Ocean Tradeoff DA

Contents
Ocean Tradeoff DA ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Notes ..................................................................................................................................................... 3
Uniqueness................................................................................................................................................ 4
AT: Inevitable/Crowded Now ................................................................................................................ 5
AT: MSP Fails ......................................................................................................................................... 7
AT: New Tools Solve .............................................................................................................................. 8
AT: Oceans Full Before MSP ................................................................................................................ 10
Links ........................................................................................................................................................ 12
Fiat ...................................................................................................................................................... 13
Generic ................................................................................................................................................ 15
Aquaculture ......................................................................................................................................... 17
Arctic ................................................................................................................................................... 18
Drilling ................................................................................................................................................. 19
Energy ................................................................................................................................................. 20
Hydrates .............................................................................................................................................. 21
OMEGA ................................................................................................................................................ 22
Wind .................................................................................................................................................... 23
Zero Sum - MSP ................................................................................................................................... 24
Zero Sum - Permits .............................................................................................................................. 25
Zero Sum - Space ................................................................................................................................. 26
Military Readiness Module ..................................................................................................................... 27
1NC Shell ............................................................................................................................................. 28
1NC Link - Generic ............................................................................................................................... 29
1NC Link - Drilling ................................................................................................................................ 31
1NC Link - Energy ................................................................................................................................ 32
2NC Link - Drilling ................................................................................................................................ 33
2NC Link - Gulf Drilling ........................................................................................................................ 35
AT: No Link - Pentagon ........................................................................................................................ 37
Impact - China ..................................................................................................................................... 38
Impact - Terrorism .............................................................................................................................. 42
Impact - Heg ........................................................................................................................................ 45
Impact - Arctic War ............................................................................................................................. 47
2NC Spillover ....................................................................................................................................... 51
Shipping Module ..................................................................................................................................... 52
1NC Shell ............................................................................................................................................. 53
Link - Generic ...................................................................................................................................... 56
Link - Aquaculture ............................................................................................................................... 57
AT: Alt Cause ....................................................................................................................................... 58
AT: Alt Cause - Water Levels ............................................................................................................... 60
Impact - Heg ........................................................................................................................................ 61
Impact - Econ ...................................................................................................................................... 62


Notes
The coastal ocean has a limited amount of space that we can use for things like
military training, shipping, (INSERT IMPACT MODULES HERE). These activates need the
space. To prevent catastrophic conflicts, Obama implemented a Coastal and Marine
Spatial Planning (CMSP or also referred to as just MSP) tool in his 2009-2010 National
Ocean Policy that allows better management of ocean space. The aff will massively
increase ocean development which will cause the MSP to fail and force the tradeoff.

There are a few impact modules in this file. The 1NC should just be a link and an
impact. You can use the Links in the link section of this file, but there are also some
more links that are more specific to the impact module included in those sections as
well.
Military Readiness The WH card paired with a general uniqueness can be used if you
hit an aff without a specific link. Together, they say that the plan kills the MSP and the
MSP is key to military readiness. You dont have to use (C)MSP as a link otherwise.
Uniqueness
AT: Inevitable/Crowded Now
Marine spatial planning is sufficient to organize status quo ocean activities, but it
cannot prioritize uses and makes trade-offs inevitable
Spalding 11
(Mark j. Spalding is president of The Ocean Foundation in Washington, D.CA New Approach to Oceans
Is Marine Spatial Planning too Good to Be True? pg online at Ebsco//sd)
Certainly their intentions are sincere: Human activities have taken a heavy toll on the world's oceans. There are dozens of problems that need to be addressed:
overfishing, habitat destruction, the effects of climate change, and increasing toxin levels in animals to name just a few. Like so much of our resource management policy, our
ocean governance system is not broken but fragmented, built piecemeal across 20 federal agencies, including the National Marine Fisheries Service, the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the former Minerals Management Service (divided into two agencies since the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico). What's missing is a logical framework, an integrated decision-
making structure, a joint vision of our relationship to the oceans now and in the future. However, to call MSP a solution to this layered quagmire creates as many problems as it solves. MSP is a tool that
produces maps of how we use the oceans; attempting through coordinated effort among agencies to
track how the ocean is being used and what habitat and natural resources remain at any given time. The hope for MSP is to bring together ocean users--
avoiding conflicts while keeping the ecosystem intact. But MSP is not a governance strategy. It does not itself establish a
system for determining use that prioritizes the needs of marine species, including safe migratory routes, food supply, nursery habitats or adaptation to changes in sea
level, temperature or chemistry. It does not produce a unified ocean policy nor resolve conflicting agency priorities and statutory contradictions that increase the potential for disaster. Like a hammer, MSP is just a tool, and the key
to its utility is in its application.
Marine spatial planning coordinates status quo activities, but new projects will create
ocean trade-offs and hamper future planning
Halpern et al 12
(Benjamin S. Halpern, Professor, Bren School of Environmental Science and Management Research
Biologist, Marine Science Institute Center Associate, National Center for Ecological Analysis and
Synthesis Director, Center for Marine Assessment and Planning, Jordan Diamond, Environmental Law
Institute, Steve Gaines, Bren School of Environmental Science and Management Near-term priorities
for the science, policy and practice of Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP) pg online at
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X11000935//sd)
The development of coastal and marine spatial plans is intended to achieve better coordination among ocean
uses and enable more integrated, ecosystem-based approaches to planning and managing for multiple uses across sectors [13]. Thus, CMSP is an important step in the
implementation of comprehensive, ecosystem-based management (EBM) a foundational principle for comprehensive management [12]. As is true for all approaches to EBM, CMSP cannot simply be an add-on to existing
structures or ways of managing resources or something for managers to do on top of their current workloads. In other words, EBM is not equivalent to perfect sectoral management. Planning should
focus on the collective costs and benefits of all managed activities in a particular area to assess progress towards social, economic and
environmental objectives and an explicit analysis of tradeoffs among planning options. Furthermore, there is no single right way to do CMSP or EBM, and any given process will need to be adapted to the ecological, technological,
social, and political context [32]. The US National Ocean Council (NOC) is responsible for coordinating and engaging each of the 9 planning regions and all of the individual states and territories within those planning regions, and
must determine how to operationalize CMSP given limited resources over the next two years. The priorities described here are relevant to each of the regions. For example, some regions are beginning to discuss how to formalize
their RPB, engage stakeholders, and integrate data and information for decision-making. Development of communication tools (the CMSP business case) will greatly facilitate each RPB's engagement of stakeholders, especially
among those who remain skeptical about investing time and resources towards informing regional plans. Many other countries are working to develop spatially explicit management plans for coastal areas. Thus, although our focus
was primarily the US, most priority items listed here are highly relevant to both developed and developing country contexts. For example, in Chile CMSP is being developed through the National Policy of Coastal Uses (Poltica
Nacional de Uso del Borde Costero) with a focus on building transparency, taking advantage of opportunities and learning-by-doing contexts, and integrating different types of knowledge [43]. Similarly, a national level program of
marine bioregional planning within Australia has experienced challenges relevant to many priorities identified here (http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/mbp/index.html). There are also recent and ongoing scoping activities on
particular topics (e.g., ecological principles [23]) and at the international level on development of integrated and complementary ocean governance and science needs related to CMSP (e.g., [44]). In the US, as in other
countries, the transition to CMSP has been marked by rapid policy development. This poses challenges for those
charged with implementation, as they need to make best use of existing information and prioritize new work to meet ambitious
timetables. The medium to long-term success of CMSP, including the extent to which it helps achieve social, economic, and environmental objectives, will depend on perceived success of the near-term process. We
hope that our efforts to identify near-term priorities will help guide implementation and make best use of scarce resources.
High value coastal areas are becoming increasingly competitive with more users
ocean planning solves current development
Ocean Conservancy 12
(Smart Choices for a Healthy Ocean pg online at http://newenglandoceanaction.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/Ocean-Conservancy-Smart-Choices-for-a-Healthy-Ocean.pdf//sd)
The United States, and the rest of the world, is facing a rising tide of competition for valuable ocean resources. The 21st century economy depends on our
ocean, coasts and Great Lakes. From energy production to commercial fishing to shippingand transport, millions of American jobs depend on access to marine
resources, and New England is no exception. A healthy marine environment provides recreational value, wildlife habitat and, in many New England communities, cultural identity. But increasing pressure and
uncoordinated development could threaten our ability to responsibly use, protect and enjoy our valuable resources. Wind
andother energy facilities, commercial fishermen, anglers and divers, ship pilots and military training operations are all vying to
use the same watersalong with whales, birds, sea turtles and other important wildlife. Dozens of federal bureaucracies assert jurisdiction over ocean uses without
coordinating with eachother.Informationabout how the oceanis being used is incomplete, hard to find and
inconsistent. Without smart ocean-use planning, we end up with haphazard and uncoordinated
developmentan ocean traffic jam. The United States is missing opportunities to maximize what we get out of the ocean while minimizing the threats to its health. In the face of this uncoordinated competition for ocean
resources, New England states are taking action by providing a forumfor citizens and ocean users to have a say in what happens with this valuable shared resource. The Northeast Regional Ocean Council (NROC) was established in 2005 by the six New England governors to collaborate on
region-wide goals for managing coastal and ocean resources across multiple sectors. NROC priorities include planning for ocean energy, protecting ecosystem health and reducing the impacts of weather- and climate-related events on coastal communities. In the summer of 2011, they
launched the Northeast Ocean Data Portal as a tool for regional ocean planning. Data collection, mapping and availability are essential elements of smart planning. The National Ocean Policy established by President Obama has provided a
pathway for efforts like NROC, which bring together state, tribal, local and federal agencies in a public, hands-on process to better manage important ocean
and coastal resources for generations to come. Congress must do more to support these initiatives. Engaging the public and all ocean users to make smart, balanced choices will
help the oceanand those who depend upon itthrive.
AT: MSP Fails
Marine spatial planning is long term coastal management while the aff is a short term
increase in traffic
Thomas 14
(Hannah, senior programme officer at the UNEP WCMC, Hannahs work involves the strategic,
scientific and technical development of regional and global marine projects, particularly focused upon
marine protected areas; marine spatial planning; marine assessment; and policy support., within the
convention on biological diversity marine spatial planning in practicetransitioning from planning to
implementation pg online at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/sbstta/sbstta-18/information/sbstta-
18-inf-23-en.pdf//sd)
The challenge of assessing the impacts and outcomes of MSP was a central theme of the Technical Meeting. One of the difficulties is that MSP goals are frequently couched in terms of an
advance to more sustainable forms of development expressed as measurable improvements in environmental and/or societal conditions. Yet MSP, as an expression of the ecosystem
approach, is a long term process that yields such improvements only after years or decades of effort. As seen by the survey
results, there are as yet few examples of MSP initiatives that have made the transition to implementation and
fewer still that have been sustained long enough to generate social, economic and environmental impacts at a significant
scale. The exceptions are primarily in developed country contexts. Another challenge is that expressions of ecosystem change are most often
the product of many forces playing out at a range of scales. This raises the important issue of understanding the contribution of an MSP
initiative to an observed social or environmental change, rather than claiming such a change can be attributed to the MSP effort alone. The Orders of Outcomes is a framework for addressing
these challenges.

AT: New Tools Solve
The NOP isnt binding law.
Migliaccio 14 Emily Migliaccio, J.D. Candidate at Vermont Law School, Chairman of the Ocean and
Coastal Law Committee of the Environmental Law Society at Vermont Law School, Senior Head Notes
Editor at the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, holds a B.S. in Environmental Science from Boston
College, 2014 (The National Ocean Policy: Can It Reduce Marine Pollution and Streamline Our Ocean
Bureaucracy?, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law (15 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 629), Spring, Available Online to
Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
The Obama Administration issued Executive Order 13,547, intending for Congress to "show support for effective
implementation of the NOP, including the establishment of an ocean investment fund"the hope being
that Congress would codify the Order in subsequent legislation. n130 At present, Congress is wrestling with some bills relating to the NOP; however, not all proposals support
the policy. For example, the House has adopted an amendment to the Water Resources and Development Act ("WRDA") n131 that would bar the Obama Administration fromimplementing marine spatial planning under the WRDA, specifically "preventing the Army Corps of Engineers and
other entities that receive money fromthe bill from implementing such planning as part of the National Ocean Policy." n132 Then again, also before Congress is a bill that seeks to establish a National Endowment for the Oceans, which would fund programs and activities to "restore,
protect, maintain, or understand living marine resources and their habitats and ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes resources. . . ." n133 For this bill to pass, House and Senate members must
agree to prioritize ocean conservation and research, and allocate funds to [*647] the initiative. Although
the NOP is appearing on the Congressional docket, it is hard to find hope for successful ocean reform in
the current congressional atmosphere. In the face of Congressional gridlock, executive orders may be necessary, particularly to advancing pro-environmental policies. As legal scholar Sandra Zellmer argues, "[t]he
bitterly partisan nature of environmental issues in Congress today suggests that comprehensive, thoughtful reforms tailored t o the problems faced by modern society are unlikely." n134 Further, Zellmer points out that even "if today's Congress were to take up the call to reformexisting
statutes, it may be more likely to dismantle provisions disliked by powerful, regulated entities than to pass comprehensive, forward-thinking legislation designed to solve contemporary environmental problems." n135 Thus, with an essentially incompetent Congress, Zellmer proposes that
non-legislative action, such as issuing an executive order, may "offer an opportunity to work around the congressional logjam and move the environmental ball forward." n136 Whether or not Executive Order 13,547 runs afoul of the separation of powers doctrine is a matter of time.
Nevertheless, there is a distinction in the language of the Policy that opponents may be overlooking. The
Executive Order calls for a national policy, n137 which is no more than guidance to agencies and decision-
makers. n138 The language of the Implementation Plan for the policy dismisses any hint of binding
authority; it reads: The Policy does not create new regulations, supersede current regulations, or modify
any agency's established mission, jurisdiction, or authority. Rather, it helps coordinate the implementation of existing regulations and authorities by all Federal agencies in the interest of
more efficient decision-making. The Policy does not redirect [*648] congressionally-appropriated funds, or direct agencies to
divert funds from existing programs. Instead, it improves interagency collaboration and prioritization to help focus limited resources and use taxpayer dollars more efficiently. n139 The Final
Implementation Plan for the NOP is by no means a binding body of laws; again, it is merely guidance for
federal and state agencies, stakeholders, and communities to begin prioritizing ocean and coastal issues.
The Plan recommends the types of actions agencies will take to address such priorities, and provides the
tools required for taking such action. Ultimately, the NOP is a perfectly appropriate use of presidential authority to bring desirable national priorities to the fore.
The NOP isnt being funded Republicans are strongly opposed.
Migliaccio 14 Emily Migliaccio, J.D. Candidate at Vermont Law School, Chairman of the Ocean and
Coastal Law Committee of the Environmental Law Society at Vermont Law School, Senior Head Notes
Editor at the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law, holds a B.S. in Environmental Science from Boston
College, 2014 (The National Ocean Policy: Can It Reduce Marine Pollution and Streamline Our Ocean
Bureaucracy?, Vermont Journal of Environmental Law (15 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 629), Spring, Available Online to
Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)
D. Funding
Unfortunately, the area that received the lowest grade out of the four here listedand one that is probably most needed for the
implementation of the NOPis funding. The JOC gave this category a "D-" because ocean programs are
"chronically underfunded." n175 In order to implement the NOP to the fullest extent possible under existing authorities and
as directed by the 2010 Executive Order, the government must allocate resources to the NOC. The President's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request contains additional
funding to advance priority activities identified in the Final Recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force. n176 [*655] However, some legislators are skeptical about the
Obama Administration's plan to begin implementing the NOP. n177 Mostly hailing from the Republican
party, the opposition fears that the money to support the Policy will be siphoned from other important
programs, and argue that the White House fails to garner Congressional authorization. n178 Also, Republicans
are concerned that the Implementation Plan is a plan for the government to "zone" the ocean,
establishing areas for specific uses while precluding other activities (such as oil drilling). n179

AT: Oceans Full Before MSP
Coastal competition is zero-sum, the sea is finitebelieve it or not...
Bell et al 8
(Johann Bell, Wollongong University, Australia., Patrick Christie, University of Washington, Seattle,
United States., David Obura, CORDIO East Africa, Keny, A Call to Zone Tropical Coastal Oceans pg
online at http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/a-call-to-zone-tropical-coastal-oceans//sd)
Lacking in most locations are holistic, regional-scale management approaches to balance the growth in
competing demands from fisheries, aquaculture, shipping, oil, gas and mineral extraction, energy
production, residential development, tourism and conservation. Says lead author Peter Sale of the UN
Universitys Canada-based Institute for Water, Environment and Health: We zone land for
development, for farms, for parks, for industry and other human needs. Required today is a comparable
degree of care and planning for coastal ocean waters. We have tended to think of the seas as our last
great wilderness, he adds, yet we subject them, particularly along tropical shores, to levels of human
activity as intense as those on land. The result is widespread overfishing, pollution and habitat
degradation. Coastal marine management efforts today are just woefully inadequate to avoid
irreparable degradation of the bounty and services on which so many people depend for food and well-
being.

