Repeated Failures: Explaining the

Rise and Tactics of the Current Wave

of Radical Islamic Terrorism
Lindsay Hundley
Terrorism, like all forms of revolutionary political violence, occurs
at the intersection of motive and opportunity.
1
Although outside factors
facilitate this convergence, weak governance is ultimately responsible
for creating the political grievances that motivate various population
sectors and for presenting dissident groups with the occasion to rebel.
Te rise of radical Islamic terrorism is not an exception. Trough their
repeated failures to ease the violent societal transitions associated with
modernization coupled with their inability to wholly extinguish the
movement, the weak, secular governments of the Middle East are the
primary cause of the current manifestation of Islamic terrorism.
Tis paper will rst briey review existing academic literature
concerning the rise of terrorist movements, pointing out aws with and
gaps in conventional wisdom on the subject. Next, it will introduce a brief
theoretical model of how terrorism occurs, focusing particularly on the role
of weak governance and the relationship between motive and opportunity.
Tis model will then be applied directly to the current wave of radical
Islamic terrorism. In doing so, this paper will explain: (1) how the political
grievances which resulted from the failures of Middle Eastern governments
served to motivate the jihadist movement, (2) why this wave of terrorism
did not gain speed until the end of the 20
th
century, and (3) how increased
motivation coupled with innovative political strategy has enabled some
groups to adopt suicide bombing as a terrorist tactic. Moreover, throughout
its entirety, this paper will continually demonstrate and emphasize how
weak governance is the underlying cause of the origins, growth, survival,
and strength of the current wave of Islamic terrorism.
LINDSAY HUNDLEY is a junior at Te College of William and Mary
majoring in International Relations and History. She would like to thank
Professor Elizabeth Arsenault, Professor Denis Smith, Emily Pehrsson, Eric
Novak, Kristin Bartschi, and Will Shimer for their assistance.
19 Te Rise and Tactics of Radical Islamic Terrorism
Discovering the Pieces: A Brief Review of Existing Terrorism Scholarship
Current scholarship on the origins of terrorist movements is
divided among individual, organization, and systemic explanations.
Although analysis of each level of motivation would create the most
complete understanding of the rise of terrorist movements, competing
theories must reconcile divides in scholarship before such a task could
be accomplished. Tis study focuses on the systemic causes of terrorist
movements, seeking to resolve current academic debates to create a
single, unied theory of terrorism.
On the systemic level, academia has identied the following
three factors as the most prominent causes of terrorist movements:
Poverty Beginning in the 1970s, scholarship began to
largely focus on the supposed link between deprivation
and the occurrence of terrorism. Ted Gurr argued that
povertywhile not a direct cause of terrorismcreates
the incentives for people to engage in political violence.
2

Others assert that poverty creates an environment
characterized by hopelessness, highlights latent grievances
underlying society, and undermines a states ability to
repress subversive activity.
3

However, empirical studies have not found a strong,
direct connection between poverty and terrorism. Alan
Krueger argues that after controlling for civil liberties, data
does not indicate a connection between the two occurrences.
Such authors frequently cite the fact that terrorists are most
typically drawn from a societys elite, not its lowest tiers.
4

Repression Scholarship engaging repression as a cause of
terrorism asserts that there is a direct and positive correlation
between a lack of civil liberties and political violence.
5
Tis
theory asserts that political repression closes all venues in
which political grievances can be addressed, leaving no
viable alternative aside from violence.
6
If repression does serve as a motivating factor
for terrorist violence, it would imply that democracies
are less susceptible to terrorist movements. However,
empirical evidence does not support this claim. For
20 Te Monitor - Summer 2011
example, numerous terrorist attacks occurred in India,
the worlds largest democracy, between 2000 and 2003.
However, China, the worlds largest authoritarian
regime, did not experience any incident during the same
time period.
7
Globalization & Culture Many scholars have noted that
terrorist movements are becoming increasing religious
in orientation.
8
Huntington argues that friction among
cultural linesparticularly characterized by religious
dierencewill act as the source of conict as the world
becomes increasingly smaller due to globalization.
9

Moreover, many scholars argue that the inherently
competitive and aggressive nature of globalization leads
to a perception of foreign occupation, a feeling of relative
deprivation, and a resulting identity loss which is used to
mobilize recruits in anti-globalization backlash.
10

