RAMIREZ V.

RAMIREZ (1982)

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.

DOCTRINE: Some commentators of the Civil Code have expressed the opinion that a
fideicommissary substitution is in fact a disguised case of successive institutions. This is because
both the first and the second heirs inherit from the testator and not from one another. The
beneficial use and possession of the inheritance are first given to the first heir for a lifetime at
most, and thereafter transferred to the second heir. The law requires that the first and second
heirs must be one degree apart from each other. This limitation became the objective of two
divergent views. One view holds that the one degree apart rule refers to one transfer. Ramirez
settled the controversy by holding the more restrictive view.

In an obiter, the Court opined that the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership
of land does not permit an alien to acquire the same by testamentary succession. Would such a
ruling apply to a case where the foreign beneficiary is both a testamentary and a compulsory
heir?

FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only a widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the CFI of Manila
1. The widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion Wanda is an
Austrian who lives in Spain
2. The administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow en pleno
dominio in satisfaction of her legitimee; the other part or free portion shall go to Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez en nuda propriedad. Furthermore, 1/3 of the free portion is
charged with the widows usufruct and the remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of
Wanda.
3. Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the ground that the
fideicommissary substitutions are invalid because the first heirs are not related to the
second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as provided in Art. 863 of the Civil
Code.

ISSUE: WON the fideicommissary substitutions are invalid.

HELD: Yes, the appellants are correct in their claim that it is void.
The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the
heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution
provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted.

The word degree was construed as generation and this interpretation has been followed in the
present Code, by providing that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree from the heir
originally instituted. The Code this clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and
be one generation from the first heir. It follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a
child or a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree
from the fiduciary.

There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties of
the subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners.

The Court ordered to distribute the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez as follows:
thereof to his widow as her legitime;
thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the
usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.

















VDA. DE MAPA V COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-38972 September 28, 1987
PAZ GARCIA vda. de MAPA, * SEGUNDO MAPA, PRISCILLA M. MONZON,
TERESA MAPA, IGNACIO SALAZAR AND JOSE SALAZAR, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, LUIS HIDROSOLLO and TEODORO HIDROSOLLO, in their
own behalf and as Joint Administrators of the testate estate of LudovicoHidrosollo, and
VICTORIA ** HIDROSOLLO, CORAZON HIDROSOLLO, ROSARIO HIDROSOLLO
and MAGDALENA HIDROSOLLO, respondents.
Doctrine:
Mapa resolved a dispute between two sides of a family with respect to the interpretation of a
testamentary disposition obligating the surviving husband to deliver to the nephews and nieces
(both on the side of the deceased and on his side) the residue of the entire estate. Claimants
advance the theory that the obligation of the surviving husband constituted either (a) an express
trust, or (b) an institution subject to a fideicommissary substitution. It will be noted that if the
testamentary disposition were to be treated as a fideicommissary substitution, the substitution
would have been void since the second heirs are not related to the first heir within the first degree
by consanguinity, as required in Ramirez v Ramirez, infra. If the substitution were to be declared
void, the surviving husband would have inherited the residue of the estate free and clear of any
condition or encumbrance. Consequently, upon his demise, the nephews and nieces comiong
from the side fo the deceased wife would be excluded from participating in the distribution of the
properties. It is worthwhile noting that the properties in question were largely from the estate of
the deceased wife.

If equity were to be taken into account, the decision of the Supreme Court would seem to
be correct. However, the decision fail to argue convincingly that the testatrix indeed intended to
constitute a trust.
FACTS:
1. The petitioners in this case are nephews and nieces of the late Concepcion Mapa de
Hidrosollo (Concepcion) while the respondents are the nephews and nieces of the late
LudovicoHidrosollo (Ludovido), husband of Concepcion. Ludovico died later than Concepcion.
2. On Jan. 16, 1965, the petitioner, Paz Garcia vda. deMapa (Paz) instituted before the CFI-
Manila a civil case to recover from the estate of the late Lucovico the properties left by the late
Concepcion. In her Last Will and Testament, Concepcion instituted Ludovico as universal heir to
the residue of her estate with the obligation as trustee to hold the same in trust for petitioners, her
nephews and nieces. Ludovico, however died, without fulfilling the obligation so that the estate
of Concepcion formed part of the estate of Ludovico.
3. The petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered either:
a. declaring a trust to have been created in their favor and their co-beneficiaries over the
residue of the estate of Concepcion and ordering the respondents, Luis and TeodoroHidrosollo,
as administrators, to turn over to the petitioners 6/13 of the properties of Ludovico to them OR
b. declare that the fideicommissary substitution with Ludovico as first heir and the
petitioners and their co-beneficiaries as fideicommissaries be null and void and that Concepcion
died intestate, and declaring them to be Concepcions only heirs to the residue of her estate and
ordering the administrators of Ludovicos estate to turn over Concepcions properties.
4. The respondents alleged that Ludovico, being the surviving spousebecame the universal heir
when Concepcion died without descendants or ascendants; and that as such universal heir,
Ludovico stepped into the rights, title and claims of the deceased Concepcion, so that the
controverted properties became part of his own estate.
5. The lower court ruled that a trust had been created in favor of the petitioners and their co-
beneficiaries and ordered the administrators of the estate of Ludovico to reconvey the properties
to them.
6. When the respondents appealed to the CA, the decision was reversed. According to the CA,
neither trust nor a fideicommissary substitution was created in Concepcions will. And even if a
trust had been created, the claim for reconveyance was barred by final judgment, i.e. the order
denying their motion to intervene in the proceedings which settled Ludovicos estate.
ISSUE: WON a trust was created in favor of the petitioners?
HELD: YES.
1. In Concepcions will, Ludovico was instituted as the sole and universal heir to the rest of the
properties not covered by the legacies. In addition, Ludovico was charged with the obligation to
deliver the rest of the estate in equal parts to the nephews and nieces of both Concepcion and
Ludovico.
2. While the word trust does not appear in the will, it was the testatrixs intent to create one, as
clearly demonstrated by the stipulations in the will. In designating Ludovico as the sole and
universal heir with the obligation to deliver the properties to the nephews and nieces,
Concepcion intended that legal title should vest in Ludovico, and in significantly referring to the
petitoners and their co-beneficiaries as beneficatios, she intended that the beneficial or
equitable interest in the properties should repose in them.
3. According to the Supreme Court, these designations, coupled with the other provisions
concerning co-ownership and joint administration of the properties, as well as the other
conditions imposed by the testatrix, effectively created a trust in favor of the parties over the
properties referred to in the will.
4. As Concepcions surviving spouse, Ludovico, is however entitled to of her estate as his
legitime. Thus, the trust created by Concepcion should be effective only on the free portion of
her estate.
Dispositive:WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 40448-A is
hereby reversed. Private respondents Luis and TeodoroHidrosollo or their successors as
administrators of the estate of LudovicoHidrosollo are hereby ordered to deliver to petitioners
their lawful shares in the trust constituted over the freeportion of the estate of Concepcion
Mapa. Said Luis and TeodoroHidrosollo or their successors are further ordered to render an
accounting of the income of the properties pertaining to petitioners and to deliver to the latter the
net proceeds of such income.















CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO V. MANUEL SINGSON, 4 SCRA 491
(1962)
FACTS: Dona Leona Singson died testate, leaving a property in Ilocos Sur to her brothers
(Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Crisologo) and her niece, petitioner Consolacion Florentino.
1. Petitioners filed an action for partition against respondent Manuel Singson in connection
with a property located in Ilocos Sur. They alleged that the subject property was co-
owned in share by both parties (Consolacion and Manuel) by virtue of the probated
will of the testator Dona Leona Singson.
2. Singson, on the other hand, contended that Consolacion was a mere usufructuary and not
a co-owner of the property, and hence, was not entitled to demand partition

ISSUE: WON the testamentary disposition in the testators will provided for sustitucion vulgar
(vulgar substitution) or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria (fideicommissary substitution)

HELD: The last will of the decedent established a mere vulgar substitution, the substitution
Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective upon the death of
Consolacion, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause shows that the substitution is not expressly made of
the fideicommissary kind, nor does not contain a clear statement that Consolacion, during her
lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over the property bequeathed to her, since naked
ownership was vested to the brothers of the testatrix. The provision in question merely provides
that upon Consolacions death, whether this happens before or after that of the testatrix, her share
shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN VULGAR SUBSTITUTION AND FIDEICOMMISSARY
SUBSTITUTION
If the clause in the will created a vulgar substitution, the result would be that Consolacion, upon
the death of the testatrix, becomes the owner of the undivided of the property. But if the clause
provided for a fideicommissary substitution, Consolacion acquires only usufructuary rights over
the pro-indiviso share.
In fideicommissary substitution, the fiduciary does not acquire full ownership of the property
bequeathed by the will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to
deliver said property to the fideicommissary; it is obvious that the nude ownership is passed to
another person other than the fideicommissary.

To constitute fideicommissary substitution, there must be an obligation imposed on the first heir
(fiduciary heir) to preserve and transmit to another (fideicommissary heir) the whole or part of
the estate bequeathed to him, upon his death or upon the happening of a particular event. For
this reason, Art 785 Old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution shall have no
effect unless it is made expressly either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first
heir the absolute obligation to deliver the inheritance to a substitute or second heir.


















RODRIGUEZ v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-287334, 28 March 1969
27 SCRA 546

A testamentary disposition prohibiting the alienation of the hereditary estate for a period exceeding
twenty years is void. However, the Court has ruled that the nullity refers not to the prohibition to
alienate, but to the prohibition in excess of the first twenty years.

Justice Fernando made a cryptic statement in the penultimate paragraph of the decision. He
opined that the intestate heirs may never even have the right to challenge the question provision of
the will which created the trust. Is he suggesting that the said intestate heirs (first cousin of the
testatrix) must survive the twenty year period in order to have the personality, at that time, to
challenge the trust? If so, is there a suggestion that the successional right of the intestate heirs would
ripen only if they survive the period? This point is important for two reasons: (a) the first cousins
are relatives of the testatrix within the fifth degree, and beyond which relationship with the testatrix
is no longer recognized by law; (b) the said first cousins, assuming they do not survive the twenty-
year period, cannot, under the present law, be represented by their own respective descendants.

FACTS:

The disputed clause reads thus:

[Clausula Decima o Pang Sampu]. Ipinaguutos ko na ang mga pag-aaring
nasasabi sa Clausulang ito ay pangangasiwaan sa habang panahon, at ito nga ang
ipagbubukas ng "Fideicomiso" sa Juzgado sa pagkatapos na maayos ang naiwanan
kong pag-aari. Ang pangangasiwaang pag-aari ay ang mga sumusunod: x x x.
Ang lahat ng pag-aaring nasasabi sa Clausulang ito (hindi kasama ang "generator"
at "automobile") hindi maisasanla o maipagbibili kailan man, maliban sa pag-
aaring nasa Quezon Boulevard, Maynila, na maaring isanla kung walang pondo na
gagamitin sa ipagpapaigi o ipagpapagawa ng panibago at alinsunod sa kaayusang
hinihingi ng panahon.

ISSUE:

WON the testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period IS void.

HELD:

In the language of a Civil Code provision:

If a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt,
that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.

Nor is this all. A later article of the Civil Code equally calls for observance. Thus:

The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions
inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which
will prevent intestacy.

Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the
testator allowed to prevail that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving
it effect. Thus:

Where the testator's intention is manifest from the context of the will and
surrounding circumstances, but is obscured by inapt and inaccurate modes of
expression, the language will be subordinated to the intention, and in order to give
effect to such intention, as far as possible, the court may depart from the strict
wording and read a word or phrase in a sense different from that which is ordinarily
attributed to it, and for such purpose may mould or change the language of the will,
such as restricting its application or supplying omitted words or phrases.

A more recent reiteration of such an attitude is found in an opinion by former Chief Justice
Paras. Thus:

As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of Oliva Villapana
in leaving her properties to the person named in the will, and omitting therefrom the
oppositors-appellees. Suffice it to state that the trial court itself found the will to
have been executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with
Oliva having testamentary capacity; and in such a situation it becomes our duty to
give expression to her will.

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that petitioners could not challenge the provision in question.
It had no right to vindicate. Such a right may never arise. The twenty-year period is still with us.
What would transpire thereafter is still locked up in the inscrutable future, beyond the power of
mere mortals to foretell. At any rate, we cannot anticipate. Nor should we. We do not possess the
power either of conferring a cause of action to a party when, under the circumstances disclosed, it
had none.












RABADILLA v COURT OF APPEALS (2000

Johnny S. Rabadilla, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Maria Marlena Coscoluella Y
Belleza Villacarlos, respondents

DOCTRINE: Rabadilla distinguished between a conditional institution and a modal institution, It
also discussed the various forms of substitution of heirs.

Justice Purisima concluded that in case of doubt, the institution must be deemed modal and
not conditional. Following his discussion, he noted that while a modal institution obliges, it does not
suspend the effectivity of the institution. On the other hand, a conditional institution suspends the
efficacy of the institution, although it does not impose any obligation on the instituted heir.

One question that should probably be asked is: what happens to the mortgage in favor of
PNB and RPB upon the cancellation of the title of the property in the names of the heirs of Dr.
Rabadilla? If the mortgage is to be honored, the heirs of Aleja Belleza will receive the property
subject to the encumbrance. On the other hand, if the mortgage is to be cancelled, PNB and RBP
will be prejudiced.

FACTS: In a codicil (a supplement to a will; an appendix) of Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
was instituted devisee of a 511, 855 sqm. lot in Bacolod. With the obligation to deliver 100
piculs of sugar to private respondent Maria Marlena Coscoluella Y Belleza Villacarlos every year
during her lifetime.
1. The codicil provides that the obligation is imposed not only on the instituted heir but also to
his successors-in-interest and that in case of failure to deliver, private respondent shall seize
the property and turn it over to the testatrixs near descendants.
2. Dr. Rabadilla died and was survived by his wife and children, one of whom is herein
petitioner.
3. Private respondent file a complaint with the RTC praying for the reconveyance of the
subject property to the surviving heirs of the testatrix. She alleged that the heirs failed to
comply with the provisions on the codicil: (a) The lot was mortgaged to PNB and RPB in
disregard of the testatrixs specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near
descendants and sister of the testatrix; (b) Defendants-heirs failed to comply with their
obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to private respondent from sugar crop years 1985
up to the filing of the complaint, despite repeated demands; (c) the banks failed to comply
with the Codicil which provide s that in case of the sale, lease or mortgage of the property,
the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of
sugar per crop year to private respondent.
4. During the pre-trial, a compromise agreement was concluded between the private
respondent and Alan Azurin, son-in-law of petitioner who was lessee of the property and
acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant heirs. The lessee of the property assumed the delivery
of 100 piculs of sugar to private respondent; however, only partial delivery was made.
5. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, While there
may be the non-performance of the command as mandated, exaction from them (the
petitioners), simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner
of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.
6. The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature
of modal institution and a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose when
petitioner failed to comply with their obligation under the codicil, and in ordering the
reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix.
ISSUE: WON private respondent has a legally demandable right against the petitioner, as one of the
compulsory heirs of Dr. Rabadilla

HELD: Yes
The CA found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a
legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A mode imposes an obligation
upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his right to succession. On the other
hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and
the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

In the case at bar, the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-
in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena
Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
Rabadillas inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied
with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrixs near descendants. The manner of institution
of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a
charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the heir
should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the
intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.


































REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL, petitioners, vs. AIDA FRANCISCO-
ALFONSO, respondent
[G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001]
Doctrine:
The legitime is a portion of the estate of the deceased person which is reserved by law for
the compulsory heirs. An attempt to deprive a compulsory heir of the legitime by way of a
simulated sale will not be tolerated. The simulated sale will be set aside.
In this case, the simulation of sale was proved by the fact that neither of the two buyers of
the property had sufficient financial resources to justify their acquisition of the property by
way of a cash purchase. And because the decedent had no property other than those
parcels of land which he allegedly sold to his illegitimate daughters, the simulation of said
sale resulted in the dissipation of his assets and the deprivation of the legitimate daughter
of her legitime.
The second reason proferred by the Supreme Court in sustaining the Court of Appeals is
erroneous. The Courts reasoning was: even if the sale was not simulated, the same violated
Aidas legitime. Therefore, the sale is void. The reasoning is flawed. If the sale was bona
fide in that consideration was indeed paid, then Aida would have no cause to complain,
because her father Gregorio, in his lifetime had every right to dispose the land for valuable
consideration. Aidas legitime will have to be determined at the time of death of Gregorio,
at which time, the land had already been validly sold.
The Courts argument seems to suggest that the simulated sale was Gregorios way of
depriving Aida of her rightful participation in the distribution of his estate. However, there
is nothing in the decision that would seem to prove that intent. Indeed, the decision states
that Gregorio confided to Aida that the titles to the property were in the possession of
Regina Francisco and ZenaidaPascual. There is no indication that he admitted to having
fraudulently sold the property to the latter. The inference is that the titles were merely
entrusted to Regina and Zenaida. Consequently, I fail to appreciate the Courts suggestion
that the transfer of the property to Regina and Zenaida was Gregorios way to transfer the
property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter.
In any event, there is merit to the nullification of the sale based on the first theory that the
sale was simulated. I do not believe that the second reason proferred by the Court is
correct, nor did it support the conclusion.

