ERNESTO A. FAJARDO, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENTS. FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Fajardo, an employee of Bureau of Customs (BOC) designated as a Special Collecting Officer at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) Customs House, Collection Division, failed to remit the total amount of P53,214,258.00 unremitted collection from sales of accountable forms with money value and stamp. This findings were result of the audit made by the Commission on Audit State Auditor. Customs Commissioner Antonio M. Bernardo requested respondent National Bureau of Investigation-National Capital Region (NBI-NCR) to conduct an investigation on the reported misappropriation of public funds committed by petitioner. A case of plunder was filed against the petitioner. When the petitioner failed to return the said money and duly account for the same, an administrative investigation commenced. The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, ordering the dismissal of the petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied. When petitioner elevated the case to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman. ISSUES: 1) Whether competent evidence was presented before the Office of the Ombudsman to establish dishonesty and grave misconduct on the part of petitioner -There is substantial evidence to support the finding that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct 2) Whether the Ombudsman can directly dismiss petitioner from government service -The Ombudsman has the power to dismiss erring public officials or employees HELD: 1) There is substantial evidence to support the finding that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. The result of the audit was not the sole basis for his dismissal. Affidavits and testimonies of witnesses taken during the ball hearing in the criminal case were also submitted as evidence. The discrepancy between the "audit sales' and the actual amount remitted by petitioner is sufficient evidence of dishonesty and grave misconduct warranting his dismissal from public service. 2) It is already well-settled that "the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory." As we have explained in Atty. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the fact "[t]hat the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with [the] order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for discipilinary action [under Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770]; is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's 'recommendation' is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of law." The petition was hereby DENIED. the Decision of CA hereby AFFIRMED. 2.) CHREA vs. CHR [G.R. NO. 155336. November 25, 2004] Chico-Nazario, J. DOCTRINE: The constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. FACTS: The Congress passed RA 8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998) providing for special provisions that are applicable to all Constitutional Offices that are enjoying fiscal autonomy. These constitutional offices were authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices, to fix and determine the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their personal services itemization, including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective constitutional offices. Relying on the strength of these special provisions of the GAA, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) adopted an upgrading and reclassification scheme, whereby it stated that: NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal autonomy hereby approves and authorizes the upgrading and augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from savings under Personal Services to support the implementation of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998 Consequently, the CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising salary grades of certain positions in the CHR, and authorizing the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel Services. CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the following justification: Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request to reject the subject appointments or planitlla reclassification of the CHR. 1. Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights is a constitutional commission. NO. Palpably, the Court of Appeals' Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Thus: Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5, Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus: SEC. 24.Constitutional Commissions. - The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. SEC. 26.Fiscal Autonomy. - The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. SEC. 29.Other Bodies. - There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency. From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum - what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. 2. Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights enjoys fiscal autonomy. NO. Considering that the CHR is not a constitutional commission, it cannot as a consequence, enjoy fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time. In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon case, the Supreme Court explained that: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision. Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership. All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. 3) GAMINDE VS COA 3. THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAUL C. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN, respondents. [G. R. No. 140335. December 13, 2000] PARDO, J.: FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff,effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit enbanc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioners appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her. HELD: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff. Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and tenure. [T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that the incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity of the Constitution. However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution. _______________________________________________ 4.)Evalyn FETALINO vs. COMELEC G.R. NO. 191890; December 4, 2012 BRION, J. DOCTRINE: An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. Petitioners can never be considered to haveretired from the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more importantly, because they did not serve a "term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended. Hence, they are not entitled to the retirement benefits. FACTS: On February 10, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos extended an interim appointment to the petitioners, FETALINO, BARCELONA, and CALDERON, as Comelec Commissioners, each for a term of seven (7) years, pursuant to Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. Eleven days later (or on February 21, 1998), Pres. Ramos renewed the petitioners' ad interim appointments for the same position. Congress, however, adjourned in May 1998 before the CA could act on their appointments. The constitutional ban on presidential appointments later took effect and the petitioners were no longer re-appointed as Comelec Commissioners. Thus, the petitioners merely served as Comelec Commissioners for more than four months, or from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998. 3/15/05 - petitioners applied for their retirement benefits and monthly pension with the Comelec, pursuant to R.A. No. 1568. The Comelec initially approved the petitioners' claims, granted pro rated gratuity and pension, but petitioners asked for re computation on the principal ground that R.A. No. 1568, 13 does not cover a pro-rated computation of retirement pay. Presently, in the questioned COMELEC RESO 8808 the Comelec,completely disapproved the petitioners' claim for a lump sum benefit under R.A. No. 1568. The question rather is: Can it be considered as retirement from service for havingcompleted one's term of office? Petitioners contend that non-renewal of their ad interim appointments by the CA until Congress already adjourned qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity.
The petitioners argues that the non-renewal of their ad interim appointments by the CA until Congress already adjourned qualifies as retirement under the law and entitles them to the full five-year lump sum gratuity. However, the Respondents argues that petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity, considering that they cannot be considered as officials who retired after completing their term of office. It emphasizes that R.A. No. 1568 refers to the completion of the term of office, not to partial service or to a variable tenure that does not reach its end, as in the case of the petitioners. The Comelec also draws the Court's attention to the case of Matibag v. Benipayo where the Court categorically ruled that an ad interim appointment that lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. ISSUE:Whether the petitioners rendered full term of office thus, are entitled to retirement benefits. HELD: NO. As stated by the COMELEC, When the law, in this case, RA 1568 refers to completion of term of office, it can only mean finishing up to the end of the seven year term. By completion of term, the law could not have meant partial service or a variable tenure that does not reach the end. It could not have meant, the "expiration of term" of the Commissioner whose appointment lapses by reason of non-confirmation of appointment by the Commission on Appointments and non-renewal thereof by the President. It is rightly called expiration of term but note: it is not completion of term. RA 1568 requires 'having completed his term of office' for the Commissioner to be entitled to the benefits. Therefore, one whose ad interim appointment expires cannot be said to have completed his term of office so as to fall under the provisions of Section 1 of RA 1568 that would entitle him to a lump sum benefit of five (5) years salary. *R.A. No. 1568 provides two types of retirement benefits for a Comelec Chairperson or Member: a gratuity or five-year lump sum, and an annuity or a lifetime monthly pension. Our review of the petitions, in particular, Barcelona's petition for intervention, indicates that he merely questions the discontinuance of his monthly pension on the basis of Comelec Resolution No. 8808. 