However, such explanation fails to account for
revolutionary political movements that are inherently
secular in naturelike the 26-year long campaign by
the LTTEand the fact that terrorist violence occurred
many years before globalization.
As evident, academia has yet to reach a common consensus
on whether or not these factors are even credible causes of terrorist
movements, irrespective of which is the primary cause of the current
wave of radical Islamic terrorism. In fact, this divide has led many
scholars to contend that there is no primary cause of terrorist
movementsthat there are only facilitating factors.
Tis paper, however, argues against such concessionary
claims. Although all terrorist movements contain specic conditions
and nuances, there are general, observable patterns of behavior
which lead to sustainable revolutionary violence. Moreover,
current scholarship has largely failed to recognize how these factors
compound to create both the motivation and opportunity for
terrorist movements. More importantly, by failing to understand
this process, academics have failed to recognize the one common,
unifying cause: weak governance.
21 Te Rise and Tactics of Radical Islamic Terrorism
How Terrorism Occurs: Weak Governance and the Interplay of
Motive and Opportunity
Continued acquiescence is fundamentally a function of power.
11

In order to maintain their authority, governments must both dissuade
and prevent challengers from arising through a system of rewards and
punishments.
12
Failure to maintain the proper balance of these rewards
and punishments, however, results in the motivation to rebel, the
opportunity to rebel, or both.
Even strong governments can neglect to provide this balance and
thus serve to create either motive or opportunity; however, weak governments
create both.
13
Not only do their failuressuch as the inadequate provision
of an education systemcreate real political grievances, weak governments
lack the ability to completely annihilate any opposition to their rule, which
presents dissident groups with the opportunity to rebel.
14

Te opportunity to rebel is then best dened as the ability to
take on an adversary with potential for success. Tere are two general
avenues for opportunity: (1) the adversary is either exceedingly
weak or (2) the challenger becomes better equipped to contend
against its adversary. Moreover, the latter avenue causes motive and
opportunity to become intrinsically linked. For instance, in situations
in which the government is exceedingly weak, only a few motivated
elites are needed for terrorism to occur through a conspiratorial
strategy.
15
Otherwise, motivated elites must acquire the support of
the population to be able to mobilize enough resources to challenge
the government. Te ability to attract this support ultimately lies
in the degree of motivation of the population.
16
In essence, the
opportunity to rebel relies on the motivation to rebel. Furthermore,
as a challenger becomes better equipped to take on its adversary
and the potential for success increases, the more likely people will
support the challenger.
17
Terefore, there is a continuous feedback
loop between motive and opportunity.
Te Rise of Radical Islamic Terrorism: Applying the Teoretical Model
Shocked by the event of Napoleons Egyptian campaign, the
Middle East struggled throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries to lessen the ever-growing power gap between itself and the
22 Te Monitor - Summer 2011
West.
18
Two campsthe modernizers and the fundamentalistsarose
in response to this dilemma. Te modernizers argued that the Middle
East should westernize and adopt the Wests political, economic, and
military models. Te fundamentalists, on the other hand, argued
against modernization and advocated for a return to the teachings of
the Quran and Sunnah in order to restore the Islamic empire to its
former glory.
19

Te modernizing camp triumphed; two waves of mass reforms
consequently occurred throughout the Middle East.
20
While these
reforms allowed state governments to expand both their capacity and
authority, the actions and inactions of these governments created
political grievances that motivated both the elites and masses.
Moreover, the character of their rule further alienated the population
and legitimized the use of violence. Ultimately, weak governance and its
failures allowed for religion to be used as an esoteric appeal, or uniting
ideology, to further motivate the populace.
Creation of Elite and Mass Motivation: Te Origins and Growth of
Radical Islam
Te complete abrogation of all intermediate powers created
the political grievancethe loss of claims to traditional power that
motivates religious elites.
21
While the expansion of authority by the
previously quasi-central governments made conict with the ruling
regional elites inevitable, the Middle Eastern governments neglected
to broker any sort of power-sharing agreement to appease the elites by
allowing them to retain any degree of their former power.
22

