THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 135297. June 8, 2000]

GAVINO CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. Spouses GERONIMO GROSPE and HILARIA
GROSPE, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
The sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a
circumvention of agrarian reform laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of
these rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally permissible
conveyance in favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of said land reform rights, the
Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of the property, validly awarded it to private
respondents.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the May 14, 1998 Decision
[1]
and the August 19,
1998 Resolution
[2]
in CA-GR SP No. 47176, in which the Court of Appeals (CA)
[3]
dismissed the
petitioners appeal and denied reconsideration respectively.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads:
[4]

"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is
hereby dismissed. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. With costs against the
Petitioner."
The Facts
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a
Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a
total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned
by a certain Florentino Chioco and registered under Title No. 126638.
To pay for his wifes hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on January 20, 1982, in favor
of Virginia de Leon. When the contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria
Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of four years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to
guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties executed a contract denominated as "Kasunduan Sa
Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang Sakahan,"
[5]
which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the land during
the duration of the mortgage.
Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III),
petitioner instituted against the respondents an action for recovery of possession.
[6]
In his Complaint, he
alleged that they had entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991,
and destroyed the palay that he had planted on the land.
Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between them and petitioner allowed the
former to take over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of
paying his loan, petitioner allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights"
[7]

over the landholding in favor of respondents in consideration of P54,394.
Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over the landholding and alleged that his and his
childrens signatures appearing on the Waiver were forgeries.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and
surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had
passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent
spouses, who were the "most qualified farmer[s]-beneficiaries."
[8]

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
[9]
in a Decision promulgated on
October 8, 1997 in DARAB Case No. 1251, affirmed the provincial adjudicators Decision.
[10]
Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated February 26, 1998.
[11]
As earlier stated,
petitioners appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court ruled that petitioner had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as a
beneficiary. It rejected his contention that all deeds relinquishing possession of the landholding by a
beneficiary were unenforceable. Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) 1199 and Section 28 of RA 6389 allow a
tenant to voluntarily sever his tenancy status by voluntary surrender. The waiver by petitioner of his rights
and his conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions reallocating the landholding to the respondents
are immutable evidence of his abandonment and voluntary surrender of his rights as beneficiary under
the land reform laws.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence the alleged forgery of his and
his sons signatures.
Hence, this recourse.
[12]

Issues
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner alleges in his Memorandum that the appellate court committed these
reversible errors:
[13]

"I
xxx [I]n relying on the findings of fact of the DARAB and PARAD as conclusive when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts and the inference taken is manifestly
mistaken.
"II
xxx [I]n disregarding and/or ignoring the claim of petitioner that the alleged waiver
documents are all forgeries.
"III
xxx [I]n ruling that petitioner had forfeited his right to become a beneficiary under PD No.
27.
"IV
xxx [I]n failing to rule on the legality and/or validity of the waiver/transfer action."
In short, the focal issues are: (1) Was the appellate court correct in finding that the signatures of petitioner
and his sons on the Waiver were not forged? (2) Assuming arguendo that the signatures in the Waiver
were genuine, was it null and void for being contrary to agrarian laws? (3) Did the petitioner abandon his
rights as a beneficiary under PD 27? (4) Did he, by voluntary surrender, forfeit his right as a beneficiary?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Factual Findings
Alleging that an information for estafa through falsification was filed against the respondents, petitioner
insists that his signature on the Waiver was forged.
We are not persuaded. The filing of an information for estafa does not by itself prove that the respondents
forged his signature. It only means that the public prosecutor found probable cause against the
respondents, but such finding does not constitute binding evidence of forgery or fraud.
[14]
We agree with
the well-reasoned CA ruling on this point:
[15]

"xxx We are not swayed by Petitioners incantations that his signature on the Waiver of
Rights is a forgery. In the first place, forgery is never presumed. The Petitioner is
mandated to prove forgery with clear and convincing evidence. The Petitioner failed to do
so. Indeed, the Waiver of Rights executed by the Petitioner was even with the written
conformity of his four (4) sons (at page 11, Rollo). The Petitioner himself signed the
Resolution of the Board of Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
surrendering his possession of the landholding to the Samahang Nayon, (idem,
supra). Under Memorandum Circular No. 7, dated April 23, 1979 of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, transactions involving transfer of rights of possession and or cultivation
of agricultural lands are first investigated by a team leader of the DAR District who then
submits the results of his investigation to the District Officer who, in turn, submits his
report to the Regional Director who, then, acts on said report. In the present recourse, the
requisite investigation was conducted and the report thereon was submitted to and
approved by the Regional Director. Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Evidence, public officers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly and in
accordance with law."
As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB -- an
administrative body which has acquired expertise on the matter such findings are accorded respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal.
[16]
The presence or the absence of forgery was an issue of fact that was
convincingly settled by the agrarian and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner utterly failed to convince us that
the appellate court had misapprehended the facts. Quite the contrary, its findings were well-supported by
the evidence.
Second Issue: Validity of the "Waiver of Rights"
Petitioner insists that agreements purportedly relinquishing possession of landholdings are invalid for
being violative of the agrarian reform laws.
Private respondents contend that petitioner was no longer entitled to recognition as a farmer-beneficiary
because of the series of mortgages he had taken out over the land. They also cite his "Waiver of Rights"
and abandonment of the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary
succession. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the
landowners reacquired vast tracts of land, thus negating the governments program of freeing the tenant
from the bondage of the soil.
[17]
In Torres v. Ventura,
[18]
the Court clearly held:
"xxx As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the
landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the
government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of
the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the
government or by hereditary succession, to his successors.
"xxx [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum Circular
[No. 7, Series of 1979, April 23, 1979]:
"Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmer-beneficiaries
of PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession of their
farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their former
landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and therefore, null
and void."
Third Issue: Abandonment
Based on the invalidity of the Waiver, petitioner concludes that the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA
erroneously ruled on the basis of the said document that he had abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his
landholding. Denying that he abandoned the land, he contends that the transaction was a simple loan to
enable him to pay the expenses incurred for his wifes hospitalization.
We agree. Abandonment
[19]
requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to
desert a right or property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into
effect.
[20]
The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning,
resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned.
[21]

The CA ruled that abandonment required (a) the tenants clear intention to sever the agricultural tenancy
relationship; and (b) his failure to work on the landholding for no valid reason.
[22]
The CA also deemed the
following as formidable evidence of his intent to sever the tenancy relationship: (a) the mortgage and (b)
his express approval and conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolution installing the private
respondents as tenants/farmers-beneficiaries of the landholding. We disagree.
As earlier shown, the Waiver was void. Furthermore, the mortgage expired after four years. Thus, the
private respondents were obligated to return possession of the landholding to the petitioner. At bottom,
we see on the part of the petitioner no clear, absolute or irrevocable intent to abandon. His surrender of
possession did not amount to an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of private
respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan.
Fourth Issue: Voluntary Surrender
Contrary to the finding of the appellate court, the petitioner also denies that he voluntarily surrendered his
landholding.
His contention is untenable. The nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a
clear showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under the
present circumstances, may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the government, of his rights under the
agrarian laws.
PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be transferable
except through hereditary succession or to the government, in accordance with the provisions of existing
laws and regulations. Section 8 of RA 3844 also provides that "[t]he agricultural leasehold relation xxx
shall be extinguished by: xxx (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, xxx."
In this case, petitioners intention to surrender the landholding was clear and unequivocal. He signed his
concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions surrendering his possession of the landholding. The
Samahan then recommended to the team leader of the DAR District that the private respondent be
designated farmer-beneficiary of said landholding.
To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to another private person. It was
the government, through the DAR, which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were
declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of
extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court approval as long as it is convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence.
[23]

Petitioners voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the
government because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of
farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. Under Memorandum
Circular No. 8-80 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice from the
agrarian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be substituted to all rights and
obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer. Besides, these cooperatives are established
to provide a strong social and economic organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a
lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform.
The cooperatives work in close coordination with DAR officers (regional directors, district officers, team
leaders and field personnel) to attain the goals of agrarian reform (DAR Memorandum Circular No. 10,
Series of 1977). The Department of Local Government (now the Department of Interior and Local
Government) regulates them through the Bureau of Cooperative Development (Section 8, PD 175). They
also have access to financial assistance through the Cooperative Development Fund, which is
administered by a management committee composed of the representatives from the DILG, the Central
Bank, the Philippine National Bank, the DAR and the DENR (Section 6, PD 175).
Petitioner insists that his act of allowing another to possess and cultivate his land did not amount to
abandonment or voluntary surrender, as the rights of an OLT beneficiary are preserved even in case of
transfer of legal possession over the subject property, as held in Coconut Cooperative Marketing
Association (Cocoma) v. Court of Appeals.
[24]

We disagree. Petitioner misconstrued the Cocoma ruling because what was prohibited was the
perpetration of the tenancy or leasehold relationship between the landlord and the farmer-beneficiary.
The case did not rule out abandonment or voluntary surrender by the agricultural tenant or lessee in favor
of the government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioners appeal. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[5]
I bid., p. 78.
"KASUNDUAN SA PAGPAPAHIRAM NG LUPANG SAKAHAN
"PARA SA KALAALAMAN NANG LAHAT:
........"Ako si GAVINO A. CORPUZ, may sapat na taong gulang, biyudo at sa kasalukuyan ay nakatira sa
Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija ay tumanggap ng halagang P32,500.00 (Tatlumput dalawang libo at
limang daang piso) perang Pilipino ngayong ika 5 ng Disyembre 1986 mula kay Gng. HELARIA F. GROSPE.
Dahil sa pagkatanggap ko ng halagang nabanggit ay binibigyan ko si Gng. Helaria F. Grospe, may asawa at
may bahay ni Ginoong GERONIMO R. GROSPE ng lubos na karapatan para sakahin ang aking lupa na
nagtutukoy ng mga sumusunod:
Lot Number......:.....Not available
Location...........:.....Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija
Existing Title.....:.....Not available
Land Area........:.....22,000 sq. m.
........"Na sa kasunduang ito ay may karapatan si Gng. Helaria F. Grospe na gamitin o sakahin ang aking lupa
sa loob ng APAT NA TAON mula sa 5 Disyembre 1986 hanggang Disyembre 5, 1990 at ito ay mapapawalang
bisa lamang ayon sa bagong kasunduan namin. Pagkatapos ng apat na taon ay ibabalik ko rin ang
halagang P32,500.00 (Tatlumpot dalawang libo at limang daang piso) na aking nahiram kay Gng. Helaria F.
Grospe.
........"Na sa kasunduang ito ay isasagawa ngayon sa (illegible) 1986 sa Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
(sgd.) GAVINO A. CORPUZ
(May-ari ng lupa)
(sgd.)HELARIA F. GROSPE
(Nagpahiram ng salapi)
SA KAPAHINTULUTAN NG MGA
ANAK:
(sgd.)ANACLETO CORPUZ
(sgd.)RAYMUNDO CORPUZ
(sgd.)JIMMY CORPUZ."
SAKSI:
(signature illegible)
(sgd.)LOVELITO C. ORA

[7]
Rollo, p. 79.
"WAIVER OF RIGHTS
"KAMI, mga nakalagda sa ibaba nito, pawang may mga sapat na gulang, Pilipino, at sa kasalukuyan ay
pawang naninirahan sa Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, matapos makapanumpa nang naaayon sa batas
ay nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod:
"Na, kami ang mga tagapagmana ng lupang sakahin na dati ay nakatala sa pangalan ng aming
ina/ama/kapatid na si G/Gng. Gabino A. Corpuz na makikilala (na) Lote Blg. 3017 na may sukat na
2.2830 ektarya humigit kumulang na dating pag-aari ni Florentino Chioco na matatagpuan sa
Malaya, Sto. Domingo, NE, na napapaloob sa Titulo Blg. 126638.
"Na, bilang tagapagmana ng lupang sakahin na nabanggit sa itaas aming inililipat ang lahat ng
karapatan at pamomosisyon kay GERONIMO R. GROSPE.
"Na, ginawa namin ito upang maisaayos sa Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) ang paglilipat ng
mga karapatan sa nasabing Lote sa pangala(n) ni GERONIMO A. GROSPE.
"SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO, kami ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito ngayong ika 02 ng Enero 1990,
dito sa bayan ng Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
PANGALAN AT LAGDA SEDULA BLG. KINUHA SA NOONG
(Sgd.) Raymundo S. Corpuz 10152182 Sto. Domingo, N.E. 11/06/89
(Sgd.) Jimmy S. Corpuz 10152183 Sto. Domingo, N.E. 11/06/89
(Sgd.) Anacleto S. Corpuz 00976119 Sto. Domingo, N.E. 03/20/89
CONFORME:
(sgd.) GABINO A. CORPUZ
Sedula Blg......---.....10113264
Kinuha sa.......---.....Sto. Domingo, N.E.
noong............---.....June 22, 1989
x x x...............x x x ...............x x x."




[G.R. No. 139083. August 30, 2001]
FLORENCIA PARIS, petitioner, vs. DIONISIO A. ALFECHE, JUAN L. ALFECHE, MAXIMO N.
PADILLA, DIONISIO Q. MATILOS, Heirs of GREG A. ALFECHE, DIONISIO W. MATILO,
SIMPLICIO L. ADAYA, TEOFILO M. DE GUZMAN, FRANCISCO B. DINGLE and MARIFE
NAVARO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Homesteads are not exempt from the operation of the Land Reform Law. The right to retain seven hectares of
land is subject to the condition that the landowner is actually cultivating that area or will cultivate it upon the
effectivity of the said law.
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the June 4, 1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals
[1]
(CA), in CA-GR
SP No. 45738, which affirmed the ruling of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB). The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, [there being] no grave abuse of discretion x x x committed by DARAB, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.
[2]

The Decision of the DARAB, which was affirmed by the CA, had disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated March 19, 1992 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one is entered:
1. Declaring the private respondents to be full owners of the land they till pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
27 and Executive Order No. 228;
2. Declaring the validity of the Emancipation Patents issued to private respondents; and
3. Dismissing the case.
[3]

The Facts
The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon with an area of 10.6146
hectares, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8275 and another property with an area of
13.2614 hectares covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-4985, also located at Paitan, Quezon, Bukidnon; the
said parcels are fully tenanted by private respondents herein who are recipients of Emancipation Patents in their
names pursuant to Operation Land Transfer under P.D. 27 (Annexes A, A-1 to A-18) notwithstanding the fact that
neither the tenants nor the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) [has] paid a single centavo for the said
land. Petitioner and the tenants have not signed any Land Transfer Production Agreement. Petitioner and her
children have been deprived of their property without due process of law and without just compensation, especially
so that the tenants have already stopped paying rentals as of December 1988 to the damage and prejudice of
petitioner.
Petitioner contends that since she is entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D. 27 and/or 5 hectares and
3 hectares each for her children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), the tenants are not
supposed to acquire the subject land and the Emancipation Patents precipitately issued to them are null and void for
being contrary to law. Petitioner further alleged that she owns the subject property covered by OCT No. P-4985 as
original homestead grantee who still owned the same when Republic Act No. 6657 was approved, thus she is
entitled to retain the area to the exclusion of her tenants. As regards TCT No. 8275, petitioner has applied for
retention of seven hectares per Letter of Retention attached as Annex B, that the lands subject of the instant
petition are covered by Homestead Patents, and as decided by the Supreme Court in the cases of Patricio vs. Bayug
(112 SCRA 41) and Alita vs. Court of Appeals (170 SCRA 706), the homesteaders and their heirs have the right to
cultivate their homesteads personally, which is a superior right over that of tenant-farmers.
Petitioner moved for the cancellation and recall of the Emancipation Patents issued to private respondents-farmers
and to restore to petitioner and her children the ownership and cultivation of the subject lots plus payment of back
rentals from the time they stopped paying the same until ejected therefrom.
Respondents filed their answer dated May 29, 1991 and admitted the generation and issuance of Emancipation
Patents to private respondents as tenant-farmers thereof and the Supreme Court rulings on the Bayug and Alita cases
relative to homestead patents, but denied the rest of the material allegations for want of knowledge or information as
to the truth relative thereto. Respondents alleged that when the subject lands were covered under P.D. 27, the
petitioner was repeatedly informed and invited by the DAR Office at Valencia, Bukidnon to thresh out the matter;
that petitioners right to retain seven (7) hectares is not absolute since she owns other agricultural landholdings, thus
disqualifying her to retain the area, aside from the fact that she has other properties sufficient to support her family
as shown in the Certification of the Provincial Assessors Office listing down the petitioners landholdings (Annex
2). By way of special affirmative defenses, respondents averred that the criteria set forth under P.D. 27 were
observed before the generation of the Emancipation Patents; that under Executive Order No. 228, the tenant-farmers
under P.D. 27 are deemed full owners of the lands they till and the lease rentals paid by them should be considered
as amortization payments; that under LOI 474, petitioner who owns more than seven (7) hectares of lands are not
entitled to retention. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case. They likewise prayed that the Emancipation
Patents issued to private respondents and their peaceful possession of their farm lots be respected.
The Adjudicator a quo conducted a hearing and afforded the parties their day in court and the opportunity to
present their evidence. On August 13, 1991, the Adjudicator a quo issued an Order for the parties to submit their
respective position papers with evidence to buttress their allegations. On March 10, 1992, the Adjudicator a
quo rendered the decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Adjudicator declares the following:
1. That all the Emancipation Patents issued to tenants-respondents shall be cancelled and recalled;
2. That the Register of Deeds of Malaybalay, Bukidnon shall cancel all Emancipation Patents registered
under the names of the herein tenants-respondents; and
3. That back rentals due to the petitioners, which were given to the LBP as amortizations, shall be given
to the said petitioner.
[4]

On appeal, the DARAB reversed the adjudicator.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA rejected the claim of petitioner. It ruled that she could not retain her homesteads, since she was not the
actual cultivator thereof. It also held that she and her heirs had not been deprived of their right to retain the area
mandated by law, because the records showed that they had other agricultural landholdings. Finally, it ruled that
she had not been deprived of her properties without just compensation, since Section 2 of Executive Order 228
declared that tenant-farmers of agricultural lands under P.D. 27 are deemed owners of the land they till and the lease
rentals paid by them shall be considered as amortization payments.
[5]

Hence, this Petition.
[6]

The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
I. Whether or not the original homesteads issued under the public land act [are] exempted from the operation of
land reform.
II. Granting arguendo that homesteads are not exempt, whether or not the Emancipation Patents issued to
the respondents are valid notwithstanding lack of payment of just compensation.
III. On the assumption that homesteads are exempt from land reform and/or the emancipation patents are
illegally issued hence, void, can the respondents be ejected from the premises in question?
[7]

