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COMMISSION SENSITIVE
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Event: Major David McNulty, Chief of Intelligence, 121st Fighter Squadron, Air
National Guard, Andrews Air ForceBase
Type: Interview
Date: March 11,2004
Special Access Issues: Clearances passed
Team: 8
Prepared by: Lisa Sullivan
Location: Andrews Air ForceBaseAir National Guard Wing
Participants (non- Commission): Heather LoBue, J AG
Participants (Commission): LisaSullivan, Miles Kara, andKevin Shaeffer
Background
[FOUO] Major McNulty is anROTC graduatefromBoston University. Hewent on
activeduty in 1994andhas been acareer intelligenceofficer ever since. His assignments
includeShawAir ForceBase, 1994- 1996; fighter weapons school; Kunson Air Force
Base, Korea, J uly 1997- J uly 1998; Davis- Montham Air ForceBase, J uly 1997- April
2001. At that point, heleft activeduty and assumed anAGR with the113
th
,s Wing with
is activeguard reserve(full- time). Heisthefull- timeintelligenceofficer for the121st
fighter squadron. His duties currently areabout thesameasthey wereon9- 11. The
chief atthetimewas Lt Col SuzanneKarow, but shewas not inthebuilding that day. On
9- 11, hewas thesenior intelligenceofficer of the113
th
Wing; Major Borukin was the
senior intelligenceofficer for the89
th
Air Lift Wing.
89
th
Air Lift Wing
[FOUO] Theoutfit is afull- timemission to support distinguished visitors to theBase,
whereas the113
th
Wing is atenant. The89
th
AirLift Wing provides himhigh- level
information (TS - SensitiveCompartmentalized Information which isreceived at the89
th
Air Lift Wing's facility and sharedwith McNulty); they also do sometraining exchanges.
Intelligence officer forthe 121
st
Fighter Squadron
[FOUO] McNulty's intelligencefacility is asecret- collateral facility. Heand Major
Borukin worked closely in terms of current intelligence. McNulty had aTS- SCI
clearance; although hedidnot havemuch need for it before9- 11.
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[FOUO] When hetook thejob of intelligenceofficer for the113
th
Wing inthespring of
2001, theposition hadbeen vacant for about six months. Prior to that, Major Billy
Hutchinson had filled theroleas anadditional duty.
[FOUO] Oncehetook over, hedoesnot recall any specific information related to
domestic threats thesummer before9- 11; thepictureof thethreat was oriented onthe
MiddleEast. Hewas accustomed tothat outlook fromhisprevious assignments as an
intelligenceofficer at Davis- Montham. Hehad six tours "inthedesert" [SW Asia]prior
tojoining the113
th
Wing. As anintelligenceofficer hewas primarily concerned with
wherehis men weregoing to deploy andwhat was theterrorist threat there; theArabian
Peninsula was thesourceof alot of that chatter.
[FOUO] Avenues of Information availabletohim: Air Combat Command through
Langley AFB and 9
th
Air ForceCommand down at Shaw. Both ofthese channels were
focused onoverseas information. Healso hadapersonal contact at theNSA andAgent
Bouchamp fromtheSecret Service(that was theextent of McNulty's contact with law
enforcement). McNulty added that Bouchamp's duty stationwas the89
th
Wing - control
tower - wherehetracked presidential movements. Otherwise, McNulty did not have
regular or continuous contact with any other federal agencies on 9- 11.
On 9-11:
[FOUO] At 8:00AM McNulty was inascheduling meeting intheconferenceroomat the
l13
th
Wing. Also with himwerepilots Sasseville, Caine, andValentine. Themeeting
was interrupted totell themabout thefirst planehitting theWorldTradeCenter. Their
first assumption was that it was anaccident. They continued themeeting until
commotion inthehallway interrupted themandthey learned of thesecond planethat
went into Tower 1oftheWorld TradeCenter. Hewent totheoperations area; McNulty
sat at theoperations desk (theSOF- Supervisor of Flying- - desk) for about fiveminutes
andthen walked down to thevault. Hethought SIPRINET (Secret collateral network)
would haveinformation on theevent. Hecalled thenational agencies feeling asthough .
"hewas waking upthenational agencies" ashecontacted them. Theones hethought to
call includetheNational SIGINT Operations Center at NSA- they weredoing what he
was doing andthey hadnothing toreport. Hetried to call someoneintheWatch at the
FBI. "It was afruitless effort."
