Michael Millerman - 2004

Introduction
In an essay entitled The Mystical Self: Lost and Found, Ralph Hood explores the
question of the unity of selfhood, drawing heavily on William James’ Varieties of
Religious Experience. Hood argues that, empirically, the unity of selfhood is assured and
non-problematic. However, the phenomenon of mysticism reveals a transcendent I,
whose unity is not that of empirically studied selfhood, but rather a unity with Reality, or
God. The concern, then, is to suggest that “William James’ psychology and philosophy
has contemporary relevance in linking the empirical literature on self with the conceptual
literature on self-loss,” that is, the mystic experience. First let us look at the two
conceptions of self.

Two Conceptions of Self

A conceptual confusion that arises in empirical studies of the self is the failure to
distinguish between the being of the self and its attributes (Hood, 2002). “I think,
perceive, feel, but I am not those various acts in time,” writes philosopher William Earle,
“rather I am that ego which now thinks, now perceives, now remembers or dreams”
(1981). The two conceptions that emerge, then, are the unity of self found in reflection,
usually identified as me, and influenced by social construction insofar as we identify it by
various attributes, and the unity of the being devoid of attributes, the I, which is less
likely a product of social influence (Hood, 2002); the psychological self and the soulful
self.

The Spiritual Revolution

It is well established that the experience of unity is a defining feature of the

soulful self that emerges upon the loss of the reflexive, psychological self (Stace, 1960;
Hood, 1989). In his essay, Hood suggests that a spiritual revolution is now in progress; a
revolution made possible by a return to serious discussion of the soul (Hood, 2002.)
Although such a concept may worry some psychologists who, perhaps like the
behaviourists, wish to abstract themselves from the whole of what it means to be human
and keep their discipline “empirical,” it seems that William James was correct in noting
that, “no conventional restrictions can keep metaphysical or even epistemological
inquiries out of the psychology books” (Hood, 2002), for indeed, psychological and
philosophical conceptions of self rapidly give way to mystical ones when they are carried
to their conclusion. To study such a concept, however, requires the proper
methodological tools; for psychology, regardless of its scope, must still proceed as a
science.

The Method
 Michael Millerman - 2004

James insisted that “first and foremost and always,” the primary method of
psychology is introspective observation (Hood, 2002). He demanded careful observation
and description of internal states, in a way anticipating the school of phenomenology.
Husserl, founder of phenomenology, stressed that psychology should be the first science
to emerge with the “transcendental perspective;” that is, upon the realization that the I,
the soulful self, is at the root of our experience of reality, and indeed constitutes all reality
(Smith, 2003). According to James and Husserl, then, the methodological tool for study
of the I is introspection, which provides us with self-knowledge. James suggests we must
be radically empirical with introspection, allowing metaphysics to illuminate the
phenomena discovered thereby (Hood, 2002). James’ empiricism is experience. Again,
quoting from Hood’s essay, we have James’ empirical postulate, “Everything real must
be experiencable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be
real” (2002). Let us now turn to the mystic experience itself.

Unio Mystico
“We have everywhere found that the mystic having suppressed the empirical factors
of the stream of consciousness, arrives at a pure ego or pure consciousness, and that the
emergence of this pure ego is the introvertive experience,” writes Stace (1960). The self,
in recuperating itself, achieves an “ontological and epistemological rock-bottom,” (Earle,
1981). What we have is the synthesis or union of subjective absolute reality (the I) and
objective absolute reality, or God. Perhaps at this point it would be wise to quote directly
from one of the most important figures of philosophy and mysticism, Plotinus:

In the vision, that which sees is not reason but something greater than
and prior to reason, something presupposed by reason, as is the object
of vision. He who then sees himself when he sees will see himself as a
simple being [the undifferentiated unity of the I and God], will be
united to himself as such, will feel himself become such. We ought not
even to say that he will ‘see’, but that he will ‘be’ that which he sees, if
indeed it is possible any longer to distinguish seer and seen, and not
boldly to affirm that the two are one. In this state the seer does not
see or distinguish or imagine two things; he becomes another, he
ceases to be himself and to belong to himself [that is, the
psychological self is lost and the I, devoid of all attributes, no longer
has anything by which to distinguish itself from Absolute Reality]. He
belongs to Him and is one with Him, like two concentric circles; they
are one when they coincide, and two only when they are separated. It
is only in this sense that the soul is other. Therefore the vision is hard
to describe. For how can one describe, as other than oneself, that
which, when one saw it, seemed to be one with oneself? (Stace, 1960)

Conclusion
 Michael Millerman - 2004

The soul can return to psychology as a significant concept if the facts of

mysticism are noted (Hood, 2002). After reflecting upon the construct of the soulful self,
psychology can affect a return to positivity that is no longer transcendentally naïve
(Davidson; Cosgrove, 2002). If psychology as a science wishes to be genuine – that is, if
it demands insight in all matters - it must turn to transcendental subjectivity as a matter of
primary concern, “for it is the [soulful self],” writes Smith, “that harbors the ultimate
sources of meaning” (Smith, 2003). William Earle, too, agrees with this conclusion when
he reminds us forcefully that “only […] the most naïve and incoherent empiricism would
imagine that it can begin with ‘psychological facts’ of common life, hoping to end with a
clearer notion or even refutation of the very soulful self which is their origin and active
source (Earle, 1981). In James’ notes for Varieties, he states, “Remember that the whole
[idea] lies in really believing that through a certain point or in part you coalesce and are
identical with the Eternal.” As Ralph Hood suggests in his conclusion, "psychologists
need not have that belief as a statement of faith, but it is not bad as an empirical
hypothesis." (Hood, 2002)

WORKS CITED/REFERENCED
Davidson, Larry; Cosgrove, Lisa; Journal of Phenomenological
Psychology, Vol 33(2), 2002. pp. 140-177.
Earle, William; Mystical Reason, Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1981.
Hood, Ralph; The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion,
Vol 12(1), 2002. pp. 1-14.
Hood, Ralph; Mysticism, The Unity Thesis, and the Paranormal, in
Zollschan et al.; Exploring the Paranormal, Great Britain: Prism, 1989.
pp. 117-130.
Smith, A.D; The Cartesian Meditations, London: Routledge, 2003.
Stace, Walter; Mysticism and Philosophy, Philadelphia: Lippincott,
1960.
Stace, Walter; The Teachings of the Mystics, New York: Mentor, 1960.
pp. 119-120.