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Authority and Autonomy in Marriage
MARIANNE WEBER
Translation with Introduction and Commentary
CRAIG R. BERMINGHAM
INTRODUCTION
In ``Authority and Autonomy in Marriage,''
1
Marianne Weber investigated marriage
and the relations between the sexes by first addressing the ideas that have determined
the character of those relations through history. In so doing, she studied and evalu-
ated two competing normative systems: ``authority'' and ``autonomy.'' Weber exam-
ined the dominant normative system, ``authority'' (of the man over the woman), its
origins, and its consequences for marriage and the spouses, and advocated its replace-
ment by the ``form principle'' of ``autonomy.'' The latter constitutes an ethical stand-
ard that arose out of the ideas of Puritanism and the Enlightenment, was thrust upon
the modern woman through industrialization, and, if accepted over authority as a
legally mandated standard governing marital relations, would lead to greater fulfill-
ment on the part of the womanand the manin marriage.
In order to place Weber's argument in ``Authority'' in its proper context, three
points are worth mentioning. First, as a matter of politics, Weber lobbied for an
overhaul of the German legal provisions regarding male authority in the family as a
first step in her broader agenda that sought to liberate women from their historically
subordinate position. Second, she not only argued for an emancipatory restructuring
of the marital institution, but, at the same time, defended the marital ideal, the
``highest and most unquestionable ethical ideal that life has to offer'' (Weber
1907:571), against a contemporary eroticist movement, which she condemned as
invidious to the interests of women and to all that is spiritually fulfilling about the
relationship between man and woman (Weber 1950:40926). Third, Weber's emphasis
on marriage, and on achieving women's autonomy in marriage by way of legal
reform, rests on the fundamental assumption that human beings shape one another
in interactions, and that the sexual relation, in particular, defines human beings more
fundamentally than any other. As she has written elsewhere, ``[N]o human relation is
so full of consequences as the sexual relation. Nothing shapes human beings more
decisively than their relation in this sphere'' (Weber 1950:410).
F
1
In my introduction and commentary, I will refer to Weber's essay either by its full name, ``Authority and
Autonomy in Marriage,'' or by the abbreviation, ``Authority.'' Though ``Authority'' is my principle focus,
when necessary, I will draw on the author's other works as well.
Sociological Theory 21:2 June 2003
#
American Sociological Association. 1307 NewYork Avenue NW, Washington, DC20005-4701
The following translation of ``Authority'' and the subsequent commentary are
meant to contribute to a study of Marianne Weber's work that is urgently needed
for several reasons. First, like many of her contemporaries, Weber was a pioneering
sociologist who studied the consequences of modernity. However, as a feminist, she
was particularly interested in examining and critiquing women's subjugation amidst
the wrenching social transformations of the time. Second, Weber published nine
books of social analysis during her life, including Wife and Mother in the Development
of Law (1907), which established her as the ``acknowledged authority on women's
position in society, as well as an authority on family law and its development''
(Britton 1979:31), and Women's Questions and Women's Thoughts (1919), in
which ``Authority'' was first published. Additionally, her biography of Max Weber,
and the 10 volumes of his work edited and proofed by her within the first two years
after his death, not only preserved Max's thought for posterity but offer considerable
insight into her own life and scholarship as well. Third, during her life, Weber was a
well-known public figure in Germany who was the first woman elected to a German
parliament, was a member of the Bavarian Assembly, was elected as the only female
representative to the Baden State Constitutional Convention of 1919, and was an
executive committee member of a political party that became part of the governing
coalition in the early Weimar Republic. Finally, Weber interacted with several of
sociology's ``canonized'' male founders, such as Georg Simmel, Robert Michels, and
her husband Max. She directed a feminist critique at their work and thought while
they were still alive, and in the process of formulating the very ideas for which they are
remembered today. For all of these reasons Weber's thought deserves scholarly
attention.
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE (1912)
2
Whoever wants to fundamentally understand and correctly judge the inner structure of
marriage and the relation between the sexes must at least cast a short glance at the
history of its development, above all at the leading ideas through which it has been
defined. As far as can be determined, at the beginning of all history the woman was the
property of the man among all of the civilized peoples of Europe. Through purchase or
exchange, he gained unlimited right of ownership over her and her children. For this
reason, he could freely dispose of her person, e.g., at any time sell her, expel her, or take
up with her competitors, while she remained, with respect to him, completely without
rights, permanently bound, and obligated to loyalty and obedience.
As such, initially, the only formal shaping principle regarding the relation between
man and woman is simply the right of the stronger: primitive patriarchalism. It still
exists today among diverse uncivilized peoples as an unquestioned legal form.
The community between man and woman can only then be characterized as
marriage in an actual sense when the absolute power of the man finds its limits
through certain obligations toward the woman. Universally, this occurs first when
the woman's family ceases to turn her over unconditionally to the power of the man,
above all not without equipping her with a dowry, which elevates the woman as ``wife''
to a position above concubines. Her family thus earns for her an entitlement accord-
ing to which her children must be considered the man's ``legitimate heirs'' over all of
2
With regard to the footnotes appearing in the translation of Weber's essay, the original author's footnotes
appear in roman text. My explanatory footnotes appear in italics. Additionally, all italics and quotation marks
within the text itself appeared in Weber's original essay.
86 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
his other children. In this way, the oldest, conscious structuring of sexual relations
was created everywhere out of the natural relation of power: the so-called legitimate
marriage as an insurance of certain women and their children against the polygamous
drives of the husband. Otherwise, initially, marriage completely maintained the char-
acter of a relation of ownership.
3
From that time onward, every great cultural age has formed and built on this
original structure, and everywhere, namely, in the same fundamental direction. Wher-
ever civilization grew, the aspiration grew as well to somehow protect the woman
from the barbaric arbitrariness of the husband. On the other hand, everywhere, his
domination over her and the children nevertheless remained secure. The husband was
directed toward humane patriarchy, toward a milder domination of the wife, but not
toward the recognition of her as a companion.
The creation of monogamous marriage as an institute of law was the work of the
Greeks and Romans. This means that they created legal monogamous marriage,
which did, of course, forbid the husband from taking several wives into the home,
and only allowed him to gain legitimate children from one wife. However, it hindered
him neither legally nor morally from possessing as many other women as he liked
outside the home without any obligation. Also at that time, the commandment of
marital fidelity was imposed, under threat of severe punishment, only on the woman.