The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious. Respondents are entitled to the lands they till, subject to the determination
and payment of just compensation to petitioner.
First Issue: Petitioners Homesteads Not Exempt from Land Reform
Petitioner contends that because the subject properties are covered by homestead patents, they are exempt from
the operation of land reform. In support of her position, she cites the cases Alita v. CA
[8]
and Patricio v. Bayug,
[9]
in
which the Court ruled that homesteaders had a superior right to cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants.
Petitioners contention is without legal basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation
Patents sought to be cancelled here were issued to respondents, applies to all tenanted private agricultural lands
primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate
or not.
[10]
The law makes no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear that lots
obtained by homestead patents are exempt from its operation.
The matter is made even clearer by Department Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1978, which states:
Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn which have been acquired under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, shall also be covered by Operation Land
Transfer. Unquestionably, petitioners parcels of land, though obtained by homestead patents under
Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by land reform under PD 27.
Petitioners claimed entitlement to retain seven (7) hectares is also untenable. PD 27, which provides the
retention limit, states:
In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating
such area or will now cultivate it.
Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the
landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law.
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the
subject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any part
thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to retain any portion of her landholdings.
Even under the current primary law on agrarian reform, Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, to which the application
of PD 27 is suppletory, petitioners lands are subject to land reform. The said Act lays down the rights of homestead
grantees as follows:
SEC. 6. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a
viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by PD 27 shall be allowed to keep
the area originally retained by them thereunder; Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same
areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. (italics supplied)
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the original homesteads,
only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will
not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by the
original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage.
In the present case, as previously pointed out, neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating the
subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found that respondents were the ones who had been cultivating their
respective portions of the disputed properties.
However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires no
qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled to retain such area. This ruling is in line with Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, from which we quote:
x x x. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under PD No.
27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in fact are
on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
Petitioners heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of three (3) hectares each, since they are not actually
tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm.
Patricio v. Bayug and Alita v. CA
Not Applicable
Petitioner insists that the appellate court ignored the ruling of the Court in Patricio v. Bayug
[11]
and Alita v.
CA.
[12]
She relies on the following pronouncement in Patricio: We hold that the more paramount and superior
policy consideration is to uphold the right of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land
acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations.
[13]
She also cites the statement in Alita that
the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question finds
support in the aforecited Section 6 of RA 6657.
[14]
A closer look at these cases shows that they are not applicable to
the issues in the present case.
In Patricio, the owner and his heirs had previously cultivated the homestead, which was later sold but
subsequently reconveyed to the former. After the reconveyance, the owners heirs wanted to resume their
cultivation of the homestead, but the previous buyers tenants did not want to leave it. In Alita, the owner was also
desirous of personally cultivating the homestead; but the tenants, not wanting to relinquish it, were asserting their
own right to continue cultivating it. Thus, under these circumstances, the Court upheld the right of the homestead
owners over that of the tenants.
In the case at bar, petitioner herself has not personally cultivated the parcels of land. Neither has she or her
heirs expressed, at any time, any desire to cultivate them personally. She is invoking, yet is clearly not intending to
ever actually exercise, her alleged right as homesteader to own and personally cultivate them.
Thus, the rulings in both Patricio and Alita, which are in line with the state objective of fostering owner
cultivatorship
[15]
and of abolishing tenancy,
[16]
would be inapplicable to the present case. Since petitioner and her
heirs have evinced no intention of actually cultivating the lands or even directly managing the farm, they will
undoubtedly continue to be absentee landlords. Therefore, to blindly and indiscriminately apply the ruling in the
cited cases would be tantamount to encouraging feudalistic practices and going against the very essence of agrarian
reform. This we cannot sanction.
Second Issue: Just Compensation
It is undisputed that the subject parcels were covered by Operation Land Transfer under PD 27, and that private
respondents were identified as beneficiaries. In fact, Emancipation Patents have already been issued to them.
Petitioner, however, claims that she was not paid just compensation and, thus, prays for the cancellation of the
Emancipation Patents issued to respondents under PD 27. She contends that it is illegal for the DAR to take
property without full payment of just compensation[;] until full payment is done the title and ownership remain with
the landholder.
[17]

Petitioners contention has merit. Section 2 of PD 266 states:
After the tenant-farmer shall have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under Presidential
Decree No. 27, an Emancipation Patent and/or Grant shall be issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform on the
basis of a duly approved survey plan.
On the other hand, paragraphs 8 and 9 of PD 27 reads as follows:
For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree,
the value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one-half (2 ) times the average harvest of three normal crop
years immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;
The total cost of the land, including interest at the rate of six (6) per centum per annum, shall be paid by the tenant
in fifteen (15) years of fifteen (15) equal annual amortizations[.]
Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, they are still required
to pay the cost of the land, including interest, within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them. Thus, the
Court held in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform:
[18]

It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmers as of October 21, 1972 and declared that
he shall be deemed the owner of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the land
owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers cooperative. It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had
to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents complied with the requirement of full payment of the
cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves admitted,
[19]
their value had not even been determined yet. In the
absence of such determination, the Court cannot rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.
Presidential Decree 27 and subsequently Executive Order (EO) 228, which recognized the rights acquired by
tenant-farmers under PD 27, provide in detail the computation to be used in arriving at the exact total cost of the
parcels of land. Evidently, therefore, the law recognizes that their exact value, or the just compensation to be given
to the landowner, cannot just be assumed; it must be determined with certainty before the land titles are transferred.
Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for the lands from October 21, 1972 shall be
considered as advance payment, it does not sanction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered as
equivalent to just compensation for the land. The provision significantly designates the lease rentals as advance, not
full, payment. The determination of the exact value of the lands cannot simply be brushed aside, as it is
fundamental to the determination of whether full payment has been made.
Necessarily, the lease rentals admittedly paid by respondents until December 1988 cannot, at this point, be
considered as full settlement of the value of the lands or as just compensation for them. The value of the subject
lands was never determined; thus, there is no amount that can be used as basis for applying the lease rentals.
Under the circumstances, actual title to the subject lands remains with petitioner. Clearly then, under PD 27
and EO 228, the application of the process of agrarian reform to the subject lands is still incomplete.
Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of the application of the agrarian reform process to
the subject lands, the same should now be completed under the said law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only
suppletory effect. This ruling finds support in Land Bank of the Philippines v. CA,
[20]
wherein the Court stated:
We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA 6657 should not apply to rice and corn lands under PD 27. Section 75 of RA
6657 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act
also provides ---
Sec. 7. Priorities. The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the acquisition and
distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of (10) years from the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be
acquired and distributed as follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private lands voluntarily offered by
the owners for agrarian reform; x x x and all other lands owned by the government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture, which shall be acquired and distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the
implementation to be completed within a period of not more than four (4) years emphasis supplied).
This eloquently demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the properties which the DAR shall acquire
and distribute to the landless. And to facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the
Act should be adhered to. In Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform this Court applied the provisions (of) RA 6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of
the payment of just compensation for PD 27 lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18.
In determining the amount to be paid petitioner, all lease rentals paid by respondents to her after October 21,
1972 should be deducted therefrom. This formula is intended to put into effect the provision of Section 2 of EO
228.
Third Issue: Tenants Cannot Be Ejected
Petitioner submits that aside from cancelling the Emancipation Patents issued to respondents, the ejectment of
the latter from the premises should be ordered by the Court, in accordance with the doctrine in Patricio.
Petitioners position is unfounded. As earlier explained, Patricio finds no application to the case at bar. Thus,
there is no justification for ejecting respondents. Besides, Section 22 of RA 6657 expressly states that actual
tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or removed therefrom. Furthermore, there is no reason for
ejecting the tillers with respect to the area of five hectares, which petitioner may choose to retain. Section 6 of RA
6657 further states:
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the
landowner; Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the land owner is tenanted, the tenant
shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered
a lease holder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a
beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the
landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner
manifests his choice of the area for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farm workers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall
be respected.
The current provision on retention removes the necessity, present under PD 27, of ejecting actual tillers. Under
the current law, landowners who do not personally cultivate their lands are no longer required to do so in order to
qualify for the retention of an area not exceeding five hectares. Instead, they are now required to maintain the
actual tiller of the area retained, should the latter choose to remain therein.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby SET ASIDE. The Decision of the provincial agrarian reform adjudicator is REINSTATEDwith the
modification that the lease rentals, which respondents have already paid to petitioner after October 21, 1972, are to
be considered part of the purchase price for the subject parcels of land.
SO ORDERED.
[6]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on November 17, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the Office of
Solicitor Generals Memorandum/Comment signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Roman G. Del
Rosario and Sol. Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty. Francisco
H. Albarracin Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform Legal Services Division, was received on February 7, 2000.












SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130196. February 26, 2001]
LUCIA MAPA VDA. DE DELA CRUZ, LEODIVINA DELA CRUZ, WILMA DELA CRUZ, DARLITO
DELA CRUZ, JUANITA DELA CRUZ, RICARDO DELA CRUZ, ARSENIO DELA CRUZ, JUAN
DELA CRUZ, and PACITA DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. ADJUTO ABILLE, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J .:
Before us is an appeal of the Decision
[1]
dated December 5, 1996 of the Court of Appeals
[2]
dismissing
petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) denying their
petition for issuance of an emancipation patent.
The facts are as follows:
Herminio Abille, now deceased, had a total landholding of 13.0561 hectares, located in Infanta, Pangasinan,
comprising of 9.2903 hectares of riceland; 2.0000 hectares of cogonland; 1.7658 hectares of coconut land and .4660
hectare of residential land.
[3]

Since 1968, Balbino dela Cruz was an agricultural tenant in the riceland tilling an area of 2.84 hectares.
[4]
He
died on June 14, 1981. After his death, Balbino dela Cruz was, nevertheless, issued a Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) No. 0-064711
[5]
dated October 25, 1981 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27.
[6]
The certificate
was entered in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. Tax Declaration No. 3 in the name of
Herminio Abille was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 1134 was issued in the name of Balbino dela Cruz.
[7]

On April 3, 1987, Herminio Abille filed a petition for exemption under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of his
landholdings alleging, among others, that he was not notified of the coverage of his land under OLT; that he learned
of its coverage only on March 25, 1987; that prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711,
DAR did not notify him or his representative; that he has been deprived of his constitutional right to due process.
[8]

On April 19, 1989, Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Region I,
San Fernando, La Union, issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by DAR Memorandum Circular No. 5-87, order is hereby
issued:
1. Denying the petition for exemption, instead the right of retention of not more than seven (7)
hectares is hereby granted;
2. Directing the petitioner to immediately select the retention area;
3. Canceling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued to the tenants on the retained area;
4. Directing the MARO of Infanta, Pangasinan to prepare Agricultural Leasehold Contracts between
the petitioner and the tenants; and
5. Directing the MARO to implement this Order.
SO ORDERED.
[9]

On July 24, 1989,
[10]
Herminio Abille selected the seven-hectare retention area, which included the area
covered by CLT No. 0-064711 issued to Balbino dela Cruz; hence, said CLT was automatically cancelled.
[11]
After
the finality and implementation of the said Order dated April 19, 1989, Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Eugenio
B. Bernardo wrote a letter to the Municipal Assessor of Infanta, Pangasinan requesting for the cancellation of Tax
Declaration No. 1134 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz and the re-issuance of Tax Declaration No. 3 in favor of
Herminio Abille.
[12]
On March 4, 1991, the Provincial Assessor of Pangasinan issued a Notice of Cancellation of
Assessment, cancelling Tax Declaration No. 1134 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz for the reason that subject
property was decided by the DAR to be retained to Herminio Abille as per supporting documents attached.
[13]

On June 29, 1992, petitioners, who are the compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz, filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the issuance of emancipation patent. The petition was referred to the
Regional Director, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, for appropriate action.
[14]

In his Comment,
[15]
respondent Adjuto M. Abille, representing Herminio Abille, prayed for the dismissal of
the petition for the issuance of emancipation patent on the ground that DAR Order dated April 19, 1989, ordering
the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer of the retained area, had become final and had been implemented
by the Provincial Agrarian Officer of Pangasinan; hence, the petition had become moot and academic.
On October 21, 1992, Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Region I,
San Fernando, La Union, issued an Order denying the petition for the issuance of an emancipation patent as CLT
No. 0-064711 issued in favor of Balbino dela Cruz had already been cancelled by virtue of the Order dated April 19,
1989, which was supported by substantial evidence, and that said Order had long become final. The dispositive
portion of the Order dated October 21, 1992 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by virtue of the authority vested in me by DAR Memo No. 5, Series of 1987,
and other implementing Rules and Regulations, an Order is hereby issued:
1. Denying the instant Petition for the issuance of an Emancipation Patent (EP) filed by the Petitioners;
2. Affirming in toto the Order dated 19 April 1989, issued by then Director Nuesa;
3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Pangasinan or his duly authorized
representative to execute/implement this Order and Deputizing the Chief of PNP-Infanta to provide
the necessary police assistance to the DAR Official concerned in the implementation of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
[16]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that another Order be issued declaring as null and void
the Order dated April 19, 1989, which was issued allegedly without giving them a day in court, hence, there was
absence of due process of law, considering that Balbino dela Cruz was already deemed owner of the subject property
as of October 21, 1972. They sought the reinstatement of CLT No. 0-064711 and the issuance of an emancipation
patent in their favor as compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz.
The said motion for reconsideration was treated as an appeal and elevated to the Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform who rendered a Decision on June 20, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Order is hereby issued dismissing the instant motion for lack of merit and the
Order dated October 21, 1992 is hereby affirmed. The Regional Director is hereby ordered to prepare Certificates of
Agricultural Leasehold (CALs) to the tenants in the retained area as lessees thereat.
SO ORDERED.
[17]

In affirming the Order dated October 21, 1992, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform declared that:
After a careful re-evaluation of the records of the instant case this Office finds merit in the questioned Orders dated
April 19, 1989 and October 21, 1992. When a CLT is issued in favor of a farmer-beneficiary the said beneficiary
became the owner of only an inchoate right over the subject landholding thus, can still be cancelled administratively
for justifiable reason. As stated in the Order dated April 19, 1989, the previous owner Hermino Abille owned an
area of 13.0561 hectares, more or less of landholding and of which a portion of 9.2903 hectares is a riceland, an area
of 2.0000 hectares is cogonal, 1.7658 hectare is a coconut land and .4660 hectare is a residential land. Of his
riceland as provided for by PD No. 27, the said owner is granted the right to retain an area of not exceeding seven
(7) hectares and the right to select and segregate the said area. The aforesaid CLT had already been cancelled since
the area covered by it was among those retained area selected by the landowner as evidenced by a letter dated
October 17, 1989 of PARO Eugenio B. Bernardo and the Notice of Cancellation of Assessment dated March 4, 1991
issued by the provincial Assessor. The landowner of the retained area has the right to choose the area which he
wants to retain from his landholding. Section 6 of R.A. 6657 provides that the right to choose the area to be
retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner.
[18]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said Decision of the Secretary of DAR having been denied, they
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition for
review in a Decision promulgated on December 5, 1996.
[19]
Their motion for reconsideration was denied by the
appellate court in a Resolution dated August 6, 1997.
[20]

Hence, this petition seeking a review of the Decision dated December 5, 1996 of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners argued that it was incorrect for the Court of Appeals to hold that they were accorded due process
when the validity of the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 was resolved in the Order dated
April 19, 1989; and that their petition for issuance of an emancipation patent is a different proceeding from the
petition filed by Herminio Abille wherein Regional Director Antonio Nuesa ordered the cancellation of their
predecessors (Balbino dela Cruz) Certificate of Land Transfer; that in the said petition filed by Herminio Abille,
they were not notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Petitioners maintained that they were denied due
process so that the Order dated April 19, 1989 of Regional Director Nuesa cancelling the Certificate of Land
Transfer No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz is null and void, and cannot be used to deny their petition
for the issuance of an emancipation patent.
Citing P.D. No. 27, Locsin, et al. v. Valenzuela,
[21]
and Quiban v. Butalid,
[22]
petitioners also assert that they
became the owners of the lands they till as of the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972; that they
have religiously paid the annual rent of the property to the late Herminio Abille, that is, continuously after October
21, 1972 until 1991 or for nineteen (19) years; that by virtue of P.D. No. 27 in relation to the second
paragraph,
[23]
section 2 of Executive Order No. 228, the price of said property had been fully paid thereby entitling
them to the issuance of an emancipation patent.
The petition is devoid of merit.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that although the petitioners were not given the opportunity to be heard
when Regional Director Antonio Nuesa in his Order dated April 19, 1989 ordered the cancellation of Certificate of
Land Transfer No. 0-064711 on the retained area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an emancipation
patent, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they raised in issue the validity of the cancellation of
the said CLT, which was resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated October 21,
1992,
[24]
and also in their (petitioners) motion for reconsideration,
[25]
which was treated as an appeal by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994.
[26]
The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (emphasis supplied).
[27]
Further, the petition filed by
landowner Herminio Abille, which was for exemption of his property from the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer, cognizable by Region I Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance,
[28]
did not
require notice to petitioners. The subsequent Order dated April 19, 1989 of Regional Director Nuesa denying the
petition for exemption and instead granting to Herminio Abille the right of retention of not more than seven (7)
hectares, and to select the retention area, and cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued to the tenants on the
retained area, including CLT No. 0-064711, directing the MARO of Infanta, Pangasinan to prepare
Agricultural Leasehold Contracts between the petitioner and the tenants, and directing the PARO to implement said
Order, became final even before Herminio Abille selected on July 24, 1989
[29]
the 7 hectares retained area which
includes the 2.84 hectares covered by Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela
Cruz. Nevertheless, petitioners were able to question the validity of said Order (cancelling CLT No. 0-064711) in
their petition for issuance of emancipation patent, which was resolved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his
Decision dated June 20, 1994. Hence, petitioners were given an opportunity to be heard.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 was validly
cancelled. Said certificate was issued to petitioners predecessor, Balbino dela Cruz, before landowner Herminio
Abille was informed of such issuance and that his landholding was subject to Operation Land
Transfer. Subsequently, Herminio Abille, who was found to own riceland with an area of 9.2903 hectares, was
granted the right to retain an area not exceeding seven (7) hectares, and the right to select and segregate such area
under P.D. No. 27.
[30]
Thus the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that:
The landowner Herminio Abille having selected as part of his seven-hectare retention the area tilled by
Balbino de la Cruz, covered by a certificate of land transfer in his name, the CLT was correctly cancelled.
To hold otherwise would be to deprive the owner Herminio Abille of his right of retention and to select the
portion he wanted to retain.
The portion tilled by Balbino de la Cruz having been chosen by the owner Herminio Abille as part of his
seven-hectare retention, petitioners as heirs of Balbino de la Cruz are not entitled to an emancipation patent
over the same. Balbino de la Cruz was entitled to an agricultural leasehold contract to the area tilled by him
and this is what petitioners inherited.
[31]

In the case of Daez v. Court of Appeals, where the Certificates of Land Transfer of farmer beneficiaries over
some four (4) hectares of riceland were issued without the landowner having been accorded her right to choose what
to retain among her landholdings, we held that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued on the basis of Certificates of
Land Transfer issued to the farmer-beneficiaries cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of the deceased
landowner to retain the said riceland.
[32]
Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby.
[33]
Administrative Order No. 2, series of
1994
[34]
provides:
Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be
corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. This includes cases of lands which are
found to be exempted/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of the landowners
retained area. (Emphasis supplied.)
The earlier cases of Locsin, et al. v. Valenzuela, et al. and Quiban v. Butalid, which were cited by the
petitioners, did not involve any issue of retention rights of the landowner, and hence, the said cases are not
applicable to the case at bar.
Where there is no showing, as in the case at bar, that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality,
imposition or mistake on the part of a department head, in rendering his questioned decisions or of a total lack of
substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative decisions are entitled to great weight and respect and
will not be interfered with.
[35]

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The assailed Decision dated December 5, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals, in CA G.R. SP No. 37338, upholding the judgment of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform denying the
issuance of an emancipation patent to petitioners, is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
[6]
Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenant from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the
Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism Therefor, signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on October 21, 1972.
[23]
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer beneficiary after October 21, 1972, shall be considered as
advance payment for the land.
[27]
Sunset View Condominium Corp. v. NLRC, 228 SCRA 466, 472 (1993), citing Bautista v. Secretary of Labor
and Employment , 196 SCRA 470 (1991).
[28]
By virtue of DAR Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1987, authorizing regional offices to hear/investigate
and resolve cases involving land covered by the comprehensive agrarian reform program including those arising
from the implementation of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27 and amendatory and related decrees, letters
of instruction, rules and regulations, as well as conflicts of claims in landed estates and resettlement areas and such
other lands as have been placed under the administration and disposition of this Department.
[34]
Rules Governing the Correction and Cancellation of Registered/Unregistered Emancipation Patents (EPs), and
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) Due to Unlawful Acts and Omissions or Breach of Obligations of
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs) and for other Causes, issued on March 7, 1994.






Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 122256 October 30, 1996
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL CORPORATION, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:p
Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del
Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657).
Private respondent's certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to
farmer-beneficiaries.
The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at P19,312.24 per hectare for the riceland and
P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears, however, that in the
Statement of Agricultural Landholdings ("LISTASAKA") which private respondent had earlier filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower "Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner" was stated and
that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the Philippines valued private respondent's lands
uniformly at P15,311.79 per hectare and fixed the amount of P390,557.84 as the total compensation to be
paid for the lands.
Private respondent rejected the government's offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same
crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained the initial valuation
made by the LBP.
On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional Trial
Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent prayed that
DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground
that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), pursuant to the latter's Revised Rules of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be
had. In addition the RTC found that, in violation of the DARAB's rules of procedure the petition had been
filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the PARAD.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied on October 13, 1994. Private
respondent therefore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for
just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 56-57 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals which, in its decision
1
of October 4, 1995, set
aside the order of dismissal of the RTC. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings.
In turn the government, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform, filed this petition for review
on certiorari, raising as the issue whether in cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No.
6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a
landowner can resort to the RTC under 57. Petitioners sustain the affirmative proposition. They cite 50
of R.A. No. 6657 which in pertinent part provides:
50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). . .
and argue that the fixing of just compensation for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a
"[matter] involving the implementation of agrarian reform" within the contemplation of this
provision. They invoke 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657, which provides that "any party who disagrees to
the decision [of the DAR] may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation," as confirming their construction of 50.
The contention has no merit.
It is true that 50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform
matters" and exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform," except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is also true, however that 57 provides:
57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of
Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified
by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No.
6657]."
2
The provision of 50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering
cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A.
No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a
reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted
jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
criminal cases. Thus inEPZA v. Duly
3
and Sumulong v. Guerrero
4
we held that the valuation of
property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies, while in Scoty's Department Store v. Micaller
5
we struck down a law
granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the
Industrial Peace Act.
Petitioners also cite Rule II, 5 and Rule XIII, 1 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure in support of their
contention that decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators may only be appealed to the DARAB. These
rules provide:
Rule II, 5. Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
to review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions, and other
dispositions of its [regional and provincial agrarian reform adjudicators].
Rule XIII, 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order or
decision of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or
both, by giving or stating a written or oral appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of the resolution, order or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof
on the opposite or adverse party, if the appeal is in writing.
b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the
appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the opposite or adverse party within
ten (10) days from the taking of oral appeal.
Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies
rules of procedure cannot it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was
adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an
agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as
Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, 11 of the new rules provides:
11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation.
The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and
payment of just compensationshall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought
directly to the Regional Trial Courtsdesignated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion
for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for the
taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vested in the courts.
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their
taking.
6
Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an
offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held
7
and
afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case
may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does
not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court.
8
This
in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In
accordance with it, the private respondent's case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error
for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of 57, the RTC, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners."
9
It would subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for
the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC
an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the
RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to 57 and
therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary
manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power
to decide this question.
WHEREFORE the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 93100 June 19, 1997
ATLAS FERTILIZER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 97855 June 19, 1997
PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF FISHFARM PRODUCERS, INC. petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

ROMERO, J .:
Before this Court are consolidated petitions questioning the constitutionality of some portions of Republic
Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
1

Petitioners Atlas Fertilizer Corporation,
2
Philippine Federation of Fishfarm Producers, Inc. and petitioner-
in-intervention Archie's Fishpond, Inc. and Arsenio Al. Acuna
3
are engaged in the aquaculture industry
utilizing fishponds and prawn farms. They assail Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657, as
well as the implementing guidelines and procedures contained in Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10
Series of 1988 issued by public respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform as
unconstitutional.
Petitioners claim that the questioned provisions of CARL violate the Constitution in the following manner:
1. Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of CARL extend agrarian reform to
aquaculture lands even as Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution limits agrarian reform
only to agricultural lands.
2. The questioned provisions similarly treat of aquaculture lands and agriculture lands
when they are differently situated, and differently treat aquaculture lands and other
industrial lands, when they are similarly situated in violation of the constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.
3. The questioned provisions distort employment benefits and burdens in favor of
aquaculture employees and against other industrial workers even as Section 1 and 3,
Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State to promote equality in economic and
employment opportunities.
4. The questioned provisions deprive petitioner of its government-induced investments in
aquaculture even as Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Constitution mandate the State
to respect the freedom of enterprise and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.
The constitutionality of the above-mentioned provisions has been ruled upon in the case of Luz Farms,
Inc. v.Secretary of Agrarian Reform
4
regarding the inclusion of land devoted to the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage.
The issue now before this Court is the constitutionality of the same above-mentioned provisions insofar
as they include in its coverage lands devoted to the aquaculture industry, particularly fishponds and
prawn farms.
In their first argument , petitioners contend that in the case of Luz Farms, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,
5
this Court has already ruled impliedly that lands devoted to fishing are not agricultural lands. In
aquaculture, fishponds and prawn farms, the use of land is only incidental to and not the principal factor in
productivity and, hence, as held in "Luz Farms," they too should be excluded from R.A. 6657 just as lands
devoted to livestock, swine, and poultry have been excluded for the same reason. They also argue that
they are entitled to the full benefit of "Luz Farms" to the effect that only five percent of the total investment
in aquaculture activities, fishponds, and prawn farms, is in the form of land, and therefore, cannot be
classified as agricultural activity. Further, that in fishponds and prawn farms, there are no farmers, nor
farm workers, who till lands, and no agrarian unrest, and therefore, the constitutionally intended
beneficiaries under Section 4, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution do not exist in aquaculture.
In their second argument, they contend that R.A. 6657, by including in its coverage, the raising of fish and
aquaculture operations including fishponds and prawn ponds, treating them as in the same class or
classification as agriculture or farming violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and is,
therefore, void. Further, the Constitutional Commission debates show that the intent of the constitutional
framers is to exclude "industrial" lands, to which category lands devoted to aquaculture, fishponds, and
fish farms belong.
Petitioners also claim that Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 issued by the Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform are, likewise, unconstitutional, as held in "Luz Farms," and are therefore void as they
implement the assailed provisions of CARL.
The provisions of CARL being assailed as unconstitutional are as follows:
(a) Section 3 (b) which includes the "raising of fish in the definition of "Agricultural,
Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." (Emphasis Supplied)
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as private agricultural lands devoted
to fishponds and prawn ponds. . . . (Emphasis Supplied)
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian reform the authority to
summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the
comprehensive Agrarian reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in section 13
. . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands
are distributed within sixty (60) days at the end of the fiscal year as compensation to
regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they
currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in
excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper application,
determines a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten percent (10%)
of the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within
ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year. . . .
While the Court will not hesitate to declare a law or an act void when confronted squarely with
constitutional issues, neither will it preempt the Legislative and the Executive branches of the government
in correcting or clarifying, by means of amendment, said law or act. On February 20, 1995, Republic Act
No. 7881
6
was approved by Congress. Provisions of said Act pertinent to the assailed provisions of
CARL are the following:
Sec. 1. Section 3, Paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 3. Definitions. For the purpose of this Act, unless the context
indicates otherwise:
(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including
the harvesting of such farm products and other farm activities and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
Sec. 2. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6657 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions.
xxx xxx xxx
b) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms
and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act: Provided,
That said prawn farms and fishponds have not been distributed and
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to agrarian reform
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have been subjected to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, by voluntary offer to sell, or
commercial farms deferment or notices of compulsory acquisition, a
simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants
must consent to the exemption within one (1) year from the effectivity of
this Act. when the workers or tenants do not agree to this exemption, the
fishponds or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the worker
beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to
manage the same.
In cases where the fishponds or prawn farms have not been subjected to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the consent of the farm
workers shall no longer be necessary, however, the provision of Section
32-A hereof on incentives shall apply.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Section 11, Paragraph 1 is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 11. Commercial Farming. Commercial farms, which are private
agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable
and cut-flower farms and cacao, coffee and rubber plantations, shall be
subject to immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten
(10) years from the effectivity of this Act. In the case of new farms, the
ten-year period shall begin from the first year of commercial production
and operation, as determined by the DAR. During the ten-year period,
the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these lands,
upon payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements
thereon, preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations,
which shall thereafter manage the said lands for the workers
beneficiaries.
Sec. 4. There shall be incorporated after Section 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 a section to
read as follows
Sec. 32-A. Incentives. Individuals or entities owning or operating
fishponds and prawn farms are hereby mandated to execute within six
(6) months from the effectivity of this Act, an incentive plan with their
regular fishpond or prawn farm workers' organization, if any, whereby
seven point five percent (7.5%) of their net profit before tax from the
operation of the fishpond or prawn farms are distributed within sixty (60)
days at the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
pond workers in such ponds over and above the compensation they
currently receive.
In order to safeguard the right of the regular fishpond or prawn farm
workers under the incentive plan, the books of the fishpond or prawn
owners shall be subject to periodic audit or inspection by certified public
accountants chosen by the workers.
The foregoing provision shall not apply to agricultural lands subsequently
converted to fishponds or prawn farms provided the size of the land
converted does not exceed the retention limit of the landowner.
The above-mentioned provisions of R.A. No. 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are
excluded from the coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the question concerning the
constitutionality of the assailed provisions has become moot and academic with the passage of R.A. No.
7881.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
6 An Act Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Entitled "An Act
Instituting A Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program To Promote Social Justice And
Industrialization, Providing The Mechanism For Its Implementation, And For Other
Purposes.








[G.R. No. 107741. October 18, 1996]
FRANCISCO BERNARTE, BENEDICTO DANAN, BIENVENIDO BELLEZA, ROBERTO MALLARI,
FELICIANO MALLARI, PESCASIO DIMARUCUT, REYNALDO TIMBANG, ALFREDO
SANTOS, FEDERICO SANTOS, LAMBERTO DANAN, JESUS CASTRO, VICTORIANO TALA,
MARIANO SANTOS, IGNACIO CASTRO DE LA CRUZ, WILFREDO TAPALLA, REYNALDO
OSBUAL, ANTONIO SANTOS, TEOFILO MUNOZ, MANUEL NAGUIAT, FELICISIMO
MACASPAC, ROMAN BERNAL, JR., FAUSTINO PANGAN, FRANCISCO MACASPAC,
CARLITO AGUILUZ, FIDEL CASTRO, SALVADOR TALA, ROMEO TALA, LUCIANO
MANLAPAZ, TOMAS PAULE, DANNY MANUEL, BENIGNO PORTALES, CONRADO
MALLARI, MARTA DANAN, REGINA TIMBANG, CONCHITA VISDA, AMELIA ALFARO,
VIOLETA ALFARO, CONCHITA MALIT, SEVERINA RIVERA, FLORENCIA PAULE, ROSITA
BERNAL, GLORIA MALLARI, LILIA SERRANO, NORMA CABUAN-BAUTISTA and ANITA
MANGANTI, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The Hon. CARLOS BARTOLO,
Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao, Pampanga, THE PROVINCIAL
WARDEN OF THE PROVINCE OF PAMPANGA, MAJOR JESUS MANINANG (PNP), SPO3
CARLOS GUINTO (PNP), SPO1 JESUS KABILING (PNP), SPO4 EDGARDO LALIC (PNP) &
SPO4 DOMINADOR LACANLALE (PNP) and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 50,
GUAGUA, PAMPANGA,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J .:
This is a petition for review of the decision
[1]
dated November 19, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 29284 dismissing for lack of merit the petition for habeas corpus of petitioners.
The records show that on October 5, 1989, Estrella Arastia, in her own behalf and as attorney-in-fact
of the heirs of Teodorica Reinares Arastia, Letecia Arastia-Montenegro and Juanita Arastia, filed a
complaint for violation of Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988) before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48 in its capacity as a
Special Agrarian Court.
Docketed as Agrarian Case No. 2000, the complaint
[2]
alleged that after the EDSA Revolution, herein
petitioners, who organized themselves into the Anibang Manggagawa sa Agricultura (A.M.A.), illegally
intruded into the land located at Lubao, Pampanga (with an aggregate area of around 210 hectares) of
the plaintiffs, burned the existing sugarcane plants and started to cultivate small portions thereof. As a
result, the land was abandoned by Rustico Coronal, the civil lessee, and taken over by plaintiff-
owners. Alleging further that there had been definite findings and rulings by the Department of Agrarian
Reform that no tenancy relationship existed between the parties, petitioners herein continued to forcibly
enter, intrude into and molest the possession of the plaintiffs over the land in question in violation of
Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657. The complaint prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin petitioners from entering into the land and intruding in the possession thereof
and, after hearing, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which should be made permanent after
a full-blown trial.
In their answer,
[3]
petitioners averred that they had been in continuous and peaceful possession of
their respective tillages since 1950 when the late Teodorica Arastia was still the administratix of the
landholding in question. They moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the trial court
had no jurisdiction as it was the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, that had
jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, petitioners asserted that due to the malicious and evil intentions of
plaintiffs in harassing and ejecting them from the land, they suffered actual, as well as moral damages, for
their failure to harvest their standing crops.
Inasmuch as the complaint was very specific as regards petitioners commission of acts prohibited by
Section 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 and pursuant to Section 57 thereof,
[4]
the lower court denied the
motion to dismiss on November 2, 1989. It issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering petitioners
and/or any other person acting in their command and/or their behalf to desist and refrain from occupying
their respective portions they are allegedly cultivating pending the termination of this litigation, and/or
unless a contrary order is issued by this Court.
[5]

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration praying that the writ of preliminary injunction be set aside and
that the case be dismissed for lack of merit was denied by the lower court on April 25, 1990. It reiterated
the writ of preliminary injunction in the Order of July 31, 1991 which deputized members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) based in Lubao and Guagua, Pampanga, to enforce the said writ. On April 23,
1992, the complaint was amended to reflect the names of the John Does originally impleaded therein
and who had been identified.
Subsequently, on July 17, 1991, petitioners filed before this court a petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 100663 and entitled Jesus Bernal, et al. v. Estrella Arastia, et al., assailing the jurisdiction of
the lower court over Agrarian Case No. 2000. On July 31, 1991, this Court dismissed the petition for
failure to comply with Circular No. 1-88, specifically No. 4 thereof, requiring a verified statement of the
date when notice of the judgment, order or resolution subject of the petition was received, when a motion
for reconsideration was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.
[6]

Meanwhile, on November 29, 1989, petitioners filed before the DARAB a complaint
[7]
against Estrella
Arastia. Docketed as DARAB Case No. 161-P89, the complaint alleged that on September 25, 1989,
through the use and employ of armed men, Estrella Arastia forcibly evicted and drove them out of their
landholdings, harvested and appropriated their standing rice crops, destroyed their vegetable crops, took
their deep well and set fire on their houses. As a consequence thereof, they suffered damages in the
total amount of P3,300,000.00 for which Estrella Arastia should be held liable. They prayed for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order to enjoin defendant therein from preventing
their re-entry and re-occupation of the landholdings pending the resolution of the case.
Pursuant to Section 19 of Executive Order No. 229 and Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6657, the
case was referred to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of barangaysSan
Isidro, Santiago, San Rafael and Lourdes in Lubao, Pampanga for fact-finding and exploration of the
possibility of an amicable settlement. After conducting the necessary proceedings, the BARCs found that
petitioners had been in possession and cultivation of their respective farmholdings. This fact was
contained in the report dated May 23, 1988 of Mr. Vicente Jimenez, CARPO/Officer-in-Charge, Provincial
Office of Pampanga, to the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform which was transmitted to the
DARAB on September 18, 1989.
However, despite receipt of summons and the DARAB orders of June 5, 1990, September 19,
1990 and October 5, 1990, Estrella Arastia did not file an answer nor comply with said orders. DARAB
construed this as her waiver and affirmation of what had been submitted by petitioners, and that she had
no evidence to submit for its consideration.
On December 7, 1990, based on the findings of the BARCs, the DARAB issued an order
[8]
declaring
the 300-hectare land as within the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988;
maintaining petitioners possession and cultivation of their respective landholdings from where they
were forcibly ejected on September 29, 1989 and restraining the respondent or any other persons acting
in her behalf from entering, intruding, and disturbing the farming activities of the said petitioners in their
respective farmholdings; directing the MARO of Lubao, Pampanga and the DAR employees concerned
to process and take appropriate action on the petition for coverage under Republic Act 6657 of their
respective farmholdings in accordance with the rules and regulations of the DAR, and dismissing for lack
of merit the claims for damages.
[9]