While this failure provoked revolutionary political violence
by the elites, any government that is strong enough to take away such
power is not weak enough to be on the verge of collapse. Terefore, a
conspiratorial strategy was not a feasible approach for elites to regain
their power, and they consequently had to turn towards the public
for support to mobilize enough resources to challenge the state.
Inherently, this avenue meant that the elites needed to develop a
cause to motivate the populace in their favor and legitimize their use
of violence.
23
Repeated failures of weak Middle Eastern governments,
however, made such a task easily attainable.
23 Te Rise and Tactics of Radical Islamic Terrorism
Poverty and its associated conditions functioned as the main
exoteric appeal to motivate the population. Although poverty certainly
existed before Middle Eastern governments consolidated their power, the
rapid socio-economic change during the failed attempts to modernize
marginalized segments of the population while royal families such as
those in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia continued to acquire wealth and prot
from the sale of oil.
24
Tis inequality created a real political grievance and
discontent among the populace.
25
Furthermore, poverty-stricken areas
tend to have higher birth-rates and thus often lead to a youth bulge.
26

Because Middle Eastern governments ultimately failed to provide
high levels of development, members of the youth bulge lacked job
opportunities and became much more susceptible to radicalization.
27

On top of these political grievances, Middle Eastern governments
further alienated the masses by actualizing the ability to repress through
authoritarian models of governance.
28
Repression then strengthened
the radical movement in two ways. First, authoritarian models of rule
restricted the ability of states to co-opt the movements cause. More
importantly, the lack of political opportunity legitimized the use of
violence against the states because no eective legal avenues existed
for the masses to have their political grievances addressed.
29
Moreover,
Middle Eastern regimes lacked the ability to engage in and maintain
levels of repression high enough to crush the movement, and therefore
such middle-range repression only disaected the population more.
30

Finally, the combined factors of poverty and repression in the
face of violent society transitions of modernization resulted in issues of
mass identity loss, humiliation, and alienation.
31
As the population grew
both desperate and frustrated, religion became the medium through
which grievances were expressed, and the traditional elites were able to
easily use Islam as the esoteric appeal of their movement.
32
Not only
were these elites the authorities on Islam, the turn to religion inherently
entailed criticizing and mobilizing against the secular governments
which they sought to overthrow.
33
In addition, the use of religion as
an ideological appeal strengthened the ability to attract support by
further legitimizing the use of violence, personalizing the rewards of
the conict, and removing both the conception of time constraints and
incentives to negotiate.
34
24 Te Monitor - Summer 2011
Forestalling Opportunity and the Survival of the Jihadist Movement
U.S. support of weak, autocratic regimes, however, prevented this
degree of motivation from actualizing a sustainable terrorist campaign.
Although the American government indicated in many situations that it
would like to see a change in authority, interest in maintaining stability
in the region due to oil dependency caused the United States to look the
other way when these regimes committed atrocities to repress rebellion.
For instance, the United States continued to court President Haz al-
Assad even after the Syrian government massacred the participants of a
Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama in 1882.
35
After many repeated
events, it soon became apparent that the United States, an exceedingly
strong state, had a stake in maintaining the authority of the same regimes
that elites were seeking to overthrow. Moreover, the Islamists realized
that the existence of such foreign support decreased the potential for
success of a top-down Islamic Revolution, and they were forced to nd
another avenue for their struggle.
36

Despite certain examples of extreme repression against rebellious
groups, governments were unable to wholly destroy the Islamist
movement. Tis failure allowed elites to develop a new approach to
challenge the state. Neofundamentalism, a long-term strategy that
sought to transform society from within, substantively strengthened and
increased the movements ideological base without the detection of the
government.
37
Drawing on the previous dispositions of the populace
to support their cause, traditional religious elites now called for an
individual return to Islam and claimed that only the purest application
of Sharia law would bring the reign of a perfect and just society.
38
Tus,
religion became the lens through which the conditions of the world
were examined. Moreover, elites slowly began to re-enter the political
and social sphere, and consequently, the movement quietly took root
throughout society in ever-expanding Islamic zones during the 1980s.
39

Te opportunity to rebel, however, did not arise until the
1990s due to a series of events during the nal years of the cold war.
Te withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, followed shortly
by the Soviet Unions collapse, empowered traditional religious elites.
40

