y
of t he means of violence. Wha t actually happened, however , was a
swift di si nt egrat i on of t he old power , t he sudden loss of cont rol
over t he means of violence, and, at t he same t i me, t he amazi ng
f or mat i on of a new power st ruct ure whi ch owed its existence to
not hi ng but t he or gani zat i onal i mpul ses of t he peopl e t hemsel ves.
In ot her wor ds , when t he moment of revol ut i on had come, it t urned
out t hat t here was no power left t o seize, so t hat t he revol ut i oni st s
found themselves before t he rat her uncomf or t abl e al t ernat i ve of
either put t i ng their own pr e- r evol ut i onar y ' power ' , t hat is, t he
or gani zat i on of t he par t y appar at us , i nt o t he vacat ed power cent re
of t he defunct gover nment , or simply j oi ni ng t he new r evol ut i onar y
power centres whi ch had spr ung up wi t hout t hei r hel p.
For a brief moment , whi l e he was t he mere wi t ness of somet hi ng
he never had expect ed, Ma r x under st ood t hat t he Kommunalver-
fassung of t he Parisian Commune in 1871, because it was supposed
t o become ' t he political form of even t he smallest village, ' mi ght
well be ' t he political form, finally di scovered, for t he economi c
l i berat i on of l abor . ' But he soon became awar e t o what an ext ent
this political form cont r adi ct ed all not i ons of a ' di ct at or shi p of t he
pr ol et ar i at ' by means of a socialist or communi st par t y whose
monopol y of power and violence was model l ed upon t he highly
cent ral i zed gover nment s of nat i on-st at es, and he concl uded t hat t he
communal councils wer e, after all, only t empor ar y or gans of t he
r evol ut i on.
1 4
It is al most t he same sequence of at t i t udes whi ch, one
gener at i on l at er, we find in Leni n, who t wi ce in his life, in 1905 and
in 1917, came under t he di rect i mpact of t he events t hemsel ves, t hat
is t o say, was t empor ar i l y l i berat ed from t he perni ci ous influence of
a r evol ut i onar y i deol ogy. Thus he coul d ext ol wi t h gr eat sincerity in
1905 ' t he r evol ut i onar y creativity of t he peopl e, ' who spon-
t aneousl y had begun t o establish an entirely new power st r uct ur e in
t he mi dst of r evol ut i on,
1 5
just as, t wel ve years l at er, he coul d
let loose and wi n t he Oct ober Revol ut i on wi t h t he sl ogan: ' All
Hannah Arendt 247
power t o t he Soviets: But duri ng the years t hat separated the t wo
r evol ut i ons he had done not hi ng to reorient his t hought and to
i ncorporat e the new organs into any of the many party programmes,
wi t h t he result t hat t he same spont aneous development in 1917
found hi m and his par t y no less unprepared t han they had been in
1905. When, finally, dur i ng t he Kronst adt rebellion, the Soviets
revol t ed agai nst t he par t y di ct at orshi p and the incompatibility of
t he new counci l s wi t h t he part y system became manifest, he decided
al most at once t o crush t he councils, since they threatened the
power monopol y of t he Bolshevik part y. The name 'Soviet Union'
for post - r evol ut i onar y Russia has been a lie ever since, but this lie
has also cont ai ned, ever since, the grudging admission of the
over whel mi ng popul ar i t y, not of the Bolshevik party, but of the
soviet syst em whi ch t he par t y reduced t o i mpot ence.
1 6
Put before
t he al t ernat i ve of ei t her adjusting their t hought s and deeds to the
new and t he unexpect ed or going t o the ext reme of tyranny and
suppr essi on, t hey hardl y hesitated in their decision for the latter;
wi t h t he except i ons of a few moment s wi t hout consequence, their
behavi our from begi nni ng t o end was dictated by considerations of
par t y strife, whi ch pl ayed no role in the councils but which indeed
had been of pa r a mount i mpor t ance in the pre-revolutionary
par l i ament s. When t he Communi st s decided, in 1919, ' t o espouse
onl y t he cause of a soviet republic in which the Soviets possess a
Communi s t maj or i t y' ,
1 7
t hey actually behaved like ordi nary party
pol i t i ci ans. So great is t he fear of men, even of t he most radical and
l east convent i onal a mong t hem, of things never seen, of t hought s
never t hought , of i nst i t ut i ons never tried before.
The failure of t he revol ut i onary tradition t o give any serious
t hought t o t he only new form of government born out of revolution
can part l y be expl ai ned by Mar x' s obsession with the social
quest i on and his unwi l l i ngness t o pay serious attention t o questions
of st at e a nd gover nment . But this expl anat i on is weak and, t o an
ext ent , even quest i on-beggi ng, because it takes for granted the
over t ower i ng influence of Ma r x on the revolutionary movement
and t r adi t i on, an influence which itself still stands in need of
expl anat i on. It was , after all, not only the Marxi st s among the
revol ut i oni st s who pr oved t o be utterly unprepared for the actuali-
ties of r evol ut i onar y event s. And this unpreparedness is all the more
not ewor t hy as it surely cannot be bl amed upon lack of t hought or
i nt erest in revol ut i on. It is well known t hat t he French Revolution
had given rise t o an entirely new figure on the political scene, the
professi onal revol ut i oni st , and his life was spent not in revolution-
ar y agi t at i on, for whi ch t her e existed but few opport uni t i es, but in
st udy and t hought , in t heor y and debat e, whose sole object was
revol ut i on. In fact, no hi st ory of t he Eur opean leisure classes woul d
be compl et e wi t hout a hi st ory of the professi onal revol ut i oni st s of
t he ni net eent h and t went i et h cent uri es, who, t oget her wi t h the
moder n artists and wr i t er s, have become t he t rue heirs of the
hommes de lettres in t he sevent eent h and ei ght eent h cent uri es. The
art i st s a nd wr i t er s j oi ned t he revol ut i oni st s because ' t he very wor d
bourgeoi s came t o have a hat ed significance no less aest het i c t han
pol i t i cal ' ;
1 8
t oget her t hey est abl i shed Bohemi a, t hat island of
blessed leisure in t he mi dst of t he busy and over busy cent ury of the
Indust ri al Revol ut i on. Even among t he member s of t hi s new leisure
class, t he professi onal revol ut i oni st enjoyed special privileges since
his way of life demanded no specific wor k what soever . If t here was
a t hi ng he had no reason t o compl ai n of, it was lack of t i me to
t hi nk, wher eby it makes little difference if such an essentially
t heoret i cal way of life was spent in t he f amous l i brari es of London
and Paris, or in t he coffee houses of Vi enna and Zur i ch, or in t he
relatively comf or t abl e and undi st ur bed jails of t he vari ous anciens
regimes.
The rol e t he professi onal revol ut i oni st s pl ayed in all moder n
revol ut i ons is gr eat and significant enough, but it di d not consist in
t he pr epar at i on of revol ut i ons. They wat ched and anal ysed t he
progressi ng di si nt egrat i on in st at e and soci et y, t hey hardl y di d, or
were in a posi t i on t o do, much t o advance and di rect it. Even t he
wave of strikes t hat spr ead over Russia in 1905 and led into t he first
revol ut i on was entirely s pont aneous , uns uppor t ed by any political
or t r ade- uni on or gani zat i ons, whi ch, on t he cont r ar y, spr ang up
only in t he course of t he r evol ut i on.
1 9
The out br eak of most
revol ut i ons has surpri sed t he revol ut i oni st gr oups and part i es no
less t han all ot her s, and t her e exists hardl y a revol ut i on whose
out br eak coul d be bl amed upon their activities. It usual l y was t he
ot her way r ound: r evol ut i on br oke out and l i berat ed, as it wer e, t he
professi onal revol ut i oni st s from wher ever t hey happened t o be -
from jail, or from t he coffee house, or from t he l i brary. Not even
Lenin' s par t y of professi onal revol ut i oni st s woul d ever have been
able t o ' make' a revol ut i on; t he best t hey coul d do was t o be
ar ound, or t o hur r y home, at t he ri ght moment , t hat is, at t he
moment of col l apse. Tocquevi l l e' s obser vat i on in 1848, t hat t he
monar chy fell ' before r at her t han beneat h t he bl ows of t he vi ct ors,
who were as ast oni shed at t hei r t r i umph as were t he vanqui shed at
their defeat ' , has been verified over and over agai n.
