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Proto-language
C.B. Martin
Published online: 02 Jun 2006.
To cite this article: C.B. Martin (1987) Proto-language, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 65:3, 277-289, DOI: 10.1080/00048408712342941
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A uslralasian Journal of Philosophy
Vol. 65, No. 3, June 1987
P R OT O- L ANGUAGE 1
C. B. Ma r t i n
Ther e was life bef or e l anguage in t he hi st or y o f t he race and o f t he i ndi vi dual .
The de ve l opme nt o f t he pr e- ver bal act i vi t y o f t he r ace and o f t he i ndi vi dual
is by degr ees a pr ogr e s s i on f r o m t he s emant i c ooz e t o s ophi s t i cat ed non-
l i ngui st i c pat t er ns o f i nt er - r el at ed be ha vi our , bot h s har ed and uns har ed.
The bat t l e ma y well have been l ar gel y won 2 in s howi ng t hat pr e- l i ngui st i c
and non- l i ngui s t i c be ha vi our ma y be c ompl e x and i nt ent i onal . I wi sh t o t ake
t he bat t l e still f ur t her agai nst t he per si st ent mys t i que o f l anguage and ar gue
t hat some non-l i ngui st i c act i vi t y at its mor e sophi st i cat ed and st r uct ur ed !e-'els
has a r emar kabl e pattern o f parallels t o t hat o f linguistic act i vi t y. It is a mat t er
of degree, but when an agent shows enough o f t hi s pa t t e r n o f paral l el s, this
s t r uct ur ed ne t wor k o f i nt er - r el at ed pr oc e dur a l act i vi t y can be cal l ed ' p r o t o -
l anguage' . It s houl d be r e me mbe r e d t hat t he de ve l opme nt o f l i ngui st i c
behavi our is also a mat t er o f degr ee.
We can ma ke a begi nni ng t owa r d seei ng t hat non- ve r ba l act i vi t y ma y, in
itself, have s emant i c poi nt by r e me mbe r i ng t hat i f we have not ( by s ome
s uppos i t i on or a s s u mp t i o n or act ual obs e r va t i on) set t l ed on or hypot hes i s ed
concer ni ng an i nt er pr et at i on o f s ome ot her l i ngui st i c gr oup' s c ompl e x and
i nt er-rel at ed non-verbal doi ngs in and with t hei r physi cal e nvi r onme nt , t her e
is no al t er nat i ve non- ma gi c a l r out e t o t he s emant i c poi nt o f t hei r sayings.
One' s knowl edge o f or s uppos i t i on concer ni ng a not he r linguistic gr oup' s non-
verbal doi ngs is basi c t o a nd pr i or t o and easier t o ascer t ai n t ha n knowl edge
of their sayi ngs. Wat chi ng a film in a l anguage one does not under s t and shoul d
help t o ma ke t hat cl ear.
An exampl e o f pr oc e dur a l act i vi t y des cr i bed as pr ot o- l i ngui s t i c ma y seem
over - i nt er pr et ed onl y becaus e t he exampl e is t o o undet ai l ed. An y i nst ance
of pr oc e dur a l act i vi t y mus t be r el at ed t o a vast c ompl e x o f i nt er - r el at ed
act i vi t y o f t he agent f or it t o bear t he suggest ed i nt er pr et at i on. Ea c h case,
t hen, woul d need at l east t he pages o f a novel or a full l engt h film.
I n t he f ol l owi ng a c c o u n t an i nt ui t i ve r ange o f exampl es will be set out in
enough det ai l so t ha t t he y will be suggestive o f t he i ndefi ni t e r ange o f i nt er-
rel at ed be ha vi our r equi r ed f or t he i nst ances o f be ha vi our i n t he exampl es
t o have a degr ee o f det er mi nat enes s o f s emant i c i mpor t .
An earlier version of this paper was read at the Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Stanford University, September 20, 1985.1 wish to thank John Perry, Michael
Bratman, John Etchemendy, Paul Snowdon, John Bigelow, John Heil, and Ali Kazmi for
their helpful criticisms.
2 Cf. Robert Kirk, 'Rationality Without Language', Mind 76 (1967), Jonathan Bennett, Linguistic
Behaviour, 1976, and C. B. Martin, 'The New Cartesianism', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
4 (1984).
277
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278 Prot o-Language
The word ' language' is embedded in the word ' proto-language' , but this
is n o t meant to suggest that proto-language is a kind of language as sign
language is a kind of language. It is meant to indicate that proto-language
is a structured, rule-governed 3 network of semantic, procedural activity pr i or
to and basi c to linguistic activity, having an almost totally unnoticed and
surprising pattern of parallels to language itself.
This paper is a beginning toward detailing the structure and nature of proto-
linguistic activity in its individual and social usage so as to provide a mo d e l
for explaining a natural developmental flow (allowing also for and
incorporating and making understandable the inventive 'leaps') in the semantic
evolution of the race and the individual b e f o r e language and i nt o language.
