1. SALIGUMBA VS.

PALANOG
GR. 143365, DECEMBER 4, 2008

FACTS:

Spouses Palanog filed a complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants,
spouses Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional
Trial Court. In the complaint, spouses Palanog alleged that they have been in actual, open,
adverse and continuous possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land. The
spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises
and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land.
At the trial, only the counsel for spouses Palanogs appeared. It appeared that Eliseo Saligumba,
Sr. and Valeria Saligumba died. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an
order issued for the substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite notices sent to them
to appear, never confirmed the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba.
After a lapse of more than two years, the trial court rendered a judgment declaring spouses
Palanog the lawful owners of the subject land. No motion for reconsideration nor appeal having
been filed.
After 10 years, Palanog filed a Complaint seeking to revive and enforce the said decision. She
further requested that the heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas be impleaded as defendants.
Petitioners thus question the decision as being void and of no legal effect because their parents
were not duly represented by counsel of record. Petitioners further argue that they have never
taken part in the proceedings nor did they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. It is unfair
to bind them in a decision rendered against their deceased parents. Therefore, being a void
judgment, it has no legal nor binding effect on petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is an action for quieting of title, which is an action involving real property, extinguished upon
death of the party?
RULING:
NO. The case is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real
property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is not
extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17
of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that after a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the
deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or
within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time,
the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the
deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment
of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
20. SPOUSES SHEIKDING BOOC and BILY BOOC, petitioners, vs. FIVE STAR
MARKETING CO., INC., respondent [G.R. No. 157806. November 22, 2007.]
FACTS
The petitioners are present occupants of the third floor of the building apparently owned by Five
Star marketing. They were allowed to live there for free. However, on March 15, 1999 the
plaintiff notified all building occupants that it had withdrawn the privilege granted (rental free) to
them coupled with a notice of rental rates in each premises concerned, and further required to
any interested occupants to negotiate and sign a lease agreement with plaintiff. The defendants
failed and refused to lease and vacate the premises. They claim that they are co-owners of the
said building and that the respondent is merely holding the property in trust for them.
An unlawful detainer case was filed by the respondents which were decided in favor of the
petitioners in the lower courts but was overturned by the CA finding in favor of Five Star
Marketing hence this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners are co-owners of the building and therefore have a right of material
possession over the same
RULING
No. The court affirms the ruling of the CA that the petitioners fail to prove that petitioners Booc,
purchased the lot and constructed the building with their own money.
The petitioners claim that the subject property was being held in trust for them by Five Star
Marketing and as a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting its
existence and such proof must be clear and satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its
elements.
The petitioners were unable to present competent evidence to support their allegation of
ownership of the lot in question. And the preponderance of evidence lies in favor of respondent's
claim of ownership. Surely, the Deed of Sale, TCT, Tax Declarations and Official Receipts of
tax payments in the name of respondent are more convincing than the evidence submitted by
petitioners

G.R. No. 163081 June 15, 2007
ANITA UNGAB-VALEROSO, joined in by her husband, RUSELO VALEROSO,
Petitioners,
vs.
AMANCIA UNGAB-GRADO, FELIX UNGAB, represented by his son ROSENDO
UNGAB, ESPENILA UNGAB-JAICTIN and RUSTICINA UNGAB-TAMALA,
Respondents.

Facts:
Subject of this case is a 14.3375-hectare land in Binuni, Kolambugan, Lanao (now Binuni,
Bacolod, Lanao del Norte) registered in the name of Timoteo Ungab under Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. (P-41)-1,550. Petitioner Anita Ungab is the only child of Timoteo, now
deceased. Respondent Felix Ungab is the brother of Timoteo while the other respondents are the
heirs of Timoteos other brothers and sisters, namely Simeona, Eugenia, Lorenzo, Lazaro, and
Margarito.
In 1972, the heirs of Ciriaco Ungab filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. II-74 in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte against the brothers, sisters and
heirs of Timoteo for the partition, accounting and reconveyance of the subject land. When the
case was called for trial, the parties submitted a written compromise agreement.
On February 15, 1973, the CFI rendered judgment adopting in toto the compromise agreement.
The parties did not have the land partitioned but divided the proceeds of the land in accordance
with the decision. However, in December 1996, Anita refused to give respondents their
respective shares. Respondents then filed against petitioners Anita and her husband Ruselo
Valeroso, a complaint for recovery of possession, partition, enforcement of compromise
agreement and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 4048 with the RTC of Iligan City.
On December 1999, the RTC held that the compromise agreement bound all the parties thereto
including their heirs and assigns, and Timoteos affidavit whose presumption of regularity
petitioners failed to overcome, and the compromise agreement created an express trust which has
not yet prescribed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial courts decision
but deleted the award of attorneys fees.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether respondents are truly co-owners of the land, as shown by the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment signed by Anita herself?

