1

Topic:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PANCHAYATI RAJ INSTITUTION
IN EMPOWERING LOCAL POLITICAL GROUPS: A CASE STUDY OF
UTTAR PRADESH (INDIA)





Mukesh Kumar

















2

Contents
List of Charts ... 2
List of Tables ... 2
Abstract 3
I. Introduction .... 5
II. Study Area: Uttar Pradesh . 7
Role of Panchayati Raj Institutions in Rural Development 10
Responsibilities of Gram Panchayats .. 10
Responsibilities of Citizens . 11
Control over Gram Panchayat . 12
Devolution of State Finance Commissions Grant .. 13
Utilization of Funds . 13
Utilization of State Finance Commissions Grant 14
III. Analysis of the Success or Failure of PRIs in Uttar Pradesh with Respect to
the Rule of Law 15
IV. Proposals to Improve the Objectives and Functionality of PRIs . 19
V. Conclusion . 21
List of Charts
Chart II.1. Structure of PRIs in India 8
Chart II.2. Structure of Governance in Uttar Pradesh .. 9
Chart II.3. Flow of Funds in Uttar Pradesh 12
List of Tables
Table II.1. Summary of Funds (Devolution) . 13
Table II.2. Summary of Funds (Utilization) .. 14
Table II.3. Summary of Funds (Overall Status) ... 14

3

Abstract
After independence, the main objective of the Indian Government was the overall
development of the country. To accomplish the objective, the government drafted five-year
plans and emphasised on the growth of various sectors including agriculture, industry,
education, health, and other basic infrastructure.
1
But soon, the government realized that the
overall development of the country is possible through the development of rural India. Hence,
based on Gandhian model, a third tier of local self-government was set up.
2
And, the steps
have been taken to eradicate the inherent shortcomings of the system. It has been assumed
that the democratic decentralisation and empowerment of local political bodies would create
efficient institutions that would be more accountable and conceivably fulfil the needs of local
people.
3
Also, it has been expected that the new Panchayati Raj Institution would now
provide the required non-bureaucratic institutional support to rural development plans.
4

Subsequently, Panchayati Raj Institution launched various rural development programs such
as Gram Vikas Yojna (Village Development Scheme), Rural Road Development Scheme,
Rural Employment Scheme, Child Education Plan, Farmer Market & Livestock Market and
so on.
5

The main objective of this paper is to review the political dynamics preceded through
the 73
rd
Constitutional Amendment in 1993 and analyse the extent to which it has been
implemented and subsequently attained success in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh from the
perspective of rule of law. In this paper, I also attempt to develop a hypothesis to describe

1
Indian Planning Commission, 1
st
Five Year Plan,
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/welcome.html (last visited April 20, 2014).
2
Crispin Bates and Subho Basu, Rethinking Indian PoliticalInstitutions,
(last visited April 20,
2014).
3
Panchayati Raj A Historical Perspective,
http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in:8080/jspui/bitstream/10603/2392/11/11_chapter%203.pdf (last visited April
20, 2014).
4
Id.
5
T.R. Raghunandan, Rural Infrastructure, Panchayati Raj, and Governance,
http://www.iitk.ac.in/3inetwork/html/reports/IIR2007/02-Rural%20Infr.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).

4

some favourable conditions, under which Panchayati Raj Institution can be made more
accountable, approachable, and functional in order to fit into the interest of local people.
I write this paper into five chapters; chapter one is the introduction that gives the general
perspective of the evolution of a new legal order in the form Panchayati Raj Institution.
Chapter two defines the study area Uttar Pradesh and gives the detail information including
structure, function, sources of funds, and utilization of funds of PRIs. Chapter three analyses
the status of PRIs in Uttar Pradesh. Chapter four suggests proposals for the improvement of
effectiveness of PRIs in Uttar Pradesh. And, chapter five concludes this paper.


