28 As the assailed resolution, by its plain terms (cited above), only pertains to the lump sum benefit afforded by R.A. No. 1568, it appears that Barcelona's petition for intervention is misdirected. We note, too, that Barcelona has not substantiated his bare claim that the Comelec discontinued the payment of his monthly pension on the basis of the assailed Resolution. The petitioners are not entitled to the lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended. Sec. 1 of RA 1658 reads as ff: When xxxx any Member of the COMELEC retires from the service for having completed his term of office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, or dies while in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years but before the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his salary for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement, incapacity, death or resignation, as the case may be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government; And, provided, further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date of retirement, incapacity or resignation. The right to retirement benefits accrues only when two conditions are met: first, when the conditions imposed by the applicablelaw in this case, R.A. No. 1568 are fulfilled; and second, when an actualretirement takes place, which they did not meet. To be entitled to the five-year lump sum gratuity under Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, any of the following events must transpire: (1)Retirement from the service for having completed the term of office; (2)Incapacity to discharge the duties of their office; (3)Death while in the service; and (4)Resignation after reaching the age of sixty (60) years but before the expiration of the term of office. In addition, the officer should have rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government at the time of retirement. The petitioners obviously did not retire under R.A. No. 1568, as amended, since they never completed the full seven-year term of office prescribed by Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution; they served as Comelec Commissioners for barely four months, i.e., from February 16, 1998 to June 30, 1998. In the recent case of Re: Application for Retirement of Judge Moslemen T. Macarambon under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, 33 where the Court did not allow Judge Macarambon to retire under R.A. No. 910 because he did not comply with the age and service requirements of the law, the Court emphasized: Strict compliance with the age and service requirements under the law is the rule and the grant of exception remains to be on a case to case basis. We have ruled that the Court allows seeming exceptions to these fixed rules for certain judges and justices only and whenever there are ample reasons to grant such exception. While we characterized an ad interim appointment in Matibag v. Benipayo "as a permanent appointment that takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office," we have also positively ruled in that case that "an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office." The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments. Based on these considerations, we conclude that the petitioners can never be considered to have retired from the service not only because they did not complete the full term, but, more importantly, because they did not serve a "term of office" as required by Section 1 of R.A. No. 1568, as amended. * The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office. 5) ARSENIO ALVAREZ, vs. COMELEC and LA RAINNE ABAD-SARMIENTO, G.R. No. 142527, March 1, 2001 QUISUMBING, J.: DOCTRINES: Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases.; The "preferential disposition" applies to cases before the courts and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show. Election cases pertaining to barangay elections may be appealed by way of a special civil action for certiorari. However, this recourse is available only when the COMELEC's factual determinations are marred by grave abuse of discretion. FACTS: On 5/12/1997, petitioner was proclaimed duly elected Punong Barangay of Doa Aurora, Quezon City. He received 590 votes while his opponent, private respondent Abad-Sarmiento, obtained 585 votes. Private respondent filed an election protest claiming irregularities, i.e. misreading and misappreciation of ballots by the Board of Election Inspectors. MeTC ordered the reopening and recounting of the ballots in ten contested precincts, and declared private respondent as winner She garnered 596 votes while petitioner got 550 votes after the recount. 2 nd Division of COMELEC, on appeal, declared private respondent won over petitioner. Private respondent, meanwhile, filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal. Petition sough an MR. COMELEC EN BANC, denied the Motion for Reconsideration and affirmed the decision of the Second Division. It granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal. Hence, this petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the Commission violated its mandate on "preferential disposition of election contests" as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution as well as Section 257, Omnibus Election Code that the COMELEC shall decide all election cases brought before it within ninety days from the date of submission. 2) Whether or not COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal of private respondents on April 2, 2000 when the appeal was no longer pending. 3) Whether or not COMELEC misinterpreted Section 2 (2), second paragraph, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution: That decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Election contests involving municipal and barangay officials shall be final, executory and not appealable". HELD: 1)NO. The COMELEC has numerous cases before it where attention to minutiae is critical.HOWEVER considering further the tribunal's manpower and logistic limitations, it is sensible to treat the procedural requirements on deadlines realistically.Overly strict adherence to deadlines might induce the Commission to resolve election contests hurriedly by reason of lack of material time. In our view this is not what the framers of the Code had intended since a very strict construction might allow procedural flaws to subvert the will of the electorate and would amount to disenfranchisement of voters in numerous cases. Further, petitioner misreads the provision in Section 258 of the Omnibus Election Code. The "preferential disposition" applies to cases before the courts and not those before the COMELEC, as a faithful reading of the section will readily show. Lastly, we note that petitioner raises the alleged delay of the COMELEC for the first time. In fact, private respondent points out that it was she who filed a Motion for Early Resolution of the case when it was before the COMELEC. The active participation of a party coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later impugning the court or the body's jurisdiction. Thus no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC. 2) NO. When the motion for execution pending appeal was filed, petitioner had a MR before the Second Division. This pending MR suspended the execution of the resolution of the Second Division. Appropriately then, the division must act on the MR. Thus, when the Second Division resolved both petitioner's motion for reconsideration and private respondent's motion for execution pending appeal, it did so in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The requisites for the grant of execution pending appeal are: (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a good reason for the execution pending appeal; and (c) the good reason must be stated in a special order. In our view, these three requisites were present. In its motion for execution, private respondent cites that their case had been pending for almost three years and the remaining portion of the contested term was just two more years. In a number of similar cases and for the same good reasons, we upheld the COMELEC's decision to grant execution pending appeal in the best interest of the electorate. Again, no grave abuse of discretion on this matter. 3) NO, although we agree with petitioner that election cases pertaining to barangay elections may be appealed by way of a special civil action for certiorari. However, this recourse is available only when the COMELEC's factual determinations are marred by grave abuse of discretion. HERE, find no such abuse in the instant case. From the pleadings and the records, we observed that the lower court and the COMELEC meticulously pored over the ballots reviewed. Because of its fact-finding facilities and its knowledge derived from actual experience, the COMELEC is in a peculiarly advantageous position to evaluate, appreciate and decide on factual questions before it. There is no basis for the allegation that abuse of discretion or arbitrariness marred the factual findings of the COMELEC. As previously held, factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive on this Court, more so in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud, or error of law in the questioned resolutions.14 Unless any of these causes are clearly substantiated, the Court will not interfere with the COMELEC's findings of fact. 6) CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR, G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012 , MENDOZA, J.: ATTY. HONESTO L. CUEVA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR, G.R. No. 178845 DOCTRINE: CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who initiated the complaint. CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative cases FACTS:On September 27, 2005, petitioner Honesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713. Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases. On March 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued Resolution No. 060521 10 formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie finding that they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and Rules. Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva. ISSUE:Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies. HELD: The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of Regents over administrative cases To begin with, there is no incongruity between R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. No. 292, as previously explained in Sojor. Moreover, the Court fails to see how a complaint filed by a private citizen is any different from one filed by a government employee. If the grant to the CSC of concurrent original jurisdiction over administrative cases filed by private citizens against public officials would not deprive the governing bodies of the power to discipline their own officials and employees and would not be violative of R.A. No. 8292, it is inconceivable that a similar case filed by a government employee would do so. Such a distinction between cases filed by private citizens and those by civil servants is simply illogical and unreasonable. To accede to such a mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Code would be a great disservice to our developing jurisprudence.1wphi1 It is therefore apparent that despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8292 giving the board of regents or board of trustees of a state school the authority to discipline its employees, the CSC still retains jurisdiction over the school and its employees and has concurrent original jurisdiction, together with the board of regents of a state university, over administrative cases against state university officials and employees. Finally, with regard to the concern that the CSC may be overwhelmed by the increase in number of cases filed before it which would result from our ruling, 51 it behooves us to allay such worries by highlighting two important facts. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the Board of Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint, then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC. 52 Thus, not all administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. 7.)Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 112513 August 21, 1997 Kapunan, J.: Facts: On August 1, 1990, petitioner, an employee of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), was placed under preventive suspension by the PRC for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.After due investigation, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits. Petitioner appealed the PRCs decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which exonerated him of said charge. On appeal by the PRC, however, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct, and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner filed before the SC a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the PRCs appeal, among other grounds. The Court granted the petition and reinstated the decision of the MSPB which ordered the reinstatement of petitioner to his former position and was silent on the award of back salaries. Nevertheless petitioner, through counsel, wrote to PRC Chairman Hermogenes Pobre requesting not only reinstatement but payment of back salaries as well. Petitioner was eventually reinstated, but his claim backwages was denied. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to backwages. Held: YES. The Solicitor General recommends that petitioners prayer for payment of backwages be granted.In support of said recommendation, the Solicitor General cites the following authorities: This Honorable Court in the case of Tan, Jr. vs. Office of the President, 229 SCRA 677, stated: Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point.The provision refers to preventive suspension[s] during the pendency of administrative investigation[s], and it does not cover dismissed civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and ordered reinstated to their former or equivalent positions. The rule in the latter instance, just as we have said starting with the case of Cristobal v. Melchor (101 SCRA 857), is that when []a government official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal [purposes he is considered as not having left his office, so]that he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held.]Such award of backwages, however, has since been limited to a maximum period of five (5) years (San [Luis] vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258). Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the MSPBs decision notwithstanding. 8.)PNB v GARCIA [G.R. No. 141246. September 9, 2002] PANGANIBAN, J.: DOCTRINE: There is nothing in the law that bars an appeal of a decision exonerating a government official or an employee from an administrative charge. If a statute is clear, plain and free form ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Indeed, the campaign against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance in government will be undermined if the government or the private offended party is prevented from appealing erroneous administrative decisions. FACTS: Private respondent Ricardo V. Garcia, Jr., a check processor and cash representative at the Buendia Branch of petitioner PNB was charged by the latter with Gross Neglect of Duty in connection with the funds it had lost in the amount of P7,000,000.00.Theereafter PNB-Administrative Adjudication Office (AAO) then imposed upon him the penalty of Forced Resignation with Benefits. Garcia appealed the AAOs decision and his appeal was granted after finding that the evidence on record failed to establish neglect of duty on the part of private respondent, reinstating his position with back salaries. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but public respondent, denied the same. The CA Ruling In dismissing PNBs appeal, the CA cited Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, which had ruled that only the party adversely affected by the decision -- namely, the government employee -- may appeal an administrative case. The CA held that a decision exonerating a respondent in an administrative case is final and unappealable. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in so holding that petitioner cannot anymore elevate on appeal the resolution of the Civil Service Commission reversing petitioners finding of guilt for gross neglect of duty on Respondent Garcia. HELD: NO. Herein Petitioner PNB has the standing to appeal to the CA the exoneration of Respondent Garcia. It should be allowed to appeal a decision that in its view hampers its right to select honest and trustworthy employees, so that it can protect and preserve its name as a premier banking institution in our country. The interpretation of party adversely affected in the case of Mendez v. Civil Service Commission, has been overturned in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy. In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Reynato S. Puno explained that the Civil Service Law did not categorically sanction the old doctrine barring appeals by parties other than the respondent employee. What the law declared as final were only those decisions of heads of agencies involving suspensions of not more than thirty days or fines not exceeding thirty days salary. Neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. According to that provision, the CSC was limited to the review of decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than thirty days; (2) fine in an amount exceeding (30) days salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Nothing in the provision, however, indicates a legislative intent to bar appeals from decisions exonerating a government official or an employee from a administrative charge. It is a well-entrenched rule that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy. Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional grant. 9.) BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941, represented by MR. AMEURFINO E. CINCO, Chairman, AND URBAN POOR FOR LEGAL REFORMS (UP-LR), represented by MRS. MYRNA P. PORCARE, Secretary-General, Petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET.Al. G.R. No. 177271 May 4, 2007 REP. LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION, BANTAY KATARUNGAN FOUNDATION,Petitioners, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 177314 May 4, 2007 D E C I S I O N GARCIA, J.: DOCTRINE: While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. FACTS: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups.
BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 party-list groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WONT BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented." The Comelec issued a Resolution declaring the nominees names confidential and that the Commission will disclose/publicize the names of party-list nominees in connection with the May 14, 2007 Elections only after 3:00 p.m. on election day. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR would have the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified. ISSUE 1: Whether or not the nominees likewise belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector their respective party list claim to represent in Congress. HELD 1: The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP- LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. ISSUE 2: Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; AND Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees. HELD 2: The Comelec based its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups on Section 7 of R.A. 7941. This provision, while commanding the publication and the posting in polling places of a certified list of party-list system participating groups, nonetheless tells the Comelec not to show or include the names of the party-list nominees in said certified list. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in the case of Legaspi (WON persons employed as sanitarians are civil service eligibles), the peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. The Comelecs reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes with a weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging on a fundamental right to information. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. 10.)EN BANC G.R. No. 139792 November 22, 2000 DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: ANTONIO P. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, now known as METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents. Doctrine: See Bold Facts: Petitioner optionally retired as MeTC Judge from the Judiciary under R.A. No. 910, 2 as amended, and received his retirement gratuity under the law for his entire years in the government service; and five years thereafter he has been regularly receiving a monthly pension. On 2 December 1993, petitioner re- entered the government service. He was appointed Director III of the Traffic Operation Center of the MMA. His appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 1 March 1995, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7924, which reorganized the MMA and renamed it as Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). On 30 August 1996, the MMDA issued a Memorandum to petitioner informing him that in view of his "voluntary option to be separated from the service" his services would automatically cease effective at the close of office hours on 15 September 1996, and that he would be entitled to "separation benefits equivalent to one and one-fourth (1) monthly salary for every year of service as provided under Section 11 of the MMDA Law." Petitioner asserted that all the years of his government service, including those years in the Judiciary, should be credited in the computation of his separation benefits under R.A. No. 7924. Director IV Nelson Acebedo of the CSC-NCR, CSC, and the Court of Appeals all denied the position of petitioner. Respondent believes that petitioner has only the option either to refund his separation/retirement benefits and claim his gross retirement/separation pay without any deduction corresponding to his separation pay received, or not [to] refund his separation/retirement pay but suffer a deduction of his retirement/separation gratuity for the total amount representing his previous separation/retirement pay received. ISSUE: WON Petitioner is entitled to have his years in the judiciary credited in the computation of his separation pay under the RA 7924. HELD: No, petitioner already received and is continually receiving gratuity for his years of service as a Metropolitan Trial Court Judge. Equity dictates that he should no longer be allowed to receive further gratuity for said years of service in the guise of separation pay. "The common-sense consideration stated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for the Court in Espejo, that if a retiree is being credited with his years of service under his first retirement in computing his gratuity under his second retirement, it is but just that the retirement gratuity received by him under his first retirement should also be charged to his account, manifestly govern the case at bar.1vvph!1 It is but in accordance with the rule consistently enunciated by the Court as in Anciano v. Otadoy, affirming Borromeo, that claims for double retirement or pension such as petitioners, would run roughshod over the well- settled rule that in the absence of an express legal exception, pension and gratuity laws should be so construed as to preclude any person from receiving double pension. The case at bench is not, strictly speaking, about double pension. It is, however, about the interpretation of a gratuity law, viz., Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7924 which awards separation pay to those government employees who were displaced by the reorganization of the MMA into the MMDA, which should be construed to preclude a government employee from receiving double gratuity for the same years of service. We agree with the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that for the purpose of computing or determining petitioners separation pay under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924, his years of service in the Judiciary should be excluded and that his separation pay should be solely confined to his services in the MMA. The petitioner cannot take refuge under the second paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which provides: Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation. This provision simply means that a retiree receiving pension or gratuity can continue to receive such pension or gratuity even if he accepts another government position to which another compensation is attached. However, to credit his years of service in the Judiciary in the computation of his separation pay under R.A. No. 7924 notwithstanding the fact that he had received or has been receiving the retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended, would be to countenance double compensation for exactly the same services, i.e., his services as MeTC Judge. Such would run counter to the policy of this Court against double compensation for exactly the same services. 7 More important, it would be in violation of the first paragraph of Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution, which proscribes additional, double, or indirect compensation. Said provision reads: No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. Section 11 of R.A. No. 7924 does not specifically authorize payment of additional compensation for years of government service outside of the MMA. 11.) CSC v. Yu Facts: In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, which affected the Department of Health (DOH) along with other government agencies. Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo held the position of Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of the Department of Health (DOH) Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City and was the head of both the Basilan Provincial Health Hospital and Public Health Services. Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu, on the other hand, held the position of Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I). She was assigned, however, at the Integrated Provincial Health Office in Isabela, Basilan. Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan Governor Gerry Salapuddin (Governor Salapuddin) refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position. two years after the implementation of the devolution program, Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position. While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the re-nationalization of the Basilan General Hospital, she was made to retain her original item of PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II. Subsequently, on August 1, 2003, then DOH Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit (Secretary Dayrit) appointed Dr. Domingo Remus A. Dayrit (Dr. Dayrit) to the position of Chief of Hospital II. Aggrieved, Dr. Yu filed a letter of protest dated September 30, 2003 before the CSC claiming that she has a vested right to the position of Chief of Hospital II. CSC issued Resolution 4No. 040655 granting Dr. Yu's protest and revoking the appointment of Dr. Dayrit as Chief of Hospital II of Basilan General Hospital. Further, Secretary Dayrit was directed to appoint Dr. Yu to said position. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the CSC reversed itself and issued Resolution 5No. 040967 dated September 1, 2004 declaring that the position of PHO II was never devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan but was retained by the DOH; that the PHO II position held by Dr. Yu was a newly-created position; and that, therefore, she did not have a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position that was created by virtue of R.A No. 8543. Dr. Yu then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CSC. Ca rendered a decision in favor of Yu. Issue: MISSING ISSUE hehe Held: It was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the word shall both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503, which connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result to duplication of functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government. However, in the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed [Section 2(a)(12)] by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines automatic as involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. Note: Detail. A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. (Emphasis added) Had Dr. Castillo felt aggrieved by her detail to the DOH Regional Office, she was not without recourse. The law afforded her the right to appeal her case to the CSC, but she had not seen fit to question the justification for her detail. We could only surmise that, since Dr. Castillo was looking at only three more years from the time of her detail until her retirement in 1996, and considering that she obviously would not suffer any diminution in salary and rank, she found it pointless to pursue the matter. 12.) PENERA v. COMELEC G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009 CARPIO, J.: DOCTRINE: to be liable for premature campaigning one must first be a candidate, a person who files a COC is a candidate only upon the commencement of the campaign period, his acts prior to the start of the campaign period becomes unlawful only upon the periods commencement. FACTS: Penera was disqualified from running for Mayor as he allegedly held a motorcade on the day that he filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120 days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days earlier. Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of the campaign period. This thus reverses the LIGOT v. COMELEC case which held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period. ISSUE: WON Penera is already a candidate when he filed his COC and committed premature campaigning for holding a motorcade?\ HELD: The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the campaign period. The second element requires the existence of a "candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who "has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is not a "candidate." The third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election campaign or partisan political activity is committed. Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for the printing of official ballots. Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress, however, never intended the filing of a certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing to become immediately a "candidate" for purposes other than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not be considered as a candidate." When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law under the second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, thus: For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground of its unconstitutionality. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007, the date when she became a "candidate," even if constituting election campaigning or partisan political activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. After filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity, However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her candidacy. Penera is still liable under the Omnibus Election Code for premature campaigning which only takes effect after he is considered a candidate (after the start of the campaign period) not before. Acts committed prior to the start of the campaign period could only be prosecuted during the campaign period as he is thus not yet a candidate prior to the start of the campaign period. As an illustration a person may hold rallies and motorcades or have advertisements prior to the start of the election campaign period as an exercise of ones freedom of speech and doesnt run for office thus is not liable for premature campaigning compared to one who does file his COC who then becomes liable at the start of the campaign period for such acts as he is already considered a candidate. The laws involve only punishes Candidates so this is the keyword here. It is only upon the start of the campaign period when such acts committed prior to the campaign period becomes unlawful. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio: The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code should be read together with the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "candidate refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be considered a candidate because "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate, for purposes of determining ones possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to public office simply because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of the campaign period. 13.) Quinto vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 189698 1 December 2009 Facts: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners, who held appointive positions in government and who intended to run in the 2010 elections, assailed Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678, which deemed appointed officials automatically (ipso facto) resigned from office upon the filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC). Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369.