Facts:
1. The petitioners in this case, Regina Francisco (Regina) and ZenaidaPascual (Zenaida) are the
illegitimate daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco with his common law wife, Julia Mendoza,
with whom he begot 7 children.
2. The respondent, Aida Francisco-Alfonso (Aida), is the only daughter of Gregorio Francisco
with his wife, Cirila de la Cruz. Both Gregorio and Cirila are now deceased.
3. Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned two parcels of residential land, situated in
Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he
confided to his daughter Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession
of Regina Francisco and ZenaidaPascual.
4. After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990,
3
Aida inquired about the certificates of title from her
half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983. After
verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina
Francisco and ZenaidaPascual. Thus, on August 15, 1983, Gregorio executed a
"KasulatansaGanapnaBilihan (Kasulatan), whereby for P25,000.00, he sold the two parcels of
land to Regina Francisco and ZenaidaPascual. By virtue of the sale, the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to Zenaida Pascual.
4

5. On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against
petitioners for annulment of sale with damages.
5
She alleged that the signature of her late father,
Gregorio Francisco, on the KasulatansaGanapnaBilihan dated August 15, 1983, was a forgery.
6. In their joint answer to the complaint, petitioners denied the alleged forgery or simulation of
the deed of sale. After due proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint of Aida and sustaining the validity of the Kasulatan and the sale.
7. Upon the appeal of Aida, the CA reversed the trial court.
ISSUE:May a legitimate daughter be deprived of her share in the estate of her deceased father by
a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate children?
HELD: No. A legitimate daughter may not be deprived of her share.
1. First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was no consideration for the contract of sale.
Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the Franciscos, testified that ZenaidaPascual and Regina
Francisco did not have any source of income in 1983, when they bought the property, until the
time when Felicitas testified in 1991.
15

As proof of income, however, ZenaidaPascual testified that she was engaged in operating a
canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to
Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior thereto.
Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw money
from her bank account at the Rural Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the property. She
had personal savings other than those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings from the RTW
for three years was P9,000.00, and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.
16

Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a market vendor, selling nilugaw, earning a net income
of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought the property from the deceased for P15,000.00.
17
She had
no other source of income.
We find it incredible that engaging in buy and sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or that
earnings in selling goto could save enough to pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.
The testimonies of petitioners were incredible considering their inconsistent statements as to
whether there was consideration for the sale and also as to whether the property was bought
below or above its supposed market value. They could not even present a single witness to
the kasulatan that would prove receipt of the purchase price.
Since there was no cause or consideration for the sale, the same was a simulation and hence, null
and void.
18

2. Second: Even if the kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code
19
provisions
insofar as the transaction affected respondent's legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when
the applicable law was the Civil Code, not the Family Code.
Obviously, the sale was Gregorio's way to transfer the property to his illegitimate daughters
20
at
the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was executed to prevent respondent Alfonso
from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his death, Gregorio had a
change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Article 888, Civil Code:
"The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate
of the father and of the mother.
"The latter may freely dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children
and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter provided."
Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the parcels of land involved were
the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive respondent of her share in her
father's estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his only legitimate
child.
21

The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco must be determined in proper testate or intestate
proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in
the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
22

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 48545 is AFFIRMED, in toto.






































JUAN CASTRO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND BENITA NAVAL, 173 SCRA 656 (1989)
FACTS: Petitioners Juan and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of the decedent
Eustaquio Castro while respondent Benita Naval is the only child of Eustaquio. Petitioners as
forced heirs of the decedent Eustaquio, filed an action for partition of properties against
respondent Benita. During the trial, the parties agreed that the issue to be resolved was the status
of Benita as an acknowledged child of the decedent
1. To support her claim, Benita presented her birth certificate which the decedent filed for
registration
2. It appears that Benitas mother, Pricola, was married to Felix de Maya in 1913. However,
Pricola ran away with Eustaquio and lived as husband and wife until her death in 1924.
3. Eustaquio, at the time she lived with Precola, was a widower and was free to marry
Pricola. As a result of their cohabitation, Benita was born in 1919. After the death of her
mother, Benita continued to live with her father.
4. The trial court ruled that Benita is the acknowledged and recognized daughter of the
decedent, and as such is entitled to participate in the partition of properties left by the
decedent.
5. On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court decision and held that Eustaquios recognition of
Benita is voluntary recognition i.e., made in a public document. While Benitas mother
was married to another person, the rule in recognition is that if it is made by only one of
the parents, it will be presumed that the is natural if the parent recognizing it had the legal
capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception

ISSUE: WON Benita is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro

HELD: Yes. Under the Civil Code, illegitimate children are those who are conceived and born
out of wedlock are classified into:
1. Natural, whether actual or by fiction, are those who were born outside of lawful wedlock
of parents who, at the time of the conception of the child, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other
2. Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, are those born of parents who, at the
time of conception, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments.

Since Eustaquio was a widower when Benita was conceived, Benita then is a natural child.
However, from the viewpoint of her mother, Benita was her spurious child.

Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be
recognized voluntarily by court action. This arises from a legal principle that an unrecognized
spurious child like a natural child, has no rights from her parents or to their estate because her
rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from the childs acknowledgment by
the parent. In other words, the rights of an illegitimate child arose not because she was the true or
real child of her parents but because under the law, she had been recognized or acknowledged as
such a child.

The Civil Code provides for two kinds of acknowledgmentvoluntary and compulsory. Said
provisions apply to both natural and spurious children. Art 131 Old Civil Code provides for
voluntary acknowledgment; it states that The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made
in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public document.

Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child must be
signed by the father and mother jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone otherwise
she may be penalized.
The more liberal provisions of the new Family Code are applied considering the facts and
equities of this case.
1. Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who was
qualified to legally marry when she was conceived and born. From her birth on March
27, 1919 until the father's death on August 22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with her
father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an only child. This was
admitted by the plaintiffs
2. The rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special
relevance here because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only
immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife
contesting the inheritance of Benita.
3. It was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There is no
indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from
reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen to it that
it was preserved for 60 years
4. It was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval. The
couple continued to live with the father even after the wedding and until the latter's death.
5. The certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for
Eustaquio may not be sufficient proof of recognition under the Civil Code but they add to
the equities of this case favoring the petitioner.

Art 175 FC provides that "Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children." Art 172 and 173 FC on establishing
filiation provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or
her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
There can be no dispute that Benita Castro enjoyed the open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child of Eustaquio Castro and that the action of Benita in defending her
status in this case is similar to an "action to claim legitimacy" brought during her lifetime.





















TAYAG v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 95229, 9 June 1992
209 SCRA 665

On facts nearly identical with those of Castro v Court of Appeals, supra, the Supreme Court arrived
at a diametrically opposed conclusion. It is therefore important to distinguish between these two
cases.

FACTS:

Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should
have been filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed
on the ground of prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code
is controlling and, since the alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for
filiation may be filed within four years from the attainment of majority of the minor child.

ISSUE:

WON it is correct to apply the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that
private respondent's cause of action has not yet prescribed.

HELD: Yes.

Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right of the minor child to file an action for
recognition is a vested right or not.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the
minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil
Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case
of Republic of the Philippines v Court of Appeals, et al., where we held that the fact of filing of the
petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it, and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no longer be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provisions of the Family Code in question is
procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending
actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from its operations, is not so
pervasive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect,
since procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure
arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family
Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect adversely a right
of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which have
been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying
the provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of
action has not yet prescribed.












































BARITUA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (1990)

Jose Baritua and Edgar Bitancor, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable Court of Appeals, Nicolas Nacario and Victoria Ronda Nacario, respondents

DOCTRINE: While legitimate parents are considered as compulsory heirs of their legitimate child,
the parents are secondary compulsory heirs and inherit only in default of legitimate children and
decendants of the deceased. Thus, the legitimate parents have no right to demand indemnification
for the death of their deceased child, and such right to indemnification properly belongs to the
latter's descendants and/or spouse.

FACTS: On November 7, 1979, the tricycle driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the national
highway at Camarines Sur met an accident with a bus driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and
owned and operated by petitioner Jose Baritua.
2. Bienvenido and his passenger died due to the accident and the tricycle was damaged.
2. On March 27, 1980, extra-judicial settlement were negotiated by the petitioners and the
bus insurer with Bienvenido Nacarios widow, Alicia Nacario where she received P18,500. After the
settlement, Aliciaexecuted on March 27, 1980 a Release of Claim in favour of petitioners and the bus
insurer, releasing and forever discharging them from all actions, claims, and demands
arising from the accident.
2. About one year and ten months from the date of accident, Bienvenidos parent, private
respondents herein, filed a complaint for damages against petitioners. Private respondents
alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, petitioners through their
representatives promised them that as extra- judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified
for the death of their son, for funeral expenses incurred, and for the damage to the tricycle
which they only loaned to the victim. Petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and
instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long estranged wife of private
respondents late son.
2. The trial court dismissed the complaint. However, on appeal, the decision was reversed
by the Court of Appeals. The CA ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda.
De Nacario did not discharge the liability of the petitioners because the case was
instituted by the private respondents in their own capacity and not as heirs,
representatives, successors, and assigns of Alicia.


ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are still liable to pay the damages to private respondents
despite the agreement of extrajudicial settlement between petitioners and the victims wife.

HELD: No, petitioners are no longer liable to private respondents.

Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in interest referred to in the law as the
persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect
to their legitimate children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Compulsory heirs named in nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in nos. 1 and
2. Neither do they exclude one another.

It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a
legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As
it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private
respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The
petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of
Bienvenido and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia has been
estranged from Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a
surviving spouse as an heir of the deceased spouse.


























ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
Doctrine:
A foreign divorce validly obtained by a foreign national in a foreign court against his Filipino
spouse produces effects in the Philippines. Van Dorn suggests that the divorce decree should
likewise terminate the status of the foreign party as a "compulsory heir" of the former Filipino
spouse. It must be noted, however, that the dictum of the court in this respect is merely an obiter
inasmuch as heirship was not an issue in this case.
FACTS:
1. The basic background facts are that petitioner, Alice Reyes Van Dorn (Van Dorn) is a citizen
of the Philippines while private respondent, Richard Upton (Upton), is a citizen of the United
States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established
their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and
December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
2. Upton filed a suit against petitioner in Civil Case in the RTC- in Pasay City, stating that
petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the
parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that he
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on
the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982.
3. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
4. Van Dorn contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.
5. For his part, Upton avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. WON the divorce obtained in the Nevada Court is valid with regards to the parties. YES
2. WON Upton may still claim a right to the Galleon Shop business established in the
Philippines. NO
HELD:
Validity of Divorce:
1. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
2. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law
3. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Claim to the Galleon Shop property
1. Pursuant to the national law of the husband, he does not have any standing in court to pursue
any conjugal assets of the marriage. By his own action, such American husband should not
continue to be an heir with possible rights to the conjugal property. The Filipina should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.



INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA ROSALES, IRENEA ROSALES V. FORTUNATO
ROSALES ET AL, 148 SCRA 69 (1987)
FACTS: In 1971, Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband (Fortunato
Rosales) and two children: Magna Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio,
predeceased her, leaving a child respondent Macikequerox and his widow, petitioner Irenea
Rosales.
1. Magna Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate and was
thereafter appointed as administratrix.
2. The trial court issued an order declaring the following as legal heirs of the decedent and
prescribed their respective shares of the estate:
a. Fortunato (husband) share
b. Magna Acebes (daughter)
c. Antonio(son)
d. Macikequerox (grandson)
3. Petitioner Irenea opposed the order and insisted on getting a share of the estate in her
capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the decedent Petra.
Petitioner claimed that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her
son

ISSUE: WON the widow (petitioner Irenea) whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from her mother-in-law

HELD: No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified in to 2 groups: those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by right of representation. These are provided in Art 980, 981, 982
and 999 NCC.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her
to inherit for her mother-in-law either by her own right or by right of representation. The
provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate succession enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of her parent-in-law, it
would have so provided in the Code.

Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with Art 887 NCC. This provisions
refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory
heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. In Lachenal v. Salas, the SC held that the
surviving spouse is considered a third person in connection with the estate of the parent-in-law.

Moreover, Art 999 confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased
spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate proceedings in this case is that of
the deceased Petra Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra that
Macikequerox draws a share of the inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Art
981.

Art 971 explicitly states that Macikequerox is called to succession by law because of his blood
relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio who predeceased his mother, but his
grandmother whom his father would have succeeded. Thus, petitioner cannot assert the same
right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.

Petitioner argues that at the time of the death of her husband he had an inchoate or contingent
right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. However this right was extinguished
by his death which is why his son succeeded from Petra by right of representation.












PADURA vs. BALDOVINO
No. L-11960
December 27, 1958

FACTS: The lower court rendered judgment declaring all the reservees (without distinction)
co-owners, pro-indiviso, in equal shares of the parcel of land subject matter of the suit.

ISSUE: In a case of reserve troncal where the only reservatorios (reserves) surviving the
reservista and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the half blood and the others are
nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among them equally
or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of
the half blood?

HELD: The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the New Civil Codes
hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by the suppression of the
reserve vindal and the reversion legalof the Code of 1889 (Arts. 812 and 968-980).

There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservistas lifetime, the
reservatarios, who are ultimate acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
thereservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right; and for this
purpose they can compel the annotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the
reservista is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de Ultamar, Arts. 168, 199: Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs of the
reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of the
reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so long as there are reservatarios existing
(Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but
from the descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject of
the condition that they must survive the reservista (Sanchez Roman, Vol. Tomo 2, p. 286:
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6
th
Ed., pp274, 310). Had the nephews of whole and half blood
succeeded the prepositus directly, those of full- blood would undoubtedly receive a double share
compared to those of half blood (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.), why then should the latter
receive equal shares simply because the transmission of the property was delayed by interregnum
of the reserve? The decedent (causante), the heirs and their relationship being the same, there is
no cogent reason why the hereditary portions should vary.

It should be stated, in justice to the trial court, that its opinion is supported by distinguished
commentators of the Civil Code of 1889, among them Sanchez Roman (Estudios, Vol. 6, Tomo
2, p.1008) and MuciusScaevola (Codigo Civil, Vol. 14, p.342). The reason given by these
authors is that the reservatarios are called by law to take the reservable property because they
belong to the line of origin; and not because of their relationship. But the argument, if logically
pursued, would lead to the conclusion that the property should pass to any and all reservatarios,
as a class and in equal shares, regardless of line and degrees. In truth, such as the theory of
reserve integral (14 Scaevola, Cod. Civ., p. 332 et seq.). But as we have seen, the Supreme Court
of Spain and of the Philippines have rejected that view, and consider that the reservable property
should be succeeded to by the reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules
of intestacy.





EDROSO VS. SABLAN (1913)
Marcelina Edroso, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
Pablo and Basilio Sablan, opponents-appellees
DOCTRINE: A reservor's right to the reservable property is not just usufructuary in nature. The
reservor, having inherited the reservable property from the prepositus, acquires ownership thereof,
subject to a resolutory condition. Thus, a reservor has a registrable title to the property, and may
institute land registration proceedings in the appropriate case.

It must be noted, however, that during the registration proceedings, the reservees should
intervene solely for the purpose of ensuring that the reservable nature of the property is properly
inscribed in the title. Otherwise, a clean title issued pursuant to a decree of registration, may in the
proper case extinguish the reserva.


Mariano Ma. Rita


Victoriano Marcelina



Pedro


FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had a son named, Pedro
who inherited two parcels of land upon the death of his father.
1. Subsequently, Pedro died,unmarried and without issue, the two parcels of land passed
through inheritance tohi s mot her . Hence t he her edi t ar y t i t l e wher eupon i s
bas ed t he appl i cat i on f or registration of her ownership.
2. The two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate brothers of
Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that either the registration be denied or
if granted to her, the right reserved by law to them be recorded in the
registration of each parcel.
3. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration holding that the land in
question partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that
in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whet her or not t he pr oper t y i n ques t i on i s i n t he nat ur e of a
r es er vabl e property.

HELD:
A very definite conclusion of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
(gratuitous title), and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by
inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is
that the uncles are within the third degree of blood relationship.

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which
he had acquired without a valuable consideration - that is, by inheritance from another ascendant,
his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to reserve them
intact for the claimants, who are uncles or relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that
they partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with
the law.

The person required by article 811 to reserve the right, has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights of use
and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although
under a condition subsequent. Clearly, he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to
dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has
the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it,
although a limited and recoverable one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a
condition reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.

On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the rightis reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actuallyor constructively or
formally, in their possession; and moreover, because they haveno title of ownership or of the fee
simple which they can transmit to another, on thehypothesis that only when the person who must
reserve the right should die beforethem will they acquire it.

The SC reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the
applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter
of the application, recording in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to
either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her.












CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

SIENES v ESPARCIA
Doctrine:
The reserva creates a double resolutory condition: (1) the death of the reservor, and (2)
the survival of the reservee at the time of the death of the reservor. While the decision refers to
the first as a resolutory condition, it would seem more likely that the same is a term. In any
event, the case confirms that either the reservor or any of the reservees may alienate the
reservable property, and the final outcome of the sales will be determined by the timeliness or
untimeliness of the death of the seller. It is important to distinguish the sales referred to herein
from the concept of a double sale which is regulated in Article 1544 of the Civil Code.

The subject matter of the two sales referred to herein must be clarified. It would seem
fairly clear that the reservor sold the reservable land in question, since at the time of the said sale,
she was the registered owner of the property and in fact in possession thereof. The sale executed
by the reservees may be viewed from a different perspective. Since the reservor was still alive at
the time of the said sale, it would seem that the reservees could not have validly sold the same
parcel of land, which obviously was not theirs. If the said sale were to refer to the parcel of land,
then the sale should properly be construed as a conditional sale - the condition being the survival
of the seller-reservees upon the death of the reservor. Upon the other hand, it is also possible to
construed this sale of the reservees as a sale of their inchoate right to acquire the property. Hence
the subject matter of the sale would not be the reservable land, but the rights of the reservees
thereto, which is conditional.