5

I. Introduction
In 1993, the Government of India amended the Constitution with the purpose to
empower and democratise Indias rural representative bodies - the Panchayats. The 73
rd

Amendment to the Constitution officially recognised a third tier of government at the sub-
State level, thereby creating the legal order for local self-rule i.e. Panchayati Raj Institution.
6

This, in part, reflects the fact that the 73
rd
Amendment has given the state governments
considerable autonomy to interpret and implement constitutional reforms.
7

By that time, India, of course, was not alone in this process rather decentralisation had
emerged as a dominant trend in the world politics. In 1998, the World Bank estimated that all
but 12 of the 75 developing and transitional countries with populations greater than 5 million
had embarked on a process of political devolution.
8
However, at the heart of this
transformation, there are a number of complex yet inter-related themes. One is an ideological
shift, in which the legitimacy of central state-led development has been challenged on the
grounds that it produces systems of governance that undermine national economic
performance and effective public policy.
9
A second is a remarkably widespread political
agenda, which asserts that the decentralisation of public administration and the introduction
of locally elected bodies will produce systems of governance that are better able to meet the
needs of poor and politically marginal groups in society.
10
And, the third related idea suggests
that democratic decentralisation is a political stratagem that national lites have used to
maintain legitimacy and control in the face of political disintegration.
11


6
A.K. Mishra, Naved Akhtar, & Sakshi Tarika, Role of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in Rural Development (An
Analytical Study of Uttar Pradesh), http://www.inflibnet.ac.in/ojs/index.php/MI/article/viewFile/914/824 (last
visited April 10, 2014).
7
Id.
8
R.C. Crook, and J. Manor, Democracy and Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa.
Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press 1998).
9
C. Gore, The Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing
Countries, (2000), World Development 28(5): page789804.
10
Id.
11
A. Giddens, The Third Way, London: Polity Press (1998).

6

However, the Panchayati Raj Institution in India is primarily concerned with devolution, in
which the 73
rd
Amendment confers constitutional status to a third stratum that exists within
the government system at district, sub-district, and village levels.
12
From the beginning, the
reduction of poverty and the empowerment of poor and politically marginal groups in India
have been the core objective of decentralisation.
13
Perhaps the most enduring image of
decentralisation in India is Gandhis (Rashtrapita (the father of nation) of India) vision of
Gram Swaraj (Village Democratic Government), in which universal education, economic
self-sufficiency and village democracy would take the place of caste, untouchability and
other forms of rural exploitation.
14

Decentralization, in spite of being the core issue, had been vehemently debated
especially, since the time of independence.
15
In the Constituent Assembly on November 4,
1948, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, chairman of the Drafting Committee, called village community a
sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness, and communalism.
16
This was the
reason that the idea of Panchayats was conceptualized in the first draft of Indias
constitution.
17
However, at the instance of a few Gandhians namely Alladi Krishnaswami
Aiyar, N.G. Ranga, K. Santhanam, Shibbanlal Saxena and others, a compromise was reached
at, and panchayats were included only in the non-justifiable part of the constitution, under
Directive Principles of State Policy as Article 40, which reads, The state shall take steps to

12
N. Mukarji, The Third Stratum (1999), in S.N. Jha and P.C. Mathur (eds.) (1999) Decentralisation
and Local Politics: Readings in Indian Government and Politics (2), London.
13
J. Drze and A. Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (Delhi: Oxford
University Press 1996).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
V.N. Alok, Role of Panchayat Bodies in Rural Development since 1959,
http://www.academia.edu/1641652/Role_of_Panchayat_Bodies_in_Rural_Development_since_1959 (last
visited April 20, 2014).

7

organize village panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be
necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government.
18

Furthermore, after long debate and various commissions report, important among them are
the B. Metha Commission of 1957, the Asoka Metha Commission of 1978, and the G.V.K.
Rao Committee of 1985, decentralization in the form of Panchayati Raj Institution has been
incorporated into the India Constitution in 1993.
19

By considering the long procedural history and huge geographical area of sub-
continent India, I have limited the study area only to the most populous state of India i.e.
Uttar Pradesh. The fundamental objective of this paper is to review the status of Panchayati
Raj Institution in the state of Uttar Pradesh of India and analyse its success and or failure.

