!"#$" &"#'($)" *+ "#",((' -+ ./)$0)' 1$!

/') &+ "2,$)' $$$

0+#+ )3+ 456478 9 :;<= >? 45>@

1,.:/&AB lolltlcol low - coostltotloool low - 5epototloo of lowets - looJ
keollqomeot - coostltotlooollty of tbe ulsbotsemeot Acceletotloo ltoqtom
lowet of tbe lotse - xecotlve lmpoooJmeot

C"&A1B
When resldenL 8enlgno Aqulno lll Look offlce, hls admlnlsLraLlon noLlced
Lhe slugglsh growLh of Lhe economy. 1he World 8ank advlsed LhaL Lhe
economy needed a sLlmulus plan. 8udgeL SecreLary llorenclo 8uLch" Abad
Lhen came up wlLh a program called Lhe ulsbursemenL AcceleraLlon
rogram (uA).

1he uA was seen as a remedy Lo speed up Lhe fundlng of governmenL
pro[ecLs. uA enables Lhe LxecuLlve Lo reallgn funds from slow movlng
pro[ecLs Lo prlorlLy pro[ecLs lnsLead of walLlng for nexL year's
approprlaLlon. So whaL happens under Lhe uA was LhaL lf a cerLaln
governmenL pro[ecL ls belng underLaken slowly by a cerLaln execuLlve
agency, Lhe funds alloLLed Lherefor wlll be wlLhdrawn by Lhe LxecuLlve.
Cnce wlLhdrawn, Lhese funds are declared as savlngs" by Lhe LxecuLlve
and sald funds wlll Lhen be realloLLed Lo oLher prlorlLy pro[ecLs. 1he uA
program dld work Lo sLlmulaLe Lhe economy as economlc growLh was ln
facL reporLed and porLlon of such growLh was aLLrlbuLed Lo Lhe uA (as
noLed by Lhe Supreme CourL).

CLher sources of Lhe uA lnclude Lhe unprogrammed funds from Lhe
Ceneral ApproprlaLlons AcL (CAA). unprogrammed funds are sLandby
approprlaLlons made by Congress ln Lhe CAA.

Meanwhlle, ln SepLember 2013, SenaLor !lnggoy LsLrada made an expose
clalmlng LhaL he, and oLher SenaLors, recelved hp30M from Lhe resldenL
as an lncenLlve for voLlng ln favor of Lhe lmpeachmenL of Lhen Chlef !usLlce
8enaLo Corona. SecreLary Abad clalmed LhaL Lhe money was Laken from
Lhe uA buL was dlsbursed upon Lhe requesL of Lhe SenaLors.

1hls apparenLly opened a can of worms as lL Lurns ouL LhaL Lhe uA does
noL only reallgn funds wlLhln Lhe LxecuLlve. lL Lurns ouL LhaL some non-
LxecuLlve pro[ecLs were also funded, Lo name a few: hp1.38 for Lhe CLA
(Cordlllera eople's LlberaLlon Army), hp1.88 for Lhe MnLl (Moro
naLlonal LlberaLlon lronL), 700M for Lhe Cuezon rovlnce, 30-100M for
cerLaln SenaLors each, 108 for 8elocaLlon ro[ecLs, eLc.

1hls prompLed Marla Carollna Araullo, Chalrperson of Lhe 8oqooq
Alyoosooq Mokoboyoo, and several oLher concerned clLlzens Lo flle varlous
peLlLlons wlLh Lhe Supreme CourL quesLlonlng Lhe valldlLy of Lhe uA.
Among Lhelr conLenLlons was:

uA ls unconsLlLuLlonal because lL vlolaLes Lhe consLlLuLlonal rule whlch
provldes LhaL oo mooey sboll be polJ oot of tbe 1teosoty except lo
potsoooce of oo opptoptlotloo moJe by low."

SecreLary Abad argued LhaL Lhe uA ls based on cerLaln laws parLlcularly
Lhe CAA (savlngs and augmenLaLlon provlslons Lhereof), Sec. 23(3), ArL. vl
of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon (power of Lhe resldenL Lo augmenL), Secs. 38 and 49 of
LxecuLlve Crder 292 (power of Lhe resldenL Lo suspend expendlLures and
auLhorlLy Lo use savlngs, respecLlvely).

