1 Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Facts: The provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake
for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of
the revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the vicinities of the townships of Naujan and Pola
and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubis place in
Calapan are directed to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. It is alleged that the Mangyanes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.

Issue: Whether Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty of abode and is
therefore unconstitutional

Held:
No. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without
due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The
court further ruled that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police
power and thus constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of
civilization of the. Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems
to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.
The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit
the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.



Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of
cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. These
reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of
land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the
Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and
placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus
was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of
the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In
this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board, was challenged


xxxx Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho xxxx

FACTS:
This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being employed or engage or participate
in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or
casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit
fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition
to stop the enforcement of such ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court
rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

HELD:
Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal
protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from
the City Mayor who may withhold or refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of
the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a
State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.

Pao Ho is a Chinese national employed in the City of Manila. On 27 March 1968, then Manila
Mayor Antonio Villegas signed Ordinance No. 6537. The said ordinance prohibits foreign nationals to
be employed within the City of Manila without first securing a permit from the Mayor of Manila. The
permit will cost them P50.00. Pao Ho, on 04 May 1968 filed a petition for prohibition against the said
Ordinance alleging that as a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-
useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the
cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the
Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers. Judge
Arca of Manila CFI ruled in favor of Pao Ho and he declared the Ordinance as being null and void.

ISSUE: Whether or not there a violation of equal protection by virtue Ord 6537.

HELD: The decision of Judge Arca is affirmed. Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion
or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. Hence an undue delegation of
power.
Further, the P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails
to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay
it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification, should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
collected from every employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or
whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive. Requiring a person before he can be
employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is
tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and
equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.


E002 Estrada vs Sandiganbayan

WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are
subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended
information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements
of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms
combination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague
and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the
statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected
speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of other may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.


Facts:
Petitioner calls for the Court to subject RA 7080(An Act defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) to
the crucible of constitutionality for reasons that the act:
is vague
dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code
Issue:
Is the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being vague?

Does the Plunder law require less evidence proving the predicate crimes of plunder thus violates
the rights of the accused to due process (specifically Section 4 proposing that "it shall not be
necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of over or criminal acts inidcative of the overall lawful scheme or
conspiracy)?

Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum(therefore does not require that
the mind of the offender be guilty to be penalized) and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it

Ruling:
Petitioner has miserably failed to show that the Plunder Law is unconstitutional due to its
vagueness.

- "...the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently
explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and
prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity."

- "...the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. Criminal statutes on the other hand cannot be a
party to such a rule.
- "One to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional"

Petitioner's stand that the statute(specifically Sec.4) evades the mandatory element of the
prosecution in criminal law to prove beyond reasonable doubt the acts constituting plunder is
turned down by the court.

SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary
to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.

- What needs proof is only the "number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
which should constitute a patter and involving an amount of at least P50, 000,000". Proof to
each and every other act is not needed.

- "...we do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
"pattern" is not one of them."

- "...because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a
substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4."

- Also there is a separability clause in the act holding that if any provision in the act is held
invalid, the remaining provisions of the act shall not be affected. "All the provisions thereof
should be accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the
objects of the statute can be best achieved."

Court believes that plunder is mala in se.

- "...it is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was
committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part
of petitioner."

- The punishment for plunder, which is by reclusion perpetua to death, may be deemed as a
resolution to any doubts whether the crime of plunder is mala in se.

- Acts that are inherently immoral or inherently wrong are mala in se , and does not matter
that such acts are punished by special laws.

Court declares that RA 7659 as constitutionally valid. Petition denied for lack of merit.


xxxx Ong vs Sandiganbayan xxxx


xxxx David vs Macapagal-Arroyo

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO
5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the
government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked
all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of
their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his
arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and
they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news
agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His
arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist.
David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual
basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such
declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected
rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP
1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents
calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is
still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP.
Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part
and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO
5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed
narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day,
the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the
Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented
nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what
she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their
faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of
speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless
violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that
reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered
harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP
1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the
Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that
GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a
sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power,
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And
such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2
nd
sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however
violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is
vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders
and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision
is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP
1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority
to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1,
Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial
Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or
enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as
the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion.
The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of
emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from
Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a
valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.