It is obvious that after (racially or individually) first acquiring a language,
we do not and cannot abandon the use of the prOto-language. Their subtle
inter-play and also their separat e domains of semantic dominance and richness
need investigation.
1. Word as t oke n- wor d as type.
Sentence as t oken- sent ence as type.
2. The sentence, not the word, is the basic unit.
Ryl e - ' We use words to ma k e sentences.'
la. Step as t oke n- s t e p as type.
Procedure as t oken- pr ocedur e as type.
2a. The procedure, not the step, is the basic unit.
' We use steps to ma k e procedures. '
It is not easier to give clear and unproblematic non-intentional rules for
the distinction between step and procedure than it is to give parallel
unproblematic general non-semantic rules for the distinction between word
and sentence.
There can be greater gaps between phonemes than between words in a
sentence, so very mechanical general rules for word-detection are not possible.
The semantic function or how the writing-the-token action or sounding-the-
token action is used by the agent must be introduced and the rules for this
are not clearly and unproblematically general. If semantics can be kept entirely
out of syntax, no one has clearly shown how.
There are, of course, dictionaries that recognise and deal with words. There
are also recognised steps for procedures. There can be instruction in non-
verbal procedures showing discrete and sequential steps.
Before there were dictionaries there was instruction in the vocabulary.
Before there were illustrated manuals there was instruction in the steps of
various pr ocedur es- how to set the foot for a noiseless step in vari ous hunting
procedures. There can be pronunciation practice of a word and proto-
pronunciation practice of a step to be used (practicing a grip on a golf club).
The very same action used as a noiseless step in a stalking procedure could
3 The rules of proto-language, as also the rules of language, need not be explicitly known by
a particular user or even by any user. Some of us are not sure that a clear description of
what a rule of language is has been stated or that even one clear example of such a rule has
been given.
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C. B. Martin 279
be given a different use as a non-slipping step in a walking across the ice
procedure.
It may still be thought that there is a special difficulty in answering the
question ' Why isn't any step in a procedure to be thought of as a procedure
in itself?'
Almost any procedural steps coul d be used as a procedure just as almost
any word coul d be used as a sentence. It depends, in both the linguistic case
and the proto-linguistic case, upon how the action is used and seen by the
agent. That is, whether the action is used and seen as a procedural unit for
its own projected outcome or as only a part (step) in a total procedure taken
as the unit, for a projected outcome. This is parallel to whether verbal action
is u.sed and seen as a sentence unit for its own declarative use or as only a
part (word) in a total sentence taken as the unit for its declarative use.
A particular action may have been used as a one word sentence or may
have been used as a word in a sentence that got interrupted and so remains
only an incomplete sentence.
Similarly, a particular action may have been used as a one step procedure
or may have been used as a part of a procedure that got interrupted and
so remains only an incomplete procedure.
3. Similar words in a sentence can have a different semantic use and different
words in a sentence can have a similar semantic use.
3a. Similar steps in a procedure can have a different operational use and
different steps in a procedure can have a similar operational use.
4. Similar sentences can have different semantic point (express different
statements) in virtue of the similar words having a different semantic use and
different sentences can have similar semantic point (make the same statement)
in virtue of the different words having a similar semantic use.
4a. Similar procedures can have different operational point (perform
different operations) in virtue of the similar steps having a different operational
use and different procedures can have similar operational point (perform
similar operations) in virtue of the different steps having a similar operational
use.
5. One can ask ' Which sentence shall we use to express the statement?'
5a. One can ask ' Which procedure shall we use to perform the operation?'
6. The speaker has the capacity to make sentences expressing an indefinite
number of statements using a finite number of words.
6a. The agent has the capacity to make procedures performing an indefinite
number of operations using a finite number of steps.
7. Sat i sf act i on- t he predicate of the sentence is satisfied by something.
7a. Sat i sf act i on- t he di scer ni ngs- about representational activity of the
observational procedure is satisfied by something.
The non-linguistic procedural activity that I have called ' proto-language'
does not have anything like a full grammatical structure. It is not, after all,
language. However, there is a rough parallel to subject-predicate that can
yield a parallel to the satisfaction of a predicate.
A spatio-temporal region and something in it is represented by and fixed
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280 Proto-Language
by, e. g. , the di rect i on in which one is l ooki ng or the posi t i on of one' s hand
in t ouchi ng and di rect i on of one' s at t ent i on to what is within t he region. This
wor ks r oughl y as the ' subj ect ' .
By the selective, compar at i ve, abst r act i ve, cont r ast i ve, pr oj ect i ve use of
sensory input one per f or ms pr ocedur al l y discerning represent at i onal activity
about what has been r epr esent ed in t he s pat i o- t empor al regi on. Thi s
' pr ocedur al - di scer ni ngs- about represent at i onal act i vi t y' wor ks roughl y as the
' pr edi cat e' .