The petitioners, having filed a bond in the amount of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00),
on September 29, 1992, the DARAB issued the writ of preliminary injunction
[10]
they had prayed
for. Consequently, with the assistance of two (2) police officers assigned by the Chief of Police of Lubao,
Sheriff Josesito B. Dollente served the writ on September 30, 1992, in the presence of some barangay
officials and the CAFGU-CVO in charge. Since Estrella Arastia was not in her provincial address, a
certain Primitivo Maninang received the writ for her.
On October 7, 1992, on the strength of the said writ of preliminary injunction in DARAB Case No.
161-89, petitioners resumed occupation and cultivation of the subject land. Such actions resulted in the
dispatch of several policemen to the area. They reminded petitioners of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued earlier in Agrarian Case No. 2000 and ordered them to leave the land in dispute. Upon their
refusal to leave, the policemen arrested them and subsequently charged them with resistance and/or
disobedience to the lawful order of persons in authority before the Municipal Trial Court of Lubao. On the
same day, however, they were released from police custody on the recognizance of Atty. Zenaida Ducut.
Insisting on their right to work on the land in accordance with the writ issued in DARAB Case No.
161-89, the following day, October 8, 1992, petitioners again entered the land. Without a warrant of
arrest, herein respondent police officers named Jesus Maninang, Carlos Guinto, Jesus Kabiling, Edgardo
Lalic and Dominador Lacanlale arrested petitioners for having entered the landholding and for resisting
and intimidating said police officers. Recovered from petitioners possession were seven (7) assorted
bolos used in cultivating the land.
[11]

Petitioners were detained at the municipal jail of Lubao, Pampanga on October 8, 1992. On even
date, they were charged with direct assault upon agents of a person in authority under Criminal Case No.
5999.
On October 14, 1992, the said municipal court ordered the transfer of petitioners to the provincial jail
in San Fernando, Pampanga on the ground that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court and the fact that petitioners, having refused to receive copy of the complaint and the affidavits of
the complainants, did not "intend to file counter-affidavit. On October 16, 1992, the municipal court also
ordered that the records of the case be forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San
Fernando, Pampanga for appropriate action. On October 21, 1992, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an
information for direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 3171 before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. Arraignment was set for
December 1, 1992 at 9:00 oclock in the morning.
After the filing of the information for direct assault or on October 23, 1992, petitioners filed before this
Court a petition for habeas corpus under G.R. No. 107399 questioning the legality of their arrest and
detention. On October 28, 1992, this Court issued the writ returnable to the Acting Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals. The return of the writ was filed on November 9, 1992. In due course, on November
19, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit in the herein questioned Decision
which held in part as follows:
The petitioners claim that they were exercising their rights when they were working and farming on the said land
pursuant to the preliminary injunction issued in DARAB Case No. 161-P89, and that the preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC being enforced by the respondent PNP Team is unlawful for said RTC, Br. 48, San Fernando,
Pampanga has no jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000, deserves scant consideration. As brought out by
respondents and verified from the records of the Supreme Court, the petitioners had filed therewith
a certiorari petition entitled Jesus Bernal, et al. v. Hon. Eli G.C. Natividad, et al. (G.R. No. 100663) questioning
the said Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction in Agrarian Case No.
2000. Said petition in G.R. No. 100663 was dismissed for non-compliance with Supreme Court Circular No. 1-
88. Entry of final judgment thereon was made by the Supreme Court on October 10, 1991.
As matter (sic) now stands, the said RTC, Branch 48, San Fernando, Pampanga, has not been declared as without
jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000 and therefore, the said writ of preliminary injunction it issued is in order.
In fine, since at the time the petitioners were arrested, the PNP team was enforcing a lawful order of the same RTC
and in seriously resisting the same the appellants intimidated the PNP team committing the alleged crime of Direct
Assault Upon An Agent of A Person In Authority, a warrant was not necessary for their arrest, as provided in Sec.
5(a), Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private person may without a warrant, arrest a
person;
(a) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
In the light of the foregoing, the issue regarding the validity of four warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners
need not be taken up.
Let it also be stated that there is no explicit rule requiring a judge, after an accused has been arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the regional trial court and later charged in a complaint or information
conformably with the provisions of Rule 112, Section 7 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure to still issue a
warrant of arrest or order of commitment for the said accused (Re: Petition forHabeas Corpus of Gloria Jopson
Asuncion [G.R. L-No. 84907, Minute Resolution, First Division, November 3, 1988]). As explained by the
Supreme Court, such rule is not provided since the accused is already under detention so that the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest or an order for his commitment would be an absolute superfluity, considering that the need of a
warant of arrest arises only when the accused is at large as under Rule 113, Section 1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure means the taking of a person in custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense, and that the obvious purpose of the warrant is for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused (Re: Petition of Habeas Corpus of Gloria Jopson Asuncion , supra).
Petitioners received a copy of said Decision on November 20, 1992, a Friday. On November 23,
1992, they filed in this Court a motion for an extension of two (2) days within which to file a petition for
review on certiorari. They followed the motion with another requesting an additional two (2) days within
which to file said petition. They eventually filed the instant petition on November 27, 1992.
On December 22 and 29, 1992 and January 21, 1993, thirty (30) of the forty-five (45) petitioners
posted bail in Criminal Case No. 5999 for direct assault.
[12]
As of may 18, 1993, only three (3) remained
detained at the provincial jail.
[13]
In their Memorandum which was received by the Court on May 17, 1995,
petitioners furnished the information that most if not all of the petitioners were already released on bail
and therefore cannot avail of the writ of habeas corpus for being moot and academic.
[14]
And yet,
invoking Soriano v. Heirs of Domingo Magali(sic),
[15]
Malabanan v. Hon. Ramento
[16]
and Salonga v.
Pano
[17]
where the Court considered the issues raised notwithstanding that certain events had
supervened to render the case moot and academic, petitioners insist that dismissal of the case on such
ground should not bar the resolution of this case on the merits.
The writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty , or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The function of the special proceeding
of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of ones detention.
[18]
In all petitions for habeas corpus, the
court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioners detention from the moment petitioner was
taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition and only after such
a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has been satisfied.
[19]

However, once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention
by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy then is the quashal of the
information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.
[20]
The reason for the issuance of the writ even
becomes more unavailing when the person detained files a bond for his temporary release. Thus,
in Velasco v. Court of Appeals,
[21]
the Court said:
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is
to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events,
such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of the Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of judicial process preventing the discharge of the
detained person. . . . . Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is
detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information
and, therefore, the writ ofhabeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows; Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in the
Philippines.
x x x x x x x x x.
It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the court and
voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero (41 SCRA 235, 240 [1971]), this Court
stated:
De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest in
question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the lower
court, thereby accepting thecourts jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the
information filed against him. (emphasis supplied)
The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same legal import and
effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by the
accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
The instant petition for habeas corpus has thus been rendered moot and academic by the filing
against petitioners of charges for direct assault on October 8, 1992 before the Municipal Trial Court of
Lubao which, on being forwarded to the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga upon the filing of an
information for direct assault on October 21, 1992 became Criminal Case No. 3171, even before the filing
of the petition for habeas corpus docketed as G.R. No. 107399. Their subsequent filing of bailbonds to
secure their provisional liberty sealed the mootness of the instant petition.
As stated above, under the circumstance, petitioners remedy would have been the quashal of the
information in case they have valid reason therefor. In any event, the Court shall consider the principal
issues raised in the instant petition for habeas corpus in the interest of justice and if only to clarify certain
procedural misconceptions which appear to confuse petitioners and their counsel.
[22]

Petitioners posits the view that resolution of the instant petition for habeas corpus is interrelated with
the issue as to which of the two writs of preliminary injunction affecting them should prevail. They
contend that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the DARAB, not that earlier issued by the
Regional Trial Court in Agrarian Case No. 2000, is the valid one because the regular court had no
jurisdiction over said agrarian case. Therefore, petitioners aver, the invalidity of the writ being enforced
by police authorities could only result in the invalidity of their arrest. They further assert that, even if their
petition in G.R. No. 100663 questioning the validity of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction in
Agrarian Case No. 2000 was dismissed, such dismissal on a formal technicality does not amount to
rendering as valid the otherwise void writ of preliminary injunction issued in said case.
[23]

The petition in G.R. No. 100663 was dismissed for noncompliance with Circular No. I-88. Contrary
to petitioners contention, however, such a dismissal through a minute resolution was one on the merits of
the petition. Thus, where a first petition for certiorari was dismissed for noncompliance with paragraph 4
of Circular No. I-88 and another petition, complying with said circular and basically reiterating the same
issues raised in the first petition was filed a year later, the Court dismissed the second petition and
severely censured counsel for petitioner for refiling the same petition. In a Resolution, the Court stated as
follows:
. . . (I)t is equally axiomatic that minute resolutions of this Court, denying due course to petitions, or dismissing
cases summarily -- for failure to comply with the formal or substantial requirements laid down therefor by the law --
are actually dispositions on the merits (SEE Smith Bell & Co. V. Court of Appeals, 197 Phil. 201 [1991] citing:
Policarpio v. PVB, 106 Phil. 125; Commercial Union v. Lepanto, 86 SCRA 79, Novino v. Court of Appeals, 83
SCRA 279), constituting res jusdicata.
[24]
(Underscoring supplied)
Hence, even though the Court did not explicitly resolve G.R. No. 100663 on the merits, its dismissal
on the ground of noncompliance with Circular No. I-88 had the effect of resolving the issues raised
therein. While it may be argued that said circular is merely a remedial measure which should not unduly
affect the substantive aspects of a case, its force and effect must at all times be upheld for, after all, it
was designed for the orderly administration of justice.
As regards the issue of jurisdiction over the dispute between them and the Arastias, petitioners
should be reminded that the allegation in a complaint are determinative factors of said issue. On this
matter, the Court declared:
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein a matter resolved only
after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made
by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely upon the defendant.
[25]

In her complaint in Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia alleged that she and the rest of the
plaintiffs therein were the registered owners of the parcels of land in question which herein petitioners
illegally intruded into, damaged and cultivated under the status of holding actual title over the properties;
that the definite findings and rulings of the DAR showed that no tenancy relationship existed between
the parties and that petitioners were definitely not qualified beneficiaries of the rights and benefits under
Republic Act No. 6657 as they were not in any way tenants and/or legitimate tillers of the subject land,
and that the acts of petitioners violated Section 73 (b) of said law.
Petitioners raising the issue of jurisdiction in their answer to the complaint did not automatically
divest the lower court of jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No. 2000. The court had to continue exercising
authority to hear the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had jurisdiction over the
case. In a plethora of cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once jurisdiction is vested, the
same is retained up to the end of the litigation.
[26]
After such hearing, if tenancy had in fact been shown to
be the real issue, then the court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
[27]

It should be pointed out, moreover, that in filing Agrarian Case No. 2000, Estrella Arastia was
merely ejecting petitioners from the land on the ground that no tenancy relationship existed between
them. However, her invocation of Sec. 73 (b) of Republic Act No. 6657 which considers as a prohibited
act forcible entry or illegal detainer by persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to avail
themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform Program, obviously led the court to docket
the case as Agrarian Case No. 2000 and assume jurisdiction over it as a special agrarian court.
[28]

Such actions were in consonance with Sections 56
[29]
and 57 of said law which at vest upon the
Regional Trial Court, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, with jurisdiction over two classes of agrarian-
related cases: (1) petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and (2)
prosecution of all criminal offenses under the same law. A criminal offender under Republic Act No.
6657 is, pursuant to Section 74 of the law, (a)ny person who knowingly and willfully violates the
provisions of this Act.
[30]
Thus, the lower court correctly assumed jurisdiction over Agrarian Case No.
2000.
It was within petitioners rights to question the issuance of the writ before this Court through G.R. No.
100663. However, in filing the petition, they failed to comply with Circular No. 1-88. The consequent
dismissal of the case for noncompliance with said circular deprived this Court with authority to look into
the validity of the writ once again. To repeat, such dismissal constituted res judicata on the issue of
validity of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Consequently, petitioners are treading on shaky ground in questioning the legality of their arrest in
this petition for habeas corpus for the reason that the police officers were enforcing a writ of preliminary
injunction illegally issued in Agrarian Case No. 2000 and, in the same breath, allege that they could use
force or legally resist and even intimidate another, be he a private individual or an agent of a person in
authority, who interferes with the legitimate exercise of (his) rights
[31]
as possessors and cultivators of the
Arastia property.
If indeed petitioners are tenants of the Arastias under the law,
[32]
they are not without other legal
recourse. Certainly, through their counsel, who appear to be zealous in protecting whatever rights
petitioners believe they may have, they should pursue DARAB Case No. 161-P89 and whatever actions
are available for them under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Although it is well-accepted that a court should always strive to settle the controversy in a single
proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation,
[33]
this rule cannot apply if the
result would negate the rational application of the Rules of Court. Petitioners may not engage in
procedural shortcuts to revive the settled issue of the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in
Agrarian Case No. 2000 allegedly on the ground of the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties in the instant petition for habeas corpusarising from their arrest for having assaulted persons in
authority.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. No cost.
[4]
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty
(30) days from submission of the case for decision.
[22]
In accordance with the Salonga v. Pao (supra at p. 464) holding that the Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules and the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
[28]
Section 73 states in full as follows:
SEC. 73. Prohibited Acts and Ommissions. The following are prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Act, of
agricultural lands in excess of the total retention limits or award ceilings by any person, natural or juridical,
except those under collective ownership by farmer-beneficiaries.
(b) The forcible entry or illegal detainer by persons who are not qualified beneficiaries under this Act to
avail themselves of the rights and benefits of the Agrarian Reform program.
(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-agricultural use with intent to
avoid the application of this Act to his landholdings and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled
by them.
(d) The willful prevention or obstruction by any person, association or entity of the implementation of the
CARP.
(e) The sale, transfer, conveyance or change of the nature of lands outside of urban centers and city
limits either in whole or in part after the effectivity of this Act. The date of the registration of the deed of
conveyance in the Register of Deeds with respect to titled lands and the date of the issuance of the tax
declarations to the transferee of the property with respect to unregistered lands, as the case may be, shall
be conclusive for the purpose of the Act.
(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other usufructuary right
over the land he acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in order to circumvent the provisions of this
Act.
[29]
SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special Agrarian Court.
The Supreme Court may designate more branches to constitute such additional Special Agrarian Courts
as may be necessary to cope with the number of agrarian cases in each province. In the designation, the
Supreme Court shall give preference to the Regional Trial Courts which have been assigned to handle
agrarian cases or whose presiding judges were former judges of the defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned to said courts shall exercise said special jurisdiction in
addition to the regular jurisdiction of their respective courts.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall have the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the
Regional Trial Courts.
[30]
SEC. 74. Penalties. Any person who knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of this Act shall
be punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not more than three (3) years or a fine of
not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) and not more than fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), or
both, at the discretion of the court.
If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefor shall be criminally liable.
[32]
In Isidro v. Court of Appeals (supra), the Court said: Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does not upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of
the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these
are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.










G.R. No. 120363 September 5, 1997
CECILLEVILLE REALTY and SERVICE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL, respondents.

FRANCISCO, J .:
In synthesis, these are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land in Catmon,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan. covered by T.C.T. No. 86.494 (M). Private respondent Herminigildo Pascual
occupies a portion thereof. Despite repeated demands, private respondent refused to vacate and
insisted that he is entitled to occupy the land since he is helping his mother Ana Pascual,
petitioner's tenant, to cultivate the land in question. Thenceforth, petitioner instituted an ejectment
suit against private respondent before the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Finding no
tenancy relationship between petitioner and private respondent, the Municipal Trial Court on
September 17, 1992, ordered private respondent to vacate the land and to pay "the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees" and "another sum of P500.00 monthly from the filing of [the]
complaint."
1
Private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court which, on April 4, 1994, set
aside the Municipal Trial Court's decision and remanded the case to the DARAB for further
adjudication. Thus:
There is no question that Ana Pascual may seek the assistance of her immediate
farm household in the cultivation of the land. The law protects her in this regard. If
the tenant Ana Pascual will be deprived of such right by ejecting her son
Herminigildo Pascual from the land, it is tantamount to circumventing the law as
Ana Pascual will be deprived of the helping hands of her son. What could not be
done directly cannot be done indirectly. The issue of tenancy relationship between
the plaintiff corporation and Ana Pascual cannot be avoided in this ejectment case.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders that the
instant case be REMANDED to the DARAB for further adjudication and the
decision of the Court a quo is hereby SET ASIDE . . .
2

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but to no avail; hence, it appealed to respondent
Court of Appeals. In its assailed decision
3
, respondent court
4
dismissed petitioner's
appeal. The entire ruling of respondent court in point states:
We find this petition devoid of merit.
There is a clear tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, such
that the defendant cannot be ejected from the premises like a common squatter.
The tenancy relationship dated back to 1976 when the defendant's father, Sotero
Pascual, became the tenant of Jose A. Resurreccion, the President of the
Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation. This tenancy continued until 1991
when Sotero Pascual died and was succeeded by his wife Ann Pascual by
operation of law. That Ana Pascual is entitled to the security of tenure was upheld
by the DARAB in its Decision of November 8, 1993 which ordered the plaintiff to
respect and maintain the peaceful possession and cultivation of the property by
the defendant Ana Pascual and ordered the execution of a agricultural leasehold
contract between the parties.
The defendant Herminigildo Pascual is occupying and working on the land holding
to help his mother, a bona-fide tenant. He is an immediate member of the
family and is entitled to work on the land. As the lower court held.
Under Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by RA 2263, entitled An Act to Govern
the Relations Between Landholders and Tenants of Agricultural Lands (Leasehold
and Share Tenancy), Section 5(a) defines the term tenant, to wit:
Sec. 5.
(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or
possessed by, another, with the latter's consent for purposes of
production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or
in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
Similarly, the term "immediate farm household" is defined in the same section as
follows:
(o) Immediate farm household includes the members of the family of the
tenant, and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm
enterprise.
The defendant, although not the tenant himself, is afforded the protection provided
by law as his mother is already old and infirm and is allowed to avail of the labor of
her immediate household. He is entitled to the security of tenure accorded his
mother. His having a house of his own on the property is merely incidental to the
tenancy.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with costs against the
petitioner.
5
(Emphasis supplied.)
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari anchored on a lone
assignment of error, to wit:
Petitioner respectfully contends that the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that while the private respondent is entitled to work on the agricultural land
of petitioner in his capacity as member of the family of tenant Ana Pascual,
nonetheless he can not occupy a substantial portion thereof and utilize the same
for residential purposes.
6