She alone was the one who had to answer for the realization of a social and ethical
ideal which Antiquity already revered and recognized, but yet without making the
attempt to force the sexually ``needier'' nature of the man under its sway.
In contrast to the Greeks and Romans, old Judaism still permitted polygamy. Only
it surrounded marriage for the first time with a religious consecration of nothing less
than world-historical significance. Marriage was revealed to the prophets of the
covenant as God's oldest institution and order. God Himself had, accordingly, blessed
the first couple. But God Himself had also determined the relations of the partners.
He created for the husband a ``helper,'' and imposed on her the Word: ``Your will shall
be subordinate to your husband and he shall be your master.''
4
Thus, not only was
marriage thereby made holy, but marriage in a special form.
This sanctioning of patriarchalism had the furthest-reaching consequences. It has
determined the structure of Christian marriage up until our times. For the lofty
Christian teachings of religious equality of the woman were already distorted by the
greatest apostle when it came to her relation to her spouse. The bearer of Christian
propaganda, Paul, who sought, in all other areas of life, to break out of Jewish
tradition, remained entirely within its limits regarding the woman. Referring to the
authority of ``the law,'' he sealed not only the woman's obligation of obedience, but
also her total position with respect to the man, as a being of second order: ``[F]or the
man is not from the woman, but the woman from the man. And the man is not
created for the good of the woman, but rather the woman is created for the good of
the man.''
5
This position has been reified into dogma up until the present in all of
those circles that believe in ``definitive revelations,'' but has asserted its power beyond
these circles as well. But in another direction, Christianity created a large, new cultural
product: the deepening of the demand of ``legalized'' monogamy into an indispensable
religious-cultural imperative, that now was not only directed toward the woman, but
rather, for the first time in history, emphatically toward the man as well.
3
For the historical basis for this account, compare Marianne Weber, ``Wife and Mother in the
Development of Law,'' Tu bingen, 1907.
4
See Genesis 2:1825 and Ephesians 5:2224.
5
See 1 Corinthians 11:89.
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE 87
Though the fulfillment of this ideal has yet only been realized by a small part of
humanity, the mere fact that this was set as a goal to be strived for had to influence
the relation between man and woman most definitively. Only then, when the man was
also directed toward unification with one woman, could marriage become the vessel
for all of his spiritual strength. Only then was the soil made fertile, in which, out of the
natural element of fleeting sexual love, the most tender and deepest spiritual relation
between man and woman could grow, a relation of which it would not be senseless to
demand that it be everlasting.
However, the completeness of the Christian marital ideal would soon suffer losses
through the teachings of the Church. As a reaction against the sexual excesses of the
cultural world of late antiquity, these teachings exaggerated the ideal of controlling
one's sex life to the point of despising all that is natural, and called for its furthest
suppression possible. The natural foundation of the community between man and
woman was, from then on, banished to the domain of sin. It was still permissible in
marriage, but even there, it was not worthy of any holy consecration. Life without
marriage was considered the more complete state of affairs. Eve, the type of earthly
woman oriented toward the flesh, the mother of sin, the temptress to evil, was
juxtaposed to the Virgin Mary as the embodiment of undefiled motherliness.
Protestantism did raise marriage, as a work of God, above celibacy, as the work of
humans; but it also allowed sexual love only under the blemish of ``evil desire,'' which
originates not from God, but from the devil. In the case of such desire God merely
``looks through the fingers'' in marriage because, as Luther says, there it is compen-
sated by many kinds of listlessness and torment.
6
New arguments in the Bible were sought for the subordination of the woman.
Thus, Luther cites Eve's Fall from Grace very emphatically as its historical source: ``If
Eve hadn't sinned, she would have reigned together with Adam and ruled as his
helper.''
7
But now the Regime belongs to him alone, and she must bow before him as
before her master.
But, on the other hand, the spirit of Protestantism also contributed to the deepening
of the marital ideal, and the shaping of everyday marital life. Namely, through those
currents outside of the official churches of the Reformation that are classified as Puritan.
Of course, Puritanism made a detour that is not easily recognizable. It, namely, carried
into the world and into the institution of marriage with inexorable strictness the ascetic
ideals of monasticism: rejection of all life pleasures and suppression of sensuality.
Luther's God had still, just like the Catholic God, in magnanimous generosity turned
a blind eye toward marital sensuality. The God of the Puritans allowed marital sensuality
only for the purpose of the procreation of children for the greater glory of God.
However much we like, today, to sharply reject this demonization and rationaliza-
tion of elementary vitality, one should not forget that precisely that Puritan breeding,
which for long periods of time attained a never-before-achieved disciplining of the
man, should be credited with a deepening of the spiritual and ethical relation between
man and woman that since then has never been lost. Only then, when subjugation of
the elementary was taken seriously, could the focus become the spiritual
8
melting
together of the partners, the intimacy of their spiritual relationship as the most
important meaning of marriage.
6
For further reading of passages in Martin Luther's writing that reflect this sentiment, see Luther's Works
(1961 1: 116; 3:4748; 25:320321; 45:3536; 51:154.)
7
For this passage in Martin Luther's writing, see Luther's Works (1961 1:203.)
8
``seelische'': This German word comes from die Seele (the soul). Here, Marianne is referring to the ``melting
together of the partners' souls.''
88 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
That which marriage was capable of becoming in these circles was expressed in the
religious-colored language of the time, most beautifully in a farewell letter written by
the Quaker W. Penn to his wife as he departed his homeland in order to found a new
state on the other side of the ocean: ``Don't forget that you were the love of my youth
and the chief joy of my life, the most beloved and worthiest of my earthly solace. The
reason for that love existed more in your inner than in your outer virtues, though the
latter are many. God knows it, you know it, and I too can say it, that our connection
was a work of Providence, and God's likeness in each of us was that which attracted
us to one another the most.'' What kind of a world lies between this understanding of
the relation between the sexes and that which reveals itself in a Greek thinker's well-
known remark: ``We have hetaera to amuse ourselves with, after that purchased
hussies to care for our bodies, and finally wives who should give us legal children,
and whose duty it is to watch over all of the matters of our house.''