II. Study Area: Uttar Pradesh
Following the 73
rd
Indian Constitutional amendment of 1993, Uttar Pradesh also
amended its two tier structure of Panchayati Raj (i.e. Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat
Adhiniyam) to establish a three-tier Panchayati Raj Institution in 1994.
20
The amended Act
envisaged decentralisation of power to rural self-governing bodies including Gram
Panchayat (Village Panchayat) at the village level, Kshetra Panchayat (Block Panchayat) at
the intermediate level, and Zila Panchayat (District Panchayat) at the district level
21

(administrative hierarchy is given in Chart II.1). The system of Panchayati Raj Institutions
(PRIs) aimed at increasing participation of people in local governance and effective
implementation of rural development programs. Nevertheless, the overall supervision, co-

18
Article 40, Constitution of India.
19
V.N. Alok, Role of Panchayat Bodies in Rural Development since 1959,
http://www.academia.edu/1641652/Role_of_Panchayat_Bodies_in_Rural_Development_since_1959 (last
visited April 20, 2014).
20
A.K. Mishra, Naved Akhtar, & Sakshi Tarika, Role of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in Rural Development (An
Analytical Study of Uttar Pradesh), http://www.inflibnet.ac.in/ojs/index.php/MI/article/viewFile/914/824 (last
visited April 20, 2014).
21
Id.

8

ordination, planning, and implementation of development schemes vested with the Zila
Panchayat (District Panchayat).
22

Chart II.1 Structure of PRI s in I ndia
23


This Chart shows the hierarchy of administrative divisions of India starting from the
Government of India at the top and ending at the Gram Panchayat at village level.

With the area of 240,928 square km,
24
and total population of 199,581,477
25
(as per
census 2011 Provisional data), Uttar Pradesh is the most populous state of India. There are a

22
An Overview of the Panchayati Raj Institutions,
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_report/Government_Wise/local_bodies/Issued_Stat
e_Govt/UP/2010_11/PRI/Chap_1.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).
23
Panchayat Samiti (Block), http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cd/Setup_of_India.png (last
visited April 20, 2014).
24
Government of Uttar Pradesh: Statistics of Uttar Pradesh. http://upgov.nic.in/upstateglance.aspx (last
visited April 20, 2014).
25
Id.

9

total of 75 districts
26
and 51,974 Gram Panchayats
27
in Uttar Pradesh. The Structure of
Governance (Top to Bottom) in Uttar Pradesh is shown in the Box II.2.
28

Chart II.2 Structure of Governance in Uttar Pradesh
29


The Chart shows the hierarchical administrative division of Uttar Pradesh.



26
Rural Development Statistics: Section -9, Panchayati Raj,
http://www.nird.org.in/Rural%20Development%20Statistics%202011-12/data/sec-9.pdf (last visited April 20,
2014).
27
Government of Uttar Pradesh: Statistics of Uttar Pradesh. http://upgov.nic.in/upstateglance.aspx (last
visited April 20, 2014).
28
An Overview of the Panchayati Raj Institutions,
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_report/Government_Wise/local_bodies/Issued_Stat
e_Govt/UP/2010_11/PRI/Chap_1.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).
29
Id.

10

Role of Panchayati Raj Institutions in Rural Development
Panchayati Raj Institutions have evolved to fulfil the vision of rural development with
complete coordination and transparency in Uttar Pradesh. Initially, the development begins
with the project to supply drinkable water and other cleaning and maintenance facilities
including clean environment; constructions and maintenance of village roads and drainage
systems; primary schools for the children; and local markets.
30
In addition, the project also
includes the construction of Panchayat Bhawans (office building) for meeting halls and for
the residence of the secretary of Gram Panchayat.
31

To complete all these objectives of rural development, Gram Panchayats have been given
financial aid on the recommendations of State Finance Commission that reaches to Gram
Panchayat through different channels
32
(details given in the Chart II.3). In the chart III.3, it is
shown that the funds, which are approved for the rural development through the Panchayati
Raj Institution has to pass at least three different channels or bureaucratic offices that requires
various official and paper works. It is not only troublesome and time taking but also difficult
for the workers of Panchayati Raj Institution to follow the procedures. In addition, besides
state government, the central government also sponsors various rural development
programs.
33


Responsibilities of Gram Panchayats
In order to make Panchayati Raj Institution successful, it has been assigned certain
responsibilities such as periodic meeting of Gram Sabha (Village Council meeting) to

30
A.K. Mishra, Naved Akhtar, & Sakshi Tarika, Role of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in Rural Development (An
Analytical Study of Uttar Pradesh), http://www.inflibnet.ac.in/ojs/index.php/MI/article/viewFile/914/824 (last
visited April 10, 2014).
31
Id.
32
An Overview of the Panchayati Raj Institutions,
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_report/Government_Wise/local_bodies/Issued_Stat
e_Govt/UP/2010_11/PRI/Chap_1.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).
33
A.K. Mishra, Naved Akhtar, & Sakshi Tarika, Role of the Panchayati Raj Institutions in Rural Development (An
Analytical Study of Uttar Pradesh), http://www.inflibnet.ac.in/ojs/index.php/MI/article/viewFile/914/824 (last
visited April 10, 2014).