Zoning and permits are the currency of coastal development projectsits zero sum
Shamshak and Anderson 8
(Gina, Knauss Sea Grant Fellow at NOAA, Economist at Bureau of Labor Statistics, James Ph.D.,
Oceanography, Offshore Aquaculture in the United States: Economic Considerations, Implications &
Opportunities July 2008 pg online at https://fish.washington.edu/people/anderson/cv.pdf//sd)
The establishment of land-based operations, whether it is for poultry or catfish, faces significantly fewer obstacles than the establishment of an
offshore operation. This relates back to the presence of well-defined property rights in the agriculture sector. For offshore aquaculture, the establishment of zoning
and permitting will be critical in the creation of these rights. As a first step, the government needs to establish a streamlined process for
identifying approved areas for offshore aquaculture operations. The zoning process should consider such factors as potential interactions with
existing users (commercial, recreations, shipping) and potential interactions with marine life (mammalian interactions and impacts on
the surrounding marine environment), as well as bio-geochemical considerations (temperature, nutrients, upwelling, currents, etc.). It is the role of the government to parse out where
offshore activity is permitted, leaving the operator free to choose when and how he or she will operate within those zones. Relating back to the U.S. broiler and catfish industries, each was
able to operate with minimal restrictions or complications from outside influences. Certainly farmers had to comply with environmental guidelines and requirements (rules regarding waste
disposal and groundwater contamination, etcetera) but there was little else constraining their investment and production decisions. Similarly, the government needs to establish where activity
is permitted and then allow operators to manage their operations, much like their agricultural counterparts. Once zoning rules and regulations are
established, the actual process of issuing permits to prospective operators must be streamlined. Currently, a number of permits must be
obtained for an aquaculture operationmany of which must be obtained in a specific, sequential order. Delay in a given permit can de-rail the entire permitting process, as granted permits
expire before other permits are obtained. Additionally, the permitting process is costlyboth in terms of the time spent throughout the duration of the permitting process and also in legal
fees incurred to fight challenges and denials.
Trade-offs in space exist
Ehler 12
Charles Ehler is a consultant to UNESCO. He was a senior executive in NOAA and EPA for 32 years. In
2007 he received an award from the IPCC for his contribution to its award of the Nobel Peace Prize. He is
the author of over 100 publications including a 2009 UNESCO guide to marine spatial planning for IOC
and a 2011 report on the future of the UNESCO World Heritage Marine Program. From 1968-1973 he
taught regional planning at the University of Michigan, UCLA, and Stony Brook University. Perspective:
13 Myths of Marine Spatial Planning pg online at
http://depts.washington.edu/meam/MEAM24.html#myths//sd)
Myth 5: MSP is a "win-win" process. Some advocates of MSP promise that it will result only in outcomes
in which all interests win. However, MSP is about the allocation of marine spaces to specific uses (wind
farms, marine reserves, pipeline corridors) or goals (development areas, protected areas, security
areas). As marine space is allocated, some users will win; some will lose. While some uses may be
compatible with others, some uses will preclude others.

Links
Fiat
Marine spatial planning creates a window of opportunity to manage ocean
development- the plans fiat prevents ocean conflict resolution because it bypasses
the negotiation process
Whitea et al 12
(Crow. Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, University of California, Benjamin S.
Halpern, Professor, Bren School of Environmental Science and Management Research Biologist, Marine
Science Institute Center Associate, National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis Director, Center
for Marine Assessment and Planning and Carrie V. Kappelb National Center for Ecological Analysis and
Synthesis, University of California, Santa Barbara Ecosystem service tradeoff analysis reveals the value
of marine spatial planning for multiple ocean uses pg online at
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/12/4696.full//sd)
Concurrent with the decisive steps being taken by governments and industries to promote and develop offshore renewable energy, opposition is growing from coastal residents and marine user groups who fear substantial (some
say overestimated) impacts of offshore wind farms on marine ecosystems and services (7). Our MSP approach directly addresses this debate: our case study explicitly
quantifies impacts on sectors from energy development and shows how these tradeoffs, and thus people's fears, can
be mitigated in Massachusetts Bay. None of the incumbent sectors is immune to negative effects from energy development, and all can benefit from MSP. Across the range of scenarios,
the flounder fishery experienced the greatest losses in value (up to 100%), yet unnecessary losses were minimized when MSP was used to allocate uses. Other Massachusetts Bay fisheries that use trawls and/or nets over soft-
bottom habitat have the potential for similar losses from wind farms and gains from MSP. Percentage losses to the lobster and whale sectors, although smaller than for the flounder fishery, are significant because they translate
into substantial absolute changes in monetary value and have critical cultural and conservation implications. Furthermore, MSP greatly improved lobster fishery and whale-watching values over single-sector management,
preventing substantial losses. Finally, as one of the most recent user groups to enter marine ecosystems, offshore renewable energy is under tremendous
pressure to limit its impact on incumbent sectors (7), while facingobvious internal incentives to maximize its
value given high development costs. Our results indicate that MSP can provide substantial guidance toward these twin objectives.
Conflicts over space are becoming the norm in the oceans, and multisector planning is required to
reduce these conflicts and optimize marine management (10). Contentious, often subjective, debate over spatial conflicts is
expected to rise as ocean uses intensify and expand, further emphasizing the utility of our approach and value of MSP for quantifying and mediating these
conflicts. Resource managers around the world are now in the midst of deciding what MSP will look like, gathering information, developing tools, and attempting to garner buy-in from often skeptical stakeholders (9). Our
concrete approach can rationally and objectively identify solutions to the exact kind of problem that resource managers are facing. We offer an efficient, transparent, and transferrable method
for comparing management strategies, identifying winwin solutions and avoiding unnecessary conflicts that arise when stakeholders perceive
tradeoffs that do not actually exist. By demonstrating how MSP works and quantifying its value over conventional management, these results may enhance stakeholder and decision-maker buy-in to MSP. The efficiency
frontier, although familiar to economists, has seldom been applied to marine resource management (4). However, its flexibility and simplicity make it a promising tool for decision-makers. Several features add to its utility. First, it is
not necessary to characterize sector values in a single currency, such as dollars. Instead, the merits of different decisions can be compared based on changes in sectoral values (in absolute or percentage terms), allowing comparison
of very different ecosystem services, including those [e.g., recreational opportunities, nutrient cycling (3)], that rely on nonmarket values, such as aesthetics or conservation. Second, plotting potential solutions relative to the
efficiency frontier is a powerful method for visualization and communication, allowing decision-makers to compare many alternatives simultaneously. Although a sector-weighting scheme (e.g., an indifference curve) may
determine a single solution on the efficiency frontier to be optimal, nearby solutions on the frontier are equally efficient and may be more feasible to implement. This gives decision-makers flexibility to incorporate other
considerations (e.g., feasibility, enforceability), selecting a strategy that balances societal preferences and is practical to implement and manage. Additionally, the efficiency frontier can be an effective tool for engaging stakeholders
in joint decision-making, highlighting true tradeoffs and serving as a reference point for negotiation. To aid in this, a multidimensional efficiency frontier (Fig. 3A and SI Appendix, Fig. S5) can be deconstructed into pairwise plots
(Figs. 2 and 3B) for visual clarity. Regardless of who holds final decision-making authority, or whose values take precedence, the efficiency frontier guides decisions toward efficient strategies and away from suboptimal ones with
unnecessary conflicts. Conversely, without a formal tradeoff analysis to identify the most efficient strategies, management tends to produce outcomes interior to the frontier (6). In our model, we sought to capture the main drivers
of, and tradeoffs among, offshore energy and key ecosystem services that it impacts in Massachusetts Bay. However, a number of simplifying assumptions about the dynamics of these services and the marine ecosystem may
influence our results. For example, conservation values other than whales (e.g., birds) are affected by wind turbines. A wind farm also may affect coastal viewshed and property values (4), and its submarine infrastructure may
affect fish more than we assumed. Furthermore, other industrial sectors, such as shipping, already have high value in Massachusetts Bay and may have implications for conservation and MSP. Consideration of tradeoffs among
these sectors may alter the solutions presented here; therefore, our spatial results should be considered heuristic rather than prescriptive. Finally, although we focused on net present value for directly measuring sector values, we
recognize that indirect benefits also exist. Modeling indirect benefits, such as employment and coastal waterfront economic activity, would further enrich our understanding of the value of MSP. Previous Section Next Section
Conclusion We offer a transparent and quantitative approach to assessing and communicating ecosystem dynamics and the interactions among varied ecosystem services and the sectors they support. The spatially
explicit tradeoff analysis we conducted for Massachusetts Bay demonstrates the viability and value of strategic ecosystem-based MSP
for informing and rationalizing the often entrenched debates around spatial allocation of marine resources, focusing them on objective
conflicts and identifying efficient solutions for improving management outcomes. Such a demonstration of the value-added from MSP over sectoral management has been
highlighted as one of the most pressing needs for helping move MSP forward in the United States and elsewhere (11). Inertia is a strong force, and when the costs of non-
MSP outcomes are undefined, it is easy for decision-makers to succumb to the notion that MSP planning is too difficult or unnecessary. At the same time, institutional inertia can be quickly overcome when a policy window of
opportunity is effectively used (12). The introduction of MSP into US National Ocean Policy represents such a policy window
and at a time when spatial conflicts over marine ecosystem services are becoming alarmingly
prevalent (10). By showing the utility and feasibility of MSP and quantifying its value over conventional management, we provide timely support and momentum for the transition to
comprehensive, ecosystem-based management that is needed to address the challenges we face in an increasingly crowded
coastal and marine environment.


Generic
Increased ocean development causes ocean sprawl that forces tradeoffs.
Scheer and Moss 14 Roddy Scheer, Contributing Editor to E Environmental Magazine, and Doug
Moss, Publisher and Executive Editor of E Environmental Magazine, 2014 (Ocean sprawl will
jeopardize food, jobs and recreation we have come to depend from the ocean, EarthTalka
publication of E Environmental Magazine, January 8
th
, Available Online at
http://www.thevindicator.com/anahuac_progress/news/article_6b4bee08-77f0-11e3-88b3-
001a4bcf887a.html?mode=story, Accessed 08-02-2014)
We are all familiar by now with urban sprawlthe uncontrolled spread of urban development into
areas beyond the city. But environmentalists warn that the next frontier in sprawl is on the high seas,
where the proliferation of fishing, shipping, tourism, resource extraction, energy development,
military exercises and other human activity has begun to call into question just how vast our oceans
really are.
According to the non-profit Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), our oceans are already under
siege from problems like pollution, overfishing and acidification, and increased industrial activity off-
shoreleading to so-called ocean sprawlwill jeopardize the food, jobs and recreation we have
come to depend on the oceans to provide. Its hard to believe, given how much planning goes into
various types of development and human activity on land, that the oceans are still like the Wild West
with various entities staking claims on huge stretches of open water for different purposes.
Governments are beginning to manage ocean sprawl, but new uses will result in
overcrowding.
Vlahakis 11 John Vlahakis, Founder of Earth Friendly Productsa green household products brand,
holds a Masters in Management, Marketing, and Transportation from the Kellogg School of
Management at Northwestern University, 2011 (Water, Green Bites: Ecological Musings from the
Front, Published by John Vlahakis, ISBN 0615431070, p. 77)
Ocean Sprawl
Many of us are familiar with the growing concerns about urban sprawl; but now governments around
the world are beginning to look also at ocean sprawl. Much like urban sprawl, ocean sprawl refers to
the overcrowding of our oceans, an equally concerning problem that hasnt garnered much media
attention until recently. The Obama administration has appointed a task force to begin looking into the
way we regulate ocean use 57; the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization is
examining the way countries are using their ocean resources. Increases in farm fishing, shipping lane
traffic and the beginnings of ocean energy use have sparked an interest in managing ocean sprawl.
UNESCO, along with the federal government is also trying to determine where offshore wind or wave
turbines need to be placed to help create new sustainable energy.
One would never really think of oceans as having a sprawl problem, since all we see from the beach is an
endless horizon; but many of us know that in reality over fifty percent of the Earths diverse ecosystem
lives underwater. UNESCO is concerned by the depletion of wildlife fisheries and the increase of farm
fishing around the world. The organization also has concerns about the way goods are transported by
ocean freights and their impact on whale migration patterns 58.
The oceans of the world could be the last frontier for man, but they need to be protected. Finding a
balance that protects the ocean ecosystem while meeting our needs is not going to be easy.

Aquaculture
Coastal projects inhibit military and commercial shipping because of mitigated port
access and accident risks
Jerez 8
Pablo, Department of Marine Sciences and Applied Biology, University of Alicante, Spain, Aquaculture
and Coastal Space Management in Europe: An Ecological Perspective pg online at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/226596819_Aquaculture_and_Coastal_Space_Management_i
n_Europe_An_Ecological_Perspective//sd)
Among the chief users of coastal waters is shipping, whether it is for commercial, recreational or defence related
purposes. While the use of coastal space by ships in any particular area is relatively temporary, it nevertheless places considerable
restrictions on the placement of aquaculture installations. Commercial shipping lanes and their immediate
vicinity, together with military shipping areas, almost completely exclude aquaculture due to the risks posed
by surface-based structures as navigational hazards. Numerous ships transport hazardous products, such as
chemical and petrol-derived products, which affect the coastal environment adversely when accidental spillage occurs
(Davis 1993) and pose environmental and health risks to coastal aquaculture. For example, the break-up of the oil tanker Prestige off the Galician
coast of Spain in 2002 caused 9 million Euros of lost mussel production in the year following the accident (Garza-Gil et al. 2005). Recreational sailing and boating
activities also challenge aquaculture for coastal space, particularly in areas where both operate from local ports. Space in the immediate sea
areas surrounding ports is sought after by both aquaculture and recreational boating activities due to ease of access. Most sea-cage fish
farms along the relatively featureless coastline of south-eastern Spain are sited less than 5 km from the coast and operate out of ports that are popular for
recreational boating.
Arctic
And ocean stress and marine spatial planning applies to the arctic
Ehler 11
(Charles Ehler is a consultant to UNESCO. He was a senior executive in NOAA and EPA for 32 years. In
2007 he received an award from the IPCC for his contribution to its award of the Nobel Peace Prize. He is
the author of over 100 publications including a 2009 UNESCO guide to marine spatial planning for IOC
and a 2011 report on the future of the UNESCO World Heritage Marine Program. From 1968-1973 he
taught regional planning at the University of Michigan, UCLA, and Stony Brook University. MARINE
SPATIAL PLANNING IN THE ARCTIC: A first step toward ecosystem-based management pg online at
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/ee/Aspen_MSP_Report_II.pdf//sd)
Driven by outside economic forces and the effects of climate change, the Arctic, its ecosystems, and its people are faced withsubstantial change ranging fromthe loss of ice-dependent species, more
intense uses of the Arctic resources, including space, and the loss of natural services provides by Arctic ecosystems. International and national interests in mitigating and adapting to these changes has led to increased
calls to manage human activities through an ecosystem-based approach. Marine spatial planning has emerged as an operational approach to translate
this concept into management practice in many marine areas around the world. Marine spatial planning is a public process of analyzing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribution of human activities to specific
marine areas to achieve ecological, economic, and social goals and objectives that are specified through a political process. MSP is integrated, future-oriented, participatory, adaptive, ecosystem-based, and area-based. The process of MSP answers three simple questions: (1) where are we
today?; (2) where do we want to be?; and (3) how do we get there? Effective marine spatial planning is a continuous process, not a one-time "master plan", and can only be successful through a highly-participatory networked governance approach, i.e., all who have an interest in the
governance of the Arctic are included in all stages throughout the processfrom setting goals and specifying measurable objectives, through implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Monitoring and evaluation of the performance of the MSP process is critical. The performance of
management plans and their specific measures should be monitored, evaluated and reported to all stakeholders and rights-holders in a transparent manner. MSP can provide a variety of environmental, economic and social benefits ranging fromidentifying biologically and
ecologically important areas and identifying the cumulative effects of human activities on the environment, to creating certainty for business
investment decisions and streamliningthe process to creating new opportunities for local community and citizen participation, including indigenous peoples. Marine spatial
planningis already in place in one Arctic countryNorway has implemented an integrated management plan, including spatial and temporal management measures, for its part of the Barents Sea. The plan integrates previously separate
management regimes for fisheries, shipping, oil and gas, and nature conservation. Canada has developed an integrated management plan for its part of the Beaufort Sea that will develop a marine
spatial plan as one of its future actions. In the US, the federal government has developed a marine spatial planning framework for its
entire exclusive economic zone, including its Arctic seas.