9
Within the religious communities of the new world that were governed by the
Puritan spirit, the thought of religious equality of the woman was taken seriously for
the first time. For the Quakers, the teachings in the Bible did not represent the
definitive and only possible revelation, but rather one of many forms in which the
``inner light'' appears to human beings. They could, for that reason, drop the dogma
concerning the subordination of the woman as God's desire. ``Obey God more than
human beings''; this sentence, which establishes freedom of conscience on the part of
the individual as an inalienable right against every earthly authority, was recognized
among these communities for the first time also in the case of the wife with respect to
the husband. Freedom of conscience, the mother of all civil rights of the individual,
stood across the ocean at the cradle of women's rights as well.
Fundamental subjugation under traditional and trusted authoritiesfundamental
subjugation only under one's own consciencefrom then on, those are the two forms
of human action that arise equally out of religious feeling, and between which there is
only an ``either-or.''
The eighteenth century directed at worldly things the idea that every human
beingprecisely because he is a human beingis entitled to certain inalienable rights
vis-a -vis all others and every earthly authority:
10
against the state in the form of a
demand for political participation and legal equality of its citizens, against the social
community in the form of a moral demand on the part of the individual for a certain
sphere of inner and outer freedom. These ideas achieved their deepest significance and
their highest clarity in the ethical teachings of freedom of German idealism, through
our great thinkers Kant and Fichte.
That which in this context is of interest may be formulated in a few sentences: The
human being is, as a bearer of reason, intended to govern himselfthat is, to act not,
for example, according to the arbitrariness of his instincts, but rather, in accordance
with a conscience that has been subordinated to the moral law. As a bearer of this
capacity for ``autonomy,'' the individual possesses its specific dignity, which distin-
guishes it as a ``personality'' before all other beings; it may, for that reason, raise the
claim to be ``an end in itself.'' Out of these ideas arises the simple and undeniable
principle for the shaping of human relationships: every person should respect in every
9
Hetaera refers to a highly cultured courtesan or concubine, especially in ancient Greece.
10
In this translation, I have chosen to employ the masculine pronoun form because Marianne used that form
in the original German. Marianne's use of the German masculine pronoun er was not a consciously gendered
choice, but rather a matter of grammatical necessity. In German, the pronoun employed must be masculine
because, grammatically, it must agree with the gender of the word for human being, der Mensch, which is also
masculine.
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE 89
other human being the predestination of that person to be an end in himself. No
person should consider his fellow human beings merely as a means for his personal
ends. There is, in reality, hardly a human relationship thinkable that, if it desires to be
ethically adequate, can get around this maxim. And the path from the acceptance of
this sentence to a new structuring of the relation between the sexes seems to be a short
one. For according to it, the highest ethical goal of existence, for the woman as well,
can be nothing other than the development into a morally autonomous personality.
Accordingly, it is just as immoral for her, too, to bend to a foreign will against her own
conscience. Accordingly, she, too, may not be used as a mere means to the husband's ends.
But again, alone in the case of the woman, these ideals were distorted. The
tradition that conceded to the man's natural instincts for power remained powerful
with regard to her. Even the great heralds of autonomy did not even think about
laying a hand on the patriarchal system. Instead, they tried, through a clever chess
move of reason, to bring her fundamental subordination into agreement with the new
ideals. Husband and wife are declared to be ``originally equals,'' and marriage a
contract through which the wife voluntarily subordinates herself to the husband. In
Kant's view, it is not, for example, contrary to the equality of the spouses, if the law
says of the husband with reference to the wife: And he should be your master. And
Fichte's dialectic was even able to infer, out of his teachings on freedom, a patriarchal
marital ideal, which did, of course, include a complete right to divorce on the part of
the woman.
But that which was denied the woman in the realm of the idea was soon forced
upon her in the realm of realities. The new life forces of the Machine Age blew open
the circle of her family duties, led her away from the protection of the house, and
thereby out of the husband's sphere of domination. The increasing reduction of
household work under the pressure of technical and economic forces compels a
constantly increasing percentage of women to either temporarily or permanently
stand on their own feet outside the home.
But the intellectual ring that had closed around her due to the restriction of her
activities and influence to the house was also thereby blown open. Today, she sees
herself woven into a world of superpersonal contexts that demand that she prove herself
in new ways. She sees herself placed before an array of new forms of influence and life
problems, between which no one other than she can rationally choose. This intellectual
departure from the house, just like the economic departure, must fundamentally shift
her position within our social community and her relation to the other sex.
We are, indeed, experiencing also in our time, like in no time before, a thorough
readjustment of the customs and views regarding the woman, and an expansion of the
opportunities for life and development that are conceded to her. In many areas of life,
she has achieved the legal status to speak for herself; in other areas, she is still denied
that status. And above all, for marriage, in which man and woman are most closely
and directly connected to one another, the legally protected predominance of the
husband is still an indispensable form-principle. We find, of course, a growing number
of men, above all from the leading intellectual strata, who are ready to value their own
wife as a personality and to do without the use of gender privilege with regard to her.
However, only very few today agree to the fundamental renunciation of the rights of
authority with regard to the entire female sex.
An unmistakable document of this fact is the legal form of modern marriage, which
the German representatives of the people bestowed upon us just in time for the turn of
the century. It is true that the German Civil Code fundamentally recognizes women's
juridical competency, and makes them, just like men, fully responsible in business and
90 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
transactions. But the housewife's competency is limited wherever it could threaten the
husband's dominance in the household. Thus, our marital law is a strangely garnished
construct, which bears all the stylelessness of a compromise between irreconcilable
principles.
For example, the robust, ungarnished obedience-article that is familiar to all older
statutory regimes is disguised in a politely appearing husband's decision-making
authority, which nevertheless inadequately hides its unaltered fundamental character.
For the decision-making authority is valid not only in the husband's special sphere of
duties, but rather in all those matters that concern the family's collective life, i.e., also
in the housewife and mother's special sphere of duties. Furthermore, marital law
today indeed provides for ``parental authority'' rather than the paternal authority of
earlier times, but the mother's parental authority attains its full scope of application
only after the father's death, or when he is hindered from exercising that authority.
Next to the father, the mother's parental authority is only a fragment. She can neither
represent the children in court and in legal transactions, nor manage and administer
their property. Minor children need only the father's consent to enter into marriage.
And above all, the wife is again expressly subordinate to the husband within the most
important sphere of parental duty: the welfare of the children's person, which is vested
in the mother as well as the father, and their care and rearing, which includes a
determination of their living arrangements. In the case of differences of opinion, the
father decides. That is, he can determine for the boys and girls which school they
attend, which vocation they take up, and where they should be reared.
