G.R. No.

L-32213 Witnesses to Wills November 26, 1973

Page 1 of 1

AGAPITA N. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY, respondents.
FACTS:
Valente Z. Cruz executed a last will and testament and upon death was allowed
for probate. Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the said decease opposed the
allowance of the will, alleging that the will was executed through fraud, deceit,
misrepresentation and undue influence; that the said instrument was execute without
the testator having been fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what
properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and testament was not
executed in accordance with law. The will was executed in the presence of three
instrumental witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr., Dr. Francisco
Paares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., the last named, is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged.
ISSUE:
Whether the Notary Public acknowledging the will, may be an instrumental
witness in the execution of a will
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The last will and testament in question was not executed in accordance with law.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered
as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having
signed the will. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is to guard against any
illegal or immoral arrangement. That function would be defeated if the notary public
were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. For them he would be interested
sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves him and the validity of his own act.
It would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of acknowledgment,
which is to minimise fraud.
To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses
to the will which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 805 requiring at
least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the
testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to
acknowledge the will. The result would be, only two witnesses appeared before the
notary public for or that purpose. In the circumstances, the law would not be duly in
observed.
G.R. No. L-37453 Witnesses to Wills May 25, 1979
Page 1 of 2

RIZALINA GABRIEL GONZALES, petitioner,
v.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUTGARDA SANTIAGO, respondents.

FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 as a widow and without issue in the
municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the
age of eighty-five (85). Lutgarda Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition
for probate of Isabels will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The
will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a niece of Isabel,
on the following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2. will was not executed and
attested as required by law, 3. the decedent at the time of the making of the will did not
have testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will was procured
through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of
Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court. The petitioner filed a petition for
review with Supreme Court claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the
will of the decedent was executed and attested as required by law when there was
absolutely no proof that the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. Can a witness be considered competent under Articles 820-821 and still not be
considered credible as required by Article. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the witness to a will
has good standing in his/her community or that he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805 requires
something more than just being competent and, therefore, a witness in addition
to being competent under Articles 820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805.
The competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is
determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on
the appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of
the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the
Supreme Court held and ruled that: Competency as a witness is one thing, and
it is another to be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept
what he says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a given
matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to believe
or not to believe his testimony.
2. No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially
or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his
reputation for trustworthiness and for being reliable, his honesty and
uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is
proved otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony may be
believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications
G.R. No. L-37453 Witnesses to Wills May 25, 1979
Page 2 of 2

enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the
soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the
questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his
appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact
that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the
satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under
Article 821 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. L-8774 Witnesses to Wills November 26, 1956
Page 1 of 1

In the matter of the testate estate of the deceased JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO.
EMILIANA MOLO-PECKSON and PILAR PEREZ-NABLE, Petitioners-Appellees, v. ENRIQUE
TANCHUCO, FAUSTINO GOMEZ, ET AL., Oppositors-Appellants.
EN BANC
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Facts:
Mariano Molo and Juana Juan was a couple possessed of much worldly wealth,
but unfortunately, not blessed with children. To fill the void in their marital life, they
took into their home and custody two baby girls, raising them from infancy, treating
them as their own daughters, sending them to school, and later to the best and
exclusive centres of higher learning, until they both graduated, one in pharmacy, and
the other in law and these two fortunate girls, now grown up women and married.
Mariano Molo died in January, 1941, and by will bequeathed all his estate to his
wife. Juana, his widow, died on May 28, 1950, leaving no forced heirs but only collateral,
children and grandchildren of her sisters. She left considerable property worth
around a million pesos or more, and to dispose of the same, she was supposed to have
executed on May 11, 1948, about two years before her death, a document purporting to
be her last will and testament, wherein she bequeathed the bulk of her property to her
two foster children, Emiliana and Pilar. These two foster daughters, as Petitioners,
presented the document for probate in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The other
relatives, filed opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that the instrument in
question was not the last will and testament of Juana. Oppositors in their printed
memorandum contend that under Section 618 of Act 190, the Old Code of Civil
Procedure, which requires that a will should be attested or subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses, two of the attesting witnesses to the will in question, who were
employed as pharmacist and salesgirl, respectively, in the drugstore of Pilar, one of
beneficiaries in the will, may not be considered credible witnesses for the reason that as
such employees, they would naturally testify in favour of their employer.
Issue:
Whether or not the witnesses who are salesgirls and employees of one of the
beneficiaries can be credible witnesses to a will.
Held:
The Supreme Court finds the contention untenable. Section 620 of the same
Code of Civil Procedure provides that any person of sound mind, and of the age of
eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf, or dumb and able to read and write, may
be a witness to the execution of a will. This same provision is reproduced in our New
Civil Code of 1950, under Art. 820. The relation of employer and employee, or being a
relative to the beneficiary in a will, does not disqualify one to be a witness to a will. The
main qualification of a witness in the attestation of wills, if other qualifications as to age,
mental capacity and literacy are present, is that said witness must be credible, that is to
say, his testimony may be entitled to credence.
G.R. No. L-2538 Revocation by Subsequent Will or Codicil September 21, 1951
Page 1 of 1

Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE
MOLO, petitioner-appellee,
v.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
Juana Juan Vda. de Molo sought the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However,
upon petition filed by the respondents, the order of the court admitting the will to
probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties
presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the probate of said will
on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed in
accordance with law.
Petitioner filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on August 17, 1918. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the
petition based on three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the
probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner
required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked. But before the
second petition could be heard, the battle for liberation came and the records of the
case were destroyed. Consequently, a petition for reconstitution was filed, but the same
was found to be impossible because neither petitioner nor oppositors could produce the
copies required for its reconstitution. As a result, petitioner filed a new petition similar
to the one destroyed, to which the oppositors filed an opposition based on the same
grounds as those contained in their former opposition.
The court issued an order admitting the will to probate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will of the deceased
which was denied probate is valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior will of
1918.
HELD:
It is void. Even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the
testator could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court,
such destruction cannot have the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of
the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief that the will of 1939 has been validly
executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which this principle is
predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is
clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasions and instituted
his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of
dying testate.


G.R. No. L-11823 Revocation by Subsequent Will or Codicil February 11, 1918
Page 1 of 2

CRISTINA SAMSON, DELFINA NAVAL, and SOR CONSOLACION EUGENIO, petitioners-
appellants,
v.
MONICA NAVAL, ROSA NAVAL, and CELESTINA NAVAL, objectors-appellants.
EN BANC
Araullo, J.:
Facts:
On September 20, 1915, Attorney Perfecto Gabriel presented in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance as the will of Simeona F. Naval, who
died in said city two days previously, a document executed by her of February 13, 1915,
and in which he was appointed executor. It was denied on the ground that said
document was not duly executed by the deceased as her last will and testament,
inasmuch as she did not sign it in the presence of three witness and the two witnesses
did not sign it in the presence of each other. Thereafter the nieces and legatees of the
same deceased filed in the same court for allowance as her will, another document
executed by her on October 31, 1914. The petition for allowance was opposed by
Monica Naval, Rosa Naval, and Cristina Naval on the ground that the will, the allowance
of which is asked, could not be allowed, because of the existence of another will of
subsequent date, executed during her lifetime by the same Simeona F. Naval, and
because said will has been revoked by another executed subsequently by her during her
lifetime. The probate court on February 8, 1916, issued an order, admitting said second
document and ordering its allowance as the last will and testament of said deceased.
The oppositors then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court averring among other things
that the will executed on October 31, 1914 was revoked by the will executed on
February 13, 1915 and as such the latter could not transmit real and personal property.
Issue:
Whether or not the will that was executed on October 31, 1914 was revoked by
the will executed on February 13, 1915.
Held:
The trial court declared that the first document presented by the executor of the
deceased, Simeona F. Naval, as a will executed by her on February 13, 1915, could not
be allowed, on the ground that it was not executed with the requisites and formalities
prescribed by law. Article 739 of the Civil Code provides that a former will is by
operation of law revoked by another valid subsequent will, if the testator does not state
in the later will his desire that the former should subsist wholly or partly. In harmony
with this provision of substantive law, we find section 623 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides that no will shall be revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise
than by some will, codicil, or other writing executed as provided in case of wills.
Therefore, according to the legal provisions, in order that the will of February 13,
1915, that is, the first document presented as the will of the deceased Simeona F. Naval,
could have the effect of revoking that which was presented afterwards by the
G.R. No. L-11823 Revocation by Subsequent Will or Codicil February 11, 1918
Page 2 of 2