E003 Tanada vs Tuvera
FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders,
invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is necessary before
its enforcement.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does
not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within
this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

xxxx Philippine International Trading Corporation vs Angeles

PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for
importation from the Peoples Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export
program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from
China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative
order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in
which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court
contends further authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules
and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987.
Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not PITCs Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is
invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which
states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO
under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is
punitive in character.


xxxx Republic of the Philippines vs Express Telecommunication Co. Inc.

Facts:
On 29 December 1992, the International Communications Corporation (now Bayan
Telecommunications,Inc. or Bayantel) filed an application with the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN, NTC Case 92-486) to
install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for
a Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter, or on 22 January1993, the NTC issued Memorandum
Circular 4-1-93 directing all interested applicants for nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective
applications before the Commission on or before 15 February 1993, and deferring the acceptance of any
application filed after said date until further orders. On 6 May 1993, and prior to the issuance of any
notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantels original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-
parte motion to admit an amended application. On 17 May 1993, the notice of hearing issued by
the NTC with respect to this amended application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the
application as well as the notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings
were conducted on the amended application. But before Bayantel could complete the presentation
of its evidence, the NTC issued an Order dated 19 December1993 stating that in view of the recent grant
of 2 separate Provisional Authorities in favor of ISLACOM and GMCR, Inc., which resulted in the closing
out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by Bayantel, and in order that the case
may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, the case was ordered archived without
prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. On 17 May
1999,Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency bands for
CMTS operators. On 1 February 2000, the NTC granted BayanTels motion to revive the latters
application and set the case for hearings on February 9, 10, 15, 17 and 22, 2000. The NTC noted that the
application was ordered archived without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite
frequency shall become available. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc. (Extelcom) filed in NTC Case 92-
486 an Opposition (With Motion to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of Bayantels application; arguing
that Bayantels motion sought the revival of an archived application filed almost 8 years ago, and thus,
the documentary evidence and the allegations of Bayantel in said application are all out dated and
should no longer be used as basis of the necessity for the proposed CMTS service. On 3 May 2000, the
NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate CMTS service,
applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure. Extelcom filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition (CA-GR SP 58893), seeking the annulment of the
Order reviving the application of Bayantel, the Order granting Bayantel a provisional authority
to construct, install, operate and maintain a nationwide CMTS, and Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000
allocating frequency bands to new public telecommunication entities which are authorized to install,
operate and maintain CMTS. On 13 September 2000,the Court of Appeals granted the writs of certiorari
and prohibition prayed for, annulling and setting aside the NTC orders dated 1 February and 3 May 2000
in NTC Case 92-486, dismissing Bayantels Amended Application without prejudice to the filing of a new
CMTS application. Bayantel and the NTC, the latter being represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. On the other hand, Extelcom
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that NTC Memorandum Circular 9-3-2000 be also
declared null and void. On 9 February 2001, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution denying all of the
motions for reconsideration of the parties for lack of merit. Hence, the NTC and Bayantel filed their
petitions for review on certiorari (GR 147096, and GR 147210 respectively). In the present petition,
Extelcom contends, among others, that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules which were filed
with the Office of the National Administrative Register on 3 February 1993. These Revised Rules deleted
the phrase on its own initiative; accordingly, a
provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of the proper motion before the Commission. The
NTC, on theother hand, issued a certification to the effect that inasmuch as the 1993 Revised Rules have
not been published ina newspaper of general circulation, the NTC has been applying the 1978 Rules.

Issue:
Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the approval of
Bayantels application.

Held:
The absence of publication, coupled with the certification by the Commissioner of the NTC
stating that the NTC was still governed by the 1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 Revised Rules
have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. The fact that the
1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is
nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law
Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. The National Administrative Register is
merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all
appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and
to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.

Still,publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine
qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC, which
implements Section 29 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146, as amended), fall
squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Taada v. Tuvera.
Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.

The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should
be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect.
Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their publication
in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules
that governs


E004 Garcillano vs House of Representatives Committees on Public Information

Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the
conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional
director, regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his
senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house of representative
investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such
playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping
law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be prevented from further
conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper publication of the senate
rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.

Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further
proceed with their investigation?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be
the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set
forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines."

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by
arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in
booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web
page.

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the
Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any
distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional
mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages
and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of
the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases.
The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused
the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."

Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the
reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental
Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a
persons life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the
senate that they already published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or
the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not
conforme with what the constitution propounded. In this regard the high court granted the petition for
injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.