$11,/1B
l. WheLher or noL Lhe uA vlolaLes Lhe prlnclple no money
shall be pald ouL of Lhe 1reasury excepL ln pursuance of an
approprlaLlon made by law" (Sec. 29(1), ArL. vl, ConsLlLuLlon).
ll. WheLher or noL Lhe uA reallgnmenLs can be consldered as
lmpoundmenLs by Lhe execuLlve.
lll. WheLher or noL Lhe uA reallgnmenLs/Lransfers are
consLlLuLlonal.
lv. WheLher or noL Lhe sourclng of unprogrammed funds Lo Lhe
uA ls consLlLuLlonal.
v. WheLher or noL Lhe uocLrlne of CperaLlve lacL ls appllcable.

D/(EB

$+ no, Lhe uA dld noL vlolaLe SecLlon 29(1), ArL. vl of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon. uA
was merely a program by Lhe LxecuLlve and ls noL a fund nor ls lL an
approprlaLlon. lL ls a program for prlorlLlzlng governmenL spendlng. As
such, lL dld noL vlolaLe Lhe ConsLlLuLlonal provlslon clLed ln SecLlon 29(1),
ArL. vl of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon. ln uA no addlLlonal funds were wlLhdrawn
from Lhe 1reasury oLherwlse, an approprlaLlon made by law would have
been requlred. lunds, whlch were already approprlaLed for by Lhe CAA,
were merely belng reallgned vla Lhe uA.

$$+ no, Lhere ls no execuLlve lmpoundmenL ln Lhe uA. lmpoundmenL of
funds refers Lo Lhe resldenL's power Lo refuse Lo spend approprlaLlons or
Lo reLaln or deducL approprlaLlons for whaLever reason. lmpoundmenL ls
acLually prohlblLed by Lhe CAA unless Lhere wlll be an unmanageable
naLlonal governmenL budgeL deflclL (whlch dld noL happen). neverLheless,
Lhere's no lmpoundmenL ln Lhe case aL bar because whaL's lnvolved ln Lhe
uA was Lhe Lransfer of funds.

$$$+ no, Lhe Lransfers made Lhrough Lhe uA were unconsLlLuLlonal. lL ls
Lrue LhaL Lhe resldenL (and even Lhe heads of Lhe oLher branches of Lhe
governmenL) are allowed by Lhe ConsLlLuLlon Lo make reallgnmenL of
funds, however, such Lransfer or reallgnmenL should only be made wlLhln
Lhelr respecLlve offlces". 1hus, no cross-border Lransfers/augmenLaLlons
may be allowed. 8uL under Lhe uA, Lhls was vlolaLed because funds
approprlaLed by Lhe CAA for Lhe LxecuLlve were belng Lransferred Lo Lhe
LeglslaLlve and oLher non-LxecuLlve agencles.

lurLher, Lransfers wlLhln Lhelr respecLlve offlces" also conLemplaLe
reallgnmenL of funds Lo an exlsLlng pro[ecL ln Lhe CAA. under Lhe uA,
even Lhough some pro[ecLs were wlLhln Lhe LxecuLlve, Lhese pro[ecLs are
non-exlsLenL lnsofar as Lhe CAA ls concerned because no funds were
approprlaLed Lo Lhem ln Lhe CAA. AlLhough some of Lhese pro[ecLs may be
leglLlmaLe, Lhey are sLlll non-exlsLenL under Lhe CAA because Lhey were
noL provlded for by Lhe CAA. As such, Lransfer Lo such pro[ecLs ls
unconsLlLuLlonal and ls wlLhouL legal basls.

Oo tbe lssoe of wbot ote sovloqs

1hese uA Lransfers are noL savlngs" conLrary Lo whaL was belng declared
by Lhe LxecuLlve. under Lhe deflnlLlon of savlngs" ln Lhe CAA, savlngs only
occur, among oLher lnsLances, when Lhere ls an excess ln Lhe fundlng of a
cerLaln pro[ecL once lL ls compleLed, flnally dlsconLlnued, or flnally
abandoned. 1he CAA does noL refer Lo savlngs" as funds wlLhdrawn from
a slow movlng pro[ecL. 1hus, slnce Lhe sLaLuLory deflnlLlon of savlngs was
noL complled wlLh under Lhe uA, Lhere ls no basls aL all for Lhe
Lransfers. lurLher, savlngs should only be declared aL Lhe end of Lhe flscal
year. 8uL under Lhe uA, funds are already belng wlLhdrawn from cerLaln
pro[ecLs ln Lhe mlddle of Lhe year and Lhen belng declared as savlngs" by
Lhe LxecuLlve parLlcularly by Lhe u8M.

