The Ombudsman

HON. JUAN M. HAGAD, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, petitioner,
vs. HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, Presiding Judge, Branch XXVIII, Regional Trial Court,
Mandaue City, Mandaue City Mayor ALFREDO M. OUANO, Mandaue City Vice-Mayor PATERNO
CAETE and Mandaue City Sangguniang Panlungsod Member RAFAEL MAYOL, respondents.

VITUG, J .:
The determination of whether the Ombudsman under Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 6770, otherwise known as
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations
over local elective officials by virtue of the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1991, is the pivotal issue before the Court in this petition.
The petition seeks (a) to annul the writ of preliminary injunction, dated 21 October 1992, issued against
petitioner by respondent trial court and (b) to prohibit said court from further proceeding with RTC Case
No. MDE-14.
Parenthetically, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas Arturo Mojica assumed the office of Juan Hagad, now
resigned, who took the initiative in instituting this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition.
The controversy stemmed from the filing of criminal and administrative complaints, on 22 July 1992,
against herein respondents Mayor Alfredo Ouano, Vice-Mayor Paterno Caete and Sangguniang
Panlungsod Member Rafael Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors
Magno B. Dionson and Gaudiosa O. Bercede with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
The respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended, 5 Articles 170 6 and
171 7 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713. 8Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that
respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration and/or falsification of Ordinance No.
018/92 by increasing the allocated appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without
authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. The complaints were separately docketed
as Criminal Case No. OMB-VIS-92-391 and as Administrative Case No. OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015.
A day after the filing of the complaints, or on 23 July 1992, a sworn statement was executed by Mandaue
City Council Secretary, Atty. Amado C. Otarra, Jr., in support of the accusations against respondent
officials. The next day, petitioner ordered respondents, including Acting Mandaue City Treasurer Justo G.
Ouano and Mandaue City Budget Officer Pedro M. Guido, to file their counter-affidavits within ten (10)
days from receipt of the order. Forthwith, Councilors Dionson and Bercede moved for the preventive
suspension of respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative case.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on 05 August 1992,
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of
jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against
said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of
the President.
In their opposition, filed on 10 August 1992, Dionson and Bercede argued that the Local Government
Code of 1991 could not have repealed, abrogated or otherwise modified the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution granting to the Ombudsman the power to investigate cases against all public officials and that,
in any case, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate local officials under the Ombudsman Act had
remained unaffected by the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991.
During the hearing on the motion for preventive suspension, the parties were directed by the Deputy
Ombudsman to file their respective memoranda.
In his memorandum, Mayor Ouano reiterated that, under Sections 61 and 63 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, the Office of the President, not the Office of the Ombudsman, could lawfully take
cognizance of administrative complaints against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city
or an independent component city and to impose disciplinary sanctions, including preventive suspensions,
and that there was nothing in the provision of the Constitution giving to the Office of the Ombudsman
superior powers than those of the President over elective officials of local governments.
In an Order, 9 dated 10 September 1992, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied the motion to
dismiss and recommended the preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City Budget Officer
Pedro M. Guido, until the administrative case would have been finally resolved by the
Ombudsman. 10 Respondent officials were formally placed under preventive suspension by the Deputy
Ombudsman pursuant to an Order of 21 September 1992.
On 25 September 1992, a petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, was filed by respondent officials with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City. Acting favorably on the pleas of petitioning officials, respondent Judge issued, on even date, a
restraining order directed at petitioner, enjoining him ". . . from enforcing and/or implementing the
questioned order of preventive suspension issued in OMB-VIS-ADM-92-015."
Petitioner moved to dismiss the petition but it was to no avail. The court a quo, on 15 October 1992, denied
the motion to dismiss and issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, holding
thusly:
So by following and applying the well-established rules of statutory construction that
endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of these two laws in order that
each shall be effective, it is the finding of this Court that since the investigatory power
of the Ombudsman is so general, broad and vague and gives wider discretion to
disciplining authority to impose administrative sanctions against a responsible public
official or employee while that of Section 60 of the New Local Government Code
provides for more well defined and specific grounds upon which a local elective official
can be subjected to administrative disciplinary action, that it Could be considered that
the latter law could be an exception to the authority and administrative power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an investigation against local elective officials and as such,
the jurisdiction now to conduct administrative investigation against local elective
officials is already lodged before the offices concerned under Section 61 of Republic
Act No. 7160.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Order is hereby issued:
1) Expanding the restraining order dated September 25, 1992 issued by the Court into
an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting of the
petitioners of the bond in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
conditioned that the latter will pay all the costs that may be adjudged to the adverse
party and/or damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court
will finally adjudge that the petitioners are not entitled thereto, and
2) Denying the respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated September 28, 1992 for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued on 21 October 1992. 13 A motion for reconsideration made by
petitioner was denied by the trial court.
The instant recourse seeks the nullification of the order of 15 October 1992 and the writ of preliminary
injunction of 21 October 1992 both issued by the trial court and prays that respondent judge be directed to
desist from further proceeding with RTC Case No. MDE-14.
There is merit in the petition.
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987
Constitution, thus:
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
while his statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A.
No. 6770 that reads:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints
relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation;
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in
accordance with law;
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could be subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman, viz.:
Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials
of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)
Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, petitioner thus contends that the Office of
the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority to decree preventive suspension on any
public officer or employee under investigation by it. Said section of the law provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c)
the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Respondent officials, upon the other hand, argue that the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over
local officials must be deemed to have been removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which vests the authority to investigate administrative charges, listed under
Section 60 15 thereof, on various offices. In the case specifically of complaints against elective officials of
provinces and highly urbanized cities, the Code states:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against
any erring local elective officials shall be prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an
independent component city or component city shall be filed before the Office of the
President.
Thus respondents insist, conformably with Section 63 of the Local Government Code, preventive
suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the respondent is an elective official of
a province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city; . . . " under sub-paragraph (b)
thereof:
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence; Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials
shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that
several administrative cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the
same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
In his comment, which the Court required considering that any final resolution of the case would be a
matter of national concern, the Solicitor-General has viewed the Local Government Code of 1991 as
having conferred, but not on an exclusive basis, on the Office of the President (and the various
Sanggunians) disciplinary authority over local elective officials. He posits the stand that the Code did not
withdraw the power of the Ombudsman theretofore vested under R.A. 6770 conformably with a
constitutional mandate. In passing, the Solicitor General has also opined that the appropriate remedy that
should have been pursued by respondent officials is a petition for certiorari before this Court rather than
their petition for prohibition filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly
or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in
question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike
down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that
courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known
the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect
to all laws on the subject.
Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very reason that underlies the creation
of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom."
Quite interestingly, Sections 61 and 63 of the present Local Government Code run almost parallel with the
provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61 and Section 63 of the precursor local Government
Code of 1983, under the heading of "Suspension and Removal," read:
Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. Verified complaints against local elective
officials shall be prepared as follows:
(a) Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local
Government.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the
Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city or
municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined,
when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act
or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of
the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days
after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him until its
termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault,
neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over
elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government
until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770,
specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already
prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local
Government by the Office of the President.
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24
of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided by Section 63
of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions govern differently.
In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the
evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case
filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials,
whether elective or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter
period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an
elective local official (at any time after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the
evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office
of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records
and other evidence.
Respondent officials, nevertheless, claim that petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he
caused the issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing.
The contention is without merit. The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive
suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on the motion for preventive
suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be
that, as it may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a preventive suspension
can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are brought and even before the charges
are heard. Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of guilt or innocence. In
the early case of Nera vs. Garcia, reiterated in subsequent cases, we have said:
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the
administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or
penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after
such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an
opportunity to prove his innocence.
Moreover, respondent officials were, in point of fact, put on preventive suspension only after petitioner had
found, in consonance with our ruling in Buenaseda vs. Flavier, that the evidence of guilt was strong.
Petitioner gave his justification for the preventive suspension in this wise:
After a careful and honest scrutiny of the evidence submitted on record, at this stage,
it is the holding of this office that the evidence of guilt against the respondents in the
instant case is strong. There is no question that the charge against the respondents
involves dishonesty or gross misconduct which would warrant their removal from the
service and there is no gainsaying the fact that the charge for falsification of veritable
documents like city ordinances are very serious charges that affect the very
foundations of duly established representative governments. Finally, it is likewise the
holding of this office at this stage that the continued stay in office of respondents may
prejudice the judicious investigation and resolution of the instant case.
Finally, it does appear, as so pointed out by the Solicitor General, that respondent official's petition for
prohibition, being an application for remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21
September 1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court. The proscription in Section 14
of R.A. No. 6770 reads:
Sec. 14. Restrictions. No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is
a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
Likewise noteworthy is Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this Court on
matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases originating from the Office
of the Ombudsman; thus:
Sec. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. . . .
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition
for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
All told, petitioner is plainly entitled to the relief prayed for, and we must, accordingly; grant the petition.
WHEREFORE, the questioned writ of preliminary injunction of 21 October 1992 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and RTC Case No. MDE-14 is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., took no part.





OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, - versus- ROLSON RODRIGUEZ,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

D E C I S I O N


CARPIO, J .:

The Case


This is a petition for review[1] of the 8 May 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00528 setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the 21 September 2004 Decision[3] of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) in OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.


The Antecedent Facts

On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint[4] for abuse of authority,
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong
barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003, the sangguniang
bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar
complaint[5] against Rodriguez for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and
neglect of duty.

In its 8 September 2003 notice,[6] the municipal vice-mayor required Rodriguez to submit his answer
within 15 days from receipt of the notice. On 23 September 2003, Rodriguez filed a motion to
dismiss[7] the case filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint were
without factual basis and did not constitute any violation of law. In a compliance[8] dated 22 October 2003,
Rodriguez alleged complainants violated the rule against forum shopping.

Meanwhile, in its 10 September 2003 order,[9] the Ombudsman required Rodriguez to file his
answer. Rodriguez filed on 24 October 2003 a motion to dismiss[10] the case filed in the Ombudsman on
the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping. He alleged that the sangguniang bayan had already
acquired jurisdiction over his person as early as 8 September 2003.

The municipal vice-mayor set the case for hearing on 3 October 2003.[11] Since complainants had
no counsel, the hearing was reset to a later date. When the case was called again for hearing,
complainants counsel manifested that complainants would like to withdraw the administrative complaint
filed in the sangguniang bayan. On 29 October 2003, complainants filed a motion[12] to withdraw the
complaint lodged in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that they wanted to prioritize the complaint filed
in the Ombudsman. Rodriguez filed a comment[13] praying that the complaint be dismissed on the ground
of forum shopping, not on the ground complainants stated. In their opposition,[14] complainants admitted
they violated the rule against forum shopping and claimed they filed the complaint in the sangguniang
bayan without the assistance of counsel. In his 4 November 2003 Resolution,[15] the municipal vice-mayor
dismissed the case filed in the sangguniang bayan.

In its 29 January 2004 order,[16] the Ombudsman directed both parties to file their respective verified
position papers. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the pendency of his motion to
dismiss.[17] In its 11 March 2004 order,[18] the Ombudsman stated that a motion to dismiss was a
prohibited pleading under Section 5 (g) Rule III of Administrative Order No. 17. The Ombudsman reiterated
its order for Rodriguez to file his position paper.

In his position paper, Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to exercise
jurisdiction over the complaint filed against him. He claimed he had not received any resolution or decision
dismissing the complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. In reply,[19] complainants maintained there was
no more complaint pending in thesangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their motion to withdraw
the complaint. In a rejoinder,[20] Rodriguez averred that the sangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the
case filed against him was not valid because only the vice-mayor signed it.

The Ruling of the Ombudsman

In its 21 September 2004 Decision,[21] the Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and
oppression. It imposed on Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits,
disqualification to hold public office, and forfeiture of civil service eligibilities. Rodriguez filed a motion for
reconsideration.[22] In its 12 January 2005 Order,[23] the Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration. In its 8 March 2005 Order,[24] the Ombudsman directed the mayor of Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental to implement the penalty of dismissal against Rodriguez.

Rodriguez filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 8 May 2006 Decision,[25] the Court of Appeals set aside for lack of jurisdiction the Decision of
the Ombudsman and directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing on the administrative
case. The appellate court reasoned that the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction over the
person of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals relied on Section 4, Rule
46 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent by the service on him of its
order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by his voluntary
submission to such jurisdiction.

The appellate court noted that the sangguniang bayan served on Rodriguez a notice, requiring the
latter to file an answer, on 8 September 2003 while the Ombudsman did so two days later or on 10
September 2003.

Petitioner Ombudsman contends that upon the filing of a complaint before a body vested with
jurisdiction, that body has taken cognizance of the complaint. Petitioner cites Blacks Law Dictionary in
defining what to take cognizance means to wit, to acknowledge or exercise jurisdiction. Petitioner points
out it had taken cognizance of the complaint against Rodriguez before a similar complaint was filed in
the sangguniang bayan against the same respondent. Petitioner maintains summons or notices do not
operate to vest in the disciplining body jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in an administrative
case. Petitioner concludes that consistent with the rule on concurrent jurisdiction, the Ombudsmans
exercise of jurisdiction should be to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.

Private respondent Rolson Rodriguez counters that when a competent body has acquired jurisdiction
over a complaint and the person of the respondent, other bodies are excluded from exercising jurisdiction
over the same complaint. He cites Article 124 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 7160,[26] which provides that an elective official may be removed from office by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Private
respondent insists the sangguniang bayan first acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and his person. He
argues jurisdiction over the person of a respondent in an administrative complaint is acquired by the
service of summons or other compulsory processes. Private respondent stresses complainants violated
the rule against forum shopping when they filed identical complaints in two disciplining authorities
exercising concurrent jurisdiction.

The Issues

The issues submitted for resolution are (1) whether complainants violated the rule against forum
shopping when they filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayanidentical complaints against
Rodriguez; and (2) whether it was the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman that first acquired
jurisdiction.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has merit.

Paragraph 1, Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 13. The Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office, or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, states:

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions, and Duties. The Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigations of such cases.

The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts,
the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government.[27] Republic
Act No. 8249, otherwise known as An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, limits the
cases that are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 and higher. TheSandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private respondent who,
as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14 under Republic Act No.
6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.[28]

Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, to wit:

SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint
against any erring elective official shall be prepared as follows:

x x x x



(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before
the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall
be final and executory.


Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative
cases against elective barangayofficials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private
respondent in this case.

The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman,[29] which
likewise involved identical administrative complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang
panlungsod against a punong barangay for grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule against
forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.[30] Thus, even
if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private
respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature
of an administrative case.

In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the
body in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.[31] In this case, since the
complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the
complaint, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang
bayanexercising concurrent jurisdiction.


It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon
the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.[32]When herein complainants first
filed the complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no
longer be transferred to thesangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same
complainants.