Drilling
Drilling trades off with other activities- aquacultures, alternative energy, and LNG
production
Christie 8
(Donna. Associate Dean gor International Programs, Florida State University College of Law;
Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management; NOAA; IOC-UNESCO. Potential Impacts of Oil and
Gas Explorations in the Gulf Collins Center, pg online at
http://mote.org/media/uploads/files/offshore_oil_drilling_report.pdf//sd)
Q(31) Can other existing or contemplated ocean and coastal activities (marine protected areas, aqua-culture, tidal energy, wind farms, LNG facilities) be affected by
offshore drilling? AThere are a number of potential conflicts between oil and gas activity and competing uses of the marine environment besides sand
resources and military exercises. These competing uses could include protection of essential fisheries habitat that may or may not be located in
marine protected areas, alternative energy development, offshore aquaculture, and siting of additional liquid
natural gas facilities, to name a few. Marine spatial planning (analogous to comprehensive management planning for marine waters) is a potential
mechanism for resolving these disputes, but Florida has yet to develop such a process.

Energy
New ocean energy or aquaculture development creates spatial conflicts theres a
necessary tradeoff with existing uses.
WCMAC 12 Washington Coastal Marine Advisory Councilan advisory group to the State of
Washingtons Department of Ecology, 2012 (Draft Stakeholder Perspectives on Marine Spatial
Planning, July, Available Online at
http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/sea/ocean/pdf/stakeholder_interviews_July2012.pdf, Accessed 08-
02-2014)
Future Human Use Conflicts
Most of the group stated that they were not against ocean energy but expressed concern around
potential future impact to the marine environment and impact on existing uses. The most common
potential spatial conflict described was between fishing and ocean energy. Other potential spatial
conflicts that may occur with ocean energy described by the group include: military activity, shipping,
whale migrations, view shed, crowding of shipping lanes, recreational activities and ecological
benefits, such as, healthy habitats derived from numerous ecological processes. Future offshore
aquaculture was also commonly named as causing potential spatial conflicts with existing uses.


Ocean energy projects conflict with current spatial management
Johnson 14
(COURTNEY B. JD cum laude Lewis & Clark Law School 2007. Staff Attorney at Crag Law Center,
Courtney coordinates the Coastal Law Project, a collaboration with Oregon Shores Conservation
Coalition, addressing land use issues in Oregon's coastal communities. Journal of Environmental Law &
Litigation 29 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 191 ARTICLE: Advances in Marine Spatial Planning: Zoning Earth's Last
Frontier pg online at lexis//sd)
Renewable energy sources do not involve the same extraction methods as oil and gas; nevertheless,
they do involve a certain level of exploration and development. At the very least, these technologies
occupy space in the ocean and by their very presence may conflict with the consumption and
management of other ocean resources or other potential uses of ocean areas.

Hydrates
Expanded gas drilling destroys naval readiness- current leases dont trigger
Weiss, 12 Danile J - Center for American Progress Action Fund senior fellow "The American Energy
Initiative," Congressional Documents and Publications, 9-13-12, l/n, accessed 1-31-13, mss]

There have been recent proposals to open areas off the Atlantic coast for oil and gas production. Such
proposals, however, could impair national security because a large portion part of this area is critical for
a wide array of military training, including explosives, submarine exercises and Navy SEAL training. The
Department of Defense wants to prohibit offshore drilling in a vast majority of the 2.9 million acre zone
under consideration for oil production off Virginia. n65 About 20 percent, or 630,000 acres, would be
open to drilling. n66 Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar reiterated that Defense Department needs will
take precedence over the energy industry. n67 Similarly, proposals to open the Gulf coast of Florida to
expanded oil and gas production would also interfere with Department of Defense training. Tom
Neubauer, president of the Bay Defense Alliance, raised concerns about conflict with the Navy during an
April 2012 public hearing on the expansion of drilling. He warned: The Gulf test range, which is
essentially everything east of the military mission line, which comes down from Pensacola into the Gulf
of Mexico, is really essential to nine bases in Northwest Florida. Most of those bases do testing and
training, research and development in the Gulf of Mexico. ... Drilling in those areas would impair those
missions. n68 One of the benefits of energy independence would be enhanced national security. It
makes little sense to strive for that goal by drilling in places that would interfere with our security.
Drilling in these two places important to our military is even less sensible because "about 70 percent of
undiscovered oil and gas resources are on federal lands that are available for leasing under current laws
and administrative policies" according to recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office. n69

OMEGA
OMEGA takes up 10 million ocean acres ONLY for aviation fuel
Tribune Business 10
(Quoting 1AC advocate Jonathan Trent, NASA boss investigated for possible conflict of interest on
biofuel project: Charlie Bolden asked Marathon Oil for its opinion on Project OMEGA ? but he has
financial interest in Marathon, which has a competing project pg online at proquest//sd)
Many scientists consider algae a prime future source of alternative fuels. Trent envisions algae farms covering 10 million acres of
ocean, generating enough biofuel to satisfy U.S. aviation-fuel needs, which is about 21 billion gallons a year.


OMEGA competes with shipping and fishing industries
Trent 12
(TED talk with Jonathan Trent, lead scientist of OMEGA, and Chris Anderson, host of TED talk. Jonathan
Trent: Energy from floating algae pods pg online at
https://www.ted.com/talks/jonathan_trent_energy_from_floating_algae_pods/transcript#t-
767708//sd)
So here's what I came up with. Imagine that we build an enclosure where we put it just underwater, and we fill it with wastewater and some form of microalgae
that produces oil, and we make it out of some kind of flexible material that moves with waves underwater, and the system that we're going to build, of course, will
use solar energy to grow the algae, and they use CO2, which is good, and they produce oxygen as they grow. The algae that grow are in a container that distributes
the heat to the surrounding water, and you can harvest them and make biofuels and cosmetics and fertilizer and animal feed, and of course you'd have to
make a large area of this, so you'd have to worry about other stakeholders like fishermen and ships and
such things, but hey, we're talking about biofuels, and we know the importance of potentially getting an alternative liquid fuel.
Wind
Offshore wind interferes with military and shipping sectorsempirics prove
Medina et al 14
(Monica Medina currently is the Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Joel Smith has a Ph.D. in Cancer Biology from the
University of Utah and a B.S. in Biochemistry from the University of California at Davis. Linda Sturgis
Senior Coast Guard Fellow National Coastal Ocean Mapping Advancing National Defense and Ocean
Conservation pg online at http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/OceanMapping_MedinaSmithSturgis.pdf//sd)
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST Recent disputes between the military and other users over the use of the coastal
ocean have highlighted competing economic, security and environmental interests in this increasingly crowded space. Off the
coast of Virginia earlier this year, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security raised an issue regarding the location of a planned offshore wind farm,
contending that the introduction of fixed infrastructure in "off limits" military training areas could create an unsafe situation, endanger lives or
impede military operations.22 Private operators in the area have also voiced concerns that the proposed wind farm would shift the pre-
established routes of commercial vessels navigating the area and "create delays or unsafe operating situations for towing vessels during hazardous weather and restrict
north to south coastal navigation."" Additionally, this area is situated within the migratory path of several marine species, including the previously mentioned North Atlantic right whale.
Zero Sum - MSP
MSP analysis exposes clear tradeoffs
White Halper and Kappel 11 (Crow White - Bren School of Environmental Science and Management,
University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, Benjamin Halpern and Carrie Kappel - National Center for
Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA Ecosystem service tradeoff
analysis reveals the value of marine spatial planning for multiple ocean uses, 9/1/11, Proceeding of the
National Academy of Sciences for the United States of America,
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/12/4696.short)
Marine spatial planning (MSP) is an emerging responsibility of resource managers around the United States and elsewhere. A key
proposed advantage of MSP is that it makes tradeoffs in resource use and sector (stakeholder group) values explicit, but
doing so requires tools to assess tradeoffs. We extended tradeoff analyses from economics to simultaneously
assess multiple ecosystem services and the values they provide to sectors using a robust,
quantitative, and transparent framework. We used the framework to assess potential conflicts among
offshore wind energy, commercial fishing, and whale-watching sectors in Massachusetts and identify and quantify the value from choosing optimal
wind farm designs that minimize conflicts among these sectors. Most notably, we show that using MSP over conventional planning could prevent >$1
million dollars in losses to the incumbent fishery and whale-watching sectors and could generate >$10 billion in extra value to the energy sector. The
value of MSP increased with the greater the number of sectors considered and the larger the area under management. Importantly, the framework can
be applied even when sectors are not measured in dollars (e.g., conservation). Making tradeoffs explicit improves transparency
in decision-making, helps avoid unnecessary conflicts attributable to perceived but weak tradeoffs,
and focuses debate on finding the most efficient solutions to mitigate real tradeoffs and maximize
sector values. Our analysis demonstrates the utility, feasibility, and value of MSP and provides timely support for the management transitions
needed for society to address the challenges of an increasingly crowded ocean environment.
Zero Sum - Permits
Zoning and permits are the currency of coastal development projectsits zero sum
Shamshak and Anderson 8
(Gina, Knauss Sea Grant Fellow at NOAA, Economist at Bureau of Labor Statistics, James Ph.D.,
Oceanography, Offshore Aquaculture in the United States: Economic Considerations, Implications &
Opportunities July 2008 pg online at https://fish.washington.edu/people/anderson/cv.pdf//sd)
The establishment of land-based operations, whether it is for poultry or catfish, faces significantly fewer obstacles than the establishment of an
offshore operation. This relates back to the presence of well-defined property rights in the agriculture sector. For offshore aquaculture, the establishment of zoning
and permitting will be critical in the creation of these rights. As a first step, the government needs to establish a streamlined process for
identifying approved areas for offshore aquaculture operations. The zoning process should consider such factors as potential interactions with
existing users (commercial, recreations, shipping) and potential interactions with marine life (mammalian interactions and impacts on
the surrounding marine environment), as well as bio-geochemical considerations (temperature, nutrients, upwelling, currents, etc.). It is the role of the government to parse out where
offshore activity is permitted, leaving the operator free to choose when and how he or she will operate within those zones. Relating back to the U.S. broiler and catfish industries, each was
able to operate with minimal restrictions or complications from outside influences. Certainly farmers had to comply with environmental guidelines and requirements (rules regarding waste
disposal and groundwater contamination, etcetera) but there was little else constraining their investment and production decisions. Similarly, the government needs to establish where activity
is permitted and then allow operators to manage their operations, much like their agricultural counterparts. Once zoning rules and regulations are
established, the actual process of issuing permits to prospective operators must be streamlined. Currently, a number of permits must be
obtained for an aquaculture operationmany of which must be obtained in a specific, sequential order. Delay in a given permit can de-rail the entire permitting process, as granted permits
expire before other permits are obtained. Additionally, the permitting process is costlyboth in terms of the time spent throughout the duration of the permitting process and also in legal
fees incurred to fight challenges and denials.

Zero Sum - Space
Coastal competition is zero-sum, the sea is finitebelieve it or not...
Bell et al 8
(Johann Bell, Wollongong University, Australia., Patrick Christie, University of Washington, Seattle,
United States., David Obura, CORDIO East Africa, Keny, A Call to Zone Tropical Coastal Oceans pg
online at http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/a-call-to-zone-tropical-coastal-oceans//sd)
Lacking in most locations are holistic, regional-scale management approaches to balance the growth in
competing demands from fisheries, aquaculture, shipping, oil, gas and mineral extraction, energy
production, residential development, tourism and conservation. Says lead author Peter Sale of the UN
Universitys Canada-based Institute for Water, Environment and Health: We zone land for
development, for farms, for parks, for industry and other human needs. Required today is a comparable
degree of care and planning for coastal ocean waters. We have tended to think of the seas as our last
great wilderness, he adds, yet we subject them, particularly along tropical shores, to levels of human
activity as intense as those on land. The result is widespread overfishing, pollution and habitat
degradation. Coastal marine management efforts today are just woefully inadequate to avoid
irreparable degradation of the bounty and services on which so many people depend for food and well-
being.

Military Readiness Module
1NC Shell

<INSERT LINK>
Readiness collapse causes global war
Spencer 00 Jack Spencer, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation's Roe Institute for
Economic Policy Studies, The Facts About Military Readiness, Heritage Backgrounder #1394, 9-15,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/09/bg1394-the-facts-about-military-readiness

Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world
that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will
be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in
combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting
aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