FACTS:
1. Lot 3368 originally belonged to SaturninoYaeso (origin). With his first wife, Teresa Reales,
he had 4 children, named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana.
2. With his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco (propositus).
3. Upon Yaesos death, said lot was left to Francisco and title was issued in his name. Because
Francisco was then a minor, his mother administered the property for him and declared it in her
name for taxation purposes.
4. When Francisco died, single and without any descendant, his mother, Andrea Gutang
(reservista) as sole heir, executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale of the property in favor of
the Sps. ConstancioSienes and GenovevaSilay (Sps. Sienes).
5. Thereafter, the Sps. Sienes demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband, Jose Esparcia, the
surrender of the original certificate of title (which was in their possession). The latter refused.
6. Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso (reservatorios), the surviving half-sisters of Francisco as such,
declared the property in their name and subsequently executed a deed of sale in favor of the Sps.
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Sps. Esparcia), who in turn, declared it in their name for tax
purposes and thereafter secured title in their name.
7. ConstancioSienes then filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale executed by
Paulina and Cipriana, the reconveyance of the lot and damages and cost of suit.
8. Fidel Esparcia countered that they did not know any information regarding the sale by Andrea
Gutang in favor of the Sps. Sienes, and that if such sale was made, the same was void since
Andrea had no right to dispose of the property.
9. The trial court declared that the sale of Andrea Gutang to Sps. Sienes was void and that the
sale by Paulina and CiprianaYaeso to the Sps. Esparcia was also void. The land in question was
reservable property and therefore, the reservista Andrea Gutang, was under obligation to reserve
it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came, if any, survived her.
10. The records show that the lone reserve surviving was CiprianaYaeso.
ISSUE:
WON the lot in question is reservable property and if so, whether the reservoir or the reserve can
alienate the same
HELD: Yes, the lot is reservable property.
1. On Franciscos death, unmarried and without descendants, the property was inherited by his
mother, Andrea Gutang, who was under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any, survived her.
2. Being reservable property, the reserve creates two resolutory conditions:
a. the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and
b. the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which the property came.
In connection with this, the court has held that the reservista (reservor) has the legal title and
dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. Hence, he may
alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservista, the right acquired by the transferee being revoked or
resolved by the survival of reservatorios (reserves) at the time of the death of the reservista .
3. In the present case, inasmuch as when the reservista, Andrea Gutang died, CiprianaYaeso was
still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor
of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property passed in exclusive
ownership to Cipriana.
4. On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters, Paulina and CiprianaYaeso, in favor of the
Sps. Esparcia was subject to a similar resolutory condition. While it may be true that the sale
was made by Cipriana and her sister prior to the death of Andrea, it became effective because of
the occurrence of the resolutory condition.




























RICARDO LACERNA V. AGATONA PAURILLO VDA DE CORCINO, 1 SCRA 1226

DOCTRINE: The reserva applies only where the property sought to be reserved was acquired by
operation of law by an ascendant from a descendant who in turn, acquired it by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, brother or sister. Thus, where the disputed property was acquired by a
descendant from an ascendant, there is yet no reserva because there has yet to be a second
transmission of the property to another line by operation of law.

FACTS: Bonifacia Lacerna died in 1932, leaving 3 parcels of land to her only son, Juan
Marbebe. Juan Marbebe died single and intestate in 1943. An action was then filed by the
plaintiffs Ricardo Lacerna et al (Juan Marbebes cousins) for the recovery of 3 parcels of land
from respondent Agatona vda de Corcino (sister of Bonifacia).
1. Agatona claimed that she held the disputed lands under a power of attorney executed by
Juan Marbebe in her favor and that she is entitled to succeed Juan in the same manner as
the plaintiffs since she was Juans aunt.
2. Jacoba Marbebe filed an intervention alleging that she is the half-sister of Juan and as
such, she is entitled, by succession, to the properties in question.
3. It appears that Bonifacia had a sister (Agatona) and 2 brothers: Catalino (who was
survived by 3 children) and Marcelo (who was survived by his 7 children). On the other
hand, Jacoba is the daughter of Bonifacias husband from his 1
st
marriage and is the half-
sister of Juan.
4. The trial court held in favor of Jacoba.
5. Plaintiffs contend that pursuant to Art 891 establishing a reserve troncal, the properties in
dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third degree, who belong to the
line from which the properties came. Since the properties were inherited by Juan from his
mother Bonifacia, they should go to his nearest relative within the third degree on the
maternal line, to which the plaintiffs belong.
6. Jacoba avers that brothers and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives in the order of
intestate sucession, and as Juans half-sister, she has a better right then the plaintiffs to
inherit his properties

ISSUE: WON the parcels of land were subject to reserve troncal

HELD: No. The main flaw in the plaintiffs theory is that it assumes that said properties are
subject to reserva troncal under Art 891 NCC when such is NOT the case.

Art 891 is not applicable since the conditions set forth by the article is that the ascendant inherits
from the descendant which is not the case here. The lands in dispute were inherited by a
DESCENDANT, Juan Marbebe, from an ASCENDANT, his mother Bonifacia. The transmission
of lands by inheritance was therefore in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate
succession, pursuant to which, a sister, even if by a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or
brothers, or of children of sisters or brothers, excludes all other collateral relatives regardless of
whether or not the latter belong to the line from which the property of the deceased came.

Reserva troncal contemplates three transfers:
(1) From the descendant to the ascendant or brother or sister to the prepositus by gratuitous
title
(2) From the prepositus to another ascendant (the reservoir)by operation of law; and
(3) Upon the reservors death, from the prepositus to the reservees (if they are still alive)
by theory of delayed intestacy

The first two are the most important with respect to this case. While admittedly, Juan received
the properties by gratuitous title from his mother, when he died without a will, the property was
not transferred to an ascendant of Juan. His nearest heir was his half-sister Jacoba. Thus the
second transfer, contemplated by the rules on the reserva never took place. No reserva troncal
was created. Therefore, the property will pass to Jacoba under the rules of intestate succession.



















SOLIVIO v COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83484, 12 February 1990
182 SCRA 119

The reservor can never be a descendant of the supposed prepositus. Thus, where properties were
inherited from a mother (origin) by a daughter (as prepositus), which properties were later inherited
by her son, the son holds the properties subject to no reservation in favor of any relative, since this
case is not contemplated by Article 891 which establishes the reserva troncal. In addition, the
reserva applies only if the prepositus dies without issue.

Concordia . . . . . Esteban Sr. Salustia . . . . . . Celedonia


Esteban, Jr.


FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war
Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt,
petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the
private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana,
Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in
December 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties which she had inherited from her
mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife, but no conjugal property was acquired during
her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.,
including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time,
the titles to all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and
some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor
but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on
February 26, 1977, without having set up the foundation.

ISSUES:

Whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his relative
within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and

Whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same in
the "Salustia Solivio vda. de Javellana Foundation," and notwithstanding the fact that conformably
with said agreement, the foundation has been formed and properties of the estate have already been
transferred to it.

HELD:

On the question of reserva troncal

The reserva troncal provision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) - the ascendant who
inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios) - relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (prepositus), and belonging to the line from which the property
came.

3. The prepositus - the descendant who receives by gratuitous title and died
without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p.
692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for
Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he
inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a
reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his
mother's side. The reserva troncal is applied to properties inherited by an ascendant from a
descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by
Article 891.

Since the deceased Esteban Javellana, Jr. died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the
distribution of his estate are Article 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which reads:

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the
decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed
to the subject estate "without distinction of line or preference among them by
reason of relationship by the whole blood," and is entitled to one-half (1/2) share
and share alike of the estate.

The question of Concordia's one-half share

Concordia, having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation,
Concordia is obliged to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.




CHUA v CFI OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V (1977)
Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, petitioners,
vs.
The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch V and Susana De La Torre, in her
capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre

DOCTRINE: The gratuitous acquisition of the reservable property by the prepositus from the
origin of the reservable property was interpreted in this case. Even if the prepositus had to pay a
certain amount to a third party for the purpose of acquiring the reservable property, if such payment
obligation was not imposed by the origin, the acquisition by the latter is still gratuitous in nature.

Patricia Jose Consolacion


Ignacio Juanito
Lorenzo
Manuel


FACTS: Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio sired three children, namely: Ignacio,
Lorenzo and Manuel. When Patricia died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage
with Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
1. Manuel died without leaving any issue.
2. Then in 1929, Jose died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion and his son Juanito of
the second marriage and sons Ignacio and Lorenzo of his first marriage.
3. In the Intestate Proceeding, the lower court issued an order adjudicating,
among others, the one-half portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of P8,000.00 in favor of
Jose's widow, Consolacion, the other half of Lot No. 399 in favor of Juanito;
P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio. By virtue of said
adjudication, a TCT was issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion
and Juanito.
4. On Feb.27, 1952, Juanito died intestate without any issue. After his death, his mother
Consolacion succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot No. 399. In a week' s
time, Consolacion executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her
favor the pro- indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which a TCT covering the
whole lot was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion di ed
intestate leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her
brother and sisters.
5. In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio, of the
first marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint
before the respondent CFI of Negros Occidental, praying that the one-half portion of Lot
No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito but which passed to Consolacion upon the
latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot in question
was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the NCC.
6. The respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether the property in question as acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father,
Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or not, in relation to first requisite of reserve troncal

HELD: Yes
The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give
anything in return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made
gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of theperson making it, without
imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the
property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino
commentator, "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any
prestation." It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to
Juanito Frias Chua upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous.

In order that a property may be impressed with a reservable character the following requisites must
exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is
inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which said property came.

In the case at bar, all of the requisites are present: Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399
was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre, by operation of law. When Consolacion de la
Torre died, Juanito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These
relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.

It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is
essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person
making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving
the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator,
"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity,
without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage upon the death
of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore gratuitous

The obligation of paying the Standard is imposed upon Consolacion and Juanito not personally
by the deceased Jose in his last will and testament but by an order of the court. As long as the
transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased
himself and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous. The order of the court
does not change the gratuitous nature of the transmission of the property to him. As far as the
deceased Jose is concerned the transmission of the property to his heirs is gratuitous. This being
the case the lot in question is subject to reserva troncal under Art. 891.




































ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
FLORENTINO v FLORENTINO G.R. No. L-14856 November 15, 1919
Doctrine:
Florentino settles a number of issues. First, with respect to the right of representation
accorded the reservee, the same may be exercised only by such person seeking to represent if he
himself is a relative within the third degree of the prepositus. Second, Florentino rejected the
theory that if the reservable property does not fall into the hands of strangers, then the reserva is
not applicable. Thus, whether or not the reservable property was devised or willed by the
reservor to a relative of the prepositus coming from the same line as the origin, the reservable
nature of the property is not lost. From this principle arises an inference that the reservable
property is not part of the estate of the reservor upon his demise. Third, there is an affirmation
that the title of the reservor to the reservable property is not in the nature of full dominion, by
reason of the reservation provided by law. However, there is serious doubt as to the validity of
this proposition in the light of the more recent pronouncements of the Court. That the reservor is
a mere usufructuary (as intimated in Florentino), is contradicted by later decisions characterizing
the title of the reservor to the reservable property as absolute but possessed with a resolutory
condition.
Notice, however, that the court, in the dispositive portion of this decision, committed an
error in the distribution of the reservable property.
FACTS:
1. ApolonioIsabeloFlorentino II married Antonia Faz, with whom he had 9 children. When his
wife died, Apolonio married Severina, with whom he had 2 children- Mercedes and Apolonio
III.
2. Apolonio II died and was survived by his second wife and the ten children, Apolonio III,
being born after Apolonio II died.
3. He was able to execute a will instituting as universal heirs his 10 children, the posthumous
Apolonio III and his widow, Severina, and declaring that all of his property should be divided
among all of his children in both marriages.
4. In the partition of his estate, Apolonio III was given 6 parcels of land and some personal
property of Apolonio II.
5. Apolonio III later died and his mother, Severina, succeeded to all these properties. She
subsequently died, leaving a will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
Mercedes.
6. As such heir, Mercedes took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother,
including the property inherited by Severina from Apolonio III, which is said to be reservable
property. Accordingly, Mercedes had been gathering the fruits of the parcels of land.
7. The children of Apolonio II by his first wife, as well as his grandchildren by the first
marriage, instituted an action for recovery of their share of the reservable property. The
defendants contend that no property can be reserved for the plaintiffs inasmuch as there is a
forced heiress and the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty to respect the legitime.
8. Also, the danger that the property coming from the same line might fall into the hands of
strangers has been avoided.
ISSUE:
WON the property is subject to reserve troncal or not
HELD: Yes, it is subject to reserve troncal
1. Even if Severina left in her will said property to her only daughter and forced heiress,
nevertheless, this property has not lost its reservable nature. The posthumous son, Apolonio III,
acquired the property by lucrative title or by inheritance from his legitimate father.
2. Although such property was inherited by Severina, nevertheless, she was duty bound to
reserve the property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives within the third degree of the
line from which such property came. Ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its
enjoyment , use and trust merely for the reason that the law imposes the obligation to reserve and
preserve the same for certain designated persons, who on the death of said ascendants- reservoir,
acquire the ownership of said property in fact and operation of law in the same manner as forced
heirs.
3. There are then 7 reservees entitled to the reservable property left at the death of Apolonio III,
to wit:
a. Apolonio IIs 3 children from his first marriage
b. The children of Apolonio IIs deceased children, 12 in all
c. Mercedes, Apolonio IIIs sister.
All of the plaintiffs are relatives of the posthumous son within the third degree (four as half-
siblings and 12 as his nephews and nieces). As the first four are his relatives within the third
degree in their own right and the others by right of representation, all are entitled as reservees.
4. The properties in question came from the common ancestor, Apolonio II, and when, on the
death of Apolonio III without issue, the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his
legitimate mother, Severina; it became reservable property with the object that the same should
not fall into the possession of persons other than those comprehended within the order of
succession traced by the law from Apolonio II, the origin of the property.
5. Severina could have disposed in her will all her own property in favor of her only living
daughter, Mercedes, as forced heir. But the provision concerning the reservable property
reducing the rights of the other reserves is null and void inasmuch as said property is not her own
and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the right to deliver the same to the
reserves.
6. Reservable property neither comes nor falls under the absolute dominion of the ascendant
who inherits and receives the same from his descendant, therefore, it does not form part of his
property nor become the legitimeof his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case all
the relatives of his descendant died, in which case, the said reservable property loses such
character.






















BEATRIZ GONZALES V. CFI MANILA, 104 SCRA 481 (1981)

DOCTRINE: Gonzales gives an extended discussion on the nature and effects of reserva troncal.
Among other things, it stresses that the reservable property does not form part of the estate of the
reservor, if upon his or her death he or she is survived by qualified reservees. As such, the reservor
cannot will or bequeath the reservable property in his or her will, nor can the reservor choose who
or discriminate among the reservees should get the property. The reservees inherit the reservable
property not from the reservor, but from the prepositus. Thus, Gonzales affirms the ruling in Padura
v Baldovino and follows the theory of delayed intestacy in the matter of distributing the reservable
property among the reservees. It should be noted that the Court relied heavily on the ruling in
Florentino and quotes substantially from the text of the said decision. However, there is a failure to
note the oversight committed by the Court when it failed to distinguish between full-blood brothers
from half-blood brothers. The opportunity to rectify an error was lost.

FACTS: Benito Legarda y dela Paz (Benito II), son of Benito Legarda y Tuazon (Benito I), died
and was survived by his widow, Filomena and their 7 children. The real properties left by his
deceased father, Benito I, were partitioned in 3 equal parts by Benito IIs sisters and his heirs
pro-indiviso. One of his daughters, Filomena, died without issue and her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena vda de Legarda
1. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself the properties she inherited
from her daughter as a result of which she succeeded her deceased owner as co-owner of
the properties held pro-indiviso by her other 6 children. Later, Mrs. Legarda executed 2
handwritten documents disposing of the properties which she inherited from her daughter
in favor of her 16 grandchildren (the children of her sons). Eventually, Mrs. Legarda and
her 6 surviving children partitioned the co-owned property
2. Mrs. Legarda died and in the testate proceeding of her estate, Beatriz Gonzales, one of
her daughters, filed a motion to exclude in the inventory of the properties inherited from
Filomena, the deceased daughter, on the ground that said properties were reservable and
should be inherited by Filomenas 3 sisters and 3 brothers, not by the 16 grandchildren of
Mrs. Legarda, or Filomenas nephews and nieces. She also filed an action securing a
declaration that the properties are reservable which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in
her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her 6 chidlren
3. It is contended here than the properties in question are not reservable properties because
only relatives within the third paternal line have survived and that when Mrs. Legarda
willed the properties to her grandchildren, who are third degree relatives of Filomena and
who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: to
prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property
that should otherwise have remained therein.

ISSUE: WON the properties could be conveyed by will to the 16 grandchildren (reservees
within the third degree) to the exclusion of the 6 children (reservees within the second degree)

HELD: No. Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her 16 grandchildren the
reservable properties she inherited from her daughter because the reservable properties did not
form part of her estate. The reservoir cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservoir.

Art 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
within the third degree from prepositus who in this case are the 6 children of Mrs. Legarda. She
could not select the reservees to whom to the reservable properties should be given and deprive
the other reservees of their shares therein. To allow the reservoir to make a testamentary
disposition of the reservable properties in favor the reservees in the third degree and,
consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of Art
891, this cannot be allowed.

Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of the properties in question in her will even if the disposition is
in favor of relatives within the third degree from Filomena. The said properties, by operation of
Art 891, should go to Mrs. Legardas 6 children as reservees within the second degree from
Filomena. Reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the
reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must survive the reservor.

The reservation could be extinguished only by the absence of reservees at the time of Mrs.
Legardas death. Since at the time of her death, there were reservees belonging to the second and
third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of
the properties should be made in accordance with Art 891 and in accordance with the reservors
holographic will.

