On August 19, 1996, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the Court deliberated on the arguments set out in their
pleadings.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the outset, the Court notes that petitioner does not dispute respondent court's finding that Ana
Pascual, private respondent's mother, is its bona-fide tenant. Neither does petitioner question
"the right of Ana Pascual, the tenant, to be assisted by a member of her household, who in this
case is respondent Herminigildo Pascual."
7
What petitioner impugns as erroneous is respondent
court's gratuitous pronouncement which effectively granted private respondent not only a home
lot, but also the right to maintain his own house in petitioner's small parcel of land
8
despite the
fact that Ana Pascual, the adjudged bona-fide tenant, has previously been given a home lot and
has an existing house thereon. Private respondent Herminigildo Pascual, for his part, insists that
he is entitled by law, "(Section 22, (3) of Rep. Act No. l199, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2263),"
9
to
a home lot and the right to maintain another house different from that of his mother. To bolster his
contention, private respondent adopts respondent court's ruling finding him as a member of Ana
Pascual's immediate farm household. Private respondent holds, quoting extensively from the
assailed decision, that "although not the tenant himself, [he] is afforded the protection provided
by law as his mother is already old and infirm and is allowed to avail of the labor of her immediate
household. . . . [And] [h]is having a house of his own on the property is merely incidental to the
tenancy."
10

As the Court sees it, the issue lies on the interpretation of Section 22, paragraph 3, of Rep. Act No.
1199, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2263. This section provides in full as follows:
Sec. 22
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling
with an area of not more than 3 per cent of the area of his landholding provided
that it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be located at
a convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be designated
by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise
vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor industries, the
products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. The tenant's dwelling
shall not be removed from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder,
except as provided in section twenty-six unless there is a severance of the tenancy
relationship between them as provided under section nine, or unless the tenant is
ejected for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five days following such
severance of relationship or dismissal for cause. (Emphasis supplied)
The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it must be applied according to its plain
and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
11
As clearly provided, only a
tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a
house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he is not petitioner's
tenant. In fact, he admits that he is a mere member of Ana Pascual's immediate farm
household. Under the law, therefore, we find private respondent not entitled to a home lot.
Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same
within the very small landholding of petitioner. To rule otherwise is to make a mockery of
the purpose of the tenancy relations between a bona-fide tenant and the landholder as
envisioned by the very law, i.e., Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended, upon which private
respondent relies, to wit:
Sec. 2. Purpose. It is the purpose of this Act to establish agricultural tenancy
relations between landholders and tenants upon the principle of social justice; to
afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders; to insure
the equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide
tenant-farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural
production; to bolster their economic position and to encourage their participation
in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities.
(Emphasis supplied )
Thus, if the Court were to follow private respondent's argument and allow all the members of the
tenant's immediate farm household to construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to
not more than one thousand (1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private respondent
wanted this Court to dole-out, then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if not colonies, of
houses. How then can there be "equitable division of the produce and income derived from the
land" and "more efficient agricultural production" if the land's productivity and use for growing
crops is lessened or, more appropriately, obliterated by its unceremonious conversion into
residential use? It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been
ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary.
12
This Court should not deviate
therefrom.
Further, it is undisputed that Ana Pascual, the tenant and private respondent's mother, has an
existing home lot and a house on the subject property in which private respondent may take
refuge while attending to his work. Curiously, despite its availability private respondent chose to
construct, without petitioner's permission, a concrete house of his own thereby saving him the
trouble of paying appropriate rents. If the Court were to abide by the respondent court's inordinate
pronouncement that private respondent is entitled to maintain his own house then we will be
condoning the deprivation of a landholder's property without even a fraction of compensation. It
taxes the credulity of the Court, therefore, to insist that private respondent's "having a house of
his own on the property is merely incidental to the tenancy" and to afford him the convenience of
attending to the cultivation of the land for, in the first place, he is not the tenant as he himself
admits. Besides, the "incidental" use of his own house can very well be provided by the existing
house of his mother, who with her "old and infirm" condition, surely needs the attention and care
of her children, one of whom is herein private respondent. Be it emphasized that like the tenant
the landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law as one of the purposes of the "Act" is
"to afford adequate protection to the rights of BOTH tenants and landholders".
13
The policy of
social justice, we reiterate, is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is
committed by the underprivileged. "Compassion for the poor", as we said in Galay, et. al. v. Court
of Appeals, et. al.
14
"is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a
rascal claiming an undeserved privilege."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The part of the decision appealed from which is
inconsistent herewith is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court
directing the private respondent Herminigildo Pascual to vacate the portion of the landholding he
occupies and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and another sum of
P500.00 monthly from the filing of complaint is hereby REINSTATED.
Costs against private respondent.

















G.R. No. 72282 July 24, 1989
ANACLETO DE JESUS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SOCORRO CALIMBAS-MIACO, GUILLERMO
CALIMBAS-RODRIGUEZ and TIRSO CALIMBAS, respondents.
FERNAN, C.J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
February 28, 1985 which reconsidered its previous decision dated July 29, 1984 in A.C. G.R. No. 70261-
R entitled "Socorro Calimbas-Miaco v. de Jesus" and reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Bataan (Branch II) dismissing an action for "Recovery of Possession with Damages" for lack of
jurisdiction.
The pivotal issue posed by petitioner is whether or not he is an agricultural lessee or a civil law lessee. It
is of paramount importance in this case to appreciate the contradistinction between an agricultural lessee
whose security of tenure is guaranteed by the Tenancy Law (Sec. 5(b) R.A. 1199) and a civil law lessee
whose right to work on the land expires in accordance with the terms of the Lease Agreement.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondents are owners of some 7.162 hectares of land in Pilar, Bataan known as Lot No. 513 of
Pilar cadastre and covered by TCT No. T-3975. About four (4) hectares of the above lot is a fishpond
possession of which has been in petitioner since 1962 as a lessee. On April 22, 1972, private
respondents, as heirs of Spouses Eustacio Calimbas and Modesta Paguio who in their lifetime were the
registered owners of the land, entered into a civil law contract of lease, with petitioner de Jesus and one
Felicisima Rodriguez. This contract was to be effective for 2-1/2 years starting January 1, 1972 to July 1,
1974.
Petitioner de Jesus and Felicisima Rodriguez formed a partnership over the fishpond with de Jesus as
the industrial partner and Rodriguez as the capitalist. Upon the expiration of the civil law lease contract on
July 1, 1974, Felicisima Rodriguez gave up the lease but petitioner de Jesus refused to vacate the leased
premises despite repeated demands. On December 5, 1975, private respondents filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Possession with Damages" against the petitioner before the Court of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Court of Bataan Branch II, docketed as Civil Case No. 4016, On July 20, 1979, the Court of
First Instance of Bataan ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice to the filing of the same with the proper court with respect to
the other incident which is for adjustment and fixing of the rentals.
1

According to the lower court, the fishpond is an agricultural land as held in the case of Tawatao & del
Rosario v. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. L-17649, July 31, 1963 .
2
It further held that petitioner is an agricultural
lessee and not a civil law lessee, therefore jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the Court of Agrarian
Relations and not to the Court of First Instance. The bases for holding that petitioner de Jesus is an
agricultural lessee are the following: [1] the land is agricultural; [2] Felicisima Rodriguez testified that she
left the lease after the expiration in 1974 and it was petitioner who managed the fishpond alone, thereby
qualifying as an agricultural lessee; and [3] the CFI Judge, motu propio, visited the fishpond and saw no
one but the petitioner working on the fishpond, thereby further strengthening the contention that the land
is subject to a one man cultivation.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. They appealed to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, and on June 29, 1984, the latter rendered a decision
affirming the Court of First Instance of Bataan; to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 20, 1979 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction
of the lower court, is hereby AFFIRMED.
3

On Motion for Reconsideration the Intermediate Appellate Court, after a thorough review and assessment
of the records for any oversight, realized its error which was to some extent influenced by the lower
court's findings as above discussed and reversed itself in the resolution of February 23, 1985, holding that
petitioner is not an agricultural lessee but a civil law lessee and further ordered the latter to vacate the
land. On the basis of stronger evidence, where petitioner himself admitted that he hired the services of
many people other than the members of his family to cultivate the land, respondent appellate Court ruled
that petitioner failed to qualify as an agricultural lessee under the doctrine laid down in Gabriel v.
Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974) and as defined in Paragraph 2, Section 166, Chapter XI of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code .
4
Moreover, he admitted that he cultivated an adjacent fishpond of 11-1/2
hectares by employing other laborers, whereby he was more correctly categorized as a business
enterpreneur engaged in the fishpond industry.
Hence, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the Motion for Reconsideration meritorious, the decision sought to
be reconsidered is hereby REVERSED and set aside, except the statement of facts
thereof which is hereby incorporated by reference, and a judgment is hereby entered:
1. Declaring the Lease Contract (annex B) between the parties as having
been lawfully terminated as of July 1, 1974;
2. Ordering the defendant-appellee and/or any person acting under him,
to immediately vacate the land in question including the fishpond, and
restore and deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiffs-appellants in
good condition as before;
3. Ordering the defendant-appellee to pay to the plaintiffs-appellants
reasonable rentals over the premises at the rate of P 4,000.00 per
annum from July 1, 1974 until said appellee shall have completely
restored possession thereof to the plaintiffs-appellants; and
4. Ordering the defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants attorney's
fees of P 5,000.00 and litigation expenses of P 5,000.00, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.
5

On September 25, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence this
Petition for Review on certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court as not
supported by evidence, inconclusive and contrary or violative of applicable laws, Rules of Court, B.P. 129
and established jurisprudence.
We rule against petitioner.
The Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted by Congress to institute land reforms in the Philippines.
It was passed to establish owner-cultivatorship and the family size farm as the basis of Philippine
agriculture; to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious industrial restraints
and practices; to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens and a
source of a genuine strength in our democratic society.
6

In other words, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was enacted to help the small farmers and to uplift
their economic status by providing them a modest standard of living sufficient to meet a farm family's
needs for food, clothing, shelter, education and other basic necessities. The law further protects the small
farmer by conferring upon him security of tenure over the landholding he is working on. The leasehold
relation cannot be extinguished by the mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract or by
the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. He can only be ejected by the
Court for cause.
7
But with this benevolence is his obligation to work on the land by himself or with the aid
of his immediate farm household. By "immediate farm household", the law means the members of the
family of the lessee or lessor and other persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually
help him in his activities.
8

Petitioner de Jesus contends that he is an agricultural lessee because a fishpond is an agricultural land
as held in the case of Tawatao v. Garcia, supra. While this is true, the mere fact that the land is
agricultural does not ipso factomake him an agricultural lessee. The law provides conditions or requisites
before he can qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of them. Among others, the law is
explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land.
9

Thus, petitioner also contends that he is the sole cultivator of the fishpond as supported by the testimony
of his former partner, Felicisima Rodriguez and as found by the trial judge. But on review by the Court of
Appeals these allegations gave way to a much stronger evidence-the judicial admissions of petitioner
himself, that he hired many persons to help him cultivate the fishpond. The pertinent portion of his
testimony reads:
Q When you first took possession of the property, how large was this
fishpond in question?
A There is only one and a half hectares that could be used sir and this
area is the only one that has water.
Q But according to the complainant, the area is now four hectares, can
you explain why it has grown to four hectares?
A I had it constructed, this is ricefield and grassland before.
Q Do you mean to tell us that you spent effort and money in improving
this fishpond to four hectares?
Atty. Origuera: Leading
Court: Sustained
Q You said you improved the fishpond from one and one-half hectares to
four hectares, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you do this by yourself
A With my sons and my father-in-law.
Q You did not employ any other person except your immediate relatives?
A I did sir, I hired many.
10

A disclosure made before the court is a judicial admission and under the rules this cannot be contradicted
unless previously shown to have been made by palpable mistake.
11

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner committed a palpable mistake in
making the above disclosures. Hence, absent the requisite of personal cultivation, petitioner de Jesus
cannot be considered an agricultural lessee. In the case of Evangelista v. Court of Appeals,
12
this Court
held that one cannot be said to be an agricultural lessee if he has not personally or by his farm household
cultivated the land in question.
Moreover, it is an undisputed fact that petitioner is cultivating an adjacent fishpond with a size of 11-1/2
hectares which further proves that he is not a small farmer but a businessman.
He testified thus:
Q: Do you have any other source of income between 1963 and 1969?
A: There is sir.
Q: What?
A: Fishpond also.
Q: Up to the present?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is the area of the fishpond in question which are you operating
at present excluding this one?
A: Eleven hectares and a half.
Q: Who owns this eleven and a half hectares?
A: Maximo Reyes, sir.
Q: Where is this located?
A: Adjacent, sir.
Q: Do you employ help in operating this eleven and a half hectares?
A: Yes sir.
Q: How many?
A: Sometimes plenty, sometimes few.
Q: You employ help because you cannot work in that eleven and a half
hectares yourself?
A: No, sir.
13

Petitioner asserts that the cultivation of another fishpond is irrelevant as the law does not require or
prohibit the total absence of other sources of income. In ruling on this matter, it is of much significance to
look into the spirit of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. First and foremost, the law is meant to assist
and help the small farmers as enunciated in its Declaration of Policy. In the case at bar, petitioner de
Jesus is not a small farmer but a businessman. To consider him an agricultural lessee despite the fact
that he is cultivating another fishpond with an area of 11-1/2 hectares, and furthermore despite the fact
that he does not cultivate the fishpond personally and/ or with the help of his immediate farm household
as defined by law, would render nugatory the letter and intent of the Agricultural Reform Code.
Petitioner further contends that the civil law lease contract he signed in 1972 is unenforceable because
his consent was vitiated. We have to disagree. Under the law on contracts,
14
vitiated consent does not
make a contract unenforceable but merely voidable. If indeed petitioner's consent was vitiated, his
remedy would have been to annul the contract for voidable contracts produce legal effects until they are
annulled.
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance has also been put in issue on the assumption that if
petitioner is an agricultural lessee, then the case should have been filed in the Court of Agrarian
Relations. We hold that this issue has now become moot and academic in view of the passage of B.P.
129. Section 19 of said law provides that the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, shall have
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned Resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed.
Footnotes
4 Republic Act No. 3844 "Agricultural Land Reform Code" Chapter XI, Section 166,
Paragraph (2): "Agricultural lessee" means a person who, by himself and with the aid
available from within hisimmediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or
possessed by, another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price
certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee as
understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines. (Italics supplied)
11 Sec. 2, Rule 129, Revised Rules of Court: Judicial Admissions Admissions made
by the parties in the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings do not
require proof and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made
through palpable mistake. (Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, No. L-23023, August 31, 1968, 24 SCRA
1018).











[G.R. No. 152957. September 8, 2003]
FAUSTINO ESQUIVEL,
[1]
petitioner, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO REYES, herein substituted by his only
daughter, JULIETA R. GONZALES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Because of his utter failure to prove that he has personally cultivated the subject property,
petitioners claim of being a tenant collapses. Not being a bona fide tenant, he is not entitled to the
benefits granted by tenancy laws.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
[2]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the
January 28, 2002 Decision
[3]
and the April 10, 2002 Resolution
[4]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
SP No. 63208. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DARAB Decision dated December 18, 2000 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the PARAD Decision dated December 3, 1997 is ordered REINSTATED.
[5]

The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:
[Respondent] Eduardo Reyes was the administrator of the landholdings previously owned by his parents, Spouses
Leopoldo and Dolores Reyes. The subject landholding, approximately four (4) hectares, situated in Bayate, Liliw,
Laguna, was one of those he administered. When the heirs of Sps. Reyes partitioned the landholdings, only 2.7
hectares was adjudicated to Atty. Reyes excluding the subject land.
When [respondent] took over the administration of the subject land, a patao named Juana Montalbo was staying
therein who was specifically tasked to prevent the entry of intruders and thieves of coconuts. As such patao, she
received 20% share of the net harvest as compensation. In 1971, Juana Montalbo who was then old and could no
longer perform as patao, recommended [Petitioner] Faustino Esquibel. [Respondent] acceded and gave him the
same compensation that Juana Montalbo used to receive. [Petitioner] was not, in any way, involved in the
cultivation of the land, as the plucking of coconuts was done by magkakawit, the gathering of fallen nuts was done
by magsisimot, the husking of the nuts was done by magtatapas, and the transportation of nuts on horseback or
by carabao-drawn sleds was done by maghahakot or maghihila, all separately paid for by the [respondent].
In 1995, [petitioner] went to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nagcarlan, Laguna, and requested
the execution of a leasehold contract including his share in the lanzones harvest. [Respondent] Eduardo Reyes
vehemently denied the existence of a tenancy relationship with [petitioner].
In the meantime, [Respondent] Reyes learned that [petitioner] has abandoned the subject landholding as he and his
family moved in Barangay Sta. Lucia, Nagcarlan, Laguna. [Respondent] then stopped paying [petitioner] the usual
20% of the net proceeds of the coconut harvest.
However, in one of the conferences with the MARO, [respondent] offered to sell the subject land to [petitioner] but
the latter was adamant.
On April 8, 1997, [petitioner] filed a complaint against [respondent] for Illegal Withholding of Shares;
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession and Execution of Leasehold Tenancy Contract with the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Accordingly, on December 3, 1997, the PARAD dismissed the
said complaint in its Decision 1. (F)inding the contract between Complainant Faustino Esquibel and Defendant
Eduardo Reyes not one Agricultural Share Tenancy but a contract for services paid on commission basis;
2. Finding and declaring Complainant Faustino Esquibel not an agricultural share tenant de jure but a security
services contractee paid on commission basis, hence, not entitled to security of tenure and shares in the produce of
the subject landholding; x x x.
On appeal, the DARAB reversed the decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision dated December 3, 1997 is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring Appellant as a bonafide tenant on the subject landholding, thus entitled to security of tenure;
2. Ordering the Appellee to maintain the Appellant in the peaceful possession of the subject lot; and
3. Directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nagcarlan, Laguna to assist the Plaintiff and
Respondent in the execution of an agricultural leasehold contract between the parties.
SO ORDERED.
[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In reversing the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the CA ruled that
petitioner was not a tenant, but a mere patao engaged in providing security for the plantation rather than
in undertaking agricultural production. The appellate court noted that the various phases of farm work --
gathering, piling, husking and hauling coconuts -- were done by outside labor. Whenever petitioner took
a hand in any phase of the work, he was aptly paid for his labor.
The CA also held that in transferring his residence to another municipality, he had abandoned the
landholding. Since he had ceased to provide security for the plantation, he was no longer entitled to any
compensation.
Hence, this Petition.
[7]

Issues
In his Petition
[8]
and Memorandum,
[9]
petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the findings of the DARAB Central Office and declared that
petitioner Faustino Esquivel is not a de jure tenant but a mere 'patao.'
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it reversed the findings of the DARAB Central [Office] and declared
that petitioner Faustino Esquivel has abandoned the subject landholding."
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Petitioner Not a de Jure Tenant
At the outset, we stress that whether a person is a tenant is a question of fact.
[10]
Substantial
evidence must establish the concurrence
[11]
of all the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship as
follows:
(1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
(2) The subject of the relationship is agricultural land.
(3) There is consent between the parties to the relationship.
(4) The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production.
(5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee.
(6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
[12]