1NC Link - Generic
***A successful CMSP is key to military readiness
NOC 11 (National Ocean Council - The National Ocean Council is charged with implementing the
National Ocean Policy., LEGAL AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COASTAL AND
MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING 2-14-11, Whitehouse.gov,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/cmsp_legal_compendium_2-14-11.pdf
The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) 46 U.S.C. 57101; 50 App.
U.S.C. 1744 Brief summary: The NDRF and RRF are composed of ships having value for national
defense purposes. As provided for in 46 U.S.C. 57101 and 50 App. U.S.C. 1744, the purpose of the
NDRF and RRF is to provide a reserve of ships for use by the Department of Defense for sealift,
deployment of U.S. Armed Forces, military and civil contingency operations, storage or transportation of
non-defense related cargo, and training purposes. The NDRF and RRF are maintained and managed by
the Department of Transportation. NDRF ships that are not part of the RRF are located in U.S. inland and
territorial waters; RRF ships operate globally. Domestic implementing authority: 46 U.S.C. 57101
(Placement of vessels in the National Defense Reserve Fleet); 50 App. U.S.C. 1744 (National Defense
Reserve Fleet) Relationship to CMSP: CMSP will account for NDRF merchant marine and maritime
resources needed to ensure national security. CMS Plans must be coordinated and compatible with
national and homeland security needs, which include the mobility and flexibility necessary to ensure
effective maintenance, training and operations by NDRF ships. Decision makers must ensure an
appropriate balance between the need and responsibility to protect the environment with the need to
ensure that NDRF ships, operating in support of national defense missions, have the necessary
readiness, mobility and flexibility to meet national security requirements.
Coastal zones are prime areas- linear increases in activity trades off with military
deployment and training capabilities
Medina et al 14
(Monica Medina currently is the Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Joel Smith has a Ph.D. in Cancer Biology from the
University of Utah and a B.S. in Biochemistry from the University of California at Davis. Linda Sturgis
Senior Coast Guard Fellow National Coastal Ocean Mapping Advancing National Defense and Ocean
Conservation pg online at http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/OceanMapping_MedinaSmithSturgis.pdf//sd)
The United States is a maritime nation with an expansive coastal ocean that is integral to economic, environmental and national security.1 The coastal ocean hosts a wide range of users, including
the U.S. military, coastal shipping companies, offshore energy producers, commercial andsport fishermen, recreational users and conservation groups. As a primary user of
the coastal ocean, the U.S. military needs dedicated and charted offshore areas in which to train andconduct exercises to prepare for war, thwart terrorist activities and
prevent other threats against the United States. For the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps, operating in the coastal ocean is critical
to maintaining operational readiness.2 Although the ocean may seem vast, a unified effort is necessary
to balance increased offshore activity with the need to maintain U.S. military proficiency and national security and ensure the safety and sustainability of this vital
resource. White House Executive Order 13547 adopted the final recommendations of the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force and establi shed the National Ocean Council to implement an ocean policy to safeguard the country's ocean interests. The executive order requires the council to
work with stakeholders across the country to develop coastal and marine spatial planning.1 To improve transparency and coordi nation, nine "regional planning bodies" were created to manage the neighboring coastal ocean and produce plans by 2015 for incorporation into the national
ocean plan.4 Although significant progress has been made on national ocean planning over the past four years, efforts across the nation to improve information sharing and coordination among ocean users are inconsistent. Meanwhile, increased offshore
activity and competition for space in the coastal ocean have created tension among national security, commercial industry andocean
conservation communities.5 As a steward of the ocean, the military expends significant time and resources to comply with federal environmental requirements. However, military users are often challenged by the envi ronmental conservation
community because of the potentially harmful effects on ocean life as a result of certain military activities.6 The development of a national coastal ocean mapping systemthat integrates geospatial data fromall coastal ocean users (federal agencies, the military, local and state regulators
and law enforcement, industry and private individuals) would be an integral step toward balancing the offshore training needs of the military with the needs of ocean conservation groups and private-sector communities. Such a mapping system would also help integrate federal, military
and regional planning efforts to manage these areas more effectively. Ultimately, it would increase transparency and awareness of the burgeoning activity along America's coasts. The military, in particular, would benefit froma mapping system, which would inform operational planning
efforts and help it comply with applicable environmental laws and statutes. The Growing Importance of the Coastal Ocean As the diversity and volume of activity in the coastal ocean increases and
numerous users vie for improved access, the potential for conflict rises.In 2010, the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force recognized that "[d]emands for energy development, shipping, aquaculture, emerging security requirements
and other new and existing uses are expected to grow. Overlapping uses and differing views about which activities should occur where can generate conflicts and misunderstandings."7 MILITARY ACTIVITIES The ocean functions as a geographic barrier
for the United States, as well as a highway for U.S. military forces to deploy around the world. In order to be prepared for national defense,
the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps require large areas of the coastal ocean for training and long-
range weapons testing. To maximize situational awareness and ensure safety and operational effectiveness, the military places significant
value on the collection and analysis of data.8
1NC Link - Drilling
OCS drilling tanks Naval and Air Force military readiness
Bouchard 7
(Joe, Senior Program Executive for Homeland Security at Zel Technologies Director, Navy Reconstitution
Group at Naval Operations Group (Deep Blue), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, The Pentagon
Commanding Officer, Naval Station Norfolk at United States Navy, Impact of Offshore Gas Drilling on the
Virginia Capes Operating Area pg online at http://easternshoredefensealliance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/Impact-of-Offshore-Gas-Drilling.pdf//sd)
The Navy has also provided its intentions regarding the future of the Virginia Capes Operating Area: Support the current training. The Navy currently trains throughout
the Range Complex and must preserve that ability. Increase some training from current levels as necessary. This ensures units are
surge ready, meaning they can deploy on short notice if required. Accommodate new missions. The Navys training
needs are constantly evolving and we need to be responsive to changing global demands. Additionally, the
Navy needs to train with new vessels, aircraft, and weapons systems as they are introduced in the VACAPES Range Complex.
Implement enhanced range complex capabilities. New technologies are emerging and improving the way we train. The Navy must be able to make full use of these technologies
to continue to ensure the best trained and equipped military in the world. Upgrades and modernization of existing range capabilities and facilities
are necessary to enhance and sustain Navy training in the VACAPES Range Complex.2 In response to the Congressional proposal to expand offshore drilling
for oil and natural gas, the Navy, in its role as Executive Agent for the Department of Defense for outer continental shelf (OCS) matters, provided its
views on drilling in DOD offshore training areas to the Minerals Management Service. As a user of the oceans, navigational waters, and air space above the
OCS, the Navy and Air Force have maintained a keen interest in preserving unrestricted access to these
areas and ensuring that national security associated with ongoing training and testing activities are not adversely affected by activities that
occur in the OCS. Our commanders have told us that unrestricted use of critical sea ranges, warning areas, and military airspace operating
areas is essential to naval exercises, pilot training, and live ordnance and weapon system testing and evaluation. Drilling rigs and related structures, because
of their height and size would be hazardous to low flying drone aircraft and missiles and military exercises would be hazardous to
operations associated with oil and gas resources development. To prevent such incompatible encroachment, DoD has sought to discourage oil and gas development that would interfere with
current and future military uses of the OCS.3 This leaves no doubt that drilling for natural gas inside the Virginia Capes Operating Area would constitute incompatible encroachment on the
ability of the Navy and Air Force to conduct training and testing in the area. To even consider such a proposal at a time when the Virginia Capes Operating Area is used heavily for training Navy
and Air Force combat units for the war in Iraq and the broader War on Terror is unconscionable.
1NC Link - Energy
Energy products induce electromagnetic disruption of shipping and military activities
Medina et al 14
(Monica Medina currently is the Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Oceans and Atmosphere of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Joel Smith has a Ph.D. in Cancer Biology from the
University of Utah and a B.S. in Biochemistry from the University of California at Davis. Linda Sturgis
Senior Coast Guard Fellow National Coastal Ocean Mapping Advancing National Defense and Ocean
Conservation pg online at http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/OceanMapping_MedinaSmithSturgis.pdf//sd)
Renewable energy has also emerged as a growing offshore industry. 2013 was the first year in which the
U.S. government auctioned offshore area leases for wind energy projects.16 Meanwhile, wave energy
projects have raised concerns in the maritime community, with offshore development coming into
conflict with coastal fisheries management in the Pacific Northwest." Other coastal ocean users have
expressed concern that new energy projects often require the rerouting of established shipping routes.
This type of activity can interfere with efficient transportation of goods, disrupt commercial and
recreational fishing grounds and disturb defense readiness through the induction of electromagnetic
fields near offshore military training areas."*
2NC Link - Drilling
OCS drilling undercuts Naval training for missions and aircraft carriers
Moran 10
(Jim, senior member of the Appropriations Committee, Moran serves as the Ranking Member on the
Subcommittee on the Interior and Environment and also serves on the Defense and Legislative Branch
Subcommittees. Virginia Off-Shore Drilling Off-Limits, says DoD report pg online at
http://moran.house.gov/press-release/virginia-shore-drilling-limits-says-dod-report//sd)
Congressman Jim Moran, Virginia Democrat and Chair of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the Interior and the Environment released new information today detailing the militarys objections to
drilling in the area off Virginias coast known as Lease Sale 220. The report, presented in a DoD briefing with Moran, indicates that almost 80 percent of the proposed drilling
area scheduled to be sold as part of the OCS Oil and Gas Leasing Program 2007-2012 would infringe on US Navy operations. Congressman Moran
released a map summarizing the findings, along with a letter to Governor McDonnell detailing the militarys concerns. The unimpeded operation of the US Navy off the
coast of Virginia is far more important to the Commonwealths economy than even the most optimistic revenue estimates that might come from offshore drilling more than a decade
from now, said Moran. The Congressman has long argued that the militarys investment in the Tidewater area would be jeopardized by expanded
commercial drilling in the Virginia Capes Operating Area. In the past, the Navy and NASA have expressed concerns about drilling off the
shore of Virginia. The document obtained by Moran details the first comprehensive DoD survey conducted on areas in the Virginia Capes, including Lease Sale 220, which could be opened to drilling as early as 2012. Seventy-
eight percent of the proposed Lease Sale 220 site overlaps with military operations which would be impeded by drilling
structures and related activities. Most of the remaining area consists of major shipping lanes trafficked by commercial vessels and used by the Coast Guard. According to the DoD report, Lease Sale 220
would either interfere or prohibit the Navy from conducting live ordnance tests, aircraft carrier qualifications,
sensitive undersea and surface operations, shipboard qualification tests and other equipment testing
and evaluation.

High potential for drilling to interfere with military training
Christie 8
(Donna. Associate Dean gor International Programs, Florida State University College of Law;
Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management; NOAA; IOC-UNESCO. Potential Impacts of Oil and
Gas Explorations in the Gulf Collins Center, pg online at
http://mote.org/media/uploads/files/offshore_oil_drilling_report.pdf//sd)
Ultimately, it is the Secretary of Defense who will determine whether exploration and production activity in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico is compatible with military training exercises.
Statements from past defense secretaries and current commanding officers at Eglin Air Force Base suggest that the potential for conflict
does exist. The primary military concerns over drilling in the Eastern Gulf arise from fears that commercial
operations would interfere with training activities, either by putting civilians or drilling infrastructure at risk from falling debris or by
exposing training missions to observation. These concerns were articulated by military personnel and stakeholder interest groups in testimony to the
House Select Policy Council on Strategic and Economic Planning and House Military Affairs and Local Policy Committee. Two recently released reports from offshore drilling
lobbying groups (Securing America's Future Energy, or SAFE, and the American Petroleum Institute, or API) downplay these concerns. They claim that while
there are risks of encroachment from certain military activities, the risks are minima) and should not be considered as a stumbling block for exploration and development. Information
gathered through Freedom of Information requests is used by SAFE to argue that the areas that the military wants to protect are used infrequently. However, it must be noted that the validity
of the arguments made by SAFE and API have yet to be confirmed by the military officials at Eglin Air Force base or the Department of Defense. Senator Bill Nelson's office reports that
legitimate concerns were raised by Secretary of Defense William Gates in a 2007 letter to Senator Nelson. More recently, in testimony to the House
Military Affairs and Local Policy Committee, Eglin Air Force Base Commander Col. Bruce McClintock reiterated concerns regarding the problems drilling could
pose to military exercises. In the end, it will be up to the Department of Defense, in consultation with the Department of Interior, to determine if competing uses of the
areas in question are compatible.

Proven by empirics aff undermines global Naval operations
Nolan, Communications Director at Chesapeake Climate, 2010 (Jamie, August 11, Offshore Oil Drilling
Poses "unacceptable risk to naval forces in Hampton Roads" Blue Virginia,
http://www.chesapeakeclimate.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1785:blue-virginia-
offshore-oil-drilling-poses-unacceptable-risk-to-naval-forces-in-hampton-roads&Itemid=29)
First, according to Bouchard, there's a long record of offshore oil and gas activities interfering with
Defense Department training ranges. The industry likes to claim that they have a "great working
relationship with the military," but "you can't believe that for a minute." In fact, Bouchard says,
"interference with training ranges is well documented," and claims to the contrary by the oil industry
are "disingenuous if not outright untrue." Second, Bouchard points out that two Navy bases on the Gulf
coast were closed in the 2005 BRAC round, one of the reasons being the inadequacy of the training
ranges there because of interference from offshore oil and gas drilling activities. According to Bouchard,
"that should stand as a very clear warning to those of us here in Virginia." Bouchard adds that "DoD and
the Navy have made it clear for years that they're opposed to drilling in the Virginia Capes operating
area." The bottom line is that the Navy can't live with oil drilling.
2NC Link - Gulf Drilling
Gulf drilling undermines naval readiness prevents effective training
Weiss, Senior Fellow Center for American Progress, 2012 (Daniel, September 13, The American
Energy Initiatives Congressional Documents and Publications, lexis)
There have been recent proposals to open areas off the Atlantic coast for oil and gas production. Such
proposals, however, could impair national security because a large portion part of this area is critical for
a wide array of military training, including explosives, submarine exercises and Navy SEAL training. The
Department of Defense wants to prohibit offshore drilling in a vast majority of the 2.9 million acre zone
under consideration for oil production off Virginia. n65 About 20 percent, or 630,000 acres, would be
open to drilling. n66 Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar reiterated that Defense Department needs will
take precedence over the energy industry. n67 Similarly, proposals to open the Gulf coast of Florida to
expanded oil and gas production would also interfere with Department of Defense training. Tom
Neubauer, president of the Bay Defense Alliance, raised concerns about conflict with the Navy during an
April 2012 public hearing on the expansion of drilling. He warned: The Gulf test range, which is
essentially everything east of the military mission line, which comes down from Pensacola into the Gulf
of Mexico, is really essential to nine bases in Northwest Florida. Most of those bases do testing and
training, research and development in the Gulf of Mexico. ... Drilling in those areas would impair those
missions. n68 One of the benefits of energy independence would be enhanced national security. It
makes little sense to strive for that goal by drilling in places that would interfere with our security.
Drilling in these two places important to our military is even less sensible because "about 70 percent of
undiscovered oil and gas resources are on federal lands that are available for leasing under current laws
and administrative policies" according to recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office.
Opening up drilling in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico destroys military readiness
House of Representatives 06 (Proceedings and Debates of the 109
th
Congress, Second Session,
Vol 152, May 18, 2006, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2006-05-18/pdf/CREC-2006-05-18-pt2-
PgH2835.pdf)//js
You have heard a lot tonight about the potential environmental impacts, but let me just draw to your attention the issue as it affects our national
de- fense. Looks pretty cluttered, but this is a test range for Eglin Air Force Base where they do weapons testing from
the panhandle of Florida all the way to the Florida Keys. This red line right in here is a military mission line. Basi- cally, the Air Force says, the Secretary of Defense
has said, the Navy has said that anything that is east, anything that is east of that military mission line is incompatible with the mission at Eglin Air Force Base. There is live fire testing. We are not just
practicing out there. This is not Top Gun flying airplanes around. These are new weap- ons systems, classified new weapons
systems that are being tested over the Gulf of Mexico. Yes, the beaches of Florida are a na- tional treasure, but I can tell you from a national
defense standpoint, this entire area of the extreme eastern Gulf of Mexico is a national treasure
because there is no other weapons testing area like it in the country or in the world. Opponents of the
Putnam amendment say that the underlying language does nothing to hurt the readiness of our military.
Well that is 100 percent wrong! As you can see from this map, the Joint Gulf Test Range extends from the Panhandle of Florida to Key West. The Air Force uses this area for Live Fire testing and
evaluation of weapons systems. The Navy uses the Gulf Ranges to do predeployment certifications and to fire Toma- hawk
cruise missiles from submarines. Let me read you a list of just a sampling of current and future missions that are conducted in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico. F35 Joint Strike
Fighter Initial Training and live fire F/A22 pilot upgrade training including AMRAAM live fire Tomahawk
Cruise Missile launch from submerged vessels Testing of Small Diameter Bomb program against man-
made targets in the Gulf F16 weapons sys- tems testing and evaluation, U.S. Navy predeployment
certification, testing and devel- opment of hypersonic munitions, low-cost min- iature cruise missiles,
Air-Dominance muni- tions, unmanned combat air vehicles, Directed Energy weapons, and classified
programs. The Commander of the Air Armament Cen- ter, Major General Robert W. Chedister, said last August Clearly, structures associated with oil/gas
production are totally incompatible with, and would have a significant impact on, the mission activity
in the Eastern Gulf of Mex- ico. Accordingly, it is absolutely visceral that the vast water area
encompassed by the Gulf be preserved in order for us to continue to serve the needs of national
defense. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld re- cently wrote areas east of the 8641 line in the Gulf of Mexico commonly known
as the military mission line are specially critical to DoD. He went on to say In those areas east of the military mission line drilling structures and associated
development would be incom- patible with military activities, such as missile flights, low-flying drone aircraft, weapons test- ing, and training. Now let me show you where this mission line is. The underlying language in this bill
would open the door to drilling in the entire Joint Gulf Range and is completely incompatible with the military mission
of our Air Force and Navy.