Held:
YES.
We note, however, that even without the Affidavit of Timoteo, there is still evidence on record
proving that the respondents and Timoteo indeed own the land in common. For one, there is the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment dated August 4, 1960.
Petitioners contend that respondents cannot use the Affidavit of Acknowledgment signed by
Anita and her mother as Anita was misled in signing it. A question involving the due execution
of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment would require an inquiry into the appreciation of evidence
by the trial court, a matter which this Court cannot do in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45. The truth or falsehood of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment is a question of fact, of
which this Court cannot take cognizance. Moreover, the Affidavit of Acknowledgment, being a
notarized document, enjoys the presumption of regularity. Petitioners mere allegation that Anita
was misled by her mother into signing the affidavit could not overcome this presumption.
As properly held by the trial and appellate courts, the execution of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment and the compromise agreement established an express trust wherein the
respondents, as trustors, reposed their confidence on petitioner Anita and her mother, as trustees,
that they will hold the land subject of the co-ownership. There are no particular words required
in the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. This express
trust is shown in the two documents. Express trusts do not prescribe except when the trustee
repudiates the trust.



16. LORENZO vs. POSADAS
FACTS: Thomas Hanley died, leaving a will and a considerable amount of real and personal
properties. Proceedings for the probate of his will and the settlement and distribution of his estate
were begun in the CFI of Zamboanga. The will was admitted to probate.
The CFI considered it proper for the best interests of the estate to appoint a trustee to administer
the real properties which, under the will, were to pass to nephew Matthew ten years after the two
executors named in the will was appointed trustee. Moore acted as trustee until he resigned and
the plaintiff Lorenzo herein was appointed in his stead.
During the incumbency of the plaintiff as trustee, the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue
(Posadas) assessed against the estate an inheritance tax, together with the penalties for
deliquency in payment. Lorenzo paid said amount under protest, notifying Posadas at the same
time that unless the amount was promptly refunded suit would be brought for its recovery.
Posadas overruled Lorenzos protest and refused to refund the said amount. Plaintiff went to
court. The CFI dismissed Lorenzos complaint and Posadas counterclaim. Both parties appealed
to this court.
*Plaintiff contends that the lower court erred:
In not allowing as lawful deductions, in the determination of the net amount of the estate subject
to said tax, the amounts allowed by the court as compensation to the "trustees" and paid to them
from the decedent's estate.
ISSUE:
WON in determining the net value of the estate subject to tax, is it proper to deduct the
compensation due to trustees?
RULING:
The SC modified the lower courts decision with respect to the deduction of compensation due to
trustees.
Certain items are required by law to be deducted from the appraised gross in arriving at the net
value of the estate on which the inheritance tax is to be computed (sec. 1539, Revised
Administrative Code). In the case at bar, the defendant and the trial court allowed a deduction of
only P480.81. This sum represents the expenses and disbursements of the executors until March
10, 1924, among which were their fees and the proven debts of the deceased. The plaintiff
contends that the compensation and fees of the trustees, which aggregate P1,187.28 (Exhibits C,
AA, EE, PP, HH, JJ, LL, NN, OO), should also be deducted under section 1539 of the Revised
Administrative Code which provides, in part, as follows: "In order to determine the net sum
which must bear the tax, when an inheritance is concerned, there shall be deducted, in case of a
resident, . . . the judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate proceedings, . . . ."
A trustee, no doubt, is entitled to receive a fair compensation for his services (Barney vs.
Saunders, 16 How., 535; 14 Law. ed., 1047). But from this it does not follow that the
compensation due him may lawfully be deducted in arriving at the net value of the estate subject
to tax. There is no statute in the Philippines which requires trustees' commissions to be deducted
in determining the net value of the estate subject to inheritance tax (61 C. J., p. 1705).
Furthermore, though a testamentary trust has been created, it does not appear that the testator
intended that the duties of his executors and trustees should be separated. (Ibid.; In re Vanneck's
Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 893; 175 App. Div., 363; In re Collard's Estate, 161 N. Y. Supp., 455.)
On the contrary, in paragraph 5 of his will, the testator expressed the desire that his real estate be
handled and managed by his executors until the expiration of the period of ten years therein
provided. Judicial expenses are expenses of administration (61 C. J., p. 1705) but, in State vs.
Hennepin County Probate Court (112 N. W., 878; 101 Minn., 485), it was said: ". . . The
compensation of a trustee, earned, not in the administration of the estate, but in the management
thereof for the benefit of the legatees or devises, does not come properly within the class or
reason for exempting administration expenses. . . . Service rendered in that behalf have no
reference to closing the estate for the purpose of a distribution thereof to those entitled to it, and
are not required or essential to the perfection of the rights of the heirs or legatees. . . . Trusts . . .
of the character of that here before the court, are created for the the benefit of those to whom the
property ultimately passes, are of voluntary creation, and intended for the preservation of the
estate. No sound reason is given to support the contention that such expenses should be taken
into consideration in fixing the value of the estate for the purpose of this tax.


Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS. v.s. ANG
CHIA, as Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO LEE, and
LEE BUN TING

Facts:
Rafael Dinglasan filed a civil case in the CFI of Capiz against Ang Chia, her son Claro
Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel of land located in
Capiz. He also filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The counsel for defendants
objected on the basis that there was a pending case in the same court concerning the intestate
estate of Lee Liong. The plaintiffs withdrew the motion and filed an amended complaint seeking
the inclusion of Ang Chia (widow), the administratix of the estate, as a party-defendant. The
plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion
praying that a co-administrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix be
increased. The plaintiffs made of record the pendency of the civil case and prayed that the
intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. Thereafter,
the administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the motions
made by the plaintiffs. The trial court denied the petition for a co-administrator but increased the
bond to P5,000 and stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the intestate proceedings
is presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. It also took cognizance of the pendency
of said civil case. The administratrix did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and
instead moved for the closing of the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the
ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The
petitioners objected. Subsequently, the CFI of Capiz issued in the intestate estate proceedings an
order holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an extra-judicial partition the closing
of said proceedings until after the final termination of the civil case of the same court.
Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
WON the lower court may hold the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the
termination of the separate civil action.

Held:
Yes. A probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of ordinary case
because to hold otherwise would render some rules in the ROC nugatory. Section 1, Rule 88, of
the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the
estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator" What
practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be
prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings
without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the
estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. Section 17, Rule 3 also implies
that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case wherein
an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule nugatory.
Thus, the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact
that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching
consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate.


Vda De Lopez vs Lopez
35 SCRA 81
Facts:
On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the estate of the
deceased, filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and
her legitimate children with the deceased. The lower court approved the project of partition and
declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and closed for all legal purposes." Seventeen days
thereafter, the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez,

represented by their mother, Lolita
B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that they
were illegitimate children of the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations
with Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the
estate given to them. The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that
the proceeding had already been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the
hands of the distributees; and that the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper
remedy, which should be an independent action against the individual distributees..
Issue/s:
(1) whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late; and
(2) whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.
Held:
1. The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding
closed did not become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or
orders in ordinary actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
Special Proceedings." And judgments or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30)
days from notice to the party concerned. In this case appellants' motion to reopen was led only
seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure. The remedy was therefore invoked on
time.
2.
In the recent case of Uriarte vs. Uriarte, et al., G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, May 29, 1970, this Court,
thru Justice Arsenio Dizon, pointed out that there are two alternatives for an acknowledged
natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent, to wit: (1) to
intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and (2) to ask for its reopening if it has
already been closed.
Demands and claims filed by any heir, legatee or party in interest to a testate or intestate
succession, shall be acted upon and decided in the same special proceedings, and not in a
separate action, and the judge who has jurisdiction over the administration of the inheritance, and
who, when the time comes, will be called upon to divide and adjudicate it to the interested
parties, shall take cognizance of all such questions.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NELIA S.
SILVERIO-DEE, Respondents.