This observat i onal di scerni ngs-about -represent at i onal activity parallels (but,
of course, is not t he same t hi ng as) t he pr edi cat e of a sent ence as the
obs er vat i onal f i x of somet hi ng parallels (but , of course, is not t he same thing
as) the subj ect of a sent ence.
l have emphasi sed the non- behavi our al act i vi t y, but what coul d be called
' experi ent i al l y-l oaded behavi our ' is c ommonl y and i mpor t ant l y i nvol ved.
One' s own behavi our is experi ent i al l y-l oaded as one has visual, tactile,
ki naest het i c sensory f eed- back concer ni ng t hat behavi our as one t urns one' s
head for a bet t er view, moves one' s hand to get a bet t er feel of the obj ect ,
or wal ks closer to obser ve in mor e detail, etc.
8. A sent ence is t rue iff the pr edi cat e is satisfied by somet hi ng.
8a. An obser vat i onal pr ocedur e is veridical iff the di scerni ngs-about
r epr esent at i onal act i vi t y is satisfied by somet hi ng.
9. What is or isn't (e.g., a rock falls down a cliff, does not hit a boul der)
t hat is represent ed in a sent ence expressi ng a t rue st at ement , t ypi cal l y woul d
still have been or not been t hough unr epr esent ed.
9a. What is or isn't (e.g., a rock falls, etc.) t hat is represented in a procedure
per f or mi ng a veridical observat i onal scanning oper at i on, typically woul d still
have been or not been t hough unr epr esent ed.
10. What is required f o r there to be an unexpressed st at ement ?
Ther e woul d be someone' s real ( t hough unexerci sed) linguistic capaci t y to
generat e a sent ence t hat woul d have or have had a par t i cul ar semant i c point
(expressi ng the st at ement ) , and t here is what is or isn't t hat woul d provi de
or woul d have pr ovi ded sat i sf act i on f or the predi cat es i f the i ndi vi dual had
mani f est ed its capaci t y to generat e such a sentence.
10a. What is requi red f o r there to be an unperf ormed operation?
Ther e woul d be s omeone' s real ( t hough unexerci sed) pr ocedur al capaci t y
t o generat e a pr ocedur e t hat woul d have had a par t i cul ar pr ocedur al poi nt
( per f or mi ng an oper at i on) , and t here is what is or isn't t hat woul d pr ovi de
or would have provi ded satisfaction for procedural proj ect i on i f the individual
had mani f est ed its capaci t y t o generat e such a pr ocedur e.
11. What is requi red f o r there to be an unexpressed st at ement wi t hout even
the existence o f utterances or any individuals capable o f language?
It woul d be f or t here t o exist a Wa y of using wor ds simpliciter t hat could
exist t hough not hi ng capabl e of usi ng wor ds existed.
11 a. What is requi red f o r there to be an unper f or med operation wi t hout
even the existence o f any i ndi vi dual s capable o f compl ex interrelated
procedures?
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C. B. Martin 281
It woul d be f or t here to exist a Way of using steps si mpl i ci t er, t hat coul d
exist t hough not hi ng capabl e of using steps existed.
As t here woul d be a Way of (non-exi st ent ) speakers using (non-exi st ent )
wor d- t okens, t here woul d be a Way of (non-exi st ent ) agent s using (non-
existent) powder ed uni cor n horn.
Why not say i nst ead t hat in such exigencies we are left j ust with what is
or isn' t, f or t hat can be i f real i sm is correct , wi t hout l anguage or pr ocedur al
act i on and even wi t hout bei ngs capabl e of such act i on? Tr ut h is a rel at i on
between such beings and what is or isn't. What is or isn't can be wi t hout t rut h,
but t r ut h cannot be wi t hout what is or i s n ' t . 4
Such a st ri ct ure woul d keep fai t h with the t r ut h t hat l anguage consists in
the capaci t i es and act i ons of peopl e.
However one goes in this cont ent i ous field, whet her to l uxuri at e in
universals or Ways or pr oposi t i ons or possi bl e worl ds, or to t ake the st erner
stand t hat less is enough, t he paral l el s bet ween the linguistic and the non-
linguistic cont i nue. That is enough f or t he pur poses of this paper .
12. The most basic ki nd of sentence is t he decl arat i ve in which the sentence
is a r epr esent at i on of somet hi ng such t hat it is t rue or false, and t he act i vi t y
of r epr esent at i on does not serve pr i mar i l y to affect what is represent ed.
12a. The mos t basic ki nd of pr ocedur e is obser vat i onal in which t he
pr ocedur e is a r epr esent at i on of somet hi ng such t hat it is veri di cal or non-
veridical, and the act i vi t y of r epr esent at i on does not serve pr i mar i l y to affect
what is represent ed.
The represent at i on of observi ng a r abbi t runni ng f r om a dog is achieved by
the procedural use of sensory i nput . For exampl e, it is by selectively at t endi ng
to the movement of a rabbi t , cont rast i ng this against a st at i onar y backgr ound
of trees and mount ai ns (and not at t endi ng to passing clouds) and compar at i ve
at t ent i on to t he movement of the dog getting closer to the rabbi t .