AT: No Link - Pentagon
Pentagon says drilling cant work with the military
Eisman, 2010 (Dale, March 31, How Offshore Drilling Affects US Military AOL News,
http://www.aolnews.com/2010/03/31/how-offshore-drilling-affects-us-military/)
President Barack Obama's decision to expand offshore energy development could put oil platforms in
the middle of some of the military's prime East Coast training areas, tracts of open ocean and airspace
now largely reserved for ship maneuvers, bombing runs and naval gunfire. And the armed forces, which
have long zealously guarded their training grounds, apparently are fine with it. Environmentalists
howled Wednesday about the administration's plan to push oil and gas drilling in the eastern Gulf of
Mexico and off the Virginia coast. "Drilling our coasts will do nothing to lower gas prices or create
energy independence," said Michael Brune, executive director of the Sierra Club. The Obama plan
"continues our reliance on dirty fossil fuels," complained Maggie L. Fox, president of the Alliance for
Climate Protection. The Pentagon, meanwhile, signaled that it's willing to share the waters with energy
companies. The Defense Department was "tightly connected" with Interior Department officials who
developed the administration's proposal and is "comfortable with the efforts" to develop energy
resources offshore, said Lt. Cmdr. Wendy Snyder, a Pentagon spokeswoman. Cmdr. Danny Hernandez, a
Navy spokesman, cautioned that "it's too early to assess the potential impacts on our training" but
added that the Navy is "fully committed" to the administration's energy initiatives. Three years ago, as
the Bush administration announced plans to sell oil and gas leases off Virginia, the Pentagon declared
that drilling in the area "is not acceptable ... because of its incompatibility with the military training and
testing conducted in that area." The military's stance then heartened drilling foes and helped preserve a
congressionally imposed moratorium on Atlantic drilling. It also figured in successful efforts by Florida
lawmakers to ban drilling in the Gulf of Mexico within 100 miles of the Florida coast. Air Force, Navy and
Marine jets based in Hampton Roads and eastern North Carolina use ranges off Virginia to practice
bombing runs and air-to-air combat. Navy ships based in Norfolk also train in the area. In the gulf, the
Air Force and Navy share several ranges, training pilots based at Eglin and Tyndall Air Force bases and
the Pensacola Naval Air Station. The Obama plan announced Wednesday keeps oil rigs at least 125 miles
off Florida, far enough to win at least a tentative endorsement from the state's senior senator,
Democrat Bill Nelson. Before signing off on the proposal, Nelson said he wants Defense Secretary Robert
Gates "to look me in the eye" and provide assurances that military training will not be compromised.
Impact - China
Collapse of naval readiness ensures Chinese aggression and triggers wars in every
major hotspot
Eaglen, Research Fellow National Security at Heritage, 2011 (Mackenzie, May 16, Thinking About a
Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/thinking-about-a-day-without-sea-power-
implications-for-us-defense-policy)
Global Implications. Under a scenario of dramatically reduced naval power, the United States would
cease to be active in any international alliances. While it is reasonable to assume that land and air forces
would be similarly reduced in this scenario, the lack of credible maritime capability to move their bulk
and establish forward bases would render these forces irrelevant, even if the Army and Air Force were
retained at todays levels. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, 90 percent of material arrives by sea, although
material bound for Afghanistan must then make a laborious journey by land into theater. Chinas claims
on the South China Sea, previously disputed by virtually all nations in the region and routinely contested
by U.S. and partner naval forces, are accepted as a fait accompli, effectively turning the region into a
Chinese lake. China establishes expansive oil and gas exploration with new deepwater drilling
technology and secures its local sea lanes from intervention. Korea, unified in 2017 after the implosion
of the North, signs a mutual defense treaty with China and solidifies their relationship. Japan is
increasingly isolated and in 20202025 executes long-rumored plans to create an indigenous nuclear
weapons capability.[11] By 2025, Japan has 25 mobile nuclear-armed missiles ostensibly targeting China,
toward which Japans historical animus remains strong. Chinas entente with Russia leaves the Eurasian
landmass dominated by Russia looking west and China looking east and south. Each cedes a sphere of
dominance to the other and remains largely unconcerned with the events in the others sphere.
Worldwide, trade in foodstuffs collapses. Expanding populations in the Middle East increase pressure on
their governments, which are already stressed as the breakdown in world trade disproportionately
affects food importers. Piracy increases worldwide, driving food transportation costs even higher. In the
Arctic, Russia aggressively asserts its dominance and effectively shoulders out other nations with
legitimate claims to seabed resources. No naval power exists to counter Russias claims. India,
recognizing that its previous role as a balancer to China has lost relevance with the retrenchment of the
Americans, agrees to supplement Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf to protect
the flow of oil to Southeast Asia. In exchange, China agrees to exercise increased influence on its client
state Pakistan. The great typhoon of 2023 strikes Bangladesh, killing 23,000 people initially, and 200,000
more die in the subsequent weeks and months as the international community provides little
humanitarian relief. Cholera and malaria are epidemic. Iran dominates the Persian Gulf and is a nuclear
power. Its navy aggressively patrols the Gulf while the Revolutionary Guard Navy harasses shipping and
oil infrastructure to force Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries into Tehrans orbit. Russia supplies
Iran with a steady flow of military technology and nuclear industry expertise. Lacking a regional threat,
the Iranians happily control the flow of oil from the Gulf and benefit economically from the protection
provided to other GCC nations. In Egypt, the decade-long experiment in participatory democracy ends
with the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a violent seizure of power. The United States is
identified closely with the previous coalition government, and riots break out at the U.S. embassy.
Americans in Egypt are left to their own devices because the U.S. has no forces in the Mediterranean
capable of performing a noncombatant evacuation when the government closes major airports. Led by
Iran, a coalition of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq attacks Israel. Over 300,000 die in six months of fighting
that includes a limited nuclear exchange between Iran and Israel. Israel is defeated, and the State of
Palestine is declared in its place. Massive refugee camps are created to house the internally displaced
Israelis, but a humanitarian nightmare ensues from the inability of conquering forces to support them.
The NATO alliance is shattered. The security of European nations depends increasingly on the lack of
external threats and the nuclear capability of France, Britain, and Germany, which overcame its
reticence to military capability in light of Americas retrenchment. Europe depends for its energy
security on Russia and Iran, which control the main supply lines and sources of oil and gas to Europe.
Major European nations stand down their militaries and instead make limited contributions to a new EU
military constabulary force. No European nation maintains the ability to conduct significant out-of-area
operations, and Europe as a whole maintains little airlift capacity. Implications for Americas Economy. If
the United States slashed its Navy and ended its mission as a guarantor of the free flow of transoceanic
goods and trade, globalized world trade would decrease substantially. As early as 1890, noted U.S. naval
officer and historian Alfred Thayer Mahan described the worlds oceans as a great highwaya wide
common, underscoring the long-running importance of the seas to trade.[12] Geographically organized
trading blocs develop as the maritime highways suffer from insecurity and rising fuel prices. Asia
prospers thanks to internal trade and Middle Eastern oil, Europe muddles along on the largesse of Russia
and Iran, and the Western Hemisphere declines to a new normal with the exception of energy-
independent Brazil. For America, Venezuelan oil grows in importance as other supplies decline. Mexico
runs out of oilas predictedwhen it fails to take advantage of Western oil technology and investment.
Nigerian output, which for five years had been secured through a partnership of the U.S. Navy and
Nigerian maritime forces, is decimated by the bloody civil war of 2021. Canadian exports, which a
decade earlier had been strong as a result of the oil shale industry, decline as a result of environmental
concerns in Canada and elsewhere about the fracking (hydraulic fracturing) process used to free oil
from shale. State and non-state actors increase the hazards to seaborne shipping, which are
compounded by the necessity of traversing key chokepoints that are easily targeted by those who wish
to restrict trade. These chokepoints include the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran could quickly close to trade
if it wishes. More than half of the worlds oil is transported by sea. From 1970 to 2006, the amount of
goods transported via the oceans of the worldincreased from 2.6 billion tons to 7.4 billion tons, an
increase of over 284%.[13] In 2010, $40 billion dollars [sic] worth of oil passes through the worlds
geographic chokepoints on a daily basisnot to mention $3.2 trillionannually in commerce that
moves underwater on transoceanic cables.[14] These quantities of goods simply cannot be moved by
any other means. Thus, a reduction of sea trade reduces overall international trade. U.S. consumers face
a greatly diminished selection of goods because domestic production largely disappeared in the decades
before the global depression. As countries increasingly focus on regional rather than global trade, costs
rise and Americans are forced to accept a much lower standard of living. Some domestic manufacturing
improves, but at significant cost. In addition, shippers avoid U.S. ports due to the onerous container
inspection regime implemented after investigators discover that the second dirty bomb was smuggled
into the U.S. in a shipping container on an innocuous Panamanian-flagged freighter. As a result,
American consumers bear higher shipping costs. The market also constrains the variety of goods
available to the U.S. consumer and increases their cost. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report
makes this abundantly clear. A one-week shutdown of the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports would lead
to production losses of $65 million to $150 million (in 2006 dollars) per day. A three-year closure would
cost $45 billion to $70 billion per year ($125 million to $200 million per day). Perhaps even more
shocking, the simulation estimated that employment would shrink by approximately 1 million jobs.[15]
These estimates demonstrate the effects of closing only the Los Angeles and Long Beach ports. On a
national scale, such a shutdown would be catastrophic. The Government Accountability Office notes
that: [O]ver 95 percent of U.S. international trade is transported by water[;] thus, the safety and
economic security of the United States depends in large part on the secure use of the worlds seaports
and waterways. A successful attack on a major seaport could potentially result in a dramatic slowdown
in the international supply chain with impacts in the billions of dollars.[16] As of 2008, U.S. ports move
99 percent of the nations overseas cargo, handle more than 2.5 billion tons of trade annually, and move
$5.5 billion worth of goods in and out every day. Further, approximately 95 percent of U.S. military
forces and supplies that are sent overseas, including those for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring
Freedom, pass through U.S. ports.[17] General Conclusions. This simple thought experiment is designed
to highlight the impact of the loss of preponderant American sea power. Because this is a scenario-
based excursion, it is important to retain perspective. In order to create this absence of sea power, a
Hobbesian nightmare had to be imposed, although a slow erosion of naval power in the next decade
could leave the country dramatically unprepared for something less than Hobbes might conjure.
Certainly, America would have many important needs if such a scenario became reality. Yet the
scenarios description shows the extent to which Americas power as a maritime nation depends on its
ability to field and operate a global fleet that aggressively protects its interests even as it provides a
benign security environment for other nations to enjoy. Put another way, the cost of maintaining a fleet
that can project power and presence around the globeeven if it encourages others to underinvest in
their naval forcesproduces substantial national security and economic benefits for the American
people, and these benefits far outweigh the costs of maintaining it.
Extinction

Goldstein 13
Avery Goldstein is the David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, Director of
the Center for the Study of Contemporary China, and Associate Director of the Christopher H. Browne
Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania, First Things First: The Pressing
Danger of Crisis Instability in U.S.-China Relations, International Security, Vol. 37, no 4, Spring, 2013, pp
49-89
In a crisis, the U.S. and Chinese interests at stake will be high, and either side could decide that the risk
of escalation introduced by conventional, space, or cyberattacks was worth running. Even though no
stake in a crisis would be high enough for either the United States or China to choose an unrestrained
nuclear exchange, some stakes might be high enough for either one to choose to initiate military actions
that elevate the risk of escalation to such a disastrous outcome.88 As discussed above, both China and
the United States have important interests over which they could find themselves locked in a war
threatening crisis in the Western Pacific. The recent pattern of pointed Chinese and U.S. statements
about the handling of persistent disputes in the South China Sea, for example, suggests that both sides
attach a high and perhaps increasing value to their stakes in this region. Whether that value is high
enough to contribute to crisis instability is an empirical question that cannot be answered in advance.
The most worrisome source of instability, however, is clearthe temptation to use nonnuclear strikes
as a way to gain bargaining leverage, even if doing so generates an unknowable risk of nuclear
catastrophe that both China and the United States will have incentives to manipulate.

Impact - Terrorism
Naval power solves wars that escalate and terrorism
Eaglen and McGrath 11 (Mackenzie Eaglen is Research Fellow for National Security in the Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. Bryan McGrath is a retired naval officer
and the Director of Delex Consulting, Studies and Analysis in Vienna, Virginia. On active duty, he
commanded the destroyer USS Bulkeley (DDG 84) and served as the primary author of the current
maritime strategy, Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power: Implications for U.S. Defense Policy,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/05/Thinking-About-a-Day-Without-Sea-Power-
Implications-for-US-Defense-Policy, May 16, 2011
*The scenario described here is inspired by work done by Decision Strategies International (DSI) for the
U.S. Navys Strategic Planning Process describing collapse of Americas Navy in the above section of the
article Thinking About a Day Without Sea Power- Implications for US Defense Policy
Global maritime trade declines dramatically due to rising oil prices, terrorism, and piracy, and
international cooperation to provide enhanced security does not materialize. With the decrease in long-
haul international trade, regional trade blocs become the dominant mode of commerce. Even as the
depression reduces demand, supply is reduced further. The United Nations is ineffective and ignored, a
relic of an age of international cooperation long since past. Worldwide competition for declining energy
resources increases, exacerbated by a global decline in energy innovation as commercial investment
slows dramatically. Industrial nations with domestic access to energy engage in power politics, creating
even more conflict in an already unstable world. In this environment, Americans are not embraced
internationally, and the U.S. military loses many of its basing rights as it redeploys to the United States.
Implications for Naval Force Structure. In 2025, the Navy consists of 70 deployable ships. The rest of the
fleet is either mothballed or kept pierside as a result of the worldwide depression. All aircraft carriers
and all but six attack submarines are sidelined as the Navy cuts back dramatically on expensive nuclear
engineers and pilots. Additionally, the Navy completely deemphasizes projecting power and sea control
beyond territorial waters. It maintains a fleet of four ballistic missile submarines, with one in maximum
readiness and capable of launching its missiles, including the possibility of pierside launch. While
deemphasizing power projection decimates the carrier force, the amphibious force is cut less severely,
both because of the flexibility of these platforms and because they are highly valued for their usefulness
in defense support to civil authority missions, such as disaster relief and internal security. All forward-
deployed forces redeploy to the naval bases in Norfolk, Virginia, and San Diego, California. A third naval
base in Bangor, Washington, remains open to support the four remaining ballistic missile submarines. A
greatly diminished U.S. Coast Guard maintains a presence in Hawaii. All other naval bases are closed.
Worldwide, trade in foodstuffs collapses. Expanding populations in the Middle East increase pressure on
their governments, which are already stressed as the breakdown in world trade disproportionately
affects food importers. Piracy increases worldwide, driving food transportation costs even higher.

Extinction
Hellman 8 (Martin E. Hellman, emeritus prof of engineering @ Stanford, Risk Analysis of Nuclear
Deterrence SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf)

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the publics mind than the threat of a full-scale
nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before
proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense
proportions: A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely
kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and
its way of life would be changed forever. [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is
also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear
terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright,
a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, We
would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be
anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we cant live in a world
where its anything but extremely low-probability. [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security
experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the probability of an attack
involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years, with 79 percent of
the respondents believing it more likely to be carried out by terrorists than by a government [Lugar
2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not
inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger
mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the
risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are
found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s)
warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the
U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear
terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to
reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, societys almost total
neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT
of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure
and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next
section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a
failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and
Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of
the first World War. World War IIs fatalities were double or triple that numberchaos prevented a
more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars
that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World
War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In
that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from
which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold
a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas
MacArthur, stated, Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. If you lose, you are
annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner
of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide. Former Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and
NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed [McNamara 1986,
page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those
concerns when they quoted President Reagans belief that nuclear weapons were totally irrational,
totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.
[Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll
that World War III would exact: The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive
branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) a
change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each
side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be
injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care millions of people might
starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. further
millions might eventually die of latent radiation effects. [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also
noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new
potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly
simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that
might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T
Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a
large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no
scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work
[Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer
nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic
consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern
megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we
apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its
50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessitynot an option.