Facts:
The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of her estate.
On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to
remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On January 3, 2005, the
RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of
the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new administrator. On January 26, 2005,
Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated January 3, 2005, as
well as all other related orders.
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the
premises of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a
copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on
Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for
reconsideration was denied in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by
private respondent on December 22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her
Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on January 23, 2006.
Thus, on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was
not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution for the
enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to vacate the premises.
Consequently, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition dated May 2,
2007 with the CA. On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer
for the issuance of a TRO.
Issue:
W/N the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are
Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal under Sec. 1 of Rule 41.
Held:
The Orders are interlocutory and thus, cannot be appealed.
The denial of due course by the RTC was based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-
Dees appeal was against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed
under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on
Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule
41.
Petitioner argues that because private respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order dated
December 12, 2005 which denied her motion for reconsideration of the Omnibus Order dated
May 31, 2005, her appeal is of an order denying a motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioner
alleges that private respondent employed the wrong remedy in filing a notice of appeal and
should have filed a petition for certiorari with the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
instead.
A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular
proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been
determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case
completely but leaves something to be decided upon.
Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the
appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The
interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when
such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the
ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,
Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of
the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. The
purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from Ricardo Silverio,
Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real interest in the
specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road,Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31,
2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an
appeal. Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case should have
been dismissed.
The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the reglementary
period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper remedy in the instant
case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy of appeal from the May 31,
2005 Order of the RTC.

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS vs JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

FACTS:

Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no
children but they have legally adopted Juanita Lopez then single but now married to Federico
Guilas. Before the adoption of Juanita, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro
as her sole heir and executor. Doa Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil so as to
include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.

Nevertheless, in a project of partition executed by both Alejandro Lopez and Juanita
Lopez Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos.
3368 and 3441, both situated in Bacolor Pampanga were adjudicated to Juanita Lopez-Guilas
as her share in the estate of Dona Jacinta. The rest of the estate of the deceased was allotted to
Don Alejandro.
On April 23, 1960, the trial court approved the said project of partition and on August 28,
1961, the same court approved the correction of clerical errors appearing in the project of
partition. On April 10, 1964, Juanita filed a separate ordinary action to compel Alejandro to
deliver immediately to her lots nos. 3368 and 3441 which were allocated to her under the project
of partition.
Alejandro opposed and claims that by virtue of the order dated April 23, 1960 and order
of December 15, 1960 which "ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate
proceedings had already been closed and terminated; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches
and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the
estate, when she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60) days from
December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court.
Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the
heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings,
determines the termination of the probate proceedings; and that she is not guilty of laches,
because when she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for the delivery of her share allocated to
her under the project of partition, less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the
amended project of partition was approved, which is within the 5-year period for the execution of
judgment by motion .
The trial court issued an order suspending the consideration of the action for delivery of
the shares considering that the action for the annulment of the project of partition is a prejudicial
question. Juanita then filed an amended complaint on the action for delivery, where she
acknowledges the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as the allocation
in her favor of the Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is seeking. She then filed
a motion seeking to set aside the order suspending the consideration of the action for delivery on
the ground that she already admitted the partial legality and validity of the project of partition
and it is longer a prejudicial question to her petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery of her
share.
The trial court denied Juanita's motion on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to
suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of her shares until after the civil action for
annulment of the project of partition has been finally settled and decided. The MR was denied
ISSUE:

WON Juanita is guilty of latches.

HELD:

NO. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the
probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied
with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated; because a judicial
partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to
obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed. The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action,
which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the
probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for
the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited
doctrines.
In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed on
July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project
of partition was approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of
partition was approved. Clearly, her right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project
of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of
Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated December 15, 1960 of the
probate court closing and terminating the probate case did not legally terminate the testate
proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has not been delivered to her.