In this case, there are two sets of factual findings: one, by the CA and the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) which found that Esquivel was not a tenant; and the other, by the
DARAB which ruled that he was. The conflicting factual findings make this case an exception
[13]
to the
general rule that only questions of law may be raised before this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. For this reason, we gave due course to this Petition.
The documentary exhibits of petitioner consist of (1) his Affidavit;
[14]
(2) receipts
[15]
showing the
alleged sharing between him and private respondent of net proceeds from harvests; (3) a
Certification
[16]
from the barangay captain of Bayate, Liliw, Laguna, that he was a resident thereof; (4) a
Certification
[17]
from the Municipal Assessor's Office listing the landholdings over which private respondent
was paying real estate taxes; and (5) the Mediators Report
[18]
(Katitikan) of the mediation conference
between the parties.
Sadly for petitioner, his evidence fails to establish all the essential requisites for the existence of a
tenancy relationship. It is doctrinal that with respect to a parcel of land, the absence of one element does
not make an occupant or a cultivator or a planter a de jure tenant.
[19]
A careful examination of the
evidence shows that only the receipts -- showing Reyes payments to him of a 20 percent share in net
proceeds from the coconut produce -- have any direct and relevant evidentiary value to the alleged
tenancy relationship.
The Certifications are inconclusive as far as the other requisites are concerned. The only thing that
the municipal assessors Certification proves is that private respondent was paying real taxes on the
properties listed therein. Realty tax payment or the declaration of property for tax purposes alone is not a
conclusive evidence of ownership.
[20]
In any event, petitioner could have very well established the status
of private respondent as the legal possessor of the subject landholding. The meaning of landholder in a
tenancy relationship is not limited to the owner, as the term includes a lessee, a usufructuary or a legal
possessor of land.
[21]

The barangay captains Certification, on the other hand, merely shows that Esquivel was a resident
of Barangay Bayate; it does not advance the claim that petitioner was a tenant. Obviously, the barangay
captain -- or the mayor whose attestation appears on the document -- was not the proper authority to
make such determination. Even certifications issued by administrative agencies and/or officials
concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship are merely preliminary or provisional
and are not binding on the courts.
[22]

More significantly, the exhibits presented by petitioner fail to show one essential element
[23]
in
establishing the existence of a tenancy relationship: the personal cultivation of the land by him alone or
with the aid of his immediate farm household.
[24]
The PARAD observed the dearth of evidence in this
respect:
It seems quite paradoxical, if not ironic, that Complainant Esquivel should be invoking the rulings of the Highest
Tribunal hereinbefore cited in support of his claim for tenancy status when, in application and in effect, the same
negate the existence of the relationship as concern[ing] him. Unlike his case, the seekers in the cited cases had
performed various acts of cultivation such as the periodical cleaning of the landholding, the fumigation, smudging or
smoking of the plantation, the application of fertilizer and watering of the growing plants to enhance [their]
productivity.
"Nothing of that kind obtains in Esquivel's case for while it is true that he had once planted coconut trees and
lanzones on the landholding in question, he had been duly and [aptly] paid for his labor. Neither has he tended the
growing plants for [Reyes] had availed himself of hired labor the job. And if ever Esquivel did participate in the
harvests of coconuts, he did so for a fee. These chores comprise the odd jobs Esquivel indulged in as sideline to his
regular employ as a 'patao' for which he was compensated with the cash equivalent of 20% of the net proceeds from
the sale of the produce."
[25]

The DARABs pronouncement that Esquivel worked on the subject lot did not cite specific, concrete
or factual evidence. It was at best speculative, as the following excerpt indicates:
x x x [Esquivel] has been living in the subject lot since 1968 when he was installed by [Reyes] thereon to take care
of the coconuts and lanzones planted therein. It is in effect putting the life of the plants into the hands of [Esquivel].
In the performance of his duties, the latter has to do some cultivation such as smudging or smoking the plantation,
weeding, watering, applying fertilizers and cleaning the surroundings."
[26]
(Italics supplied)
The exhibits of private respondent, on the other hand, adequately controvert the alleged tenancy
relationship. The payrolls
[27]
he has presented show that he hired laborers to harvest, gather, pile, husk
and transport the produce. Significantly, Exhibits 6
[28]
and 7
[29]
-- both bearing the signature of Esquivel --
reveal the payments petitioner received for every coconut and lanzones tree he has planted on the
subject lot.
Second Issue:
Abandonment of Landholding
Since Esquivel failed to establish that he was a tenant of Reyes, the formers alternative claim for
security of tenure
[30]
or compensation
[31]
has no leg to stand on. It is settled that unless a person has
established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to the security of tenure or the other benefits
provided by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.
[32]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[1]
Also spelled as Esquibel in some documents in the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD), Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and the
Court of Appeals (CA).
[7]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on March 4, 2003, upon the Courts receipt of
respondents Memorandum signed by Attys. Norberto S. Gonzales and Orchids C. Albino-
Mateo. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Ibra D. Omar, Al Haj of the Bureau of Agrarian
Legal Assistance (DAR), was filed earlier on February 28, 2003.
[13]
The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals may be reviewed by the Court in any of the following
instances:
1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken,
absurd, or impossible;
4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
7) when the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion;
8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they
are based; and
10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but
such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. (Oarde v. CA, supra, citing several
cases)
[24]
166(8) of RA No. 3844, as amended, defines the immediate farm household as the family members
who are usually dependent for support upon, and who usually help in the activities of, the lessee
or the lessor.

G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.

FRANCISCO, R., J .:
It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be
carried out to such an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on
his side.
1
As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:
. . . social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving, whether he be a
millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable
doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution
fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor
simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for
justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the
law.
2

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the aforestated principles be applied in its
resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No.
118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the petitions were
ordered consolidated.
3

Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted
private respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby
GRANTED:
a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is
declared null and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;
b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit not
merely "earmark", "reserve" or "deposit in trust" with an accessible
bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the following
petitioners the following amounts in cash and in government financial
instruments within the parameters of Sec. 18 (1) of RA 6657:
P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L. Yap
P 135,482.12 Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P 15,914,127.77 AMADCOR;
c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to
withdraw the above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the final
determination of just compensation by the proper authorities; and
d) Respondent DAR is ordered to
1) immediately conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the just compensation for the lands of the petitioners giving
the petitioners 15 days from notice within which to submit evidence and
to 2) decide the caseswithin 30 days after they are submitted for
decision.
4

Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the Resolution dated January 18, 1995,
5
denying their
motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL,
Republic Act No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and
payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private
respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents questioned the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992
6
and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990,
7
and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative
proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to
deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in
trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9, 1994, this Court referred the petition to
respondent Court of Appeals for proper determination and disposition.
As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:
Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and
were transferred in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the request
of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and
P719,869.54 have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands
covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563 and
TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without
notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of Section 16 (e) of
RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible
bank. (Rollo, p. 6).
The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the
owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615
hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December
1990, without notice to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries
executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the LandBank
for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24
October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay
the landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in the amount of
P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in
the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E";Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed
the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the
LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank which required the
execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any amount as
rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for
brevity) alleges with respect to its properties located in San Francisco, Quezon that
the properties of AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel
covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary
administrative proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by TCT
No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the landowner;
that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the
compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215
hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a trust account
for said amount in the name of AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of
P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first
trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner
AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in
Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an
area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued covering an area of
701.8999 hectares which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken
thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust
account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount of P12,247,217.83',
three notices of acquisition having been previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-
9)
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the DARAB proceedings (land
valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p. 100).
8

Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the
compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e)
of RA 6657.
9
Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely
"earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite
the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in
cash or in bonds.
10

Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making
power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657.
11
Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the
"Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343).
12

For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in
consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words
"reserved/deposited" were also used.
13

On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private
respondents.
14
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same.
15

Hence, the instant petitions.
On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging
that the appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality of the appealed decision.
16
The
Court, however, denied the motion and instead required the respondents to file their comments.
17

Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as null and void DAR Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or
in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and
provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed
for just compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a trust account
as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit
through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since
it merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared policies of
RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of
Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does
it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to
include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account"
is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction
of the term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency
may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of
power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit
of a legislative enactment.
18
In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into
effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into
effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment,
19
for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and
an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
20

In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations
when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account
in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section
16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the
same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing
regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit
any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private respondents are entitled to withdraw the
amounts deposited in trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the final
valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section
16(e) of RA 6657 and payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18
21
of the same law.
According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf
pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that
adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section
16(e) in case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and intended
merely to secure possession of the property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention
petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association of Small Landowners in the Phil.
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform".
22

The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well-
accepted principle of eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected.
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court in discarding petitioners' assertion
as it found that:
. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657
which led the Supreme Court, in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil.
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of the
just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money" even as the
Supreme Court admits in the same case "that the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other" the Supreme Court in said case did not
abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to the property expropriated shall pass from
the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just
compensation."
23
(Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in the "Association" case merely
recognized the extraordinary nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby
allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and recognized payment other
than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the expropriated property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and determination of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their
properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already
been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. The irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But
petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private respondents
in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced. This is
misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and
final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the
same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and
possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we
reiterate the cardinal rule that:
. . . within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just compensation
means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss.
24
(Emphasis supplied)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for the true freedom
of the farmer.
25
But despite this, cases involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the
courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the farmers from
their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this
objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled
to protection.
26

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and
the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto.
Footnotes
6 which provides formulas for the valuation of land expropriated under RA 6657.
7 which provides for the opening of trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of
depositing in an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land
expropriated by the DAR.
9 Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. For purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following shall be followed:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land
and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
11 Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations. The PARC and the DAR shall have the
power to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry
out the objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (l0) days
after the publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
21 Sec. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. The LBP shall compensate
the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the
DAR and LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17
and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the
court as the just compensation for the land.


G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276 dated
December 11, 2001,
1
which annulled the Orders dated January 29, 2001 and April 2, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.
2

Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 246.0561 hectares,
located in Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-20193. He
voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR),
3
under Section 20 of R.A. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
(CARL). The DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03, which was however rejected by the respondent.
Hence, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced
summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation of the land.
On October 14, 1998, the DARAB rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the foregoing computation, the prior valuation made by
the Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby set aside and a new valuation in the amount of TEN
MILLION NINE HUNDRED FIFTY SIX THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SIXTY THREE PESOS
AND 25 CENTAVOS (P10,956,963.25) for the acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. The Land
Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner
provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.
4

Thereafter, a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the
respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation in the manner provided by law.
5

On September 2, 1999, respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD, alleging that petitioner
Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on June 18, 1999. He argued that such
failure of the petitioner to comply with the writ of execution constitutes contempt of the DARAB.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1999, petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Branch 52, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), for the determination of just
compensation, as provided for in Section 16 (f) of the CARL.
6

On August 20, 2000, the PARAD issued an Order granting the Motion for Contempt, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for contempt is hereby GRANTED, thus ALEX
A. LORAYES, as Manager of respondent LAND BANK, is cited for indirect contempt and hereby
ordered to be imprisoned until he complies with the Decision of the case dated October 14, 1998.
SO ORDERED.
7

Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order,
8
which was however
denied by the PARAD on September 20, 2000.
9
Thus, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD,
manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to the DARAB Central, pursuant to Rule XI, Section 3 of
the 1994 DARAB New Rules of Procedure.
10

On the other hand, the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the determination of just
compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated October 25, 2000. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise denied.
In a Resolution dated November 27, 2000, PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioners Notice of
Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of
just compensation to respondent.
11
On January 3, 2001, he directed the issuance of an arrest order
against Manager Alex A. Lorayes.
12

Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD Capellan from
issuing the order of arrest.
13
The case was raffled to Branch 51 of said court. On January 29, 2001, the
trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or
anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest
against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52,
Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank.
SO ORDERED.
14

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order, which was denied in an Order
dated April 2, 2001.
15

Thus, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
16
docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 65276. On December 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision which
nullified the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN ENTERTAINING THE RESPONDENTS SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR
CERTIORARI TO QUESTION THE FINAL ORDER OF THE RTC WHICH, HOWEVER, WAS
SUBJECT TO APPEAL UNDER THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA DECIDED IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE THE RTC FINAL ORDER OF
INJUNCTION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PARAD DID NOT ACQUIRE COMPETENT JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS INASMUCH AS IT WAS INITIATED BY MERE MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND
NOT BY VERIFIED PETITION, IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 2, RULE XI OF THE NEW DARAB
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND OF RULE 71 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT.
B. THE PARAD CONTEMPT ORDER CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FINAL AND EXECUTORY,
BECAUSE THE PARAD ITSELF DISALLOWED THE PETITIONERS APPEAL TO THE DARAB
CENTRAL OFFICE, IN DISREGARD OF THE BASIC RULE THAT THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
DETERMINES THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL.
C. THE PARAD ORDER OF ARREST AGAINST LBP MANAGER ALEX LORAYES WAS IN
GROSS AND PATENT VIOLATION OF HIS PERSONAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL
RIGHTS AGAINST UNJUST ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT, INASMUCH AS, UNDER THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, ONLY JUDGES CAN ISSUE WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST
CITIZENS, AND THE PROPER SUBJECT OF THE CONTEMPT PROCEEDING WAS THE
PETITIONER ITSELF AND NOT THE LBP MANAGER, AND YET THE CONTEMPT ORDER
WAS AGAINST THE LBP MANAGER.
D. THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID, AS IT
ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION THAT WAS
ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND EXECUTORY, AS THE MATTER OF JUST COMPENSATION
BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS ON APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
17

As regards the first issue, petitioner submits that the special civil action for certiorari filed by respondent
before the Court of Appeals to nullify the injunction issued by the trial court was improper, considering
that the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court was a final order which is appealable to the Court
of Appeals via a notice of appeal.
18

Petitioners submission is untenable. Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of
ones substantive right or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. Thus, it has been held that an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an
interlocutory order. As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety
or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case
completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon.
19

Clearly, the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction is in the nature of an interlocutory order, hence,
unappealable. Therefore, respondents special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was
the correct remedy under the circumstances. Certiorari is available where there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
20

The order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an interlocutory order; as such, it cannot by
itself be subject of an appeal or a petition for review on certiorari. The proper remedy of a party
aggrieved by such an order is to bring an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment in the main
case, citing therein the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order. However, the party
concerned may file a petition for certiorari where the assailed order is patently erroneous and
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.
21

On the substantive issue of whether the order for the arrest of petitioners manager, Mr. Alex Lorayes by
the PARAD, was valid, Rule XVIII of the 2003 DARAB Rules reads, in pertinent part:
Section 2. Indirect Contempt. The Board or any of its members or its Adjudicator may also cite
and punish any person for indirect contempt on any of the grounds and in the manner prescribed
under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In this connection, Rule 71, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which deals with the
commencement of indirect contempt proceedings, provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending
in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed,
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
x x x x x x x x x
The requirement of a verified petition is mandatory. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Vice-Chairman of the
Revision of the Rules of Court Committee that drafted the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explains this
requirement:
1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing
contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under
the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to
file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with
the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this
amended section.
x x x x x x x x x
Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal
charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full
compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the
second paragraph of this section.
22

Therefore, there are only two ways a person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) through a
verified petition; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court motu proprio.
In the case at bar, neither of these modes was adopted in charging Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt.
More specifically, Rule 71, Section 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, referring to indirect contempt
against quasi-judicial entities, provides:
Sec. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule
shall apply to contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-
judicial functions, or shall have suppletory effect to such rules as they may have adopted
pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The Regional Trial Court of
the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as
may be filed therefore. (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing amended provision puts to rest once and for all the questions regarding the applicability of
these rules to quasi-judicial bodies, to wit:
1. This new section was necessitated by the holdings that the former Rule 71 applied only to
superior and inferior courts and did not comprehend contempt committed against administrative
or quasi-judicial officials or bodies, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly
defined as contempt of court, as is done in the second paragraph of Sec. 580, Revised
Administrative Code. The provision referred to contemplates the situation where a person, without
lawful excuse, fails to appear, make oath, give testimony or produce documents when required to
do so by the official or body exercising such powers. For such violation, said person shall be
subject to discipline, as in the case of contempt of court, upon application of the official or body
with the Regional Trial Court for the corresponding sanctions.
23
(emphasis in the original)
Evidently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not
within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still
within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect contempt charge was
filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD, and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes
with indirect contempt.
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion for Contempt" filed by the
respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons:
24
First, the Rules of Court clearly
require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this
case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was by a motion filed by
respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge
filed by the respondent. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the
DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondents "Motion for Contempt,"
specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A.
Lorayes, are null and void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65276, dated December 11, 2001, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 51, dated January 29, 2001, which
enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of
arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 103953. March 25, 1999]
SAMAHANG MAGBUBUKID NG KAPDULA, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, PONCIANO DUCUSIN, AQUILINO DUCUSIN, EUFEMIO CABINGAN,
LEONARDO DIAZ, REYNALDO PEREZ, SERAPIO FIRME, RICARDO BRAZA, ANTONIO
BAUTISTA, ROMULO BUCLATIN, EULOGIO PARANAQUE, JR., AGAPITO DUCUSIN,
DELFIN DUCUSIN, REYNALDO GARCIA, MARTIN SALAZAR, MELECIO LAYON, CIRIACO
ABEJERO, BASILIO BUCLATIN, FERLITA BUCLATIN, RUFINA BUCLATIN, BONIFACIO
BUCLATIN, LUNINGNING BUCLATIN, LEONARDO BEJESON, REGENTOR COTONER,
DANILO GONZALES, EMILIO DUCUSIN, GERMAN DUCUSIN, MARCIANO BACAY,
IRENEO DUCUSIN, LEONARDO DUCUSIN, ALEJANDRO DUCUSIN, SERGIO DUCUSIN,
WILLIE CADESALE, MARTIN DE LA CUESTA, DOMINGO ORENSE, CRESENCIANA
LOPEZ, PONCIANO BELTRAN, JUN DOYOLA, DONATO CRUZ, MIGUEL BUGAGAO,
LUCIO ILAO, ALFREDO COSTACIO, HILARION CARAIG, LARRY DE LA VEGA,
RAYMUNDO SOBEJANO, AVELINO DUCUSIN, RESENDO DUCUSIN, VICENTE RIVERA,
BONGBONG BACAY, DONATO CASCANO, EDGARDO DUCUSIN, OLIVER DUCUSIN,
ARMANDO BEJESON, ROMEO OBIAS, JOMARIE LALAGON, ROGELIO SEVILLA,
MICHAEL DUCUSIN, MAURA BUCLATIN, ERNESTO MOGAR, FILEMON ANARNA,
RUPERTO ILAO, RUPERTO MENDOZA, CARLOS MENDOZA, ALFREDO DRIZ, MARIO
CABINGAN, JUAN SOMBILLO, EUGENIO MERCADO, CECILIO BENIG, JR., ROMIE
LUYAS, ALFONSO BULAHAN, ADAM CARBADILLA, PEPITO CADESALE, LIWAYWAY
CAPARAS, EVARISTO CREUS, RAUL GONZAGA, ANTONIO GONZAGA, SANO ADION,
REYNALDO ZORINO, WILFREDO ALILING, and BERNARDO ASUNCION, respondents-
appellees.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J .:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 26173.
The facts that matter are as follows:
Macario Aro was the former owner of two (2) parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of 168.7
hectares, more or less, in Barangay Malinta, Dasmarinas, Cavite. The members of petitioner Samahang
Magbubukid Ng Kapdula, Inc. were the tenants on the two (2) parcels of land.
Sometime in 1979 or 1980, Mr. Aro sold the said parcels of land to Arrow Head Golf Club, Inc., which was
founded by Ricardo Silverio who envisioned to establish a car assembly plant within the area. In the process, the
members of petitioner were evicted. But the establishment of a car assembly plant in the place never materialized.
The parcels of land in question were later leased to the spouses, Ruben Rodriguez and Gloria Bugagao, for a
term of seven (7) years from July 8, 1983 to July 8, 1990
[2]
, and were then developed into a sugarcane plantation,
with the herein private respondents as the regular farmworkers.
On July 13, 1984, the same property was acquired by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) at a Sheriffs
auction sale.
[3]