In addition to this personal subordination, this legislative regime also provides for
the wife's pecuniary dependence. This has perhaps less fundamental significance, but
in everyday marital life, it is of all the more practical importance. Of course, the new
economic conditions of life, into which our age has placed the woman, have also
wrested an important innovation from German legal thinking: the wife's independent
earnings from work remain at her disposal as her savings, while in earlier times she
had to hand them over to her husband.
The working woman has thus become, up to a certain point, economically inde-
pendent. This is not the case, however, for the woman with her own property assets
insofar as she does not protect herself before marriage through a special marital
contract. For the legal regime places all of the assets that she brings into the marriage
in the hands of her husband. This is done explicitly in order to secure, as the
comments to the German civil code acknowledge, the husband's position as ``master
of the household and head of the marriage.'' And, above all, there is a mass of women
who are not secure, including those who are without property, and who have to do
without independent earnings for the good of their career as housewives and mothers.
Still today, these women, even if one only views it economically, make irreplaceable
contributions to the family through their domestic work, and perhaps also through
their assistance in their husbands' careers. To be sure, all of these women have a legal
claim to support by their husbands that is appropriate to their social standing. But this
very elastic formulation provides them with not a penny for their free disposal, and
secures for them not even a modest independence for the satisfaction of their personal
needs. For both the woman with property and the woman without, it is at the pleasure
and discretion of the husband whether she will be able to freely dispose of some
amount of money.
The modern women who strive for personality rights in the deepest sense for their
sex, responsibility and self-reliance, protest against these carryovers from the
patriarchal system. Precisely because the woman, by force of her familial functions
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE 91
through marriage, is normally much more strongly bound than the husband in every
sense, physically and economically, the lawmaker should, first and foremost, make her
protection a priority. For that reason, they juxtapose the principle of the authority of
the husband with the idea of companionship of the partners as a form principle in
marriage, and propose:
1. Elimination of the husband's general, legal decision-making authority.
2. A different distribution of parental rights, such that in the event of unsolvable
differences of opinion, the husband decides for the sons, and the wife decides
for the daughters.
3. They work to achieve, for the women of all strata, a sphere of pecuniary
independence secured through a more exact definition of the support obliga-
tions of the husband.
Here is not the place to further expound upon these legal questions. As such, we
return to the fundamental ethical question: whether authority or autonomy should
shape spouses' relations.
How, then, does marriage look when, in accordance with its legal form, the
fundamental authority of the husband really governs the relationships of the partners?
Then there is no doubt that the family and the house are the husband's sphere of
domination. Then in the sphere of influence that has been ascribed to the woman from
time immemorial as her native, innate domain, she stands as housewife and mother
constantly under the tutelage of the husband. And in all matters in which she should
normally be considered the more competent, she has, at most, an advisory, but not a
deciding, voice. For that reason, in the case of differences of opinion between the
partners, an external unity of will is effortlessly createdand the authoritarian
principle is still justified today by this highly external aim. But is it worth the sacrifices
that it costs? It is clear that the constant bending of the wife's will without her inner
consent and conviction can either be a mere feigned submission on her part, from
which she, in turn, underhandedly frees herself behind her husband's back, or it
actually achieves a suppression of her ability to reasonthat is, the atrophy of her
entire intellectual and spiritual development. Whoever has once learned the satisfac-
tion of acting conscientiously according to one's own determination will know how
the inner development of those women is restricted whose wants and aspirations are
never given free reign under the pressure of authority.
The influence of the patriarchal system can certainly not stop at matters that affect
only the life of the family community, as its modern proponents purport. There is no
question that it also extends itself all of the way into the sphere of the woman's
entirely personal life. For marital relationships encompass the entire person, and that
which one spouse does and feels, touches necessarily at some point the life of the
other. The male spouse who is patriarchally disposed will without question also want
to dictate and control the inner life of the woman. The richer and more independent
the content of her personality comes to be, the more difficult her fundamental
subordination must of course become.
For this reason, strong aspirations toward self-reliance and intellectual develop-
ment necessarily fill a husband who is bent on authority with a severe uneasiness. He
will not rest if he is not constantly secure also in his position as the master of her most
personal inner life. He will feel the need to monitor her readings, her friendships, her
interests outside the home. This half-unconscious tendency, which is, in many cases,
merely suggested by tradition, also continues to make countless husbands today
92 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
suspicious of every serious ambition on the part of women to be active beyond the
limits of the house. And that is entirely understandable. For outside the home they
are, just like men, placed in superpersonal contexts and structures that remove them
from personal domination.
The inner protest of the patriarchally disposed husband, who lacks the full, naive
freedom from restraint of earlier times, is normally dressed up as a concern that the
woman is neglecting her family life and her childrena plea that rarely fails to
achieve its effect on conscientious, sensitive women. From time immemorial up until
the present day, a part of the energy and intellectual vitality of the womaneven of
her moral qualities: forthrightness and courage in her own opinionhave very
certainly been sacrificed to her rearing for patriarchal marriage, and to that marriage
itself. Has it not been made through all the centuries into a religious obligation, and a
precondition for her happiness, that she learn submission in silent obedience? And
certainly the feelings of happiness of many women have been less impaired through
this process than their inner development. This can only change when husbands learn
to do without the fundamental privileges of authority.
But does the ethical autonomy of the woman forbid any subordination of her will
whatsoever to that of the husband? Very certainly not. Voluntary subordination,
devotion, which is offered as a free gift of love, is something different than compelled
subordination. The personality that is responsible for its own actions does not then
end up in a contradiction with itself if it bends before another personality's higher
insight, more mature judgment, and greater completeness due to its own inner con-
victions, if it sacrifices for the higher aspirations of a greater person. On the basis of
such convictions, the autonomous woman can of course also make her husband's will
her own, and place her wishes and interests behind his. But when that can occur may
only be decided before the forum of her own conscience, and only from case to case. It
may absolutely not be decided for all time at the very beginning of their relationship,
as the principle of authority would require. In any case, where the wife knows that the
husband is caught in a mistakeand the husband also ``errs, as long as he continues
to try''and where, for that reason, she cannot freely agree with him, then in the
spirit of autonomy, her own inner voice must decide. Then she must, to express it
religiously, claim the right: to obey God more than human beings. Only the free
sacrifices of love for the aspirations of a greater person possess beauty and dignity. A
husband's offer of these to the wife is also no disgrace.