Not only did this event prove the capability of a small group of
religiously motivated ghters, it broke the third dimension of power
25 Te Rise and Tactics of Radical Islamic Terrorism
against challenging the United States: if they could undermine one
world superpower, nothing prevented them from causing the demise
of another.
41
However, such an undertaking required a dramatic shift
in strategic thought and mobilization.
Although these elites had mobilized a substantial segment of the
population against weak Middle Eastern governments, they now needed
to channel and increase that same motivation against the United States.
Globalization, also unleashed in part by the end of the Cold
War, and continued failures weak governance aorded the conditions
necessary to rebel. Decreasing costs of communication essentially
shrunk the world, leading to the mass export of American culture in
particular.
42
Advances in communication and information technologies
not only increased the ecacy of terrorist activities but also enabled
elites to obtain and mobilize additional resources necessary to challenge
the United States through the new ability to recruit and acquire funding
from abroad.
43
More importantly, globalization increased motivation
by exacerbating pre-existing grievances and facilitating the perception
of the United States as the blame.
44
However, a states domestic politics
and political institutions determine how well their particular nation
adapts to these rapid, violent forces of globalization.
45
Tus, weak
governanceby creating the original grievances and failing to provide
the benets of globalizationis ultimately responsible for the eects of
this force in the intersection of motive and opportunity.
46
By enabling elites to frame the United States as the enemy,
globalization drastically magnied the motivation of the Middle
Eastern masses to support the jihadist movement.
47
Te economic
dominance and the mass export of American culture led to the
perception of globalization as a new form of American imperialism
meant to ensure U.S. preeminence. First, traditional religious elites
argued that America used globalization both in an attempt to spread
its materialistic values and to oer freedoms and human rights as a
bribe to steer Muslims away from their perfect morality and faith.
Additionally, these elites believed that secularizationinherent to
globalizationis an attempt to institutionalize the removal of Islam
from thought and action, so that Muslims become subservient to the
West.
48
Moreover, elites fashioned globalization as an economic and
26 Te Monitor - Summer 2011
cultural invasion. Tis impression, thus, strengthens the elites calls to
lesser jihad, the duty of all true Muslims to defend and protect Islam
from outside incursions.
49
Finally, religion in the face of globalization
created the ideal of cosmic war, motivating the populace through
the belief that they are ghting for the triumph of good over evil.
50

Tus, these combined impacts on motivation, coupled with the ways
globalization better-suited and equipped terrorist organizations, nally
presented traditional religious elites with the opportunity to actualize a
sustainable terrorist campaign against the West.
Explaining the Rise and Strength of Suicide Terror Tactics
With a larger, more highly motivated segment of the population
supporting the movement, the Islamists began to adopt and employ
suicide tactics to achieve their political goals.
51
First and foremost, the
turn to suicide bombings is a function of increased motivation and
tactical success.
52
Simply put, terrorist organizations adopted these
tactics because they have been met with more success than others.
53

Moreover, suicide tactics better equip organizations to challenge the
United States, since democracies are much more vulnerable to the
brute coercion these attacks entail.
54
However, while suicide tactics
better aord the opportunity to rebel, a suicide campaign requires
extensive communal support in order to be sustainable; not only do
suicide bombers need to be replaceable, active support is also required
to provide the incentives to participate in such attacks.
55
Te individual motivation to become a suicide bomber results
from the same environmentagain an environment created by the
failures of weak governancewhich compelled the population to
support the jihadist movement: rampant poverty, political repression,
and the perception of foreign occupation in the face of a strong
religious ideology. First, those who tend to partake in suicide bombings
are usually the young, impressionable men of the poverty stricken
youth bulge.
56
Secondly, a repressive, impoverished environment is
characterized by hopelessness, and this hopelessness is easily exploited.
57

To empower the population, traditional elites used rituals, ceremonies,
and calls to religious texts to create a culture of martyrdom, celebrating
the sacrices of those who gave their lives in suicide attacks.
58
Elites, in
27 Te Rise and Tactics of Radical Islamic Terrorism
some situations, further capitalized on impoverished conditions by even
oering cash rewards to the families of suicide bombers.
59
Furthermore,
the perception of American occupation through economic and cultural
dominance not only reinforced a culture of martyrdom, but also
motivated individuals to participate in these attacks for vengeance
against humiliation.
60