** The proviso was lifted from Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Petitioners averred that they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates. They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. (Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 provides that any person filing his certificate of candidacy within the period set by COMELEC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.) Petitioners further averred that the assailed provision is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Representing the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition was premature and petitioners had no legal standing since they were not yet affected by the assailed provision, not having as yet filed their CoCs. The OSG also argued that petitioners could not avail the remedy of certiorari since what they were questioning was an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of its rule-making power. The OSG further averred that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of its Resolution No. 8678 since it merely copied what was in the law. The OSG, however, agreed that there is no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned upon filing their CoCs because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time. Issue: Whether Section 4(a) of COMELECs Resolution No. 8678 and the laws upon which it was based (second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) are unconstitutional Held: The second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 were declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad. In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. There are 4 requisites for a valid classification that will justify differential treatment between classes: (a) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (b) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. (W)hether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. An appointive official could wield the same dangerous and coercive influence on the electorate as the elective official. Both may be motivated by political considerations rather than the publics welfare, use their governmental positions to promote their candidacies, or neglect their duties to attend to their campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The challenged provision is also overbroad because: (a) It pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not (It would be absurd to consider a utility worker in the government as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC; it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.); and (b) It is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a sweeping scale. __________________________________________________________________ 14.)JOSELITO R. MENDOZA,-versus-COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, G.R. No. 191084, March 25, 2010, PEREZ, J.: DOCTRINE: However the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, either in the exercise of exclusive original jurisdiction or an appellate jurisdiction, the COMELEC will act on the case in one whole and single process: to repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for reconsideration, en banc. There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed. FACTS: Petitioner Joselito R. Mendoza was proclaimed the winner of the 2007 gubernatorial election for the province of Bulacan, besting respondent Roberto M. Pagdanganan by a margin of 15,732 votes. On 1 June 2007, respondent filed the Election Protest which, anchored on the massive electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioner, was raffled to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). With petitioners filing of his Answer with Counter-Protest on 18 June 2007, the COMELEC proceeded to conduct the preliminary conference and to order a revision of the ballots from the contested precincts indicated in said pleadings. Upon the evidence adduced and the memoranda subsequently filed by the parties, the COMELEC Second Division went on to render the 1 December 2009 Resolution, which annulled and set aside petitioners proclamation as governor of Bulacan and proclaimed respondent duly elected to said position by a winning margin of 4,321 votes. Coupled with a directive to the Department of Interior and Local Government to implement the same, the resolution ordered petitioner to immediately vacate said office, to cease and desist from discharging the functions pertaining thereto and to cause a peaceful turn-over thereof to respondent. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc and an Opposition to the Motion for Execution Against respondents Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC Second Division. On 8 February 2010, however, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the proclamation of ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN as the duly elected Governor of Bulacan. On 11 February 2010, petitioner filed before the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Recall the Resolution Promulgated on February 8, 2010. On 12 February 2010, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Certiorari with an Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Status Quo Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction directed against the 8 February 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. In the meantime, the COMELEC En Banc issued a 10 February 2010 Order, scheduling the case for re-hearing on 15 February 2010, on the ground that there was no majority vote of the members obtained in the Resolution of the Commission En Banc promulgated on February 8, 2010. At said scheduled re- hearing, it further appears that the parties agreed to submit the matter for resolution by the COMELEC En Banc upon submission of their respective memoranda, without further argument. As it turned out, the deliberations which ensued again failed to muster the required majority vote since, with three (3) Commissioners not taking part in the voting, and only one dissent therefrom, the assailed 1 December 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only garnered three concurrences. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents protest should have been dismissed when no majority vote was obtained after the re-hearing in the case HELD: YES. The failure of the COMELEC En Banc to muster the required majority vote even after the 15 February 2010 re-hearing should have caused the dismissal of respondents Election Protest. Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure categorically provides as follows: Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. When the Commission en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. As one pertaining to the election of the provincial governor of Bulacan, respondents Election Protest was originally commenced in the COMELEC, pursuant to its exclusive original jurisdiction over the case. Although initially raffled to the COMELEC Second Division, the elevation of said election protest on motion for reconsideration before the Commission En Banc cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered an appeal. Tersely put, there is no appeal within the COMELEC itself. As aptly observed in the lone dissent penned by COMELEC Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, respondents Election Protest was filed with the Commission at the first instance and should be, accordingly, considered an action or proceeding originally commenced in the Commission. The dissent reads Section 6 of COMELEC Rule 18 to mean exactly the opposite of what it expressly states. Thus was made the conclusion to the effect that since no decision was reached by the COMELEC En Banc, then the decision of the Second Division should stand, which is squarely in the face of the Rule that when the Commission En Banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on re-hearing, no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission. The reliance is on Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution which provides: Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit En Banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission En Banc. The dissent reasons that it would be absurd that for a lack of the necessary majority in the motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, the original protest action should be dismissed as this would render nugatory the constitutional mandate to authorize and empower a division of the COMELEC to decide election cases. We cannot, in this case, get out of the square cover of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. The provision is not violative of the Constitution. The Rule, in fact, was promulgated obviously pursuant to the Constitutional mandate in the first sentence of Section 3 of Article IX(C). Clearly too, the Rule was issued in order to expedite disposition of election cases such that even the absence of a majority in a Commission En Banc opinion on a case under reconsideration does not result in a non-decision. Either the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed or the action originally commenced in the Commission shall be dismissed. It is easily evident in the second sentence of Section 3 of Article IX(C) that all election cases before the COMELEC are passed upon in one integrated procedure that consists of a hearing and a decision in division and when necessitated by a motion for reconsideration, a decision by the Commission En Banc. However the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, either in the exercise of exclusive original jurisdiction or an appellate jurisdiction, the COMELEC will act on the case in one whole and single process: to repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for reconsideration, en banc. There is a difference in the result of the exercise of jurisdiction by the COMELEC over election contests. The difference inheres in the kind of jurisdiction invoked, which in turn, is determined by the case brought before the COMELEC. When a decision of a trial court is brought before the COMELEC for it to exercise appellate jurisdiction, the division decides the appeal but, if there is a motion for reconsideration, the appeal proceeds to the banc where a majority is needed for a decision. If the process ends without the required majority at the banc, the appealed decision stands affirmed. Upon the other hand, and this is what happened in the instant case, if what is brought before the COMELEC is an original protest invoking the original jurisdiction of the Commission, the protest, as one whole process, is first decided by the division, which process is continued in the banc if there is a motion for reconsideration of the division ruling. If no majority decision is reached in the banc, the protest, which is an original action, shall be dismissed. There is no first instance decision that can be deemed affirmed. In a protest originally brought before the COMELEC, no completed process comes to the banc. It is the banc which will complete the process. If, at that completion, no conclusive result in the form of a majority vote is reached, the COMELEC has no other choice except to dismiss the protest. In a protest placed before the Commission as an appeal, there has been a completed proceeding that has resulted in a decision. So that when the COMELEC, as an appellate body, and after the appellate process is completed, reaches an inconclusive result, the appeal is in effect dismissed and resultingly, the decision appealed from is affirmed. 