Impact - Heg
Naval dominance is key to prevent the rise of any global challengers and the lynchpin
of hegemony
Stratfor 2008 - the worlds leading private intelligence service. (U.S.: Naval Dominance and the
Importance of Oceans,
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/u_s_naval_dominance_and_importance_oceans)
Our statement that control of the worlds oceans is a cornerstone of U.S. geopolitical security and keeps
any potential adversary half a world away sparked extensive comment. This is a long-standing Stratfor
position, not a casual assertion, and is crucial to the way we see the world. In his 1890 classic The
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, U.S. Naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan examines the decisive
role superior sea power played in geopolitical competition and conflict from 1660 to 1783. His work has
made him perhaps the foremost theorist of naval power in the United States. At the risk of
oversimplification, Mahans thesis is that control of the sea can be decisive in both peacetime and
wartime, and has far-reaching military, economic and geopolitical ramifications. Mahan is required
reading at Stratfor. The world has changed quite a bit since the time of Mahan, who wrote as sail was
giving way to steam as the principal method of naval propulsion. Indeed, a common question from our
readers has been about the applicability of the oceans to U.S. security in the 21st century, particularly in
the context of globalization. In essence, readers have asked us whether oceans still matter after
globalization has so reduced transit times and increased interconnectivity that transnational terrorism
and cyberspace have come into existence. While aviation, the intercontinental ballistic missile, satellites
and the Internet have all fundamentally altered the way the world interacts and how wars are fought,
Mahans analysis holds true. Over the course of a century, but particularly during and after World War II,
the United States honed and perfected expeditionary naval operations. Washingtons ability to function
on the other side of the planet from home port is unparalleled and has surpassed the sea power of the
British Empire that Mahan so admired. The importance of this cannot be overstated, and has broad
applicability. Globalization has massively increased, not decreased seaborne commerce. As the
dominant global naval power, Washington exercises a decisive influence over the principal avenue of
both international trade and the flow of the worlds oil (and, increasingly, natural gas). In addition to
wielding this as a lever over other countries, the U.S. Navy is the guarantor of Americas global supply
lines. That Washington has claim to both the worlds foremost navy and the worlds foremost economy
is no coincidence, and it is a key dynamic of the entire international system. From a military perspective,
the last shooting war in the Western Hemisphere of any strategic significance for the United States was
the Spanish-American War. That conflict resulted in the expulsion at the end of the 19th century of the
last Eastern Hemispheric power from Washingtons periphery. For more than a century now, the United
States has fought its wars abroad, with the only strategic threat to the homeland being Soviet (and to a
much lesser extent, Chinese) nuclear weapons. Indeed, the fundamental value of naval dominance was
demonstrated in 1962. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington was able to prevent the re-
emergence of an outside powers beachhead in Cuba because U.S. naval dominance made the situation
untenable for the Kremlin. The Russian navy was not in a position to sustain forces there in the face of
concerted U.S. naval opposition. And while the notion of invasion in the 21st century may seem
anachronistic in the U.S. perspective, the rest of the world sees things very differently. That apparent
anachronism is symptomatic of fundamental U.S. geopolitical security. Across the oceans, even much of
Europe still looks east over the open Northern European plain and remembers columns of Soviet armor.
Nations the world over continue to struggle day in and day out with their neighbors. Pakistan, India and
China continue to squabble over Kashmir, which they each consider core to their geographic security.
Russias foremost geopolitical struggle is the re-establishment of some semblance of a peripheral buffer
in Europe and the Caucasus necessary buffers, but a poor compensation for unfavorable geography.
These issues crucial geopolitical objectives keep Eurasia divided and restrict (but obviously do not
eliminate) other countries bandwidth to deal with global issues farther afield. The ultimate
consequence of this division is the prevention of the emergence of a potential challenger to the United
States. By this, we mean the emergence of a country so secure in its geopolitical position that the
mustering of resources necessary to project military force across the Atlantic or Pacific to meaningfully
challenge the strategic security of the North American continent becomes a possibility. More simply,
U.S. naval dominance allows Washington to keep the costs of projecting hostile military force across the
worlds oceans prohibitively high. The countries of the world are thus largely left confronting
geopolitical challenges in their own backyards, unable to militarily challenge the United States in its
backyard. All the while, the U.S. Navy conducts operations daily in Eurasias backyard. This is a secure
and enviable geopolitical position.
Impact - Arctic War
Naval mobility is critical to preventing conflict in the Arctic
Posner 2007 (Eric, professor of law at the University of Chicago, is co-author of "The Limits of
International Law, The New Race for the Arctic
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118610915886687045.html?mod=opinion_main_commentaries,sec)
Melting polar ice and the high cost of energy are creating a new battleground at the top of the world.
Yesterday a Russian mini-sub released a capsule containing a Russian flag onto the seabed at the North
Pole. This was the climax of a research expedition whose purpose is to support Russia's claim to what
could be billions of tons of oil and gas reserves in an area of the Arctic twice the size of France. Russia
has already been setting up new military and civilian posts, such as in the Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa
archipelago in the northeastern Barents Sea. Meanwhile, Canada has reasserted its claim over the
melting Northwest Passage, a portion of the Arctic Ocean linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Its
recent announcement that it will build patrol vessels in order to establish sovereignty over the passage
had a belligerent tone uncharacteristic of our peaceful neighbor. The United States has long resisted
both claims. The international legal arguments are esoteric, but boiled down they amount to this:
Russia's claim is based on the principle that a coastal nation controls the mineral resources of its
continental shelf, and the as-yet unproved assertion, which the U.S. disputes, that the continental shelf
abutting Russian territory extends deep into the Arctic. Canada argues that the straits composing the
Northwest Passage amount to inland seas, and therefore are subject to Canadian sovereignty, just as the
U.S. controls Lake Michigan. The U.S. replies that these straits are part of the high seas, and thus anyone
can enter them without obtaining Canada's consent. Power, not international law, will settle the issue.
Indeed, international law recognizes this fact by making title dependent on a nation's ability to exert
control over an area. That is why Russia is sending ships into the Arctic, and why Canada is saying that it
will patrol the Northwest Passage. As long as such expressions of power are credible, other nations,
disadvantaged by distance, will generally acquiesce and sovereignty will be extended accordingly.
Russia's expression of power is credible; Canada's is not. Canada cannot prevent other countries from
sending ships up the Northwest Passage, as the U.S. has demonstrated from time to time for just this
purpose. The melting of the Northwest Passage will significantly shorten the sea route between oceans,
as well as open up access to energy resources. The U.S. does not want Canada to reap all the benefits of
control of the passage, but this is a side show. The real threat is the Russian bear, not the Canadian
beaver. The world is divided into two types of space: areas controlled by states and areas that are
uncontrolled. Oceans are mostly uncontrolled, with the significant exception of territorial seas, where
states have been able to exert some control with naval resources. International law has long recognized
states' control over their coastal seas (which extend about 12 miles), which means they can block and
regulate foreign shipping in those areas. The high seas, however, are free to all. The major naval powers
have always advanced the principle of freedom of the seas for the simple reason that their naval forces
dominate them. But "commons" are subject to overexploitation, and overfishing has been the
predictable consequence of uncontrolled oceans. Predictable and unavoidable: If no one can control the
oceans, then the problem cannot be solved by giving a country nominal title to them. Where a state can
exert control, it is best for it to do so, because this avoids the commons problem. It is in the world's
interest for Canada to control the Northwest Passage, even if it will profit and has the formal power to
keep the rest of the world out. Canada has an interest in protecting the passage and exploiting its
resources, which the rest of the world can purchase. But given its military weakness, Canada cannot
have this control without the support of the U.S. Russia's claims present a different case. It is re-
emerging as a global troublemaker, and its claims are far more ambitious than Canada's. At some point,
Russia, the U.S. and other countries will carve up the Arctic into mutually exclusive economic zones.
Russia is positioning itself to take the lion's share. Russia has major advantages over Canada and the U.S.
in the battle over the Arctic. Control over the seas is determined by two things: power and propinquity.
With respect to the Arctic, Russia has both. The U.S. has power but not, for the most part, propinquity;
Canada has propinquity but not power. As long as the U.S. and Canada are at loggerheads over the
Northwest Passage, they will have trouble resisting Russia's claims to the rest of the Arctic. If the U.S.
supports Canada's claim to the Northwest Passage, in return for some sort of guarantee of U.S. military
and civilian access, the two countries will strengthen their position vis--vis Russia. As the world heats
up, the two countries need to prepare themselves for the re-emergence of old rivalries, and in the battle
over control of the Arctic, the U.S. and Canada are natural allies.
Arctic confrontation causes extinction most holistic scholarship
Murray 12
(Professor of Political Science @ Alberta, Arctic politics in the emerging multipolar system: challenges
and consequences, The Polar Journal, 2.1)
It is no overstatement to say that the end of the Cold War was one of the most important events in recent world history. Scholars from many areas of study have used the fall of the Soviet Union as a starting point to explain shifts
in security, globalization, humanitarianism and institutional integration, all of which played important roles in world affairs in the immediate post-Cold War era. Since 1991, explanatory models for international and global politics
have broadened their scope to include variables such as individual preferences, capitalist oppression, ideational construction, environmentalism, gender and sexual politics, and discursive power to levels previously unforeseen
throughout the Cold War years. As such, we now see the world as a far more complex and nefarious arena in which power and dominance are exercised each day. At the systemic level, the fall of the Soviet Union equated to
nothing short of a monumental shift in the way states would make foreign and defence strategy. For 50 years, the bipolar system was dominated by two superpowers constantly competing and building arms in an effort to balance
one another. The end of the Cold War signalled a major shift in systemic arrangement, as the system went from being bipolar to the world entering what was often referred to as the unipolar moment.1 The era of unipolarity and
American hegemony in the international system has been marked by stability in an interstate sense, and the realignment of various spheres of influence in the wake of the Soviet Unions demise. Far from being just a theoretical
notion, the unipolar momenthas also provided states with an environment in which to pursue their national self-interest where the likelihood ofconflict is decreased and great power security competition has been minimized.2 As
such, new areas of foreign affairs and defence strategy have become far more important than they could have been throughout the bipolar constrained Cold War years. One of the most notable examples in this regard has been
the increased desire for territorial protection and extension in the Arctic region. In an era of state preoccupation with humanitarianism, terrorism and economic recession, it is being suggested by some
observers that the Arctic has become the primary stage through which states, both great and minor in
power, can pursue their self-interest in a way that combines soft powercooperation through bodies of
governance with hard power and military build-up. As things presently stand, there are a variety of
nations and institutions all seek- ing to claim governing authority over different parts of the
circumpolar region. Nations making claims to parts of the Arctic Ocean or other northern waters include Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, Iceland and Denmark/Greenland. On the institutional
side, Arctic governance has been debated and defined by bodies such as the United Nations, the European Union, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Arctic Council.3 To date, no
clear resolution to competing claims is in sight, and in some cases the situation is on the verge of
becoming far more competitive as nations such as Russiahave resorted to asserting possible military
solutions to contested Arctic issues to bolster their declarations. It is important to note the increased levels of interest over Arctic relations between
states, but, on this point, little attention has been given to the influence of the international system over this situation. If the unipolar moment has been defined as an era of relative stability and diplomatic coexistence, and
tensions in the Arctic are already on the rise, what is to happen when the multipolar system finally emerges in the near future? Since 2005, the status of the United States as
systemic hegemon has been in decline due to economic, military and political strains placed on
American power capabilities throughout the Bush era and beyond. This decrease in relative power
preponderance has been even further exacerbated by the economic recession starting in 2008 and the nations inability to stabilize
its markets. As such, the predictions of those like Christopher Layne and John Mearsheimer are on the verge of coming to fruition, in that the unipolar moment is about to end.4 New great powers are rising, the United States is no
longer able to prevent these nations from balancing their power, and the once obvious prevalence of American power is far murkier than it was a decade ago. As the multipolar era becomes
increasingly likely, one must ponder the effects this shift might have on state foreign and defence
strategy- making, especially towards the Arctic region. To date, though its relative power position has declined significantly in recent years, the United States
remains the hegemon of the international system, but it is contended here that such status is soon to evaporate. In this context, this article argues that the emergence of a multipolar systemic arrangement
is very likely to increase security competition in the system as a whole, and the Arctic will be at the epicentre of such conflict. To lend support to this hypothesis, an examination of the impending shift from unipolarity to
multipolarity will be made, as will an account of current security dynamics in the circumpolar region. The article concludes with a stark warning that without some kind of real action towards settling competing Arctic claims, it will
be left to states to secure their own territorial assertions through hard power and forceful means. The system is unipolar ... for now In order to evaluate the polarity of the international system in a given historical period, one must
identify the hierarchy of power in terms of the number of super or great powers dominating international outcomes. Counting great or super powers can be somewhat difficult in contemporary international relations, as scholars
have begun to expand the notions of power and capabilities, but the clearest guideline for being able to identify great powers is through determining capabilities. The reason it is essential to understand the great powers in
international relations is that they, above all other states, institutions, non-state actors and ideational forces, are responsible for the daily conduct of behaviour in the international system, and they have been historically
accountable for substantial alterations to power distribution since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Measuring capabilities allows observers to explain which states are most likely to affect the behaviour of other states, to use force
or violence; also, the number of great powers in a given era determines how stable or unstable the international system will be. Identifying great powers is literally done by evaluating each states capabilities in essential areas of
political life that can maximize security or extend ones power. When discussing the distribution of power across states, there is a clear hierarchy of capabilities among states that leads observers to classify these utility maximizing,
rational actors as super, great, major, middle or minor powers in the international system. In terms of actual measurement, Kenneth Waltz argues: Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.5 Once these various factors are taken into account, one can clearly determine the given polarity of the
system at a given moment in history. Why is polarity important? According to structural realist theory, the number of great powers in the system determines how conflictual, violent or stable international politics will be. While the
overall structure of the system remains anarchic, meaning a clear absence of a governing authority above states that can control their actions, there can be consequential variations within the anarchic structure that can impact
how states will evaluate their foreign and defence policy strategies and affect their overall behaviour. Waltz claims that consequential variations in number are changes of number that lead to different expectations about the
effect of structure on units.6 There are three types of structure within the system that have been determined throughout the history of the modern state system unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity. The consequential
variations described by Waltz take place when great powers either rise or fall, and induce shifts from one type of polarity to another. The rise and fall of great powers is perhaps the most important explanatory aspect of
international politics because it is these states that inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other.7 Though the primary motivation for all states is
security maximization, great powers become the most important actors because while they are capable of defending themselves, they also have the ability to extend their sphere of influence in offensive posturing. It is in this
context that the polarity of the system becomes even more vital, in that the more great powers there are, the greater likelihood of violence and conflict there is. In each systemic arrangement, the abilities of great powers to pursue
their ultimate goal, which is hegemony, dictates whether foreign and defence policy strategies will be overtly defensive or potentially offensive. All states are like-units, in that
they all strive for survival by making rational calculations about how to best pursue their interests in
an anarchic system. Of course, strategies of states will differ greatly based on the distribution of
power, meaning that great powers are able to pursue their goals more freely than minor powers
because they can operate without allies or institutions in achieving their goals. Lesser powers, however, typically try to increase
their power position in world affairs through various alliance blocs and institutional binding. In doing so, it is hoped that middle and minor powers are able to guarantee their survival by aligning themselves with powers larger than
themselves. Given the arrangement of the system, the number of alliances or blocs of power will differ, which also contributes to just how stable or violent the system will be. Conflict, or the
possibility of it, is a constant problem in international relations due to the anarchic structure of the
international system. Anarchy, by its definition, denotes a lack of overarching authority and thus states, especially the most powerful states, are able to behave as they would like, without any external
body capable of controlling their actions. Robert Art and Robert Jervis aptly define anarchy by arguing: States can make commitments and treaties, but no sovereign power ensures compliance and punished deviation. This the
absence of a supreme power is what is meant by the anarchic environment of international politics.8 In anarchy, just as in the state of nature or war prior to
the establishment of civilized human society, there is no harmony and actors are left to their own
inclinations to pursue their self-interest. The key elements of anarchy that precipitate conflict are the
constant distrust of others motives, the assumption that other actors may not be as rational as
oneself, and, as Waltz notes, a state will use force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects
for success, it values those goals more than it values the pleasures of peace.9 The constant tensions between states, and the ability of
great powers to more freely pursue their national interests, contributes to a system where security and survival are at a premium, and the polarity of the system matters to all states. By definition, bipolar systems are the most
stable. According to Mearsheimer, this assumption is made based on three criteria: First, the number of conflict dyads is fewer, leaving fewer possibilities for war. Second, deterrence is easier, because imbalances of power are
fewer and more easily averted. Third, the prospects for deterrence are greater because miscalculations of relative power and opponents resolve are fewer and less likely.10 By contrast, multipolar systems have a far greater
probability of conflict, tension and distrust among states. War is far more likely in multipolar systems because major power dyads are more numerous, each posing the potential for conflict. Conflict could also erupt across dyads
involving major and minor powers. Dyads between minor powers could also lead to war [...]. Wars in a multipolar world involving just minor powers or only one major power are not likely to be as devastating as a conflict between
two major powers. However, local wars tend to widen and escalate. Hence there is always a chance that a small war will trigger a general conflict.11 While bipolarity is considered to be the most stable arrangement, and
multipolarity the least stable, there is also the rare time when the system is unipolar in character. Put simply, unipolarity occurs when there is such a
preponderance of power by one state that others are incapable of balancing against it. According to
William Wohlforth, unipolarity is also a stable and peaceful arrangement: unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers
and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leadingstates power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of
balance-of-power politics among the major states.12 The status of the hegemonic power in a unipolar system allows for the expansion of its normative agenda, but also allows it to pacify international affairs because it lacks both a
hegemonic rival and the effects of balance of power politics.13 As such, unipolar systems can be stable, depending on whom the hegemon is and what its vision for dominance might be. Since the end of World War II, only two
types of polarity have been seen. Between 1945 and 1991, the system was bipolar, in that there were only two super- powers dominating the affairs of international politics. This bipolar arrangement was surprisingly stable and
though smaller proxy wars erupted throughout the years of the Cold War, the relations between the two dominant powers, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, never came to a head. There are various explanations for
why this was the case, but John Mearsheimer provides perhaps the most concise and accurate explanations as he contends that the absence of war in Europe and beyond throughout the Cold War can be attributed to three specific
factors: the bipolar distribution of military power on the [European] Continent; the rough military equality between the two states comprising the two poles in Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union; and the fact that each
superpower was armed with a large nuclear arsenal.14 At the conclusion of the Cold War, there was a clear and major shift in the distribution of power in the system, which translated into the unipolar moment. With the fall of the
Soviet Union, the United States retained its superpower status and held a preponderance of power in virtually all areas of capabilities measurement. Christopher Layne contends that American hegemony is contingent upon two
factors: First, the United States enjoys a commanding preeminence in both military and economic power. Second, since the Soviet Unions disappearance, no other great power has emerged to challenge US preponderance. In this
sense, US hegemony is the result of objective material conditions.15 Throughout the Clinton and early years of the Bush administrations, the role of the United States as systemic hegemon was virtually unquestioned, and it
seemed as if American hegemony could last for a very long time. It was not until the latter years of the Bush administration that the waning of American hegemony began to become apparent. One of the key reasons the system
remains unipolar is that there has yet to be a state that can balance against US power in either the hard or soft power senses. That said, the main reason for the decline in American hegemony has been a costly set of irrational and
ill-advised foreign policy decisions, combined with years of economic overvaluation that eroded the hegemonic position of the worlds lone superpower.16 Both the intervention into Iraq, starting in 2003, and the fallout of the
2008 recession have served to substantially weaken the United States in both the hard and soft power contexts, and thus it is clear that a multipolar system is on the horizon. As Layne notes, although a new geopolitical balance
has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states have been engaging in balancing against the United States including hard balancing.17 The emerging great powers, especially China and Russia, will have a
profound impact on the conduct of international relations in the years to come. Perhaps the most important area of security competition that has
gone under- scrutinized from a systemic standpoint is the increased level of interest in the Arctic.
Currently, the competing claims for the circumpolar region are mostly peaceful and focusing on
diplomatic and legal battles, but recent trends suggestthat non-violent strategy may not continue. As
the era of American hegemony comes to an end, and a multipolar system begins to emerge, the impact on the
Arctic region is likely to be profound due to the militaristic nature of state security strategies,
unpredictability and a potential retreat from cooperation normally seen in multipolar structures. The Arctic in
the unipolar moment One of the cornerstones of Americas unipolar moment has been the remarkable decline in
interstate conflict. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international system has not been on the verge of any major war, nor have great powers aggressively pursued policies that would balance
against American power in a way that would be taken seriously. According to many scholarly studies, the world since the end of the Cold War has become far more secure in the interstate sense, and security and defence policies of
states are now preoccupied more with human- centric and intrastate variables than anything else. Though it is difficult to deny that the world has become more stable at the systemic level, the role of hard power and military
capabilities did not disappear with the Soviet Union; instead, the use of militarism to achieve national goals in the unipolar moment greatly decreased as a direct result of the values and grand strategy of the United States. The
impact of a unipolar systemic arrangement on state behaviour is best explained by the hegemonic stability theory.18 According to this theory, a unipolar structure is able to pacify the relations of states because there is recognition
of the hegemons ability to control or intervene in conflicts that may threaten its power, or the order of the system. Wohlforth summarizes the basic precept of hegemonic stability theory by contending: The theory stipulates that
especially powerful states (hegemons) foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisfied state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and
larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be [...] If the system is unipolar, the great power hierarchy should be much more stable than any hierarchy
lodged within a system of more than one pole. Because unipolarity is based on a historically unprecedented concentration of power in the United States, a potentially important source of great power conflict hegemonic rivalry
will be missing.19 It is essential to note two things about the status of the United States as systemic hegemon throughout the immediate post-Cold War era first, that its preponderance of power in every area of capability
measurement created a stable and less tense system in which states were able to interact; and second, that the United States time as hegemon has fostered the growth of multilateral institutions and agreements rather than a
bullying type of unipolarity.20 From a systemic standpoint, it would seem that there is little reason to be concerned about military aggression, arms racing and distrustful competition in the modern system, but one vital concern to
note is that much of the unipolar and hegeomic stability literature completely ignores the role of the Arctic in state security calculations. Throughout an era of institutional binding, regional integration, humanitarianism and soft
power growth, the competition for the Arctic was following much of the same pattern, with states preferring to make their claims in institutional or legal settings. Yet, as the unipolar moment has started to decline, and
multipolarity is on the horizon, the competition in the circumpolar region has taken on a very different tone. Competing claims over Arctic territories, such as the Northwest Passage, Beaufort Sea and other maritime boundaries,
and the use of the region as a space for military exercises are by no means new and they have not come to the forefront of the strategic security agendas of states since the post-9/11 era. Rather, throughout the Cold War, the
Arctic was a realm of constant supervision, not because either superpower wanted to develop the region, but more because of the mutual fear each side had of offensive attacks being launched over the pole. Even throughout the
unipolar moment, the Arctic has been a space for sovereignty competition, but the nature of the competition had been mostly legal, institutional or soft power
focused.21 Worth noting as well is the very complex nature of reasons for state interests in the Arctic. Mark Nuttall effectively summarizes the complexities of the high north as he claims: In the post-Cold War world [the Arctic] is
seen as a natural scientific laboratory, under- stood as a homeland for indigenous peoples, a place of sovereignty conflicts, an emerging hydrocarbon province with which the world is coming to think of as one of the last major
frontiers for oil and gas, and a region of dramatic environmental change.22 Though the intricacies of Arctic competition are intriguing to note, it is how states are strategically asserting their claims that is of particular
importance. The start of Americas hegemonic decline has allowed states to revisit their approaches to the Arctic as nations jockey for position by balancing or rivalling American preferences.As a result, the nature of Arctic
competition has incorporated both soft power and hard power elements. Further, the nature of militarism and hard power tension has increased due to the recent spending and strategic shifts by many Arctic states in recent years,
including Canada, Norway, Sweden and Russia.23 The reasons for Americas decline are relatively unsurprising military overextension in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of international support for American foreign policy
objectives throughout the Bush era; the 2008 economic recession; and the utter dis- trust by most states, incl uding close American allies, of the United States political obj ectives.24 The systemremai ns unipolar, of course, but as stated a bove, the pr eponderance of power ca pabilities has substa ntially diminished, openi ng the door for others to balance and ri val America n power in the comi ng years. Coi ncidentally, it has also been the revelations of science in recent years that have also promoted a faster pa ce for those states making Arctic claims. The role of climat e change a nd its impact over the Arcti c has allowed for states to more freely move into the regi on and pursue strategies previously unavailable. 25 Accordi ng to Lotta Numminen, cli mate cha nge has recently affected states per ceptions of the possi ble
economi c opportunities in the Arcti c in four ways: first, that the subsurfa ce of the Arctic Ocea n fl oor is assumed to contain substa ntial oil and gas reserves, t o which there will be increased a ccess; second, that melting waters will provide new waters for international fisheries; thir d, the increase in res earch strategies; and fourth, is the greater access to sea pa ssages.26 One of the main rea sons states see the Ar ctic region as such a lucrative area is the potential for increasi ng their respective economic a nd natural resour ce ca pabilities. Previously, the nort hern ice caps prevented states fromentering most of the Arctic Ocea n and surrounding area s, but as these environmental situations cha nge, states have readily identified the high north as a priority in bot h their security and economi c strategies. Amo ng the main reasons the Arcti c has not been more rea dily seen as a potential area for security competi tion and conflict is the inter pretation that the United States has little or no interest in the cir cumpolar region at all. Accor ding to Stephen Br ooks and William Wohl forth, America n hegemony thr oughout the post-Cold War era was seen a s passive,
stable and enduring beca use of the lack of counter power being demonstrated in the system: Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly power s to the north and south, the United States is both less vul nerable tha n previous aspiring hegemons a nd also less threateni ng to others. The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, meanwhile China, Russia, Japan, and Germa ny are in the opposite position. They can- not aug ment their military capabilities so as t o balance the United States without si multaneously becoming an i mmediate t hreat to their neig hbors. Politics, even internat ional politics, is local. Although America n power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually more concerned with their own neighborhoods tha n with the global equilibrium. Were any of the potential challenger s to make a serious run at the United States, regional balancing efforts would al most certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power ca pabilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary to hea d off an emerging threat.27 Al most completely omitted fromsuch i nterpretations, however, are
Americas north- ern borders over Alaska and into the Arctic. Latitudinal thi nking woul d seemto indi cate that Brooks and Wohl forth are correct in terms of Americas interests in ma ny areas of the globe, but this ignores what has been happening at the top of the world in the high north. It is not as if the United States has been ignorant of its own decline in power, especially regarding the Arctic. In 2009, the United Stat es issued Nati onal Security Presidential Directive 66 a nd Homela nd Security Presidential Directive 25 that deal exclusively with Ameri can Arctic policy. Accor ding to these directives, the alterations to national policies of other states regarding the Arcti c compelled the United States to clearly outline the security and development strategies they would use to protect its Arctic interests. Among the first, and most clear, element s of the directives is the clear intention of the United States to defend their national security interests. According to Article III , subsection B 1 of the directives: The United States has broa d and funda mental national security interests in the Arctic region and is prepared to operate either independently or in
conj unction with other states to safeg uard these interests. These interests incl ude such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic seali ft, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; a nd ensuring freedom of navigation and overflig ht.28 The contemporary cha nges to the inter national systemas the era of Ameri can heg emony has begun to wa ne, the effects of cli mat e cha nge and greater access, and the increa singly militaristic strategies of most every Arctic state have led to a situation where tensions are at an all time high, and that legal or institutional processes are unlikely to resolve anything ami cably. As the systemcontinues its transition away fr om unipolarity, observers are left to ponder what mi g ht come next after an era of relative interstate stability. Multipolarity and the circumpolar In their 2002 article on t he nature of United States prima cy and the enduri ng aspects of America n hegemony, Brooks and Wohl forth argue that the United Stat es would have to a ct as a benev olent hegemon in order to prevent counterbalancing and to be able to build
effective regimes worldwide. They argue: Magna nimity and restraint in the fa ce of temptation are tenets of successful statecra ft that have proved their worth from classical Greece onward. Standing taller than leading states of the past, the United States has unprecedented fr eedom to do as it pleases. It can play the game for itsel f alone or for the systemas a whole; it can focus on small returns today or larger ones tomorrow. If the administration truly wants to be loved as well as feared, the policy answers are not hard to fi nd.29 The pr oblemwith such analyses of America n hegemony is that the Bush admi nistration chose to ignore utterly such warni ngs and, rather than acting magnani mously, post-9/11 American foreign policy di d preci sely what it shoul d not have. Pre-emption, coerci on and irrational interventions, combined with a major economi c recession, all serve to explain why Ameri can heg emony began to decline by 2005 in ter ms of both actual power levels and perceptions of legiti mate hegemoni c status. 30 The clearest sign that Ameri can exceptionalismha s been decr easing is the aggressive and regional balancing dyna mics taking
place between states in the Arcti c region. Security strategy in the circumpolar region ha s altered dra matically since 2005, with more states showi ng interest, hard power spending increa sing, and legal processes being coupled by at times overtly offensive strategy.31 Russia, Canada a nd a number of Eur opean states, especially Norway and Sweden, exemplify this line of argument about how sovereig nty claims have become focused on traditional inter- state arms raci ng and militarismwhile soft power components, like governance structures a nd legal processes, continually evolve.32 As mentioned previously, even the United States has woken up to see that, as their hegemony decli nes, ot her states have beg un to bala nce against themin the Arctic, thus prov oking the 2009 Presidential Directives. Even so, Arctic interested nations have not yielded to American claims, nor ha s there been any evidence of Ameri cas closest allies backing down in the face of its Arcti c assertions, most clearly evidenced by Cana das continued claims over the Northwest Passage. 33 In the i nternational relations canon, most observers point to either I ndia or China as
emerging great power s that are the most likely to counter balance America n power. The 2004 Ameri can National Intelligence Coun cil report hig hlights this theory by stating: The likely emergence of China and India as new maj or global players si milar to the rise of Ger many in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century will transformthe geopolitical landscape, with i mpa cts potentially as dramatic as those of the pr evious two centuries. In the sa me way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the America n Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the ti me when some in the developi ng world led by China a nd India ca me into their own.34 Both Chi na a nd India have recently expressed their interest in Arctic a ffairs, but no power is as close to rivalling or challenging America n power in hard power terms tha n Russia. This i s especially true in the Arctic, as Russias Arctic policies have made its intentions towards asserting its control over territory it deems to be sovereign very clear. The role of the Arctic i n Russian foreign policy cannot be understated. According to Russia s 2008 Ar ctic poli cy document, the regi on is
seen as the epicentre of Russias military and soci o-economic devel opment. The top two pri orities for Russian Arctic interests are defined a s foll ows: (a ) In the sphere of soci o-economic development the expansion of the resource base of the Arctic Z one of the Russia n Federation, in order to substantially satisfy Russia s needs in hydr ocarbon resour ces, hy dro-biologi cal resources, and ot her types of strategic raw materials; (b) In the sphere of military security, defense, a nd sa fekeepi ng of the state borders of the Russian Federation located in the Ar ctic Zone of the Russian Federation the upkeep of a favorable operational regime in the Arctic Zone of the Russia n Federation, i ncluding the maintena nce of the required combat potential of military grouping s under the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, ot her troops, military for mations and agencies in t his region [... ]35 In order to achieve these goals, the Russians have created a unique military brigade to be per manently posted in the Arctic, have pla ced a Russian Federation flag o n the Arctic Ocea n seabed, have conducted various missile tests, have sailed their nuclear submarines
through contested waters and have openly challenged the abilities of ot her states to enfor ce their own claims. In response to Russian offensive posturi ng and the i nability of the United States to dissuade security competition in the area, middle and minor power s have begun to use hard power as a mea ns of trying to enfor ce their sovereignty. Perhaps the best exa mple her e is Cana da, whose military capa bilities are extremely weak, but strong rhetoric and a drastically incr eased level of high-north military spending si nce 2006 seems to i ndicate that the Cana dian government cannot rely on its America n alliances to pr otect its interest s, and that posturing by states like Russia or even Denmark clearly threaten Ca nada s national interests. As Norway, Sweden and Denmark have begun to put an emp hasis on hard power ca pabilities to extend or defend norther n clai ms, Ca nada has done the sa me. Worth noting as well in the Ca nadian context is that, while great power s like Russia and the United States ca n easily defeat any middle or mi nor power, Cana das capabilities are bei ng either rivalled or sur passed by European states like Norway.36
Canada s realization of the evolving security and environmental cli mate in the Arcti c has compelled cha nges to its domestic and foreign security policies, ea ch seeking t o assert Ca nadian sovereignty over areas of the Arctic, especially the Northwest Passage. One of the main components of now Prime Minister Harpers 200506 ca mpaign was to bolster Arctic security resources, as many Cana dians have identified the region as an essential part of Cana das national security and identity.37 Rob Huebert argues: The Har per government ha s increa singly recog nized t he signifi cance of mai ntaining a strong presence in the Arcti c and has vigorously begun to i mpr ove Cana das northern abili ties [...] The Harper g overnment has also ma de a series of promises to consi der- ably expand Ca nadas northern capa bility [...] I f these promises are implemented, Cana da will have signifi cantly impr oved its ability to cont rol activity in its Arctic.38 In v irtually any other area of the world, Ca nadian national security cannot be divorced fromthe United States, whi ch is a partial explanation for why Ca nada ha s traditionally been considered a mi ddle power since the end
of World War II.39 Yet, since the start of America n decline, the Ca nadia n government has recog nized that its fate i n the Arct ic will be its own, and not intrinsi cally tied to the protection of the United States, as the Americans have their own interests in the region and have shown a complete disregard for Canadian claims over the Northwest Passage a nd the Beaufort Sea. As the world moves towar ds multipolarity, it has become increasingly obvi ous that the Arcti c region represents a n area of increased security competition and a potentially conflict ual region in the future. Multipolar systems are the most unstable, a nd hist ory has shown these to produce military conflict due to the natural effects broug ht by a larger number of self -interested power s vying for power and security. Further, as new great powers begin to emerge,
American strategic considerations will be spread so thin that they will be unable to prevent against their eventual loss of hegemony. The largest mistake being made at this time by international security scholars and policymakers is
their normal obsession with China, India and latitudinal thinking. The next area of major war is not likely to be the Middle East, the Indian Ocean or the South China Sea, due to traditional security balancing, deterrence and
economic interests in each of these areas. Multipolarity naturally brings the possibility of war. Mearsheimer contends that
war is far more likely in multipolar systems for three reasons: First, there are more opportunities for
war, because there are more potential conflict dyads in a multipolar system. Second, imbalances of
power are more commonplace in a multipolar world, and thus great powers are more likely to have
the capability to win a war, making deterrence more difficult and war more likely. Third, the potential
for miscalculation is greater in multipolarity: states might think they have the capability to coerce or
conquer another state when, in fact, they do not.40 Presently, there is little reason to believe that tension and strategic posturing will lead to the outbreak of war in the
near future. That said, as Americas influence continues to wane, other states have shown their desire to
take full advantage of the United States inability to control northern affairs. If the United States does
lose its hegemony, which many commentators believe is inevitable, there will be at least four dyads in
security calculations, with Russia, China and India entering the fray, and two of those states have
Arctic borders and a historical legacy of conflict. Power imbalance in the Arctic is already apparent, with only Russia and the United States as great powers, while the other
Arctic states are middle or minor powers with no hope of preventing a great power from doing as it pleases. Lastly, miscalculation is evident in the present context, as Sweden and Norway are both arming for possible Russian
aggression, though Russia has shown little or no overtly aggressive tendencies towards Nordic nations. Unipolarity was not going to last forever, but as it fades the probability of northern conflict is ever increasing. The shift to hard
power strategies, the effects of cli- mate change, and the decline of the United States all speak to the fact that multipolarity can increase levels of tension and mistrust, thus altering the currently stable nature of Arctic affairs.
Efforts at Arctic governance through institutional binding or legal claims, as seen in the Arctic Council and UNCLOS, are able at present to mitigate the ongoing and ever increasing security competition in the high north, but as the
system changes from unipolarity to multipolarity, constraining state behaviour becomes increasingly difficult. As such, observers must be mindful of the systemic variables at play when explaining and forecasting Arctic politics, as
changes to the structure are very likely to translate into changes to state security strategies.