Strategically, radical Islamists adopted suicide tactics for
two broad purposes: (1) brute coercion against opponents and (2)
to further gain support within the population.
61
Suicide terrorism
serves as a form of strategic signaling. Trough its shocking acts,
these bombings exploit the media and display willingness to die for
a cause.
62
Tis degree of dedication inspires both extreme fear within
target populations and others to join the movement.
63
Moreover,
the inability of the government to protect the population highlights
its failures, creating yet another political grievance to motivate the
masses to rebel.
64
Finally, suicide terrorism attempts to attract more
support through a strategy of provocation. By reacting with a harsh,
indiscriminate response, governments create the motivation not only
to support the terrorist movement but also to get revenge for the death
of loved ones.
65
Terefore, suicide tactics both create the opportunity to
rebel by better equipping organizations to challenge democratic states
in particular and, in many situations, also create even more motivation
within the masses, enabling groups to replenish the suicide bombers
lost in attacks.
Tus, by creating both the motive and opportunity to rebel,
weak governance in the Middle East not only facilitates but also
drives the current wave of radical Islamic terrorism. Te origins of this
wave lie in the failure of central governments to buy o elites when
consolidating power. Moreover, weak governance contributed to the
movements growth by creating political grievancesunequal poverty,
political repression, and the resulting identity losswhich enabled
elites to use a strong, religious ideology to motivate the masses to
support their cause. Although these governments were able to prevent
rebellion in the 1970s with the support of the United States, their
inability to completely annihilate these movements allowed elites to
turn to neofundamentalism, which ultimately created a religious lens
28 Te Monitor - Summer 2011
through which events were framed. Tus, when governments were
unable or unwilling to provide the benets of globalization to the lower
societal tiers, elites were able to frame globalization as an economic and
cultural invasion by the United States, meant to ensure the dominance
of indels over the true believers.
Increasing motivation drastically, terrorist organizations were
then able to adopt suicide bombings, a tactic particularly suited for
challenging democracies like the United States. Hence, through
increased motivation and a new, powerful strategy, the opportunity
to rebel ultimately arose. Finally, through its ability to inspire future
suicide bombers, suicide terrorism became sustainable. Even then,
weak government generates support for terrorism through its inability
to protect the populace. Terefore, while radicals themselves serve as
one tier constituting the threat of radical Islamic terrorism, the greater
threat and challenge to United States security are the weak governments
who create an environment which generates such political violence.
66
Notes
1
Martha Crenshaw, Te Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of
Strategic Choice, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Teologies, State
of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998),
7-11, 16.
2
Ted Robert Gurr, Economic Factors, Te Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise
Richardson. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 87-88
3
Susan Rice, Te Treat of Global Poverty, Te National Interest (2006), 76-82.
4
Alan B. Krueger, Cash Rewards and Poverty Alone Do Not Explain Terrorism,
New York Times, May 29 2003, C2.
5
Ibid.
6
Crenshaw, Te Causes of Terrorism, 384.
7
Gause, Can Democracy Stop Terrorism? Foreign Aairs 84, no. 5 (2005), 62-76.
8
Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve: Globalization and International
Terrorism, International Security 27, no. 3 (2002/2003), 46-51.
9
Samuel Huntington, Te Clash of Civilizations? International Politics: Enduring
Concepts and Contemporary Issues, eds. Art, Robert J., and Robert Jervis (New
York: Longman, 2004), 391-196.
10
Michael Mousseau, Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror, International
Security 27, no. 3 (2002/2003), 19; Robert Pape, Explaining Suicide Terrorism,
Dying to Win: Te Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, (New York: Random House,
2005), 22; Mark Juergensmeyer, Religion as a Cause of Terrorism, Te Roots of
Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 140-141.
11
John Gaventa, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence & Rebellion in an Appalachian
Valley (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 3-23.