15.) Talaga vs. COMELEC DOCTRINES: (1) Jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy rests with the COMELEC in division, not the COMELEC En Banc. (2) COMELEC has the power to deny due course, or to cancel a candidates Certificate of Candidacy based on apparent ineligibility of a candidate. (3) A decision or resolution of a Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. FACTS: The case involves the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election. Ramon Talaga, Jr. and Philip Castillo respectively filed their certificates of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in the scheduled 2010 national and local elections. Castillo filed with the COMELEC 1 st Division, a petition denominated In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served 3 Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, docketed as SPA 09-029 (DC). Castillo alleged that Talaga was successively elected mayor of Lucena City in 2001, 2004, and 2007 local elections based on the records of the COMELEC of Lucena City and had fully served the aforesaid 3 terms without any voluntary and involuntary interruption. In the meantime, the SC promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the 3-term limit rule. Talaga filed with the COMELEC aManifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino, acknowledging that he is now disqualified to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having served 3 terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the 2010 elections. Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Talaga did not withdraw his Certificate of Candidacy. Consequently, on the 19 th day of April 2010, the COMELEC 1 st Division declared Talaga disqualified to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 2010 elections. Initially, Talaga filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration against the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC 1 st Division. Later on, however, he filed at 9:00 a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for Reconsideration. On the same day (4 May 2010), Barbara Ruby filed her own certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Talaga, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Talaga. On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramon Talagas Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC 1 st Divisions Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and executory. NOTE: It is important to determine when exactly did the April 19, 2010 COMELEC 1 st Division became final and executory. Should it be reckoned (a) from the time said Resolution was promulgated; (b) from the time Talaga withdrew his Motion for Reconsideration; or (c) on May 5, 2010, from the time COMELEC En Banc declared that COMELEC 1 st Divisions Resolution became final and executory. Important to determine to know whether Talaga was a candidate on the May 10, 2010 elections. On election day (May 10, 2010), the name of Talaga remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with the majority votes as against Castillo. Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers seeking the suspension of Barbara Rubys proclamation. On May 13, 2010, three days after the election day, through Resolution No. 8917, the COMELEC En Banc gave due course to Barbara Rubys Certificate of Candidacy and Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance, thereby including her in the certified list of candidates. Consequently, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City. Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC 2 nd
Division, alleging that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Talaga because his Certificate of Candidacy had been cancelled and denied due course; and that Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution 3 days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Talaga should be considered stray. The COMELEC 2 nd Division held that Castillo was notified of Resolution No. 8917 on May 13, 2010, as it was the basis for the proclamation of Ruby on that date. Castillo failed to file any action within the prescribed period either in the COMELEC or the SC assailing the said resolution. Thus, the said resolution has become final and executory. The COMELEC 2 nd Division further held that: There is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code or any election laws for that matter which requires that the substitution and the Certificate of Candidacy of the substitute should be approved and given due course first by the Commission or the Law Department before it can be considered as effective. There being no irregularity in the substitution by Ruby of Ramon Talaga as candidate for mayor of Lucena City, the counting of the votes of Talaga in favor of Ruby is proper. The proclamation, thus, of Ruby as mayor elect of Lucena City is in order. Hence, we find no cogent reason to annul the proclamation of respondent Barbara Ruby C. Talaga as the duly elected Mayor of the City of Lucena after the elections conducted on May 10, 2010. 1. Whether or not the COMELEC 1 st Division erred in cancelling the Certificate of Candidacy of Talaga. NO. The Supreme Court has held in Fermin vs. COMELEC that: The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relateto the qualifications required of the public office he is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is eligible for the office he seeks. Sec. 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the Certificate of Candidacy that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. The Court has already likened a proceeding under Sec. 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Sec. 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in fact that a Sec.78- related petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. Castillos petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Talaga made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Talaga as candidate (that is, the right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Talaga made the false representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible. The petition expressly challenged Ramon Talagas eligibility for public office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code against any person serving three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent Ramon Talaga be denied due course to or cancel the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate." The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted. In Mitra vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court ruled that: The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws. Talaga himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELECs declaration of his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all. 2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in making no express finding that Talaga committed any deliberate misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy. NO. Although Castillos petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC), whereby Castillo filed with the COMELEC 1 st Division, a petition denominated In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served 3 Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena, specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy, the COMELEC categorically stated in the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillos petition without express qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramons Certificate of Candidacy based on his apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and because Ramon later withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it. 3. Whether or not the COMELEC 1 st Division Resolution disqualifying Talaga, became final and executory before the 2010 elections. It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Talaga disqualified is decisive. According to Section 10, Rule 19 of the COMELECs Resolution No. 8804, a decision or resolution of a Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of five days following its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. Under Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804, the decision of the COMELEC En Banc becomes final and executory five days after its promulgation and receipt of notice by the parties. The COMELEC First Division declared Talaga disqualified through its Resolution dated April 19, 2010, the copy of which Talaga received on the same date. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration on April 21, 2010 in accordance with Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696, but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010, ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such circumstances indicated that there was no more pending matter that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due course. Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of five days from its promulgation and receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably on April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the withdrawal by Talaga of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final and executory. The COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Talagas ineligibility. Also, Talaga did not voluntarily withdraw his Certificate of Candidacy before the elections in accordance with Sec. 73 of the OEC. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her Certificate of Candidacy on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate. 4. Considering that the COMELEC Resolution disqualifying Talaga has become final and executory, whether or not the Ruling in Cayat vs. COMELEC would be applicable in this case. Cayat Ruling: The COMELEC Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayats favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none. Yet, the Supreme Court cannot agree with Castillos assertion that with Talagas disqualification becoming final prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor. Barbara Rubys filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat ruling. Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat, the petitioner in Cayat, was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his disqualification became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no substitution of Cayat was made, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet. In contrast, after Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillos claim of being the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor. Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr. ruling should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will." On the other hand, the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to Talagas ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC before the elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit: If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. Velasco, Jr. J.: Notably, the finality of the judgment of the Comelec is reckoned from the date of the promulgation and not from the date of receipt of the resolution, decision or order which is the standard rule in non-election related cases. To my mind, the rationale for such requirement would manifest by relating the aforementioned provision with Section 5 of Rule 18 of the same Rules, which provides: The promulgation of a decision or resolution of the Commission or a Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram. Abad, J.: But Ramons withdrawal of his motion for reconsideration in the morning of May 4, 2010 rendered the COMELEC First Divisions April 19, 2010 resolution final and executory, even without the En Bancs formal action. The Court held in Rodriguez, Jr. v. Aguilar, Sr. that a motion for reconsideration, once withdrawn, has the effect of canceling such motion as if it were never filed. The consequence of this is that the decision subject of the withdrawn motion for reconsideration ipso facto lapses into finality upon the expiration of period for appeal. Thus, in accordance with COMELEC Rules, the April 19, 2010 resolution became final and executory five days from its promulgation or on April 24, 2010. The May 5, 2010 COMELEC En Banc resolution merely confirmed the final and executory nature of the First Divisions April 19, 2010 resolution. As correctly observed by Chairman Brillantes in his dissent, the withdrawals effectivity cannot be made to depend on COMELEC approval because, if such were the case, substitution of candidates may be frustrated by either the commissions delay or inaction. 16) ABUNDO VS COMELEC
16. ABUNDO, SR. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013 Velasco, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE: To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz: 1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon). 2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the officials service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates). 3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service (Latasa). 4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.). 5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida). 6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera). FACTS: For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the formers disqualification to run, the corresponding petition, docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution(per curiam by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento (Presiding Commissioner), Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal) finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes. Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify. By Decision of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor. Just like the RTC, the COMELECs Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-term limit rule. In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc (per Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph and concurred in by Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco and Christian Robert S. Lim) held in essence the following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundos 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to have lost title to the disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not to the service of the term. ISSUE: Whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials
HELD: NO. In the present case, the Court finds Abundos case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule. It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied. This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundos mayoralty. The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007 term. There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled. A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office." It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another." It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160, the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of said term. In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less. Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundos opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004the start of the termuntil May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no legal right to said position. As a final note, We reiterate that Abundos case differs from other cases involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it may bring. In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to Abundoan elected official who was belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing candidateor the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office but held it anywayWe find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by an invalid proclamation. Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want" and hence, should, as much as possible, "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it overreaches itself." For democracy draws strength from the choice the people make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect. Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice- Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this Decision. _________________________________________________________________ 17.) JALOSJOS vs. COMELEC and ERASMO G.R. NO. 192474; June 26, 2012 Abad, J.: DOCTRINE: The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. FACTS: In May 2007, Romeo Jalosjos Jr. Ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboangadel Norte and won. While serving as mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. In September 2008 he beganoccupying the house. After 8 months he applied with the Election Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters registration record to Precint 0051F. Erasmo opposed the said application. After due proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos application. Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters of Precint 0051F before the 1 st MCTC of Ipil-Tungawan who granted the same. The MCTC found the Jalosjos did not abandon his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor. Jalosjos appeal to RTC which affirmed MTC. Jalosjos then elevated the matter to CA which granted his application and enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions with the result that his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Villages Voters list pending the resolution of petition. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his COC for the position of Representative of the 2nd District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 2010 National Elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in the COC when he indicated that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint resolution dismissingErasmospetitions. While Erasmos Motion for Reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC, Jalosjos won in the 2010 elections and was proclaimed. Meantime, on June 2, 2010 the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before it, holding that the lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the voters list of Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and Republic Act 8189 to vote in that place. Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA decision before the SC. Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the COMELECs finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and denial of due process. Erasmo assails the COMELEC En Bancs failure to annul Jalosjos proclamation as elected representative despite his declared ineligibility. ISSUE: Whether SC has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of Jalosjos residency qualification considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office. HELD: NO. While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives (SET/HRET). The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos had already beenproclaimed on May 2010 as winner in the election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the proclamation of Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated rule. Since the COMELEC declared him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his proclamation was void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia. For Erasmo, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order. Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide. The COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELECs failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET. 18) TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN, G.R. No. 198742 August 10, 2012. REYES, J.: DOCTRINE: An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration.; A person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws provides another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code; Judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. FACTS: The petitioner, natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen, owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. Later, she filed an application and was approved to re-acquire her Philippine citizenship pursuant to Section 3 of RA 9225, Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. She took her oath of allegiance to the RP on 12/5/2005. Petitioner then filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. Thereafter, petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections but lost. She again ran during the 5/10/2010 elections for the Vice-Mayor which she won this time around. She took her oath of office on 5/13/ 2010. Private respondents Picar, Pagaduan, and Bautista, registered voters of Caba, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioners eligibility and also sought the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. RTC held that the petitioners failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public officeThe law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Hence, she was disqualified and ineligible to hold vice-mayorship, that her proclamation be nullified, and declaring the position of vice-mayor as vacant. 2 nd Division COMELEC, upon appeal, dismissed the same, for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On MR, appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc however It concurred with the RTC; it also granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents. Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en banc. ISSUES: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the qualifications of the petitioner HELD: 1) An appeal may be simultaneously reinstated and definitively resolved by the COMELEC en banc in a resolution disposing of a motion for reconsideration. The power of COMELEC EN BANC to decide MR in election cases is found Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, : Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Relate this with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, to wit: Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order. The said provisions do not set any limits to the COMELEC en bancs prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially dismissed it. Thus no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the petitioners appeal after ruling for its reinstatement. Further, petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en bancs exercise of discretion on the substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first place. 2) The COMELEC en banc has the power to order discretionary execution of judgment. Due to the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure COMELECs authority to order discretionary execution of judgment cannot be questioned. Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the ROC, execution pending appeal may be issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron, we stressed the import of the provision vis--vis election cases when we held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. 3) Private respondents are not estopped from questioning petitioners eligibility to hold public office. The fact that petitioners qualifications were not questioned when she filed certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections does not operate as an estoppel to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC. Under the BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit: (1) Before election, Sec. 78 provides a Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. ; and (2) After election, Sec. 253. A Petition for quo warranto. Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws provides another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section 253. xx..x 19.) EFREN ARATEA v.COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, Carpio, J. DOCTRINE: One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution on 18 February 2010 cancelling Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy. Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor. Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanidas disqualification. DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his criminal conviction, and as a consequence, his office was deemed permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELECs resolution of Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration. In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the COMELEC. On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Bancs resolution was based on two grounds: first Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second , Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. ISSUE: Whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. A candidate for mayor in the 2010 local elections was thus required to provide 12 items of information in the certificate of candidacy xxx a statement that the candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election xxx. The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run. The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification. Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Lonzanida, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction waspromulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009,before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. 20.) Dela Cruz vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 192221 November 13, 2012 Villarama, Jr., J.: Facts: On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacyfor theposition of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province ofAntique under the ticket of the National Peoples Coalition (NPC).Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz (Aurelio) also filed a certificate ofcandidacyfor the same position. Petitioner filed a petition to declare Aurelio anuisance candidate on the ground that he filed his certificate of candidacyfor the vice-mayoralty position to put the election process in mockery and to cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of his surname with petitioners surname. On January 29, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued aResolution declaring Aurelio as a nuisance candidate and cancelling his certificate of candidacy for the vice-mayoralty position in Bugasong. Despite the declaration of Aurelio as a nuisance candidate, however, his name was not deleted in the Certified List of Candidates and Official Sample Ballot issued by the COMELEC. Petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion praying, among other things, that COMELEC issue an order directing the deletion of Aurelios name from the Official List of Candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor, the Official Ballots, and other election paraphernalia to be used in Bugasong for the May 2010 elections. She also prayed that in the event Aurelios name can no longer be deleted in time for the May 10, 2010 elections, the COMELEC issue an order directing that all votes cast in favor of Aurelio be credited in her favor, in accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 dated May 7, 2001. The COMELEC decided to consider stray the votes of the disqualified candidates, if voted upon. In the elections, petitioner lost by 39 votes. Aurelio garnered 532 votes. She insisted that the Aurelios votes be tallied in her favor. Issue: Whether or not the 532 votes for Aurelio should be tallied in petitioners favor. Held: YES. The COMELEC argues that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it simply followed the Omnibus Election Code with regard to the rule on votes for disqualified candidates. The Supreme Court disagrees. It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69(nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown to be false). Clearly, a petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC under Section 69 as in Section 78 cannot be treated in the same manner as a petition to disqualify under Section 68 as what COMELEC did when it applied the rule provided in Section 72 that the votes cast for a disqualified candidate be considered stray, to those registered candidates whose COCs had been cancelled or denied due course. Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she neverfiled a COC. COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in special action cases, provides: (5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall becounted and tallied for the bona fide candidate. Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELECs changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. The votes for Aurelio is to be tallied in favor of petitioner. Petitioner is hereby declared the duly elected Vice Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique in the May 2010 elections. 21.)DELOS SANTOS v.COMMISSION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 198457, August 13, 2013 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: FACTS: Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco of the Second District of Cebu City entered into a MOA with the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr. Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his PDAF to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy (TNT) Health Program (TNT Program). Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the TNT Program surfaced. On December 14, 2004, petitioner Filomena G. Delos Santos (Delos Santos), who succeeded Dr. Alquizalas, created, a fact- finding committee to investigate the matter. The fact-finding committee submitted its Report essentially affirming the unseen and unnoticeable irregularities attendant to the availment of the TNT Program but pointing out, among others, that: (a) VSMMC was made an unwilling tool to perpetuate a scandal involving government funds; (b) the VSMMC management was completely blinded as its participation involved merely a routinary ministerial duty in issuing the checks upon receipt of the referral slips, prescriptions, and delivery receipts that appeared on their faces to be regular and complete. Delos Santos alleged that Cuenco put up the TNT Office in VSMMC, which was run by his own staff who took all pro forma referral slips bearing the names of the social worker and the Medical Center Chief, as well as the logbook. From then on, the hospital had no more participation in the said program and was relegated to a mere bag keeper. Consequently, a special audit team (SAT), led Team Leader Atty. Federico E. Dinapo, Jr., to conduct a special audit investigation. Examination by the SAT of the records and interviews with the personnel involved showed that the purported patients-beneficiaries of the TNT Program were mostly non-existent and there was no actual procedure followed except for the mere preparation of payment documents which were found to be falsified. Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, disallowed the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents, and holding petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor. ISSUE: The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10. HELD: NO. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherentin our form of government. Corollary thereto, it is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism. In this case, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will be discussed below.
The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been deeply involved in the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party to the MOA and, as such, has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of Cuencos PDAF. Further, under the MOA VSMMC undertook to ascertain that [a]ll payments and releases under [the] program x x x shall be made in accordance with existing government accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing agency, i.e., the Department of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Clearly, by allowing the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco to take over the entire process of availing of the benefits of the TNT Program without proper monitoring and observance of internal control safeguards, the hospital and its accountable officers reneged on their undertaking under the MOA to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation of the said health program. They likewise violated paragraph 5 of NBC 476 which requires a regular monitoring activity of all programs and projects funded by the PDAF, as well as Sections 123 and 124 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (Auditing Code), which mandates the installation, implementation, and monitoring of a sound system of internal control to safeguard assets and check the accuracy and reliability of the accounting data