The par t of t he professi onal revol ut i oni st s usually consists not in
maki ng a revol ut i on but in rising t o power after it has br oken out ,
Hannah Arendt 249
and t hei r gr eat advant age in this power struggle lies less in their
t heori es and ment al or organi zat i onal preparat i on than in the
si mpl e fact t hat t hei r names are the only ones which are publicly
known. "
0
It cert ai nl y is not conspiracy that causes revolution, and
secret societies - t hough they may succeed in committing a few
spect acul ar cri mes, usually with the help of the secret pol i ce
2 1
- are
as a rule much t oo secret t o be able t o make their voices heard in
publ i c. The loss of aut hor i t y in the powers-t hat -be, which indeed
precedes all revol ut i ons, is actually a secret t o no one, since its
mani f est at i ons are open and tangible, t hough not neccessarily
spect acul ar; but its sympt oms, general dissatisfaction, widespread
mal ai se, and cont empt for those in power, are difficult to pin down
since t hei r meani ng is never unequi vocal .
2 2
Nevertheless, contempt,
hardl y a mong t he mot i ves of the typical professional revolutionist,
is cert ai nl y one of t he most pot ent springs of revolution; there has
hardl y been a revol ut i on for whi ch Lamart i ne' s remark about
1848, ' t he revol ut i on of cont empt ' , woul d be altogether
i nappr opr i at e.
However , whi l e t he par t played by the professional revolutionist
in t he out br eak of revol ut i on has usually been insignificant to the
poi nt of non-exi st ence, his influence upon the actual course a
revol ut i on will t ake has pr oved to be very great. And since he spent
his appr ent i ceshi p in t he school of past revolutions, he will
i nvari abl y exer t this influence not in favour of the new and the
unexpect ed, but in favour of some action which remains in
accor dance wi t h t he past . Since it is his very task to assure the
cont i nui t y of revol ut i on, he will be inclined to argue in terms of
hi st ori cal pr ecedent s, and t he conscious and pernicious imitation of
past event s, whi ch we ment i oned earlier, lies, partially at least, in
t he very nat ur e of his profession. Long before the professional
revol ut i oni st s had found in Mar xi sm their official guide t o the
i nt er pr et at i on and annot at i on of all history, past , present and
fut ure, Tocquevi l l e, in 1848, could already not e: ' The imitation [i.e.
of 1789 by t he revol ut i onary Assembly] was so manifest t hat it
conceal ed t he terrible originality of t he facts; I continually had the
i mpressi on t hey wer e engaged in play-acting the French Revolution
far mor e t han cont i nui ng i t . '
2 3
And again, during the Parisian
Commune of 1871, on whi ch Ma r x and Marxi st s had no influence
what soever , at least one of t he new magazines, Le Pere Duchene,
adopt ed t he ol d revol ut i onary cal endar' s names for the mont hs ot
t he year. It is st range i ndeed t hat in this at mosphere, where every
i nci dent of past revol ut i ons was mul l ed over as t hough it were part
of sacred hi st ory, t he onl y entirely new and entirely spontaneous
i nst i t ut i on in revol ut i onary history shoul d have been neglected t o
t he poi nt of obl i vi on.
Ar med with t he wi sdom of hi ndsi ght , one is t empt ed to qualify
this st at ement . Ther e are cert ai n par agr aphs in t he wri t i ngs of the
Ut opi an Socialists, especially in Pr oudhon and Bakuni n, i nt o whi ch
it has been relatively easy t o read an awar eness of t he council
syst em. Yet t he t r ut h is t hat these essentially anar chi st political
t hi nkers were singularly unequi pped t o deal wi t h a phenomenon
whi ch demonst r at ed so clearly how a revol ut i on did not end wi t h
t he abol i t i on of st at e and gover nment but , on t he cont r ar y, ai med
at t he f oundat i on of a new st at e and t he est abl i shment of a new
form of gover nment . Mor e recently, hi st ori ans have poi nt ed t o t he
rat her obvi ous similarities bet ween t he counci l s and t he medieval
t ownshi ps, t he Swiss cant ons, t he English sevent eet h-cent ury ' agi-
t at or s' or r at her ' adj ust at or s' , as they were originally called and
t he General Counci l of Cr omwel l ' s ar my, but t he poi nt of the
mat t er is t hat none of t hem, with t he possi bl e except i on of t he
medieval t o wn ,
2 4
had ever t he slightest influence on t he mi nds of
t he peopl e wh o in the course of a r evol ut i on spont aneousl y
organi zed themselves in counci l s.
Hence, no t r adi t i on, ei t her r evol ut i onar y or pr e- r evol ut i onar y,
can be called t o account for t he regul ar emergence and re-
emergence of t he counci l system ever since t he French Revol ut i on.
If we leave aside t he Febr uar y Revol ut i on of 1848 in Pari s, wher e a
commission pour les travailleurs, set up by t he gover nment itself,
was al most exclusively concer ned wi t h quest i ons of social legisla-
t i on, t he mai n dat es of appear ance of t hese or gans of act i on and
germs of a new st at e are t he fol l owi ng: t he year 1870, when t he
French capital under siege by t he Prussi an ar my ' spont aneousl y
reorgani zed itself i nt o a mi ni at ur e federal body' , whi ch t hen formed
t he nucl eus for t he Pari si an Commune gover nment in t he spri ng of
1 8 7 1 ;
2 5
t he year 1905, when t he wave of spont aneous st ri kes in
Russia suddenl y devel oped a political l eadershi p of its own, out si de
all r evol ut i onar y part i es and gr oups, a nd t he wor ker s in t he
factories organi zed t hemsel ves i nt o counci l s, Soviets, for t he
pur pose of represent at i ve sel f-government ; t he Febr uar y Revol u-
t i on of 1917 in Russi a, when ' despi t e different political t endenci es
among t he Russi an wor ker s, t he or gani zat i on itself, t hat is t he
soviet, wa s not even subject t o di s cus s i on' ;
2 6
t he years 1918 and
1919 in Ger many, when, after t he defeat of t he ar my, soldiers and
wor ker s in open rebellion const i t ut ed t hemsel ves i nt o Arbeiter- und
Soldatenrdte, demandi ng, in Berlin, t hat this Rdtesystem become
t he f oundat i on st one of t he new Ger man const i t ut i on, and est ab-
Hannah Arendt 251
lishing, t oget her with t he Bohemians of the coffee houses, in
Muni ch in t he spri ng of 1919, the short-lived Bavarian Rdterepub-
lik; t he last dat e, finally, is the aut umn of 1956, when the
Hungar i an Revol ut i on from its very beginning produced the
council syst em anew in Budapest , from which it spread all over the
count r y ' wi t h i ncredi bl e r api di t y. '
2 8
The mer e enumer at i on of these dates suggests a continuity that in
fact never exi st ed. It is precisely the absence of continuity, tradition,
and or gani zed influence t hat makes the sameness of the phe-
nomenon so very st ri ki ng. Out st andi ng among the councils'
common charact eri st i cs is, of course, the spontaneity of their
comi ng i nt o bei ng, because it clearly and flagrantly contradicts the
t heoret i cal ' t went i et h- cent ur y model of revolution - planned,
pr epar ed, and execut ed al most t o cold scientific exactness by the
professi onal r evol ut i onar i es . '
2 9
It is true t hat wherever the revolu-
t i on was not defeat ed and not followed by some sort of restoration,
t he one- par t y di ct at or shi p, t hat is, the model of the professional
r evol ut i onar y, event ual l y prevailed, but it prevailed only after a
violent st ruggl e wi t h t he or gans and institutions of the revolution
itself. The counci l s, mor eover , were always organs of order as much
as or gans of act i on, and it was indeed their aspiration to lay down
t he new or der t hat br ought t hem into conflict with the groups of
professi onal revol ut i onari es, who wished t o degrade them t o mere
execut i ve or gans of revol ut i onary activity. It is true enough that the
member s of t he counci l s were not cont ent t o discuss and ' enlighten
t hemsel ves' about measur es t hat were taken by parties or assem-
blies; t hey consci ousl y and explicitly desired the direct participation
of every citizen in t he publ i c affairs of the count r y,
3 0
and as long as
they lasted, t her e is no doubt t hat ' every individual found his own
sphere of act i on and coul d behol d, as it were, with his own eyes his
own cont r i but i on t o t he events of the da y. '
3 1
Witnesses of their
funct i oni ng wer e often agreed on t he extent t o which the revolution
had given birth t o a ' direct regeneration of democracy' , whereby the
i mpl i cat i on was t hat all such regenerations, alas, were foredoomed
since, obvi ousl y, a direct handl i ng of public business through the
peopl e was i mpossi bl e under moder n conditions. They looked upon
t he counci l s as t hough they were a romant i c dream, some sort of
fant ast i c Utopia come t r ue for a fleeting moment t o show, as it
wer e, t he hopel essl y r omant i c yearnings of the people, who
appar ent l y di d not yet know t he t rue facts of life. These realists
t ook t hei r o wn beari ngs from t he part y system, assuming as a
matter of cour se t hat t here existed no ot her alternative tor
represent at i ve gover nment and forgetting conveniently t hat the
downfal l of t he ol d regi me had been due, among ot her t hi ngs,
precisely t o t hi s syst em.