DE PAPA v CAMACHO
No. L-28032, 24 September 1986
144 SCRA 281

Between two groups of reservatarios: (a) uncles and aunts of the prepositus, and (b) a niece of the
prepositus, the latter is preferred to the exclusion of the former in the distribution of the reversionary
estate. This is pursuant to the application of the ordinary rules of intestate succession which govern
the distribution of the reversionary estate. Please note that brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces rank
fourth in the order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Upon the other hand, the uncles
and aunts (collectively referred to as collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree) rank fifth in the
order of intestate succession to a legitimate person. Thus, following the order of preference, those
who rank fourth will exclude all those relatives who rank fifth. Again, this is a reaffirmation of the
theory of delayed intestacy first initiated in Padura.

Marciana Balbino . . . . . Romana


Francisca
Manuel
Nicolas
Eustacio Toribia


Faustino Trinidad


Dalisay


Narvasa, J.:

This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following
"Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise:"


FACTS:

1. The defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs Francisca Tioco de Papa,
Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's
grandaunt and granduncles.

2. Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho have as a common ancestor the late
Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and
great grandfather of defendant. The family relationship of the parties is shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex "A" and made an integral part of this stipulation.

3. Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four(4) parcels of land to her niece
Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes "B", "B-1", and "B-2."

4. Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two
legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho) and leaving the aforementioned four (4) parcels of land as the
inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.

5. In 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his legitimate children and by his wife
Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and
Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila,
copies of which are attached hereto as Annexes "C' and "C-1" were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco,
the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso shares.

6. In 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2)
pro-indiviso share in the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned to his father, Eustacio
Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title Annexes "B", "B-1",
"C" and "C-1."

7. In 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of
land above-mentioned were inherited by her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D.
Tongko-Camacho, subject to the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant
Primo Tongko.

8. On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived by his only legitimate descendant,
defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho.

9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns one-half (1/2) of
all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her inheritance from her mother,
Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.

10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the
said seven parcels of land abovementioned by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon
upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the law on intestate succession; but the
plaintiffs, also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths
(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited
by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the said parcels ofland, by
virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon.

11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case the legal issue of
whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the whole of the seven (7)
parcels of land in question, or whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino
Dizon are reservatarios (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share
therein which was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to
three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three-eights (3/8) of said seven (7)
parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals collected and to be
collected by defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of
land, minus the expenses and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the
rentals.

12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have acted upon legal advice
in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to restore and preserve harmony in their
family relations, they hereby waive all their claims against each other for damages (other
than legal interest on plaintiffs' share in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem
proper to award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the
respective parties.


ISSUE:

The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower court,
all relatives of the prepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed without
distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista.


HELD:

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted
by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and succeeding degrees can never be considered
as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his
rights as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right
of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as
in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. x x
x

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that
of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se,
proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to
whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property
should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not
specify otherwise. x x x

Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession, the
plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunts and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded from the succession by his niece,
the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree as the latter. x
x x

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay
Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the
plaintiffs-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside, and the
complaint is dismissed with costs against plaintiffs-appellees.




























CARILLO V. DE PAZ (1966)

Prima G. Carillo and Lorenzo Licup, plaintiffs and appellants,
vs.
Francisca Salak De Paz and Ernesto Bautista, defendants and appellees.

DOCTRINE: Carillo establishes that the rights of a reservatario to the reservable property may be
lost by extinctive prescription. Thus a reservatario must institute action to recover the reservable
property either within ten or thirty years from the time the right to recover the same accrued. In this
case, it must be noted that the ten-year prescriptive period applied on the premise that the possessor
of the reservable property was a possessor in good faith and with a colorable title to the same.

FACTS: The property in question is Lot No. 221, originally owned by Severino Salakand Petra
Garcia (deceased, September 21, 1941)
1. On August 16, 1943, Severino sold to Honoria Salak his 1/2 portion of Lot221. A year later,
or on December 5, 1944, Severino died. Sometime in January 1945, Honoria and other
members of her family died massacred by the Japanese. As a result, two settlement
proceedings were instituted:
a) SP No. 3, to settle the estates of Severino Salak and Petra GarciaOn September
4, 1946, a Project of Partition adjudicated Lot No. 221 to Francisca Salak
de Paz (1/4 of it, in her capacity as heir, theother 3/4 by purchase and/or
exchange with her co-heirs: RitaSahagun, Aurea Sahagun and Ernesto
Bautista).On November 9, 1948, Agustina de Guzman Vda. de Carrillo filedan
action against the Francisca to recover 1/2 of Lot No. 221.
b) SP No. 23, to settle the estates of the Salak family
Parents: Simeon Salak and Isabel Carrillo
Children: Adolfo, Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya

2. The court held that the heirs entitled to the estates of the Salak family were
Agustina (3/4 share) and Ernesto (1/4 share), applying the survivorship presumption:
a) Simeon died first his properties went to his children: Adolfo, Honoria,
Consuelo and Ligaya (1/4, each);
b) Honoria, Consuelo and Ligaya died next Honoria's andConsuelo's properties
went to their mother, Isabel; thoseof Ligaya went to her son, Ernesto Bautista;
c) I s abel di ed next her pr oper t i es went t o her s on Adol f o; and
d) Adolfo died last his properties went to his maternal grandmother, Agustina.

3. Agustina, thereby, succeeded to the properties that came byintestate succession
from Honoria and Isabel, including 1/2 of Lot No. 221.
4. On April 24, 1950, Agustina died. Subsequently, or on June 8,1950, the court
decreed the properties inherited by Agustina subject to reserva troncal.
5. Thus , on November 6, 1950, Er nes t o f i l ed a pet i t i on f or t he execution of
the said judgment. Acting on said petition, the court held:
" in view of the death of the reservista, Doa Agustina, the court decl ar es al l her
i nt er es t i n t he 3/ 4 s har e of t he pr oper t i es t er mi nat ed, and t hat t he
r es er vee, Er nes t o, ent i t l ed t o t he immediate delivery to him of the said 3/4
share declared reserved to him "

6. On April 22, 1963, Prima Carrillo and Lorenzo Licup, heirs of Agustina, filed suit for the
recovery of their share in Lot No. 221 against Francisca and Ernesto.
7. On June 20, 1963, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of
action is barred by prescription.

ISSUE: May the petition prosper.

HELD: No
According to Manresa, the reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservista, as it then
becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory
suit therefor. Nonetheless, this right, if not exercised within the time for recovering real properties,
can be lost by prescription.

Scaevola also states the view that prescripion can apply against the reservatarios to cut off their
right to the reservable property

The reserva troncal arose as had been finally decided by the CA in SP No. 23 When Agustina
acquired by operation of law all the properties of her descendant Adolfo (grandson), who acquired
them by gratuitous title from another ascendant, Isabel (Adolfos mother).

Appellants, as reservatarios, had the right to claim the property from the time when the
reservista, Agustina, died on April 24, 1950. Section 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure
fixes 10 years as the period of prescription for actions to recover real property, counted
from the time the cause of action accrued. Plaintiffs-appellants' suit herein having been filed only
on April 22, 1963, or more than ten (10) years from April 24, 1950, has prescribed.



















MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT
COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO,
DONATO, LUIS, ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed
BALANTAKBO, respondents.
SUMAYA v INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Doctrine:
The reversionary rights of the reservees may be lost to an innocent purchaser of the
reservable property. For the protection of the said reservees, it is important that the reservable
character of the property must be properly annotated at the back of the title thereto. However,
even absent such annotation, if it can be shown that the third party purchaser had actual or
constructive notice of the reservable character of the property, then the reversionary rights of the
reservees shall be upheld
FACTS:
1. Raul Balantakbo inherited two sets of properties from two different descendants, namely:
a. 1/3 interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land in Liliw, Laguna from his father, Jose Sr.
who died January 28, 1945 and
b. 1/7 interest pro-indiviso in ten parcels of registered land from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on Nov. 3, 1950.
2. On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single without any issue, and leaving only his mother,
Consuelo, as his surviving heir to the real properties he inherited.
3. Consuelo, then adjudicated to herself the properties in an Affidavit which provided that Raul
did not have a will and that he had no descendants and that she was the only universal and
legitimate heir.
4. The property inherited by Raul from his father, was sold by Consuelo to MariquitaSumaya,
which the latter sold to Villa Honorio Development Corporation (VHDC), which then sold the
property to Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. (AICCI). The property is currently in the
name of AICCI (2/3 share).
5. Consuelo also sold the share of Raul in the parcels of land inherited from his grandmother.
Said share was sold to VHDC, who in turn sold it to Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative Inc. (LAICC). The properties are presently in its possession.
6. The certificates of titles covering these properties do not contain any annotation of its
reservable character.
7. On June 3, 1968, Consuelo died.
8. On March 4, the 5 brothers in full blood of Raul, surviving nephew and nieces of Raul by his
deceased brother, Jose and another brother filed civil cases to recover the properties which they
claimed were subject to reserve troncal in their favor.
9. The two cases, were consolidated since the identity of the subject matter of res involved, the
transferees, the dates of the conveyances were the same, involving the same legal question of
reserve troncal.
10. The lower court and the CA ruled in favor of the Balantakbos.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners were innocent purchasers for value, since there was no
encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of title covering the properties.
HELD: No, the petitioners were not innocent purchasers for value.
1. Upon the death of Raul, the reservista, Consuelo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties were inherited
by Raul from his father and from his maternal grandmother. Said affidavit of self adjudication
was registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna and this is sufficient notice to the whole
world in accordance with Sec. 52 of the Property Registration Decree which provides:
Sec. 52.CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every conveyance,
mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land
shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing or entering.
2. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the
certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo. Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the
petitioners had actual knowledge of the properties before they bought these from Consuelo. The
petitioners and private respondents were long time acquaintances and that VHDC and its
successors, the LAICCI are family corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners knew all
along that the properties litigated in this case were inherited by Raul from his father and maternal
grandmother, and that Consuelo inherited these from her son, Raul.
3. The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that the cause of action of the private
respondents did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not commence upon
the death of the propositus Raul Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the reservor
Consuelo Vda. deBalantakbo on June 3, 1968. Relatives within the third degree in whose favor
the right (or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee simple over the reserved
property during the lifetime of the reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the
reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus creating a fee simple, and only then
will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives within
the third degree . The reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it then becomes a
right of full ownership on the part of the reservatarios, who can bring a reivindicatory suit
therefor. Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for recovery may prescribe in ten
(10) years under the old Code of Civil Procedure or in thirty years under Article 1141 of the
New Civil Code. The actions for recovery of the reserved property was brought by herein private
respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years from the death of the reservor.
Therefore, private respondents' cause of action has not prescribed yet.
Dispositive:ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the modification on the necessity to
annotate the reversable character of a property subject of reservatronca






















SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA V. MANUELA ALCALA AND JOSE DEOCAMPO, 41 PHIL
915 (1920)

DOCTRINE: Nieva ruled that reserva runs only in the legitimate family.

FACTS: Juliana Nieva, the natural mother of plaintiff Segunda Nieva, married Francisco
Deocampo. From this marriage, Alfeo Deocampo was born. Juliana died intestate in 1889 and
Alfeo inherited from her by intestate succession, several parcels land.
1. Alfeo died intestate and without issue in 1890. Two parcels of land (which Alfeo
inherited from his mother) were inherited by his father Francisco by intestate succession.
Thereafter, Francisco married respondent Manuela Alcala; of this marriage, Jose
Deocampo was born
2. Upon Franciscos death in 1914, Manuela and Jose took possession of the subject
property under the claim that Jose (a minor then) had inherited the same from his
deceased father
3. Plaintiff Segunda, who claims to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana, filed an
action to recover the subject parcels of land invoking Art 811 of the Civil Code
4. The trial court held that while Segunda was an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana,
she was not entitled to the property in question because an illegitimate relative has no
right to reserva troncal under the provisions of Art 811

ISSUE: WON an illegitimate relative (Segunda) within the third relative entitled to the reserva
troncal provided for by Art 811 Spanish Civil Code

HELD: No.In determining the persons who are obliged to reserve under Art 811, Manresa
notes:

Is every ascendant, whether legitimate or not, obliged to reserve? Should the natural father or
grandfather reserve the properties proceeding from the mother or other natural ascendant? Article
811 does not distinguish; it speaks of ascendants without attaching the qualification of legitimate,
and, on the other hand, the same reason that exists for applying the provision to the natural family
exists for applying it to the legitimate family. Nevertheless, the article in referring to the ascendant
in an indeterminate manner shows that it imposes the obligation to reserve only upon the legitimate
ascendant.

Articles 908 and 910 themselves speak only of ascendants. Can it in any way be maintained that
they refer to legitimate as well as to natural ascendants? They evidently establish the legitime of the
legitimate ascendants included as forced heirs in number 2 of article 897. And article 811, - and as
we will see also article 812, - continues to treat of the same legitime. The right of the natural parents
and children in the testamentary succession is wholly included in the eighth section and is limited to
the parents, other ascendants of such class being excluded in articles 807, No. 3, and 846. Therefore,
the place which article 811 occupies in the Code is proof that it refers only to legitimate ascendants.

In determining the persons in whose favor the reservation is established, Manresa writes:
Persons in whose favor the reservation is established.- This is one of the most delicate points in the
interpretation of article 811. According to this article, the reservation is established in favor of the
parents
1
who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came.

It treats of blood relationship, which is applicable to questions on succession, according to articles
915 to 920. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by affinity is established between each
spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission
of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the other, which is, just what this article
intents to prevent.

It also treats of legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve is a legitimate ascendant who
inherits from a descendant property which proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being
true, there can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line
of that family and only in favor of that line is the reservation established. Furthermore, we have
already said, the object is to protect the patrimony of the legitimate family, following the precedents
of the foral law. And it could not be otherwise. Article 943 denies to legitimate parents the right to
succeed the natural child and vice versa, from which it must be deduced that natural parents neither
have the right to inherit from legitimate ones; the law in the article cited establishes a barrier
between the two families; properties of the legitimate family shall never pass by operation of law to
the natural family.

Thus, to hold that the appellant is entitled to the property left by her natural brother, Alfeo
Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a flagrant violation of the express provisions of the Art
943 Spanish Civil Code.





















1
NOTE: There seems to be an error of translation here. The Spanish word used is parientes which
means relatives.
MATEO v LAGUA
No. L-26270, 30 October 1969
29 SCRA 864

Mateo outlines the procedure for the liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, where in
particular, an allegation is made that certain dispositions inter vivos impaired the legitime of a
compulsory heir. It must be noted that collation is important only if the decedent left compulsory
heirs. Otherwise, collation would be irrelevant. Note, further, that the procedure outlined in Mateo
does not take into account the prior liquidation of the conjugal partnership or absolute community,
in case the deceased is survived by a spouse. The procedure for liquidating the same are found in
Articles 102 and 103 of the Family Code for the absolute community of property, and Articles 129
and 130 of the same Code for the conjugal partnership of gains.

FACTS:

Cipriano Lagua was the original registered owner of 3 parcels of land situated in Asingan,
Pangasinan. Sometime in 1917, Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument,
donated Lots 998 and 6541 to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter's marriage to
Bonifacia Mateo. The marriage was celebrated on 15 May 1917, and thereafter, the couple took
possession of the properties, but the Certificate of Title remained in the donor's (sic) name.

In 1923, the son, Alejandro, died. His widow, Bonifacia Mateo, and her infant daughter
lived with her father-in-law, Cipriano Lagua, who then undertook the farming of the donated lots. In
1926, however, Cipriano refused to deliver the said share, thus prompting Bonifacia to resort to the
Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan, from where she obtained a judgment awarding
to her possession of the two lots, plus damages.

On 31 July 1941, Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land in
favor of his younger son, Gervasio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua is valid.

Whether or not the donation to Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots with a combined area of 11,888 square
meters exceeded by 494.75 square meters his (Alejandro's) legitime and the disposable portion that
Cipriano Lagua could have freely given by will, and, to the same extent prejudiced the legitime of
Cipriano's other heir, Gervasio Lagua.

HELD:

The sale executed by Cipriano Lagua in favor of other defendants, Gervasio Lagua and Sotera
Casimiro, Is null and void and non-existent.

The donation was thus declared inofficious, and defendants-appellees were ordered to reconvey to
plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion of 494.75 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of
the lots.the cause of action to enforce Gervasio's legitime, having accrued only upon the death of his
father on 12 November 1958, the dispute has to be governed by the pertinent provisions of the new
Civil Code; and that a donation propter nuptias may be reduced for being inofficious. Donations
propter nuptias are without onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion or
motive for the donation, not its causa. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for
inofficiousness upon the donor's death, if they should infringe the legitime of a forced heir.Article
908 of the new Civil Code specifically provides as follows:

Art. 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of
the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts and charges, which shall not
include those imposed in the will.

To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by
the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them.

In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be
reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned
by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it.
With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be
established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be
proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the
donee's share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be said
that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of
the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to
the respondent.



















NATCHER V. COURT OF APPEALS (2001)

Patricia Natcher, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals and the Heir of Graciano Del Rosario - Leticia Del Rosario, Emilia Del
Rosario Manangan, Rosalinda Fuentes Llana, Rodolfo Fuentes, Alberto Fuentes, Evelyn Del
Rosario, and Eduardo Del Rosario, respondent

DOCTRINE: Natcher succinctly outlines the procedure for the calculation of the legitime of
compulsory heirs. Of equal interest is the assumption of jurisdiction by a court of general
jurisdiction over an issue which relates to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person. Note that
the trial court, after ruling that the deed of sale executed by Graciano in favor of Patricia (his wife)
is void; that the deed of sale cannot gain validity by treating it as a donation to Patricia, went further
to state that the instrument may, however, be construed as a document pertaining to the grant of
advance legitime to Patricia. It is ironic that a document that is void (either as a sale or as a
donation) could be the source of a right.

On the issue of impairment of legitime, the outcome could be predictable if Graciano left no
other asset. Of Gracianos share in the subject property (5,326.85 sq. m,), he donated 4,849.38 sq.
m. (or more than 90% thereof) to his children. He sold 80.90 sq. m. or (1.5% thereof) to a third
party, and purportedly sold to Patricia 447.60 sq. m. (or 8.4%). Each child received by way of a
donation from Graciano some 808 sq. m. while the Graciano attempted to give Patricia 447 square
meters. Based on the numbers, it is clear that if anyone suffered an impairment of the legitme, it
would be Patricia, the surviving spouse. This therefore raises the question as to whether or not the
children were properly advised to seek the annulment of Patricias title to 447 sq. m. parcel of land.