E005 El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs Palanca

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt.
His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure
of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property.
Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El
Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper.
The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to
Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years
thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of
the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the
summons.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.

HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been
met. The requisites are;

1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter
before it.
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of
the proceedings.
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.


E006 People of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed a criminal case against Cristita Reyes, Rogen Doctora, Johny Santos, and Antonio
Alegro; and another separate case against a certain Jane Go for killing her husband, Dominador, before
the Tacloban RTC. The accused in those criminal cases had failed to file their complaints. As for Santos
and Alegro they were already in prison when they were served notices. Petitioner complained that
Judge Pedro Espina who handled these cases is not impartial as he enjoined the preliminary
investigation sought to be conducted by the prosecutor against Jane Go.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of the state has been violated.

HELD: The SC saw it deem to decide over the case without a reply from the accused for waiting for
replies would just cause further delay to the case. On of the essential requirements of procedural due
process in a judicial proceeding is that there must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial
power to hear and determine the matter before it. Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out
by the Solicitor General, cannot be considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial
judge as to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of
his previous decision in Special Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary
investigation at the Regional State Prosecutors Office level against herein respondent Jane Go, the
principal accused in the killing of her husband Dominador Go. Judge Espinas decision in favor of
respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the prosecution to seriously doubt his
impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have been more prudent for Judge Espina to
have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal cases.


E007 Tabuena vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
Then Pr es . Fer di nand Mar c os i ns t r uc t ed L ui s Tabuena, Gener al Manager of t he
Mani l a International Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to pay directly to the
presidents office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction
Corp. The verbal instruction was reiterated in a Presidential memorandum. In obedience to Pres.
Marcos instruction, Tabuena, with the hel p of Gerardo Dabao
andA d o l f o P e r a l t a , t h e A s s t . G e n . Mg r . a n d t h e A c t i n g F i n a n c e S e r v i c e
s Mg r . o f MI A A , r es pec t i vel y , c aus ed t he r el eas e of P55M of MI AA f unds of t h
r ee ( 3) wi t hdr awal s and delivered the money to Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, private secretary of
Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. Later, it
turned out that PNCCnever received the money. The case involves two (2) separate petitions for
review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta. They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision convicting them of
malversation of MIAA funds in the amount of
P55M.Fur t her , pet i t i oner s c l ai med t hat t hey wer e c har ged wi t h i nt ent i onal mal
ver s at i on, as al l eged i n t he amended i nf or mat i on, but
i t woul d appear t hat t hey wer e c onv i c t ed f or malversation with negligence. Hence, their
conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their constitutional right to be informed of the
accusation.

ISSUE:
( 1 ) Wh e t h e r o r n o t t h e S a n d i g a n b a y a n c o n v i c t e d t h e m o f a c r i me
n o t c h a r g e d i n t h e amended information; and
( 2 ) Wh e t h e r o r n o t T a b u e n a a n d P e r a l t a a c t e d i n g o o d f a i t h .

HELD:
( 1 ) No . Ma l v e r s a t i o n i s c o mmi t t e d e i t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r b y
n e g l i g e n c e . T h e dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of
the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is
involved.

( 2 ) Y e s . T a b u e n a a c t e d i n s t r i c t c o mp l i a n c e wi t h t h e MA R C OS
Me mo r a n d u m. T h e o r d e r emanated from the Office of the President and bears the
signature of the Presi dent himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the
presumption that it was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no
law makes the payment of an obl igation il legal . This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for
its execution constrains one to act swiftly without question. However, a more compelling reason
for the ACQUITTAL is the violation of the accused's basic constitutional ri ght to due
process. Records show that the Sandi ganbayan actively t ook par t i n t he
ques t i oni ng of a def ens e wi t nes s and of t he ac c us ed t hems el ves .
Theq u e s t i o n s o f t h e c o u r t we r e i n t h e n a t u r e o f c r o s s e x a mi n a t i o n s
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena and Peralta may not have
raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court to consider
such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the
whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as
may be found i n the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject
of assignments of error or not. The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge " requirement of due process
was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness,
assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. Time and again the Court has declared that due
process requires no less than the cold neutral ity of an impartial j udge. That the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that
hi s dec i s i on wi l l be j us t . The par t i es ar e ent i t l ed t o no l es s t han t hi s ,
as a mi ni mum guaranty of due process.
HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.


xxxx Roxas vs Vasquez

FACTS: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards
Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids
for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee voted to award the
contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract was executed
between PC-INP and Tahei Co.
The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicated on the
disbursement voucher and the purchase order.
Consequently, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against the
respondents.
After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended the
indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the complaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal
charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea
and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information.
Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the
same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil
and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused violated their right to due process.