petitioners as executed by the same deceased on October 31, 1914, that is, on a date
previous to the execution of the first, it was necessary and indispensable that the later
will, that is, that first presented for allowance, should be perfect or valid, that it,
executed as provided by lay in case of wills.
It also appears from the record that the opponents themselves maintained that
said later will, that is, that of February 13, 1915, was not perfect, or executed as
provided by law in case of wills, and the Court of First Instance of Manila has so held in
disallowing said documents as the will of the deceased. So that it very evident that the
second will presented, that is, that of October 31, 1914, was not and could not have
been revoked by the first, and the court was not in error in so holding in the order
appealed from. We deem it unnecessary to add a single word mere or cite well-known
doctrines and opinions of jurists in support of what has already been stated.
G.R. No. 17857 Revocation by Subsequent Will or Codicil June 12, 1922
Page 1 of 2

Unson v. Abella, et. al.
VILLAMOR, J.:
FACTS:
Pedro Unson, executor of Dona Josefa Zalameas last will, filed a petition for the
probate of the will of the latter. Attached on the said will is an inventory of all the
properties of Dona Josefa.
Opposition was made thereto by Antonio, Ignacia and Avivencia Abella
and Santiago Vito on the ff. grounds:-will is not paged correlatively in letters rather it is
in Arabic numerals- There is no attestation clause in the inventory attached to the will-
Will was not signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other.
Note: only the two witnesses namely Gonzalo Avaya and Eugenio Zalamea testified as
to the authenticity of the will. The third witness, Pedro de Jesus, was not
presented because he was hostile with Unson and has been meeting with the
oppositors since the filing of the petition for the probate of the will of Josefa.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid?
HELD: YES!
1. As to the paging of the will, the SC cited the case of Aldaba v. Roque. Thus:
It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance
with the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods
indicates the correlation of the pages and serves to prevent the abstraction of
any of them. In the course of the decision, we said: "It might be said that the
object of the law in requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make
falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages
of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses,
the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In other
words the more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B,
C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signatures.
2. The inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it so the
inventory need not have an additional attestation clause at the end.
3. The actuation of the proponents in NOT bringing to court Pedro de Jesus does
not render the will invalid. As announced in Cabang vs. Delfinado, the general
rule is that, where opposition is made to the probate of a will, the
attesting witnesses must be produced.
Exceptions:
a. when a wi t ness i s dead, or
b. cannot be served with process of the court, or
c. his reputation for truth has been questioned or
d. He appears hostile to the cause of the proponent.
In the aforementioned cases, the will may be admitted to probate
without the testimony of said witness, if, upon the other proofs adduced in the case,
the court is satisfied that the will has been duly executed. But supposing that de Jesus,
when cited, had testified adversely to the application, this would not by itself have
change the result reached by the court a quo, f or section 632 of the Code of Civil
G.R. No. 17857 Revocation by Subsequent Will or Codicil June 12, 1922
Page 2 of 2

Procedure provides that a will can be admitted to probate, notwithstanding that
one or more witnesses do not remember having attested it, provided the court is
satisfied upon the evidence adduced that the will has been executed and signed in the
manner prescribed by the law.