FACTS: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a
parcel of land located in Manila and covered by TCT No. 11889.
1. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano together with his six children entered into
an extrajudicial settlement of Gracianas estate adjudicating and dividing among
themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889.
2. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children
received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled and
in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the six children.
3. Further, on February 9, 1954 said heirs executed and forged an Agreement of
Consolidation Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights where they
subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several
lots.
4. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in
the land leaving only a portion registered under Gracianos name, as covered by TCT No.
35988.
5. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two
separate lots where the first lot was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot
was registered under TCT No. 107443.
6. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot to a third person but retained the ownership over
the second lot.
7. On March 20, 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a
result of which TCT No. 186059 was issued in the latters name.
8. On October 7, 1985, Graciano died leaving his second wife and six children by his first
marriage as heirs.
9. In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the RTC of Manila, Br. 55, herein
private respondent alleged that upon Gracianos death, Natcher, through the employment
of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear
that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated June 25, 1987 in favor of herein petitioner
resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT No. 186059 in
the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been
impaired.
10. In her answer, Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano and thus, under
the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further
alleged that during Gracianos lifetime, he already distributed in advance, properties to
his children, hence, herein private respondent may not anymore claim against Gracianos
estate or against herein petitioners property.
11. After trial, RTC Manila rendered a decision holding the Deed of Sale as prohibited by
law and thus, a complete nullity.
12. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the lower courts decision.

ISSUE: WON the RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance/
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to
any of the heirs.

HELD: No
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made
by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. Matters which involve settlement
and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court
in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by
deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased
at the time of his death; then, all donation subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

The trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate
of Graciano del Rosario. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best
forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving
the settlement of Graciano del Rosarios estate.
PARTENZA LUCERNA VDA. DE TUPAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BRANCH XLIII of the HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
respondent, and TUPAS FOUNDATION, INC., private respondent-appellee.

VDA. DE TUPAS v BR XLIII RTC OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

Doctrine:
Vda.deTupas outlines the procedure for the determination of the hereditary estate of a
deceased person, particularly where impairment of the legitime is an issue. The case
outlines the step-by-step procedure for the determination of the legitime of the compulsory
heirs, as well as the determination of the freely disposable portion, which in turn will
determine the validity of donations inter vivos made by the deceased.

FACTS:
1. Tupas died childless in Bacolod City, leaving his widow as his sole compulsory heir. He left
a will which was duly admitted to probate.
2. Among the assets listed in his will were two parcels of land which were however, no longer
part of his estate upon his death since he donated them to the Tupas Foundation.
3. Claiming that such donations left her destitute, the widow filed suit to have the donations
declared inofficious.
4. The trial court dismissed her complaint stating among others that since the donation was
made to a stranger, the same is not subject to collation.

ISSUE:
WON the donation is subject to collation

HELD: Yes, donations are only subject to the limitation that the donor cannot give more than
what he can give by will.
1. The fact that the property no longer actually formed part of the estate of the donor at the time
of death cannot be asserted to prevent its collation.
2. The fact that the property donated is separate property is also not a defense against collation.
3. Since the donation was made to a stranger, the same is imputable to the free portion and
subject to reduction in case it impairs the legitime of compulsory heirs.

NOTES:
A. Step by step Procedures in determining whether a donation is inofficious or not:
(1) determination of the value of the property which remains at the time of the testator's death;
(2) determination of the obligations, debts, and charges which have to be paid out or deducted
from the value of the property thus left;
(3) the determination of the difference between the assets and the liabilities, giving rise to the
hereditary estate;
(4) the addition to the net value thus found, of the value, at the time they were made, of
donations subject to collation; and
(5) the determination of the amount of the legitimes by getting from the total thus found the
portion that the law provides as the legitime of each respective compulsory heir.
8

B. Deducting the legitimes from the net value of the hereditary estate leaves the freely
disposable portion by which the donation in question here must be measured. If the value of the
donation at the time it was made does not exceed that difference, then it must be allowed to
stand. But if it does, the donation is inofficious as to the excess and must be reduced by the
amount of said excess. In this case, if any excess be shown, it shall be returned or reverted to the
petitioner-appellant as the sole compulsory heir of the deceased Epifanio R. Tupas.








































RODRIGUEZ V. HON DE BORJA AND PANGILINAN AND JACALAN, 17 SCRA 418
(1966)
FACTS: Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died in 1963. On March 4, 1963, respondents Pangilinan and
Jacalan delivered to CFI Bulacan a purported last will of the decedent. Petitioners filed a petition
for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will but the same was later withdrawn.
1. On March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before CFI Rizal a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of the decedent. On the same day, respondents filed a petition for
probation of the will
2. Petitioners contend that since the intestate proceedings was filed earlier in time, CFI
Bulacan had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate
3. On the other hand, respondents Pangilinan argue that CFI Bulacan acquired jurisdiction
over the case upon delivery of the will on March 4, 1963 and as such, the probate case
takes precedence over the case filed in CFI Rizal

ISSUE: WON the intestate proceedings take precedence over the probate case for being filed
earlier in time

HELD: No. The jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan became vested upon the delivered of the decedents
will on March 4, 1963. Even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon
the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place
for proving the will as provided in Sec 3 of Rule 76 ROC. According to this provision, where the
petition for probate is made after the deposit of ht will, the petition is deemed to relate back to
the time when the will was delivered.

Since the will was delivered to CFI Bulacan on March 4 and the intestate proceedings in CFI
Rizal was filed on March 8, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan is
incontestable. Moreover, it appears that the filing of the intestate proceedings was made in bad
faith, with a view of divesting CFI Bulacan of jurisdiction. The order of priority established in
Rule 73 is not designed to convert the settlement of the decedents estate into a race between the
applicants, with the administration of properties as the price for the fastest.

More importantly, intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since
intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. Art 960 NCC provides:

Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost is validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place
only with respect to property which the testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not
happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates
the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes
place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases
provided in this Code.

As held in Castro v. Martinez, only after final decision as to the nullity of the testate succession
could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action. As such, the
institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not proceed while the probate of the purported
will of the decedent is pending.













FRANCISCA MADARCOS V. HON. DELA MERCED AND LORETO STA. MARIA, 174
SCRA 599 (1989)
FACTS: Petitioners Francisca Madarcos and Telesforo Catain are the niece and nephew of
spouses Benito Catain and Andrea Madarcos. Francisca is the daughter of the deceased brother
of Andrea while Telesforo is the son of a deceased brother of Benito.
1. Spouses Catain died intestate and left a parcel of land covered by a homestead patent.
The only heirs of the deceased spouses were their nephews and nieces
2. The said heirs divided among themselves the subject parcel of land into several lands,
one of which was awarded to Francisca while the rest were adjudicated to the other
nephews and nieces of the deceased couple
3. Francisco sold her share of the inheritance (Lot B) to respondent Loreto Sta. Maria for
P4,800. A TCT was then issued in his name
4. Subsequently, petitioners Francisca and Telesforo demanded the reconveyance of the said
lot pursuant to Sec 119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent refused; as such, they filed an
action for repurchase with damages
5. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that petitioners had no
capacity to sue since they are not the legal heirs contemplated in Sec 119 Public Land
Act. The trial court dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to succeed from deceased spouses Catain

HELD: Yes. The term legal heirs is used in Sec 119 is used in a generic sense. It is broad
enough to cover any person who is called to the succession either by will or by operation of law.
Thus, legal heirs include both testate and intestate heirs depending upon whether succession is by
the will of the testator or by law. Legal heirs are not necessarily compulsory heirs but they may
be so if the law reserves a legitime for them.

Since the decedents had left no will, the law supplanted their intention. Their estates were
distributed by intestate succession. For this reason, the nephews and nieces succeeded to the
entire estate of the deceased.

Art 975 states that when the children of one or more brother or sister of the deceased survive,
they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But
if they survive alone, they shall inherit in equal portions.

Petitioners are legal heirs. Having been decreed under the rules of intestacy as entitled to succeed
to the entire estate of the Catain spouses due to the absence of compulsory heirs, they now step
into the shows of the decedents. They should be considered among the legal heirs contemplated
by Sec 119 as entitled to redeem the homestead.

This interpretation of legal heir as distinguished from the restrictive construction given by the
lower court is more in keeping with the salutary purpose behind the enactment of Sec 119 and
the jurisprudence laid down on the matter.



















DELOS SANTOS V. DELA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 555(1971)

DOCTRINE: De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the nearer relatives exclude the
more remote ones, except if the right of representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate
succession, the nephews and nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific instance, is
barred from exercising the right of representation.

FACTS: Gertrude de los Santos for specific performance against Maximino de la Cruz, alleging
that she and several co-heirs, including defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement
over a portion of land and that the parties agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to the defendant in addition
to his share, on the condition that the defendant would undertake the development of the estate,
all expenses shall be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of the 3 lots.
1. Defendant asserts that plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the agreement
was void with respect to her, since the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz,
deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement
by mistake.
2. Defendants counterclaim alleged that since the plaintiff had sold her share in the estate
and that extrajudicial partition agreement being void as to the latter, he is entitled to of
the proceeds as his share by way of reversion.
3. The court held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement,
was stopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent
Pelagia de la Cruz; hence he must abide by the terms of the agreement.
4. The parties admit that the owner of the subject matter of the extrajudicial agreement was
Pelagia de la Cruz, who died instestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant is a nephew
of the said decedent; that plaintiff is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother,
Marciana de la Cruz, being niece of the decedent. Plaintiffs mother died on September
22, 1935, thus predeceasing the decedent; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial
partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de
la Cruz.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff-apellee Gertrude de los Santos is a heir of the decedent.

HELD: No, plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not
inherit from the latter by right of representation, much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit
in her own right.

Applying Art. 972 and Art. 962 of the Civil Code, the Court in Linarty y Pavia vs. Ugarte y
Itturalde said:
In and intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and cannot participate with a
niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant
grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does not obtain
beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters.

In the case at bar, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews
and nieces, one of whom is the defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a
grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

The legal effect of plaintiff-appellee inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial
partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action did not confer upon her
the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement,
as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz and in the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating
in representation of her deceased mother.

It is apparent therefore that the parties were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-
appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such heir,
the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code.

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner and
another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the
prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and
void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appelee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its
terms enforced.

The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she may not
be heard to assert estoppels against defendant-appellant. Estoppels cannot be predicated on a
void contract, or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy.

In Ramiro vs. Grao, et al., the Court held:
No estoppels arises where the representation or conduct the party sought to be stopped is
due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And which there is authority to the contrary,
the weight of authority is that the acts and declarations of a party based upon an innocent
mistake as to his legal rights will not estop him to assert the same, especially where every
fact known to the party sought to be stopped is equally well known to the party setting up
the estoppels.




















BAGUNU V. PIEDAD, 347 SCRA 571 (2000)

DOCTRINE: Under the rule of proximity, a maternal aunt (a relative within the 3
rd
degree)
excludes the daughter of the first cousin of the decedent (a relative within the 5
th
degree), even if
under the order of intestate succession, both of them fall within sixth level of preference.
Moreover, the daughter of the first cousin is not entitled to the right of representation in order to
elevate her status to a relative of a nearer degree because representation in the collateral line is
limited to children of brothers and sisters of the decedent.

FACTS: Augusto H. Piedad died without any direct descendants or ascendants. Respondent,
PastoraPiedad (Pastora), is the maternal aunt of the decedent, a third-degree relative of the
decedent, while petitioner, Ofelia Bagunu(Ofelia) is the daughter of a first cousin of the
deceased, or a fifth-degree relative of the decedent.
1. On 28 August 1995, herein Bagunu moved to intervene in Special Proceedings No. 3652,
entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Augusto H. Piedad,"
pending before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 117, of Pasay City. Asserting
entitlement to a share of the estate of the late Augusto H. Piedad, Bagunu assailed the
finality of the order of the trial court awarding the entire estate to respondent Pastora
contending that the proceedings were tainted with procedural infirmities, including an
incomplete publications of the notice of hearing, lack of personal notice to the heirs and
creditors, and irregularity in the disbursements of allowances and withdrawals by the
administrator of the estate.
2. The trial court denied the motion, prompting Ofelia to raise her case to the Court of
Appeals, sought the dismissal of the appeal on the thesis that the issues brought up on
appeal only involving nothing else but questions of law to be raised before the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 thereof and
consistently with Circular 2-90 of the Court.
3. "These facts are undisputed.
a) the facts that Ofelia is a collateral relative within the fifth degree of Augusto H.
Piedad;
b) the she is the daughter of the first cousin of Augusto H. Piedad; that as such,
Ofelia action seeking to inherit was published for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation;
c) that there was no order of closure of proceedings that has been issued by the
intestate court;
d) and that the intestate court has already issued an order for the transfer of the
remaining estate of Augusto H. Piedad to Pastora.

ISSUE: Can Ofelia, a collateral relative of the 5
th
civil degree, inherit along with Pastora, a
collateral relative of the 3
rd
civil degree? Does the rule of proximity in intestate succession find
application among collateral relatives?

HELD: No. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones, except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply.
The right of representation does not apply to other collateral relatives within the 5
th
civil degree
(to which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in order of preference
following:
First- legitimate children and descendants
Second- the legitimate parents and ascendants
Third- illegitimate children and descendants
Fourth- surviving spouse
Fifth- brothers and sisters/ nephews and nieces of decedent

Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles and aunts, the rule of proximity, expressed in Art. 962 of the Code is
an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the collateral relatives to the
decedent, Art. 966 of the Civil Code gives direction.

In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit alongside a paternal uncle and a first cousin or the full blood
can inherit equally with a first cousin of the half-blood, but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-
degree relative, excludes the cousins of the decedent, being in the 4
th
degree of relationship; the
latter, in turn, would have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative.

Notes:
"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
"Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article
1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2,
concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines."
Article 966.xxx
"In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made ancestor
and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person
is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle, who is the brother of his father,
four from his first cousin and so forth."
Accordingly-
Respondent, being a relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes
petitioner, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate of the
decedent.















HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE V. CA AND BENEDICTO ESTRADA, 284 SCRA 511
(1998)

Pedro Ursula Juan .(brother) Domingo Catalina

Agatonica Justa Gregorio Primitiva

Benedicto Jorencio Josefina
Enecia Gaudencio
Nicolas Simplicio
Lupecino Domingo
Felisa Virgilio
Heirs of Pascacio:
Roselyn
Madrilyn
Lourdes
Felomina

FACTS: Private respondent Benedicto is the son of Agatonica Arrez, whose parents were Pedro
Arreza and Ursula Tubil. Upon the death of Pedro, Ursula married Juan Arnaldo and had a
daughter, Justa.
1. On the other hand, petitioners heirs of Pascasio Uriarte, are the widow and daughters of
Pascasio. Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitava and Conrado Uriarte. Primitiva was
the daughter of Catalina and Domingo Arnaldo. Dominngo and Juan were brothers.
Petitioners are thus grandnieces and grandnephews of Justa by her first cousin and are
therefore, within the 6
th
degree.
2. The other petitioners are the children of Primitiva and those of her brother, Gregorio.
They are relatives of Justa within the 5
th
degree.
3. Private respondent Benedicto filed an action for the partition of the land left by the
decedent Justa. He claimed to be the sole surviving heir ofJusta, and alleged that Pascasio
worked on the property as Justas tenant. He contended that Pescasio had no right to the
entire property but could only claim of the 0.5 hectare which Justa inherited from her
parents Juan and Ursula
4. On the other hand, petitioners averred that the property was originally owned by
Ambrocio Arnaldo, their great-uncle. It was allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan
in a will, in shares of 2/3 and 1/3 respectively. Petitioners alleged that private respondent
did not have any right to the property because he was not an heir of Ambrocio, the
original owner of the property.
5. The trial court held in favor of petitioners
6. On appeal, CA found that the .05 hectares had been acquired by Justas parents during
their marriage. As the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica, private respondent
was held to be entitled to the share of Justa.

ISSUES:
1. How is the subject property to be partitioned among the heirs?
2. Who among the petitioners and the private respondent is entitled to Justas esate as her
nearest relatives within the meaning of Art 962 NCC?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Since a portion of the subject property was acquired by the parents of Justa, the
property should be divided as follows:
a. The first hectare should divided into two parts, the share of Juan which will accrue to
petitioners and the second hald which pertains to Ursula, will accrue to private
respondent
b. The second portion of the subject property which as was consolidated with the hectare
originally belonging to the conjugal partnership of Juan and Ursual, shall accrue to
private respondent, who is only three degrees from Justa whereas petitioners who are the
children of Primitivo and Gregorio, are six and five degrees removed from Justa.

SECOND ISSUE: Art 962 provides that in every inheritance, the nearest relative in degree
excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of Art 1006
with respect to relatives of the full and half blood and of Art 987(2), concerning division
between paternal and maternal lines.

In the case at bar, the private respondent is the son of Agatonica who is the half-sister of Justa.
He is thusa third degree relative of Justa. On the other hand, petitioners are the sons and
daughters of Justas cousin. They are thus fifth degree relatives of Justa.

Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the fartherst, then Benedicto is the lawful heir of
Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.

A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendants, ascendants or
spouse survive the decedent. The determination of whether the relationship is of full or half
blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.




