$F+ no. unprogrammed funds from Lhe CAA cannoL be used as money
source for Lhe uA because under Lhe law, such funds may only be used lf
Lhere ls a cerLlflcaLlon from Lhe naLlonal 1reasurer Lo Lhe effecL LhaL Lhe
revenue collecLlons have exceeded Lhe revenue LargeLs. ln Lhls case, no
such cerLlflcaLlon was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

F+ ?es. 1he uocLrlne of CperaLlve lacL, whlch recognlzes Lhe legal effecLs of
an acL prlor Lo lL belng declared as unconsLlLuLlonal by Lhe Supreme CourL,
ls appllcable. 1he uA has deflnlLely helped sLlmulaLe Lhe economy. lL has
funded numerous pro[ecLs. lf Lhe LxecuLlve ls ordered Lo reverse all acLlons
under Lhe uA, Lhen lL may cause more harm Lhan good. 1he uA effecLs
can no longer be undone. 1he beneflclarles of Lhe uA cannoL be asked Lo
reLurn whaL Lhey recelved especlally so LhaL Lhey relled on Lhe valldlLy of
Lhe uA. Powever, Lhe uocLrlne of CperaLlve lacL may noL be appllcable Lo
Lhe auLhors, lmplemenLers, and proponenLs of Lhe uA lf lL ls so found ln
Lhe approprlaLe Lrlbunals (clvll, crlmlnal, or admlnlsLraLlve) LhaL Lhey have
noL acLed ln good falLh.














0#/&' ")A')$',1 ./E" .+ ./(0$&" -+ D')'#".(/ /G/&,A$F/
1/&#/A"#H *"2,$A' )+ '&D'" :#+? 1/&#/A"#H 'C .,E0/A
0+#+ )3+ 457IJJ 9 )3-KLMKN >6? 45>O

1,.:/&AB lolltlcol low - coostltotloool low - locol Covetomeot - lovollJ
ueleqotloo
leqlslotlve uepottmeot - lovollJ ueleqotloo of leqlslotlve lowet

1hls case ls consolldaLed wlLh C.8. no. 208493 and C.8. no. 209231.

C"&A1B
1he so-called pork barrel sysLem has been around ln Lhe hlllpplnes slnce
abouL 1922. ork 8arrel ls commonly known as Lhe lump-sum,
dlscreLlonary funds of Lhe members of Lhe Congress. lL underwenL several
legal deslgnaLlons from cooqtessloool lotk 8ottel" Lo Lhe laLesL ltlotlty
uevelopmeot Asslstooce looJ" or *E"C. 1he allocaLlon for Lhe pork barrel
ls lnLegraLed ln Lhe annual Ceoetol Apptoptlotloos Act(CAA).

Slnce 2011, Lhe allocaLlon of Lhe uAl has been done ln Lhe followlng
manner:

a. *85 LP<<P3Q: for each member of Lhe lower house, broken down Lo
- 40 mllllon for botJ ptojects" (lnfrasLrucLure pro[ecLs llke
roads, bulldlngs, schools, eLc.), and 30 mllllon for soft ptojects"
(scholarshlp granLs, medlcal asslsLance, llvellhood programs, l1
developmenL, eLc.),
b. *455 LP<<P3Q: for each senaLor, broken down Lo - 100 mllllon for
hard pro[ecLs, 100 mllllon for sofL pro[ecLs,
c. *455 LP<<P3Q: for Lhe vlce-resldenL, broken down Lo - 100
mllllon for hard pro[ecLs, 100 mllllon for sofL pro[ecLs.

1he uAl arLlcles ln Lhe CAA do provlde for NKR<PSQLKQT 3U U;QVW whereby
cerLaln cablneL members may requesL for Lhe reallgnmenL of funds lnLo
Lhelr deparLmenL provlded LhaL Lhe requesL for reallgnmenL ls approved or
concurred by Lhe leglslaLor concerned.



lteslJeotlol lotk 8ottel

1he presldenL does have hls own source of fund albelL noL lncluded ln Lhe
CAA. 1he so-called presldenLlal pork barrel comes from Lwo sources: (a)
Lhe Malampaya lunds, from Lhe Malampaya Cas ro[ecL - Lhls has been
around slnce 1976, and (b) Lhe resldenLlal Soclal lund whlch ls derlved
from Lhe earnlngs of ACCC8 - Lhls has been around slnce abouL 1983.