For t he r emar kabl e t hi ng about t he counci l s was of course not
only t hat they crossed all par t y lines, t hat member s of t he vari ous
part i es sat in t hem t oget her, but t hat such par t y member shi p pl ayed
no role what soever . They were in fact t he only political or gans for
peopl e who bel onged t o no par t y. Hence, t hey i nvari abl y came i nt o
conflict wi t h all assembl i es, wi t h the ol d par l i ament s as well as wi t h
t he new ' const i t uent assembl i es' , for t he si mpl e reason t hat the
l at t er, even in t hei r mos t ext r eme wi ngs, were still t he chi l dren of
t he par t y system. At this stage of event s, t hat is, in t he mi dst of
revol ut i on, it was t he par t y pr ogr ammes mor e t han anyt hi ng else
t hat separ at ed t he councils from t he par t i es; for t hese pr ogr ammes ,
no mat t er how r evol ut i onar y, were all ' r eady- made f or mul as'
whi ch demanded not act i on but execut i on - ' t o be carried out
energetically in pract i ce' , as Rosa Luxembur g poi nt ed out wi t h
such amazi ng cl earsi ght edness about t he issues at s t a k e .
3 1
Today we
know how qui ckl y t he t heoret i cal formul a di sappear ed in pract i cal
execut i on, but if t he formul a had survived its execut i on, and even if
it had pr oved t o be t he panacea for all evils, social and pol i t i cal , t he
counci l s wer e bound to rebel agai nst any such policy since t he very
cleavage bet ween t he part y expert s who ' knew' and t he mass of t he
peopl e who were supposed t o appl y this knowl edge left out of
account t he average citizen' s capaci t y t o act and t o form his own
opi ni on. The counci l s, in ot her wor ds , were bound t o become
superfluous if t he spirit of t he revol ut i onary par t y prevai l ed.
Wherever knowi ng and doi ng have par t ed company, t he space of
freedom is lost.
The counci l s, obvi ousl y, were spaces of freedom. As such, t hey
i nvari abl y refused t o regard themselves as t empor ar y or gans of
revol ut i on and, on t he cont r ar y, made all at t empt s at est abl i shi ng
t hemsel ves as per manent or gans of gover nment . Far from wi shi ng
t o make t he revol ut i on per manent , t hei r explicitly expressed goal
was ' t o lay t he f oundat i ons of a republ i c accl ai med in all its
consequences, t he onl y gover nment whi ch will close forever t he era
of invasions and civil war s ' ; no par adi se on ear t h, no classless
society, no dr eam of socialist or communi s t fraternity, but t he
est abl i shment of ' t he t rue Republ i c' was t he ' r ewar d' hoped for as
t he end of t he s t r uggl e.
3 3
And what had been t rue in Paris in 1871
remai ned t rue for Russia in 1905, when t he ' not merel y dest ruct i ve
but const r uct i ve' i nt ent i ons of t he first Soviets were so manifest t hat
cont empor ar y wi t nesses ' coul d sense t he emergence and t he f or ma-
Hannah Arendt 253
tion of a force whi ch one day might be able to effect the
t r ansf or mat i on of t he St a t e . '
3 4
It was not hi ng mor e or less t han this hope for a transformation of
the st at e, for a new form of government t hat would permit every
member of t he moder n egalitarian society to become a ' participa-
t or ' in publ i c affairs, t hat was buri ed in the disasters of twentieth-
cent ury r evol ut i ons. Thei r causes were manifold and, of course,
vari ed from count r y t o count r y, but the forces of what is commonly
called react i on and count er-revol ut i on are not prominent among
t hem. Recal l i ng t he r ecor d of revolution in our century, it is the
weakness r at her t han t he strength of these forces which is
i mpressi ve, t he frequency of their defeat, the ease of revolution, and
- last, not least - the ext r aor di nar y instability and lack of authority
of most Eur opean gover nment s restored after the downfall of
Hi t l er' s Eur ope. At any rat e, the role played by the professional
revol ut i onari es and t he revol ut i onary parties in these disasters was
i mpor t ant enough, and in our cont ext it is the decisive one. Without
Leni n' s sl ogan, ' All power t o the Soviets', there would never have
been an Oct ober Revol ut i on in Russia, but whet her or not Lenin
was sincere in pr ocl ai mi ng the Soviet Republic, the fact of the
mat t er was even t hen t hat his slogan was in conspicuous con-
t r adi cat i on t o t he openl y procl ai med revolutionary goals of the
Bolshevik par t y t o ' seize power ' , t hat is, to replace the state
machi nery wi t h t he par t y appar at us. Had Lenin really want ed to
give all power t o t he Soviets, he woul d have condemned the
Bolshevik par t y t o the same i mpot ence which now is the outstan-
di ng char act er i st i c of t he Soviet parl i ament , whose party and non-
part y deput i es are nomi nat ed by the part y and, in the absence of
any rival list, are not even chosen, but only acclaimed by the voters.
But while t he conflict bet ween part y and councils was greatly
shar pened because of a conflicting claim to be the only ' t rue'
represent at i ve of t he Revol ut i on and the people, the issue at stake is
of a much mor e far-reachi ng significance. .
What t he counci l s chal l enged was the party system as such, mai l
its forms, and t hi s conflict was emphasized whenever the councils,
bor n of r evol ut i on, t ur ned against the part y or parties whose sole
ai m had al ways been t he revol ut i on. Seen from the vanguard point
of a t r ue Soviet Republ i c, t he Bolshevik party was merely more
danger ous but no less react i onary t han all the ot her parties or me
defunct regi me. As far as t he form of government is concerned
and t he counci l s everywhere, in contradistinction to the revolution-
ary par t i es, wer e infinitely mor e interested in the political than in
t he social aspect of r e vol ut i on
3 5
- t he one- par t y di ct at or shi p is only
t he last st age in t he devel opment of t he nat i on- st at e in general and
of t he mul t i - par t y syst em in par t i cul ar . Thi s may sound like a
t r ui sm in t he mi dst of t he t went i et h cent ury when t he mul t i - par t y
democr aci es in Eur ope have decl i ned t o t he poi nt wher e in every
French or It al i an election ' t he very f oundat i ons of t he st at e and the
nat ur e of t he r egi me' are at s t a k e .
3 6
It is t herefore enl i ght eni ng t o
see t hat in pri nci pl e t he same conflict exi st ed even in 1871, dur i ng
t he Pari si an Commune , when Odysse Bar r ot f or mul at ed wi t h rare
preci si on t he chief difference in t er ms of French hi st ory bet ween the
new form of gover nment , ai med at t he Co mmu n e , and t he old
regi me whi ch soon was t o be r est or ed in a different, non-
monar chi cal di sgui se:
En t ant que r evol ut i on sociale, 1871 pr ocede di r ect ement de
1793, qu' i l cont i nue et qu' i l doi t achever . . . En t ant que
revol ut i on pol i t i que, au cont r ai r e, 1871 est r eact i on cont r e
1793 et un r et our a 1789. . . . 7/ a efface du programme les
mots 'une et indivisible' et rejette l' idee aut or i t ai r e qui est une
idee t out e monar chi que . . pour se rallier a l'idee federative,
qui est par excellence l'idee liberale et republicaine
iJ
(my
italics).