ISABEL DELA PUERTA V. COURT OF APPEALS AND CARMELITA DELA
PUERTA, 181 SCRA 861 (1990)
FACTS: Dominga Revuelta died with a will leaving her properties to her 3 children: Aflredo,
Vicente and Isabel. Isabel was given the free portion in addition to her legitime and was
appointed executrix of the will.
1. The petition for probate of the will filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers who
alleged that their mother was already senile at the time of the execution of the will (no
testamentary capacity), and that some of the properties were exclusively theirs
2. During the pendency of the proceedings, Alfredo died, leaving Vicente as the lone
oppositors
3. Meanwhile, Vicente filed a petition to adopt Carmelita dela Puerta (private respondent).
The adoption decree was subsequently granted.
4. Carmelita, then, intervened in the probate proceedings of Domingas will and filed a
motion for the payment of her monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of
Vicente
5. The trial court granted the motion, declaring that since Carmelita was a natural child of
Vicente, she was entitled to the amounts claimed for her support.

ISSUE: May Carmelita claim support and successional rights to the estate of Dominga?

HELD: No. This is because: (a) Vicente did not predecease his mother; and (b) Carmelita is a
spurious child.

Art 970 NCC provides: Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented and acquires the
rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

In testamentary succession, the right of representation can take place only in the following cases:
(a) When the person represented dies before the testator
(b) When the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and
(c) When the person represented is disinherited by the testator

In all of these cases, since there is a vacancy in the inheritance the law calls the children or
descendants of the person represented to succeed by right of representation.

CAB: Not having predeceased Dominga, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her
directly or in his own right. No right of representation as involved nor could it be invoked by
Carmelita upon her fathers death, which came after Domingas death. It would have been
different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga died. Carmelita could have inherited from
her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming she was a lawful heir.

However, as a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga
because of Art 992, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families.

Art 992 Provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato
between the illegitimate child and legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie by blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purpose of Art 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed
to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.

Even as an adopted child, Carmelita is still barred from inheriting from Dominga because there
are no natural kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. As
pointed out by Tolentino: If the adopting parent should die before the adopted child, the latter
cannot represent the former in the inheritance from the parents or ascendants of the adopted. The
adopted child is not related to the deceased in that case, because the filiation is created by fiction
of law is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted.

As a result, Carmelita, as spurious daughter of Vicente, has successional rights to the intestate
estate of her father but not to the estate of Dominga.







ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO, 14 SCRA 986 (1965)

DOCTRINE: As an exception to the general rule that the right of representation is available only in
the descending line, Art. 975 of the Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but only
in intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are concerned. When such
nephews and nieces inherit by representation, they succeed to that portion which their predeceased
or incapacitated father or mother would have otherwise been entitled to inherit. By right of
representation, these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two degrees remote from the
decedent. However, the prerequisite for the exercise of the right of representation is that the
nephews and nieces must concur with at least one uncle or aunt. Otherwise, nephews and nieces
will inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the decedent.

It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own right as third degree relatives,
nephews and nieces are preferred over the uncles and aunts of the decedent (who are likewise
relatives within the third degree of the decedent). This is because of the order of intestate succession
which ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order of succession, whereas other
collateral relatives, including uncles and aunts of the deceased, are ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise
of the right of representation is subject to the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families
under Article 992.

In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006 (480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through Justice
Corona ruled that (u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces),
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.

Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug clarified that the right of
representation is generally available only in the descending line, never in the ascending. In the
collateral line, the right is limited to children of brothers and sisters who concur with uncles and/or
aunts. No other collateral relative can benefit from the right of representation.


FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter, up
to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her estate, she
has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10) years having
elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for
purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate among her heirs.
1. The deceased Melodia Feraris was survived only by collateral relatives, namely Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedents father, Anacleto Ferraris; and
by Gaudencia, Catalina,Conchita, and Juanito, all surname Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodias only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris,
who predeceased the decedent.
2. The trial court ruled that the children of the only predeceased brother of the decedent,
exclude the aunt of the same decedent for the reason that the former are nearer in degree
(2 degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation,
while the aunt is 3 degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives
are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in
accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
3. Petitioner-appellant contends that she is of equal degree of relationship as the oppositors
(3 degrees removed from the decedent) and that under 975 of the New Civil Code, no
right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do
not concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the former succeed in their own right.

ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived
only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or
her?

HELD: The Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from
the decedent (3 degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong
degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and hen descending to the heir
(Civil Code, Art. 966). Also, nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(i.e.. per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided by Art.
975.

The Court held that in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other
collaterals (aunt and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Art. 1009, the absence
of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals
(uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.

Tolentino expressly states:
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers or
sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond this, we
can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under
the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives,
for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the
farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on
account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court ruled that under the laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.




















MALANG V. MOSON, 338 SCRA 393 (2000)

DOCTRINE: The rights to the succession of a Muslim who died during the effectivity of the
Muslim Code shall be governed by the said law. Prior to the effectivity of the Muslim Code, the
succession to the estate of a Muslim is governed by the Civil Code.

The capacity of an heir to succeed is determined by the law in force at the time of the conception
or birth of the heir.
Wife Children

1. Aida Limba Ulyssis-a.k.aTengAbdula
(divorced when pregnant Malindatu- a.k.a. KetoAbdula
with 4th child) Datulina
Lawanbai

2. JubaidaKado

3. Nayo Omar

4. MabaiAdzis Fatima- a.k.a. Kueng Malang

5. Saaga (divorced)

6. Mayumbai (divorced)

7. Sabai (divorced)

8. Neng Malang a.k.a.
KaguiKadigua


FACTS: HadjiAbdula Malang (Malang), a Muslim, contracted marriage with Aida Limba. They
had four children. When Aida was pregnant with their fourth child, Malang divorced her.
3. He married seven more times, divorced three times, so at the time of his death, he was
living with petitioner, Neng Malang (Neng). He died without a will. Neng filed for the
settlement of his estate, in the Sharia District Court in Cotabato City, praying that letters
of administration be issued in the name of her niece, Tarhata
4. Neng claimed that she was the wife of Malang, and that his other legal heirs are his three
children, namely TengAbdula, KetoAbdula and Kueng Malang and that he left seven
parcels of land, five of which were title in the name of Malang married to Neng Malang,
and a pick up jeepney.
5. The Sharia District Court ordered the publication of the petition. The eldest son of
Malang, Ulyssis filed his opposition to the petition alleging that the surviving heirs of his
father are as follows: the 5 children and the four wives, whom he did not divorce, namely
Jubaida, Nayo, Mabai and Neng.
6. The Sharia District Court applied the Islamic Law in the distribution of the Estate.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. She filed an original
action for certiorari with the Supreme Court holding that the law applicable on issues of
marriage and property regime is the New Civil Code, under which all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. The Sharia Court, however,
viewed the Civil Code provision on conjugal partnership as incompatible with plural
marriages, which is permitted under Muslim Law, and held the applicable property
regime to be complete separation of property under PD 1083.

ISSUE: What law governs the succession to the estate of a Muslim who died after the Muslim
Code and the Family Code took effect?

HELD: The Muslim Code which was already in force at the time of Malangs death will govern
the determination of the respective shares of each heir.

However, the Court decided to remand this case for determination of several issues like the exact
dates of the marriages and the exact dates of the dissolution; the actual period of cohabitation;
the identification of specific properties during each period of cohabitation and the identities of
the children and their dates of birth.

HadjiAbdula died intestate on December 16, 1993. Thus, it is the Muslim Code which should
determine the identification of the heirs in the order of intestate succession and the respective
shares of the heirs.

Meanwhile, the status and capacity to succeed on the part of the individual parties who
entered into each and every marriage ceremony will depend upon the law in force at the time of
the performance of the marriage rite.

The status and capacity to succeed of the children will depend upon the law in force at the time
of conception or birth of the child. If the child was conceived or born during the period covered
by the governance of the Civil Code, the Civil Code provisions on the determination of the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child would appear to be in point. Thus, the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:
(1) By the impotence of the husband;
(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were living separately, in such a way that
access was not possible;
(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

If the child was conceived or born during the period covered by the governance of the
Muslim Code, i.e., from February 4, 1977 up to the death of HadjiAbdula Malang on
December 18, 1993, the Muslim Code determines the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child. Under the Muslim Code:
Art. 58. Legitimacy, how established. --- Legitimacy of filiation is established by the evidence of
valid marriage between the father and the mother at the time of the conception of the child.

Art. 59. Legitimate children. ---
(1) Children conceived in lawful wedlock shall be presumed to be legitimate. Whoever
claims illegitimacy of or impugns such filiation must prove his allegation.
(2) Children born after six months following the consummation of marriage or within two
years after the dissolution of the marriage shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against
this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of physical impossibility
of access between the parents at or about the time of the conception of the child.

Art. 60. Children of subsequent marriage. --- Should the marriage be dissolved and the wife
contracts another marriage after the expiration of her idda, the child born within six months
from the dissolution of the prior marriage shall be presumed to have been conceived during the
former marriage, and if born thereafter, during the latter.

Art. 61. Pregnancy after dissolution. --- If, after the dissolution of marriage, the wife believes
that she is pregnant by her former husband, she shall, within thirty days from the time she
became aware of her pregnancy, notify the former husband or his heirs of that fact. The husband
or his heirs may ask the court to take measures to prevent a simulation of birth.

Upon determination of status and capacity to succeed based on the foregoing provisions,
the provisions on legal succession in the Muslim Code will apply. Under Article 110 of the
said Code, the sharers to an inheritance include:
(a) The husband, the wife;
(b) The father, the mother, the grandfather, the grandmother;
(c) The daughter and the sons daughter in the direct line;
(d) The full sister, the consanguine sister, the uterine sister and the uterine brother.

When the wife survives with a legitimate child or a child of the decedents son, she is entitled to
one-eighth of the hereditary estate; in the absence of such descendants, she shall inherit one-
fourth of the estate. The respective shares of the other sharers, as set out in Article 110
abovecited, are provided for in Articles 113 to 122 of P.D. 1083.

WHEREFORE, the decision dated September 26, 1994 of the Fifth Sharia District Court of
Cotabato City in Special Proceeding No. 94-40 is SET ASIDE, and the instant petition is
REMANDED for the reception of additional evidence and the resolution of the issues of the case
based on the guidelines set out in this Decision.


MAURICIO SAYSON V. COURT OF APPEALS AND DELIA SAYSON, 205 SCRA 321
(1992)
FACTS: Spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had 5 children: Maurico, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Teodoro (died 1972) married Isabel Bautista (died 1981). Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who
claim to be their children
1. Petitioners who are the surviving siblings of Teodoro, and Juana (Isabels mother) filed a
complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel.
2. This was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel, who alleged successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents lawful descendants
3. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint for accounting and partition of the
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couples surviving children.
They alleged that Edmundo and Delia were adopted by Teodoro and Doribel was a
legitime daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherited
Teodoros share in his parents estate by right of representation
4. The trial court held that as legitimate descendants of Teodoro and IsabelDelia and
Edmundo were legally adopted in 1967 and Doribel was a legitimate daughterthey
were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of representation
5. On appeal, CA disqualified Edmundo and Delia from inheriting from spouses Eleno and
Rafaela but affirmed that Doribel was entitled to inherit from spouses Eleno by right of
representation
6. Petitioners averred that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel
had already been born on February 27, 1967 when the adoption decree was issued on
march 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from adopting pursuant to
Art 335(1) NCC prohibits to adopt those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children, or natural children by legal fiction
7. Petitioners also contend that Doribel should be disqualified from inheriting since Doribel
herself is not the daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to Editha Abila,
who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural
daughter

ISSUE: Who is/are entitled to inherit from the estate of spouses Eleno and spouses Teodoro.

HELD: On the intestate estate of spouses Teodoro: Doribel (as legitimate child), and Delia and
Edmundo (as adopted children). On the estate of spouses Eleno: Doribel (by right of
representation).

Petitioners contention is inconsistent. They seek to annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on
the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same
breath, try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.

Moreover, it is too late now to challenge the adoption decree after it had become final and
executory. Assuming they were the proper parties, petitioners should have seasonably appealed
the decree of adoption, which they did not.

Doribels legitimacy cannot be question in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a
direct action seasonable filed by the proper party.

Therefore, Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, pursuant to Art 979. The philosophy behind this article is that a persons
loves descends first to his children and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and
thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in
acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love and as a
provision for their continued care even after his death.

On the right of representation, the following provisions of the Civil Code apply:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but
the one whom the person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right
of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of
Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has the right to represent her deceased father in the distribution
of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Art 981, she is entitled to the share her
father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of
her grandparents children.

But it is not so in the case of Delia and Edmundo. While it is true that the adopted child
shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights
do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by adoption is between
only the adopting parents and the adopted child, and does not extend to the blood relatives
of either party.
















EUGENIO DEL PRADO V. JESUS SANTOS DEL PRADO, 18 SCRA 68 (1966)
FACTS: Anastacio del Prado died intestate; at the time of his death, Anastacio was single.
1. Petitioner Eugenio del Prado is a legitimate brother of Anastacio while respondent Jesus
del Prado was the son of Anastacio with Aurea Santos, with whom he had cohabited
during his lifetime.
2. After Anastacios death, his estate was adjudicated to respondent Jesus
3. Petitioner filed an action to annul the adjudication on the ground that he was deprived of
his rightful share in the estate of his brother
4. Respondent contended that being an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, he was
entitled to the property left by Anastacio
5. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that since the deceased Anastacio left
no legitimate descendants or ascendants, respondent shall succeed to the entire estate left
by his supposed father to the exclusion of the plaintiff who is only a collateral relative

ISSUE: Who has a better right to the parcel of land left of the decedent Anastacio del Prado,
plaintiff or minor Jesus del Prado?

HELD: Jesus del Prado.

Since Anastacio died in 1958, the New Civil Code applies. Illegitimate children other than
natural are entitled to successional rights (Art 287). In this case, the deceased died intestate,
without legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed to his
entire estate (Art 988), to the exclusion of petitioner who is only a collateral relative.









CACHO V. UDAN, 13 SCRA 693 (1965)

DOCTRINE: The Court reaffirms the exclusion of legitimate brothers and sisters of the decedent
by the latter's illegitimate child. Note, however, that the Court disallowed the intervention of the
brothers in the probate proceedings, since regardless of the outcome of the probate, the brothers
cannot inherit from the deceased. Implicitly, the lower court also disqualified the said brothers from
claiming any right against the illegitimate son of the deceased by reason of Article 992, when the
said court instructed the fiscal to study the propriety of instituting escheat proceedings.


FACTS: Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a
purported will naming her son, Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs,
share and share alike.
1. Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in the CFI of Zambales.
2. Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate.
3. Francisco G. Udan, through counsel, filed his opposition to the probate of this
4. After one witness, the Notary Public who made and notarize the will, had testified in
court, oppositor Francisco G. Udan died on June 1961.
5. After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both
legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on
the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that the
testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue
influence.
6. Petitioner-appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss Oppositions filed by the Oppositors.
7. CFI issued an order disallowing the 2 oppositions for lack of interest in the estate and
directing the Fiscal to study the advisability of filing escheat proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan may claim to be heirs intestate
of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan.

HELD: The Court held that John and Rustico Udon cannot claim to be heirs intestate of their
legitimate sister, for t the time of her death, Silvinas illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her
heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Art. 988 nd 1003 of the Civil
Code, which was in force at the time of the death of the testatrix.

The legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherir only in the
absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can
concur with the widow or widower under Art. 1101, they do not concur, but are excluded by the
surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate.

John and Rustico Udan had no standing to oppose the probate of the will. For if the will is
ultimately probated John and Rustico are excluded by its terms from participation in the estate;
ad if probate be denied, both oppositors-appellant will be excluded by the illegitimate son,
Francisco Udan, as sole intestate heir, by operation of law.

The death of Francisco 2 yrs after his mothers demise does not improve the situation of
appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at
law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, the
legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. (Art. 992, Civil Code)























TOMAS CORPUS V. ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
TEODORO YANGCO, 85 SCRA 567 (1978)
FACTS: Teodoro Yangco died with a will. He left no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his
nearest relatives were: (a) his half-brother Luis Yangco; (b) half-sister Paz Yangco and wife of
Miguel Osorio; (c) children of his half-brother Ramon Corpus; and (d) Juanita Corpus; daughter
of his half-brother Jose Corpus
1. Teodoro was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles (widow of Tomas
Corpus). Before her marriage with Luis Rafael, Ramona had 5 children with Tomas, 2 of
which were Pablo and Jose.
2. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition was submitted but this
was opposed.
3. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus and the estate of Luis
R. Yangco appealed. A compromise agreement was entered into thereafter
4. Based on the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt acknowledging that
he received from the Yangco estate P2,000.
5. Tomas, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action to recover the supposed share in
Yangcos intestate estate. He alleged that the dispositions in Yangcos will imposing
perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under Art 785 Old Civil Code and
that the 1949 partition is invalid and as such, the estate should be distributed according to
the rules of intestacy

ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus, mother of Tomas, was a legal heir of Yangco

HELD: No.To determine Juanitas right to inherit, it is necessary to ascertain Yangcos filiation.
Luis Rafaels will states that Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate
child. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to
be legitimate following the principle of simper preasumitur pro matrimonio, that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful
marriage.

Since Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child (illegitimate) and Juanita was the legitimate
child of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus, petitioner-appellant Tomas has no cause of action
for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother in Yangcos estate. Juanita was
not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between legitimate and
illegitimate relatives.

Art 992 NCC provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit
in the same manner from the illegitimate child. This rule is based on the theory that the
illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and
seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.

Following the rule in Art 992, it was held that:
a. Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
b. The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandfather
c. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate
brother of her natural mother.
















CRESENCIANO LEONARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA CAILLES, 120
SCRA 890 (1983)
FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate in 1963. She was survived by 2 daughters, Maria and
Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter Pascuala who
predeceased her. Sotero died in 1944 while Silvestra died in 1949.
1. Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of Sotero, filed a complaint
seeking to:
a. Be declared one of the lawful heirs of deceased Francisca, entitled to share in the
estate of the deceased jointly with defendant Maria
b. Have the estate of Francisca partitioned between him and Maria
2. Respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties and
alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation
3. The trial court held in favor of petitioner. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court decision
and dismissed the complaint

ISSUE: WON petitioner has legal right to inherit by representation to Franciscas estate

HELD: No.