But if, instead of such free giving of one's self, the woman obliges his needs and
everyday goals against her inner voice, simply because it is comfortable, for the sake
of outward peace, or to please her husband, then she commits blasphemy against her
own human dignity; then she devalues herself to a second-class being.
And the consequences of such a relation between the partners turn back on the
husband as well. The wife who is subordinated remains ``subordinated'' in the totality
of her being: almost a child, naive to the world, intellectually contented, enclosed in
the circle of the household, fixed in her interests on the purely personal and trifling.
And this is the tragic irony of her fate: this woman who, in order to comply with her
husband's wishes, did not fully develop her powers of moral judgment and her
intellectual abilities is normally left mentally and spiritually far behind in the course of
the years by the aspiring, alert husband. She cares for him in their everyday life, but she
has absolutely no problems, no complementing ideas or impulses, no intellectual stimu-
lations to offer him. The relationship to her requires absolutely no effort from his side.
Thus, we often experience then that the much-extolled German model-housewife
always remains valuable to the husband as the mother of his children and the source
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE 93
of his comfort, but that he would rarely think of sharing his higher intellectual life
with her. He even often prefers to seek the normal rest and relaxation alone, for
everyday life's thick dust of boredom covers the relationships and turns to gray that
which was once colorful and shining. And then when, with increasing desire for
comfort, real chivalry fades out of everyday marital life, a state of affairs often
developseven in those strata where, according to their position in life and talents,
it would definitely not be necessaryabout which Nietzsche spoke: ``Ah, this poverty
of a soul in twos, ah, this filth of a soul in twos, ah, this pitiful comfort in twos! They
call all of this marriage, and they say their marriages were made in heaven.''
11
Or the other possibility: Time and destiny mature the woman in spite of her
authoritarian boundedness. Then one day her aspirations and reason will break
through their bounds. But then it is very difficult, with respect to a husband who
had been used to her subordination up to that point, to find courage in her own
opinion, and to thereby upset the marital equilibrium. How often have even noble and
brave women been able to find no other way out of the conflict between the dictates of
one's own conscience and the dictates of one's husband than to pretend to submit
themselves to him, but to secretly circumvent such submission. The individual life of
the woman that for so long remained latent confronts the husband as a strange,
hostile element that disturbs the marital happiness. The unconditional trust vanishes,
the marital life then splits in an often-irreparable breach, and all of this just because
the wife first found herself so late, and because the husband did not learn to value the
being at his side as ``destined for self-determination'' just as he is.
Modern women value marriage as it should bethat is, a life's partnership that is
founded on the affinity of souls and senses, and on the desire for full responsibility, as
the highest ideal of human community that stands as an unshakable guiding star
above the sexual life of civilized humanity. They are, like the women of all times,
prepared to make those sacrifices that, as family members, marriage now demands
of them as a matter of necessity. These sacrifices are perhaps more difficult to make
for many today than in earlier times because our time is the first to know the conflict
between marriage and career, and between the special family tasks of the woman and
her inner drive to contribute to the construction of the superpersonal cultural world.
Modern women alone would now like to be declared of age, and to be respected by
the husband as a companion for life who, like him, stands before the face of eternity
responsible for her actions, and who, like him, must autonomously prove herself in
the world. They demand the trust that the female sex can learn to keep the balance
between natural and self-selected tasks just as well as the male sex between its various
obligations and interests. And they are convinced that only where this occurs can
marriage be more than an institution of social expediency.
It is no small task to keep the marital partnership free from the suffocating ash of
everyday life and habit through all of the phases of a long life, from the time of
youthful passion that allows no room for anything else, through the prime of life,
where, along with love, an abundance of other powers struggle to rule the soul, up
until the time when days grow few. More dangerous than all the suffering and strife
that destiny imposes from without, more fearful than the problems that arise out of
the struggle of souls, is the endless chain of satisfied, comfortable, struggleless every-
days, in which the partners have one another effortlessly in possession. Only when, in
11
For the context of this quote in the original German, see Nietzsche's ``Also sprach Zarathustra; Ein Buch
fur Alle und Keinen'' in Nietzsche's Werke in Drei Ba nden (1994:15657). For this quote in a readable English
translation, see Nietzche (1966:70).
94 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
both husband and wife, the content of their souls, the riches of their inner beings,
remain in constant growth, can the holy flame of tender and deep sensitivity con-
tinuously find new nourishment. Only then can the hours return again and again, in
which, between all earthly things, the treasure of love illuminates as a certainty of the
everlasting in the human soul. But a part of this, above all, is that the wife, too,
remains one who is reaching and becoming, so that she can forever give to her
husband from her own self-earned, inner treasures.
TRANSLATOR'S COMMENTARY
Weber's Objective and Methodology
Marianne Weber's chief objectives, and a number of important aspects of her meth-
odology, are revealed through the opening sentence of her essay. In ``Authority,''
Weber attempted to ``fundamentally understand'' marriage through an essentially
historical, conceptual approach. Like her neo-Kantian teacher, Heinrich Rickert,
Weber believed that unique historical events may only be understood, and made
relevant to our understanding of the present, by clearly formulating historical con-
cepts that illuminate distinctions between unique historical phenomena (see Rickert
1902). In this regard, for example, Weber began her study by proposing several ``ideal
typical'' constructs, or, to use Rickert's language, ``historical individuals'': ``primitive
patriarchalism,'' ``legitimate marriage,'' and ``humane patriarchy.'' Arguably, she also
employed ``autonomy of the partners'' as an ``ideal type'' to understand the present
reality of marriage. Ultimately, however, Weber advocated her concept of autonomy,
and used it to critique male authority. As such, in contrast to Rickert, her historical
constructs represent more than merely ``ideas'' built to aid logical analysis and an
interpretive understanding of the social world. For her, they are also ``ideals'' in the
normative, prescriptive sense of the word.
Her second aimto ``correctly judge'' marriage and sexual relationsshould be
understood in this context. Weber made clear value judgments regarding patriarchal
domination through history. Not only is this true in the context of this essay, but it is
also characteristic of her methodology in general. For, as she informs us elsewhere:
[T]he social science academic, whose findings are, in great measure, usable for
the shaping of life, and who, for that reason, is responsible for the course of
politics, has a double task: the advancement of truth for its own sake, and the
orientation of his actions on clear, consciously chosen convictions. (Weber
1950:361)
Apart from the importance of normatively prescriptive historical concepts in her
analysis, Weber's call for an examination ``above all'' of the ``leading ideas'' that have
``defined'' marriage (the first half of ``Authority'' is devoted to this subject), emphasizing
the role of ideas in history. These ideasor ``form principles,'' as she called them
amount to sanctioned standards of conduct that defined marriage by constraining
individual action. Thus, while Weber maintained that sexual relations shape human
beings more than any other, this level of social life is dependent upon a more structural
inquiry into the institutionally sanctioned norms that define marriage in the first place.