11

communicate, plan, and assigned the works to its workers.
34
These meetings are the
imperative components of all the two levels of Panchayati Raj Institution i.e. Gram
Panchayat and Gram Samiti. The higher order officials take the report of the works and
suggest new projects and plans in the meetings.
35
They discuss the expenses of the funds and
make specific plan how much amount should be given for the particular project. They also
discuss how to increase the income of Gram Panchayat through the collection of taxes and
fees prescribed by the act of the legislature.
36

Furthermore, the Gram Pradhan (Head of Gram Panchayat) inspects all the assets of
Gram Samaj (Village Society) at least once in a quarter.
37
Likewise, check and balance is
created though different levels of responsibilities.

Responsibilities of the Citizens
Another salient aspect of the legislation of this third order governance is it also assigns
responsibilities to local people.
38
The objective behind this is, to make the development
project successful, involvement of local people is imperative. Therefore, local people are
asked to co-ordinate the meetings. The purpose of meeting is - local people should get the
information regarding the works and planning of Gram Panchayat and the usage of received
funds.
39
Besides, local people have also given responsibilities to check and maintain the
cleanliness of the village; illegal cutting of trees; illegal possession of land of Gram Sabha;
and maintenance of community buildings.
40
The maximum public co-ordination will ensure
the maximum development.



34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.

12

Control over Gram Panchayat
To stop the misuse of the funds at Gram Panchayat level, there are various legal
provisions of investigation against Pradhans (Heads of Gram Panchayat), Deputy Pradhans
(Deputy Heads of Gram Panchayat) and the members.
41
However, if any official caught
misusing the public funds; a copy of complaint along with the affidavit and relevant proof
need to be given to the district magistrate.
42
The investigation of the complaint will be done
by the district level officers only. If the alleged official was found guilty, Gram Sabha can
rusticate the Pradhan by passing a no confidence resolution.
43

Chart II.3 Flow of Funds in Uttar Pradesh
44


This Chart shows the different channels and levels through which funds reach to Gram
Panchayats.

41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
An Overview of the Panchayati Raj Institutions,
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_report/Government_Wise/local_bodies/Issued_Stat
e_Govt/UP/2010_11/PRI/Chap_1.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).

13

Devolution of State Finance Commissions Grant
The Second Finance Commission recommended that 5 per cent of the net proceeds of
total tax revenue should be devolved to the PRIs.
45
Further, the Third State Financial
Commission recommended that 5.5 per cent of the net proceeds of the total tax revenue
should be devolved to the PRIs.
46
The devolution of funds and actual release of funds to PRIs
by the Government during the period of 2006-11 is given in the Table II.1.

Table II.1
47
Summary of Funds (funds given in Crore
48
)
Year Net proceeds of
total tax revenue of
State Government
Funds to be
devolved
Funds actually
devolved
Shortfall/
Excess
Per cent
2006-07 22,998 1,150 1,169 (+)019 (+)02
2007-08 24,959 1,248 1,568 (+)320 (+)26
2008-09 28,659 1,433 1,282 (-)151 (-)11
2009-10 33,878 1,694 1,262 (-)432 (-)26
2010-11 43,464 2,391 2,377 (-)14 (-)01

Utilization of Funds
Utilization of grants received under 12
th
and 13
th
Finance Commission during the
period of 2006-11 is summarized in the Table II.2. As shown in the table II.2, during the year
2009-10 INR 5.35 crore lapsed to Government account due to non-withdrawal from the
treasury at Directorate level. The analysis of above further discerns that during the year 2010-
11 INR 273.39 crore remained unutilized.