To determine petitioners successional rights to the decedents estate, his filiation must first be
ascertained. Petitioner failed to prove his filiation; the name of the child described in the birth
certificate presented as evidence, is not that of the plaintiff but a certain Alfredo Leonardo who
was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Soccoro Timbol. Other than his bare
allegations, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that Alfredo Leonardo
mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself.

Even if it is true that petitioner is a child of Sotero, he still cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca considering that he was born outside of
wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father and mother were
not yet married; and his alleged fathers first marriage was still subsisting. As such, petitioner
would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca.


DIAZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 150 SCRA 645 (1987)

DOCTRINE: This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992. As will be noted, the legitimate
collateral relative of the intestate was preferred over the illegitimate descendants. There was no
showing that between the grandmother and her illegitimate grandchildren, there was animosity. It
must likewise be noted that the deceased grandmother did not have any other descendants other than
the illegitimate children who were excluded from her inheritance.

FACTS: The case is a review of the decision declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The present
controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
1. Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion.
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another
child who died during infancy
3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo
Santero
4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero
5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976
6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and
his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two
minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD: No
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in
the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate
or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the persons to be
represented are themselves illegitimate.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the
limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother."

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children
and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former,
in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
ground of resentment."

While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those
articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being
exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person
to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants
may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. In the case at
bar, the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be the
sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation.
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he
further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the
term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the
word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral
relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was
used in a more restrictive or limited sense.





ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all
surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO
SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Doctrine:
This resolution settled the motion for reconsideration filed by the illegitimate children on the
decision immediately preceding. An argument is raised that the word "relatives" used in Article
992 cannot possibly refer to the grandmother of the illegitimate children, but only to the other
collateral relatives. The argument stresses the injustice resulting from the fact that while the
illegitimate children of an illegitimate child can exercise the right of representation, the same
right is denied the illegitimate children of a legitimate child.

FACTS:
It is undisputed
1) thatFelisaPamutiJardin is a niece of SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero who together with Felisa's
mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila
Asuncion;
2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born FelisaPamuti and another
child who died during infancy;
3) thatSimonaPamutiVda. deSantero is the widow of PascualSantero and the mother of Pablo
Santero;
4) that Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents PascualSantero and
SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero;
5) thatPascualSantero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and SimonaSantero in 1976;
6) that Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother SimonaSantero and his
six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children
with FelixbertaPacursa.
These six minor children, petitioners in this case, are the illegitimate children of Pablo Santero.
ISSUE: The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of SimonaPamutivda.
De Santero (Simona). We are tasked to determine whether petitioners as illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona by right of representation of their father, Pablo Santero,
who is a legitimate child of Simona.
HELD: FelisaPamuti-Jardinis is declared to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of
SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
1. Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession abintestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood,
but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between the legitimate family
and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and
incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former,
in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a
blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
ground of resentment.
2. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those
articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being
exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person
to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his
illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his
legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier
imposed Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even
though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code
because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate children the
right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their
grandparents (legitimate).
3. The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed to
be the legitimate heirs of the late SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero are FelisaPamutiJardin and the
six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by
the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any
error in holding FelisaPamutiJardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero.
4. According to Prof.Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he
further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the
term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates
that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not
so in the case at bar.
5. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly
the same footing. Even the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation
between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away with the sub-
classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that
illegitimate children have only those rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended
to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We
hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare FelisaPamuti-Jardin to be the
sole heir to the intestate estate of SimonaPamutiVda. deSantero, to the exclusion of
petitioners.
Dispostive: WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED











BENIGNO MANUEL V. HON. FERRER AND MODESTA BALTAZAR, 247 SCRA 476
(1995)
FACTS: The property in dispute here is the inheritance left by an illegitimate child who died
intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
1. Petitioners are the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling.
During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an affair with Ursula Bautista and sired a
child, Juan Manuel.
2. Juan Manuel married Esperanza Gamba. A donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land
was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other properties
were purchased by Juan and registered in his name. Spouses Juan Manuel did not have
any children however, the raised Modesta Manuel-Baltazar (ward) as their own
3. After the death of Juan and Esperanza, Modesta executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication, claiming for herself the 3 parcels of land
4. Petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the instruments Esperanza executed
5. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the petitioners, not being heirs ab
intestate of the illegitimate brother Juan Manuel, were not real properties in interest
6. Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over of Juans intestate estate (while the
other half would pertain to Juans surviving spouse) under Art 994
7. On the other hand, respondent claims that Art 994 should be read in conjuction with Art
992 NCC which provides that an illegitimate child is barred from inheriting ab intestate
from the legitimate relatives of his father or mother and the latter are barred in the same
manner from inheriting from the illegitimate child

ISSUE: WON petitioners, who are legitimate children of spouses Antonio and Beatriz, can
inherit from their illegitimate sibling

HELD: No.

Art 992 enunciates what is commonly referred to in the rules of succession as the principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family. The doctrine
rejects succession ab intestate in the collateral line between legitimate relatives and illegitimate
relatives, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is
predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application on testamentary
disposition.

The SC has ruled in several cases that:
a. Where the legitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right
to the formers inheritance;
b. The legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate
child;
c. A natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the
legitimate grandparent
d. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a
legitimate brother of her natural father; and
e. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the illegitimate children and
relatives of her father

In the case at bar, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan
Manuel. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a
compulsory or a legal heir.






























VDA. DE CRISOLOGO v COURT OF APPEALS
No. L-44051, 27 June 1985
137 SCRA 233

The petitioners filed an action against private respondents for ownership, annulment of sale, and
delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages.
Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering
seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao in favor of
respondent Mallillin.

FACTS:

Julia Capiao, who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, begot with him
one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao, who was married to Raymundo
Zipagan, both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964 respectively, without any
children and/or immediate forced heirs

Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao, having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any
will intestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil
degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao), were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs
and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extra-judicial
partition.

ISSUE:

WON the relatives of Julia Capiao, namely: the plaintiffs in this case, inherit from Lutgarda
Capiao, the original owner of the properties in question.

HELD:

No.

Clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit from an
illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992
of the new Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia
Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant case.


On certain occasions, this Court has allowed the filing of an appeal outside the period prescribed by
law in the interest of justice. Emphatic in the decisions cited by the petitioner are strong
considerations of substantial justice. The present case does not warrant such liberality because the
decision of the lower court is satisfactorily supported by the records. It is clear from the records that
the petitioners cannot inherit the properties in question because of Article 992 of the Civil Code.
Being relatives on the legitimate line of Julia Capiao, they cannot inherit from her illegitimate
daughter. Their relative Julia Capiao predeceased the daughter, Lutgarda Capiao. As explained by
Manresa, whom the private respondent cited:

Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother
who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be
called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but
the law does not recognize it. In this Article 943 is based upon the reality of the
facts and upon the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is,
in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in
the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish
upon the family. Every relations is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.




















SUNTAY III V COJUANCO-SUNTAY (2010)

DOCTRINE: While the barrier in Art. 992 remains in force, Justice Nachura sets the tone in what
could lead to a reconsideration of the ruling in Diaz v Intermediate Appellete Court, supra. Be
mindful, however, that the excerpt cited above is at best an obiter since the principal issue raised in
this case relates to the preference in the appointment of an administrator.


FACTS: On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr.
Federico Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay
(Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico. , Cristina was survived by her husband,
Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio
III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
1. During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three
children, namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed
Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled.
2. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay
Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos,
respectively.
3. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby,
nine months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural
child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise
brought up by the spouses Federico and Cristina.
4. After the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his
grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Federico was allowaed a one
hour of visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes and eventually stopped
because of a manifestation filed by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents.
5. Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.
6. Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor for
the administration of the estate of Cristina
7. Federico filed his opposition, disavowing the allegations of Isabel. He further alleged that
being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he
should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years
8. After a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as
administrator of the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as
the one with a better right to the letters of administration.
9. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations
in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was
better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent,
Cristina
10. In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.
11. The trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein petitioner,
Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate.
12. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina.

ISSUE: Who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act as administrator of
the decedents estate.

HELD:
The Court held that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina is as
much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the CA even
declared that "under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the
conjugal partnership."

Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional
bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance
where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the
decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from
infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents
husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.

We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning
the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent Justice
J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child
can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother.
The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article
943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles
(990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his
own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a
choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation,
in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify
Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude
vis--vis illegitimate children.
23

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said, first
descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants,
then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in degree to those
of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would have done so had he manifested
his last will Lastly, in default of anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties
of blood or affection, it is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to
charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.
24

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession,
i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the
status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the
legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism
between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
It must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration
of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and
Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long
deceased couple has yet to be settled.
The Court reversed and set aside the CAs ruling and declared that Letters of Administration
over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M.
Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a
determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the
actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the
subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay
with dispatch.















ZOSIMA VERDAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES,
NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA
ROSALES AND VIRGINIA ROSALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996
When a surviving spouse inherits, she acquires all the rights and privileges of ownership
pertaining to the property thus acquired. Hence, where a surviving spouse becomes a co-owner
of property through succession to her deceased spouse, the former is entitled to the right of
redemption in the circumstances described in Article 1620 of the Civil Code. Verdad confirms
this fact when a widow was granted the right to redeem a property in which she was a co-owner,
that her brothers and sisters-in-law sold to a third party without giving her prior written notice.
Children
MacariaAtega
1. First Marriage to
Angel Burdeos Ramon
Estela


2. Upon demise of Angel
Burdeos

married Canuto Rosales David- married to Socorro
Justo
Romulo
Aurora


FACTS:
1. During her lifetime, MacariaAtega had a first marriage with Angel Burdeos and had two
children, Ramon and Estela. Upon the death of Angel, she married Canuto Rosales, with whom
she had four children, David, Justo, Romulo and Aurora. Socorro Rosales, is the widow of
David Rosales who himself, some time after Macarias death in March 8, 1956, died intestate
without issue.
2. ZosimoVerdad is the buyer of a 248 sq.m. residential lot in Butuan City, sold to him by the
widow of Ramon Burdeos and his children on June 14, 1982. Socorro seeks to exercise a right of
legal redemption over the property, trading her title to Macaria,her mother in law.
3. Socorro discovered the sale on March 30, 1987 when she was at the Treasurers Office. She
wanted to redeem the property by tendering to amount of P23,000, as indicated in the deed of
sale. Zosimo wanted the current value of P80,000. The trial court ruled that the right of the
private respondents to redeem the property had already lapsed. Such was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: Does Socorro have a right to redeem the property?
HELD: Yes, because she is a legal heir of her husband David Rosales.
1. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; WRITTEN NOTICE OF SALE, MANDATORY. - When
their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption
arose in favor of private respondents. This right of redemption was timely exercised by private
respondents. Concededly, no written notice of the sale was given by the Burdeos heirs (vendors)
to the co-owners required under Article 1623 of the Civil Code. The thirty-day period of
redemption had yet to commence when private respondent Rosales sought to exercise the right of
redemption on 31 March 1987, a day after she discovered the sale from the Office of the City
Treasurer of Butuan City, or when the case was initiated, on 16 October 1987, before the trial
court. The written notice of sale is mandatory. This Court has long established the rule that
notwithstanding actual knowledge of a co-owner, the latter is still entitled to a written notice
from the selling co-owner in order to remove all uncertainties about the sale, its terms and
conditions, as well as its efficacy and status.
2. David Rosales, incontrovertibly, survived his mothers death. When Macaria died on 08
March 1956 her estate passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who
thereupon became co-owners of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own
estate, which included his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on
to his widow Socorro and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession.
ART. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children
and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the
entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, should
there be any, under Article 1001.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
[4]

Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales, thereupon
became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria.
When their interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of
redemption arose in favor of private respondents; thus:
ART. 1619. Legal redemption is the right to be subrogated, upon the same terms and conditions
stipulated in the contract, in the place of one who acquires a thing by purchase or dation in
payment, or by any other transaction whereby ownership is transmitted by onerous title.
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all
the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.
All given, we find no error in the appellate courts finding that private respondents are entitled to
the redemption of the subject property.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
































IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON V.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, 14 SCRA 563 (1965)
FACTS: Pedro Santillon died intestate, leaving one son, Claro and his wife, Perfecta Miranda.
During his marriage, pedro acquired several parcels of land
1. After his death, Claro Santillon filed petition for letters of administration. His mother,
Perfecta and spouses Benito Miranda opposed the petition on the following grounds:
a. Properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except for 3 parcels which
Perfecta claims to be her exclusive property
b. Perfecta conveyed of her undivided share in most of the properties to spouses
Miranda
c. Perfecta should be appointed administrator over her spouses estate
2. Thereafter, Claro filed a motion to declare shares of heirs and resolve the conflicting
claims of the parties with respect to their rights in the estate. Invoking Art 892, Claro
insisted that after deducting Perfectas share from the conjugal property, the remaining
property shall be divided as: for Perfecta and for him
3. On the other hand, Perfecta claimed that she was entitled under Art 996 to another of
the remaining half
4. The trial court held in favor of Perfecta, declaring that the surviving spouse Perfecta is
entitled to of Pedros estate and the remaining is given to Claro

ISSUE: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided when the only survivors
are the spouse and one legitimate child?

HELD: Half and half pursuant to Art 996 NCC.

Art 892 NCC falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession, whereas Art 996 comes under
the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot
rely on Art 892 to support his claim to of his fathers share. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime
of the surviving spouse and Art 888 thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession.
While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a
spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares
that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs. As such, the pertinent
provision on intestate succession shally apply, i.e. Art 996.

In his commentary, JBL Reyes, noted that: if there is only one legitimate child surviving with
the spouse, since they share equally, of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes
to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to children or descendants, the rule in
statutory construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular in this case.

The theory of commentators sharing Claros position are premised on the following arguments:
a. Art 996 speaks of children therefore it does not apply when there is only one child
and as such Art 892 should be applied through a process of judicial construction and
analogy
b. Art 996 is unfair because in intestate succession, the widow gets only while in testacy,
she would get shares

It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. As such,
children in Art 996 also refers to a child.

The equal shares theory seems to be a logical inference from the circumstance whereas Art 834
Spanish Civil Code, from which Art 996 was taken, contained 2 paragraphs governing two
contingencies: (a) where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children; and (b) where
the widow or widower survives with only one child. Since Art 996 NCC omitted to provide for
the second situation, it can be deemed that the legislators intent was to promulgate only
one general rule applicable to both situations.



















PARISH PRIEST OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF
VICTORIA, TARLAC v RIGOR
No. l-22036, 30 April 1979
89 SCRA 496

Capacity to succeed is determined from the moment of the death of the testator or the decedent.
To be capacitated, an heir, legatee or devisee must be living at the time succession opens, except
in case of representation whenever appropriate. A testamentary disposition giving a devise to the
nearest male relative who would pursue an ecclesiastical career is meant to refer to such relatives
living (or at least conceived) at the time of the testator's death. A contrary interpretation may be
upheld only if there is a clear intention to the contrary. Nevertheless, the enforceability of such a
testamentary disposition is necessarily limited to twenty years from the time succession opens, in
order that the disposition be consistent with the rule prohibiting perpetuities.

FACTS:

The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court
from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the
said devise was inoperative (Rigor v Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Victoria,
Tarlac, CA-G.R. No. 23419-R, August 1, 1963).

The record discloses that Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August
9, 1935, leaving a will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the
testator's nearest relatives

To ascertain Father Rigor's intention, it may be useful to make the following restatement of the
provisions of his will:

1. That he bequeathed the ricelands to anyone of his nearest male relatives who
would pursue an ecclesiastical career until his ordination as a priest;

2. That the devisee could not sell the ricelands;

3. That the devisee at the inception of his studies in sacred theology could enjoy and
administer the ricelands, and once ordained as a priest, he could continue enjoying
and administering the same up to the time of his death but the devisee would cease
to enjoy and administer the ricelands if he discontinued his studies for the
priesthood;

4. That if the devisee became a priest, he would be obligated to celebrate every year
twenty masses with prayers for the repose of the souls of Father Rigor and his
parents;

5. That if the devisee is excommunicated, he would be divested of the legacy and the
administration of the ricelands would pass to the incumbent parish priest of Victoria
and his successors;

6. That during the interval of time that there is no qualified devisee, as contemplated
above, the administration of the ricelands would be under the responsibility of the
incumbent parish priest of Victoria and his successors; and

7. That the parish priest-administrator of the ricelands would accumulate annually the
products thereof, obtaining or getting from the annual produce five percent thereof
for his administration and the fees corresponding to twenty masses with prayers
that the parish priest would celebrate for each year, depositing the balance of the
income of the devise in the bank in the name of his bequest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the devise was inoperative

HELD:

No.

Following that interpretation of the will, the inquiry would be whether at the time of Father Rigor
died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or who had manifested his
desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is categorically answered in paragraph 4 of the
appellant priest's petitions of February 19, 1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged
therein that "no nearest male relative of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the
priesthood."

Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore,
the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the will, was
likewise inoperative.


It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee only when
the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to become a priest, had not yet
entered the seminary, or having been ordained a priest, he was excommunicated. Those two
contingencies did not arise and could not have arisen, in this case because no nephew of the
testator manifested any intention to enter the seminary or ever become a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil
Code, nor article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it
shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of
accretion exists".

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, nor article 960(2), which
provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the
testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said ricelands, the same should be
distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition
as to the said ricelands.