Additionally, while Weber understood the defining historical role of ideas, she also
observed that, through history, a larger structure of oppressionpatriarchyhad
permeated the institutions in which ideas are formed and enforced, and manipulated
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE 95
them as an instrument of domination. Weber's consideration of the law, religion, and
the Enlightenment should be seen in this context. Yet the author also recognized that
the patriarchal system does not merely produce an ideology that perpetuates oppres-
sion. In contrast, Weber asserted that many potentially liberating ideas arose out of
institutions, seemingly independent of patriarchal domination, but that those ideas
were also distorted by men in power within institutions who were not willing to
consistently apply them to women as well. For instance, Christianity and the Enlight-
enment produced liberating ideas that could have had immense impact on women's
social status. However, St. Paul and the great Enlightenment thinkers, respectively,
``reconstructed'' those ideas to reconcile them with the precepts of patriarchy.
Areas of Substantive Focus in ``Authority and Autonomy in Marriage''
Weber's examination of the Protestant ethic. In a discussion that reveals fascinating
parallels to her husband's work, Weber examined the moral standards of conduct
advanced by Christianity, particularly the ``spirit of Protestantism,'' their profound
influence on the behavior of married partners, and their consequent influence on the
character of marriage as an institution.
As an important early step in this process, the author considered the efforts of
medieval Catholicism to harness the powerful energy of religion as a shaping force in
the sexual lives of men and women. Catholicism began the enforcement of monogamy
as a moral ideal that, for the first time, applied to both men and women, and placed
great emphasis on the suppression of individuals' sex lives. Luther's Reformation
and especially the ideas of Puritanismcontinued this process by releasing the power-
ful religious forces of the monasteries into everyday life, and thereby transformed
actors' sexual activities into religiously meaningful and highly ``disciplined'' tasks.
This morally mandated, strict control of sexual drives fundamentally transformed
marriage by removing sex as its basis and founding it instead upon spiritual, ethical
values: mutual responsibility and dedication; honesty and respect between partners,
rather than the pursuit of selfish goals at the expense of the other; orientation on the
future of the relationship through emotional and intellectual investment; and unwa-
vering fidelity. Additionally, Weber noted that these same standards continue to
define the character of marriage, though Puritanism no longer provides the religious
meaning and sanction for them.
Apart from the establishment of a deeper spiritual and romantic bond between the
partners, Weber also attributed to the ``Puritan spirit'' the development of ``freedom of
conscience'' as a moral standard that mandated action according to one's conscience,
rather than on the basis of blind and thoughtless obedience to earthly authorities. This
moral standard not only stood at the fore of women's rights in general, but, in
particular, changed the character of marriage by explicitly freeing the woman, for
the first time in history, from the husband's authority.
In her discussion of Protestantism, Weber revealed several additional themes that
are worth noting at this juncture: First, in discussing the influence of Puritan moral
standards on the character of marriage, her observations suggest a clear dialectical
tension in her thought. For example, though Western religion has promoted values
that have relegated women throughout history to second-class status, it has also given
rise to the ideals of liberation that would free women from that status. While religion
sanctioned the subordinate role of the woman, it also enforced monogamy in the case
of the man as well. Though the ``spirit of Protestantism'' promoted the abhorrence of
all natural sexual pleasure in marriage, the disciplining of the man and the elevated
96 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
importance of marriage facilitated a romantic, spiritual, and intellectual union
between the partners such as had never before been seen, and which has never since
been lost. In short, though her feminist critique of Christianity is powerful and
effective, Weber's discussion also suggests that she by no means rejected that tradition
in its entirety. On the contrary, the oppressive and emancipatory ideas arising out of
that tradition exist in dialectical tension to one another.
Second, Weber introduced several themes that are of critical importance in order to
make her argument polemically appealing to the reader, and as a matter of theoretical
analysis. On the one hand, she emphasizedoften in poetic and romantic prosethe
importance for human beings of the ``tender and deep spiritual and intellectual
relation'' between man and woman, and contrasted this ``marital ideal'' with ``fleeting
sexual love.'' On the other hand, though intimate sexuality as the natural foundation
of the ``community'' between wife and husband had been damaged by the Christian
banishment of sex to the domain of sin, this historical ``disciplining'' of the man's
sexual drives allowed marriage to become ``a vessel of spiritual strength'' for him as well.
Regarding the polemical appeal of her argument, both themes are quite significant.
On the one hand, they serve to draw a clear line against eroticism and to lay bare the
emotional, spiritual, and intellectual emptiness of sexual activity without moral
commitment. On the other hand, it is important for Weber's legislative agenda to
show that men also have a great deal to gain from her alternative marital form
principle.
Concerning Weber's theoretical analysis, these two themes are quite significant,
because they offer insight into her sociological understanding of the relation between
several levels of social life: institutionally mandated ideas (the moral standards of
Puritanism) shape individuals' conduct (by motivating them to strive for moral
perfection, to view sex as merely a means for the procreation of children to the greater
glory of God, and to live monogamous, less sexually oriented lives). Individuals'
conduct (e.g., the ``disciplined'' man), in turn, reshapes the form of their relationships
(making them more tender, intimate, and spiritually based), and that form also
reflexively affects individuals' lives (giving them a source of great strength, joy, and
energy). This theoretical understanding of social life, revealed through her passages on
the significance of Puritanism for the institution of marriage, is characteristic of
Weber's thought throughout ``Authority'' and in general.
Weber's employment of Kantian ethics. According to Weber, up until the development
of the ``Puritan spirit,'' marriage had been governed, to varying degrees, by the ``form
principle'' of ``authority''that is, the structurally mandated inequality of power
between the sexes that subordinated the woman to the man's will. At the conclusion
of her examination of Puritanism, however, the author noted a new development:
since that time, two dialectical ideas, both of which arose out of the Christian
tradition, have competed in their influence on human behavior: ``fundamental sub-
jugation under traditional and trusted authorities'' and ``fundamental subjugation
only under one's own conscience.''