45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See Finance Accounts and Director Panchayati Raj Lucknow, Deputy Director Zila Panchayat Monitoring Cell
Lucknow, Commissioner Rural Development Lucknow,
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_report/Government_Wise/local_bodies/Issued_Stat
e_Govt/UP/2010_11/PRI/Chap_1.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).
48
1 Crore = 10,000,000 INR (Indian Rupee).

14

Table II.2
49
Summary of Funds (funds given in Crore)
Year Total funds available Funds utilized Funds not utilized
2006-07 585.6 551.96 33.64
2007-08 585.6 556.52 29.08
2008-09 587.28 587.1 0.18
2009-10 585.6 580.25 5.35
2010-11 911.29 637.9 273.39

Utilization of State Finance Commissions Grant
The position of grants available under the State Finance Commission, utilization and
non-utilization for the period 2006-11 is summarized in the Table II.3.
Table III.3
50
Summary of Funds (funds given in Crore)
Year Opening balances Funds received
during year
Total funds
available
Funds utilized
(per cent)
Funds not
utilized (per
cent)
2006-07 373.69 1,169.05 1,542.74 724.01 (47) 818.73 (53)
2007-08 818.73 1,567.77 2,386.50 1,065.30 (45) 1,321.20 (55)
2008-09 1,321.20 1,281.68 2,602.88 1,280.71 (49) 1,322.17 (51)
2009-10 1,322.17 1,262.07 2,584.24 1,168.01 (45) 1,416.23 (55)
2010-11 1,416.23 2,376.94 3,793.17 1,098.84 (29) 2,694.34 (71)

It is clear from the above table that the pace of utilization of funds by the PRIs was
slow as huge amounts were laying unspent at the close of each financial year. The gap
between funds granted and the funds actually utilized has been increasing every year. And,
surprisingly, in 2010-11, it reached to the INR 2,694.34 Crore (71 per cent). On the contrary,
people were deprived of the benefits of development activities. People of rural Uttar Pradesh
are still deprived of basic amenities including potable water, public toilet, sewerage,
sanitation, road etc.
Above all, the most significant reason of failure of PRIs in Uttar Pradesh is flawed
and inconsistent budgeting and budgetary process. Budgetary process was not followed and

49
See Finance Accounts and Director, Panchayati Raj, Lucknow,
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_report/Government_Wise/local_bodies/Issued_Stat
e_Govt/UP/2010_11/PRI/Chap_1.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).
50
Id.

15

accounting records were not maintained in the prescribed formats and as a result of which a
true and fair view of income and expenditure of the PRIs was not available.
51
The data base
was not developed despite funds for the same were available. In addition, the District
Planning Committees were also not functional even after the lapse of 12 years of enactment
of the District Planning Committee Act, 1999. As result of which their developmental
activities could not be planned and monitored at the district level.
52
This inconsistency in the
system not only gives the faulty records of funds but also hinders the future planning.

III. Analysis of the Success or Failure of PRIs in Uttar Pradesh with Respect to
the Rule of Law
In theory, reservations and the Gram Panchayats provide an important means of
ensuring that marginal groups are incorporated into local politics and that representatives act
in a way that is consistent with their formal responsibilities and the plural interests of their
constituents. In practice, however, neither appears to have lived up to this rather lofty ideal.
Studies of decentralisation in the state of Uttar Pradesh have categorically highlighted the fact
that the 73
rd
Amendment and even earlier attempts at decentralisation have failed to prevent a
local (and primarily landed) lite from controlling local Panchayats.
53
The Micro-level
studies have shown that Gram Sabha often failed to fulfil their role as deliberative bodies or
as a mechanism for accountability.
54
This is partly attributed to low levels of participation
among the electorate as well as the non-cooperation of local officials.
55
Examples of the latter
include officials delaying or postponing Gram Panchayat meetings, officials not attending

51
Annual Technical Inspection Report (Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies), Uttar Pradesh For
the Year 2010-11,
http://saiindia.gov.in/english/home/Our_Products/Audit_report/Government_Wise/local_bodies/Issued_Stat
e_Govt/UP/2010_11/PRI/Chap_1.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).
52
Id.
53
S.V. Deshpande and Venkatesha Murthy, Pressures from Below: Decentralised Governance in Karnataka,
Economic and Political Weekly, May 4, 2002.
54
Id.
55
Id.