2NC Spillover
Loss of a single key naval base requires us to reconfigure our entire defense strategy
Holmes, Professor Strategy at Naval War College, 1-11-2012 (James, Can US Navy Shift to the
Pacific? The Diplomat, http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/01/11/can-u-s-navy-shift-to-
pacific/)
And third, some of the critics intimated that I disregard intervening factors working against a wholesale
shift of forces from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Not so. Politics is a messy business. I harbor no
illusions that this process will unfold strictly according to strategic logic. Myriad factors shapeand
misshapebig, complex decisions like realigning the U.S. sea services. For one thing, it's excruciatingly
hard for large institutions to relinquish longstanding commitments. In a way, naval proponents had it
easy a century ago: the navy was building up to a one-power standard rather than shedding loads.
Today, by contrast, scaling back commitments engages strong passions like fear and honor. Wouldnt
withdrawing from the Atlantic signal a return to isolationism, collapsing the edifice of U.S. leadership?
And then theres domestic politics. If the Base Realignment and Closure, or BRAC, process showed
nothing else, it's that closing military bases or shifting major assets around represents an uphill struggle.
The thought of losing defense-related revenues renders lawmakers apoplectic. Legal challenges are
commonplace. The Virginia congressional delegation, for instance, pitched a fit last year over proposed
plans to transfer one carrier strike groupa nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and its entourage of
escorts and support vesselsfrom Hampton Roads to Mayport, Florida. Imagine the uproar that would
greet plans to move all such groups to Pacific or Indian Ocean seaports! A decision of such moment will
be neither swift nor easy nor politically painless.