G.R. No. 6845 Revocation by Subsequent Will or Codicil September 1, 1914
Page 1 of 1

YAP TUA, petitioner-appellee,
v.
YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN, objectors-appellants.
FACTS:
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong executed a last will and testament on the 6
th
day of
August with all the formalities required by law. However, a subsequent will was
executed by the testator on the 11
th
day of August, 1909 before her death. The will was
signed by the deceased, as well as Anselmo Zacarias, Severo Tabora, and Timoteo Paez.
Objectors to the alleged nullity of the will as the testator had already executed a prior
will with all the formalities required by law on the 6
th
day of August 1909
ISSUE:
Whether the prior will was revoked by the subsequent will.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong executed the will of August 6, 1909 as several
witnesses testified to that fact. The fact, however, that she executed a former will is no
proof that she did not execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to dispose of
her property, in accordance with the provisions of law, up to the very last of moment
her life. She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or revoke any and all of her
former wills and to make a new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to
expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the charge that she did not make
the new will. The execution of subsequent will executed on August 11, 1909 validly
revokes the prior will executed on the 6
th
day of August.
G.R. No. L-40207 By Mutilation September 28, 1984
Page 1 of 1

ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,
v.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI,
Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.

FACTS:
On September 1, 1971, private respondent Gregorio K. Kalaw, claiming to be the
sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition for probate of her
holographic will executed on December 24, 1968.
The holographic will, as first written, named Rosa K. Kalaw, a sister of the
testatrix as her sole heir. Hence, petitioner Rosa K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging that
the holographic will contained alterations, corrections, insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil
Code.
Rosas position was that the holographic will, as first written, should be given
effect and probated so that she could be the sole heir.
The trial court denied probate. The court adjudged based on the NBI report that
the handwriting, the signature, the insertions and/or additions and the initial were
made by one and the same person. It was the handwriting of the decedent. However,
since the alterations and/or insertions or additions were not authenticated by the full
signature of the testatrix based on Article 814 of the Civil Code, the court denied the will
to be probated.
Gregorio moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, Rosa filed
a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature
of the testatrix, should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
HELD:
NO. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations
made by the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the
will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one
substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another,
but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full
signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for
nothing remains in the will after that which could remain valid. To state that the will as
first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to
authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.

G.R. No. L-26317 Revocation by Mutilation January 29, 1927
Page 1 of 2

Estate of Miguel Mamuyac, deceased.
FRANCISCO GAGO, petitioner-appellant,
v.
CORNELIO MAMUYAC, AMBROSIO LARIOSA,
FELICIANA BAUZON, and CATALINA MAMUYAC, opponents-appellees.
Nicanor Tavora for appellant.
Jose Rivera for appellees.
JOHNSON, J.:
Facts:
Miguel Mamuyac, died on the 2
nd
day of January, 1922, in the municipality of
Agoo of the Province of La Union. On or about the 27th day of July, 1918, the said
Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament. In the month of January, 1922, the
said Francisco Gago presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
La Union for the probation of that will. The probation of the same was opposed by
Cornelio Mamuyac, Ambrosio Lariosa, Feliciana Bauzon, and Catalina Mamuyac. The
probate court denied the probate of said will upon the ground that the deceased had on
the 16
th
day of April, 1919, executed a new will and testament. Fransisco filed another
petition for the probate of the will executed on the 16
th
day of April, 1919. Said will was
opposed by the same oppositors alleging that that the said will is a copy of the second
will and testament executed by the said Miguel Mamuyac and that the same had been
cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of Miguel Mamuyac. After examining the
evidence adduced, the probate court denied the petition because of the fact that it was
cancelled and revoked in the year 1920.
Issue:
Whether or not the will executed in 1919 was revoked.
Held:
The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancelation of a will
to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or
cancelation of wills. The fact that such cancelation or revocation has taken place must
either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the
original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have
been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The
same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will
and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been
destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The
force of the presumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying
greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but
may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to
revoke it.
G.R. No. L-26317 Revocation by Mutilation January 29, 1927
Page 2 of 2

Having proved its execution by the proponents, the burden is on the contestant
to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which wills are
destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancelation
or destruction and all evidence of its cancelation perish with the testator. Copies of
wills should be admitted by the courts with great caution. When it is proven, however,
by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was executed
with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be
admitted in evidence when it is made to appear that the original has been lost and was
not cancelled or destroyed by the testator.