. TIMBOL V. CANO
Facts: Mercedes Cano died leaving her only son Floranto Timbol as sole heir. Her brother, Jose
Cano, was appointed judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the agricultural lands of the estate
be leased to him at P4,000 which was approved by the court. The court later on approved the
reduction of rent to P2,400 and the conversion of some of the agricultural lands to a subdivision.
A year later, a project of partition was approved by court designating Florante as the sole heir
and he was appointed judicial administrator. He then proposed moved that the area designated
for the subdivision be increased but was opposed by Jose because the enlargement of the
subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and his tenants will lose their landholdings.
Nevertheless, the court approved Florantes petition hence the case at bar.

Issue: W/N the probate court has jurisdiction to annul rights under the contract of lease though it
would prejudice the lessee

Held: YES
In probate proceedings, the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters of
administration of the party best entitled thereto, supervises and controls all acts of
administration, hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased, orders payment of
lawful debts, authorizes sale, mortgage, or any encumbrance or real estate, directs the delivery of
the estate to those entitled. The lease was obtained with the courts approval hence if the probate
court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation or reduction of the subject
of the lease.

And though lessee may be prejudiced by the reduction, reduction alone cannot bar the reduction
of the land leased because such reduction is necessary to raise funds to pay and liquidate the
debts of the estate under administration.

Ariaga vda. De Guerrea, Et al. vs. Suplico
G.r. No 144320 April 26, 2006

Facts:

Ricardo Gurrea, represented by and through his counsel Atty. Enrique Suplico (the defendant),
filed an Opposition in Special Proc. No. 7185. Inconsideration of said representation, Ricardo
Gurrea agreed to pay Atty. Suplico "a contingent fee of twenty (20%) of whatever is due me,
either real or personal property" . During the pendency of the proceedings and upon the oral
instructions of Ricardo Gurrea, Atty. Supliconegotiated with the other heirs of Adelina Gurrea
regarding the transfer of the piso (apartment building) in Spain to Ricardo Gurreas daughter,
Juliet Gurrea de Melendres. Ricardo Gurrea further instructed Atty. Suplico not to enter into any
settlement with the heirs unless the piso is transferred to his daughter. Finally, the transfer of the
piso worth P64,000.00 was executed and the heirs arrived at an amicable settlement regarding
the estate of Adelina Gurrea. Hence, Ricardo Gurrea withdrew his Opposition and the heirs then
drew up a project of partition which was eventually approved by the probate court.

As payment of his attorneys fees, Ricardo Gurrea offered the San Juan lot to Atty. Suplico who
was initially hesitant to accept the same as the property is occupied by squatters. However, in
order not to antagonize his client, Atty. Suplico agreed to Ricardo Gurreas proposal with the
further understanding that he will receive an additional commission of 5% if he sells the Baguio
property. Thereafter, the deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was drafted. The said deed was
presented to Ricardo Gurrea for his signature.

On August 20, 1975, the deed was finally signed by Ricardo Gurrea at the office of Atty. Pama,
in the presence of the latter, Atty. Suplico, Victor Tupas and another person, the last two acting
as witnesses.Later, on October 7, 1980, Atty. Suplico registered the deed and obtained a
title/TCT to the San Juan property under his name. Ricardo Gurrea died on October 22, 1980.
After his death, his heirs instituted Special Pro. No. 2722 for the settlement of Ricardo Gurreas
estate.

In the said proceedings, Atty. Suplico filed several claims for unpaid attorneys fees (no claim
was filed relative to Special Proc. No. 7185); however, all were dismissed withfinality . Also in
the same case, the estates administrator, Carlos Gurrea, filed an Inventory of Properties left by
the decedent, which did not initially include the property subject of this case. The said lot was
included only subsequently in the Amended Inventory.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING THE TRANSFER OF RIGHTS AND INTERESTS
DULY EXECUTED BY RICARDO GURREA VIOLATES ARTICLE 1491 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE AND, THEREFORE, NULL AND VOID.