16

Gram Sabha meetings, and, more generally, official decisions having no bearing on decisions
reached during the Gram Sabha.
56

Furthermore, there are various issues that are hindering the free functionality of the
Gram Sabha such as excessive bureaucracy, limited benefits of participation, corruption, and
agenda fixing.
57
In addition, dominance of elite class creates fear of exclusion from the
community and disrupts the existing patron-client relations, particularly to the poor groups.
Therefore, after reviewing the provisions of PRIs and its current status in the state of
Uttar Pradesh, I am wondering where is the objective of rule of law in this whole
constitutionally designed rural development program i.e. decentralization of power?
This is a particularly important limitation in the context of analysing the relationships
among law, development, and the state. It is widely asserted that economic development and
the stability and efficiency of market economies depend on the establishment of a reliable
rule of law but what it takes to build the rule of law in a particular environment is still a
great mystery.
58
Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast, in their article Law without
Coercion: Examining the Role of Law in Coordinating Collective Punishment define law is
a system of rules established by governments with exclusive control over the legitimate use of
force has led policymakers to focus law and development efforts on building reliable state
legislatures and agencies, enacting law through these state entities, and building the capacity
of state-controlled courts and regulators to enforce law in a neutral and non-corrupt way.
59

I think, rule of law evolved and structured with the objective to serve the entire
population of a given region and not as just the manoeuvre in the hands of some ruling elite.
However, if I consider the other aspects of the decentralization (in the perspective of rule of

56
Id.
57
M. Nambiar, Making the Gram Sabha Work, Economic and Political Weekly, August 18, 2001.
58
Gillian K. Hadfield and Barry R. Weingast , Law without Coercion: Examining the Role of Law in Coordinating
Collective Punishmen, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/privatelaw/related-
content/hadfield.law.without.coercion.9.11.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).
59
Id.

17

law), awareness and participation of all citizens is imperative to make it fully functional. The
concept and structure of PRIs are designed to serve the interests of all politically
marginalized people (especially rural people) but it cannot be successful only by involvement
of some of the elite people. PRIs can be made successful only after the participation of all
citizens and their determination of accepting the responsibility. Exercising freedom and
assuming responsibility for decisions taken in the context of freedom go hand in hand. In an
ideal situation, the constitution establishes the legal orders that people need to live in their
community and they ensure that the members of that community respect and live by the rules;
not only the president or the prime minister rather each and every citizen from the bottom
up, and not from the top down.
60

Decentralisation is not merely a shift in power away from the central organisation but
it provides the population with a genuine means of influencing the way the country is run
from the bottom up.
61
Decentralisation then becomes more than the decentralisation of
government processes: it allows the local people to take an active role in governing their own
affairs.
62

Further, decentralisation can make a contribution to establish rule-of-law structures
provided the group of the population concerned is given a genuine possibility of participation
and also if it strengthens the responsibility and accountability of the individuals.
63
This can
happen only if those in power are willing to hand over some of the power; and, the population
is willing to assume responsibility and invest time and energy in developing community
structures.
64
Neither precondition can be taken for granted.

60
Id.
61
H. Hamann, Can decentralisation contribute to promoting rule-of-law structures? The democratic republic of
Congo, Rwanda and Burundi as examples, http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2012/16.html (last visited
April 20, 2014).
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.

18

However, the important questions that need to be discussed over the not
resourcefulness of PRIs in Uttar Pradesh are 1) Should the population take an active
indeed a proactive role in running their own affairs? or 2) Should it merely be integrated as
effectively as possible in the formal organisation of centralised state structures? Starting
points and targets can be established only in the targeted geographic region itself, through
careful examination and with a long-term perspective.
65

By considering the idea, concept, structure, and objective of the rule of law behind the PRIs,
the major issues in the state Uttar Pradesh are:
Reluctance of state government to make laws and rules for the effectiveness of PRIs
that conform to the real spirit of the rule of law.
66

Political reluctance has led to bureaucratic creativity in minimalistic interpretations of
the law.
67

State government has kept enough powers with itself to deal with PRIs as far as
checks and balances are concerned. It directly affects the concept of democratic
decentralisation on the one hand and the autonomy of the PRIs on the other.
68