As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has no
power to remove an elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do
so.[33] Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory.
The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove[34] an erring public official other than
members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment.[35]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 8 May 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528. We AFFIRM the 21 September 2004 Decision of the Ombudsman
(Visayas) in OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.











































The Sandiganbayan
CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO and REYNALDO G. MEJICA, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J .:
Petitioners Conrado B. Rodrigo and Reynaldo G. Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, respectively, of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, while petitioner Alejandro A.
Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer of the same municipality.
On 15 June 1992, the Municipality of San Nicolas, represented by Mayor Rodrigo, entered into an
agreement with Philwood Construction, represented by Larry Lu, for the electrification of Barangay
Caboloan, San Nicolas, for the sum of P486,386.18, requiring:
1. Installation of the two (2) units diesel power generator (20) KVA, 220 W, Battery start and other
accessories);
2. Installation of 24 rolls feeder lines with nos. 6, 8 and ten wires;
3. Installation of 40 units 4 x 4 wooden post with accessories; and
4. Construction of powerhouse with concrete foundation double throw safety switches (double pole, 250
amperes capacity of 220 V with fuse).[1]
On 2 September 1992, Mejica, the Planning and Development Coordinator of San Nicolas, prepared
an Accomplishment Report stating that the Caboloan Power Generation project was 97.5%
accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. On
the basis of said report, payment of P452,825.53 was effected by the Municipal Treasurer, petitioner
Facundo, to Philwood Construction.
On 14 August 1993, petitioners received a Notice of Disallowance dated 21 June 1993 from the
Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan, Atty. Agustin Chan, Jr., who found that as per COA (Commission on
Audit) evaluation of the electrification project, only 60.0171% of the project (equivalent to P291,915.07)
was actually accomplished. Of the two units of generator supposedly purchased, only one second-hand
unit was delivered. The same generator broke down after only two nights of operation. In addition, instead
of 40 wooden posts, only 27 were installed. The powerhouse was only 65.635% completed. The
Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the amount of P160,910.46.
The graph below serves to illustrate the conflicts between Mejicas report and the COAs:
Percentage
Accomplished

Amount paid
By Municipality
P452,825.53 93.0090% (accdg. to Mejicas report)
Cost of Actual
Accomplishment
P291,915.07 60.0171% (accdg. to COA report)
Amount
Disallowed
P160,910.46 33.08% (difference)
In September 1993, petitioners requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of
disallowance[2] and to re-inspect the project.[3] Petitioners reiterated their plea in a letter to the Provincial
Auditor dated 3 November 1993,[4] attaching therewith a Certificate of Acceptance and
Completion[5] signed by Clemente Arquero, Jr., Barangay Captain of Caboloan, and Eusebio Doton,
President of the Cabaloan Electric Cooperative. The Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act on
petitioners requests.
On 10 January 1994, the Provincial Auditor filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the
Ombudsman against petitioners. Likewise impleaded were Larry Lu and Ramil Ang, President and
General Manager, and Project Engineer, respectively, of Philwood Construction.
On 10 June 1995, Acting Ombudsman Francisco Villa approved the filing of an information against
petitioners for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019[6] before the Sandiganbayan.
On 28 July 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation before
the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan granted said motion in an Order dated 22 April 1996.
On 7 November 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor issued a memorandum recommending
that the charges against petitioners be maintained. The Ombudsman approved said memorandum.
Petitioners thereafter filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information alleging, as
grounds therefor that (1) the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense, and (2) the same
information charged more than one offense. Petitioners, however, did not elaborate on these
grounds. They instead faulted the Provincial Auditor for instituting the complaint against them
notwithstanding the pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance. They also argued that the
evidence against them did not establish the element of damage nor the presence of any conspiracy
between them.
The Sandiganbayan denied said motion in an Order dated 18 March 1996.
On 18 March 1996, the prosecution moved to suspend petitioners pendente lite. Petitioners
opposed the motion on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over them. In a Resolution
dated 2 July 1996, the Sandiganbayan ruled that it had jurisdiction over petitioners and ordered the
suspension of petitioners pendente lite.
Petitioners thus filed before this Court the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that
the Court annul: (a) the order of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to quash, and (b) the
resolution of the same court upholding its jurisdiction over petitioners. Petitioners likewise prayed that this
Court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the case.
On 28 August 1998, the court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for.
Petitioners allege the following grounds in support of their petition:
I
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ALLOWING THE LITIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION
FOR CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATING SECTION 3(E) OF THE ANTI- GRAFT ACT (R.A. 3019) WHEN THE
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE STILL PENDS WITH THE PROVINCIAL AUDITOR UNDER PETITIONER
PROTEST SUPPORTED BY CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE
REQUIRED ELEMENT OF 'CAUSING UNDUE INJURY TO ANY PARTY, INCLUDING THE
GOVERNMENT AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE.
II
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS NO JURISDICTION TO PROCEED AGAINST ALL THE PETITIONERS
AND ALL THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN, PARTICULARLY THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION FROM
OFFICE PENDENTE LITE, ARE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
III
THE ONGOING PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSEAS IT WAS
PRECEDED BY HASTY, MALICIOUS, SHAM AND HASTY PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
INEVITABLY EXPOSING THEM TO A PROLONGED ANXIETY, AGGRAVATION, EXPENSES, AND
HUMILIATION OF A PUBLIC TRIAL.
IV
THE PRECIPITATE SANDIGANBAYAN ORDER OF SUSPENSION IS A LEGAL ERROR AS THE SAME
EVIDENTLY THE LACK OF THE REQUIRED COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL
TRIBUNAL VIOLATING PETITIONERS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE AND BILL OF RIGHTS.[7]
The first ground raises two issues: (1) whether petitioners right to due process was violated by the
filing of the complaint against them by the Provincial Auditor, and (2) whether the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion in filing the information against petitioners. The second questions the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over petitioners. The third and fourth grounds are related to the first and are
subsumed thereunder.
After a meticulous scrutiny of petitioners arguments, we find the petition devoid of merit.
I
Petitioners contend that the institution by the Provincial Auditor of the complaint despite the
pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance violates their right to due process. They submit
that the issuance of a notice of disallowance against (them) compels the provincial auditor to either accept
a settlement or adjudicate and decide on the written explanation for the purpose of lifting/settling the
suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a
disallowance.[8]
The italicized portion above is an excerpt from Section 44.6.4 of the State Audit Manual, which
states in full:
Sec. 44.6.4. Auditors Responsibility re Evaluation of Disallowance. It shall be the responsibility of the
auditor to exercise professional judgment in evaluating, on the basis of the facts and circumstances of
each case as well as the pertinent provisions of applicable laws, rules and regulations, the grounds for a
charge or suspension/disallowance of an account or transaction.
It shall be the responsibility of the auditor to exercise sound judgment in evaluating the written explanation
of the accountable/responsible/liable officer concerned for the purpose of lifting the suspension or
extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to its conversion into a
disallowance. (Underscoring supplied.)
The aforequoted provision should be read in conjunction with Section 82 of the State Audit
Code,[9] which states that:
(a) charge of suspension which is not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or
notice by the accountable officer concerned shall become a disallowance, unless the Commission or
auditor concerned shall, in writing and for good cause shown, extend the time for answer beyond
ninety days.
At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between a disallowance and a
suspension. A disallowance is the disapproval of a credit or credits to an account/accountable officers
accountability due to non-compliance with law or regulations.[10] Thus, the auditor may disallow an
expenditure/transaction which is unlawful or improper.[11]
A suspension, on the other hand, is the deferment of action to debit/credit the account/accountable
officers accountability pending compliance with certain requirements.[12] A notice of suspension is issued
on transactions or accounts which could otherwise have been settled except for some requirements, like
lack of supporting documents or certain signatures. It is also issued on transactions or accounts the
legality/propriety of which the auditor doubts but which he may later allow after satisfactory or valid
justification is submitted by the parties concerned.[13]
As stated in Section 82, supra, however, the suspension shall become a disallowance if the charge
of suspension is not satisfactorily explained within ninety days after receipt or notice by the accountable
officer concerned." The ninety-day period within which the accountable officer may answer the charge of
suspension may nevertheless be extended by the Commission or the auditor for good cause shown.
Clearly, petitioners misinterpreted Section 44.6.4. First, petitioners were not charged
with suspension but disallowance. Second, the written explanation referred to in said section is for the
purpose of lifting the suspension or extending the time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to
its conversion into a disallowance, not for contesting a disallowance, as petitioners wrongfully assert.
Section 44.6.4., therefore, finds no application in this case.
On the other hand, respondents correctly invoke Sections 55 and 56 of Commission on Audit
Circular No. 85-156-B, which respectively provide:
SECTION 55. REPORTING FRAUD/UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES
If after evaluation of the findings, the auditor is convinced that the evidence sufficiently discloses the fraud
and other unlawful activities and identifies the perpetrators thereof, he shall prepare the sworn statements
of the examining witnesses and/or other witnesses and make a report to the Manager/Regional Director
concerned, attaching thereto copies of the pertinent affidavits and other supporting documents.
SECTION 56. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
If criminal prosecution is warranted, the Regional Director/Manager concerned with respect to National
Government Agencies/government Owned or Controlled Corporations or Provincial/City Auditors with
respect to local government units shall prepare a letter-complaint and file the same with the Tanodbayan
or the local deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor within ten (10) days from receipt of the report from the
examining auditor, attaching thereto copies of the sworn statements or affidavits of witnesses and other
pertinent documents.
Section 56 imposes upon the Provincial Auditor the duty to file a complaint before the Tanodbayan
(now the Ombudsman) when, from the evidence obtained during the audit, he is convinced that criminal
prosecution is warranted. The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the opposition to the notice of
disallowance and the motion for re-inspection pending in his office before he institutes such complaint so
long as there are sufficient grounds to support the same. The right to due process of the respondents to
the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is concerned, is not impaired by such
institution. The respondents will still have the opportunity to confront the accusations contained in the
complaint during the preliminary investigation. They may still raise the same defenses contained in their
motion to lift the disallowance, as well as other defenses, in the preliminary investigation. Should the
Provincial Auditor later reverse himself and grant respondents motions, or should the COA, or this Court,
subsequently absolve them from liability during the pendency of the preliminary investigation, the
respondents may ask the prosecuting officer to take cognizance of such decision. The prosecuting officer
may then accord such decision its proper weight.
It bears stressing that the exoneration of respondents in the audit investigation does not mean the
automatic dismissal of the complaint against them. The preliminary investigation, after all, is independent
from the investigation conducted by the COA, their purposes distinct from each other. The first involves
the determination of the fact of the commission of a crime; the second relates to the administrative aspect
of the expenditure of public funds.[14]
Accordingly, we hold that the Ombudsman did not err in entertaining the complaint filed by the
Provincial Auditor against petitioners, nor the Sandiganbayan in allowing trial to proceed, despite the
pendency of petitioners motions before the auditor.
II
Petitioners argue that their opposition to the disallowance, supported as it is by a certificate of
acceptance and completion, would betray the absence of the elements of evident bad faith or negligence,
and damage. They likewise claim that the evidence does not establish conspiracy among them.
The presence or absence of the elements of the crime, however, is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.[15] The
same applies to the alleged absence of any conspiracy between the accused.
This Court, moreover, has maintained a consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of
the Ombudsman regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the
exercise of such discretion.[16] In a recent decision,[17] this Court, quoting Young vs. Office of the
Ombudsman,[18] stated the rationale for this rule:
... The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the
court will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much
the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
Petitioners have failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
III
Petitioners next question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They contend that Mayor Rodrigo
occupies a position of Grade 24 and is, therefore, beyond the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
theSandiganbayan.
Before the passage of Republic Act No. 7975[19] on 30 March 1995, the pertinent portions of section
4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,[20] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,[21] read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in
this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment
for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
xxx.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 subsequently redefined the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court such that
the pertinent portions of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic
Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a)
of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
x x x
Then Associate, now Chief Justice, Hilario Davide explained the effects of these amendments
in People vs. Magallanes:[22]
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original
jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended,[23] as amended; R.A. No.
1379,[24]and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,[25] it retains only cases where the
accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above and, generally, national and local officials
classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A.
No. 6758). Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed penalty, viz., that which is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they
are committed by those public officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4
above. However, it retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to
or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1,[26] 2,[27] 14,[28] and 14-A.[29]
The apparent intendment of these amendments is to ease the dockets of the Sandiganbayan and to
allow the Anti-Graft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of those occupying higher positions in government,
the proverbial big fish. Section 4, as amended, freed the Sandiganbayan from the task of trying cases
involving lower-ranking government officials, imposing such duty upon the regular courts instead. The
present structure is also intended to benefit these officials of lower rank, especially those residing outside
Metro Manila, charged with crimes related to their office, who can ill-afford the expenses of a trial in Metro
Manila. As the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9825[30] states:
One is given the impression that only lowly government workers or the so-called small fry are expediently
tried and convicted by the Sandiganbayan. The reason for this is that at present, theSandiganbayan has
the exclusive and original jurisdiction over graft cases committed by all officials and employees of the
government, irrespective of rank and position, from the lowest-paid janitor to the highly-placed government
official. This jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan must be modified in such a way that only those occupying
high positions in the government and the military (the big fishes) may fall under its exclusive and original
jurisdiction. In this was, the Sandiganbayan can devote its time to big time cases involving the big fishes
in the government. The regular courts will be vested with the jurisdiction of cases involving less-ranking
officials (those occupying positions corresponding to salary grade twenty-seven (27) and below and PNP
members with a rank lower than Senior Superintendent. This set-up will prove more convenient to people
in the provinces. They will no longer have to travel to Manila to file their complaint or to defend
themselves. They can already file their complaint or their defense before the Regional Trial Court or the
Municipal Trial Court in their respective localities, as the case may be.
To distinguish the big fish from the small fry, Congress deemed the 27th Grade as the
demarcation between those who should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and those
within the regular courts. (While H.B. No. 9825 originally intended only officials of Grade 28 and above as
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the resulting law included officials of
Grade 27.) Thus, officials occupying positions of Grade 27 and above, charged with crimes referred to in
Section 4 a. and b., are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; those below
come under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Although some positions of Grade 27 and above are stated by name in Section 4 a., the position of
Municipal Mayor is not among them. Nevertheless, Congress provided a catchall in Section 4 a. (5), thus:
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
Such a catchall is necessary, for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each
position created or will be created pertaining to Grades 27 and above.
At present, Volume III of the 1997 edition of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and
Salary Grades, which was prepared by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6758,[31] otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, lists the following positions under Salary Grade 27, including the position of Municipal Mayor I:
Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Assistant Regional Cabinet Secretary
Assistant Regional Executive Secretary
Board Member I
Chairman, Police Regional Appellate Board
Chief of Mission, Class II
City Government Department Head III
City Trial Court Judge
Clerk of the Commission
Commission Member I
Court Attorney VI
Court of Appeals Reporter II
Deputy Administrator I
Deputy Commissioner I
Deputy Executive Director III
Deputy Insurance Commissioner
Director III
Executive Clerk of Court II
Executive Director II
Government Corporate Attorney III
Graft Investigation Officer II
Municipal Mayor I
Professor IV
Project Manager III
Prosecutor II
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
Public Attorney IV
Regional Treasurer
Register of Deeds IV
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member
Sangguniang Panlungsod Member II
Scientist II
Solicitor II
Special Prosecution Officer II
State Counsel IV
SUC President I
SUC Vice-President III
Earlier, in the 1989 version of the same Index, the Municipal Mayor was also assigned a Salary Grade of
27. It appears, therefore, that petitioner Mayor comes within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners, however, claim that at the time of the commission of the alleged crime on or about 2
September 1992, Mayor Rodrigo, the highest public ranking public official impleaded in this case, was
receiving a monthly salary of P10,441.00. Such amount 6758 is supposedly equivalent to a fourth step
increment in Grade 24 under the Salary Schedule prescribed in Section 7 of R.A. No. 6758: *
SEC. 7. Salary Schedule. The Department of Budget and Management is hereby directed to implement
the Salary Schedule prescribed below:
Salary Schedule
Grade 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th
Xxx
24 10,135 10,236 10,339 10,442 10,646 10,652 10,768 10,866
Xxx

Petitioners conclude that Mayor Rodrigo, at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, was
occupying a Grade 24 position and, thus, not within the Sandiganbayans original and exclusive
jurisdiction, as defined in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975.
This is a simplistic, and altogether incorrect, interpretation of the law.
Section 5, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that:
The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporation with original charters, taking
into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their
positions.
This provision is not unique to the 1987 Constitution. The 1973 Constitution, in Section 6, Article XII
thereof, contains a very similar provision pursuant to which then President Marcos, in the exercise of his
legislative powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 985.[32]
However, with the advent of the new Constitution, and in compliance therewith, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 6758. Section 2 thereof declares it the policy of the State to provide equal pay for substantially
equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions."
To give life to this policy, as well as the constitutional prescription to (take) into account the nature
of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions of government officials
and employees, Congress adopted the scheme employed in P.D. No. 985 for classifying positions with
comparable responsibilities and qualifications for the purpose of according such positions similar
salaries. This scheme is known as the Grade, defined in P.D. No. 985 as:
Includ[ing] all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work,
are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements
of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic
compensation.[33]
The Grade is therefore a means of grouping positions sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty
and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work so that they may be lumped
together in one range of basic compensation.
Thus, Congress, under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6758, fixed the Salary Grades[34] of officials holding
constitutional positions, as follows:
SEC. 8. Salaries of Constitutional Officials and their Equivalent. Pursuant to Section 17, Article XVIII of
the Constitution, the salary of the following officials shall be in accordance with the Salary Grades
indicated hereunder:
Salary
Grade

President of the Philippines 33
Vice-President of the Philippines 32
President of the Senate 32
Speaker of the House of
Representatives
32
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 32
Senator 31
Member of the House of
Representatives
31
Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court
31
Chairman of a Constitutional
Commission under Article IX,
1987 Constitution

31
Member of a Constitutional
Commission under Article IX, 1987
Constitution

30

The Department of Budget and Management is hereby authorized to determine the officials who are of
equivalent rank to the foregoing Officials, where applicable, and may be assigned the same Salary Grades
based on the following guidelines:
x x x
As indicated in the aforequoted section, Congress delegated the rest of this tedious task (of fixing
Salary Grades) to the DBM, subject to the standards contained in R.A. No. 6758, by authorizing the DBM
to determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable, and to
assign them the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.[35]
For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 directs the DBM to prepare the
Index of Occupational Services guided by (a) the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9,[36] and (b)
the following factors:
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position;
(2) nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
Pursuant to such authority, the DBM drafted the 1989 Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades, later revised in 1997. In both versions, the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned
a Salary Grade 27.
That petitioner received a salary less than that prescribed for such Grade is explained by Sections
10 and 19 (b) of R.A. No. 6758, which respectively provide:
SEC. 10. Local Government Units (LGUs). -- The rates of pay in LGUs shall be determined on the basis of
the class and financial capability of each LGU: Provided, That such rates of pay shall not exceed the
following percentages of the rates in the salary schedule prescribed under Section 7 hereof:

For
Provinces/Cities
For
Municipalities
Special
Cities
100%
1stClass 100% 90%
2ndClass 95% 85%
3rdClass 90% 80%
4thClass 85% 75%
5thClass 80% 70%
6thClass 75% 65%

SEC. 19. Funding Source. The funding sources for the amounts necessary to implement this Act shall
be as follows:
(a) x x x
(b) For local government units, the amount shall be charged against their respective funds. Local
government units which do not have adequate or sufficient funds shall only partially implement the
established rates as may be approved by the Joint Commission under Section 8 of Presidential Decree
No. 1188: Provided, That any partial implementation shall be uniform and proportionate for all positions in
each local government unit: Provided further, That savings from National Assistance to Local Government
Units (NALGU) funds may be used for this purpose.
x x x. (Underscoring supplied.)
Thus, a local government officials actual salary may be less than what the Salary Schedule under
Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local
government unit. This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such officials Grade. As the foregoing
discussion shows, on officials salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position,
andultimately by the nature of his position the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of
qualification requirements of the work. To give credence to petitioners argument that Mayor Rodrigos
salary determines his Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the
constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.
Petitioner mayors position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758,
and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2
of R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of the same Section 4 a., as amended, his co-accused are also subject to the
Anti-Graft Courts jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by
this Court on 28 August 1996 LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, and Pardo, JJ., concur.


