Ruling: Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code provides:1491. The following persons cannot acquire
by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights
in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by
assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. According to
the evidence for the defendant, a Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the
Executor and Bond dated June 20, 1975was filed in the case, alleging in paragraphs 3 and 5
thereof, that the executor Angel E. Ordoez has already turned over to the respective heirs and
devisees all their respective shares in accordance with the Project of Partition duly approved by
the Court. Thereafter, more than one month from the filing thereof, the Transfer of Rights and
Interest was executed on August 20, 1975. Hence, at the time of the execution of the questioned
document, it may be concluded that Special Proceedings No. 7185 had been terminated. The
property in San Juan is no longer the subject of a litigation and may be alienated by the client to
his lawyer as payment of attorneys fees rendered. It is clear from the above-quoted ruling of the
trial court that its sole basis in concluding that Special Proceedings No. 7185 had been
terminated and that the subject property is no longer the object of litigation at the time the deed
of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed on August 20, 1975 is the allegation of the
executor, Angel E. Ordoez, in his Motion for Termination of Proceeding and Discharge of the
Executor and Bond dated June 20, 1975, that he had already turned over to the respective heirs
and devisees all their respective shares in accordance with the project of partition duly approved
by the probate court.

In the present case, there is no proof to show that at the time the deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest was executed, the probate court had issued an order granting the Motion for Termination
of Proceeding and Discharge of the Executor and Bond. Since the judge has yet to act on the
above-mentioned motion, it follows that the subject property which is the subject matter of the
deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest, is still the object of litigation, that is Special Proceedings
No. 7185. Furthermore, we agree with the petitioners undisputed contention that when the deed
of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the title over the subject lot was still in the name
of Adelina Gurrea and that it was only on October 7, 1980 that the title was transferred in the
name of Ricardo. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same. In the present case, while the subject lot was assigned as Ricardos share in the project of
partition executed by the heirs of Adelina Gurrea, the title over the subject lot was still in the
name of the latter and was not yet conveyed to Ricardo when the Transfer of Rights and Interest
was executed. It having been established that the subject property was still the object of litigation
at the time the subject deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed, the assignment of
rights and interest over the subject property in favor of respondent is null and void for being
violative of the provisions of Article 1491 of the Civil Code which expressly prohibits lawyers
from acquiring property or rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession.
. ANCHETA VS. DALAYGON G.R. 139868

FACTS: Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle
Guersey Hill (Kyle). Audrey died, leaving a will and she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard
(husband), who was also designated as executor. The will was admitted to probate before the
Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due
to Richards renunciation of his appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.
Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
Audreys will was also admitted reprobate by then to Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding. As administrator of Audreys
estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties:
(1) Audreys conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at Forbes Park, Makati,
Metro Manila, (Makati property); (2) a current bank account in Audreys name; and (3) shares of
stock.
Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was
also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N.
Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or
any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary
administrator.
Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 138, Atty. Ancheta was appointed as ancillary administrator.
Petitioner filed in Special Proceeding, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of
Audrey and project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard being apportioned the
undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48
from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property,
16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court and
directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and
to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey ( undivided interest)
and Kyle ( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333
shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank
to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.
12

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding also filed a project of
partition wherein
2
/
5
of Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while
3
/
5
thereof were allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy. Since Richard
left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc,
shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order disapproved the
project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated
Richards entire undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.
Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial courts Orders. Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached
his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of
Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her
entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not
merely thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over
the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to
respondent.
CA annulled the trial courts Order, petitioner filed motion for reconsideration, but this
was denied by the CA and they filed a petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the Petitioner commits a fraud in the performance of duties as Ancillary
Administrator of Audreys Estate?
HELD: Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a
position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence
and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or
insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of
prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in
similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the
terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Audrey s was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland U.S.A and she was residing in the
Phil. The last Will and Testament probate before the MaryLand Court and reprobate in the Phil.
Court. Clear showing that petitioner knows the national law of the decedent.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While
such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as well as the resultant
frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount
to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latters last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who
are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided
in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law
of the nation of the decedent."
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved
Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or
of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of
according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall
be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons
who are inhabitants of another state or country.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an
official of the court.
5. BERNARDO v. CA February 28, 1963
FACTS:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. Eusebio died and his properties
were disposed in his will to his wife Hermogena and his 6 cousins which included Deogracias
Bernardo, the executor. The wife died and she was substituted by her collateral relatives, upon
executor Bernardo's petition. Petitioner-executor filed his project of partition, but was opposed
by collateral relatives claiming that of the properties disposed of in the will are part of the
spouses conjugal partnership. Probate court heard evidence. Petitioner contended that it was
donated by the wife to the husband so it was not part of CPG and that the oppositors cannot
question the validity of the donation in the probate proceedings. Oppositors rebutted that since it
was donated during marriage, it was void; hence, the husband did not own it and cannot dispose
it by will. Probate court ordered the donation voided and that executor submit another project of
partition. Petitioner filed Motion for New trial (MNT) on the ground that probate court had no
jurisdiction, but was denied. Petitioner filed for appeal to CA, but was also denied. Hence, this
petition for review by certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a probate court can determine a question of ownership over property during
distribution.
HELD:
YES. Probate court has to liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the testator's estate to
be distributed to the heirs who are parties to the proceedings.
As a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate
proceedings," except:
a. where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.