29 Te Rise and Tactics of Radical Islamic Terrorism
12
Ibid., 14.
13
Cristiana C. Brafman Kittner, Te Role of Safe Havens in Islamist Terrorism,
Terrorism & Political Violence 19, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 311.
14
Crenshaw, Te Logic of Terrorism, 16-17.
15
Bard ONeill, Insurgent Strategies, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to
Apocalypse, 2
nd
Revised ed. (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 46-49.;
Eric Wolf, Peasants and Revolutions, In Revolutions: Teoretical, Comparative,
and Historical Studies, ed. Jack Goldstone, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Cengage
Learning, 2008), 58-59.
16
Charles Tilly, Does Modernization Breed Revolution? Revolutions: Teoretical,
Comparative, and Historical Studies. ed. Jack Goldstone, (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth/Cengage Learning, 2008), 49-52.; Bard ONeill, Popular
Support, Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd Revised ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 94-96.
17
ONeill, Popular Support, 107.
18
Bernard Lewis, Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East, Foreign Aairs
84, no. 3 (2005), 42-44.
19
Bernard Lewis, Te Revolt of Islam, New Yorker (November 19, 2001), 57-58.
20
Fareed Zakaria, Why Do Tey Hate Us?,Understanding the War on Terror, ed.
James F. Hodge and Gideon Rose (New York: Foreign Aairs/Council on Foreign
Relations, 2005), 119-124.
21
Michael Mousseau, Market Civilization and Its Clash with Terror,19.
22
Lewis, Freedom and Justice, 43.
23
David Galula, Revolutionary War: Nature and Characteristics,
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Teory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006),
3-4, 8-9.; Crenshaw, Te Logic of Terrorism, 10-11.
24
Ted Robert Gurr, Economic Factors, Te Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise
Richardson. (New York: Routledge, 2006), 87-88.; Zakaria, Why Do Tey
Hate Us? 120-121.
25
Crenshaw, Te Causes of Terrorism, 383.
26
Rice, Te Treat of Global Poverty, 80.
27
Gurr, Economic Factors, 89.
28
Lewis, Freedom and Justice, 42-44.
29
Crenshaw, Te Causes of Terrorism, 383-384.
30
Ibid., 382-383.
31
Mark Juergensmeyer, Religion as a Cause of Terrorism, 140-141.
32
Ibid, 141-142.; ONeill, Popular Support, 101-102; Mark Juergensmeyer,
Religion as a Cause, 142.
33
Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Name of God, Current History (2001), 359-360.
34
Ibid., 358.
35
Lewis, Te Revolt of Islam, 56-57.
36
Oliver Roy, Neofundamentalistm, Te Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 75.
37
Ibid., 76.
38
Ibid., 76-77.
39
Ibid., 84, 86-87.
40
Lewis, Freedom and Justice, 50.
41
Lewis, Te Revolt of Islam, 62.
30 Te Monitor - Summer 2011
42
Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Globalization: Whats New? Whats Not?
(And So What?), Foreign Policy 118 (2000): 116-120.
43
Audrey Kurth Cronin, Behind the Curve.
44
Fauzi Najjar, Te Arabs, Islam and Globalization, Middle East Policy XII,
no. 3 (2005), 91-92.
45
Keohane, Globalization, 117.
46
Cronin, Behind the Curve, 38.
47
Mosseau, Market Civilization, 7-23.
48
Najjar, Te Arabs, 92-95.
49
John L. Esposito, Jihad and the Struggle for Islam, Unholy War: Terror in the
Name of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 27-28.
50
Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Name, 358.
51
Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: Motivations for Suicide Terrorism, Root Causes of
Suicide Terrorism: Te Globalization of Martyrdom, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York:
Routledge, 2007), 25.
52
Mohammed Hafez, Dying to be Martyrs: Te Symbolic Dimension of Suicide
Terrorism, Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York:
Routledge, 2006), 54.
53
Robert Pape, Explaining Suicide Terrorism, 22.; Bloom, Dying to Kill, 32.
54
Pape, Explaining Suicide Terrorism, 21.
55
Bloom, Dying to Kill, 27.; Robert Pape, Occupation and Religious
Dierence, Dying to Win: Te Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,(New York:
Random House, 2005), 81-82.
56
Bloom, Dying to Kill, 36.
57
Hafez, Dying to be Martyrs, 55.
58
Assaf Moghadam, Te Roots of Suicide Terrorism: A multi-causal approach,
Root Causes of Suicide Terrorism, ed. Ami Pedahzur (New York: Routledge, 2006),
92.; Hafez, Dying to be Martyrs, 64-67.
59
Bloom, Dying to Kill, 35.
60
Pape, Dying to Win, 80-91.; Moghadam, Te Roots of Suicide
Terrorism, 91-98.
61
Pape, Explaining Suicide Terror, 11.; Bloom, Dying to Kill, 26.
62
Moghadam, Te Roots of Suicide Terrorism, 95.
63
Ibid., 95.; Bloom, Dying to Kill, 26.
64
Moghadam, Te Roots of Suicide Terrorism, 95.
65
Bloom, Dying to Kill, 40-41.
66
Cronin, Behind the Curve, 38.