lotk 8ottel 5com coottovetsy

Lver slnce, Lhe pork barrel sysLem has been besleged by allegaLlons of
corrupLlon. ln !uly 2013, slx whlsLle blowers, headed by 8enhur Luy,
exposed LhaL for Lhe lasL decade, Lhe corrupLlon ln Lhe pork barrel sysLem
had been faclllLaLed by !aneL Llm napoles. napoles had been helplng
lawmakers ln funnellng Lhelr pork barrel funds lnLo abouL 20 bogus nCC's
(non-governmenL organlzaLlons) whlch would make lL appear LhaL
governmenL funds are belng used ln leglL exlsLlng pro[ecLs buL are ln facL
golng Lo ghosL" pro[ecLs. An audlL was Lhen conducLed by Lhe Commlsslon
on AudlL and Lhe resulLs Lhereof concurred wlLh Lhe exposes of Luy eL al.

MoLlvaLed by Lhe foregolng, Creco 8elglca and several oLhers, flled varlous
peLlLlons before Lhe Supreme CourL quesLlonlng Lhe consLlLuLlonallLy of Lhe
pork barrel sysLem.

$11,/1B
l. WheLher or noL Lhe congresslonal pork barrel sysLem ls
consLlLuLlonal.
ll. WheLher or noL presldenLlal pork barrel sysLem ls
consLlLuLlonal.

D/(EB
$+ no, Lhe congresslonal pork barrel sysLem ls unconsLlLuLlonal. lL ls
unconsLlLuLlonal because lL vlolaLes Lhe followlng prlnclples:

o. 5epototloo of lowets
As a rule, Lhe budgeLlng power lles ln Congress. lL regulaLes Lhe release of
funds (power of Lhe purse). 1he execuLlve, on Lhe oLher hand, lmplemenLs
Lhe laws - Lhls lncludes Lhe CAA Lo whlch Lhe uAl ls a parL of. Cnly Lhe
execuLlve may lmplemenL Lhe law buL under Lhe pork barrel sysLem, whaL's
happenlng was LhaL, afLer Lhe CAA, lLself a law, was enacLed, Lhe leglslaLors
Lhemselves dlcLaLe as Lo whlch pro[ecLs Lhelr uAl funds should be
allocaLed Lo - a clear acL of lmplemenLlng Lhe law Lhey enacLed - a
vlolaLlon of Lhe prlnclple of separaLlon of powers. (noLe ln Lhe older case
of PlLCCnSA vs Lnrlquez, lL was ruled LhaL pork barrel, Lhen called as Cul
or Lhe CounLrywlde uevelopmenL lund, was consLlLuLlonal lnsofar as Lhe
leglslaLors only recommend where Lhelr pork barrel funds go).

1hls ls also hlghllghLed by Lhe facL LhaL ln reallgnlng Lhe uAl, Lhe
execuLlve wlll sLlll have Lo geL Lhe concurrence of Lhe leglslaLor concerned.

b. Noo-Jeleqoblllty of leqlslotlve lowet
As a rule, Lhe ConsLlLuLlon vesLs leglslaLlve power ln Congress alone. (1he
ConsLlLuLlon does granL Lhe people leglslaLlve power buL only lnsofar as Lhe
processes of referendum and lnlLlaLlve are concerned). 1haL belng,
leglslaLlve power cannoL be delegaLed by Congress for lL cannoL delegaLe
furLher LhaL whlch was delegaLed Lo lL by Lhe ConsLlLuLlon.

LxcepLlons Lo Lhe rule are:

(l) delegaLed leglslaLlve power Lo local governmenL unlLs buL Lhls
shall lnvolve purely local maLLers,
(ll) auLhorlLy of Lhe resldenL Lo, by law, exerclse powers
necessary and proper Lo carry ouL a declared naLlonal pollcy
ln Llmes of war or oLher naLlonal emergency, or flx wlLhln
speclfled llmlLs, and sub[ecL Lo such llmlLaLlons and
resLrlcLlons as Congress may lmpose, Larlff raLes, lmporL and
exporL quoLas, Lonnage and wharfage dues, and oLher duLles
or lmposLs wlLhln Lhe framework of Lhe naLlonal developmenL
program of Lhe CovernmenL.