[FOUO] McNulty returned totheOperations Desk. At this point, Major Cainewas on
thephonewith Major Bouchamp. Theinitial conversation was about how they were
going to get theBully fighters home(athree- ship training mission totheDareRangein
North Carolina) becauseFAA was shutting down theair space. Heoverheard the
conversation inwhich Major Hutchinson (Bully flight lead) was already heading back to
Baseandwas told to "go ID that thing coming uptheriver." It was at about that timethe
WhiteHouseJ oint Operations Center (J OC) Special Agent Garrambito called theWing.
Bouchamp may havefacilitated theconnection between theWH J OC andtheWing's
operations desk. McNulty was not positivewho called who first. McNulty thinks the
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call probably took placearound 9:15AM. Several phonecalls took place; hethought
Major Caine, theSOF, talked totheWH J OCjust after 10AM. Meanwhile, Assistant
Senior Airman Garciawas calling local lawenforcement agencies. McNulty was himself
running between CaineandGarcia andhis vault trading information asit becameknown.
[FOUO] After theNorth tower collapsed, McNulty left thefacility todriveacross Baseto
wherethe89
th
Air Lift Wing had its SCIF. Therewas no information on theevents
posted on theTS- SCI channels availableto himthere, either (SIPRINET, J WICS, etc).
Herecalled asinglecritic messagethat cameout of theNSA. [Note: NSA provided that
critic and it should beinthefiles at K Street. It is not particularly responsive.]
[FOUO] Theinitial threat pictureMcNulty got was fromAgent Garambito andit was
"cloudy at best" becauseit included information such as abomb at theStateDepartment.
This call was at 10:30- 10:45AM. Hepinned that timetowhen CAPS 01 (Sasseville)
first launched which was approximately 10:45AM. They stopped for asecond to :figure
out what was going on. They erased thewhiteboard on which they werenoting
information andturned off theTV because, according tohim, "at that point they [news
media and Secret Service] werereporting crap," such astheStateDepartment hadbeen
blown up, etc.
[FOUO] They never memoralized what was written onthewhiteboard based onAgent
Garambito's input. Basically, it was "how many aircraft dowehavehijacked?" andthey
started tokeep alist of planes that weresuspect. Herecalls therewere8airlines
unaccounted for. Garambito gavethemtheflight numbers: AAL 11,UAL 175,UAL 93,
"aDelta 1989was apoint of consternation," andacoupleof flights fromoverseas. Next,
they wanted toverify fromtwo sources (if possible) thestatus of theflights. At this point
theresounded liketherewas another waveof airplanes coming at us; theGuard had sent
afighter up (Bully 1- Major Hutchinson) tocheck out what was coming down theriver,
andit wasn't until later that they realized theplaneinquestion might beUAL 93which
had crashed inPennsylvania. (Note: according toFAA tapes andtranscripts the"plane"
was actually anArmy National Guard helicopter based out of Davison Field, Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, which hadbecomeisolated inMaryland as events unfolded andwhich
wanted toreturn to itshomefield.]
Situational Awareness and Unit Status
[FOUO] What situational awareness didMajor Hutchinson havewhen hewent back up
to ID theplanecoming down theriver? McNulty told theCommission that tohis
knowledge, Hutchinson had got someinformation fromthetanker herefueled fromin
North Carolina to theeffect that something hadhappened inNew York. Hewas fairly
lowon fuel when helanded, Lt Col Phil Thompson hadrelieved Major Caineas SOF and
directed Hutchinson to immediately takeoff,despitelowfueL Hutchinson received no
specific ROE except to identify theaircraft coming up theriver.
[FOUO] That week, theunit hadcomeback fromaRedFlag exerciseat Nellis in
Nevada, anintensivetraining event. Monday was adown day; Tuesday was alight
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flying day which was why they launched athree- ship (Bully flight) that morning rather
than aneight ship that they normally would haveflown. Therewerefewpilots andplanes
availablethat morning. Planes wereconfigured for travel (two gas pods, travel pods and
CaptiveAim- OneTwenty rounds that they carry for tonnage"dummy rounds"). This
configuration shortened thetimeneeded tobring theplanes back up; andthedummy
rounds appeared fromtheground tobearrried. Seven pilots wereavailable, threeof them
wereflying inNorth Carolina.
Bully flight: Hutchinson, Campbell, Hagis.
Sasseville, Caine, Rasmussen, Drifter Valentine, Heather Penny werethe
other pilots inthebuilding.
(FOUO) Concerning Hutchinson's immediatetakeoff; hewas told toID something
coming down theriver. As far asMcNulty recalled, Hutchinson was not given specific
ROE. It isMcNulty's understanding theinformation about theplanecoming down the
river camefromtheWhiteHouseJ oint Operations Center. McNulty, meanwhile, was
trying to figureout what planeit was that Hutchinson was looking for. UAL 93 andAAL
77werestill unaccounted for at this point andthey hada good ideawhich of theplanes
went into theWorld TradeCenters (AAL 11andUAL 175). Hespecified that heused a
two- sourceruletovalidateinformation andthat accounted for his status onthefour
hijacked aircraft at that point intime.