In 1986, the members of petitioner sought the assistance of the former Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR),
now Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through then Minister Heherson Alvarez, for their reinstatement as
farmworkers thereon, but nothing came out of such efforts.
The ownership of subject parcels of land was later transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) which
conveyed the same on March 19, 1991 to the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DAR
[4]

On March 26, 1991, in furtherance of its objective of instituting agrarian reform in the country, the DAR issued
Certificate of Land Ownership (CLOA) Nos. 1116
[5]
and 1117
[6]
for the said parcels of land in favor of the
petitioner.
On September 27, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
assailing the issuance of said CLOAs to the petitioner.
On January 30, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in that the respondent Department of Agrarian Reform be
directed to conduct a hearing and/or investigation, with due notice to the herein petitioners, to determine the rightful
beneficiaries of the subject parcels of land in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 or the CARP; and to cause the
cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. CLOA-1116 and 1117 in the name of private respondent,
should private respondent be found not entitled to the subject parcels of land.
[7]

Dissatisfied therewith, the petitioner has come to this Court to assail the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
contending that:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FOR NON-
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
I-A
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
NOT GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED
PRECEDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE AWARDS.
I-B
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT DETERMINATION OF QUALIFIED
BENEFICIARIES IS A DECISION OF THE SECRETARY AND THAT RESORTING TO THE DAR
ADJUDICATION BOARD TO QUESTION SUCH DECISION IS UNAVAILING.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING THAT THERE WAS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE
PROCESS IN THE ISSUANCE OF TCT NOS. CLOA-1116 AND CLOA-1117 IN THE NAME OF HEREIN
PETITIONER.
II-A
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY
HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED ABSENT EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE DAR TO CONDUCT A HEARING AND/OR
INVESTIGATION, WITH DUE NOTICE TO HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, TO DETERMINE THE
RIGHTFUL BENEFICIARIES OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND IN ACCORDANCE WITH R.A. NO.
6657, AND TO CAUSE THE CANCELLATION OF TCT NOS. CLOA-1116 AND CLOA-1117 IN THE NAME
OF HEREIN PETITIONER SHOULD IT BE FOUND NOT ENTITLED THERETO.
III-A
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING RESPECT AND REGARDING WITH FINALITY THE
FINDINGS OF FACT OF DAR.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN ITS FINDING OF FACTS WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.
Petitioner-appellants submissions boil down to two pivotal issues:
1. Whether or not there was observance of due process by the Department of Agrarian Reform prior to
the issuance of CLOA Nos. 1116 and 1117 in favor of petitioner; and
2. Whether there was a need for the private respondents to exhaust administrative remedies before filing
their petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner contends that before taking recourse to the Court of Appeals, the private respondents should have
first exhausted all administrative remedies available to them. On the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, the respondent court should have dismissed the petition of private respondents. To buttress its stance,
petitioner cited Section 50
[8]
of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) and Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of
DAR Adjudication Board
[9]
vesting the DAR and DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) with jurisdiction to resolve
agrarian reform disputes, including the issuance of CLOAs.
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, opined that determination by Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform as to the rightful beneficiaries has the effect of a final ruling or award by the DAR itself and therefore, resort
to DARAB to question the ruling of the Secretary would be improper. There is thus no need to exhaust
administrative remedies, under the premises.
From the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, it can be gleaned that decisions of the DAR Secretary cannot
be questioned before DARAB. Pertinent rules, provide:
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have
primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
x x x
(c) Cases involving the annulment or cancellation of orders or decisions of DAR officials other than the Secretary,
lease contracts or deeds of sale or their amendments under the administration and disposition of the DAR and LBP;
(Rule II, DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure) (italics ours)
From the foregoing, it is decisively clear that DARAB may only entertain appeals from decisions or orders of
DAR officials other than the Secretary. It is also irrefutable that the issuance of subject CLOAs constituted a
decision of the Secretary, who issued and signed the same.
[10]

Consequently, the propriety of the recourse by private respondents to the respondent court on a petition
for certiorari, to assail the issuance by the DAR of the CLOAs in question, is beyond cavil. Under Section 54 of
RA 6657, decisions and awards of the DAR may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari.
[11]

Time and again, this court has ruled that in cases of denial of due process, exhaustion of available
administrative remedies is unnecessary
[12]
The aggrieved party may seek judicial relief outright.
But was there a denial of due process under the attendant facts and circumstances? Respondent court found
that herein private respondents were denied the opportunity to ventilate their stance before the DAR. But according
to the petitioner, during the investigation and conferences conducted on the question of inclusion of subject
properties in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government, Mr. Ruben Rodriguez was notified
of the same, as evidenced by Annexes E
[13]
, F
[14]1
, F-1
[15]
, and F-2
[16]

Records show, however, that the letter (Annex E), which was supposed to be the notice to the private
respondents regarding the inclusion of subject properties in the CARP, was ineffective. First of all, the letter of
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Serapio T. Magpayo to Mr. Ruben Rodriguez indicates no receipt of the same
by Mr. Rodriguez nor was it signed by Mr. Magpayo. Secondly, if it was ever sent, it was sent too late, the same
being dated June 5, 1991, when the said parcels of land had already been awarded to the members of
petitioner. (The CLOAs under controversy were issued on March 26, 1991.) Thirdly, the letter was addressed to
Mr. Ruben Rodriguez, who no longer possessed the said properties as his lease thereover ended on July 8, 1990.
There is thus a need for further hearings to determine the beneficiaries of subject parcels of land. In such
hearings, the private respondents, who were deprived of an opportunity to be heard before the DAR, should
participate. This is in pursuance of the provisions of Section 40(4)
[17]
, in relation to Section 22
[18]
of RA 6657,
providing for the order or priority of the qualified beneficiaries of CARP.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
26173 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

[8]
SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. --- The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
[9]
SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall
have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing
rules and regulations.
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited to the following:
f) Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT), Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA)
and Emancipation Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;
[11]
SECTION 54. Certiorari. Any decision, order, award, or ruling of the DAR on any agrarian dispute or on any
matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent
laws on agrarian reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by certiorari except as otherwise provided in this
Act within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The findings of fact of the DAR shall be final and conclusive if based on substantial evidence.
[17]
SECTION 40. Special Areas of Concern. -- As an integral part of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, the following principles in these special areas of concern shall be observed:
(4) Idle, Abandoned, Foreclosed and Sequestered Lands Idle, abandoned, foreclosed and sequestered lands shall
be planned for distribution as home lots and family-size farmlots to actual occupants. If land area permits, other
landless families shall be accomodated in these lands."
[18]
"SECTION 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. -- The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as
possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same
municipality in the following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness, attitude, and ability to cultivate and make the land
as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of monitoring the record or performance of each
beneficiary, so that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall
forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the performance of the
beneficiaries to the PARC.
If, due to the landowner's retention rights or to the number of tenants, lessees, or workers on the land, there is not
enough land to accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted ownership of other lands available for
distribution under this Act, at the option of the beneficiaries.
Farmers already in place and those not accomodated in the distribution of privately-owned lands will be given
preferential rights in the distribution of lands from the public domain."



G.R. Nos. 148404-05 April 11, 2002
NELITA M. BACALING, represented by her attorney-in-fact JOSE JUAN TONG, and JOSE JUAN
TONG, in his personal capacity, petitioners,
vs.
FELOMINO MUYA, CRISPIN AMOR, WILFREDO JEREZA, RODOLFO LAZARTE and NEMESIO
TONOCANTE,respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J .:
Before us is a Petition for Review of the consolidated Decision
1
dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals
2
in CA-G.R. SP No. 54413,
3
and in CA-G.R. SP No. 54414,
4
and of its Resolution
5
dated June 5,
2001 reversing the Decision
6
dated May 22, 1998 and Resolution July 22, 1999 of the Office of the
President.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Nelita M. Bacaling and her spouse Ramon Bacaling were the owners of three (3) parcels of
land, with a total area of 9.9631 hectares, located in Barangay Cubay, Jaro, Iloilo City, and designated as
Lot No. 2103-A (Psd-24069), Lot No. 2103-B-12 (Psd 26685) and Lot No. 2295. These lots were duly
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-5801, T-5833 and T-5834, respectively. In 1955 the
landholding was subdivided into one hundred ten (110) sub-lots covered by TCT Nos. T-10664 to T-
10773, inclusive of the Registry of Deeds of the City of Iloilo. On May 16, 1955, the landholding was
processed and approved as "residential" or "subdivision" by the National Urban Planning Commission
(NUPC).
7
On May 24, 1955 the Bureau of Lands approved the corresponding subdivision plan for
purposes of developing the said property into a low-cost residential community which the spouses
referred to as the Bacaling-Moreno Subdivision.
8

In 1957, a real estate loan of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00) was granted to the spouses
Nelita and Ramon Bacaling by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for the development of
the subdivision.
9
To secure the repayment of the loan, the Bacalings executed in favor of the GSIS a real
estate mortgage over their parcels of land including the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots.
10
Out of the
approved loan of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00), only Two Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos
(P240,000.00) was released to them.
11
The Bacalings failed to pay the amortizations on the
loan and consequently the mortgage constituted on the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots was foreclosed by
the GSIS.
12
After a court case that reached all the way to this Court,
13
Nelita Bacaling (by then a widow)
in 1989 was eventually able to restore to herself ownership of the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots.
14

According to the findings of the Office of the President, in 1972 and thereafter, respondents Felomino
Muya, Crispin Amor, Wilfredo Jereza, Rodolfo Lazarte and Nemesio Tonocante clandestinely entered and
occupied the entire one hundred ten (110) sub-lots (formerly known as Lot No. 2103-A, Lot No. 2103-B-
12 and Lot No. 2295) and grabbed exclusively for themselves the said 9.9631 hectare
landholding.
15
Apparently, respondents took advantage of the problematic peace and order situation at
the onset of martial law and the foreclosure of the lots by GSIS.
16
They sowed the lots as if the same
were their own, and altered the roads, drainage, boundaries and monuments established thereon.
17

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that in 1964 they were legally instituted by Bacaling's
administrator/overseer as tenant-tillers of the subject parcels of land on sharing basis with two and a half
(2) hectares each for respondents Muya, Amor, Tonocante and Lazarte, and one and a half (1)
hectares for respondent Jereza. In 1974, their relationship with the landowner was changed to one of
leasehold. They religiously delivered their rental payments to Bacaling as agricultural lessor. In 1980, they
secured certificates of land transfer in their names for the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots. They have
made various payments to the Land Bank of the Philippines as amortizing owners-cultivators of their
respective tillage.
In 1977, however, the City Council of Iloilo enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 212 declaring the one hundred
ten (110) sub-lots as "residential" and "non-agricultural," which was consistent with the conversion
effected in 1955 by the NUPC and the Bureau of Lands. In 1978, Nelita Bacaling was able to register the
subject property as the Bacaling-Moreno Subdivision with the National Housing Authority and to obtain
therefrom a license to sell the subject one hundred ten (110) sub-lots comprising the said subdivision to
consummate the original and abiding design to develop a low-cost residential community.
In August 21, 1990, petitioner Jose Juan Tong, together with Vicente Juan and Victoria Siady, bought
from Nelita Bacaling the subject one hundred ten (110) sub-lots for One Million Seven Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P1,700,000.00).
18
The said sale was effected after Bacaling has repurchased the subject property
from the Government Service Insurance System. To secure performance of the contract of absolute sale
and facilitate the transfer of title of the lots to Jose Juan Tong, Bacaling appointed him in 1992 as her
attorney-in-fact, under an irrevocable special power of attorney with the following mandate-
1. To file, defend and prosecute any case/cases involving lots nos. 1 to 110 covered by TCT Nos.
T-10664 to T-10773 of the Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo;
2. To assume full control, prosecute, terminate and enter into an amicable settlement and
compromise agreement of all cases now pending before the DARAB, Region VI, Iloilo City, which
involved portion of Lots 1 to 110, covered by TCT Nos. T-10664 to T-10773 of the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo City, which were purchased by Jose Juan Tong, Vicente Juan Tong and Victoria
Siady;
3. To hire a lawyer/counsel which he may deem fit and necessary to effect and attain the
foregoing acts and deeds; handle and prosecute the aforesaid cases;
4. To negotiate, cause and effect a settlement of occupation and tenants on the aforesaid lots;
5. To cause and effect the transfer of the aforesaid lots in the name of the VENDEES;
6. To execute and deliver document/s or instrument of whatever nature necessary to accomplish
the foregoing acts and deeds.
19

It is significant to note that ten (10) years after the perfection and execution of the sale, or on April 26,
2000, Bacaling filed a complaint to nullify the contract of sale. The suit was, however, dismissed with
prejudice and the dismissal has long become final and executory.
20

Following the sale of the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots and using the irrevocable special power of
attorney executed in his favor, petitioner Tong (together with Bacaling) filed a petition for cancellation of
the certificates of land transfer against respondents and a certain Jaime Ruel with the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region VI Office in Iloilo City.
21
The DAR, however, dismissed the petition on the
ground that there had been no legitimate conversion of the classification of the 110 sub-lots from
agricultural to residential prior to October 21, 1972 when Operation Land Transfer under P.D. No. 72 took
effect.
22
Bacaling and Tong appealed to the DAR Central Office but their appeal was similarly
rejected.
23
The motion for reconsideration failed to overturn the ruling of the Central Office Order.
24

On September 19, 1997, Bacaling and Tong appealed the adverse DAR Orders to the Office of the
President which reversed them in toto in a Decision
25
dated May 22, 1998 (OP Decision, for brevity), the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises [considered], the assailed order of the Regional Director, DAR Region
VI, dated April 3, 1996, as well as the orders of the DAR Secretary dated December 12, 1996 and
September 4, 1997, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and subject landholdings declared
exempt from coverage of the CARL. The Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) issued to the
appellees are hereby cancelled and the Department of Agrarian Reform directed to implement the
voluntary offer made by appellant with respect to the payment of disturbance compensation and
relocation of the affected parties. 1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
26

The OP Decision found that the one hundred ten (110) parcels of land had been completely converted
from agricultural to residential lots as a result of the declarations of the NUPC and the Bureau of Lands
and the factual circumstances, i.e., the GSIS loan with real estate mortgage, the division of the original
three (3) parcels of land into one hundred ten (110) sub-lots under individual certificates of title, and the
establishment of residential communities adjacent to the subject property, which indubitably proved the
intention of Nelita and Ramon Bacaling to develop a residential subdivision thereon. The OP
Decision also categorically acknowledged the competence of the NUPC and the Bureau of Lands to
classify the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots into residential areas. On July 22, 1999, separate motions for
reconsideration thereof were denied.
27

Respondents elevated the OP Decision to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure.
28
Before the petition was resolved, or on December 2, 1999, Nelita Bacaling
manifested to the appellate court that she was revoking the irrevocable power of attorney in favor of Jose
Juan Tong and that she was admitting the status of respondents as her tenants of the one hundred ten
(110) sub-lots which allegedly were agricultural in character. The manifestation was however
characterized by an obvious streak of ambivalence when her prayer therein urged the Court of Appeals to
decide the case, curiously, "on the basis of the clear intent of Private Respondent" and "in accordance
with the perception of this Honorable Court."
29

On January 31, 2001 the Court of Appeals reversed the OP Decision and validated the certificates of land
transfers in favor of respondents without however promulgating a ruling on petitioner Tong's supposedly
ensuing lack of material interest in the controversy as a result of the manifestation.
30
The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is GRANTED; and the May 22, 1998 Decision of
the Office of the President is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 3, 1996 Order of the
Regional Director, DARAB, Region VI, is REINSTATED.
31

The appellate court refused to recognize the 1955 NUPC and Bureau of Lands classification of the
subject lots as residential subdivision. Tong moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision which Bacaling
did not oppose despite her manifestation. On June 5, 2001, again without a single reference to Bacaling's
alleged repudiation of Tong's actions, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration of its
decision,
32
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari based on the following assignment of errors:
I
SUBJECT LANDHOLDINGS ARE EXEMPT FROM THE COVERAGE OF P.D. 27 AND
OPERATION LAND TRANSFER (1972, AS WELL (sic) THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW (1988) AS THEY WERE CLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL WAY BACK IN 1955
BY THE THEN NATIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION AND THE SUBDIVSION PLAN WAS
APPROVED BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE CLTs ISSUED TO
PRIVATE RESPONENTS IN OCTOBER, 1980 ARE INVALID AS HAVING BEEN ISSUED
WITHOUT JURISDICTION.
II
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT BONA FIDE TENANTS OF THE LANDS INVOLVED.
PUBLIC REPSONDENT'S RULING THAT THE LATTER ARE SUCH IS CONTRARY TO LAW
AS IT IGNORED THE FACT THAT THE LANDHOLDINGS ARE RESIDENTIAL AND NO
COMPETENT PROOF OF CONSENT OF THE OWNER WAS EVER PRESENTED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
III
APPROVAL OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE
VALID CLASSIFICATION OF THE LANDS INVOLVED INTO RESIDENTIAL BECAUSE THE
CARL, AS ALSO THE RELATED AGRARIAN LAWS, HAVE NO RETROACTIVE
APPLICATION.
33