The status of such a simple case depends upon the degree to which it, as a pro
cedure, fits for the agent into a complex interrelated network of such procedures.
If the degree of fit is sufficiently sophisticated then even such a simple case could
win the status of what I have called prot o-l anguage. All of this is required in
making det ermi nat e the scope for veridicality and non- veridicality.
The agent in such obser vat i onal cases need not be sel f-consci ous about
what it is using and h o w on t he occasi on of use any mor e t han t he nor mal
speaker woul d be.
Di fferent obser vat i onal pr ocedur es can pe r f or m t he same obser vat i onal
oper at i on in vi rt ue of di fferent steps bei ng gi ven si mi l ar oper at i onal use.
For i nst ance, selectively at t endi ng to t he movement of t he f r o n t legs of
the r abbi t is a st ep in one' s selective orderi ng and abst r act i ng in t he use of
sensory i nput f or t he pr ocedur al r epr esent at i on of vi sual l y t r acki ng a r abbi t
runni ng f r om a dog. That st ep coul d have been repl aced by t he step of
selectively at t endi ng t o t he move me nt of t he bac k legs of t he r abbi t wi t hout
altering t he oper at i onal poi nt of t he r epr esent at i on.
4 cf. c. B. Martin, "Anti-Realism and the World's Undoing" Pacific Philosophical Quarterly,
January 1984, for a defense of realism.
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282 Proto-Language
My account has not been couched in t er ms of bel i ef states and desire states
as i nt ent i onal pri mi t i ves. Let me expl ai n why.
. . uni versal i t y bel ongs not t o t hi ngs t hemsel ves, whi ch are all of t hem
par t i cul ar in t hei r existence, even t hose words and ideas which are general
. . t hei r general nat ur e bei ng not hi ng but t he capaci t y t hey are put i nt o
by the underst andi ng, of signifying or representing many particulars. (John
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, I I I - I I I - 11.
We can par aphr as e what Locke says by sayi ng t hat not hi ng par t i cul ar is
i nt ent i onal in i t sel f but is made so only by its use. Beliefs and desires or
' i nf or mat i on' st at es are par t i cul ar st at es and so in t hemsel ves are not
i nt ent i onal . Nor are t hey i nt ent i onal because of t hei r compl ex causal
i nt er r el at i onshi p wi t h ot her st at es wi t h per haps bi o-genet i c expl anat i ons
concerni ng their evol ut i on t hr ough their compl ex envi r onment al sensitivities.
That account does well enough f or such non- i nt ent i onal st at es as st at es of
t he digestive syst em. 5
Fol l owi ng Locke, and empl oyi ng his semi nal not i on of part i al considering,
i nt ent i onal i t y comes onl y f r om t he pr ocedur al uses by t he agent of its states
Belief or desire st at es are not t he ki nds of t hi ngs f or such pr ocedur al use.
They are i nst ead capacity (and t endency) st at es f or t he use of what can be
used. What can be used is our sensory i nput and i mager y and our experientially
l oaded ( t hr ough sensor y f eedback) behavi our .
It is mor e frui t ful t o consi der t he expl i cat i on of bel i ef and desire in t er ms
of the doi ngs and an i nt errel at ed compl ex of doi ng capacities (and tendencies)
of which t he experiential is an intrinsic and essential par t or aspect of anyt hi ng
used in such a doi ng (and i f t he doi ng is a ' ment al ' doi ng, it is t he principal
part ), t han it is t o expl i cat e such experi ent i al l y l oaded doi ngs in t er ms of
beliefs and desires
Thi s active, pr ocedur al model for percept ual discernings replaces the model
of per cept i on t hat ei t her gives no rol e t o sensat i on (repl aci ng it wi t h belief)
or gives sensat i on onl y t he dumb mi ddl e- man causal rol e of bei ng an effect
of physi cal st i mul i and a cause of belief. I n t he act i ve model I am suggesting
it is t he mat er i al f or pr ocedur al use.
Paul Snowdon in cor r espondence suggest ed t hat onl y in t he linguistic case
one r eason f or goi ng t hr ough t he act i vi t y of sayi ng t hat it is rai ni ng is t hat
it is a way of maki ng a decl ar at i ve r epr esent at i on t hat it is rai ni ng. The
char act er i sat i on is par t of an expl anat i on of t he act i on.
I n a paral l el way, however , I can put mys el f in t he obser vat i onal posi t i on
of havi ng a good l ook and feel at what I already k n o w- t h e fami l i ar cont ours,
col ours, t ext ure, etc. of my own hand. Par t of t he r eason f or engagi ng in
such r epr esent at i onal act i vi t y is t hat it is a r epr esent at i on. I like t he look and
the f eel whi ch I know t hat I can al t er (by hal f closing my eyes, et c. ) wi t hout
al t eri ng t he hand. I am not doi ng this t o get new i nf or mat i on or even t o re-
affi rm old knowl edge. I t ma y be as close as one can get t o r epr esent at i on
f or r epr esent at i on' s sake.