HELD: YES. It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason,
there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be
parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted,
without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not
be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their right to due
process.
Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special
Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of law requires
that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend
himself in person at every stage of the proceedings.

E00C Budiongan vs dela Cruz

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Memorandum[1]
dated April 28, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, recommending
that petitioners be charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and petitioner
Pedro E. Budiongan with violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019. Also assailed is the Resolution[2]
dated October 19, 2005 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, series of 2001, the Municipality of Carmen, Bohol
appropriated the amount of P450,000.00 for the purchase of a road roller for the municipality.
However, on November 16, 2001, the Municipal Development Council through Resolution No. 3
recommended that the amount of P450,000.00 be realigned and used for the asphalt laying of a portion
of the Tan Modesto Bernaldez Street.[3] The proposed realignment was included in the December 21,
2001 agenda of the Sangguniang Bayan of Carmen but discussion thereon was deferred.
On February 6, 2002, petitioner Municipal Treasurer, Fulgencio V. Paa, issued a Certificate of
Availability of Funds for the project. Thereafter, the Office of the Municipal Engineer prepared a
Program of Works and Cost Estimates duly noted/approved by Municipal Budget Officer Taciana B.
Espejo and Mayor Budiongan.
Bidding was conducted on March 5, 2002. The next day, March 6, 2002, Mayor Budiongan issued
the Notice of Award and Notice to Commence Work in favor of Herbert Malmis General Merchandise
and Contractor, Inc. who emerged as the lowest complying bidder. On March 22, 2002, the Sangguniang
Bayan passed Resolution No. 60,[4] series of 2002, authorizing Mayor Budiongan to sign and enter into
contract with Malmis relative to the above project in the amount of P339,808.00. With such authority,
Malmis commenced with the project.
Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no ordinance approving the realignment of the
funds. Thus, on May 17, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Ordinance No. 8,[5] series of 2002,
approving the realignment of the fund. On June 14, 2002, Malmis was paid the contract price.
On July 3, 2002, private respondents Arlene P. Palgan and Valeriano U. Nadala filed a complaint[6]
against the petitioners before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the
conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence work since there was no fund appropriated for
the purpose.
On July 31, 2003, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found probable cause and
recommended the filing of an information for violation of Article 220[7] of the Revised Penal Code
against the petitioners. However, the complaint against Hermosila Logrono, Desiderio Gudia, Jr. and
Herbert Malmis was dismissed for lack of merit.[8]
Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum dated April 28, 2004, modifying the charge from violation
of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code to (1) violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against
petitioners for allegedly giving unwarranted benefit to Malmis and (2) violation of Section 3(h) of R.A.
No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan for allegedly directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary
interest in a contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity.
Thus, two separate Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against the petitioners docketed as Criminal Case No. 28075 and (2) for violation of
Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan docketed as Criminal Case No. 28076.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash[9] the information charging them with violation
of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In a Resolution[10] dated June 10, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the
motion to quash and remanded Criminal Case No. 28075 to the Office of the Ombudsman for
amendment of the Information. It held that although Malmis benefited from the contract, the same is
not unwarranted considering that the project was implemented, executed and completed.
On June 27, 2005, an Amended Information[11] was filed charging petitioners with violation of
Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, alleging that petitioners, by prematurely awarding to Malmis the project
despite the absence of funds specifically appropriated for such purpose, and thereafter paying the
contract price from the Municipal Treasury which was originally appropriated for the purchase of a road
roller, caused damage and undue injury to the government.
Finding that the Amended Information contains all the material averments necessary to make
out a case for the first mode of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, i.e., causing any undue injury to
any party, including the government, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information in its
Resolution dated August 18, 2005.[12]
On even date, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion
for Reinvestigation[13] arguing that the above Informations were filed without affording them the
opportunity to file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the modified charges. On September 20, 2005,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution[14] denying the motion insofar as Criminal Case No. 28076 is
concerned. It held that it is too late in the day to remand the case for reinvestigation considering that
Budiongan had already been arraigned and the case had long been set for pre-trial proceedings, with
both parties having filed their respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case No. 28075, the Sandiganbayan
noted that although the conduct of the preliminary investigation was regular, petitioners however were
not given the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the modified charges. Thus, it granted leave to the
petitioners to file with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration (not a motion
for reinvestigation) of the said offices Memorandum dated April 28, 2004.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Special Prosecutor which was
denied for lack of merit in the Resolution dated October 19, 2005.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN REJECTING THE FINDINGS AND AMENDING/MODIFYING THE
RESOLUTION OF THE GRAFT INVESTIGATING OFFICER, OMBUDSMAN VISAYAS, AND IN FILING THE
INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF RA 3019 WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONERS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THEIR COUNTER EVIDENCE IN A RE-INVESTIGATION;
II. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO CONDUCT A RE-INVESTIGATION HAS VIOLATED
PETITIONERS' RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS;
III. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING RESOLUTIONS DATED APRIL 28, 2004 AND OCTOBER
19, 2005 FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 3(e) OF RA 3019 AGAINST HEREIN
PETITIONERS; and
IV. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FILING THE INFORMATION FOR VIOLATION OF SEC.3(e) OF RA
3019 AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN DOCKETED AS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28075.