Managing and controlling powers of fund approval, suspension, and dismissal have
been vested in the hands of bureaucrats. This straightaway places PRIs in a position of
disadvantage, which takes away the fundamental objective of PRIs (as elected
representative bodies). For example, it is reported that for the purpose of release of
funds and other developmental activities, the Gram Panchayat Sarpanches (Heads of
Gram Panchayats) more often waste most of their time visiting Block Offices and
many times experience harassment by the Block level officials. In fact, these daunting

65
Id.
66
Chapter 10: Decentralization & Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs),
http://planningcommission.gov.in/plans/mta/mta-9702/mta-ch10.pdf (last visited April 20, 2014).
67
Id.
68
Id.

19

and dispiriting interactions with the Block officials distort the role of Pradhans as
elected representatives of the Gram Sabha and induct them into the bad old ways of
officialdom and also promote corruption.
69

Lack of transparency and rapport between the PRIs and state government.
70

Last but not the least, reluctance of local people in participation because of
unawareness.
71


IV. Proposals to Improve the Objectives and Functionality of PRIs
PRIs are well conceptualized and effective modes of rule of law that were placed in
the Indian Constitution through the 73
rd
Amendment. However, because of some structural
loopholes, state governments negligence, and local peoples unawareness, it is not as
effective and functional as it should be.
Therefore, to make PRIs more effective, approachable, and to fulfil the real objective of
decentralization of power, state government needs to take interest and establish direct relation
with the heads of PRIs
72
and also give more autonomy and independency to PRIs.
73
Direct
involvement of state government will definitely shorten the lengthy and troublesome
bureaucratic procedures.
74
It will give freedom to local bodies and encourage to spend funds
on their own without having to take technical approval from the government officials
75
(i.e.
bureaucrats).
In reality, a key to the success of the Panchayati Raj system is transparency in the way
these bodies function. Being closer to the people, the Panchayats right to information -- and

69
Id.

70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.


20

accessibility to the Panchayats -- must be ensured. However, the Central Government circular
in 1997 already proposed that each state may consider passing orders highlighting three
different aspects of transparency. First, the Panchayati Raj Institutions, especially Gram
Panchayats, should display all vital information about the development projects (especially
receipts of the funds and how these are being spent) in the Panchayat Offices or on a
prominent board outside the village school for the information of the public. Second, all
relevant records should be open to inspection. Third, public members should also be able to
obtain photocopies of the documents related to development projects as also matters of
general public interest by paying a nominal charge. Such documents would be extended in
particular to all bills, muster rolls, vouchers, estimates and measurement books as well as
information about the criterion and procedure for selection of beneficiaries. A list of
beneficiaries should not only be available for the inspection, but photocopies of it should be
given on demand from a convenient place such as Block or Tehsil Office.
76

Moreover, empowerment of the Gram Sabhas would require efforts aimed at mobilisation
of the village community for mass participation in the meetings Gram Sabha. A massive
programme to generate awareness needs to be taken up to inform the Gram Sabhas about
their rights in planning, implementation, and the audit of development programmes in control
over natural resources, land records and conflict resolution. Lastly, there is overlapping of
works assigned to all the three tiers system i.e. Gram Panchayat, Kshetra Panchayat, and
Zila Panchayat. Therefore, the state legislature needs to clearly delineate the works of
panchayats.
77
In doing so, the state can ensure that the panchayats (at the village level) can be
effective institutions for local governance.



76
Id.
77
Id.

21

V. Conclusion
In the formal sense, panchayats have had a limited but important role in the various
stages of planning and implementation of several developmental programmes, especially
anti-poverty programmes. It is conceptualized to fulfil the meaning of the rule of law for
the development (bottom up approach). But there is no evidence from the study that the
Gram Panchayats have completed any of their roles assigned to them by the law.
Discrepancy, reluctance, bureaucracy, corruption, and unawareness are the significant
causes for the ineffective functioning of the PRIs.
Therefore, to improve the condition and make the PRIs effective, some structural and
functional changes are imperative. Besides, it is also essential to educate the village
people for mass level participation. They need to understand that the PRIs system is
created for them, it is theirs, and it must be run by them.


Mukesh Kumar