5 cf. c. B. Martin and Karl Pfeifer, "Intentionality and the Non-Psychological", Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 4 (1986).
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C. B. Martin 283
I have t ri ed t o i sol at e act i vi t y pur sued onl y f or t he semant i c pur pose of
represent i ng somet hi ng t o be t he case. Thi s pur i t y is r ar e in bot h linguistic
and non-l i ngui st i c activity, but I have shown it is possi bl e t o achi eve as much
in t he non-l i ngui st i c as in t he linguistic case.
On pages 148-49 of J ona t ha n Bennet t ' s spl endi d book, Li ngui st i c
Behavi our, he states:
The human si t uat i on differs f r om t he t ri bal one in anot her way. To explain
it, I need t o di st i ngui sh t hree ways in whi ch U mi ght get A t o believe t hat
P. (1) He mi ght reveal t o A some i nt ent i on- f r ee evi dence f or P, i.e. some
i t em whi ch is evi dence f or P i ndependent l y of U' s i nt ent i ons in maki ng
it avai l abl e t o A. (2) He mi ght empl oy t he credence mechani s m t o get A
t o believe P, by some act i on cont ai ni ng what I call a ' nat ur al poi nt er ' t o
P, t hat is, somet hi ng which nat ur al l y t ends t o i nduce in the observer some
t hought closely connect ed wi t h P; f or i nst ance, a pant omi ne of a snake
i f P is about a snake. (3) He mi ght empl oy t he credence mechani s m by
means of an act i on whi ch did not nat ur al l y poi nt t o P, e. g. sayi ng ' Ther e
is a snake near you' t o war n A t hat t here is a snake near hi m.
(2) and (3) coul d be descri bed as i nvol vi ng, respect i vel y, ' i coni c' and
' non- i coni c' vehicles of meani ng. The ' nat ur al poi nt er ' i nvol ved in (2) need
not be ' i coni c' in t he strict sense of i nvol vi ng a r esembl ance bet ween t he
act i on and somet hi ng to do wi t h P; f or t he poi nt er coul d be an act ual
obj ect whi ch is i nvol ved in P - f o r exampl e, U mi ght hol d up a dish
meani ng t hat he want ed A t o give it t o hi m. Still, ' i coni c' is a handy label,
and I shall use it.
I do not t hi nk t hat Bennet t ' s classifications capt ur e t he fol l owi ng ki nd of
case.
Non-l i ngui st i c modes of mat hemat i cal t hi nki ng in t opol ogi cal and
geomet ri cal ways are achi eved by pr oj ect i ons f r om act ual and i magi ned,
per f or med and unper f or med, mani pul at i ons and gr oupi ngs of obj ect s. It is
pr ocedur al and oper at i onal t hi nki ng. Thi s ma y be shar ed or not shared.
A carpent er may come t o know non-linguistically t he general characteristics
of ma t e r i a l s - of di fferent ki nds of wood - what ki nd of wood is sui t abl e f or
what ki nd of use, wi t h const ant pr oj ect i ons (right or wrong) f or new and
untried ki nds of use. I t is pr ocedur al and oper at i onal t hi nki ng. Thi s ma y
be shared or not shared.
Someone who has mast er ed these ways of pr ocedur al pr oj ect i ve t hought
may, on si ght i ng a par t i cul ar shape of a par t of a di st ant mount ai n, use this
in his or her var i ous compl ex procedures of t hought t o pr oj ect this shape
as par t of a pl an f or t he possi bl e use of a speci al wood t o be used in a very
special new fitting r el at i onshi p in a novel shelter design.
Bennet t has consi der ed onl y t he communi cat i ve behavi our al f or ms of
represent at i on and this wor ked well f or t he pur poses of his ar gument . I have
been emphasi si ng f or ms of r epr esent at i on t hat are not for, or not pr i mar i l y
for, communi cat i on. The shar ed and communi cat i ve uses of even l anguage
itself seem t o me t o have been over-st ressed. At least ei ght y percent of our
linguistic act i vi t y is nei t her shar ed nor communi cat ed. It occurs in our silent
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284 Prot o- Language
verbalisations in the head and talking to ourselves, or notes written only for
one' s own eye. It is the most common mode of representation for our
assessments, claims, wonderi ngs, plans, proj ect s, reflections and
hypothesisings. Such activity deserves full status as linguistic utterance. It
is not a kind of rehearsal for the ' real' t hi ng- i t i s the real thing. It is not
something ' behind' ut t er ance- i t i s utterance.
The socialisation and sharedness of semantic activity both linguistic and
nonqinguistic has been over emphasised and wrongly been made exclusive.