CONRADO B. RODRIGO, JR., ALEJANDRO A. FACUNDO and REYNALDO G. MEJICA, petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), OMBUDSMAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
KAPUNAN, J .:
In our Decision dated 18 February 1999, we upheld the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
petitioners thus:
Petitioner mayors position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758, and
having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No.
7975. By virtue of the same Section 4 a., as amended, his co-accused are also subject to the Anti-Graft
Courts jurisdiction.
We noted that while Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, did not expressly include the
position of Municipal Mayor as among those within the Sandiganbayans exclusive and original jurisdiction,
such position is embraced in the catch-all provision, Section 4 a. (5).
The Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,[1] however, does not specify the Grade
accorded the position of Municipal Mayor. Instead, Section 9 of said law provides:
SEC. 9. Salary Grade Assignments for Other Positions. For positions below the Officials mentioned
under Section 8 hereof and their equivalent, whether in the National Government, local government units,
government-owned or controlled corporations or financial institutions, the Department of Budget and
Management is hereby directed to prepare the Index of Occupational Services to be guided by the
Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed hereunder and the following factors: (1) the education and
experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the position; (2) the nature and complexity
of the work to be performed; (3) the kind of supervision received; (4) mental and/or physical strain required
in the completion of the work; (5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships; (6) kind of
supervision exercised; (7) decision-making responsibility; (8) responsibility for accuracy of records and
reports; (9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and (10) hardship, hazard and personal risk
involved in the job.
Benchmark Position Schedule
Position Title Salary Grade
Laborer I 1
Messenger 2
Clerk I 3
Driver I 3
Stenographer I 4
Mechanic I 4
Carpenter II 5
Electrician II 6
Secretary I 7
Bookkeeper 8
Administrative Assistant 8
Education Research Assistant I 9
Cashier I 10
Nurse I 10
Teacher I 10
Agrarian Reform Program Technologist 10
Budget Officer I 11
Chemist I 11
Agriculturist I 11
Social Welfare Officer I 11
Engineer I 12
Veterinarian I 13
Legal Officer I 14
Administrative Officer II 15
Dentist II 16
Postmaster IV 17
Forester III 18
Associate Professor I 19
Rural Health Physician 20
In no case shall the salary of the chairman, president, general manager or administrator, and the board of
directors of government-owned or controlled corporations, and financial institutions exceed Salary Grade
30: Provided, That the President may, in truly exceptional cases, approve higher compensation for the
aforesaid officials.
In accordance with the above Section and that of Section 6[2] of the same law, the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) prepared the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary
Grades where the position of Municipal Mayor was assigned Salary Grade 27.
Petitioners now move for a reconsideration of our decision, contending that the authority of the DBM
was limited to thepreparation of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. A
new law adopting said Index, petitioners argue, is required for such Index to have the force of law. It is
also alleged that the authority conferred upon the DBM constitutes an undue delegation of the legislative
powers resulting in the executive branch, through the DBM, determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners overlook Section 444 (d) of the Local Government Code,[3] which provides:
The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade
twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant
thereto. (Underscoring supplied.)
The above provision is confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors,
and should thus lay the matter of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over petitioner Mayor to rest.
In any event, we find unmeritorious petitioners contention that a new law adopting the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades is necessary for it to have legal effect. To
accord merit to petitioners argument would render superfluous the above-quoted Section 9. If Congress
intended the Index to be, in petitioners words, a mere preparatory step, it could have simply required the
DBM to submit a proposed Index before enacting R.A. No. 6758, and incorporated therein such a
proposal.
The implications of petitioners theory would likewise result in absurdity for it would mean that every
time the DBM assigns a position to its proper grade, Congress would have to enact a law adopting such
allocation. Such a construction would be contrary to Section 17 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 985, as
amended by Section 14, R.A. No. 6758, which authorizes the DBM to administer and revise the
Compensation and Position Classification System as necessary.
The reason Congress delegated the administration of the System to the DBM is precisely to relieve
itself of this cumbersome task, leaving to the DBM the preparation of the Index to fill in the details.
Indeed, this is the very rationale for the delegation of powers by the legislature to administrative
agencies. With their specialized knowledge, administrative agencies are more up to tasks involving their
expertise.
xxx. To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the
competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions
may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields
assigned to them. With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a
statue by filing in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide.[4]
Through delegation, Congress may devote more time to address other pressing matters. Moreover,
Congress may be slow to act on matters requiring continuous decision. Thus, Professor Jaffes
observations, quoted by then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in Trade Unions of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS-WFTU) vs. Ople,[5] is even more appropriate today:
xxx. Power should be delegated where there is agreement that a task must be performed and it cannot be
effectively performed by the legislature without the assistance of a delegate or without an expenditure of
time so great as to lead to the neglect of equally important business. Delegation is most commonly
indicated where the relations to be regulated are highly technical or where their regulation requires a
course of continuous decision.
With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts.[6]
It must be clarified that what Congress delegated to the DBM is the administration of the
Compensation and Position Classification System, and, with it the, assignment of Salary Grades not the
determination of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. When the DBM assigns a position a certain Salary
Grade, it does so pursuant to its authority under R.A. No. 6758. That by such allocation the official comes
under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is only incidental to the exercise of
such authority.
R.A. No. 6758 is not an undue delegation of legislative powers. The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated, or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestats delegata non delegari
potest.[7]This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.[8] Congress
however may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law for the reasons stated above. Nevertheless, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must
set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate- and (b) fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.[9]
R.A. No. 6758 is complete in itself. It sets forth the policy to be carried out or implemented by the
delegate, the DBM in this case, in Section 2 thereof:
SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. xxx.
R.A. No. 6758 fixes a standard and the limits of such standards are sufficiently determinate or
determinable. Particularly with regard to the assignment of Salary Grades for positions below those in
Section 8, Section 9 provides the standards which should guide the DBM in preparing the Index of
Occupational Services. These are (a) the Benchmark Position Schedule prescribed in Section 9 and (b)
the ten (10) factors enumerated therein.
Finally, petitioners claim that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witnesses in their case would come from Baguio City and
San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No.
7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.
The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement its intent,
and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with Grade 27 and above
shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the
congressional will.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration. This
denial is FINAL.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Melo, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.







CRESENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and LETICIA G.
FUERTES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
In a prosecution for violation of Section 3[e] of the Anti-Graft Law, that is, causing undue injury to
any party, the government prosecutors must prove actual injury to the offended party; speculative or
incidental injury is not sufficient.
The Case
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision promulgated on June 23, 1995 and the Resolution
promulgated on October 12, 1995 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 18343, finding Cresente Y.
Llorente, Jr. guilty as charged.
Llorente, then municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, was charged with violation of
Sec. 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, under an
Information dated October 22, 1992, textually reproduced as follows:[1]
That in or about and during the period of July, 1990 to October, 1991, or for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sindangan, Province of Zamboanga del Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., a public officer, being then the Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, in the exercise of his official and administrative functions, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith refuse to sign and approve the payrolls and
vouchers representing the payments of the salaries and other emoluments of Leticia G.
Fuertes, without just valid cause and without due process of law, thereby causing undue injury
to the said Leticia G. Fuertes.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Duly arraigned on March 29, 1993, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of NOT
GUILTY.[2] After trial in due course, the Sandiganbayan[3] rendered the assailed Decision, disposing as
follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr.
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act 3019, as amended, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6)
YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH, as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, as maximum; to further
suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; and to pay the costs.
Respondent Court denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution,
thus:[5]
WHEREFORE, accuseds Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. His Motion for Marking of Additional Exhibits Cum Offer of Documentary Exhibits
in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial is now rendered moot and
academic.
Hence, this petition.[6]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
As found by Respondent Court, the prosecutions version of the facts of this case is as follows:[7]
After appreciating all the evidence on both sides, the following uncontroverted facts may be
gleaned:
1. Accused Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr., at the time the alleged act was committed, was the
Municipal Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
2. Private [C]omplainant, Leticia C. Fuertes, is the duly appointed Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the
same municipality since October 18, 1985.
3. Starting 1986, private complainant was detailed to different offices, as follows:
(a) Municipality of Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte from April, 1986 to August, 1987 as OIC
Municipal Treasurer.
(b) Municipality of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte from September, 1987 to March, 1988 as OIC
Municipal Treasurer.
(c) Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte from April, 1988 to May, 1988.
(d) Municipality of Pian, Zamboanga del Norte from June, 1988 to June, 1990 as OIC Municipal
Treasurer.
4. In July, 1990, she was returned to her post as Assistant Municipal Treasurer in the town of
Sindangan.
She was not provided with office table and chair nor given any assignment; neither her daily
time record and application for leave acted upon by the municipal treasurer per instruction of
accused Mayor (Exh. G-2; G-3).
5. On July 23, 1990, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, presided
by accused Mayor, passed Resolution No. SB 214 (Exh. 3), vehemently objecting to the
assignment of complainant as Assistant Municipal Treasurer of Sindangan.
6. On March 12, 1991, accused Municipal Mayor received a letter (SB Resolution No. 36)
from the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Pian, demanding from the private
complainant return of the amount overpaid to her as salaries (par. 9, p. 2 of Exh. 4 counter-
affidavit of accused Mayor).
7. On May 22, 1991, private complainant filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages (Exh.
E) against the accused Mayor and the Municipality of Sindangan before Branch II, Regional
Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte docketed as Special Proceedings No. 45, for
the alleged unjustified refusal of Mayor Llorente to sign and/or approve her payrolls and/or
vouchers representing her salaries and other emoluments as follows: (a) salary for the month of
June, 1990 in the amount of P5,452.00 under disbursement voucher dated September 5, 1990
(Exh. H). Although complainant rendered services at the municipality of Pian during this
period, she could not collect her salary there considering that as of that month, Pian had
already appointed an Assistant Municipal Treasurer. When she referred the matter to the
Provincial Auditor, she was advised to claim her salary for that month with her mother agency,
the Municipality of Sindangan, [(]p. 12, TSN of August 9, 1994; 10th paragraph of complainants
Supplemental Affidavit marked Exh. G); (b) salary differential for the period from July 1, 1989
to April 30, 1990 in the total amount of P19,480.00 under disbursement voucher dated August,
1990 (Exh. I); (c) 13th month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance under Supplemental
Budget No. 5, CY 1990 in the total amount of P7,275 per disbursement voucher dated
December 4, 1990 (Exh. J); (d) vacation leave commutation for the period from October to
December 31, 1990 in the total amount of P16,356.00 per disbursement voucher dated
December 3, 1990 (Exh. K); (e) RATA for the months of July, August and September, 1990,
January and February, 1991 in the total amount of P5,900.00 (par. 12 & 16 of Exh. E); and (f)
salaries for January and February, 1991 in the total amount of P10,904.00 (par. 17 of Exh. E).
8. Accused Mayor did not file an answer; instead, he negotiated for an amicable settlement
of the case (p. 24, TSN of August 10, 1994). Indeed, a Compromise Agreement (Exh. A)
dated August 27, 1991, between the accused and private complainant was submitted to and
approved by the court, hereto quoted as follows:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
That the parties have agreed, as they hereby agree, to settle this case amicably on the basis of the
following terms and conditions, to wit:
(a) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente, Jr. binds himself to sign and/or approve all
vouchers and/or payrolls for unpaid salaries, RATA, Cash-gifts, 13th month pay, clothing allowance, salary
differentials and other emoluments which the petitioner is entitled is Assistant Municipal Treasurer of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte;
(b) That the parties herein hereby waive, renounce and relinquish their other claims and counter-
claims against each other;
(c) That the respondent Mayor Cresente Y. Llorente Jr. binds himself to sign and/or approve all
subsequent vouchers and payrolls of the herein petitioner.
9. On August 27, 1991, a Decision (Exh. B) was rendered by Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena on
the basis of the aforesaid compromise agreement.
10. For his failure to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement, private
complainant, thru counsel, filed a Motion for Execution on September 12, 1991. A Writ of
Execution (Exh. C) was issued by the Court on September 17, 1991, and served [on] the
accused on September 23, 1991.
11. As shown in the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D), private complainant
was paid her salaries for the period from January, 1991 to August, 1991, while the rest of her
salaries including the RATA and other emoluments were not paid considering the alleged need
of a supplemental budget to be enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sindangan per verbal
allegation of the municipal treasurer.
12. Complainant was not also paid her salaries from July to December 1990; September and
October, 1991; RATA for the period from July 1990 to June 1994 (admission of accused, pp. 8-
9, TSN of June 27, 1994, a.m.; Exh. E; p. 17, TSN of June 27, 1994).
13. Sometime in 1993, accused municipal mayor received from the Municipality of Pian, Bill
No. 93-08 (Exh. 1), demanding from the Municipality of Sindangan settlement of overpayment
to complainant Fuertes in the amount of P50,643.93 per SB Resolution No. 6 sent on July 23,
1990. The bill was settled by the Municipality of Sindangan in December, 1993 per
Disbursement Voucher No. 101-9312487 dated December 2, 1993 (Exh. 2).
14. Private complainant was able to receive complete payment of her claims only on January
4, 1993 in the form of checks all dated December 29, 1992 (as appearing on Exhs. H, I, J,
K of the prosecution, Exhs. 6, 7, 8, of the defense) except her RATA which was given to her
only on July 25, 1994, covering the period from July 1990 to December, 1993 amounting to
P55,104.00, as evidenced by Disbursement Voucher dated July 25, 1994 (Exh. 5).
Version of the Defense
While admitting some delays in the payment of the complainants claims, petitioner sought to prove
the defense of good faith -- that the withholding of payment was due to her failure to submit the required
money and property clearance, and to the Sangguniang Bayans delayed enactment of a supplemental
budget to cover the claims. He adds that such delays did not result in undue injury to complainant. In his
memorandum, petitioner restates the facts as follows:[8]
1. Complainant xxx was appointed assistant municipal treasurer of Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte on October 18, 1985. However, starting 1986 until July 1990, or for a period of about
four (4) and one half (1/2) years, she was detailed in other municipalities and in the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Zamboanga del Norte. She returned as assistant treasurer of
Sindangan in July 1990. (Decision, pp. 5-6).
2. As complainant had been working in municipallities and offices other than in Sindangan for
more than four (4) years, her name was removed from the regular payroll of Sindangan, and
payment of past salaries and other emoluments had to be done by vouchers. When
complainant xxx presented her vouchers to petitioner, the latter required her to submit
clearances from the different offices to which she was detailed, as well as a certificate of last
payment as required by COA regulations (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994). Instead of submitting the
required documents, Mrs. Fuertes said that what I did, I endorsed my voucher to the mayor
through the municipal treasurer (Tsn, p. 13, June 27, 1994). The municipal treasurer could
not, however, process the vouchers and certify as to the availability of funds until after the
Sangguniang Bayan had passed a supplemental budget for the purpose (Exhs. D and 6-c
Motion), which came only in December 1992.
3. Petitioner, in the meanwhile, received on March 12, 1991 SB Resolution No. 36 from the
Municipality of Pinan, demanding from Mrs. xxx Fuertes the reimbursement ofP105,915.00, and
because of this demand, he needed time to verify the matter before acting on Mrs. Fuertes
claims (Exh. 4). Mrs. Fuertes admitted that she had at the time problems of accountability with
the Municipality of Pinan. She testified:
Q. Counsel now is asking you, when you went back to Sindangan there was [sic] still problems of the
claims either against you or against the Municipality of Sindangan by the municipalities had, [sic]
in their minds, overpaid you?
A. Yes, your Honor, that was evidence[d] by the bill of the Municipality of Pinan to the Municipality of
Sindangan. (Tsn, p. 18, Aug. 3, 194).
4. Petitioner also stated that he could not act on complainants claims because she had not
submitted the required money and property accountability clearance from Pinan (Tsn, 11, Aug.
10, 1994) and that at the time the Sangguniang Bayan had not appropriated funds for the
purpose. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994). Nonetheless, petitioner included Mrs.
Fuertes name in the regular annual budget beginning 1991 (Exhs. 4-b, 4-d, 4-f), as a result of
which she had been since then receiving her regular monthly salary.
5. On May 21, 1991, Mrs. Fuertes filed a complaint xxx. Petitioner filed his answer to the
complaint, alleging as a defense, that plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies. (Annex
B, p. 3, Petition; Exh. 1-Motion). On August 27, 1991, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement, which the trial court approved (Exh. B). x x x.
6. Upon motion of counsel for Mrs. Fuertes, the trial court issued a writ of execution of the
compromise judgment. However, the writ of execution was addressed only to petitioner; it was
not served on the municipal Sangguniang Bayan. x x x.
Thus, Mrs. Fuertes had been receiving her regular salary from January, 1991 because
petitioner had included her name in the regular budget beginning 1991, which fact complainant
did not dispute. With respect to her other claims for past services in other offices, Municipal
Treasurer, Mrs. Narcisa Caber, informed that a supplemental budget for such purpose to be
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan was necessary before she could be paid thereof. Being the
municipal treasurer, Mrs. Caber knew that without such supplemental budget, payment of Mrs.
Fuertes other claims could not be made because the law requires that disbursements shall be
made in accordance with the ordinance authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations
(Sec. 346, RA 7160) and that no money shall be disbursed unless xxx the local treasurer
certifies to the availability of funds for the purpose. (Sec. 344, RA 7160).
7. Petitioner had instructed the municipal budget officer to prepare the supplemental budget
for payment of complainants unpaid claims for submission to the Sangguniang [Bayan] for
enactment. (Tsn, pp. 32-33, Aug. 10, 1994). The budget officer, Mr. Narciso Siasico stated as
follows:
1. I am the budget officer for the Municipality of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, a position I have held since 1981.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Immediately after said mandamus case was settled through a compromise
agreement, Mayor Llorente instructed me to prepare the necessary budget
proposals for the deliberation and approval of the Sangguniang Bayan;
xxx xxx xxx.
8. Instead of waiting for the Sangguniang Bayan to enact the budget or of securing
an alias writ of execution to compel the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the same, Mrs. Fuertes
filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman under date of October 28, 1991,
admitting receipt of her salaries from January 1991 and saying she had not been paid her other
claims in violation of the compromise judgment. (Exh. F). She had thus made the Office of the
Ombudsman a collecting agency to compel payment of the judgment obligation.
9. While the budget proposal had been prepared and submitted to the Sangguniang Bayan
for action, it took time for the Sangguniang Bayan to pass the supplemental budget and for the
Provincial Board to approve the same. It was only on December 27, 1992 that the municipal
treasurer and the municipal accountant issued a certification of availability of funds for the
purpose. Petitioner approved the vouchers immediately, and in a period of one week, Mrs.
Fuertes was paid all claims, as evidenced by the prosecutions Exhs. H, I, J and K, which were
the four vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes, xxxx.
xxx xxx xxx
11. Petitioner testified that he could not immediately sign or approve the vouchers of Mrs.
Fuertes for the following reasons:
a) The Sangguniang Bayan had not appropriated the amounts to pay Mrs.
Fuertes. (Tsn, pp. 18, 30, 42-43, Aug. 10, 1994).
b) Municipal Treasurer Caber, to whom Mrs. Fuertes endorsed her vouchers
for processing, and the Municipal Accountant issued the certificate of availability of
funds only on December 27, 1992 (Tsn, p. 42, Aug. 10, 1994; Exhs. H, I, J and K);
and the delay in the issuance of the certificate of availability of funds was due to the
delay by the Provincial Board to approve the supplemental budget. (Tsn, p. 43, Aug.
10, 1994).
[c]) He received on March 12, 1991 a demand from the Municipality of Pinan,
Zamboanga del Norte, where Mrs. Fuertes last worked, for the reimbursement of
P105,915.00, and the matter had to be clarified first. (Exh. 4). Mrs. Fuertes
admitted that she had some problem of accountability with the Municipality of Pinan.
(Tsn, p. 18, 1994). It took time before this matter could be clarified by the
Municipality of Pinan reducing its claim to P50,647.093 and the Municipality of
Sindangan paying said claim. (Exh. 2; Decision, p. 9).
[d]) Mrs. Fuertes had not submitted the required clearance from the Municipality
of Pinan. (Tsn, p. 11, Aug. 10, 1994). He did not insist on this requirement after the
trial court issued the writ of execution to implement the compromise judgment. (Tsn,
p. 23, Aug. 10, 1994). Nonetheless, in the post audit of Mrs. Fuertes accountability,
the Commission on Audit issued a notice of suspension of the amount of P5,452.00
from Mrs. Fuertes for her failure to submit: 1. Clearance for money & property
accountability from former office. 2. Certification as [sic] last day of service in former
office. 3. Certification of last salary received & issued by the disbursing officer in
former office, certified by chief accountant and verified by resident auditor. (Exh. 2-
Motion).
12. The Information dated October 12, 1992 filed against petitioner alleged that petitioner as
mayor did not sign and approve the vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes for payment of her salaries and
other emoluments from July 1, 1990 to October 1991, which caused her undue
injury. However, the prosecutions Exh. D, the sheriffs return dated November 19, 1991,
stated that Mrs. Fuertes had received her salary from January 1, 1991 up to the present, which
meant that even before the information was filed, she had been paid her regular salaries from
January 1, 1991 to October 1991. The supplemental budget to cover payment of her other
claims for past services was passed only in December 1992 and the municipal treasurer and
accountant issued the certificate of availability of funds only on December 27, 1992, and Mrs.
Fuertes got paid of [sic] all her other claims, including those not claimed in the Information,
within one week therefrom. (Exhs. H, I, J, and K).
xxx xxx xxx.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
Respondent Court held that the delay or withholding of complainants salaries and emoluments was
unreasonable and caused complainant undue injury. Being then the sole breadwinner in their family, the
withholding of her salaries caused her difficulties in meeting her familys financial obligations like paying for
the tuition fees of her four children. Petitioners defense that complainant failed to attach the required
money and property clearance to her vouchers was held to be an afterthought that was brought about, in
the first place, by his own failure to issue any memorandum requiring its submission. That the voucher
form listed the clearance as one of the requirements for its approval had neither been brought to
complainants attention, nor raised by petitioner as defense in his answer. In any event, the payment of
complainants salary from January to November 1991, confirmed by the sheriffs return, showed that the
clearance was not an indispensable requirement, because petitioner could have acted upon or approved
the disbursement even without it. The alleged lack of a supplemental budget was also rejected, because it
was petitioners duty as municipal mayor to prepare and submit the executive and supplemental budgets
under Sections 318, 320, and 444 (3)(ii) of the Local Government Code,[9] and the complainants claims
as assistant municipal treasurer, a permanent position included in the plantilla for calendar year 1990 and
1991, were classified as current operating expenditures for the same calendar years, which were
chargeable against the general funds of the town of Sindangan. Except for the representation and
transportation allowance, Fuertes claims for thirteenth month pay, cash gift and clothing allowance were
already covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for calendar year 1990. Petitioners contention that funds
covering complainants claims were made available only in December 1992 was unbelievable, considering
that an ordinance enacting a supplemental budget takes effect upon its approval or on the date fixed
therein under Sec. 320 of the Local Government Code.
The Sandiganbayan also ruled that the petitioners evident bad faith was the direct and proximate
cause of Fuertes undue injury. Complainants salaries and allowances were withheld for no valid or
justifiable reasons. Such delay was intended to harass complainant, because petitioner wanted to replace
her with his political protege whom he eventually designated as municipal treasurer, bypassing Fuertes
who was next in seniority. Bad faith was further evidenced by petitioners instructions to the outgoing
municipal treasurer not to give the complaining witness any work assignment, not to provide her with office
table and chair, not to act on her daily time record and application for leave of absence, instructions which
were confirmed in the municipal treasurers certification. (Exh. G-2).
The Issues
In his memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues:[10]
1. Could accused be held liable under Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the discharge of his official
administrative duties, a positive act, when what was imputed to him was failing and refusing to
sign and/or approve the vouchers of Mr[s]. Fuertes on time or by inaction on his obligation
under the compromise agreement (ibid., p. 19), a passive act? Did not the act come under
Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019, of [sic] which accused was not charged with?
2. Assuming, arguendo, that his failure and refusal to immediately sign and approve the
vouchers of Mrs. Fuertes comes [sic] under Sec. 3(e), the questions are:
(a) Did not the duty to sign and approve the same arise only after the Sangguniang Bayan had passed
an appropriations ordinance, and not before? In other words, was the non-passage of the appropriation
ordinance a justifiable reason for not signing the vouchers?
(b) Did Mrs. Fuertes suffer undue injury, as the term is understood in Sec. 3(e), she having been paid all
her claims?
(c) Did petitioner not act in good faith in refusing to immediately sign the vouchers and implement the
compromise agreement until the Sangguniang Bayan had enacted the appropriation ordinance and until
Mrs. Fuertes submitted the clearance from the Municipality of Pinan, Zamboanga del Norte?
Restated, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of undue injury and
bad faith. Additionally, petitioner submits that a violation of Section 3[e] of RA 3019 cannot be committed
through nonfeasance.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious. After careful review of the evidence on record and thorough deliberation
on the applicable provision of the Anti-Graft Law, the Court agrees with the solicitor generals assessment
that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime charged.
First Issue: Undue Injury
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, which states:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements must be established
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:
(1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;
(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her
official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;
(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party;
and
(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.[11]
The solicitor general, in his manifestation,[12] points out that undue injury requires proof of actual
injury or damage, citing our ruling in Alejandro vs. People[13] and Jacinto vs.
Sandiganbayan.[14] Inasmuch as complainant was actually paid all her claims, there was thus no undue
injury established.
This point is well-taken. Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed
even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of
the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be specified,
quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
In jurisprudence, undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual damage. Undue has been
defined as more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal; and injury as any wrong or damage done to
another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property[;] [that is, the] invasion of any legally protected
interest of another. Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in civil law.[15]
In turn, actual or compensatory damages is defined by Article 2199 of the Civil Code as follows:
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such
compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
Fundamental in the law on damages is that one injured by a breach of a contract, or by a wrongful or
negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation commensurate to the loss sustained as a
consequence of the defendants act. Actual pecuniary compensation is awarded as a general rule, except
where the circumstances warrant the allowance of other kinds of damages.[16] Actual damages are
primarily intended to simply make good or replace the loss caused by the wrong.[17]
Furthermore, damages must not only be capable of proof, but must be actually proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty. They cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon
speculation, conjecture or guesswork.[18] They cannot include speculative damages which are too remote
to be included in an accurate estimate of the loss or injury.
In this case, the complainant testified that her salary and allowance for the period beginning July
1990 were withheld, and that her family underwent financial difficulty which resulted from the delay in the
satisfaction of her claims.[19] As regards her money claim, payment of her salaries from January 1991
until November 19, 1991 was evidenced by the Sheriffs Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D). She
also admitted having been issued a check on January 4, 1994 to cover her salary from June 1 to June 30,
1990; her salary differential from July 1, 1989 to April 30, 1990; her thirteenth-month pay; her cash gift; and
her clothing allowances. Respondent Court found that all her monetary claims were satisfied. After she
fully received her monetary claims, there is no longer any basis for compensatory damages or undue
injury, there being nothing more to compensate.
Complainants testimony regarding her familys financial stress was inadequate and largely
speculative. Without giving specific details, she made only vague references to the fact that her four
children were all going to school and that she was the breadwinner in the family. She, however, did not
say that she was unable to pay their tuition fees and the specific damage brought by such
nonpayment. The fact that the injury to her family was unspecified or unquantified does not satisfy the
element of undue injury, as akin to actual damages. As in civil cases, actual damages, if not supported by
evidence on record, cannot be considered.[20]
Other than the amount of the withheld salaries and allowances which were eventually received, the
prosecution failed to specify and to prove any other loss or damage sustained by the
complainant. Respondent Court insists that complainant suffered by reason of the long period of time
that her emoluments were withheld.
This inconvenience, however, is not constitutive of undue injury. In Jacinto, this Court held that the
injury suffered by the complaining witness, whose salary was eventually released and whose position was
restored in the plantilla, was negligible; undue injury entails damages that are more than necessary or are
excessive, improper or illegal.[21] In Alejandro, the Court held that the hospital employees were not
caused undue injury, as they were in fact paid their salaries.[22]
Second Issue: No Evident Bad Faith
In the challenged Decision, Respondent Court found evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner,
holding that, without any valid or justifiable reason, accused withheld the payment of complainants
salaries and other benefits for almost two (2) years, demonstrating a clear manifestation of bad faith.[23] It
then brushed aside the petitioners defenses that complainant failed to submit money and property
clearances for her vouchers, and that an appropriation by the Sangguniang Bayan was required before
complainants vouchers could be approved. It said:[24]
Secondly, his reliance on the failure of complainant to submit the clearances which were
allegedly necessary for the approval of vouchers is futile in the light of the foregoing
circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
b. The evidence on record shows that complainants salaries for the period from January to November
1991 (included as subject matter in the mandamus case) were duly paid, as confirmed in the Sheriffs
Return dated November 19, 1991 (Exh. D). This means that accused, even without the necessary
clearance, could have acted upon or approved complainants disbursement vouchers if he wanted to.
c. It may be true that a clearance is an indispensable requirement before complainant will be paid of her
claims, but accused could not just hide behind the cloak of the clearance requirement in order to exculpate
himself from liability. As the approving officer, it was his duty to direct complainant to submit the
same. Moreover, accused could not just set aside the obligation he voluntarily imposed upon himself
when he entered into a compromise agreement binding himself to sign complainants vouchers without any
qualification as to the clearance requirement. Perforce, he could have seen to it that complainant secured
the same in order that he could comply with the said obligation.
xxx xxx xxx
Fourthly, accuseds contention that the delay in the release of complainants claim could not be attributed
to him because the vouchers were only submitted to him for his signature on December 24-27, 1992; that
the approval of the budget appropriations/resolutions depends on the Sangguniang Bayan, Budget Officer
and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, is unavailing.
As revealed in the alleged newly discovered evidence themselves, particularly x x x SB Res. No. 202 and
Appropriation Ordinance No. 035, both dated May 21, 1990 (Exh. 5-a- Motion), the Sangguniang Bayan
appropriated a budget of P5M in the General Fund for calendar year 1991 [the Budget Officer does not
approve the budget but assists the Municipal Mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan in the preparation of the
budget (Sec. 475, Local Government Code of 1991)]. Complainants claims consisted of her salaries and
other benefits for 1990 and 1991 which were classified as Current Operating Expenditures chargeable
against the General Fund. It is undisputed that she was holding her position as Assistant Municipal
Treasurer in a permanent capacity (her position was also designated Assistant Department Head), which
was included in the plantilla for calender years 1990 and 1991 (Exhs. 4-a & '4-b', Motion). In Program
Appropriation and Obligation by Object (Exhs. 4-c & 4-c, Motion), appropriations were made for current
operating expenditures to which complainants claims properly appertained. xxx. Verily, complainants
claims were covered by appropriations duly approved by the officials concerned, signifying that adequate
funds were available for the purpose. In fact, even complainants claims for her 13th month pay, cash gift
and clothing allowance, subject matter of Disbursement Voucher marked Exhibit J which would need a
supplemental budget was covered by Supplemental Budget No. 5 for CY 1990 duly approved by the
authorities concerned as shown in the voucher itself. This means that the said claim was already
obligated (funds were already reserved for it) as of calendar year 1990. xxxx. It is clear, then, that as
regards availability of funds, there was no obstacle for the release of all the complainants claims.
The Court disagrees. Respondent Court cannot shift the blame on the petitioner, when it was the
complainant who failed to submit the required clearance. This requirement, which the complainant
disregarded, was even printed at the back of the very vouchers sought to be approved. As assistant
municipal treasurer, she ought to know that this is a condition for the payment of her claims. This
clearance is required by Article 443 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government
Code of 1991:
Art. 443. Property Clearances When an employee transfers to another government office,
retires, resigns, is dismissed, or is separated from the service, he shall be required to secure
supplies or property clearance from the supply officer concerned, the provincial or city general
services officer concerned, the municipal mayor and the municipal treasurer, or the punong
barangay and the barangay treasurer, as the case may be. The local chief executive shall
prescribe the property clearance form for this purpose.
For her own failure to submit the required clearance, complainant is not entirely blameless for the
delay in the approval of her claims.
Also, given the lack of corresponding appropriation ordinance and certification of availability of funds
for such purpose, petitioner had the duty not to sign the vouchers. As chief executive of the municipality
Llorente could not have approved the voucher for the payment of complainants salaries under Sec. 344,
Local Government Code of 1991.[25] Also, Appropriation Ordinance No. 020[26] adding a supplemental
budget for calendar year 1990 was approved on April 10, 1989, or almost a year before complainant was
transferred back to Sindangan. Hence, she could not have been included therein. SB Resolution No. 202
and Appropriation Ordinance No. 035,[27] which fixed the municipal budget for calendar year 1991, was
passed only on May 21, 1990, or almost another year after the transfer took effect. The petitioners failure
to approve the complainants vouchers was therefore due to some legal obstacles,[28] and not entirely
without reason. Thus, evident bad faith cannot be completely imputed to him.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill
will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill
will for ulterior purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident bad faith connotes a
manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. [29]
In Jacinto, evident bad faith was not appreciated because the actions taken by the accused were not
entirely without rhyme or reason; he refused to release the complainants salary because the latter failed to
submit her daily time record; he refused to approve her sick-leave application because he found out that
she did not suffer any illness; and he removed her name from the plantilla because she was moonlighting
during office hours. Such actions were measures taken by a superior against an erring employee who
studiously ignored, if not defied, his authority.[30]
In Alejandro, evident bad faith was ruled out, because the accused gave his approval to the
questioned disbursement after relying on the certification of the bookkeeper on the availability of funds for
such disbursement.[31]
Third Issue: Interpretation of Causing
The Court does not completely agree with petitioners assertion that the imputed act does not fall
under Sec. 3[e] which, according to him, requires a positive act -- a malfeasance or
misfeasance. Causing means to be the cause or occasion of, to effect as an agent, to bring into
existence, to make or to induce, to compel.[32] Causing is, therefore, not limited to positive acts
only. Even passive acts or inaction may cause undue injury. What is essential is that undue injury, which
is quantifiable and demonstrable, results from the questioned official act or inaction.
In this case, the prosecution accused petitioner of failing or refusing to pay complainants salaries on
time, while Respondent Court convicted him of unduly delaying the payment of complainants claims. As
already explained, both acts did not, however, legally result in undue injury or in giving any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, [or] administrative x x x functions. Thus,
these acts are not punishable under Sec. 3[e].
It would appear that petitioners failure or refusal to act on the complainants vouchers, or the delay
in his acting on them more properly falls under Sec. 3[f]:
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act
within a reasonable time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly
or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage, or for purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or
discriminating against any other interested party.
Here, the neglect or refusal to act within a reasonable time is the criminal act, not the causing of
undue injury. Thus, its elements are:
1) The offender is a public officer;
2) Said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due
demand or request has been made on him;
3) Reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the public officer
having acted on the matter pending before him; and
4) Such failure to so act is for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person
interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or advantage in favor of an
interested party, or discriminating against another.[33]
However, petitioner is not charged with a violation of Sec. 3[f]. Hence, further disquisition is not
proper. Neither may this Court convict petitioner under Sec. 3[f] without violating his constitutional right to
due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED of violating Section 3[e]
of R.A. 3019, as amended. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.



















