These wor ds are surpri si ng because t hey wer e wr i t t en at a t i me
when t here exi st ed har dl y any evi dence at any rat e not for peopl e
unacquai nt ed wi t h t he cour se of t he Amer i can Revol ut i on - a bout
t he i nt i mat e connect i on bet ween t he spirit of r evol ut i on and t he
pri nci pl e of federat i on. In or der t o pr ove what Odysse Bar r ot felt t o
be t r ue, we must t ur n t o t he Febr uar y Revol ut i on of 1917 in Russi a
and t o t he Hungar i an Revol ut i on of 1956, bot h of whi ch l ast ed just
l ong enough t o s how in bar e out l i nes what a gover nment woul d
l ook like and h o w a r epubl i c was likely t o funct i on if they wer e
f ounded upon t he pri nci pl es of t he counci l syst em. In bot h i nst ances
counci l s or Soviets had s pr ung up ever ywher e, compl et el y i ndepen-
dent of one anot her , wor ker s ' , sol di er s' , and peasant s' counci l s in
t he case of Russi a, t he mos t di spar at e ki nds of counci l s in t he case
of Hungar y, nei ghbour hood counci l s t hat emerged in all residential
di st ri ct s, so-cal l ed r evol ut i onar y counci l s t hat grew out of fighting
t oget her in t he st reet s, counci l s of wri t ers and art i st s, bor n in t he
coffee houses of Budapest , st udent s' and yout hs' counci l s at t he
uni versi t i es, wor ker s ' counci l s in t he factories, counci l s in t he ar my,
among t he civil ser vant s, and so on. The format i on of a counci l in
each of t hese di spar at e gr oups t ur ned a mor e or less acci dent al
Hannah Arendt
255
proximity into a political i nst i t ut i on. The mos t st r i ki ng aspect of
these spont aneous devel opment s is t hat in bot h i nst ances it t ook
these independent and hi ghl y di s par at e or gans no mor e t han a few
weeks, in the case of Russi a, or a few days , in t he case of Hunga r y,
to begin a process of co- or di nat i on a nd i nt egr at i on t hr ough t he
formation of hi gher counci l s of a r egi onal or pr ovi nci al char act er ,
from which finally t he del egat es t o an assembl y r epr esent i ng t he
whole country coul d be c h o s e n .
3 8
As in t he case of t he earl y
covenants, ' cosoci at i ons' , and conf eder at i ons in t he col oni al hi st or y
of Nort h Ameri ca, we see her e h o w t he federal pri nci pl e, t he
principle of league and al l i ance a mong separ at e uni t s, arises out of
the elementary condi t i ons of act i on itself, uni nfl uenced by any
theoretical specul at i ons a bout t he possi bi l i t i es of r epubl i can
government in l arge t er r i t or i es and not even t hr eat ened i nt o
coherence by a c ommon enemy. The c ommon obj ect was t he
foundation of a new body pol i t i c, a new t ype of r epubl i can
government whi ch woul d rest on ' el ement ar y r epubl i cs' in such a
way that its own cent ral powe r di d not depri ve t he const i t uent
bodies of their ori gi nal powe r t o const i t ut e. The counci l s, in ot her
words, jealous of t hei r capaci t y t o act a nd t o f or m opi ni on, wer e
bound t o discover t he divisibility of powe r as wel l as its mos t
important consequence, t he necessary separ at i on of power s in
government . . .
Freedom, wherever it exi st ed as a t angi bl e real i t y, has al ways been
spatially limited. Thi s is especi al l y clear for t he gr eat est and mos t
elementary of all negat i ve l i bert i es, t he freedom of movement ; t he
borders of nat i onal t er r i t or y or t he wal l s of t he ci t y-st at e compr e-
hended and pr ot ect ed a space in whi ch men coul d move freely.
Treaties and i nt er nat i onal guar ant ees pr ovi de an ext ensi on of t hi s
territorially bound f r eedom for citizens out si de t hei r own count r y,
but even under t hese mode r n condi t i ons t he el ement ar y coi nci dence
f freedom and a l i mi t ed space r emai ns mani fest . Wh a t is t r ue for
freedom of movement is, t o a l arge ext ent , val i d for freedom in
general. Fr eedom in a posi t i ve sense is possi bl e onl y a mong equal s,
and equality itself is by no means a uni versal l y val i d pri nci pl e but ,
again, appl i cabl e onl y wi t h l i mi t at i ons a nd even wi t hi n spat i al
units. If we equat e t hese spaces of f r eedom - whi ch, fol l owi ng t he
gist, t hough not t he t er mi nol ogy, of J ohn Ada ms , we coul d al so call
spaces of appear ances - wi t h t he pol i t i cal r eal m itself, we shall be
inclined t o t hi nk of t hem as i sl ands in a sea or as oases in a desert ,
' hi s i mage, I believe, is suggest ed t o us not merel y by t he
consistency of a me t a phor but by t he r ecor d of hi st ory as wel l .
The phenomenon I am concer ned wi t h here is usual l y called the
' el i t e' , and my quarrel wi t h this t er m is not t hat I doubt t hat the
political way of life has never been and will never be t he way of life
of t he many, even t hough political busi ness, by definition, concerns
mor e t han t he many, namel y strictly speaki ng, t he sum t ot al of all
citizens. Political passi ons cour age, t he pur sui t of publ i c happi -
ness, t he t ast e of publ i c freedom, an ambi t i on t hat strives for
excellence regardl ess not only of social st at us and admi ni st r at i ve
office but even of achi evement and congr at ul at i on are per haps
not as rare as we are inclined to t hi nk, living in a society whi ch has
per ver t ed all vi rt ues i nt o social val ues; but they cert ai nl y are out of
t he or di nar y under all ci rcumst ances. My quar r el wi t h t he ' el i t e' is
t hat t he t er m implies an ol i garchi c form of gover nment , t he
domi nat i on of t he many by t he rule of a few. Fr om t hi s, one can
onl y concl ude - as i ndeed our whol e t r adi t i on of political t hought
has concl uded - t hat t he essence of politics is rul ershi p and t hat the
domi nant pol i t i cal passi on is t he passi on t o rule or t o govern. Thi s,
I pr opose, is pr of oundl y unt r ue. The fact t hat political ' el i t es' have
al ways det er mi ned t he political destinies of t he many and have, in
most i nst ances, exert ed a domi nat i on over t hem, i ndi cat es, on the
one hand, t he bitter need of t he few t o prot ect t hemsel ves agai nst
t he many, or r at her t o pr ot ect t he i sl and of freedom they have come
t o i nhabi t agai nst t he sur r oundi ng sea of necessity; and it i ndi cat es,
on t he ot her hand, t he responsi bi l i t y t hat falls aut omat i cal l y upon
t hose who care for t he fate of t hose wh o do not . But nei t her this
need nor t hi s responsi bi l i t y t ouches upon t he essence, t he very
subst ance of t hei r lives, whi ch is f r eedom; bot h are i nci dent al and
secondar y wi t h respect t o what act ual l y goes on wi t hi n t he l i mi t ed
space of t he i sl and itself. Put i nt o t er ms of present -day i nst i t ut i ons,
it woul d be in par l i ament and in congress, wher e he moves a mong
his peers, t hat t he political life of a member of represent at i ve
gover nment is act ual i zed, no mat t er h o w much of his t i me may be
spent in campai gni ng, in t ryi ng t o get t he vot e and i n l i st eni ng t o t he
vot er. The poi nt of t he mat t er is not merel y t he obvi ous phoni ness
of his di al ogue i n moder n par t y gover nment , wher e t he vot er can
onl y consent or refuse t o ratify a choi ce whi ch (with t he except i on
of t he Amer i can pri mari es) is made wi t hout hi m, and it does not
even concer n conspi cuous abuses such as t he i nt r oduct i on i nt o
politics of Madi s on Avenue met hods , t hr ough whi ch t he rel at i on-
shi p bet ween represent at i ve and el ect or is t r ansf or med i nt o t hat of
seller and buyer . Even if t her e is communi cat i on bet ween represen-
t at i ve and vot er , bet ween t he nat i on and par l i ament - and t he
exi st ence of such communi cat i on mar ks t he out st andi ng difference
Hannah Arendt 257
bet ween t he gover nment s of the British and the Americans, on one
side, and t hose of West ern Europe, on the other - this communi -
cat i on is never bet ween equals bur between those who aspire to
govern and t hose who consent t o be governed. It is indeed in the
very nat ur e of t he par t y system t o replace ' the formula "govern-
ment of t he peopl e by t he peopl e" by this formula: "government of
t he peopl e by an elite sprung from the people" V'
9
It has been said t hat ' t he deepest significance of political parties'
mus t be seen in their provi di ng ' t he necessary framework enabling
t he masses t o recrui t from among themselves their own elites',
and it is t r ue enough t hat it was primarily the parties which opened
political careers t o member s of the lower classes. No doubt the
par t y as t he out st andi ng institution of democratic government
cor r esponds t o one of t he major trends of the modern age, the
const ant l y and universally increasing equalization of society; but
this by no means implies t hat it corresponds to the deepest
significance of revol ut i on in t he moder n age as well. The 'elite