With this observation, Weber began an investigation into the ethical teachings of
freedom of German idealism, in which the latter of these two competing ideas
``achieved [its] deepest significance and [its] highest clarity.'' Although the author
seems to present her subsequent discussion of Enlightenment ethics merely as an
examination of further historical ideas that influenced the character of marriage, in
fact, her employment of Kantian ideas in the service of feminist inquiry is fundamen-
tally significant for her argument in ``Authority'' and for her work in general.
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE 97
Like many members of her intellectual circle, Weber made Kant's thought a pillar
of her ideas. It is important to note that she employed the Kantian concept of
``autonomy'' in three ways. First, she derived her ideal-typical, moral-evaluative
concept of autonomy directly from Kantian ethics, and she returned to this concept
throughout her work in order to critique patriarchy. Second, she proposed autonomy
as a structural form principle for marriage, one that should inform future legislation
regarding the family, and one that, if implemented through law, would restructure the
sexual relation between man and woman and make it more rewarding and satisfying
than any fashionable eroticist alternative. Finally, she understood autonomy in the
strict Kantian sensethat is, as an individualistic moral ideal of conduct according to
which all individuals, but particularly women, become reasoning, morally responsible
agents, and only through which may they achieve the full measure of their humanity.
Weber introduced the Kantian concept of autonomy by asserting that ``[t]he human
being is, as a bearer of reason, intended to govern himselfthat is, to act not, for
example, according to the arbitrariness of his instincts, but rather, in accordance with
a conscience that has been subordinated to the moral law.''
12
The ``moral law'' to
which she referred in this passage is Kant's categorical imperative.
13
In this context,
autonomy should be understood as distinct from the Kantian concept of ``hetero-
nomy,'' which refers to the foreign determination of one's will, be it by any earthly
authority, an ``unreasoned'' passion or instinct, orfor that matterGod.
Weber then continued her argument by explaining that ``[a]s a bearer of this
capacity for `autonomy,' the individual possesses its specific dignity which distin-
guishes it as a `personality' before all other beings; it may, for that reason, raise the
claim to be `an end in itself.''' It is important to note that Kantian ethics went so far as
to cite the human capacity for autonomy as the distinguishing factor between human
beings and all other animals. Further, only because of their reason, Kant argued, may
human beings be considered ``ends in themselves.'' By employing this Kantian line of
argument, Weber suggested that the principle of authority has deprived women of
their very humanity through the ages, and only through autonomy can they become
fully human.
The author completed the foundation of her Kantian critique of patriarchy by
asserting the ``simple and undeniable principle for the shaping of human relations''
that ``every person should respect in every other human being the predestination of
that person to be an end in himself. No person should consider his fellow human
beings merely as a means for his personal ends.'' Note that, while Kant put forth this
maxim to guide autonomous individual human action alone, Weber employed the
``ends principle,'' which is one formulation of the categorical imperative,
14
explicitly as
a structural ``principle for the shaping of human relations.'' As such, the author
transformed a bourgeois, individualistic, and atomizing ethical principle into a struc-
tural precept that should define all human interactions.
Ultimately, Weber utilized the ``ends principle'' to direct a potent ethical critique at
patriarchy by explaining that
12
For two formulations of Kant's principle of autonomy, see Kant (1972): ``Always act so that you can
regard your own will as making universal law'' (Kant 1972:434) and ``Accordingly, every being of reason
must act as if, through his maxims, he were at every moment a member of the universal kingdom of ends
who is making universal rules'' (Kant 1972:438).
13
For a formulation of Kant's categorical imperative, compare Kant: ``Always act so that you can will the
rule of your action to be a universal law'' (Kant 1972:421). Kant delivered five formulations of his
categorical imperative, one of which Marianne uses to make her feminist argument.
14
For Kant's formulation of the ``ends principle,'' see Kant (1972:429): ``Always treat others, and yourself,
as an end, and never as a mere means.''
98 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
the path from the acceptance of this sentence to a new structuring of the relation
between the sexes seems to be a short one. For according to it, the highest ethical
goal of existence, for the woman as well, can be nothing other than the develop-
ment into a morally autonomous personality. Accordingly, it is just as immoral
for her, too, to bend to a foreign will against her own conscience. Accordingly,
she, too, may not be used as a mere means to the husband's ends.
Thus, Weber not only transformed this ethical principle into a normative system for
the governing of human relations, but employed it specifically in order to critique and
overcome patriarchy: only autonomy as a ``form principle'' will enable women to
achieve their full humanity as moral agents.
In sum, then, Weber's discussion of Kantian ethics consists, on the one hand, of a
call to women to recapture their own autonomy. Women sacrifice their humanity and
dignity by allowing their will to be determined by anything but their own reason and
conscience. On the other hand, the author indicted the structurally mandated author-
ity of men over women throughout history because, under it, men have violated the
categorical imperative by failing to treat women as ends and not merely as means. As
a result, women have been structurally deprived of their very humanity, because they
have not been permitted to fully develop as reasoning moral agents.
The woman's liberation from male authority through modernity. After examining mar-
riage through history, the author turned her attention toward an investigation of the
current character of the marital institution. To accomplish this, she focused on the
influence of Industrialization and its new material conditionsin short, modernityon
marriage and women's lives. In this context, she noted that, while the maxim of
autonomy had existed before Industrialization, it had not been applied to women.
The material conditions of the new economy, in contrast, forced greater autonomy on
women by placing them in ``superpersonal contexts and structures that remove them
from personal domination.'' Prior to Industrialization, woman's relations were limited
to the home and family, and, as such, her identity and consciousness were exclusively
oriented toward her interactions with husband, children, and other family members.
However, the industrial economy withdrew women from the restrictive interactions of
the home and inserted them into the diverse interactions of the extrafamilial world, in
which actors decide autonomously and are responsible for the consequences of those
decisions. This physical involvement outside the home also resulted in the woman's
intellectual emancipation. Both aspects, the physical and the intellectual, challenged the
husband's authority over his wife and fundamentally changed the character of marriage.
Thus, in theoretical terms, Weber observed that the power of one individual over
another is not simply dependent upon the relation between the two, but can be
intensified or ameliorated by the number and type of interactions within which the
subordinate finds herself in general. Furthermore, it is worth noting that, in contrast
to other sociologists of her generation who studied the drastic changes in the modern
world, Weber clearly emphasized women's liberation from the home as a chief con-
sequence of modernity. Though she observed that, for autonomous individuals, there
are many challenges involved in being free to make choices, her evaluation of this
development wasin contrast to other members of her intellectual circle, who
thought of modernity more ambivalentlyclearly positive. Weber was not only
interested in the context and mechanisms of patriarchy, but was, of course, also
concerned with the conditions under which liberation from that oppression might
be achieved. For her, modernity represented just such liberating conditions.