Recall


DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
FRANCISCO, J .:
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by
the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14,
1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.
[1]
At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed
the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the
recall election in view of petitioners opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall
election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action
No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary
hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his
counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without COMELEC approval.
[2]

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of
the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of
the Solicitor Generals manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter
through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.
[3]

Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within one
(1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996,
and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-
Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner
maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely
four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only
once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to
the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
[4]
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an
elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with
paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall
election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation
of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision
of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people
before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as
erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall
provision of the Local Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the
enactment of a statute.
[5]
An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
[6]

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution.
[7]
Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically
paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of
the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose
and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth x x x
[8]

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must
be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year
immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the
officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor
elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall
provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held
by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section
74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is
barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.
[9]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should
be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza, JJ., concur in the majority and
separate concurring opinions.
Davide, Jr., Please see separate concurring opinion.










































MAYOR RICARDO M. ANGOBUNG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, and
ATTY. AURORA S. DE ALBAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
Before us on certiorari is a petition seeking to annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-2951
[1]
dated
October 15, 1996 issued by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which (1) approved
the Petition for Recall filed and signed by only one registered voter - herein private respondent Ma. Aurora
Siccuan de Alban, against petitioner - incumbent Mayor Ricardo Angobung; (2) set the further signing of
said petition by the rest of the registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela on November 9, 1996; and (3) in case
the said petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered votes in Tumauni, Isabela,
scheduled the recall election on December 2, 1996.
On October 25, 1996, this court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
[2]
enjoining public
respondent COMELEC from implementing and enforcing Resolution No. 96-2951.
The facts of this case are not disputed.
Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local
elections of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private respondent de Alban was also a
candidate in said elections.
Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar in
Tumauni, Isabela, a Petition for Recall
[3]
against petitioner. On September 12, 1996, petitioner received a
copy of this petition. Subsequently said petition was forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval.
Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to the
COMELEC En Banc, a Memorandum
[4]
dated October 8, 1996 recommending approval of the petition for
recall filed by private respondent and its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of
the total number of registered voters as required by Section 69(d) of the Local Government code of 1991.
In turn acting on the abovementioned Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director Joson, the
COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.
Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid,
on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by
just one person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures
supporting and petition for recall; and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1)
year from the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.
In at least three (3) urgent motions, private respondent has sought the lifting of the Temporary
Retraining Order issued last October 25, 1996 on the twin grounds (1) that the issue of the one-year bar on
recall elections has been resolved in the case of Paras v. COMELEC
[5]
promulgated on November 4, 1996;
and (2) that the procedure prescribed by Resolution No. 96-2951 involving petition signing upon initiation
of even just one person, is no different from that provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 which was
upheld as constitutional in the 1991 cases of Sanches, et al. v. COMELEC
[6]
and Evardone v.
COMELEC
[7]

Private respondent is correct in saying that in the light of our pronouncement in Paras v.
COMELEC
[8]
, the recall election scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the instant case cannot be said to be
barred by the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. In construing the meaning of the term, regular local
election in Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that no recall shall take
place within one (1) year x x x immediately preceding a regular local election, we ruled that for the time
bar to apply, the approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be
recalled, is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate. Thus, in the instant case where the time
bar is being invoked by petitioner mayor in view of the approaching Barangay Elections in May 1997, there
can be no application of the one year bar, hence no invalidity may be ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951
on this ground.
We, however, find petitioners second ground to be impressed with merit.
Before the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code, the recall of public officials voted for in
popular elections, was governed by Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1983. Pursuant to Section 59 thereof, which states that the Commission
on Elections shall conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall x x x and, in pursuance
thereof, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
2272 Sections 4 and 5 of which provide as follows:
Sec. 4. How instituted. - The recall of an elective provincial, city or municipal official shall be
commenced by the filing of a duly verified notice of recall containing the address and precinct
number of the voter filing the notice, and the name of the official sought to be recalled, his position,
and the ground(s) for the recall. Each notice shall refer to only one official.lex
The notice shall be filed in triplicate with the local Election Registrar if the recall involves a city
or municipal official, or with the Provincial Election Supervisor if it involves a provincial official, one
copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin board in the city/municipal hall.
If the recall involves a provincial official, two additional copies of the notice shall also be
furnished by the voter filing the notice to the Election Registrar of each city and municipality in the
province, one copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin board in the
city/municipal hall.
In every case, the voter filing the notice of recall shall furnish a copy thereof to the official
sought to be recalled, the Commission on Elections in Manila and the Election Records and
Statistics Department of the Commission.
Section 5. Schedule and place of signing of the petition. - The Election Registrar shall submit to the
Commission on Elections, not later than ten days from filing of the notice of recall, the schedule of the
signing of the petition to recall for approval and funding x x x.
[9]

In the case of Sanchez v. COMELEC
[10]
, petitioners therein contended that the aforegoing
Resolution No. 2272 is unconstitutional there being no legislative enactment yet on [the] mechanism of
recall as mandated under Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution
[11]
It is true, as private respondent asseverates,
that we upheld the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272, but not because we found nothing
constitutionally infirm about the procedure of allowing the initiatory recall petition to be filed by only one
person. The issue in Sanchez was not this questioned procedure but the legal basis for the exercise by
the COMELEC of its rule-making power in the alleged absence of a grant of such power by an enabling
statute on recall. Thus we ruled:
lexWhile it is true that Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution mandates the Congress to enact a local
government code providing among others for an effective mechanism of recall, nothing in said
provision could be inferred the repeal of BP 337, the local government code existing prior to the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution merely provides that the local
government code to be enacted by Congress shall be more responsive than the one existing at
present. Until such time that a more responsive and effective local government code is enacted, the
present code shall remain in full force and effect. Thus, under Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, (a)ll existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
Considering that the present local government code (BP 337) is still in effect, respondent
COMELECs promulgation of Resolution No. 2272 is therefore valid and constitutional, the same
having been issued pursuant to Sec. 59 of BP 337. It reads:
Sec. 59. Supervision by the Commission on Elections. - The
Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the process of and
election on recall x x x and, in pursuance thereof, promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations.
[12]

We reiterated the foregoing ruling in the case of Evardone v. COMELEC
[13]
in this wise:
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or
revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the
President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four
of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and
therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present
case.
x x x
Chapter (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective
officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the
process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations. x x x Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent
COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and
constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition
for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.
[14]

In Sanchez and Evardone, the COMELEC prescribed procedure of (1) allowing the recall petition to
be filed by at least one person or by less than 25% of the total number of registered voters and then (2)
inviting voters to sign said petition on a date set for that purpose, was never put to issue. As this is the
crux of the present constitutional challenge, the proper time has come for this court to issue a definitive
ruling on the matter.
Apropos for starters is the following chronicle of the evolution of the mechanism of recall as a mode
of removing a public officer by direction action of the people, essayed in the case ofGarcia v.
COMELEC:
[15]

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of
office. The peoples prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power
and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental
operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public
affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a
representative democracy.
Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in
section 2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:
SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government
code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all
its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government
structure with an effective system of recall x x x
The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled, The Local Government Code of 1983
Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of local election
officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters
in the local government unit concerned x x x.
Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP 337 was
exercised by our people.
In February , 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for they
resorted to revolution and they booted out of office the highest elective officials of the land. The
successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the trust of the
electorate led to its firm institutionalization of the 1987 Constitution. Its Articles XIII expressly
recognized the Role and Rights of Peoples Organizations x x x.
Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and
referendum x x x. In response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1, 1992.
[16]

Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that recall of any elective x
x x municipal x x x official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of
the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which
the local official sought to be recalled was elected. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates
recall proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, may validly
initiate recall proceedings. We take careful note of the phrase, petition of at least twenty-five percent
(25%) and point out that the law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the
registered voters; rather, the petition must be of or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the
petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered
voters. This is understandable, since the signing of the petition is statutorily required to be undertaken
before the election registrar or his representative, and in the presence of a represetantive of the official
sought to be recalled, and in public place in the x x x municipality x x x.
[17]
Hence, while the initiatory
recall petition may not yet contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters,
the petition must contain the names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose
behalf only one person may sign the petition in the meantime.
We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less
than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by just one person, as in the
instant case, since this is indubitably violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.
Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They knew
that this is the requirement under a majority of the constitution and recall statutes in various American
states to the same extent that they were aware of the rationale therefor. While recall was intended to be
an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate
regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience
dictates,
[18]
it is a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons
only they, as a collective, can justify. In other words, recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one
disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purposes
as a direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish
resort to recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government.
A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of minimum voter
requirement in American recall statutes, unmistakably reveals the vigilance of lawmakers against the
abuse of the power of recall. For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in the case of In Re
Bower
[19]
that:
[t]the only logical reasons which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait
one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their
parting voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate
the soundness of his political policies and decisions. We view the statutory provision
requiring the number of petition signers to equal at least 45% of the total votes case in the
last general election for mayor as a further attempt to insure that an official will not have to
defend his policies against frivolous attacks launched by a small percentage of
disenchanted electors.
[20]

Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Colorado held in the case of Bernzen v. City of
Boulder
[21]
that:
[t]he framers, by requiring that a recall petition contain the signatures of at least 25% of
all votes cast in the last election for all candidates for the position which the person sought to be
recalled occupies, assured that a recall election will not be held in response to the wishes of a
small and unrepresentative minority. However, once at least 25% of the electorate have expressed
their dissatisfaction, the constitution reserves the recall power to the will of the electorate.
[22]

And in the case of Wallace v. Tripp
[23]
, the Supreme Court of Michigan, echoed the foregoing
posturings in this wise:
Much of what has been said to justify a limit upon recall clearly not provided or contemplated by the
Constitution has revealed fears about an irresponsible electorate xxx. A much cited Nebraska case
pertaining to a Nebraska recall statute provides some answers which are equally applicable to the
Michigan constitutional right of recall:
xxx Doubtless the provision requiring 30 per cent of the electors to sign the petition before the council [is]
compelled to act was designed to avoid such a contingency. The legislature apparently assumed that
nearly one-third of the electorate would not entail upon the taxpayers the cost of an election unless the
charges made approved themselves to their understanding and they were seriously dissatisfied with the
services of the incumbent of the office.
[24]

In the instant case, this Court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the
applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law. Private respondent who is a lawyer,
knows that Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a
petition of 25% of the total number of registered voters. Notwithstanding such awareness, private
respondent proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in
her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership
of petitioner. But the petition does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have
reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private
respondent is truly earnest in her cause, and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows
that she claims responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioners continuance in office. But the same
cannot be said of all the other people whom private respondent claims to have sentiments similar to
hers. While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same power is
accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of
such power, including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family, his
friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing
just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition,
which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained
any displeasure in the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory
law but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. We can not and must not, under any and all
circumstances, countenance a circumvention of the explicit 25% minimum voter requirement in the
initiation of the recall process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is hereby
GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 96-2951 is hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID and accordingly
SET ASIDE.
The RESTRAINING ORDER heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
lexNarvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.


JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD ADVINCULA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 140714. May 4, 2000]
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, herein represented by its Chairman,
RICHARD ADVINCULA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON. JOVITO O.
CLAUDIO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
These are petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Pasay
City (PRA) in the Commission on Elections in E.M. No. 99-005 entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 01, S-1999 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999 FOR
THE RECALL OF MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF PASAY CITY. G.R. No. 140560 is a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the nullification of the resolution,
[1]
dated October 18, 1999, of the
COMELEC giving due course to the petition for the recall of petitioner Jovito O. Claudio as mayor of Pasay
City. On the other hand, G.R. No. 140714 is a petition for mandamus filed by the PRA, represented by its
Chair, Richard Advincula, to compel the COMELEC to set the date for the holding of recall elections in
Pasay City pursuant to the aforecited resolution of the COMELEC.
The facts are as follows:
Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11,
1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998.
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to
discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19,
1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone 4, Pasay City, several
barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula,
private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714, was designated chair.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang
kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE
THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. In
a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Station
Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal submission to the Office of
the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall. Mesm
As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service of the
petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were
posted on the bulletin boards of the local COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public
market at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos St., all
in Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution was
conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the COMELEC.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L.
Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to the
resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories were
only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3)
the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case,
[2]
filed by
Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as
mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed;
and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10
were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 sangguniang
kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.
In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the
oppositions against it. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the
COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than
necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA was
1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that the total
membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the PRA,
clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the verification made by
election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members of the PRA sufficient.
On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner was a prejudicial question
which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the COMELEC ruled that it was not
and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay the recall proceedings. Finally, on
whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year from the elective official's
assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall is a process which starts with
the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day
after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the petition was filed on time.
Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in Baguio City on April 4, 2000, after
which the Court, by the vote of 8 to 6 of its members,
[3]
resolved to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 140560
for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the
Court unanimously dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 140714 on the ground that the issue raised therein
had become moot and academic.
We now proceed to explain the grounds for our resolution.
In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of the recall elections in
Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 140714 to compel the
COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay City is no longer tenable. We are thus left with only
petitioner Claudio's action for certiorari and prohibition.
The bone of contention in this case is 74 of the Local Government Code (LCG)
[4]
which provides: Scslx
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
As defined at the hearing of these cases on April 4, 2000, the issues are:
WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
...
A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening
of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.
B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the
election period for that regular election or simply the date of such election.
(1) On Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code Includes
the Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution
Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in 74(b) refers to a process, in contrast to the term "recall
election" found in 74(a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims that "when several barangay
chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by
the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a resolution to initiate the
recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence, the process of recall began" and,
since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened and
all proceedings held thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and void.
The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition
for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this case
was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the recall was
validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.
Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in 74 refers to a
process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the one-year limitation in
paragraph (b) of 74.
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly
or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then
proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution
or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled
date.
[5]
However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can
be cited in support of this conclusion.
First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the
other hand, 69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is
not the power to initiate recall proceedings
[6]
but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in
74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in
paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a
petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a
petition for recall.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or petitions for recall
filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted
to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply
only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not
merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to
limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an
elective local official.
Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC
[7]
where two objections were raised against
the legality of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the sole prerogative of the
electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2) that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in
effect unconstitutionally authorizes it to shorten the term of office of incumbent elective local officials. Both
objections were dismissed on the ground that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to
the first objection, it was held that it is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the
Constitution gave to the people. With respect to the second objection, it was held that a recall resolution
"merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he
should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official
concerned remains in office . . . ."
If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official
concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against
the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such
proceedings.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the
purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that
no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned,
and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an
elective local official. In the Bower case
[8]
cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC,
[9]
it was held that
"The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year
before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a
newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and
decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the
Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any
officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of prohibition
is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis
for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is
held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before
the end of the first year in office of a local official.
It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official concerned has been in
office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already stated, it is not
the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the performance of
the official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the Election that does. Therefore, as long as the
recall election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he will not be
judged on his performance prematurely.
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose
of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day
of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an
informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the
holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the
most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always
eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the
incumbent.
Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in
paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his] attention
should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due to political partisanship."
Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the
day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not
always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated and when it is not. The
only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self
restraint of the people and its leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A respite from
partisan politics may, have the incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really
the purpose of the limitation on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient
basis for evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official.
In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as recalls initiated
directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing repudiation by the people of [Kaloocan City's]
Preparatory Recall Assembly" when, instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they reelected him.
Two points may be made against this argument.
One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local official whose recall is
sought is actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into cities and providing for the holding of
plebiscites during which the question of cityhood is submitted to the people for their approval are not
always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good judge of the will of the
voters in the locality. In the case of recall elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA was
resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the
signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some plausibility for the
claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the people's will as are the 25 % of the voters.
Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit cannot be more
representative of the sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose members represent the
entire electorate in the local government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable to
political maneuverings or manipulations as are those composing PRAs. Korte
The other point regarding Justice Punos claim is that the question here is not whether recalls initiated by
25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the convening of the PRA. Given that question, will convening the PRA outside this period make it
any more representative of the people, as the petition filed by 25 % of the registered voters is claimed to
be?
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary
proceedings to initiate recall -
1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right
except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year
period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for
judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would
unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed
office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.
(2) On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local
Government Code includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such
Election
Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the
second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in
paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May
14, but the election period as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the
day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be
held. Sclaw
This contention is untenable.
The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period,
which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code,
[10]
it could have expressly said so.
Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be
held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an
elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from
July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine
months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the
campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected,
because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more
responsive and accountable." Sclex
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election
Code,
[11]
unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before
the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that
the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital
right of the people.
To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, 74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections.
First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an
elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from the
date the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election within one
year immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v.
COMELEC,
[12]
"[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office."
(3) On Whether the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly Verified
Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering the
holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was
not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner, the
74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their
concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top of the
page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.
This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not
raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of the names in the
petition were double entries, that some members had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that
Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a prejudicial question which must first be resolved
before the petition for recall could be given due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the
stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not include the issue now being
raised by petitioner. Xlaw
Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by mistake
because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the
attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the PRA
who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to
believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the
pages in question are part.
The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified,
because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for
Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It
cannot, therefore, be raised now.
WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 140714 is
DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
















Republic Act No. 6713
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE
BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE,
ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees."
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in
public service. Public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall
discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and
justice, lead modest lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
(a) "Government" includes the National Government, the local governments, and all other instrumentalities,
agencies or branches of the Republic of the Philippines including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and their subsidiaries.
(b) "Public Officials" includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary,
whether in the career or non-career service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they
receive compensation, regardless of amount.
(c) "Gift" refers to a thing or a right to dispose of gratuitously, or any act or liberality, in favor of another
who accepts it, and shall include a simulated sale or an ostensibly onerous disposition thereof. It shall not
include an unsolicited gift of nominal or insignificant value not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a
favor from a public official or employee.
(d) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly, a gift from a person other than a
member of his family or relative as defined in this Act, even on the occasion of a family celebration or
national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is neither nominal nor insignificant, or the gift is given
in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor.
(e) "Loan" covers both simple loan and commodatum as well as guarantees, financing arrangements or
accommodations intended to ensure its approval.
(f) "Substantial stockholder" means any person who owns, directly or indirectly, shares of stock sufficient to
elect a director of a corporation. This term shall also apply to the parties to a voting trust.