spr ung from t he peopl e' has replaced the pre-modern elites of birth
and weal t h; it has nowher e enabl ed t he people qua people t o make
t hei r ent r ance i nt o political life and t o become participators in
publ i c affairs. The rel at i onshi p between a ruling elite and the
peopl e, bet ween t he few, who among themselves constitute a public
space, and t he many, who spend their lives outside it and in
obscur i t y, has r emai ned unchanged. From the viewpoint of revolu-
t i on and t he survival of t he revol ut i onary spirit, the trouble does
not lie in t he factual rise of a new elite; it is not the revolutionary
spirit but t he democr at i c mentality of an egalitarian society that
t ends t o deny t he obvi ous inability and conspicuous lack of interest
of large par t s of t he popul at i on in political matters as such. The
t r oubl e lies in t he lack of publ i c spaces t o which the people at large
woul d have ent r ance and from whi ch an elite could be selected, or
r at her , wher e it coul d select itself. The trouble, in other words, is
t hat pol i t i cs has become a profession and a career, and t hat the
' el i t e' t herefore is bei ng chosen accordi ng t o st andards and criteria
whi ch ar e t hemsel ves pr of oundl y unpolitical. It is in the nature of
all par t y syst ems t hat t he authentically political talents can assert
t hemsel ves onl y in rare cases, and it is even rarer that the
specifically pol i t i cal qualifications survive the petty manoeuvres of
par t y pol i t i cs wi t h its demands for plain salesmanship. Of course
t he men wh o sat in t he councils were also an elite, they were even the
onl y pol i t i cal elite, of t he peopl e and sprung from the people, the
moder n wor l d has ever seen, but they were not nominated trorn
above a nd not suppor t ed from below. Wi t h respect to the
el ement ary counci l s t hat spr ung up wher ever peopl e lived or
wor ked t oget her, one is t empt ed t o say t hat t hey had selected
t hemsel ves; t hose who organi zed t hemsel ves were t hose who cared
and t hose wh o t ook t he initiative; they wer e t he political elite of the
peopl e br ought i nt o t he open by t he revol ut i on. Fr om these
' el ement ary republ i cs' , t he counci l men t hen chose t hei r deput i es for
t he next hi gher counci l , and these deput i es, agai n, wer e selected by
t hei r peers, they wer e not subject t o any pressure ei t her from above
or from bel ow. Thei r title rested on not hi ng but t he confidence of
t hei r equal s, and this equal i t y was not nat ur al but pol i t i cal , it was
not hi ng they had been bor n wi t h; it wa s t he equal i t y of t hose wh o
had commi t t ed t hemsel ves t o, and n o w were engaged in, a joint
ent erpri se. Once elected and sent i nt o t he next hi gher counci l , the
deput y found himself again among his peers, for t he deput i es on
any given level in this system were t hose who had received a special
t rust . No doubt t hi s form of gover nment , if fully devel oped, woul d
have assumed agai n the shape of a pyr ami d, whi ch, of course, is t he
shape of an essentially aut hor i t ar i an gover nment . But whi l e, in all
aut hor i t ar i an gover nment we know of, aut hor i t y is filtered down
from above, in this case aut hor i t y woul d have been generat ed
nei t her at t he t op nor at t he bot t om, but on each of t he pyr ami d' s
l ayers; and this obvi ousl y coul d const i t ut e t he sol ut i on t o one of t he
most serious pr obl ems of all moder n pol i t i cs, whi ch is not how t o
reconcile freedom and equality but h o w t o reconci l e equal i t y and
aut hor i t y.
(To avoi d mi sunder st andi ng: The pri nci pl es for t he selection of
t he best as suggested in t he council system, t he pri nci pl e of self-
selection in t he grass-root s political or gans, and t he pri nci pl e of
personal t rust in their devel opment i nt o a federal form of govern-
ment are not universally valid; they are appl i cabl e onl y wi t hi n t he
political real m. The cul t ural , literary, and art i st i c, t he scientific and
professi onal and even t he social elites of a count r y are subject t o
very different criteria among whi ch t he cri t eri on of equal i t y is
conspi cuousl y absent . But so is t he pri nci pl e of aut hor i t y. The r ank
of a poet , for i nst ance, is deci ded nei t her by a vot e of confidence of
his fellow poet s nor by fiat comi ng from t he recogni zed mast er , but ,
on t he cont r ar y, by t hose wh o only love poet r y and are i ncapabl e of
ever wr i t i ng a Une. The r ank of a scientist, on t he ot her hand, is
i ndeed det er mi ned by hi s fellow scientists, but not on t he basis of
highly per sonal qual i t i es and qual i fi cat i ons; t he criteria in t hi s
i nst ance are objective and beyond ar gument or per suasi on. Social
elites, finally, at least i n an egal i t ari an society wher e nei t her bi rt h
Hannah Arendt 259
nor weal t h count , come i nt o bei ng t hr ough processes of discrimina-
tion.)
It woul d be t empt i ng t o spi n out furt her t he pot ent i al i t i es of the
councils, but it cert ai nl y is wi ser t o say wi t h Jefferson, ' Begin t hem
only for a single pur pos e; t hey will soon s how for what ot hers they
are the best i ns t r ument s ' - t he best i nst r ument s, for exampl e, for
breaking up t he moder n mass society, wi t h its danger ous t endency
t owar d t he f or mat i on of pseudo- pol i t i cal mass movement s, or
rather, the best , t he mos t nat ur al way for i nt erspersi ng it at the
grass root s wi t h an ' el i t e' t hat is chosen by no one but constitutes
itself. The joys of publ i c happi ness and t he responsibilities for
public business woul d t hen become t he shar e of t hose few from all
wal ks of life wh o have a t ast e for publ i c freedom and cannot be
' happy' wi t hout it. Politically, they are t he best, and it is the t ask of
good gover nment and t he sign of a wel l -ordered republ i c t o assure
them of t hei r rightful pl ace in t he publ i c r eal m. To be sure, such an
' ari st ocrat i c' f or m of gover nment woul d spell t he end of general
suffrage as we under s t and it t oday; for onl y t hose who as vol unt ary
members of an ' el ement ar y r epubl i c' have demonst r at ed t hat they
care for mor e t ha n t hei r pr i vat e happi ness and ar e concerned about
the state of t he wor l d woul d have t he ri ght t o be heard in t he
conduct of t he busi ness of t he republ i c. However , this exclusion
from politics shoul d not be der ogat or y, since a political elite is by
no means i dent i cal wi t h a social or cul t ural or professional elite.
The excl usi on, mor eover , woul d not depend upon an out si de body;
if t hose wh o bel ong are self-chosen, t hose who do not bel ong are
self-excluded. And such self-exclusion, far from being arbi t rary
di scri mi nat i on, woul d in fact give subst ance and reality t o one of
t he most i mpor t a nt negat i ve liberties we have enjoyed since t he end
of t he anci ent wor l d, namel y, freedom from politics, whi ch was
unknown t o Rome or At hens and whi ch is politically per haps t he
most rel evant par t of our Chr i st i an heri t age. .
Thi s, and pr obabl y much mor e, was lost when t he spirit of
revol ut i on - a new spirit and t he spirit of begi nni ng somet hi ng new
- failed t o find its appr opr i at e i nst i t ut i on. Ther e is not hi ng t hat
coul d compens at e for t hi s failure or pr event it from becomi ng final,
except me mor y and recol l ect i on. And since t he st orehouse ot
memor y is kept and wat ched over by t he poet s, whose business it is
t o find and ma ke t he wor ds we live by, it may be wise t o t ur n in
concl usi on t o t wo of t hem (one moder n, t he ot her ancient) in order
t o find an a ppr oxi ma t e ar t i cul at i on of t he act ual cont ent of our lost
t reasure. The mode r n poet is Rene Char , per haps t he most
art i cul at e of t he many French wr i t er s and art i st s who j oi ned the
Resi st ance dur i ng t he Second Wor l d Wa r . Hi s book of aphor i sms
was wri t t en dur i ng t he last year of t he wa r in a frankly appr ehen-
sive ant i ci pat i on of l i berat i on; for he knew t hat as far as they were
concer ned, t here woul d be not onl y t he wel come l i berat i on from
Ger man occupat i on but l i berat i on from t he ' bur den' of publ i c
busi ness as wel l . Back they woul d have t o go t o t he epaisseur triste
of t hei r pri vat e lives and pursui t s, t o t he ' sterile depr essi on' of t he
pr e- war years, when it was as t hough a curse hung over everyt hi ng
t hey di d: 'If I survi ve, I know t hat I shall have t o br eak wi t h t he
ar oma of t hese essential years, silently reject (not repress) my
t r easur e. ' The t r easur e, he t hought , wa s t hat he had 'found hi msel f,
t hat he no longer suspected himself of ' insincerity' , t hat he needed no
mask and no make-bel i eve t o appear , t hat wher ever he went he
appear ed as he was t o ot her s and t o himself, t hat he coul d afford ' t o
go na ke d' .