ln Lhls case, Lhe uAl arLlcles whlch allow Lhe lndlvldual leglslaLor Lo
ldenLlfy Lhe pro[ecLs Lo whlch hls uAl money should go Lo ls a vlolaLlon of
Lhe rule on non-delegablllLy of leglslaLlve power. 1he power Lo approprlaLe
funds ls solely lodged ln Congress (ln Lhe Lwo houses comprlslng lL)
collecLlvely and noL lodged ln Lhe lndlvldual members. lurLher, nowhere ln
Lhe excepLlons does lL sLaLe LhaL Lhe Congress can delegaLe Lhe power Lo
Lhe lndlvldual member of Congress.

c. ltloclple of cbecks ooJ 8olooces
Cne feaLure ln Lhe prlnclple of checks and balances ls Lhe power of Lhe
presldenL Lo veLo lLems ln Lhe CAA whlch he may deem Lo be
lnapproprlaLe. 8uL Lhls power ls already belng undermlned because of Lhe
facL LhaL once Lhe CAA ls approved, Lhe leglslaLor can now ldenLlfy Lhe
pro[ecL Lo whlch he wlll approprlaLe hls uAl. under such sysLem, how can
Lhe presldenL veLo Lhe approprlaLlon made by Lhe leglslaLor lf Lhe
approprlaLlon ls made afLer Lhe approval of Lhe CAA - agaln, Congress
cannoL choose a mode of budgeLlng whlch effecLlvely renders Lhe
consLlLuLlonally-glven power of Lhe resldenL useless."

J. locol Aotooomy
As a rule, Lhe local governmenLs have Lhe power Lo manage Lhelr local
affalrs. 1hrough Lhelr Local uevelopmenL Counclls (LuCs), Lhe LCus can
develop Lhelr own programs and pollcles concernlng Lhelr locallLles. 8uL
wlLh Lhe uAl, parLlcularly on Lhe parL of Lhe members of Lhe house of
represenLaLlves, whaL's happenlng ls LhaL a congressman can elLher bypass
or dupllcaLe a pro[ecL by Lhe LuC and laLer on clalm lL as hls own. 1hls ls an
lnsLance where Lhe naLlonal governmenL (noLe, a congressman ls a
naLlonal offlcer) meddles wlLh Lhe affalrs of Lhe local governmenL - and
Lhls ls conLrary Lo Lhe SLaLe pollcy embodled ln Lhe ConsLlLuLlon on local
auLonomy. lL's good lf LhaL's all LhaL ls happenlng under Lhe pork barrel
sysLem buL worse, Lhe uAl becomes more of a personal fund on Lhe parL
of leglslaLors.

$$+ ?es, Lhe presldenLlal pork barrel ls valld.
1he maln lssue ralsed by 8elglca eL al agalnsL Lhe presldenLlal pork barrel ls
LhaL lL ls unconsLlLuLlonal because lL vlolaLes SecLlon 29 (1), ArLlcle vl of Lhe
ConsLlLuLlon whlch provldes:

No mooey sboll be polJ oot of tbe 1teosoty except lo potsoooce of
oo !""#$"#%!&%$' moJe by low.

8elglca eL al emphaslzed LhaL Lhe presldenLlal pork comes from Lhe
earnlngs of Lhe Malampaya and ACCC8 and noL from any approprlaLlon
from a parLlcular leglslaLlon.

1he Supreme CourL dlsagrees as lL ruled LhaL u 910, whlch creaLed Lhe
Malampaya lund, as well as u 1869 (as amended by u 1993), whlch
amended ACCC8's charLer, provlded for Lhe approprlaLlon, Lo wlL:

(l) u 910: SecLlon 8 Lhereof provldes LhaL all fees, among
oLhers, collecLed from cerLaln energy-relaLed venLures shall
form parL of a speclal fund (Lhe Malampaya lund) whlch shall
be used Lo furLher flnance energy resource developmenL and
for oLher purposes whlch Lhe resldenL may dlrecL,
(ll) u 1869, as amended: SecLlon 12 Lhereof provldes LhaL a parL
of ACCC8's earnlngs shall be allocaLed Lo a Ceneral lund
(Lhe resldenLlal Soclal lund) whlch shall be used ln
governmenL lnfrasLrucLure pro[ecLs.

1hese are sufflclenL laws whlch meL Lhe requlremenL of SecLlon 29, ArLlcle
vl of Lhe ConsLlLuLlon. 1he approprlaLlon conLemplaLed Lhereln does noL
have Lo be a parLlcular approprlaLlon as lL can be a general approprlaLlon
as ln Lhe case of u 910 and u 1869.