(g) "Family of public officials or employees" means their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age.
(h) "Person" includes natural and juridical persons unless the context indicates otherwise.
(i) "Conflict of interest" arises when a public official or employee is a member of a board, an officer, or a
substantial stockholder of a private corporation or owner or has a substantial interest in a business, and
the interest of such corporation or business, or his rights or duties therein, may be opposed to or affected
by the faithful performance of official duty.
(j) "Divestment" is the transfer of title or disposal of interest in property by voluntarily, completely and
actually depriving or dispossessing oneself of his right or title to it in favor of a person or persons other
than his spouse and relatives as defined in this Act.
(k) "Relatives" refers to any and all persons related to a public official or employee within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, including bilas, inso and balae.
Section 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees. - (A) Every public official and employee
shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official
duties:
(a) Commitment to public interest. - Public officials and employees shall always uphold the public interest
over and above personal interest. All government resources and powers of their respective offices must be
employed and used efficiently, effectively, honestly and economically, particularly to avoid wastage in
public funds and revenues.
(b) Professionalism. - Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles
as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
(c) Justness and sincerity. - Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times.
They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor
and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest. They shall not dispense or extend undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether
by consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives to positions considered
strictly confidential or as members of their personal staff whose terms are coterminous with theirs.
(d) Political neutrality. - Public officials and employees shall provide service to everyone without unfair
discrimination and regardless of party affiliation or preference.

(e) Responsiveness to the public. - Public officials and employees shall extend prompt, courteous, and
adequate service to the public. Unless otherwise provided by law or when required by the public interest,
public officials and employees shall provide information of their policies and procedures in clear and
understandable language, ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearings whenever
appropriate, encourage suggestions, simplify and systematize policy, rules and procedures, avoid red tape
and develop an understanding and appreciation of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country,
especially in the depressed rural and urban areas.
(f) Nationalism and patriotism. - Public officials and employees shall at all times be loyal to the Republic
and to the Filipino people, promote the use of locally produced goods, resources and technology and
encourage appreciation and pride of country and people. They shall endeavor to maintain and defend
Philippine sovereignty against foreign intrusion.
(g) Commitment to democracy. - Public officials and employees shall commit themselves to the democratic
way of life and values, maintain the principle of public accountability, and manifest by deeds the
supremacy of civilian authority over the military. They shall at all times uphold the Constitution and put
loyalty to country above loyalty to persons or party.
(h) Simple living. - Public officials and employees and their families shall lead modest lives appropriate to
their positions and income. They shall not indulge in extravagant or ostentatious display of wealth in any
form.
(B) The Civil Service Commission shall adopt positive measures to promote (1) observance of these
standards including the dissemination of information programs and workshops authorizing merit increases
beyond regular progression steps, to a limited number of employees recognized by their office colleagues
to be outstanding in their observance of ethical standards; and (2) continuing research and
experimentation on measures which provide positive motivation to public officials and employees in raising
the general level of observance of these standards.
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of their duties, all public officials
and employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. - All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15)
working days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by
the public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.
(b) Submit annual performance reports. - All heads or other responsible officers of offices and agencies of
the government and of government-owned or controlled corporations shall, within forty-five (45) working
days from the end of the year, render a performance report of the agency or office or corporation
concerned. Such report shall be open and available to the public within regular office hours.
(c) Process documents and papers expeditiously. - All official papers and documents must be processed
and completed within a reasonable time from the preparation thereof and must contain, as far as
practicable, not more than three (3) signatories therein. In the absence of duly authorized signatories, the
official next-in-rank or officer in charge shall sign for and in their behalf.

(d) Act immediately on the public's personal transactions. - All public officials and employees must attend
to anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and
expeditiously.
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must be made accessible to, and
readily available for inspection by, the public within reasonable working hours.
Section 6. System of Incentives and Rewards. - A system of annual incentives and rewards is hereby
established in order to motivate and inspire public servants to uphold the highest standards of ethics. For
this purpose, a Committee on Awards to Outstanding Public Officials and Employees is hereby created
composed of the following: the Ombudsman and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as Co-
Chairmen, and the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and two government employees to be appointed
by the President, as members.
It shall be the task of this Committee to conduct a periodic, continuing review of the performance of public
officials and employees, in all the branches and agencies of Government and establish a system of annual
incentives and rewards to the end that due recognition is given to public officials and employees of
outstanding merit on the basis of the standards set forth in this Act.
The conferment of awards shall take into account, among other things, the following: the years of service
and the quality and consistency of performance, the obscurity of the position, the level of salary, the
unique and exemplary quality of a certain achievement, and the risks or temptations inherent in the work.
Incentives and rewards to government officials and employees of the year to be announced in public
ceremonies honoring them may take the form of bonuses, citations, directorships in government-owned or
controlled corporations, local and foreign scholarship grants, paid vacations and the like. They shall
likewise be automatically promoted to the next higher position with the commensurate salary suitable to
their qualifications. In case there is no next higher position or it is not vacant, said position shall be
included in the budget of the office in the next General Appropriations Act. The Committee on Awards shall
adopt its own rules to govern the conduct of its activities.
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:(a)
Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have any
financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office.
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker, agent,
trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless
expressly allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official
transaction with their office.
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees shall not use or
divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or
indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any person in the
course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction
which may be affected by the functions of their office.
As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:
(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and
received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship
grant or medical treatment; or
(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place
entirely outside the Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal
value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interests of the Philippines, and permitted by
the head of office, branch or agency to which he belongs.
The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or cultural exchange
programs subject to national security requirements.
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish
and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net
worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children
under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees,
except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under
oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and
Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age
living in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.
The documents must be filed:
(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also
execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor
of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests
and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any
office in the Government.
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or
separately.

The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections shall be filed by:
() Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator;
and all national executive officials with the Office of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the President,
and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil
Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to
identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the
form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available for
inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days from
the time they are filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the
cost of reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after
receipt of the statement. After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing
investigation.
(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under this Act
for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the
general public.
Section 9. Divestment. - A public official or employee shall avoid conflicts of interest at all times. When a
conflict of interest arises, he shall resign from his position in any private business enterprise within thirty
(30) days from his assumption of office and/or divest himself of his shareholdings or interest within sixty
(60) days from such assumption.
The same rule shall apply where the public official or employee is a partner in a partnership.
The requirement of divestment shall not apply to those who serve the Government in an honorary capacity
nor to laborers and casual or temporary workers.
Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of the
Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said statements
which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a determination is
made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual
and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.
(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated Committees of both Houses of
Congress shall have the power within their respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this
Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by affirmative vote
of the majority of the particular House concerned.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual
situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject
to any sanction provided in this Act.
(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) hereof insofar as
their respective offices are concerned, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the
Executive Department and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department.
Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or
employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of
this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension
not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and
hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under
another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall
be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public
office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal
or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with
public officials or employees, in violation of this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as the
public officials or employees and shall be tried jointly with them.
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any person who obtains or uses a
report for any purpose prohibited by Section 8 (D) of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought
may assess against such person a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos
(P25,000). If another sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.
Section 12. Promulgation of Rules and Regulations, Administration and Enforcement of this Act. - The Civil
Service Commission shall have the primary responsibility for the administration and enforcement of this
Act. It shall transmit all cases for prosecution arising from violations of this Act to the proper authorities for
appropriate action: Provided, however, That it may institute such administrative actions and disciplinary
measures as may be warranted in accordance with law. Nothing in this provision shall be construed as a
deprivation of the right of each House of Congress to discipline its Members for disorderly behavior.
The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act, including guidelines for individuals who render free voluntary service to the
Government. The Ombudsman shall likewise take steps to protect citizens who denounce acts or
omissions of public officials and employees which are in violation of this Act.
Section 13. Provisions for More Stringent Standards. - Nothing in this Act shall be construed to derogate
from any law, or any regulation prescribed by any body or agency, which provides for more stringent
standards for its official and employees.
Section 14. Appropriations. - The sum necessary for the effective implementation of this Act shall be taken
from the appropriations of the Civil Service Commission. Thereafter, such sum as may be needed for its
continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 15. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any
person or circumstance is declared invalid, the remainder of the Act or the application of such provision to
other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.
Section 16. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees and orders or parts thereof inconsistent herewith, are
deemed repealed or modified accordingly, unless the same provide for a heavier penalty.
Section 17. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after thirty (30) days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved, February 20, 1989.






















Practice of Profession and Related Provisions
WILFREDO M. CATU, Complainant, - v e r s u s - ATTY. VICENTE G.
RELLOSA, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J .:


Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot
[1]
and the building erected thereon located at
959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested
the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu
[2]
and Antonio Pastor
[3]
of one of the units in the building. The
latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5
th
District of Manila
[4]
where the parties
reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation
meetings.
[5]
When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification
for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,
[6]
claiming
that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as
counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear
complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina
and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost
objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to
amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth
sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was
financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of
the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
[7]


According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the
conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor.
Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by
Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he intervened
while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)
(2) of RA 6713:
[8]


SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and
employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
(emphasis supplied)

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice
of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
[9]
This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.
[10]


We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the
recommendation on the imposable penalty.


RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO
FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS


Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. In PCGG v.
Sandiganbayan,
[11]
we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said
service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained
of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.


SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE PRACTICE OF
PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS


Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency,
from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the
general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160
[12]
governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation
other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein
a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official;
and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local
officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials),
it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private
practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.
[13]


Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the
following: the governor, the vice governor and members of thesangguniang panlalawigan for provinces;
the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the
municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for municipalities
and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of
the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local
chief executives. This is because they are required to render full time service. They should therefore
devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in
schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are
required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.
[14]
Since the law itself grants them the authority
to practice their professions, engage in any occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is
no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for
any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial
board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the
members of the sangguniang barangay.Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
[15]
Since they are excluded
from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands
to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is
supposed to hold regular sessions only twice a month.
[16]


Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession.
However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as
required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO PRACTICE LAW MUST
SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the
disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the
head of the department concerned.
[17]
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head
of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of
those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted
outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair
in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee,
which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public
duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not
take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of
directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of
the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for
Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires
legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To
underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not
only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the
legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and
disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.
[18]
Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
[19]


A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
of the lawyers oath
[20]
and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional
misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records
of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the
courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.





















MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A.
MARAVE, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, and PHILIPPINE
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.
REGALADO, J .:
Petitioner questions and seeks the nullification of the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP. No. 27504 dated March 31, 1992, dismissing the petition for having been filed by a private counsel, as
well as its succeeding resolution dated June 9, 1992, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
1

The records show that on March 17, 1989, the Regional Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, rendered
judgment in Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of plaintiff, now herein petitioner Municipality of Pililla, Rizal,
against defendant, now herein private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC, for short),
ordering therein defendant to pay said plaintiff (1) the amount of P5,301,385.00 representing the tax on
business due from the defendant under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said municipality
for the period from 1979 to 1983, inclusive, plus such amount of tax as may accrue until final determination
of the case; (2) storage permit fee in the amount of P3,321,730.00 due from the defendant under Section
10, paragraph Z(13)
(b-1-c) of the same municipal tax ordinance for the period from 1975 to 1986, inclusive, plus the amount of
said fee that may accrue until final determination of the case; (3) mayor's permit fee due from the
defendant under Section 10, paragraph (P) (2) of said municipal tax ordinance from 1975 to 1984,
inclusive, in the amount of P12,120.00, plus such amount of the same fee as may accrue until final
determination of the case; (4) sanitary inspection fee in the amount of P1,010.00 for the period from 1975
to 1984, plus the amount of this fee that may accrue until final determination of the case; and (5) the costs
of suit.
2

On June 3, 1991, in G.R. No. 90776 this Court affirmed the aforesaid judgment, with the modification that
business taxes accruing prior to 1976 are not to be paid by PPC because the same have prescribed, and
that storage fees are not also to be paid by PPC since the storage tanks are owned by PPC and not by the
municipality and, therefore, cannot be the bases of a charge for service by the municipality.
3
This
judgment became final and executory on July 13, 1991 and the records were remanded to the trial court
for execution.
On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a
motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal* for the
examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the
purpose of computing the tax on business imposed under the Local Tax Code, as amended. On October
21, 1991, defendant corporation filed a manifestation to the effect that on October 18, 1991, Pililla Mayor
Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned
judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim documents executed by said
mayor. Accordingly, on October 31, 1991 the court below issued an order denying plaintiff municipality's
motion for examination and execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment in question had already
been satisfied.
4

Thereafter, on November 21, 1991 Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's aforesaid
order of October 31, 1991, claiming that the total liability of defendant corporation to plaintiff municipality
amounted to P24,176,599.00, while the amount involved in the release and quitclaim executed by Mayor
Patenia was only P12,718,692; and that the said mayor could not waive the balance which represents the
taxes due under the judgment to the municipality and over which judgment the law firm of Atty. Mendiola
had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services of 25% and attorneys' fees of 25% which, when
quantified and added, amount to more than P12 million.
On January 28,1992, the trial court denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration.
5

On February 18, 1992, Atty. Mendiola, again ostensibly in behalf of herein petitioner municipality, filed a
petition forcertiorari with us, which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and
was docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 27504.
6
On March 2, 1992, respondent PPC filed a motion
questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent petitioner municipality.
7
Consequently, on March 31,
1992 respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in
violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality
of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
8
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of June 9, 1992.
9

Petitioner is once again before us with the following assignment of errors:
1. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to consider private respondent's new issue
raised for the first time on appeal, as it could no longer be considered on appeal,
because it was never been (sic) raised in the court below.
2. It is an error for the Court of Appeals in dismissing (sic) the instant petition with
alternative remedy of filing similar petition as it is a departure from established
jurisprudence.
3. It is an error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the filing of the instant petition by
the private counsel is in violation of law and jurisprudence.
10

We find the present petition devoid of merit.
The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of
and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. The matter of representation of a municipality by a private
attorney has been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
11
and reiterated in Province of Cebu
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,
12
where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a
province or municipality in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in
litigation. The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or
municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality
or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial
government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall
act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political
subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
13

Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy
Law,
14
only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their
lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
15

For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the
municipality's case must appear on
record.
16
In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified
to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is
without authority of law.
The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include situations wherein the
provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the
municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing
lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds
not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special
attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal
in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to
Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.
17

It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein counsel,
Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's
motion for execution of his lien, which was filed with the court a quo by the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality.
18

The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of
authority to represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of his representation can be questioned at
any stage of the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited,
19
the issue of lack of authority of private
counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of
attorney's fees for services rendered in the particular case, after the decision in that case had become final
and executory and/or had been duly executed.
Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly
authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the
municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with
herein private respondent with regard to the execution of the judgment in its favor and thereafter filed
personally with the court below two pleadings
entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim".
20

A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is considered to have impliedly
dismissed his lawyer. Herein counsel cannot pretend to be authorized to continue representing the
municipality since the latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. Both at common law and
under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a client may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any
stage of the proceedings, and there is nothing
to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to conduct his own litigation.
21

The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer.
22
Even
the lawyers' right to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for
disapproving or holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The lawyers concerned
can enforce their rights in the proper court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of
Court, but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise agreement.
23

The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that the municipality will file a similar petition,
considering that the mayor who controls its legislative body will not take the initiative, is not only
conjectural but without factual basis. Contrary to his pretensions, there is presently a manifestation and
motion pending with the trial court filed by the aforesaid municipal mayor for the withdrawal of the
"Satisfaction of Judgment" and the "Release and Quitclaim"
24
previously filed in the case therein as earlier
mentioned.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.