(Indeed, the first l i ngui s t i c use of an artificial sign could well have been the
heaping of stones as a communicative act by someone to remind i t s e l f at a
later time of where it had buried something, or the breaking of branches
to give i t s e l f r e mi n d e r s of the way back to the point from which it started.)
How far a child would go with its own unshared ideolect is a real question
that has been botched by bad research.
There are things that an infant must begin to do and even continue in doing
for i t s e l f .
An infant' s sensory discriminations, comparings and contrastings, its
reachings and graspings under sensory control are not all learned from others.
Its own inventive wa y of crawling need not have been socially reinforced.
Watch a child find its o wn way with things without sharing this with or getting
reinforcement from anyone. Yet the child may retain these skilled procedures
enjoying its success. No doubt the child as a social being would at least need
what might be called ' hugs-in-general' that might reinforce all sorts of
inventive activity to which it was not at all specially directed.
The ' born Crusoe' is quite another case and would have to be nurtured
impersonally and most luckily by nature and it would probably have to be
by nature itself (and most improbably so) the very limit case of the autistic.
At least, it is no model for us, who need not only hugs-in-general, but a great
many hugs-in-particular for our reinforcements.
We are, of course, social animals, but we are private animals too with
private ways of learning and private ways of performing, some of them basic
to the social ways.
Much of our procedural activity that is directed successfully or
unsuccessfully to an outcome is not learned from or, especially in its many
inventive forms, is not merely a socialised result of, interaction with others
and it is not a shared activity let alone a conventionally shared activity and
its purpose is not communication.
There are natural procedural ways of behaving directed to a particular
out come (that may or may not be successful) that need not be learned from
others. These procedures are reinforced by success of out come and not
necessarily by reward from others. I believe that, to a substantial degree,
we are i n n a t e l y built so that success is, to a de gr e e , its own reward and we
are, fortunately, i n n a t e l y built to bear up, not necessarily to be in all ways
dependent on social encouragement a n d to repeatedly try against failure. The
physical environment itself has a role to play in our learning by rewarding
with success and punishing by failure our endeavours.
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C. B. Martin 285
I have meant to emphasise the important role of the individual' s semantic
enterprise in which it can carry on with what works, not needing others to
'catch on' and share before its action has semantic point. Surely, no one could
think that immediate uptake was a requirement. It follows, then, that perfectly
good semantic procedure can be used by an individual and lost for want of,
or have a long wait for, effective sharing. Indeed, if semantic procedure
needed an immediate capacity for uptake from others for sharing and
communicative use, then the evolution of the proto-language and the verbal
language would be made impossible if not incoherent.
This discussion of the private proto-language is not meant to touch that
philosophical tar. baby, the private-language argument in any of its many
forms, but only to dissolve what can' t be gone around.
I wish to argue for a mixed economy. Let us allow a degree of private
entrepreneural enterprise and a degree of socialisation in semantic endeavours.
13. The semantic point of a declarative utterance is not to cause a belief
in someone else or to ' share' or to communicate, it is, instead, to go through
an utterance-representation procedure that is true or f al s e- t o represent
successfully or unsuccessfully what is.
Frequently, one satisfies that semantic point in one' s silent or solitary
sayings or writings. This is not to deny that an utterance of a declarative
sentence may not have many other functions as well as to perform its semantic
point.
13a. The semantic" point of an observational representational procedure
is not to do anything to show someone else or even to get anything done,
but rather to represent successfully or unsuccessfully what is. This is not to
deny that the performance of a representational procedure may not have many
other functions as well as to perform its semantic point.
14. Communi cat i on by means of shared rule-governed verbal activity in
which assent and dissent may figure.
14a. Communication by means of shared rule-governed procedural activity
in which acceptance and rejection may figure.
People working together in the building of a complex structure may be
doing more than birds building a nest. They may be cooperatively and
inventively testing by various procedures the feasibility of other procedures,
for the fit, the strength, the stability and the beauty of the various alternatives.
And in this, one can correct or reject the procedural recipes of the other and
substitute one' s own. In that kind of complex and inter-related pattern of
activity, one person rejecting a piece (perhaps as a sample of a kind of building
material) that will not be suitable is its proto-parallel to dissenting to the
offering-as-procedure. Its accepting a piece that is suitable is its proto-parallel
to assenting to the offering-as-suitable procedure.
15. Sent ences- recta-sentences.
15a. Pr ocedur es - recta-procedures.
Just as there can be sentences about sentences, so there can be procedures
about procedures. A testing procedure, perhaps with a model, for another
procedure is a recta-procedure.
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286 Proto-Language
16. Sentence meani ng--speaker meaning.
To have the notion of the sentence meani ng- speaker meaning distinction
requires that the individual should be capable of taking the sentence as an
object of attention and assessment and not just what is represented by the
sentence. It requires also that the individual should have some notion of an
accepted or set way for the sentence to function (either in some shared, public
use or even in the individual' s own rule-governed ideolect) as well as of how
the individual intended it to function which may or may not be at variance
with the accepted or set way.