b. when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the
probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon
c. all parties give consent so that matters affecting property under judicial administration may be
taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third
persons are not prejudiced


2 EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ

G.R. No. 167321 July 31, 2006
Facts
Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the
devisees therein. Upon Loretos death a certain Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for
the probate of the will. While the petition for the probate of the will was pending, the devisee
Oscar Casa died, intestate. Aquino filed a pleading entitled Appointment of Administrator
signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all
surnamed Casa, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of
the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased. Petitioner contested the
same.

Issue: Whether or not a person nominated as administrator by purported heirs of a devisee or
legatee in a will under probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate
proceedings despite the fact that such administrator is not the court-appointed administrator of
the estate of the devisee or legatee?

Ruling:
The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an
administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his
shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior
appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his
heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate. Said heirs may
designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial courT.


G.R. No. L-852 March 19, 1949
LEONIDA MARI and CARIDAD EVANGELISTA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ISAAC BONILLA and SILVINA ORDAEZ, defendants-appellants.
FACTS;
Casimiro Evangelista is a registered owner of a parcel of land (homestead) as evidenced by
Original Certificate of Title No. 4905, of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, consisting of
7.0652 hectares more or less situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija;
That Casimiro Evangelista was married to Leonida Mari plaintiff herein on February 7, 1920 at
Rizal Nueva Ecija and during their marriage and while living together as spouses they begot two
children Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista all surnamed Evangelista;
That Casimiro Evangelista died intestate on or about 1938 at Platero, Cabanatuan Nueva Ecija;
That on January 10, 1944 Deogracias Evangelista alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro
Evangelista executed a declaration of heirship. said Deogracias Evangelista sold on the same
date January 10, 1944 the property in question to the defendants spouses, Isaac Bonilla and
Silvina Ordaez. That after the said sale on January 10, 1944 original certificate of title No. 4905
was cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 19991 was issued in the spouses
Isaac Bonilla and Silvina Ordaez;
Judge Catalino Buenaventura gave judgment for plaintiff without costs. This is an appeal from
that judgment.
ISSUE: WON A PERSON OR HEIR WHO DEPRIVED TO PARTICIPATE IN A
PARTITION SHALL BE BOUND BY SUCH PARTITION.
HELD:
Section 4 of rule 74 provides that, "If it shall appear at anything within two year after the
settlement and distribution of an estate . . . that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived
of his lawful participation in the estate such heir or other person may compel the settlement of
the estate in the court in the manner herein provided for purpose of satisfying such participation."
Far from shielding defendants against loss the adjudication and the rule under which it was made
gave them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril. "A judicial partition in probate
proceeding does not bind the heir who were not parties thereon. No partition judicial or
extrajudicial could add one iota or particle to the interest which the partitioner had during the
joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the
co-owner may convey to the other more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate
proceeding is not final and conclusive and not being of such definitive as to stop all mean of
redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share such co-heir may still within the
prescriptive period bring an action for reivindicacionin the province where any of the real
property of the deceased may be situated. Broad perspective of public policy are set out in the
opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law of
prescription even after a partition judicial or extrajudicial has been had."
The judgment is affirmed with cost of this appeal against appellants.