ANTONIO C. RAMOS, ROSALINDA M. PEREZ, NORMA C. CASTILLO and BALIUAG MARKET
VENDORS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. CAMILO O.
MONTESA, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
Branch 19, and MUNICIPALITY OF BALIUAG, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Who has the legal authority to represent a municipality in lawsuits? If an unauthorized lawyer
represents a municipality, what is the effect of his participation in the proceedings? Parenthetically, does a
motion to withdraw the appearance of the unauthorized counsel have to comply with Rule 15 of the Rules
of Court regarding notice and hearing of motions?
These questions are answered by this Court in resolving this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court of the Decision
[1]
of public respondent
[2]
in CA-G.R. SP No. 23594 promulgated on March
15, 1991, which denied due course to and dismissed the petition therein. Also assailed is the
Resolution
[3]
of public respondent promulgated on May 9, 1991, which denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The facts as found by public respondent are undisputed, to wit:
[4]

"On April 18, 1990, petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo, and the Baliuag
Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition before the court a quo docketed as Civil Case No. 264-M-
9 for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract of
lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan.
On April 27, 1980, during the hearing on the petitioners' motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction,
the Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for respondent Municipality of Baliuag, which opposed the
petition. Whereupon, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court a quo on May 9, 1990.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed
an Answer in (sic) behalf of respondent municipality.
At the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 1990, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting
that he was counsel for respondent municipality. On the same date, and on June 15, 1990, respectively,
Atty. Romanillos filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an Amended Answer with
motion to dismiss.
On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty.
Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to-
petitioners' Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. It was also Atty. Romanillos who
submitted a written formal offer of evidence on July 17, 1990 for respondent municipality.
During the hearing on August 10, 1990, petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to
appear as counsel of (sic) the respondent municipality, which opposition was reiterated on August 15,
1990, and was put in writing in petitioners' motion of August 20, 1990 to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from
appearing as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings participated
in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.
Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion dated August 22, 1990 stating, among
others, that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel for respondent municipality and that Atty.
Regalado, as his collaborating counsel for respondent municipality, is adopting the entire proceedings
participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.
On September 19, 1990 respondent Judge issued the Order now being assailed which, as already stated,
denied petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to
declare null and void the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on the other hand, granted
Atty. Regalado's motion 'to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence'. In
support of his foregoing action, respondent Judge reasoned:
'Petitioners' motion for the disqualification of Atty. Romanillos as respondent municipality's counsel is
deemed moot and academic in view of his withdrawal as counsel of said municipality pursuant to a joint
motion dated August 22, 1990, although he shall remain as counsel on record of private respondent Kristi
Corporation. Atty. Oliviano Regalado under the same joint motion moved for the adoption of the entire
proceedings conducted by collaborating counsel, Atty. Romanillos.
It is noted that Atty. Romanillos initially entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Provincial Attorney when he filed a motion to dissolve injunction under motion dated
May 30, 1990 and since then despite his active participation in the proceedings, the opposing counsel has
never questioned his appearance until after he made a formal offer of evidence for the respondents. The
acquiescence of petitioners,' counsel of (sic) his appearance is tantamount to a waiver and petitioners are,
therefore, estopped to question the same. In all the pleadings made by Atty. Romanillos, it was clearly
indicated that he was appearing as the collaborating counsel of the Provincial Attorney. Besides,
petitioners' counsel failed to submit their comment and/or objection to the said joint motion of respondents'
counsel as directed by the Court within the reglementary period. By virtue of these circumstances, all the
proceedings attended to and participated in by said collaborating counsel is afait accompli and the Court
finds no cogent justification to nullify the same.'
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Order was denied by respondent Judge in his Order
dated October 19, 1990, the second Order now being assailed. Respondent Judge reiterated the
observations which he made in the Order of September 19, 1990 that Atty. Romanillos, while actively
handling the said case was merely appearing as the collaborating counsel of both the Provincial
Prosecutor and the Provincial Attorney of Bulacan; that Atty. Romanillos' appearance was 'never impugned
by petitioners' and was only questioned after his (Atty. Romanillos') submission of the formal offer of
evidence for respondent; and that therefore, said court proceedings 'is (sic) a fait accompli'. Respondent
Judge went on to say that the declaration of nullity of said proceedings and the re-taking of the same
evidence by the same parties is (sic) apparently an exercise in futility'. He added that in the absence of
untimely objection by petitioners to Atty. Romanillos' appearance as the collaborating counsel, petitioners
are guilty of laches for having slept on (sic) their rights and are estopped as their acquiescence may be
considered as waiver of such right. Furthermore, according to respondent Judge, assuming that the
proceedings had been 'tainted with frailness to render the same legally objectionable', the same has been
'legally remedied' by its formal adoption upon motion of the Provincial Accorney (sic), Atty. Regalado, who
is not disqualified to appear as counsel for the municipality of Baliuag, for the reason that by virtue of
Section 19 of R.A. No. 5185 (The Decentralization Act of 1967), the authority to act as legal officer/adviser
for (sic) civil cases of the province of Bulacan, of which the municipality of Baliuag is a political subdivision,
has been transferred from the Provincial Fiscal (now Provincial Prosecutor) of Bulacan to the Provincial
Attorney thereof."
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for
reconsideration. Hence this recourse.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum are:
[5]

"1) Under present laws and jurisprudence, can a municipality be represented in a suit against it by a
private counsel?
2) If not, what is the status of the proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized private counsel;
3) Can the provincial attorney of a province act as counsel of a municipality in a suit;
4) Can the provincial attorney adopt with legal effect the proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized
private counselof (sic) a municipality;
5) May a court act on an alleged motion which violates Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 26,
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court."
Petitioners contend that the assailed Decision which affirmed the Orders of the trial court is void for
being violative of the following laws:
[6]

"VI-1 The respondent court violated Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; Section
3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act; and Section 35; Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292) when it authorized Atty. Oliviano D. Regalado, the
Provincial Attorney of Bulacan, to appear as counsel for respondent Municipality of
Baliuag.
VI-2 The respondent court violated Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; Section
3, paragraph 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act; Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12, Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987; and Article 1352 of the New Civil Code,
when it denied the petitioners' motion to declare the proceedings undertaken or
participated in by said Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos, as private counsel of respondent
Municipality, null and void.
VI-3 The respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion
when it acted and granted the respondent's JOINT MOTION dated August 22, 1990
(Annex 'H') which, as a rule, is a mere worthless piece of paper which the respondent
judge/court has no authority to act upon, considering that said motion was filed in
court in patent violation of or without complying with the mandatory requirements
provided for by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 and Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court."
Public respondent did not give due course to the petition "because it does not prima facie show
justifiable grounds for the issuance of certiorari."
[7]
Public respondent adds that:
[8]

"Considering the foregoing jurisprudence, the logical conclusion is that the Provincial Attorney of Bulacan
has now the authority to represent the municipality of Baliuag in its law suits.
It follows that respondent Judge was correct in ruling in the assailed Order of October 19, 1990 that even
assuming, arguendo, that the proceedings by the court a quo which had been participated in by Atty.
Romanillos are legally objectionable, this was legally remedied by the formal adoption by the provincial
Attorney, Atty. Regalado, of the said proceedings, considering that the provincial attorney is not
disqualified from representing the municipality of Baliuag in civil cases.
In the second place, the record discloses that Atty. Romanillos had appeared as counsel for respondent
municipality of Baliuag in collaboration with the Provincial Prosecutor and the Provincial Attorney, as
shown in the motion to dissolve injunction dated May 28, 1990 which Atty. Romanillos had filed for
respondent municipality. Accordingly and pursuant to the aforecited provisions of law, it cannot correctly be
said that respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed Atty. Romanillos to
act as private counsel and Atty. Regalado, Provincial Attorney of Bulacan, to appear as counsel for
respondent Municipality of Baliuag. Perforce, it also cannot be correctly said that respondent Judge
violated the aforecited provisions when he denied petitioners' motion to declare null and void the
proceedings undertaken by and participated in by Atty. Romanillos as private counsel of the municipality of
Baliuag.
At any rate, even granting, only for the sake of argument, that Atty. Romanillos'
appearance as counsel for the municipality could not be legally authorized under the aforesaid
provisions of law, the fact that Atty. Regalado as Provincial Attorney of Baliuag had formally
adopted the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos as counsel for the municipality of
Baliuag had served, as already stated, to cure such a defect.
Thirdly, We are likewise unable to see grave abuse of discretion in respondent Judge's
actuation in granting the joint motion filed by Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado for the
withdrawal of the former as private counsel of respondent municipality, and the adoption by the
latter of the proceedings participated in/undertaken by the former, including the formal offer of
evidence submitted by the former."
Public respondent likewise found that the "joint motion does not partake of the nature of an
adversarial motion which would have rendered non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court fatal to the motion."
[9]
It is to be emphasized that petitioners "sought the disqualification of
Atty. Romanillos x x x (Thus,) what petitioners had sought to (be) achieve(d) in their said motion was in
fact what Atty. Romanillos had sought x x x in the joint motion dated August 22, 1990."
[10]

Respondent municipality submits that Section 19 of RA 5185:
"is not meant to prohibit or prevent the Provincial Attorney to act as legal adviser and legal officer for
municipalities and municipal districts because such interpretations would be to say the least, absurb (sic).
In this jurisdiction, a province is composed of municipalities and municipal districts, and therefore they are
deemed included in the provisions of Section 19 of Republic Act 5185. It is also impractical and contrary to
the spirit of the law to limit the sphere of authority of the Provincial Attorney to the province only."
[11]

The different allegations boil down to three main issues: (1) Who is authorized to represent a
municipality in a civil suit against it? (2) What is the effect on the proceedings when a private counsel
represents a municipality? Elsewise stated, may the proceedings be validated by a provincial attorney's
adoption of the actions made by a private counsel? (3) Does a motion of withdrawal of such unauthorized
appearance, and adoption of proceedings participated in by such counsel have to comply with Sections 4
and 5
[12]
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court?
The Court's Ruling
We affirm the Decision and Resolution of public respondent.
First Issue: Who Is Authorized to Represent a Municipality in Its Lawsuits?
In the recent case of Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of Appeals,
[13]
this Court, through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, set in clear-cut terms the answer to the question of who may legally
represent a municipality in a suit for or against it, thus:
[14]

"x x x The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been settled in
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
[15]
and reiterated in Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al.,
[16]
where we ruled that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in
lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
'Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The
provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court,
except in cases whereof (sic) original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the
municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government
and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a
province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.'
[17]

Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy
Law,
[18]
only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their
lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly
limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
[19]

For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the
municipality's case must appear on record.
[20]
In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show
that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the
appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law."
The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviser for the civil cases of a province and
corollarily, of the municipalities thereof, were subsequently transferred to the provincial attorney.
[21]

The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that only the provincial fiscal, provincial
attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional
instances may a private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. These exceptions
are enumerated in the case of Alinsug vs. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
[22]
to wit:
[23]

"Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a municipality only when the
municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial government or another municipality or
city within the province. This provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia v. The Auditor
General (44 SCRA 169, March 29, 1979) where the Court held that the municipality's authority to employ a
private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to
serve and represent it. With Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis, the Court therein
cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez [107 Phil. 932 (1960)] which enumerated instances when the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; if and when original jurisdiction of case
involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when, in a case involving
the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.
Thereafter, in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 728, October 30, 1981), the Court ruled that a
municipality may not be represented by a private law firm which had volunteered its services gratis, in
collaboration with the municipal attorney and the fiscal, as such representation was violative of Sec. 1683
of the old Administrative Code. This strict coherence to the letter of the law appears to have been dictated
by the fact that 'the municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private lawyer' and that
the interests of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations."'
(Underscoring supplied.)
None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. It may be said that Atty. Romanillos
appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was
sued with respondent municipality in this same case. The order of the trial court dated September 19,
1990, stated that Atty. Romanillos "entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial
prosecutor and the provincial attorney."
[24]
This collaboration is contrary to law and hence should not have
been recognized as legal. It has already been ruled in this wise:
"The fact that the municipal attorney and the fiscal are supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does
not legalize the latter's representation of the municipality of Hagonoy in Civil Case No. 5095-M. While a
private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil cases
wherein a municipality is the plaintiff."
[25]

As already stated, private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so
even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is anchored on the principle that only
accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be
expended to hire private lawyers.
Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the legality of the appearance of Atty.
Romanillos, notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of respondent municipality during the
hearing of its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of
Appeals
[26]
held that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings. This Court stated that:
[27]

"The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on
appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of his
representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore
cited, the issue of lack of authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised
for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for services rendered in
the particular case, after the decision in that case had become final and executory and/or had
been duly executed."
Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of the unauthorized representation should not be
held in estoppel just because they did not question on the spot the authority of the counsel for the
municipality. The rule on appearances of a lawyer is that
"(u)ntil the contrary is clearly shown, an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant
whom he purports to represent. (Azotes v. Blanco, 78 Phil. 739) His authority to appear for and represent
petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that
counsel was properly authorized to file the complaint and appear for his client. (Republic v.Philippine
Resources Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960)"
[28]

Second Issue: Effect on Proceedings by Adoption of Unauthorized Representation
Would the adoption by Atty. Regalado of the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos validate
such proceedings? We agree with public respondent that such adoption produces validity. Public
respondent stated the reasons
[29]
to which we agree:
"Moreover, it does not appear that the adoption of proceedings participated in or
undertaken by Atty. Romanillos when he was private counsel for the respondent municipality of
Baliuag such as the proceedings on the motion to dissolve the injunction, wherein
petitioners had even cross-examined the witnesses presented by Atty. Romanillos in support of
said motion and had even started to present their witnesses to sustain their objection to the
motion would have resulted in any substantial prejudice to petitioners' interest. As We see it,
to declare the said proceedings null and void notwithstanding the formal adoption thereof by
Atty. Regalado as Provincial Attorney of Bulacan who is authorized to represent respondent
municipality of Baliuag in court and to require trial anew to cover the same subject matter, to
hear the same witnesses and to admit the same evidence adduced by the same parties cannot
enhance the promotion of justice."
This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the appearance of Atty. Romanillos would not cause
substantial prejudice on petitioners. Requiring new trial on the mere legal technicality that the municipality
was not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest of justice. After all, this
Court does not see any injustice committed against petitioners by the adoption of the work of private
counsel nor any interest of justice being served by requiring retrial of the case by the duly authorized legal
representative of the town.
In sum, although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the
interest of substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality may adopt the work already performed
in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice is thereby
heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by
said municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyer's work cannot bind
the municipality.
Third Issue: "J oint Motion" Need Not Comply with Rule 15
We also agree with the justification of public respondent that a motion to withdraw the appearance of
an unauthorized lawyer is a non-adversarial motion that need not comply with Section 4 of Rule 15 as to
notice to the adverse party. The disqualification of Atty. Romanillos was what petitioners were really
praying for when they questioned his authority to appear for the municipality. The disqualification was
granted, thereby serving the relief prayed for by petitioners. Such being the case, no "notice directed to the
parties concerned and served at least 3 days before the hearing thereof"
[30]
need be given petitioners, the
questioned motion not being contentious. Besides, what petitioners were questioning as to lack of authority
was remedied by the adoption of proceedings by an authorized counsel, Atty. Regalado. The action of the
trial court allowing the motion of respondent municipality effectively granted petitioners' motion to disqualify
Atty. Romanillos. In People vs. Leviste,
[31]
we ruled that:
"While it is true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule 15
should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance, this Court has
likewise held that where a rigid application of the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage
of justice, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations should, as much
as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. As this Court held in Galvez vs.
Court of Appeals, an order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a
notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings x x x
(which) cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the Case."'(Citations omitted).
It should be remembered that rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation.
[32]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.




Local Initiative and Referendum
Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR
I. General Provisions
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to
the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an
election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or
law, or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of
signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on
Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong
Barangay, as the case may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all
registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum
(10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and
register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative
on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative
assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition
thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one
(1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city
should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly
initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters
in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if
signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at
least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of
the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.
II. National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall call and
supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general
and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five
(45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of
the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition of the enactment,
approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the
votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast,
the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen
(15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject
a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed
repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended
shall remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum
petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its
effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition
shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be
enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative
measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence
over the pending legislative measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from notice thereof.
III. Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters
in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in
case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or
local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law,
ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its
presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the
proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety
(90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required
number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in
the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional
assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or
local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many
places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office
in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of
signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the
proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for
the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification
by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty
(60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which
the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes
cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action
thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said
number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the
local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may,
if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or ordinance or resolution
approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed,
modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years
thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of barangays,
the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local
legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in
case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code and other
election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of
this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current
year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional,
the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.


ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF MORONG, BATAAN, respondents.
PUNO, J .:
The 1987 Constitution is borne of the conviction that people power can be trusted to check excesses of
government. One of the means by which people power can be exercised is thru initiatives where local
ordinances and resolutions can be enacted or repealed. An effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's
initiatives ought to be rejected.
In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993,
1
the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed
to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with
Republic Act
No. 7227.
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition
2
with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The petition states:
I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang
Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEZ na walang kondisyon.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang Kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEZ kung ang mga
sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng
Morong at Bataan:
(A). Ibalik sa Bataan ang "Virgin Forests" isang bundok na hindi nagagalw at punong-puno ng
malalaking punong-kahoy at iba'-ibang halaman.
(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.
(K). Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng salaping
ipinagkakaloob ng pamahalaang national o "Internal Revenue Allotment" (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa
Lalawigan.
(D). Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling "special economic zones" ang bawat bayan ng Morong, Hermosa
at Dinalupihan.
(E). Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.
(G). Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa.
(H). Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito sa magbukas pa
ng pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin
ang mga nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.
(I). Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan para sa
kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan.
(J). Magkaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong, Hermosa at Bataan.
The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within thirty (30) days after its
submission. Petitioners then resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of
1991.
3
They started to solicit the required number of signatures
4
to cause the repeal of said resolution.
Unknown to the petitioners, however, the Honorable Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor and Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the Executive Director
of COMELEC requesting the denial of " . . . the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the
exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility."
5
We quote the letter,viz:
The Executive Director
C O M E L E C
Intramuros, Metro Manila
Sir:
In view of the petition filed by a group of proponents headed by Gov. Enrique T. Garcia, relative to the
conduct of a local initiative and/or referendum for the annulment of Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993, may we respectfully request to deny the petition referred thereto considering the issues raised
by the proponents were favorably acted upon and endorsed to Congress and other government agencies
by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.
For your information and guidance, we are enumerating hereunder the issues raised by the petitioners with
the corresponding actions undertaken by the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, to wit:
ISSUES RAISED BY PROPONENTS
I. Pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye ng taong 1993.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Kapasyahang Pag-anib sa SSEZ kung:
a) Ibabalik sa Morong ang pag-aaring Grande Island, kabundukan at Naval Reservation;
b) Ibase sa aring Lupa ng LGU ang kikitain at mapapasok na manggagawa nila sa SSEZ;
c) Isama ang nasabing lupa sa pagkukuwenta ng "IRA" ng Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan;
d) Makapagtatag ng sariling "economic zones" ang Morong, Hermosa at Dinalupihan;
e) Pabayaan bukas ang pinto ng Morong patungong SSEZ at magbukas ng dalawang (2) pinto pa;
(f) Konkretohin ang daang Morong papunta sa Orani at Dinalupihan;
g) Pumili ng SBMA Chairman na taga-ibang lugar.
ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE SB OF MORONG
1. By virtue of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of 1992, all actions
of LGU's correlating on the above issues are merely recommendatory in nature when such provisions were
already embodied in the statute.
2. Corollary to the notion, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong passed and approved Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines to amend certain provisions of
R.A. 7227, wherein it reasserted its position embodied in Pambayan Kapasyahan Blg. 08 and Blg. 12,
Serye ng taong 1992, (Attached and marked as Annex "A:) which tackled the same issues raised by the
petitioners particularly items a), b), c), e), and g).
3. Item d) is already acted upon by BCDA Chairman Arsenio Bartolome III in its letter to His Excellency
President Fidel V. Ramos, dated May 7, 1993 (Attached and marked as Annex "B") with clarifying letter
from BCDA Vice-Chairman Rogelio L. Singson regarding lands on Mabayo and Minanga dated June 3,
1993 that only lands inside the perimeter fence are envisioned to be part of SBMA.
4. Item f), President Ramos in his marginal note over the letter request of Morong, Bataan Mayor
Bienvenido L. Vicedo, the Sangguniang Bayan and Congressman Payumo, when the Resolution of
Concurrence to SBMA was submitted last April 6, 1993, order the priority implementation of completion of
Morong-Dinalupihan (Tasik-Road) Project, including the Morong-Poblacion-Mabayo Road to DPWH.
(Attached and marked as Annex "C").
Based on the foregoing facts, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong had accommodated the clamor of the
petitioners in accordance with its limited powers over the issues. However, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong cannot afford to wait for amendments by Congress of R.A. 7227 that will perhaps drag for several
months or years, thereby delaying the development of Morong, Bataan.
Henceforth, we respectfully reiterate our request to deny the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum
because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility.
Thank you and more power.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDILBERTO M. DE LEON
Mun. Vice Mayor/Presiding Officer
In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the
ground that its subject is "merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance."
6
On July
13, 1993, the COMELEC en banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty. Benjamin
N. Casiano, to hold action on the authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners.
7

These COMELEC resolutions are sought to be set aside in the petition at bench. The petition makes the
following submissions:
5. This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
5.01 For certiorari, conformably to Sec. 7, Art. IX of the Constitution, to set aside Comelec Resolution Nos.
93-1676 and 93-1623 (Annexes "E" and "H") insofar as it disallowed the initiation of a local initiative to
annul PAMBAYANG KAPASYAHAN BLG. 10, SERYE 1993 including the gathering and authentication of
the required number of signatures in support thereof.
5.01.1 As an administrative agency, respondent Comelec is bound to observe due process in the conduct
of its proceedings. Here, the subject resolutions, Annexes "E" and "H", were issued ex parte and without
affording petitioners and the other proponents of the initiative the opportunity to be heard thereon. More
importantly, these resolutions and/or directives were issued with grave abuse of discretion. A Sangguniang
Bayan resolution being an act of the aforementioned local legislative assembly is undoubtedly a proper
subject of initiative. (Sec. 32, Art. VI, Constitution)
5.02 For mandamus, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court, to command the respondent Comelec to
schedule forthwith the continuation of the signing of the petition, and should the required number of
signatures be obtained, set a date for the initiative within forty-five (45) days thereof.
5.02.1 Respondent Comelec's authority in the matter of local initiative is merely ministerial. It is duty-bound
to supervise the gathering of signatures in support of the petition and to set the date of the initiative once
the required number of signatures are obtained.
If the required number of signatures is obtained, the Comelec shall then set a date for the initiative during
which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for
their approval within sixty (60) days from the date of certification by the Comelec, as provided in
subsection (g) hereof, in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which the
results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Comelec. (Sec. 22, par. (h) R.A. 7160.
Respondent COMELEC opposed the petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under the
Local Government Code of 1991, a resolution cannot be the subject of a local initiative. The same stance
is assumed by the respondent Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.
8

We grant the petition.
The case at bench is of transcendental significance because it involves an issue of first impression
delineating the extent of the all important original power of the people to legislate. Father Bernas explains
that "in republican systems, there are generally two kinds of legislative power, original and derivative.
Original legislative power is possessed by the sovereign people. Derivative legislative power is that which
has been delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power
of the people."
9

Our constitutional odyssey shows that up until 1987, our people have not directly exercised legislative
power, both the constituent power to amend or revise the Constitution or the power to enact ordinary laws.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution delegated legislative power to Congress, thus "the legislative
power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." Similarly, section 1, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, provided that "the
Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa."
10

Implicit in the set up was the trust of the people in Congress to enact laws for their benefit. So total was
their trust that the people did not reserve for themselves the same power to make or repeal laws. The
omission was to prove unfortunate. In the 70's and until the EDSA revolution, the legislature failed the
expectations of the people especially when former President Marcos wielded lawmaking powers under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Laws which could have bridled the nation's downslide from
democracy to authoritarianism to anarchy never saw the light of day.
In February 1986, the people took a direct hand in the determination of their destiny. They toppled down
the government of former President Marcos in a historic bloodless revolution. The Constitution was
rewritten to embody the lessons of their sad experience. One of the lessons is the folly of completely
surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. The result, in the perceptive words of Father
Bernas, is that the new Constitution became "less trusting of public officials than the American
Constitution."
11

For the first time in 1987, the system of people's initiative was thus installed in our fundamental law. To be
sure, it was a late awakening. As early as 1898, the state of South Dakota has adopted initiative and
referendum in its constitution
12
and many states have followed suit.
13
In any event, the framers of our
1987 Constitution realized the value of initiative and referendum as an ultimate weapon of the people to
negate government malfeasance and misfeasance and they put in place an overarching system. Thus,
thru an initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution itself. Sec. 2 of Art. XVII
provides: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein."
Likewise, thru an initiative, the people were also endowed with the power to enact or reject any act or
law by congress or local legislative body. Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI provide:
Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which
shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and referendum.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by
the Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed
by at least ten per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters thereto.
The COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an initiative and referendum.
14
Worthwhile noting is the scope of coverage of an initiative or
referendum as delineated by section 32 Art. VI of the Constitution, supra any act or law passed by
Congress or local legislative body.
In due time, Congress respondent to the mandate of the Constitution. It enacted laws to put into operation
the constitutionalized concept of initiative and referendum. On August 4, 1989, it approved Republic Act
No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." Liberally borrowed from American laws,
15
R.A. No. 6735, among others, spelled out the
requirements
16
for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum, the conduct of national initiative
and referendum;
17
procedure of local initiative and referendum;
18
and their limitations.
19
Then came
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991. Chapter 2, Title XI,
Book I of the Code governed the conduct of local initiative and referendum.
In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper
subject of an initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local
Government Code of 1991 only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on section 120,
Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: "Local Initiative Defined.
Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance."
We reject respondents' narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the
Constitution and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 on initiative and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local
initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: "The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress, or local legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black
20
defines an act as "an
expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely
physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards, and determinations . . . ." It is
basic that a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the constitution.
21
In line with
this postulate, we held in In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even
though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of the
language used."
22

The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was
implemented by Congress when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing for a System
of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes
resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean;
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution.
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution, or ordinance. (Emphasis ours)
Similarly, its section 16 states: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies Any proposition on ordinance
orresolution approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be
repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom . . . ." On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In
Re Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and
Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of
initiatives. Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of initiative The power of initiative may
be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city,
municipal or barangay law,resolution or ordinance."
There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 it intend resolutions to
be proper subjects of local initiatives. The debates confirm this intent. We quote some of the interpellations
when the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505 were being considered in the House of Representatives, viz:
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No.
17 and the consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative ad
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both
versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and
the House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum on the Constitution and on
national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two bills was that in the Senate
version there was a provision for local initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative and referendum, whereas in the
House version, we provided purely for national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions were incorporated.?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and referendum both in the constitutional
amendment and national legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with the provision of the Constitution
whereby it mandates this Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be
done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is
every five years.
23

Contrary to the submission of the respondents, the subsequent enactment of the local Government Code
of 1991 which also dealt with local initiative did not change the scope of its coverage. More specifically, the
Code did not limit the coverage of local initiatives to ordinances alone. Section 120, Chapter 2, Title IX
Book I of the Code cited by respondents merely defines the concept of local initiative as the legal process
whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend
any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local
initiative. It is section 124 of the same Code which does. It states:
Sec. 124. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than
once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians
to enact.
xxx xxx xxx
This provision clearly does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all "subjects or
matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact," which undoubtedly includes
resolutions. This interpretation is supported by Section 125 of the same Code which provides: "Limitations
upon Sanggunians. Any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of initiative and
referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the sanggunian concerned
within six (6) months from the date of the approval thereof . . . ." Certainly, the inclusion of the
word proposition is inconsistent with respondents' thesis that only ordinances can be the subject of local
initiatives. The principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, former Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
espouses the same view. In his commentaries on the said law, he wrote, viz:
24

4. Subject Matter Of Initiative. All sorts of measures may be the subject of direct initiative for as long as
these are within the competence of the Sanggunian to enact. In California, for example, direct initiatives
were proposed to enact a fishing control bill, to regulate the practice of chiropractors, to levy a special tax
to secure a new library, to grant a franchise to a railroad company, and to prevent discrimination in the sale
of housing and similar bills.
Direct initiative on the local lever may, therefore, cover all kinds of measures provided that these are within
the power of the local Sanggunians to enact, subject of course to the other requisites enumerated in the
Section.
5. Form of Initiative. Regarding the form of the measure, the section speaks only of "ordinance," although
the measure may be contained in a resolution. If the registered voters can propose ordinances, why are
they not allowed to propose resolutions too? Moreover, the wording of Sec. 125, below, which deals not
only with ordinances but with "any proposition" implies the inclusion of resolutions. The discussion
hereunder will also show support for the conclusion that resolutions may indeed be the subject of local
initiative.
We note that respondents do not give any reason why resolutions should not be the subject of a local
initiative. In truth, the reason lies in the well known distinction between a resolution and an ordinance
i.e., that a resolution is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which is to have only a
temporary effect while an ordinance is intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to
persons or things in general.
25
Thus, resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy
the efficiency necessary to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city.
26

In the case at bench, however, it can not be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the
municipality of Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of
conduct or government. The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far
reaching implications in the governance of its people. This is apparent from a reading of section 12 of
Republic Act No. 7227 entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority For This Purpose, Providing
Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." to wit:
Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the sangguniang
panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the sangguniang bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and
Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of
Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval
Base and its contiguous extensions as embraced, covered, and defined by the 1947 Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred
to a as the Subic Special Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation
to be issued by the President of the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each
local government unit shall submit its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to
the Office of the President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining
the metes and bounds of the zone as provided herein.
The abovementioned zone shall be subject to the following policies:
(a) Within the framework and subject to the mandate and limitations of the Constitution and the pertinent
provisions of the Local Government Code, the Subic Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a
self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to generate employment
opportunities in and around the zone and to attract and promote productive foreign investments;
(b) The Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate customs territory
ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within, into a exported out of the Subic Special
Economic Zone, as well as provide incentives such as tax and duty-free importations of raw material,
capital and equipment. However, exportations or removal of goods from the territory of the Subic Special
Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines:
(c) The provision of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and
national, shall be imposed within the Subic Special Economic Zone. In lieu of paying taxes, three percent
(3%) of the of the gross income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special
Economic Zone shall be remitted to the National Government one percent (1%) each to the local
government units affected by the declaration of the zone in proportion to their population area, and other
factors. In addition, there is hereby established a development fund of one percent (1%) of the gross
income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the Subic Special Economic Zone to be utilized for
the development of municipalities outside the City of Olongapo and the Municipality of Subic, and other
municipalities contiguous to the base areas.
In case of conflict between national and local laws with respect to tax exemption privileges in the Subic
Special Economic Zone, the same shall be resolved in favor of the latter;
(d) No exchange control policy shall be applied and free markets for foreign exchange, gold, securities and
futures shall be allowed and maintained in the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(e) The Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, shall supervise and regulate the operations of banks
and other financial institutions within the Subic Special Economic Zone;
(f) Banking and finance shall be liberalized with the establishment of foreign currency depository units of
local commercial banks and offshore banking units of foreign banks with minimum Central Bank regulation;
(g) Any investor within the Subic Special Economic Zone whose continuing investment shall not be less
than Two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), his/her spouse and dependent children under twenty-
one (21) years of age, shall be granted permanent resident status within the Subic Special Economic
Zone. They shall have freedom of ingress and egress to and from the Subic Special Economic Zone
without any need of special authorization from the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. The Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority referred to in Section 13 of this Act may also issue working visas renewable every
two (2) years to foreign executives and other aliens possessing highly-technical skills which no Filipino
within the Subic Special Economic Zone possesses, as certified by the Department of Labor and
Employment. The names of aliens granted permanent residence status and working visas by the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority shall be reported to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation within thirty (30)
days after issuance thereof.
(h) The defense of the zone and the security of its perimeters shall be the responsibility of the National
Government in coordination with the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority shall provide and establish its own internal security and fire fighting forces; and
(i) Except as herein provided, the local government units comprising the Subic Special Economic Zone
shall retain their basic autonomy and identity. The cities shall be governed by their respective charters and
the municipalities shall operate and function in accordance with Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991.
In relation thereto, section 14 of the same law provides:
Sec. 14. Relationship with the Conversion Authority and the Local Government Units.
(a) The provisions of existing laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, the Subic
Authority shall exercise administrative powers, rule-making and disbursement of funds over the Subic
Special Economic Zone in conformity with the oversight function of the Conversion Authority.
(b) In case of conflict between the Subic Authority and the local government units concerned on matters
affecting the Subic Special Economic zone other than defense and security, the decision of the Subic
Authority shall prevail.
Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the
people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical
to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of
Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the
welfare of the people of Morong.
Finally, it cannot be gained that petitioners were denied due process. They were not furnished a copy of
the letter-petition of Vice Mayor Edilberto M. de Leon to the respondent COMELEC praying for denial of
their petition for a local initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. Worse, respondent
COMELEC granted the petition without affording petitioners any fair opportunity to oppose it. This
procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the
people, their original power to legislate through the process of initiative. Ours is the duty to listen and the
obligation to obey the voice of the people. It could well be the only force that could foil the mushrooming
abuses in government.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 dated July 6, 1993
and Resolution 93-1676 dated July 13, 1993 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.