4 1
These reflections are significant enough as t hey testify
t o t he i nvol unt ary self-disclosure, t o t he joys of appear i ng in wor d
and deed wi t hout equi vocat i on and wi t hout self-reflection t hat are
i nher ent in act i on. And yet t hey are per haps t oo ' moder n' , t oo self-
cent red t o hi t in pur e preci si on t he cent re of t hat ' i nher i t ance whi ch
was left t o us by no t est ament ' .
Sophocl es in Oedipus at Colonus, t he pl ay of his ol d age, wr ot e
t he f amous and frightening lines:
Mr) &vvai xbv anavxa vi-
xa Xoyov. to 6' EJIEI &avfj,
fUjvai HEIO' onoOev neg fj-
XEI TTOXV devregov (bg xayioxa.
' Not t o be bor n prevails over all meani ng ut t ered in wor ds ; by far
t he second-best for life, once it has appear ed, is t o go as swiftly as
possi bl e whence it came. ' Ther e he al so let us know, t hr ough t he
mout h of Theseus, t he l egendary f ounder of At hens and hence her
s pokes man, wha t it was t hat enabl ed or di nar y men, young and ol d,
t o bear life's bur den: it was t he polis, t he space of men' s free deeds
and living wor ds , whi ch coul d endow life wi t h spl endour - xbv
P'LOV ha/xnobv noieioOai.
Hannah Arendt
261
NOTES
x
In the letter to John Cartwright, 5 June 1824.
This quotation is from a slightly earlier period when Jefferson proposed
to divide the counties 'into hundreds'. (See letter to John Tyler, 26 May
1810.) Clearly, the wards he had in mind were to consist of about a
hundred men.
3
Letter to Cartwright, quoted previously.
5
Letter to Samuel Kercheval, 12 July 1816.
The citations are drawn from the letters just quoted.
7
Letter to Samuel Kercheval, 5 Sept. 1816.
8
Letter to Thomas Jefferson Smith, 21 Feb. 1825.
Letter to Cartwright, quoted previously.
Letter to John Tyler, quote previously.
The citations are drawn from the letter to Joseph C. Cabell of 2 Feb.
1816, and from the two letters to Samuel Kercheval already quoted.
George Soule, The Coming American revolution, New York, 1934,
p. 53.
1 3
For Tocqueville, see author' s Introduction to Democracy in America;
for Marx, Die Klassenkampfe in Frankreich, 1840-1850 (1850), Berlin,
1951, p. 124.
1 4
In 1871 Marx called the Commune die endlich entdeckte politische
Form, unter der die okonomische Befreiung der Arbeit sich vollziehen
konnte, and called this its 'true secret'. (See Der Biirgerkrieg in
Frankreich (1871), Berlin, 1952, pp. 71, 76.) Only two years later,
however, he wrote: 'Die Arbeiter miissen . . . auf die entschiedenste
Zentralisation der Gewalt in die Hande der Staatsmacht hinwirken. Sie
diirfen sich durch das demokratische Gerede von Freiheit der Gemein-
den, von Selbstregierung usw, nicht irre machen lassen' (in Enthul-
lungen iiber den Kommunistenprozess zu Koln (Sozialdemokratische
Bibliothek Bd. IV), Hattingen Zurich, 1885, p. 81). Hence, Oskar
Anweiler, to whose important study of the council system, Die
Rdtebewegung in Russland 1905-1921, Leiden, 1958, I am much
indebted, is quite right when he maintains: 'Die revolutionaren
Gemeinderate sind fur Marx nichts weiter als zeirweilige politische
Kampforgane, die die Revolution vorwartstreiben sollen, er sieht in
ihnen nicht die Keimzellen fur eine grundlegende Umgestaltung der
Gesellschaft, die vielmehr von oben, durch die proletarische zentralistis-
che Staatsgewalt, erfolgen soil' (p. 19).
1 5
I am following Anweiler, p. 101.
1 6
The enormous popularity of the councils in all rwentieth-century
revolutions is sufficiently well known. During the German revolution of
1918 and 1919, even the Conservative party had to come to terms with
the Rate in its election campaigns.
1 7
In the words of Levine, a prominent professional revolutionist, during
the revolution in Bavaria: 'Die Kommunisten treten nur fur eine
Raterepublik ein, in der die Rate eine kommunistische Mehrheit haben.'
See Helmut Neubauer, 'Miinchen und Moskau 1918-1919: Zur
Geschichte der Ratebewegung in Bayern', Jahrbiicher fur Geschichte
Osteuropas, Beiheft 4, 1958.
1 8
See the excellent study of The Paris Commune of 1871, London, 1937,
by Frank Jellinek, p. 27.
1 9
See Anweiler, Die Ratebewegung, p. 45.
2 0
Maurice Duverger - whose book on Political Parties. Their Organiza-
tion and Activity in the Modern State (French edition, 1951), New
York, 1961, supersedes and by far excels all former studies on the
subject mentions an interesting example. At the elections to the
National Assembly in 1871, the suffrage in France had become free, but
since there existed no parties the new voters tended to vote for the only
candidates they knew at all, with the result that the new republic
became the 'Republic of Dukes.'
2 1
The record of the secret police in fostering rather than preventing
revolutionary activities is especially striking in France during the Second
Empire and in Tsarist Russia after 1880. It seems, for example, that
there was not a single anti-government action under Louis Napoleon
which had not been inspired by the police; and the more important
terrorist attacks in Russia prior to war and revolution seem all to have
been police jobs.
2 2
Thus, the conspicuous unrest in the Second Empire, for instance, was
easily contradicted by the overwhelmingly favourable outcome of
Napoleon Ill's plebiscites, these predecessors of our public-opinion
polls. The last of these, in 1869, was again a great victory for the
Emperor; what nobody noticed at the time and what turned out to be
decisive a year later was that nearly 15 per cent of the armed forces had
voted against the Emperor.
2 3
Quoted from Jellinek, The Paris Commune, p. 194.
2 4
One of the official pronouncements of the Parisian Commune stressed
this relation as follows: 'C'est cette idee communale poursuivie depuis le
douzieme siecle, affirmee par la morale, le droit et la science qui vient de
triompher le 18 mars 1871. ' See Heinrich Koechlin, Die Pariser
Commune von 1871 im Bewusstsein ihrer Anhanger, Basel, 1950, p. 66.
2 5
Jellinek, The Paris Commune, p. 71.
2 6
Anweiler, Die Ratebewegung, p. 127, quotes this sentence by Trotsky.
2 7
For the latter, see Helmut Neubauer, ' Miinchen und Moskau' .
2 8
See Oskar Anweiler, 'Die Rate in der ungarischen Revolution' , in
Osteuropa, vol. VIII, 1958.
2 9
Sigmund Neumann, ' The Structure and Strategy of Revolution: 1848
and 1948' , in The Journal of Politics, Aug. 1949.
3 0
Anweiler, Die Ratebewegung, p. 6, enumerates the following general
characteristics: '(1) Die Gebundenheit an eine bestimmte abhangige
oder unterdruckte soziale Schicht, (2) die radikale Demokratie als Form,
Hannah Arendt 263
(3) die revolutionare Art der Entstehung', and then comes to the
conclusion: 'Die diesen Raten zugrundeliegende Tendenz, die man als
' Rategedanken' bezeichnen kann, ist das Streben nach einer moglichst
unmittelbaren, weitgehenden und unbeschrankten Teilnahme des Ein-
zelnen am offentlichen Leben . . .'
In the words of the Austrian socialist Max Adler, in the pamphlet
Demokratie und Ratesystem, Wien, 1919. The booklet, written in the
midst of the revolution, is of some interest because Adler, although he
saw quite clearly why the councils were so immensely popular,
nevertheless immediately went on to repeat the old Marxist formula
according to which the councils could not be anything more than merely
'eine revolutionare Uebergangsform', at best, 'eine neue Kampfform des
sozialistischen Klassenkampfes'.