Long after issues were joined in the instant proceedings, or on October 8, 2001, petitioner Nelita Bacaling
resurrected her manifestation with the Court of Appeals and moved to withdraw/dismiss the present
petition on the ground that the irrevocable power of attorney in favor of petitioner Jose Juan Tong had
been nullified by her and that Tong consequently lacked the authority to appear before this Court.
34
She
also manifested that, contrary to the arguments of petitioner Tong, respondents were bona fide tenants of
the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots which were allegedly agricultural and not residential pieces of
realty.
35
Accordingly, petitioner Tong was left all alone to pursue the instant case.
The issues in this case can be summarized as follows: (1) Does petitioner Tong have the requisite
interest to litigate this petition for review on certiorari?; (2) Are the respondents agricultural lessees?; and
(3) Are the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots admittedly classified for residential use by the National Urban
Planning Commission and the Bureau of Lands prior to October 21, 1972
36
covered by the Operation
Land Transfer under P.D. No. 72?
We hold that petitioner Jose Juan Tong possesses adequate and legitimate interest to file the instant
petition. Under our rules of procedure, interest means material interest, that is, an interest in issue and to
be affected by the judgment,
37
while a real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured
by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
38
There should be no doubt that as
transferee of the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots through a contract of sale and as the attorney-in-fact of
Nelita Bacaling, former owner of the subject lots, under an irrevocable special power of attorney,
petitioner Tong stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the instant case as well as the orders
and decisions in the proceedings a quo. The deed of sale categorically states that petitioner Tong and his
co-sellers have fully paid for the subject parcels of land. The said payment has been duly received by
Bacaling. Hence, it stands to reason that he has adequate and material interest to pursue the present
petition to finality.
Respondents put too much weight on the motion to dismiss/withdraw filed by Nelita Bacaling. Under the
facts obtaining in this case, the motion should be treated cautiously, and more properly, even skeptically.
It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted
to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it
would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
39
Bacaling's motion to
dismiss the instant petition comes at the heels of her admission that she had immensely benefited from
selling the said one hundred ten (110) sub-lots to petitioner Tong and of the dismissal with prejudice of
the civil case which she had earlier filed to nullify the sale.
40
It appears that the motion to dismiss is a
crude and belated attempt long after the dismissal of the civil case to divest Tong of his indubitable right
of ownership over the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots through the pretext of revoking the irrevocable
special power of attorney which Bacaling had executed in his favor hoping that in the process that her act
would cause the assailed orders of the DAR to become final and executory.
The records also bear out the fact that Bacaling's design to dispossess petitioner Tong of material interest
in the subject matter of the instant petition appears to be subtly coordinated with respondents' legal
maneuvers when it began as a side pleading (a mere Manifestation) in the proceedings before the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 54413 and CA-G.R. SP No. 54414) but which was never pursued to its
ultimate conclusion until it again surfaced before this Court long after respondents' voluminous comment
to the instant petition had been filed. Under these circumstances, we certainly cannot place our trust upon
such an unsolicited motion having dubious roots, character and purpose.
Substantively, we rule that Bacaling cannot revoke at her whim and pleasure the irrevocable special
power of attorney which she had duly executed in favor of petitioner Jose Juan Tong and duly
acknowledged before a notary public. The agency, to stress, is one coupled with interest which is
explicitly irrevocable since the deed of agency was prepared and signed and/or accepted by petitioner
Tong and Bacaling with a view to completing the performance of the contract of sale of the one hundred
ten (110) sub-lots. It is for this reason that the mandate of the agency constituted Tong as the real party in
interest to remove all clouds on the title of Bacaling and that, after all these cases are resolved, to use the
irrevocable special power of attorney to ultimately "cause and effect the transfer of the aforesaid lots in
the name of the vendees [Tong with two (2) other buyers] and execute and deliver document/s or
instrument of whatever nature necessary to accomplish the foregoing acts and deeds."
41
The fiduciary
relationship inherent in ordinary contracts of agency is replaced by material consideration which in the
type of agency herein established bars the removal or dismissal of petitioner Tong as Bacaling's attorney-
in-fact on the ground of alleged loss of trust and confidence.
While Bacaling alleges fraud in the performance of the contract of agency to justify its revocation, it is
significant to note that allegations are not proof, and that proof requires the intervention of the courts
where both petitioners Tong and Bacaling are heard. Stated otherwise, Bacaling cannot vest in herself
just like in ordinary contracts the unilateral authority of determining the existence and gravity of grounds
to justify the rescission of the irrevocable special power of attorney. In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals
42
we
thus held-
But unlike simple grants of a power of attorney, the agency that we hereby declare to be
compatible with the intent of the parties, cannot be revoked at will. The reason is that it is one
coupled with an interest, the agency having been created for the mutual interest of the agent and
the principal xxx [Petitioner's] interest, obviously, is not limited to the commissions she earned as
a result of her business transactions, but one that extends to the very subject matter of the power
of management delegated to her. It is an agency that, as we said, cannot be revoked at the
pleasure of the principal. Accordingly, the revocation complained of should entitle the petitioner x
x x to damages.
The requirement of a judicial process all the more assumes significance in light of the dismissal with
prejudice, hence, res judicata, of Bacaling's complaint to annul the contract of sale which in turn gave rise
to the irrevocable special power of attorney. It is clear that prima facie there are more than sufficient
reasons to deny the revocation of the said special power of attorney which is coupled with interest.
Inasmuch as no judgment has set aside the agency relationship between Bacaling and Tong, we rule that
petitioner Tong maintains material interest to prosecute the instant petition with or without the desired
cooperation of Bacaling.
On the issue of whether the private respondents are agricultural tenants and entitled to the benefits
accorded by our agrarian laws, we rule in the negative. The requisites in order to have a valid agricultural
leasehold relationship are: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The
subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) There is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
We find that the first, third and sixth requisites are lacking in the case at bar. One legal conclusion
adduced from the facts in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals
43
provides that
GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of the subject properties from 1961 up to 1989 as a result of the
foreclosure and confirmation of the sale of the subject properties. Although the confirmation only came in
1975, the ownership is deemed to have been vested to GSIS way back in 1961, the year of the sale of
the foreclosed properties. This is due to the fact that the date of confirmation by the trial court of the
foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the actual sale itself.
44

Thus, the respondents cannot validly claim that they are legitimate and recognized tenants of the subject
parcels of land for the reason that their agreement to till the land was not with GSIS, the real landowner.
There is no showing that GSIS consented to such tenancy relationship nor is there proof that GSIS
received a share in the harvest of the tenants. Consequently, the respondents cannot claim security of
tenure and other rights accorded by our agrarian laws considering that they have not been validly
instituted as agricultural lessees of the subject parcels of land. And from the time Bacaling recovered the
subject properties from GSIS up to the time the former changed her legal position in the instant case,
Bacaling has consistently disclaimed respondents as her alleged tenants. Bacaling's current legal posture
cannot also overturn our finding since, as earlier mentioned, the said change of mind of Bacaling has little
or no evidentiary weight under the circumstances.
The respondents argue that GSIS cannot be considered as the owner of the said properties from 1961 up
to 1989 inasmuch as the foreclosure proceedings that started in 1957 only attained finality during its
promulgation by this Court in 1989. Respondents contend that GSIS was the owner of the said parcels of
land only from 1989.
We disagree. The pendency of the GSIS case cannot be construed as a maintenance of status quo with
Bacaling as the owner from 1957 up to 1989 for the reason that what was appealed to this Court was only
the issue of redemption, and not the validity of the foreclosure proceedings including the public auction
sale, the confirmation of the public auction sale and the confirmation and transfer of ownership of the
foreclosed parcels of land to GSIS. The ownership of GSIS over the subject parcels of land was not
disputed. It was the existence of the right to redeem in a judicial foreclosure that was the subject of the
controversy. We ruled that there was no longer any right of redemption in a judicial foreclosure
proceeding after the confirmation of the public auction. Only foreclosures of mortgages in favor of banking
institutions and those made extrajudicially are subject to legal redemption. Since GSIS is not a banking
institution and the procedure of the foreclosure is not extrajudicial in nature, no right of redemption exists
after the judicial confirmation of the public auction sale of the said lots.
With respect to the third issue, we find that the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots are indeed residential.
In Tiongson v. Court of Appeals
45
we held that if the lot in question is not an agricultural land then the
rules on agrarian reform do not apply since the "key factor in ascertaining whether there is a landowner-
tenant relationship xxx is the nature of the disputed property."
46
We reiterated this rule in Natalia Realty,
Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform
47
where we excluded lands not devoted to agricultural activity, i.e.,
lands previously converted to non-agricultural or residential uses prior to the effectivity of the 1988
agrarian reform law (R.A. No. 6657) by agencies other than the DAR, from the coverage of agrarian
reform. The statement of the rule is buttressed by P.D. No. 27 which by its terms applies only to "tenant-
farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of shared-crop or
lease tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not."
48

In the case at bar, the indubitable conclusion from established facts is that the one hundred ten (110)
sub-lots, originally three (3) parcels of land, have been officially classified as residential since 1955. The
classification began when the NUPC and the Bureau of Lands approved the subdivision of the original
three (3) parcels of land into one hundred ten (110) sub-lots each covered with transfer certificates of title.
To build the subdivision project, Nelita Bacaling then obtained a real estate mortgage loan from the GSIS
which she used to fund the project but he was unfortunately unable to complete it due to the immensity of
the project cost. Bacaling undertook to complete the sale of the subdivision when in 1978 she obtained
the registration thereof with the National Housing Authority as well as a license to sell individually the one
hundred ten (110) sub-lots. Earlier, in 1977, the City Council of Iloilo also recognized the residential
classification of the same one hundred ten (110) sub-lots when it passed the Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance. In 1990, Bacaling sold the same parcels of land to petitioner Tong who obviously wanted to
pursue the development of the subdivision project. It is clear that Tong bought the property for residential
and not agricultural purposes upon the strong assurance of Bacaling that the one hundred ten (110) sub-
lots were legally available for such prospect. To be sure, the subject lots were valuable in the buyer's
market only for residential use as shown by the example of adjacent lots which had long been utilized for
building subdivisions and the implausibility of believing that Tong would buy the lands only to lose them at
a bargain to agrarian reform.
49

Clearly, both intention and overt actions show the classification of the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots for
residential use. There can be no other conclusion from the facts obtaining in the instant case. Indeed, one
cannot imagine Nelita Bacaling borrowing the substantial amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P600,000.00) from the GSIS and spending Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00) for the
purpose of developing and subdividing the original three (3) parcels of land into one hundred ten (110)
homelots, with individual transfer certificates of title ready and available for sale, if her purported desire
were to keep the landholding for agricultural purposes. It also makes no sense that petitioner Tong would
invest so much money, time and effort in these sub-lots for planting and cultivating agricultural crops
when all the mechanisms are already in place for building a residential community. One cannot likewise
deny the consistent official government action which decreed the said one hundred ten (110) sub-lots as
most appropriate for human settlements considering that for several times beginning in 1955 and in
accordance with relevant laws and regulations, the said landholding was categorically reserved as a
residential subdivision.
It is also grave error to gloss over the NUPC action since its declarations have long been recognized in
similar cases as the present one as clear and convincing evidence of residential classification. In Magno-
Adamos v. Bagasao
50
we found the endorsements of the NUPC approving albeit tentatively a subdivision
plan to be a very strong evidence of conversion of the disputed parcels of land into a residential
subdivision which would contradict the alleged tenancy relationship. We found nothing objectionable in
the trial court's ruling in Santos v. de Guzman
51
ejecting an alleged tenant from the landholding "because
the same was included in a homesite subdivision duly approved by the National Planning
Commission."
52
In Republic v. Castellvi53 we gave great weight to the certification of the NUPC that the
subject parcels of land were classified as residential areas and ordered their appraisal as residential and
not agricultural lands -
The lower court found, and declared, that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are residential
lands. The finding of the lower court is in consonance with the unanimous opinion of the three
commissioners who, in their report to the court, declared that the lands are residential lands. The
Republic assails the finding that the lands are residential, contending that the plans of the
appellees to convert the lands into subdivision for residential purposes were only on paper, there
being no overt acts on the part of the appellees which indicated that the subdivision project had
been commenced xxx. We find evidence showing that the lands in question had ceased to be
devoted to the production of agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for residential
purposes, and that the appellees had actually taken steps to convert their lands into residential
subdivisions xxx. The evidence shows that Castellvi broached the idea of subdividing her land
into residential lots as early as July 11, 1956 in her letter to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines xxx. As a matter of fact, the layout of the subdivision plan was tentatively
approved by the National Planning Commission on September 7, 1956 xxx. The land of Castellvi
had not been devoted to agriculture since 1947 when it was leased to the Philippine Army. In
1957 said land was classified as residential, and taxes based on its classification as residential
had been paid since then xxx. The location of the Castellvi land justifies its suitability for a
residential subdivision.
The NUPC was created under EO 98, s. of 1946
54
to "prepare general plans, zoning ordinances, and
subdivision regulations, to guide and accomplish a coordinated, adjusted, harmonious reconstruction and
future development of urban areas which will in accordance with present and future needs, best promote
health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare, as well as efficiency and
economy in the process of development; including among other things adequate provisions for traffic, the
promotion of safety from fire and other dangers, adequate provision for light and air, the promotion of
healthful and convenient distribution of populations xxx."
55
Under the express terms of its mandate, the
NUPC was therefore duty-bound to act only upon realty projects which would be used for human
settlements and not for agricultural purposes. It is in this light that we must take stock of the 1955 NUPC
conversion of the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots from agricultural to residential classification.
To bolster the exclusive role of the NUPC over developmental projects for residential and industrial
purposes, the term "subdivision" (which NUPC was mandated to review and if properly executed to
approve) was defined in EO 98as "the division of a tract or parcel of land into two (2) or more lots, sites or
other divisions for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or building development, and
includes resubdivision, and when appropriate to the context, relates to the process of subdividing or to the
land or area subdivided."
56
The Subdivision Regulations
57
(which the NUPC adopted pursuant to EO 98)
decreed as mandatory the NUPC approval of all subdivisions of land in the Philippines intended for
residential, commercial and industrial purposes, before lots comprising the subdivision could be legally
sold or building development therein could validly commence -
Any owner of land wishing to subdivide land shall submit to the Director of Planning [who was the
head of NUPC] a plat of the subdivision which shall conform to the requirements set forth in these
Regulations. No subdivider shall proceed with the sale of lots of a subdivision and no plat of a
subdivision shall be filed with the Director of Lands for approval or recorded in the Office of the
Register of Deeds until such plat shall have been approved by the Director of
Planning. Applications for plat approval submitted to the District or City Engineer of a town or city
in the Philippines shall be forwarded to the Director of Planning together with the District or City
Engineer's recommendations (underscoring supplied).
We are convinced that the 1955 approval by the NUPC of the subdivision of the subject three (3) parcels
of land owned by Nelita Bacaling and her spouse into one hundred ten (110) sub-lots caused the
conversion, if not outright classification, of the entire landholding into a residential community for sale to
interested buyers. This is an official classification of the sub-lots as residential units and constitutes the
only objective and effectual means of obtaining in 1955 the classification and reservation of private land
for non-agricultural use, i.e. residential, industrial or commercial, since neither P.D. No. 27 nor R.A. No.
6657
58
(together with the specified formal mechanisms stipulated therein for converting a piece of
agricultural land into a residential lot) were then binding and effective. The assignment or conversion of
the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots for residential purposes was not abrogated by P.D. No. 27 under
which respondents invalidly secured their certificates of land transfer since the decree was only
prospectively effective
59
and its coverage was limited only to agricultural lands which clearly do not
include the residential sub-lots in question.
60

By virtue of the official classification made by NUPC and the other circumstances convincingly proved
herein, the only fair and legally acceptable decision in the instant case would be to declare, as we now
indeed rule, that the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots are truly residential in character as well as in purpose
and are thus excluded from the coverage of P.D. No. 27.
Verily, the Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) issued in respondents' names are not valid and do not
change our ruling. The respondents cannot rely on said CLTS as proof of security of tenure. It is well
settled that the certificates of land transfer are not absolute evidence of ownership of the subject
lots
61
and consequently do not bar the finding that their issuance is void from inception since they cover
residential lands contrary to the mandate of P.D. No. 27. It follows from the fact of nullity of the certificates
of land transfer in respondents' names that the respondents are not entitled to occupy and possess the
one hundred ten (110) sub-lots or portions thereof without the consent of the owner, herein petitioner
Tong.1wphi1.nt
While not raised as issues in the instant petition, we nevertheless rule now (conformably with Gayos v.
Gayos
62
that it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation) that
respondents cannot claim disturbance compensation for the reason that the sub-lots are not and have
never been available for agrarian reform. In the same vein, respondents also have no right to be
reimbursed by petitioner Jose Juan Tong for the value of or expenses for improvements which they might
have introduced on the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots since they did not allege nor prove the existence
of such improvements and their right to compensation thereto, if any.
63

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. It is further ordered and adjudged that:
1. The certificates of land transfer over the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots located in Barangay Cubay,
Jaro, Iloilo City, in the name of respondents and/or their successors in interest are
hereby DECLARED VOID AB INITIO. The said one hundred ten (110) sub-lots, covered by TCT Nos. T-
10664 to T-10773 of the Registry of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, are declared outside the coverage and
operation of P.D. No. 27 and other land reform laws.
2. The consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54413 ("Felomino Muya and
Crispin Amor v. Nelita Bacaling, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Jose Juan Tong, and the Executive
Secretary, Office of the President") and in CA-G.R. SP No. 54414, ("Wilfredo Jereza, Rodolfo Lazarte and
Nemesio Tonocante v. Hon. Executive Secretary, Office of the President and Nelita Bacaling") and its
Resolution dated June 5, 2001 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.
3. The Decision dated May 22, 1998 and the Resolution dated July 22, 1999 of the Office of the President
in OP Case No. 98-K-8180 are REINSTATED with the modification in that the respondents are not
entitled to disturbance compensation; and
4. Respondents Felomino Muya, Crispin Amor, Wilfredo Jereza, Rodolfo Lazarte and Nemesio Tonocante
together with their assigns and successors in interest are ordered to vacate and surrender peacefully the
possession of the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots, covered by TCT Nos. T-10664 to T-10773-Iloilo City, to
petitioner Jose Juan Tong within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Footnotes
36
This is the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 72, the land reform law under which respondents
obtained the certificates of land transfer in their names.
52
The National Planning Commission was the successor agency of the National Urban Planning
Commission under EO 367, s. 1950; 46 O.G., No. 11, pp. 5301-5307 (11 November 1950).
54
The EO is entitled "Creating a National Urban Planning Commission and Defining Its Powers
and Duties."