16a. Procedure meani ng- agent meaning.
To have the notion of the procedure me a ni ng- agent meaning distinction
requires that the individual should be capable of taking the procedure as an
object of attention and assessment and not just the outcome projected by
the procedure. It requires also that the individual should have some notion
of an accepted or set way for the procedure of function (either in some shared,
public use or even in the individual's own rule-governed procedural network)
as well as of how the individual intended it to function which may or may
not be at variance with the accepted or set way.
An example of an accepted procedure would be that of a recipe (not in
verbal form) developed and practiced by an individual for a particular dish.
One day, the individual follows that procedure but, by some mental lapse,
takes it to be for a quite different dish.
All of the permutations possible in the linguistic case are paralleled in this
procedural case.
17. One may say what one believes is not the case, usually in an attempt
to deceive someone else concerning what is the case. In the course of making
a declarative utterance concerning what one believes to be false may by
mistake and against one' s wishes say what is true. Or, having no beliefs one
way or the other, one may utter a sentence constituting a guess that by luck
is true or by luck is false. One can even by slip of the tongue say what is
true whether one believes it or not. This is how one is led by the nose, as
it were, by the language.
17a. One may perform a procedure projective of a particular outcome that
one believes will not be the case. In the course of this, the out come may be
satisfied to one' s surprise. One ma y believe that doing somet hi ng- t ur ni ng
the key in the lock one final, exasperated time (not because one thinks it is
worth trying, but out of anger) will not open the lock, and it does. The
procedure has the right outcome against one' s beliefs. Or, having no beliefs
one way or the other, one comes to two paths and one guesses in the form
of walking directedly down the path. This is a procedure projective of a
particular out come that only by luck is satisfied. One can even by a slip of
the hand as part of one' s procedure have an out come satisfied whether one
wants it or not.
It is interesting to see how natural it is for us to take credit without guilt
for the undeserved truths of our linguistic declaratives or the undeserved
satisfactions of outcomes of our procedures. Since we are charitable not only
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C. B. Martin 287
to our own unintended linguistic and proto-linguistic successes but even to
the unintended success of others, we are all in on the cheat of this particular
inverted form of the principle of charity. This is understandable and even
perhaps laudable given our general desire for the satisfaction of outcome
of what we do and the truth of what we say, whatever form, intended or
unintended, it may take.
18. In some cases of verbal declarative activity (such as saying ' That, over
there, is a big one.' ) the perceptual perspective of the agent is used as a
constituent of the declarative action. It is worse than misleading to call this
the ' context' of the assertion. For the verbal declarative action to have the
semantic content it has and to be representative of aparticular state of affairs,
the perceptual perspective must be used by the agent as a constituent in the
declarative action as much as the verbal sounds must be used as constituents.
18a. In some cases of procedural actions (such as getting water to be ready
to douse a part i cul ar fire as opposed to having it ready for any fire that may
occur) the perceptual perspective of the agent is used as a constituent of the
procedure. For the procedural action to be representative of a particular
outcome, the perceptual perspective must be used by the agent as a constituent
in the procedural action as much as the bodily movement must be used as
a constituent.
19. Some sentences can have a strong conditional or counterfactual point.
19a. Some observational, investigative procedural activities can have a
strong conditional or counterfactual point.
A native has noticed that when fish eat things they can be found in the
stomach of the fish. He has also noticed that they eat different things at
different times. When he catches a fish, he opens its stomach to see what
it has been feeding on, so that he can use it as bait.
On one unsuccessful day's fishing he notices an approaching storm that looks
like spoiling the fishing for a long time. Frustrated, he intends not to return
to the fishing hole until the weather changes. He picks up his fishing gear and
starts for the cave. He happens to frighten a mink eating a fish. His curiosity
overtaking him, he opens up the stomach to see what the fish had eaten and
takes out some grasshoppers. This is a procedural action whose projected
outcome is information about the past. It also has the point of finding out
what woul d have helped him to catch fish if he had used it as bait. He takes
a moment to confirm this by throwing in some grasshoppers and watching
the fish rise to take them. Miserable that he cannot use the bait that he now
knows woul d work, the threatening storm forces him to hurry to the cave.
The storm unexpectedly appears to begin to clear and he gathers his fishing
gear and watchful for the reappearance of the storm he gathers grasshoppers.
20. In language one can argue that if causal factors A and B occur then
effect E occurs. (Though it may be known that E may occur in the absence
of A and B and by means of other causes.)
The speaker should be able to make a difference between checking on the
occurrence of A and B and the non-occurrence of E versus checking on the
adequacy of the causal argument itself.
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288 Proto-Language
20a. Without language an individual could have procedurally got on to
the general causal ways of things, as a carpenter can know the many, many
causal ways of various kinds of wood, or a master chef can develop causally
general (what other kind are there?) recipes.
If the chef knows that ingredients A. . . N go to produce Z (though he
knows Z can be produced some other way without A. . . N, that is, he has
anot her recipe for Z) then when A. . . N seem to have been added and yet
Z is not produced, he has two alternatives checking procedures to follow.