Petitioners maintain that the modification of the charge from violation of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019 denied their rights to due
process since they were not given the opportunity to answer and present evidence on the new charge
in a preliminary investigation. Furthermore, the petitioners argue that public respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged
resolutions finding probable cause for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
The petition lacks merit.
The right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred
by statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the Information or
otherwise render the same defective. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the Information.[15] If absence of a preliminary investigation does not
render the Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, then the denial of a
motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction
over the case.
Petitioners were not deprived of due process because they were afforded the opportunity to
refute the charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The modification of the offense charged did not
come as a surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the same set of facts and the same
alleged illegal acts. Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered evidence nor impute
commission of grave errors or serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to warrant a
reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.[16] Thus, the modification of the offense charged, even
without affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation, did not amount to a violation of their
rights.
Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.[17] Petitioner Budiongan was
arraigned in Criminal Case No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned together with the rest
of the petitioners under the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on December 2, 2005.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.[18] A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. [19]
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral component of the Ombudsman and is under
the latters supervision and control. Thus, whatever course of action that the Ombudsman may take,
whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an
exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate. Generally, courts should not
interfere in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the
Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is clear
showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Ombudsman.[20] Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer
authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule must defer to
said officers finding and determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of
probable cause is the function of the prosecutor.[21]
In fine, certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Office of the Special Prosecutor's resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration since there is nothing to substantiate petitioners claim that it
gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case.[22]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman, dated April 28, 2004
finding probable cause that petitioners violated Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 and the
Resolution dated October 19, 2005 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

E00D Summary Dismissal Board vs Torcita

FACTS: Respondent was charged with 12 administrative complaints which were consolidated into one
major complaint, which is, conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board
suspended respondent from service for 20 days, for simple irregularity in the performance of
service. The Board later found respondent to have committed a breach of internal discipline by taking
alcoholic drinks while on duty.

HELD: Respondent was entitled to know that he was being charged with being drunk while in the
performance of duty. Although he was given the opportunity to be heard on the multiple and broad
charges filed against him, the absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found
guilty is not a proper observance of due process.


E00E People vs Estrada



xxxx Secretary of Justice vs Lantion
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the
Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note
Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the
United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to
handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the
U.S Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have
received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of
Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present
the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.

ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments ironclad duties
under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provision of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the extradition request and
its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no
further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed
that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international
law in observance of the incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by
the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly
bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply
the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogate priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty.
In states where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
E00F Secretary of Justice vs Lantion
E010 Marohombsar vs Judge Adiong


E011 De Bisschop vs Galang

FACTS: Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen, was allowed to stay in this country
for three years, expiring 1 August 1959, as the prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of
which he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of
Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July 1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of
Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a
gambling front than the enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that it purports to be,
and that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded payment of his income tax, the Commissioner of
Immigration advised him that his application for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been
denied by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within 5 days.
To forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop
filed the present case on 18 September 1959. Pending resolution of the main case for prohibition, a writ
of preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte by the court a quo on the same day ordering herein
respondent-appellant to desist from arresting and detaining petitioner-appellee unless and until proper
and legal proceedings are conducted by the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration in
connection with the Application for extension of stay filed by petitioner with said Board.
Appellant Commissioner raises two main issues: That the lower court erred (a) in holding that
the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearings on all applications for
extension of stay of aliens, and (b) in ruling that said Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written
decisions in such cases.