CID V BURNAMAN (1968)

DOCTRINE: The capacity of an heir to inherit is to be determined at the time
succession opens. Cid refers to the provision of the Civil Code of 1889 which
disqualifies an illegitimate child who has not been acknowledged by his or her putative
parents from inheriting. The status of an acknowledged natural child must be
established as of the death of the deceased parent in order to entitled such
illegitimate child to certain successional rights. Without such acknowledgement as of
such time, no successional rights shall accrue to said child.

Please note, however, that the requisite acknowledgment has been repealed by
the Family Code. This case, therefore, and the pertinent provisions of law referred to
herein, shall not longer apply to deaths occurring after the effectivity of the Family
Code

FACTS: A lot was originally decreed in undivided halves, one in favor of Gregorio
Bonoan () and the other half in favor of the five petitioners Julians (Dionicia, Amador,
Escolastica, Domingo and Teodoro), as owners in equal shares of said lot.
1. Gregoria had in her possession the OC covering the land in question. When she
died the certificate passed to her son Cenon Bonoan @ Cenon Hernando.
2. The land tax assessment was also in the name of Gregoria, but when she died,
it was placed in the names of Cenon Hernando (Cenon Bonoan) and Engracia
Hernando, her children. Engracia was the mother of the petitioners Julians.
3. On 4 May 1950, Cenon executed a sworn affidavit adjudicating unto himself the
entire half interest of his mother, Gregoria Bonoa, as "her only legal heir the
affiant named herein who is her only child,"
4. Six (6) years later, on 7 April 1956, Cenon ceded by way of absolute sale - "all
his rights, participation and interest over his entire share of one fourth unto
Nancy Warwick Burnaman"
5. Eight months afterwards, on 5 December 1956, Cenon Bonoan, or Hernando,
subscribed another deed of sale wherein, he conveyed unto the same vendee,
Nancy W. Burnaman, not one-fourth but an undivided half (1/2) interest of Lot
9008, stating in the deed of sale that he was "the absolute owner and actual
possessor of the said undivided half interest in the above described parcel of
land."
6. Petitioners Julians fileda complaint against Nancy Burnaman, her husband, Elis
J. Burnaman, and Cenon Hernando, seeking the avoidance of the sale by the
latter insofar as concerned a one-fourth (1/4) undivided interest in the lot, on
the basis that the original half owner, Gregoria Bonoan, died leaving two
children, Cenon and Engracia, the latter being the mother of plaintiffs Julian;
that upon Engracia's death, her children, the Julians, became entitled to half of
Gregoria's half interest.
7. After trial, the court of first instance found for the plaintiffs Julians; declared
them owners of the undivided 3/4 of the lot; annulled pro tanto the
adjudication in favor of Cenon, and his sale in favor of the Burnaman spouses.
8. On appeal, CA found, in its turn, that Engracia (mother of the Julians) was an
illegitimate child of Gregoria Bonoan, and was never recognized, voluntarily or
compulsory, by her mother, that her certificate of baptism on 16 April 1879,
even if considered a public document at the time it was issued, was
incompetent evidence of her acknowledgment; that not having acknowledged,
expressly or tacitly, she could not inherit from Gregoria, unlike Cenon who was
acknowledged, according to Dionisia Julian Cid's testimony; that Cenon's
admission that Engracia was his sister did not make the former an
acknowledged natural child of his mother.

ISSUE: WON Engracia is an acknowledged child of Gregoria, thus entitling Julian to
recover.

HELD: The Court of Appeals correctly held that this certificate did not constitute a
sufficient act of acknowledgment, since the latter must be executed by the child's father
or mother, and the parish priest can not acknowledge in their stead. It is true that
Cenon Hernando (or Bonoan) admitted in his answer that Engracia was his sister, but
this certainly is not an admission that she was also acknowledged by their common
mother. For acknowledgment is not a consequence of filiation.
Since the plaintiffs Julians based their title upon hereditary succession from the original
recorded owner, Gregoria Bonoan, through their mother, Engracia Bonoan, it was
perfectly proper for the appellate court to inquire whether Engracia was, or could be, an
heir of Gregorio. To be such heir, it is not enough that Engracia was Gregoria's
daughter; for not every child is entitled to inherit. To succeed, a child must be, under
the rules of the Civil Code of 1889 (in force when Gregoria died in 1938), either a child
legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else not an acknowledged natural child, for
illegitimates not natural are disqualified to inherit (Civil Code of 1889, Articles 807,
939). If Engracia was not recognized, she could not inherit from her mother, Gregoria
and, consequently, could not transmit to her own issue any successional rights to
Gregoria's estate.



















MICHAEL GUY V. COURT OF APPEALS AND KAREN DANES WEI, 502 SCRA 151
(2006)
FACTS: Sima Wei died intestate, leaving an estate valued at P10M. His known surviving heirs
are: his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeane, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy.
1. Private respondents alleged that they the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of the
decedent. They filed a petition for the appointment of an administrator to settle Sima
Weis estate
2. Petitioner Michael Guy, one of the legitimate children of the decedent, opposed the
petition, contending that private respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children of Sima Wei pursuant to Art 175 FC
3. The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a joint motion to dismiss, alleging that private
respondents claim have been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by
reason of Remedios (private respondents mother) release and waiver of claim stating that
in exchange for financial and education assistance, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities
4. The trial court denied the joint motion to dismiss, ruling that while the release and waiver
of claim was signed by Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly
constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of rights occurred

ISSUE: WON the release and waiver of claim precludes private respondents from claiming their
successional rights

HELD: No. Remedios release and waiver of cliam does not bar the private respondents from
claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of the party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms
do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.

CAB: There was no waiver of hereditary rights. The waiver does not state with clarity the
purpose of its execution. Considering that the document did not specifically mention private
respondents hereditary share in Sima Weis estate, it cannot be construed as a waiver of
successional rights.

Moreover, Art 1044 provides that parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property which must pass the courts scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not
having been judicially authorized, the release and waiver of clam in the instant case is void and
will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

It must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one
lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates a waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.

CAB: Private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they
are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner
himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be
inconsistent to rule that they have waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they
do not have such right. Hence, petitioners invocation of waiver on the part of private
respondents must fail.














LEVISTE V COURT OF APPEALS, 160 SCRA 581 (1989)

DOCTRINE: Article 1052 in part provides that if an heir repudiates the inheritance to the
prejudice of his creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the
name of the heir. This right pertains to creditors, and excludes an attorney who may have a claim
against his client-heir based on a contingent fee arrangement.

FACTS: Petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the private
respondent Rosa Del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic
will of the late Maxima C. Reselva.
1. Under the will, a piece of real property was bequeathed to Del Rosario.
2. It was agreed that petitioners contingent fee would be 35% of the property that Rosa
may receive upon the probate of the will.
3. Thereafter, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing that she was
termintating his services as her counsel due to conflicting interest.
4. Petitioner filed a Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional
Services.
5. The trial court denied his motion on the ground that he had not filed a claim for
attorneys fees nor recorded his attorneys lien.
6. Petitioner then, filed a Formal Statement of Claim for Attorneys Fees and Recording of
Attorneys Lien.
7. Del Rosario filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Probate alleging that Del Rosario
waived her rights to the devise in her favor and ageed that the De Guzman brothers and
sisters who opposed er petition for probate shall inherit all the properties left by the
decedent. Trial court denied the motion for being contrary to public policy.
8. The court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity were not
satisfied.
9. Petitioner filed an appeal, while private respondents file a motion to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest. Petitioner claims that he has a
direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed.
10. Petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a
creditor of the latter and that under Article 1052 of the Civil Code, he has a right to
accept for his client Del Rosario to the extent of 35% thereof the devise in her favor (she
in effect repudiated) to protect his contingent attorneys fees.

ISSUE: WON an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may order to collect his
fees, prosecute and appeal despite his clients refusal to appeal the trial courts decision.

HELD: No
Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the
creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa Del Rosario. The payment of
his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since
the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur.
Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.

Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa Del Rosario is not a legal heir of the
late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedents will,
she lost her right to inherit any part of the latters estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to
accept in her name.

Furthermore, petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no
direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as
former counsel for a prospective heir. The Court ruled that one who is only indirectly interested
in a will may not interfere in its probate.





































VIZCONDE V. COURT OF APPEALS AND RAMON NICOLAS, 286 SCRA 217 (1998)
FACTS: Petitioner Lauro Vizconde and his wife Estrellita had 2 children: Carmela and Jennifer.
Estrellita is one of the daughters of spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas. Their other children are:
Ramon, Teresita, Ricardo (incompetent) and Antonio who predeceased his parents. he was
survived by his widow Zenaida and their 4 children
1. In May 1979, Estrellita purchased a parcel of land (Valenzuela property) from Rafael. She
subsequently sold the property to Amelia Lim.
2. Estrellita then purchased a house and lot (Paranaque property) using a portion of the
proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property
3. In 1991, Estrellita, Carmela and Jennifer were brutally murdered. According to the
investigation, Estrellita died ahead of her daughters.
4. Thereafter, petitioner Lauro entered into an Extrajudicial Settlement of the estate of
Estrellita with waiver of shares with Estrellitas parents
1
. The settlement gave 50% to
Estrellitas parents and the other 50% to petitioner. Spouses Rafael also waived all their
rights to the Paranaque property
5. The following year, Rafael died. Teresita then instituted intestate proceedings listing as
heirs: Salud, Ramon, Ricardo and Zenaida (wife of Antonio) and the children of Antonio
6. Private respondent Ramon opposed the proceedings alleging that Estrellita was given the
Valenzuela property by Rafael and that their legitime should come from the collation of all
properties distributed by Rafael during his lifetime. Ramon averred that petitioner is one of
Rafaels children by right of representation as widower of Estrellita
2


ISSUE: WON the Paranaque property which was obtained from the proceeds of the sale of the
Valenzuela property, is subject to collation

HELD: No.

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants and other forced heirs who intervene in the
division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they
receive from him, so that the division may be made according to the law and the will of the

1
The extrajudicial partition between Lauro and his parents-in-law is irregular and disregarded the
sequence of death. Upon the death of Estrellita, her compulsory hers were heir draughts and her
surviving spouse. As such, the parents of Estrellita were excluded by Carmela and Jennifer. Spouses
Rafael were not entitled to inherit from Estrellita

2
This is wrong. It is well-settled in law that children-in-law are not heirs to the estate of their parents-in-
law, whether in their own right or by right of representation

testator.
3
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs
and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the
decedent.
4
The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs insofar as possible
because it is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a
donation or gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of
his share in the estate and the it is his will to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any
expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose a lien on the property or the subject matter
of the collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself but
the value of such property at the time it was donated, hence any increase in value or any
deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.

The Paranaque property is not subject to collation for the following reasons:
(1) Petitioner cannot be included in the intestate estate proceeding, being a son-in-law of the
decedent Rafael. In this case, petitioner is only a third person with respect to the estate of
the decedent
(2) As a rule, the probate courts determination of ownership of a property is provisional in
character and is subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve the title. What it can
resolve is only with respect to the issue whether such property may be included in the
estate proceedings or not. Here, the probate court acted beyond its jurisdiction when it
proceeded to determine the validity of the sale of the Valenzuela property between Rafael
and Estrellita
(3) The order of collation is premature. There was nothing to indicate that the legitime of any
of Rafaels heirs has been impaired to warrant collation.
5

(4) Assuming that collation is proper in this case, the probate court still erred in ordering the
collation of the Paranaque property. The Paranaque property which Estrellita acquired by
using the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property does not become collationable
simply by reason thereof.
6
The Paranaque property was conveyed not to Rafael, but to
Estrellita and petitioner is not the heir of Rafael.
7
Moreover, Rafael waived any rights or

3
It is not the property that is brought into the common mass, but only the value thereof. Collation relates
solely to the value of the property donated and solely for accounting purposesit does not require the
physical return of the property donated.
4
The duty to collate is not only limited to compulsory heirs
a. For compulsory succession, the objective of collation is to equalize the shares of compulsory
heirs so that those who receive an advance of their hereditary shares are made to account for
such advances when the estate of the donor is divided among them at the time succession opens
b. For voluntary heirs, the objective of collation is to ensure that what the donor gave gratuitously
during his lifetime does not exceed the free portion of the estate.
5
It is not accurate to state that collation shall take place only after a determination that the legitime of any
compulsory heir has been impaired. Collation is resorted to precisely to determine whether or not the
legitime has been impaired by a prior donation inter vivos
6
While there is such a thing as a collationable donation, there is no such thing as a collationable property.
this is because collation is a mere accounting process that requires the inclusion of the value of all prior
donations in calculating the hereditary estate.
7
When Lauro inherited from Estrellita, Lauro likewise inherited Estrellitas obligation to collate the value of
claims and participation as heir in the Paranaque property when he signed the extrajudicial
settlement of estate
(5) It is futile for the probate court to ascertain whether the Valenzuela property may be
brought to collation. Estrellita, it should be stressed, died ahead of Rafael. In fact, it was
Rafael who inherited from Estrellita an amount more than the value of the Valenzuela
property. Even assuming that the Valenzuela property may be collated, the collation may
not be allowed as the value of the Valenzuela preorty has long been returned to the estate of
Rafael.
8


















the collationable donation. Estrellita predeceased Rafael and therefore, she did not inherit from Rafael.
But for the purpose of liquidating Rafaels estate, Estrellita must account for the value of the Valenzuela
property which had been transferred to her as a stranger.
8
When Rafael and Salud received some cash from the estate of Estrellita, it was not a return of the value
of the Valenzuela property, which in the first place, was not even contemplated. They received the money
under a erroneous notion that they were compulsory heirs of Estrellita. Lauros obligation to collate (which
incidentally should have been required in this case) was not obliterated by the fact that Estrellita
predeceased her parents and that her parents inherited from her.

CHAVEZ V INTERMEDIATE APPELATE COURT

DOCTRINE: While Mang-oy holds that a partition inter vivos executed in accordance with
Article 1080 is revocable by a person at any time during his or her lifetime, and that such
partition will not result in a transfer of ownership to his heirs during his lifetime, Chavez holds
that an exception may be taken if the partition as in fact been implemented and that on (or some)
of the heirs, with the consent of the person making it, conveys or sells his or her pro-indiviso
share to another co-heir. Estoppel bars a selling heir from disavowing the sale and from
proceeding contrary thereto.

The Court, in passing, mentioned that the several sales among the co-heirs did not constitute
contracts involving future inheritance. This is because each of the sales among the co-heirs was
with the express consent and authorization for the parent who executed the partition. This was
construed as a sale of the parent itself.

Finally, it must be noted that in the case of a partition inter vivos under Article 1080, the law
does not specify a particular form. The court opined that such a partition may be made orally or
in writing.


FACTS: The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuela Buenavista. She
had six children namely, Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and Floserpina.
1. Presentacion Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, Manuela Buenavista, executed a
deed of sale whereby she sold her 1/6 undivided share of the land in question to her sister
Concepcion.
2. Two years later, Floserpina Chavez, with the conformity of her mother, also sold her 1/6
undivided share of the same land to her sister, Concepcion.
3. Raquel, with the conformity of her mother, likewise sold her undivided 1/6 share of the
same property to Concepcion Chavez.
4. Having acquired the shares of Presentacion, Florespina and Raquel, Concepcion thereby
became the owner of a total undivided 4/6 share of the land in question with Antonio and
Rosario as owners of the remaining 2/6 shares.
5. In all the documents, the owner, Manuela Buenavista, had assigned or distributed to her
children, in equal pro-indiviso shares her paraphernal property. The owner, however,
reserved for herself the possession of the land and the enjoyment of the fruits during her
lifetime.
6. Despite the transfers or assignments her children had executed with her conformity,
Manuela Buenavista subsequently signed a Deed of Sale of the entire property in favor of
her daughter, Raquel Chavez and her husband.
7. Antonio, Rosario and Concepcion filed a case against their mother Manuela and their
sister Raquel.
8. Thereupon, Manuela sold the entire property to Pepito Ferrer, with right to repurchase.
Ferrer was later sues as an additional defendant.
9. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal CA reversed the trial courts decision
declaring that the Deed of sale in favor of Raquel, her husband and Pepito Ferrer are null
and void.

ISSUE: WON the IAC erred in declaring valid the deeds of sale as a partition by an act inter
vivos

HELD: No
Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate either by an
act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitimate of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the
partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law. Art. 1080
of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate; either by
an act inter vivos or by WILL. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such
partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when
a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or
written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the
legitime of compulsory heirs.

In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez. in favor of Concepcion Chavez as
evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela Buenavista and her
children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the sales. The Deeds of Sale
are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance but a contract perfected and
consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista who signed the same and gave her
consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the property owner herself, is valid.













ARELLANO V. PASCUAL, 638 SCRA 826 (2010)
FACTS: Angel Pascual died intestate and left his siblings as his heirs, namely: petitioner Amelia
Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes and Nona, and respondents Francisco
Pascual and Miguel Pascual
1. Respondents alleged that the parcel of land donated to Amelia during the decedents
lifetime should be considered as an advance legitime of petitioner
2. The probate court held that the property donated to Amelia was part of the estate of the
decedent and as such, subject to collation

ISSUES:
1. WON the property donated to petitioner is subject to collation
2. WON the estate should be distributed equally among the parties

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.

The term collation has two distinct concepts:
1. Collation is a mere operation by the addition of the value of donations made by the
testator to the value of the hereditary estate;
2. It is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by the
testator during his lifetime

The purpose of collation is to security equality among the compulsory heirs insofar as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious
donations may be reduced.

Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one its purposes being to determine the
legitime and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguarded.

CAB: The decedent did not leave any primary, secondary or concurring compulsory heirs. He
was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and are not entitle to any
legitime.

The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to legitime, he was free to
donate all of his properties even if nothing was left to his siblings. His donation to petitioner is
deemed as a donation to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being
no compulsory heir, the donated property is not subject to collation.

SECOND ISSUE: The decedents remaining estate should be partitioned equally among his heirs
who are his collateral relatives, following Art 1003 and 1004 NCC.