He may check on whether A. . . N really were added and whether Z really
was not produced versus checking on the adequacy of the general recipe
procedure itself by seeing if the degree of heat was or was not a relevant
though neglected factor.
21.There can be a first person singular use of words in a sentence.
21a. There can be a first person singular function of steps in a procedure.
A young person takes a choice morsel belonging to the elder of the tribe.
The elder is angry when the elder sees it is gone and looks to each of the
young people present. They know all will be punished if the guilty one does
not own up. The other people become distressed and the mi screant steps
f orward, showi ng remains of the stolen food in his hand and accepts the
punishment.
22. Sent ence- sentence implicature.
22a. Pr ocedur e- procedure implicature.
A procedure and its projected outcome fulfilled, as in New Guinea a gift
of pigs may be actually made by one tribe to another, but the accepted
procedural implicature (that the recipient tribe should at a later date itself
give back at least as many pigs) is not performed.
23. Question.
23a. A quest is a procedure that is structurally di rect ed to achieve the
projected outcome of finding out something not fully known.
24. Order.
24a. A prot o-order is a procedure followed for the projected outcome of
making someone do something partly by the person' s knowing that was the
poi nt of your procedure. For example, pushing someone to get them to go
the rest of the way.
25. Lying.
25a. Hiding, seriously or as a joke, may be deceptive but not a lie. As
Brian McLaughlin pointed out to me in correspondence, lying requires that
for X to lie to Y about p, (a) X must intentionally represent (by some action)
itself to Y as believing that p, and (b) X must take itself to be thereby
misrepresenting its belief to Y, and (c) X must intentionally attempt to conceal
from Y the fact mentioned in (b).
X hears a wild goose calling from a meadow. X believes that the wild goose
will fly to a particular pond. X is known in its tribe as a great hunter from
whom the others in the tribe take direction and guidance from X' s example
in matters of hunting. On hearing the wild goose calls, X makes sure the
other hunters can see where he is going and then starts running in a direction
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C. B. Martin 289
t hat leads t o onl y one hunt i ng spot , namel y, the meadow. X lets the ot her
hunters run past hi m t owar d the meadow. When t hey are out of sight, X
changes direction, goes to the pond and kills the wild goose and eats the prized
meat on t he spot .
26. Pr omi se.
26a. A Pr ot o- pr omi s e is doi ng somet hi ng in or der to get peopl e to t hi nk
they coul d depend upon you to do somet hi ng else.
Ther e is an ani mal t hat is about t o br eak i nt o a cave with several peopl e
in it. Ther e is little t i me t o spare. Onl y one per son can go to t ry to kill the
ani mal because ot hers are needed in t he cave. It is a mat t er of which one
will go. You st and and gat her your weapons and put on your l eat her ar mour .
You do all of this in t he sight of t he ot hers t o decl are t hat you will kill t he
ani mal and t o make t hem depend on your goi ng because the durat i on of your
pr epar at i on excl udes anyone else doi ng it. You t hen don' t go t hr ough with
it. You br oke your pr ot o- pr omi s e.
27. Homophoni c and non- homophoni c sent ence t r ansl at i on.
27a. Homophoni c and non- homophoni c pr ocedur e t r ansl at i on.
In wat chi ng a silent film you can recogni se a pr ocedur e fol l owed as step
by step the same pr ocedur e t hat you have fol l owed. Or you see a pr ocedur e
followed as step by step a different pr ocedur e f r om the one you have fol l owed
but you t ake it t o be a different pr ocedur e t o pe r f or m t he same oper at i on.
Concl usi on
I have t ri ed t o devel op a semi nal model of a pattern of paral l el s bet ween
linguistic act i vi t y and nonqi ngui st i c pr ocedur al act i vi t y. To a very surpri si ng
degree, racially and i ndi vi dual l y, we #ve it bef or e we talk it. The mor e clearly
we see this, t he mor e nat ur al does t he easement f r om t he non-l i ngui st i c to
the linguistic become.
Even st ri ki ngl y si mpl e cases begi n t o occur t o one. It woul d be a natural
extension of the reachi ng pr ocedur e f or it to be made and used as a poi nt i ng,
because the nat ural reachi ng pr ocedur e al ready has the poi nt of directionality
to somet hi ng not wi t hi n i mmedi at e grasp. That coul d hel p t o expl ai n the
universality of t he poi nt i ng gest ure.
Not all of the uni versal gr ammat i cal niceties referred to by linguists woul d
have such t i dy expl anat i ons . . . . How much and what and how of i nnat e
structures (still l argel y a posi t of apriori gest uri ng) we need for t he t ransi t i on
f r om our semant i cal l y sophi st i cat ed pr ocedur al act i vi t y t o l anguage gets a
different l ook t hr ough t he pr ot o- l anguage model , but it is t oo soon f or
answers.
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