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE 99
The state of modern marriage under authority. Though modernity had forced changes
upon the institution of marriage, Weber observed that the governing law had not kept
pace. In this regard, German law resembled a ``compromise between irreconcilable
principles'' in which the husband still enjoyed ``legally protected predominance'' as an
``indispensable form-principle.'' After concluding her examination of German family
law, Weber refocused her inquiry on the ``fundamental question'' of whether ``author-
ity or autonomy should shape spouses' relations.'' In order to address this question,
she investigated the condition of marriage in reality when, ``in accordance with its
legal form,'' the husband's ``fundamental authority'' continued to govern the partners'
relationship, though that legal authority was increasingly at odds with the conditions
and consequences of modernity.
In framing her argument, Weber first reiterated, as a general proposition, the
importance of marriage for the development of both partners by stating that ``[M]ari-
tal relationships encompass the entire person, and that which one spouse does and
feels, touches necessarily at some point the life of the other.'' With this theoretical
assumption in mind, Weber asserted that marriage based on the form principle of
authority not only adversely shapes both partners' conduct and their individual
development, but, consequently, also hinders the growth and health of their relation-
ship to one another. First, regarding women's conduct, she noted, for example, two
alternative courses of action in the context of the wife's subordination: mere feigned
submissionthat is, acting with deceit and trickery toward her husband; or her actual
suppression of her own reason and the consequent abandonment of her very human-
ity. Similarly, with regard to the husband, authority shapes his conduct by making
him increasingly interested in controlling and monitoring his wife's every thought and
move.
Besides describing how this structurally mandated form principle affects the con-
duct of both men and women, Weber also described the consequences of this influence
for each. With respect to wives, she cited women's stalled ``inner development,'' and,
as such, on the one hand, related, in a theoretical sense, the influence of institutional
norms not only to mere conduct, but to the development of the individual's person-
ality as well. On the other hand, ``inner development'' refers specifically to the
individual's ability to employ moral reason while obeying the categorical imperative.
As such, women who submit to the principle of authority lose their ability to act as
responsible moral agents, and, by doing so, they violate their own dignity and
humanity as well. This suppression of the woman's development will, according to
Weber, also has grave consequences for the husband and his development, because, as
a result, he will experience no intellectual and spiritual stimulation or challenge in his
marriage, and will thus forfeit this fundamental source of strength, inspiration, and
growth. Finally, the author notes that, by shaping the conduct and development of
both partners, authority ultimately defines their relationship, which, in turn, will also
have long-term effects on their personal development.
Weber concluded her investigation of marriage by defining it as ``a life's partner-
ship which is founded on the affinity of souls and senses, and on the desire for full
responsibility.'' In perhaps one final statement against meaningless sexual love, the
author also explained the ethical significance of marriage as ``the highest ideal of
human community that stands as an unshakable guiding star above the sexual life of
civilized humanity.''
As Weber stated in her concluding comments, it is increasingly difficult to make a
marriage between two people work across the years. But, as she explained in beauti-
fully tender language in her concluding paragraph, only constant intellectual and
100 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
spiritual growth on the part of both partners will keep a relationship flourishing over a
lifetime of changes and challenges. In order to realize this growth, the man and the
woman must enjoy autonomy.
CONCLUSION
In my introduction to Marianne Weber's ``Authority and Autonomy in Marriage,''
I briefly examined her importance to the field of sociology and called for scholarly
attention to her work. In this short commentary, I have attempted to make a small
contribution toward that aim by addressing several key aspects of her thought.
First, Weber recognized the role of ideas as shaping forces in history and engaged
in an ideal-typical investigation of that history. However, in contrast to other think-
ers, she did not shy away from value assessments in her use of ideal types, and she
offered ``autonomy'' as her ``ideal'' type of marriage. Additionally, in viewing the
importance of ideas in history, the author recognized that, though institutions had
produced potentially liberating thought, powerful actors had manipulated and instru-
mentalized those ideas in the interests of patriarchy.
Second, in an investigation that yields striking parallels to her husband's work on
the religious origins of capitalism, Weber investigated religionspecifically, the Prot-
estant spiritand showed that Protestant moral standards of conduct affected indi-
viduals' consciousness and conduct and ultimately had great significance for the
character of marriage, which continues to affect that institution today.
Third, Weber employed the Kantian Enlightenment ideal of autonomy in an
innovative way. In order for women to attain their full humanity by becoming
autonomous, reasoning moral actors who are subjugated only under the categorical
imperative, the author advocated the adoption of ``autonomy'' as a structural ``form-
principle'' of marriage. Thus, though she subscribed to Kant's ideal of individual
freedom, the author also recognized the importance of this ideal as a social structural
norm in order to allow all people to attain that freedom.
Fourth, Weber asserted that modern conditions had begun a positive process that
freed women from men's authority by removing them from the exclusive, isolated
sphere of the home and placing them in ``superpersonal contexts'' in which they could
participate in diverse interactions. In this study of the modern economy, Weber's
ideas yield the theoretical assertion that the quality and diversity of interactions
within which an individual exists affect the dynamics of power within each one of
those interactions. Further, though individual conduct is shaped by institutionally
sanctioned norms, it is also influenced by material conditions, and the resulting
character of the interactions and relations that arise out of that conduct ultimately
permits or restricts human development.
Through her discussion in the final portion of her essay, in a practical sense, the
author demonstrated the deficits of authority in the reality of marriage. However,
viewed theoretically, her examination revealed, first, her theoretical assumption of the
importance of marriageand all sexual relationsfor the development of the human
personality. Second, it displayed Weber's understanding of the relation between social
structure, in the form of moral standards of conduct, individuals, and their inter-
actions. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it reiterated the author's belief that
individuals' ability to achieve an individualistic Enlightenment ideal is dependent
upon a structurally enforced form principle, legally mandated ``autonomy'' in marriage.
This necessity of structure to achieve individual ``humanity'' represents a significant
AUTHORITY AND AUTONOMY IN MARRIAGE 101
departure from Kant's ideas and intent and addresses the difficult theoretical tension
between human freedom and structural constraints in a very novel way.
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