Rosa Luxemburg' s pamphlet on The Russian Revolution, translated by
Bertram D. Wolfe, 1940, from which I quote, was written more than
four decades ago. Its criticism of the 'Lenin-Trotsky theory of dictator-
ship' has lost nothing of its pertinence and actuality. To be sure, she
could not foresee the horrors of Stalin's totalitarian regime, but her
prophetic words of warning against the suppression of political freedom
and with it of public life read today like a realistic description of the
Soviet Union under Khrushchev: 'Without general elections, without
unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of
opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a mere
semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains the active
element. Public life gradually falls asleep, a few dozen party leaders of
inexhaustible energy and boundless experience direct and rule. Among
them, in reality only a dozen outstanding heads do the leading and an
elite of the working class is invited from time to time to . . . applaud the
speeches of the leaders, and to approve proposed resolutions unani-
mously - at bottom, then, a clique affair. . . .'
See Jellinek, The Paris Commune, pp. 129 ff.
See Anweiler, Die Ratebewegung p. 110.
It is quite characteristic that in its justification of the dissolution of the
workers' councils in December 1956, the Hungarian government
complained: ' The members of the workers' council at Budapest wanted
to concern themselves exclusively with political matters.' See Oskar
Anweiler's article quoted previously.
Thus Duverger, Political Parties, p. 419.
Quoted from Heinrich Koechlin, Die Pariser Commune, p. 224.
For details of this process in Russia, see Anweiler's book, Die
Ratebewegung, pp. 155-8, and also the same author's article on
Hungary.
Duverger, Political Parties, p. 425.
Ibid., p. 426.
Rene Char, Feuillets d'Hypnos, Paris, 1946. For the English translation,
see Hypnos Waking: Poems and Prose, New York, 1956.
Index
'absolute freedom' 191-5
'absolute spirit' 188-9
academic study of politics 232- 7
accountability 140
Ackerman, B.A. 176
acquisition
of additional capacities 83
of holdings 107-8
action
intelligibility of 130-2
intentions and 127-30
modernist view of 125
narratives and 133-8
self-moved, and politics 224-6
settings for 128-9
Acton, J.E.E. 31, 221
Adams, J. 255
agency 166
alienation 183, 186
anarchists 121
Andromache 126, 134
Angel, Sir N. 224
Anscombe, G.E.M. 59
Aquinas, Thomas 97
Arendt, H. 7, 11
on revolutionary tradition
239- 63
aristocratic concept and honour
150
Aristotle 57, 97, 126, 134-5, 179
autocracy and liberty 21- 2, 26- 9
Bakuni n, M. 250
Barrot, O. 254
Becket, Thomas 134-5
behaviour see action
'behavioural sciences' 129
Belinsky, V. 18
Bentham, J. 36, 40, 43, 223
Berger,P. 149
Berlin, I. 7-8
on liberty 15-26
Burke, E. 19, 32, 144, 200, 205
Caesar, Julius 134,244
Campbell,/ . K. 151
Carr, E.H. 224
Carter, J.E. 75
Cato 239
Chamberlain, W., as example of
distributive justice 115-17
Char, R. 259
character, friendship and self-
knowledge 171-6
choice 40
hedonism as method of 53- 7
of rival goods 146-7
civil rights see rights
coercion 16, 20, 82
Collingwood, R.G. 98
common sense precepts and justice
44- 5
community/ society
homogenization of 193-6
honour and dignity
concepts 153,156
individual and 143, 178-99
passim
justice and 167-8
language of 182-4
liberty in 185-6, 191-5
particular, birth into 95-6
266 Index
political 219-38
see also environment
Condorcet, Marquis de 21, 36
congenital differences 82- 4
conservatives, American 613,
72-5
constraints, libertarian 105-6
Constant, B. 17, 19, 26- 8
'constructivism' 169
contract view of right and good
48- 53
contrasts, right and good 37- 59
conversation 1334
corruption in government 2412
council system, revolutionary
239-63 passim
Cromwell, O. 250
Crosland, A. 98
current time-slice principles
109-11
Dahrendorf, R. 126
deinstitutionalization 155, 157
democracy
conservatism and 734
dissatisfaction with 186-7,
195-7
liberalism and 6971
liberty and 28
deontology
justice as 401
liberating project of 160- 1,
168-71
Descartes, R. 126
Deschamps, E. 150
deserving 47
differences, individual 81- 4,
95- 6, 105
dignity, concept of 150, 153,
157-8
distribution 11- 13, 62- 71
see also equality
distributive justice see justice
dominant-end conception of
deliberation 53
Dumont, L. 209
Dworkin, R. 8-9, 160
on liberalism 6079
economic
freedom 16
incentives 1 17, 120
market 66- 9, 71- 3, 76
Edgeworth, F.Y. 40, 43
education
inequality and 86- 7
political 219-38
egalitarianism see equality
Elias,N. 151
elite 256- 7
embedding 134-5, 145
embourgeotsement of concept of
honour 1512
empirical activity, politics as
221- 2, 224
end-state principle of distributive
justice 109- 11, 118
see also patterning
ends and means 103,2256
Engels, F. 135
entitlement theory 47, 107-9
see also justice, distributive
entrepreneur in socialist society
117
environment, inequality in 82- 7
see also community
equality 18, 60- 79
distributive 11- 13, 62- 71
law and 69- 71, 80, 82
liberty and 41, 60- 3
value and merit 80-99
see also inequality; justice,
distributive
Erasmus 20
' essence' of individual 181, 189
ethics see moral; Moralitdt;
Sittlichkeit
expectations, legitimate, and moral
desert 44- 8
fairness see justice as fairness
Falstaff and concept of honour
152, 154
family as basis for inequality 84- 6
Index
267
Fiacco, A. 119
Fi cht eJ. G. 192
Ford, G.R. 75
Ford, H. 113
France, revolution 239-40,
245- 54 passim 262
freedom see liberty
Fried, C. 203
Friedman, M. 100
friendship, self-knowledge and
character 171-6
Gallie, W.B. 97
Gehlen, A. 155, 157
Geist, 180-1
genres 134
Germany, revolution 250- 1
goal
'final', of individual 181
moral 101-3
Goffman,E. 126, 143, 156
good, the, concept of 141-2,
146-7
justice and 159-76
utilitarianism and 101
see also right and good; virtues
Greek polis 179, 187, 190, 197
Green, T.H. 35
GrenfellJ. 137
gun control, American 75
Guttenplan, S. 147
happiness, justice as 44
Hardy, B. 133
Hare, R.M. 146
harmony, final 30
Hart, H.L.A. 4
Hayek, F.A. von 120
on equality, value and merit
80- 99
healthcare 205- 6, 211- 17
Hector 126, 134
hedonism as method of
choice 53- 7
Hegel, G.W.F. 16, 23, 25, 30
on history and politics, Taylor
on 177-99
and Kant 5, 7, 10, 177-8, 191
193
Heidegger, M. 136, 156
Helvetius 34
Henry II, King 134-5
Herder, J.G. 190,193
hereditary differences 82-4
hierarchical view of society and
honour 150-1
Hippocrates of Cos 211
historical and end-result principles
of distributive justice 109-11,
118
history and pol itics 177-99
see also tradition
Hitler, A. 253
Hobbes,T. 19, 34, 169
Hobsbawm, P. 136
holdings, justice in 107-9, 1 ] 4,
120-1
Holmes, O.W. 80
homogenization of society 193-6
honour as obsolescent
concept 149-58
Humboldt, K.W. von 190
Hume, D. 43, 97-8, 139,162-3,
165, 201
Hungr y, revolution 251,254-5
idea
abstract, of politics 223, 230
state as expression of 188
identity see individual
ideological style of politics 222-9
ignorance and justice 50
independence of individual 162,
166, 168-71
see also individual, differences
individual/self
accountability 140
community and 143,178-99
passim
differences 81-4, 95-6, 105 see
also separateness below
'essence'of 181,189
ends and means 103
expression 21
268
Index
freedom see liberty below
identity 138-43
inviolability 103-5
justice and 50
knowledge 171-6
liberty 12, 19- 21, 23- 5, 80- 1,
157'
modernity and 125-6,1424,
153-6
morality 160,168
moved manner of
activity 224- 6
narrative 138-41, 145
objectivity 147
rights 70- 1, 745, 101- 3, 153,
