Spouses Laperal vs Spouses Katigbak : Article 109

GR 16991, March 31, 1964

FACTS:

CFI Manila declared the property covered by TCT No.57626 as separate or paraphernal property of
Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak. The spouses Laperal disagree with this finding reiterating that its improvements
and income are conjugal assets of the Spouses Katigbak.

When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought properties unto the marriage.
Ramons occupation rendered him a monthly income of P200.00. The property in question was
registered in the name of Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak married to Ramon Katigbak. The latter declared that
her mother was the one who bought the property for her and had placed it only in her name as the
practice of her mother in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her children. The
husband having no interest with the property only signed the document for the purpose of assisting his
wife.

In August 1950, the Laperals filed a case and was granted by the trial court against the Katigbaks in
recovery of P14,000 and jewelry amounting to P97,500 or in lieu thereof, to pay such amount. A month
after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her husband for judicial separation of
property and separate administration which was granted by the court and was sought for annulment by
the Laperals.

ISSUE: WON the property in question constitutes the paraphernal property of Evelina.

HELD:

All properties acquired during the marriage are presumed conjugal. It is however not conclusive but
merely rebuttable, unless it be proved that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In
the case at bar, the deed of the land is under the name of the wife. At the time it was purchased, the
property was of substantial value and as admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to
buy considering the singular source of income.

Hence, the property covered by TCT 57626 is considered a paraphernal property of the wife.








Villanueva vs. IAC (GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987) : Article 109

FACTS: Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro,
Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as
collateral their fathers property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absolute
co-owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage in 1977 and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the
Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land
unto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when
the mortgagors failed to redeem it within the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of
Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name.
In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondents
spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases,
and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in
1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to
Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victorias shares from the conjugal
partnership property; and second Modestos interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as
his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint,
declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise affirmed the
lower courts decision.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria who
rendered the lot as conjugal property.
HELD:The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto. It was Modestos
exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of
Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by
will of otherwise to Consolacion.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on the
separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry
of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the
partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership,
but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of the making or
construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used thereof in order to determine the
character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately.
What is certain is that the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of
Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no
showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs exclusively to
said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in character.
Furthermore, Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the property appears in all respect to be
regular, untainted by any defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired
indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently
arising and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and ventilation.
BPI vs. Posadas: Article 115 - 116
GR No. 34583, October 22, 1931

FACTS:

BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila absolving
defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in recovering the
inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under
protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy of the deceased.

Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living in
Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will in March
1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The deceased possessed not
only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal property consisting of shares of stocks in
19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila
on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch.
In the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification.
Rosario is the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedents estate and
attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax, paid
under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to refund such
amount.

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.

HELD:

SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the
premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half
to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the premiums were paid partly with
paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part
and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the
beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said
estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the
matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in
these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon the
amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.




Wong vs. IAC ; Article 115 - 116
GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991

FACTS:

Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during the early
years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During the marriage or
on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan
where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return
the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in
September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan
and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband
Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of
the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name
of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito
Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an
action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the
conjugal property.

HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with Anita. The
husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized her to enter into
such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear proof where the
husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong in the conjugal
partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the husband and even though
they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases
things necessary for support of the family. The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and
the execution of judgments extends only over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The
conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without
the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no
evidence submitted that the administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as
Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against
Katrina, personally and exclusively.





Ayala Investments vs CA; Article 121-122
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security
agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally answerable with
PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and
Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution.
Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon respondent
spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses
filed injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the
said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for
the scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued
to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.

HELD: The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted
the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and
separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said
corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is only
to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given to
another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety orguarantor, that contract cannot, by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not
for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of
PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a
business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which
was clearly for the benefit of PBM.

The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of
shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must
be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off of the loan itself.



Carlos vs. Abelardo; Article 121-122
GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002

FACTS:

Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the $25,000 loan
used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner
issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The
seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the petitioner inquired
from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded that they were not yet in
position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the
extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal demand
but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than
a year prior the filing of the complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that
the amount was never intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the
construction firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the
profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts
decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the
owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife
executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.

ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the conjugal
partnership.

HELD:

Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as their
conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally liable in the
payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction
firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will entitle him to
the profits and income of the company.

Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of $25,000
plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.