ISSUE: Whether the right to a notice and hearing in certain administrative proceedings is essential to
due process?

HELD: No. The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the
Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the
immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to
uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of
immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may
warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause if we
take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop
to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as
alleged in paragraph 7 of appellants answer to the complaint, the requirement to leave before the
start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the
State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. In Cornejo vs. Gabriel and Provincial Board of
Rizal, it was held that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. The fact
should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial
proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law, has well said, due
process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the
Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative,
which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different
principles. . . . In certain proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be stated,
without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of
law.


E012 Suntay vs People of the Philippines

Facts:
Case is a petition for certoriari to annul the order of the CFI of Quezon City directing the NBI and
the DFA to take the proper steps in order that accused Suntay, allegedly in the US, be brought
back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law; and of prohibition
to enjoin the DFA Secretary from canceling the petitioners passport without previous hearing
On 26 June 1954, Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified
complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, alleging that
on June 21, 1954, the accused took Alicia Nubla, with lewd design, somewhere near the UP
compound in Diliman and had carnal knowledge of her, and Alicia being a minor of 16 years old
On Dec. 15, 1954, after investigation, Asst City Atty recommended to the City Attorney of
Quezon City that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. On 23 December 1954 attorney
for the complainant addressed a letter to the City Attorney of Quezon City wherein he took
exception to the recommendation of the Assistant City Attorney referred to and urged that a
complaint for seduction be filed against the herein petitioner.
On 10 January 1955 the petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the Department of
Foreign Affairs
On 20 January 1955 the petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco, California, U.S.A., where
he is at present enrolled in school. On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore
to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted
On 9 February 1955 the private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order
"directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the National Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the accused
brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law."
On 10 February 1955 the Court granted the motion (Exhibit D). On 7 March 1955 the respondent
Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul
General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to
return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him.
However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of the
proceeding in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. On 5 July 1955 counsel for
the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be
reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court
reconsider its order of 10 February 1955. On 7 July 1955 the respondent Secretary denied
counsel's request and on 15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence
this petition.

Petitioners Claim:
while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such
discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a
personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be
deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior hearing
Ruling:
The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is charged with seduction. And
the order of the respondent Court directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in
order that the accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law," is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the respondent Court did not specify
what step the respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to
answer the criminal charge preferred against him. True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued may not be exercised at whim. But here
the petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal charge for seduction and although at first all
Assistant City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the complaint previously subscribed and sworn to
by the father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that no final action had been taken by the City
Attorney of Quezon City as the case was still under study. And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His
suddenly leaving the country in such a convenient time, can reasonably be interpreted to mean as a
deliberate attemption his part to flee from justice, and, therefore, he cannot now be heard to complain
if the strong arm of the law should join together to bring him back to justice." In issuing the order in
question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his
inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying
it out.
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation
of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a
charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted
whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an
undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing
maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such
hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the
discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such
hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the
Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause.
The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner.

E013 Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Alcuaz

By virtue of RA 5514, Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation was granted a franchise
to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select,
station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications.
Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system
and ground terminal or terminals. Under Sec 5 of the same law, PhilComSat was exempt from the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National
Telecommunications Commission. However, EO 196 was later proclaimed and the same has placed
PhilComSat under the jurisdiction of NTC. Consequently, PhilComSat has to acquire permit to operate
from NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it
however directed PhilComSat to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on
EO 546. PhilComSat assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of respondent
NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications does not provide the necessary
standards constitutionally required hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly
the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PhilComSat asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing
for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing petitioner
under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any
standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PhilComSat subsequently clarified its
said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not
of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an
express conferment by the legislative body.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation
has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative
agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non-confiscatory and must
have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in
the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In the case
at bar, the fixed rate is found to be of merit and reasonable.

E014 Ang Tibay vs Court of Industrial Relations

TeodoroToribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union
Inc. NLU averred that Toribios act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions
in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Workers Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he
favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new
evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were
not able to present it before in the CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law.

HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative
bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are;
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

xxxx Manila Electric Company vs Public Service Commission