ROE
jBf General Wherley was onthephonewith theWhiteHouseJ OC; someoneintheSecret
Serviceandwas saying get mesomeoneinthemilitary. Therewas no official ROE for
thepilots to sign acknowledgement for at that time. CAPS Oland 02went out thedoor
with apictureof thethreat intheir head, but no specific guidance. At 11a.m. Lt Col
Thompson, theSOF, relayed over theradio tothefighters: "look toturn anything away
beforeyou do anything else." This was theclosest thing to anofficial ROE that McNulty
remembers any pilot receiving that day.
General Wherley and SassevilleJ Penny conversations:
. f81Wherley said that targets wereheaded toward downtown andheknew that they
needed tokeep all planes away fromtheWashington D.C. area. McNulty didnot
remember theterm"weapons free" being usedby General Wherley.
[FOUO] Therewas zero information about Langley fighters already inCAP over
Washington D.C. Hedidn't know what NEADS [Northeast Air DefenseSector] was;
Huntress [NEADS call sign] was something they werefamiliar with intraining; "wewere
stupid when it cametoAir Defenseof theUS that day," hestated.
[FOUO] SassevilleandPenny went upwith lead/concreterounds, 110rounds apiece.
Themaintenancecrews did agreatjob getting theplanes loaded andready to go.
CaineandRasmussen (Wild 01and 02) werewaiting for their weapons tobeloaded.
Wild 01and02got off theground at 11:09AM. At that time, McNulty was working on
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thewhiteboard which was agonizingly slow. Around 11:30- ish it seemed likeanother
waveof hijacks werecoming fromoverseas becauseawholeother series of planes
squawking emergency. Later it was determined theemergency squawk was becausethey
wereall diverted to Canada.
Threats to AF1
[FOUO] Senior Airman Garcia andhimself weretalking all day totheJ OC - anopen
secureline. McNulty never heard of any threat to AFI ontheopen lineto theJ OC, nor
didhehear threat information directed at AFl fromany other sourceuntil much later in
theafternoon when SassevilleandPenny picked up AF 1to escort it home.
Mission Reports (MISREPS)
[FOUO] Air Traffic Control had lost contact with afewaircraft ontheeast coast; he
debriefed Major Hutchinson; hefired off amission report to 9
th
Air Force, Air Combat
Command, and about everybody except NEADS (theentity hewas unawarehad air
defenseresponsibility).
~ At 11:35AM Raisin' (Caine's call sign- heis airborneby now) wanted athreat
picturebecausehewas frustrated andMcNulty, who was also frustrated, had nothing new
totell him. Therewerestill planes unaccounted for; information was starting to tricklein
that aplanehad crashed inPennsylvania. By noon everything ontheir list is crossed off.
Therewereemergency flights abroad. Hewent over the89
th
wing andat about 1:45he
got acopy of thesecurefax with theJ CS- approved ROE. Onthat day, heconcluded, .
they weresu ortin the89
t
I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a) I
DEFCON3
..fStHeheard about it after it was established at 11:09AM. About noon, helearned of it
himself on ashuttlerun to the89
th
"Weapons Free" was not mentioned to thefirst 4
pilots. [Note: 5including Hutchinson] Later flights wereaskedto signthefaxed ROE-
that was sometimeafter 2PM that afternoon.
Hutchinson's first flight recapitulated
[FOUO] McNulty said that Hutchinson was sent up thePotomac, didaspinby
Georgetown, saw thesmokeout of thePentagon, andreported therewereaton of
helicopters inthearea: Heknew itwasn't asmall airplanethat hit thePentagon.
At somepoint later intheday someonesaidwelcometotheworld of theNorth East Air
Defense.
10:05 AM ATIS message
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[FOUO] Andrews Tower started broadcasting over theATIS (Air Traffic Information
System) at about 10:05AM warning planes that if they entered Class B airspacethey
would beshot down. McNulty saidit was pretty horrifying tohear that. Hedidnot hear
themessageuntil Bully 01was back onthedeck. Hespunthetapeto get atakeofftime
- that messagewas heard prior toBully two (Hutchinson's wingman) landing fromNorth
Carolina. After Hutchinson landed westarted saving tapes but then weran out of tapes .
sowehad to start reusing them.
(FOUO) McNulty acknowledged that theWild cockpit tapetheCommission was
provided was probably fromaflight later intheday with thesamecall signbecausethey
werereusing tapes. Therefore, Caine's Wild cockpit tapelikely does not exist.
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