157
roles 138
separation from 125- 6, 143,
154-6
separateness of 162, 166,
168-71
tradition and 1435
inequality
distributive 68- 9, 71
environmental 827
justice and 94
result of equal treatment 82
see also equality
injustice in holdings 107-9
see also justice
institutions and modernity 155,
157, 186- 7
insult and concept of honour
149-50
intelligibility 130- 5, 140
intentions and action 127-30
interdependence of society 194
inviolability of individual 103-5
James, W. 25
Jefferson, T. 19, 239- 45, 259
Jesus 179
Johnson, Dr S. 136
Joyce, J. 138
justice
American 69- 71, 74
community 167-8
criminal 210- 11
distributive and moral
constraints 44- 8, 100- 22
as fairness 37- 59, 154- 61,
167-8
good, the 159-76
as happiness 44
historical and end-result
principles 109- 11, 118
in holdings 107- 9, 114
individual and 50
inequality and 94
law and 210- 11
liberty upsets patterns 115-18
patterning 11115
utilitarianism and 37- 59,
160- 1, 168
Kafka, F. 135
Kant, I. 2, 32, 63, 130
Hegel and 5, 7, 10, 177- 8, 191,
193
on individual 103, 105, 168
on justice 162
on moral law 169
knowledge
individual 1716
political 219- 38
Knowles, Dom D. 134
Kristol, I. 120
Lamartine, A. de 249
language, community 1824
law
equality and 69- 71, 80, 82
honour and 149-50
justice and 210- 11
liberty and 17, 27- 8, 31- 2, 35,
61
Leibniz, G.W. 138-9
Lenin, V.I. 134, 240, 245- 8, 253
liberalism
American 6079
equality, value and merit 80-99
history and politics 177-99
honour as obsolescent concept
149-58
Index 269
justice and the good 159-76
liberty, concepts of 15-36
moral constraints and
distributive justice 10022
political education 21938
revolutionary tradition 23963
right and good contrasted
37- 59
virtues, unity of human life and
tradition 125-48
welfare, membership and need
200-18
liberating concept of deontology
160- 1, 168- 71
liberty
absolute 191-5
autocracy and 2 1 - 2 , 2 6 - 9
in community 185- 6, 191- 5
concepts of 1536
constraints 105-6
democracy 3nd 28
equality and 41, 60- 3
individual 17, 19- 21, 23- 5,
80- 1, 157
justice and 115-18
law and 17, 27- 8, 31- 2, 35, 61
'negative' 15-22
one and many 29- 34
positive 225
sovereignty 26- 9
spatial limitation 255
Liverpool, Lord 221
Locke, J. 17, 19, 43, 139
love and benevolence 164-5
Luxemburg, R. 252, 263
McCormick, G. 119
Maclntyre, A. 65
on virtues, unity of human life
and tradition 125-48
MackayJ. H. 121
many and one 29- 34
Marshall, T. H. 206
Marx, E. 126
Marx, K. and Marxism
on ability and needs 217
on alienation and false
consciousness 156
on constraints 137
on creativity 192
on freedom 193
on revolution 240, 245-7
on social laws 30, 34
on subjectivism 156
material equality 81
means and ends 103, 225-6
medical care 205-6, 211-17
membership, need and welfare
200-18
Mencius 153
merit
distribution and 11-13
equality and value 80-99
reward and 89-94, 98
and value 88-97, 113
Mi l l J. S. 2, 224
on envy 88
on 'experiments in living' 32
on personal freedom 17,
19-22, 28, 31
on representative government
235
minimal and ultraminimal
state 100-1
Mink, L.O. 133-4,136
modernity
action and 125
dissatisfaction with 191-7
honour concept and 14951,
153
individual and 125-6, 136,
142- 4, 153- 6
institutions 155,157, 186-7
subjectivity and 155-6, 191
monism 32- 3
Montesquieu, Baron de 179,190,
197
Montrose, Marquis of 146
moral/ morality
constraints and distributive
justice 100-22
libertarian 105-6
state 100- 1
270
Index
moral goals and 1013
side 103-5
desert, and legitimate
expectations 448
epistemology, justice of 162-6
individual 160, 168
merit and distribution 111-13
order, objective, lack of 168
particularities of community and
self 143
politics and 177
private 160, 168
Moralitdt 178- 9, 185, 187
narratives 13341,145
nation, particular, birth in 95-6
nationalism 196
need, welfare and membership
200-18
'negative'freedom 15-22
neutrality 64, 66, 118
nightwatchman state 100
non-violation of rights 101- 3,
119
Nozick, R. 8-9, 214n
on moral constraints and
distributive justice 100-22
Paine, T. 19
Pareto-optimality 121-2
Parfit,D. 138
patterning 111-18
personal see individual
Petrarch 55
philosophical study of politics
236
Pigou, A.C. 43
Plato 23, 30
pleasure as method of choice
53- 7
pluralism of values 33
Pole, Cardinal R. 146
politics/ political education
219- 38
as empirical activity 221- 2,
224
history 177-99
ideological style of 222- 9
parties 257
styles 224-9
positive freedom 22- 5
poverty 206
preference-utilitarianism 78
privacy 19
Procrustes 32
professional revolutionaries
247- 9
Proudhon, P.-J. 250
provision see welfare
Quixote, Don, as example of
honour concept 152
racial discrimination 74-5
rationality 48- 9
Rawls, J. 4- 5, 8- 9, 119, 205
on right and good 3759
Sandel on 159-75
rectification of injustice 1089
redistribution 69, 207
see also distribution
reflection 166
Reisman, D. 156
remuneration see reward
republic and revolution 239, 241,
243, 258
resources, preservation of 76
revolutionary tradition 239-63
reward and merit 89- 94, 98
right and good contrasted 3759
examples 4853
hedonism as method of choice
53- 7
legitimate expectations and
moral desert 44- 8
related contrasts 39-44
see also good
rights, concept of 101- 3, 153,
157
roles and individual 138
separation of 1256, 143,
154-6
rough equality 65- 6
Index 271
Rousseau, J.-J. 16, 26- 7, 192- 3,
195, 200, 208
rural culture and concept of
honour 151
Russia, revolution 240, 245- 55,
262
Sandel, M.J. 9
on justice and the good 159-76
Snntayana, G. 55
Sartre, J.-P. 126, 136, 143, 146
satisfactions 37
Scanlon, T. 214
Schumpeter, J. 8
Self see individual
separateness 162, 166, 168-171
settings of action 128-9
Shakespeare, W. 17,135
side constraints 1025
Sidgwick, H. 4 0 , 4 3 , 5 4 - 5
Simeon 239
similarity of people 83
simple way of life 76
Sittlichkeit 177-8 1, 184- 5, 188,
190
Skinner, B.E. 129
Smith, A. 19
social
action 31
good 105
laws 30, 34
recognition 200- 18
welfare 39- 41, 200- 18
society see community
Sophocles 153, 179, 187, 260
sovereignty and liberty 2 6 - 9
Soviet Union see Russia
spatial limitations of liberty 255
spectator, impartial 38
'spirit, absolute' 188- 9
state 188- 90
and the good 159- 62
100-1
see also community
Stebbing, L.S. 98
Stephen, J. 21
stories see narrative
structural principle of distributive
justice 109
subjectivity 155-6, 191
'substance' of individuals 155-6,
191
Sumner, W.G. 97
sympathy 38
Tawney, R.H. 32
Taylor, C. 10
on history and politics 177-99
teleology 40- 1, 56- 7, 137
Theseus 260
time-slice principles, current
109-11
Tocqueville, Marquis A. de 17,
28, 190, 197, 245, 248-9
tradition
revolutionary 239- 63
and virtues and unity of human
life 125-48
tragic protagonist 146-7
transfer, of holdings 107-8, 114,
120-1
Trotsky, L. 134
truth 21
ultraminimal state 100-1
unemployment 206
United States
dissatisfaction with 192
liberalism in 6079
revolution 239- 43
welfare state 209- 17
unity of human life, virtues
and tradition 125-48
unpredictability 137
utilitarianism 101-3
American 76, 78
dissatisfaction with 191-3
the good, concept of 101
justice and 37- 59, 160- 1, 168
value 33
merit and 80- 99, 113
Van Fraasen, B.C. 146
272 Index
Vico,G. 138
virtues
choice of 146- 7
legitimate expectations and
44- 8
and unity of human life and
tradition 125- 48
see also good; moral
virtuous society 72- 3
Volksgeist 182, 189
Walzer, M. 10
on welfare, membership and
200- 18
ward system, revolutionary
23963 passim
Weber, M. 152, 168
Weil, S. 202
welfare, membership and need
200- 18
William of Canterbury 134
Zeuxis 236
Zijderveld, A. 158

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