Shipping Module
1NC Shell
<INSERT LINK>
Shipping is key to power projection
Kiefer et al 2k (Jack, principle investigator for the Planning and Management Consultants, LTD
(PMCL), Stuart Norvell, economist, Edward Cohn, independent subcontractor, Robert A. Pietrowsky,
Chief of the IWR Navigation Analysis Division, Phillip J. Thorpe, Institute for Water Resources, Navigation
Analysis Division for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers manager, "The National Dredging Needs Study of
Ports and Harbors Implications to Cost-Sharing of Federal Deep Draft Navigation Projects Due to
Changes in the Maritime Industry," http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/docs/iwrreports/00-R-8.pdf) CS
2.2.2 Other Tangible Benefits' Indirect benefits of Corps projects include gains associated with international trade. Historical expenditures for harbor improvements facilitate international trade by providing ships more efficient access to the Nation's ports. International trade in turn
creates and sustains jobs and generates Federal tax revenues. The exact method of computing income and employment associated wi th international trade is debatable. but one of the best techniques is to calculate the value added by U.S. businesses and households to imports and
exports. Computations reveal that nearly 20 percent of all U.S. jobs are directly associated with international trade. A slightly higher percentage of personal income would be associated with international trade because such jobs pay somewhat more than the U.S. average. In addition.
about $553 million were collected for the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund in 1999. 2.2.3 Intangible Benefits Some benefits of harbor improvements are difficult or impossible to quantify. For individual projects these are given little attention. Policy decisions concerning project
authorizations and appropriations should consider intangible benefits as well as tangible direct and secondary benefits. This idea is particularly applicable to international trade and specifically container trade. For example, America is such a big
market, international trade gives the U.S. considerable leverage when dealing with foreign
governments. Thus. international trade can enhance the United States' role as a world leader. National
harbors are also a vital part of our military`s power projection platform. Economists believe in the law of comparative advantage. which states that nations
benefit when they specialize in producing certain goods and services and then trade with each other rather than producing everything themselves. For example. most people perceive that the majority of foreign trade consists of consumer goods such as clothing and televisions. However.
as shown in Table 2-2. a significant portion of U.S. foreign trade consists of semi-manufactured commodities and raw materials such as iron and steel or crude petroleum. These products are used to produce other goods. or are further processed in the importing country. For example. in
the United States imported car parts are often used to produce exports of finished automobiles. Machinery and electrical equipment are often used the same way. Thus, efficient flow of international
commodities is important for all nations including the United States. Global trade is very competitive
and profit margins are thin. This is particularly true for maritime transportation including the container
shipping industry. Growth in U.S. foreign trade, even though it is substantial, is not as high as growth in total international trade. particularly with respect to containership. It is quite possible for some
U.S. trade to be diverted or to be serviced by less efficient ships. This may occur if American ports and
the Federal government are not able to meet current challenges posed by developments in international trade. 2.2.4 Lost Benefits There are lost benefits associated with
delays in the construction of harbor improvement projects. Costs increase with delays, not only because of inflation but because the construction process becomes distorted by available funds. Costs associated with delays can and have been estimated. Typically, a years delay in schedule
leads to a penalty of more than 10 percent of project cost. This is sizable and should be considered when making cost-sharing policies. Cost-sharing policies should seek to insure that both public ports and the Federal government fund projects in a timely manner. There are also benefits
foregone due to lost transportation cost savings with project delays. Project delays affect the Nation in another way. Although these benefits are difficult to quantify, such effects are perhaps more important than those that can be measured. Delays create an uncertain atmosphere that
can impact decisions to develop infrastructure elsewhere. Container ports are very capital intensive and require long termplanning. Massive containerships are rapidly being put into service at ports throughout the world. Without a clear signal of intent to accommodate these vessels in
the United States, necessary ports and facilities may be built elsewhere. Once major investments are made elsewhere, the full efficiencies of large containerships in the form of lower transportation costs for general cargo may be lost to the Nation for a long time to come. 2.3
Geographical Incidence of International Trade Public ports generally have a regional or local economic development mandate along with authorizations to improve harbor facilities. This does not mean, however, that local economies near ports capture all or most of the benefits
associated with international trade. For example, when a port unloads crude petroleum froma ship, it charges a fee that generates revenues for the port and the local community. But imported oil also fuels cars and homes throughout the Nation. Likewise, when a port loads grain or coal
onto a ship for export, farmers in the U.S. heartland benefit as do coal miners in the hills of West Virginia, Pennsylvania and Kentucky. Container trade benefits all regions of the country as well. As shown in Table 2-3, fifteen U.S. ports account for about 80 percent of international
maritime trade in terms of value. These ports represent only ten states, however much of the cargo they handle flows to other regions. Table 2-4 shows the origin and destination of international cargo for each U.S. state measured in terms of value. On average, any given state uses the
services of 15 different ports around the country. For example, the California ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach and Oakland collectively handle about $187 billion worth of cargo, but the state of California is the origin or destination of only $106 billion. While most container trade flows in
and out of ports on the East and West Coasts, it is distributed throughout the Nation as shown in Tables 2-5 and 2-6. For instance, the Port of Charleston, S.C. handled about 800 thousand TEUs in 1996, but the state of South Carolina was the origin or destination of only 160 thousand of
these TEUs. Similarly, the ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach and Oakland handled five million TEUs but only 2.5 million originated or were destined to sites within California. [table omitted] 2.4 Conclusion The benefits of harbor improvements are numerous. Expenditures for harbor
improvements have facilitated international trade by providing ships more efficient access to the Nation's ports. International trade in turn creates and sustains jobs and generates Federal tax revenues. Foreign commerce has become crucial to the economic well-being of the United
States. In 1946, U.S. international trade represented a relatively small portion of the U.S. economy, but today foreign trade accounts for 27 percent of U.S. gross domestic product. Harbor improvements also affect prices of U.S. imports and exports. With deeper channels vessel operators
can load more cargo onto a ship and sail deeper, or they can use larger more efficient vessels. Unit transportation costs decline and lower transportation costs are reflected in commodity prices. Intangible benefits are also important. Free trade
promotes international relations and stability and bolsters the United States position as a world leader.
Lastly, it is important to stress that the economic benefits of international trade are widespread and are not limited to a handful
of coastal states.
Hegemony solves nuclear war
Kagan 11, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, 2011
(Robert, The Price of Power The benefits of U.S. defense spending far outweigh the costs, 1-24,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html)

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. The terrorists who would like to kill
Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks.
American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them
to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of
September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances
they will succeed. American forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades
prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes,
making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alike. Now
the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually
to push the U.S. militarys area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the worlds
most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South
Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of
the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing
influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the
United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will
have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by
building nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports
armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American
dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day
as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim
Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into
anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist
course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war
between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to
Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have
to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it. In the 1990s,
after the Soviet Union had collapsed and the biggest problem in the world seemed to be ethnic conflict in the Balkans, it was at least plausible to talk about cutting back on American military
capabilities. In the present, increasingly dangerous international environment, in which terrorism and great power rivalry vie as the greatest threat to American security and interests, cutting
military capacities is simply reckless. Would we increase the risk of strategic failure in an already risky world, despite the near irrelevance of the defense budget to American fiscal health, just
so we could tell American voters that their military had suffered its fair share of the pain? The nature of the risk becomes plain when one considers the nature of the cuts that would have
to be made to have even a marginal effect on the U.S. fiscal crisis. Many are under the illusion, for instance, that if the United States simply withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan and didnt
intervene anywhere else for a while, this would have a significant impact on future deficits. But, in fact, projections of future massive deficits already assume the winding down of these
interventions.Withdrawal from the two wars would scarcely make a dent in the fiscal crisis. Nor can meaningful reductions be achieved by cutting back on waste at the Pentagonwhich
Secretary of Defense Gates has already begun to do and which has also been factored into deficit projections. If the United States withdrew from Iran and Afghanistan tomorrow, cut all the
waste Gates can find, and even eliminated a few weapons programsall this together would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending. In fact, the only way to get
significant savings from the defense budgetand by significant, we are still talking about a tiny fraction of the cuts needed to bring down future deficitsis to cut force structure: fewer
troops on the ground; fewer airplanes in the skies; fewer ships in the water; fewer soldiers, pilots, and sailors to feed and clothe and provide benefits for. To cut the size of the force, however,
requires reducing or eliminating the missions those forces have been performing. Of course, there are any number of think tank experts who insist U.S. forces can be cut by a quarter or third
or even by half and still perform those missions. But this is snake oil. Over the past two decades, the force has already been cut by a third. Yet no administration has reduced the missions that
the larger force structures of the past were designed to meet. To fulfill existing security commitments, to remain the worlds power balancer of choice, as Leslie Gelb puts it, to act as the
only regional balancer against China in Asia, Russia in eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East requires at least the current force structure, and almost certainly more than current force
levels. Those who recommend doing the same with less are only proposing a policy of insufficiency, where the United States makes commitments it cannot meet except at high risk of failure.
The only way to find substantial savings in the defense budget, therefore, is to change American strategy fundamentally. The Simpson-Bowles commission suggests as much, by calling for a
reexamination of Americas 21st century role, although it doesnt begin to define what that new role might be. Others have. For decades realist analysts have called for a strategy of
offshore balancing. Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the
nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and
Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed passing the mantle of regional stabilizer to a consortium of Russia, China, Iran, and India. In East Asia offshore balancing
would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvementagain, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which
point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this
would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and
others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize
that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or
it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four
successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia,
China, and Iran to jointly stabilize the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia
and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean
Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to
Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japans case would mean the
rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable
occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would
balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally
providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for
debatemost would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been
pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first
in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American
strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever
since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build situations of strength
(Achesons phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a preponderance of power, and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial
numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They
did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because
they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They
believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive
and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of
foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter
Lippmann railed against Trumans containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power.
Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of imperial overstretch, arguing that American decline was inevitable if the trends in national indebtedness, low
productivity increases, [etc.] were allowed to continue at the same time as massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe. Today,
we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not
caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided,
including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order
that the United States has sustained since Word War IIthe prevention of major war, the support of
an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government.
How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another
type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen
a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have
been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American
economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited
immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient
military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been
worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars.
In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power
struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in
terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always,
is that we dont even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the
world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations
have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in
progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring
to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the
decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold
War when people spoke of the end of history. It is always tempting to believe that the international
order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at
least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American
strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role
will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under
a table and the table will not fall over.


Link - Generic

Additional coastal activity would compete with shipping
Region 83
(Proposed 1983 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease Sale Offshore Central California: OCS Sale No.
73 : Draft Environmental Impact Statement pg online at
http://books.google.com/books?id=XisRAAAAYAAJ&dq=port+harbor+space+competition&source=gbs_n
avlinks_s//sd)
Vessel Traffic. Additional tankering and support vessel activity is expected to result from the proposed lease sale. The Increased use
of tankers to transport OCS crude oil Into and out of ports (I.e., San Francisco Bay Area, and/or Culf of Mexico Galveston), and the increased use of crew and supply boats
would have an associated number of space-use conflicts within the ports and harbors- Vessels require a number of support facilities and berthing
space. Displacement of some commercial fishing or industrial vessel berth space and support facilities is
expected to occur, as competition for this space is already seen in some Central California ports and harbors. Alternative locations are not readily
available and opportunities for expansion are limited. Expansion of existing ports and harbors is dependent upon consistency with Local Coastal Plans, Port/Harbor Plans, etc Also refer
to Sections IV.E.3.d (Coastal Land use) and IV.E.3.e (Commercial Fisheries). These impacting agents could result in high impacts to ports
and harbors (l.e Port San Luis) in Central California. These impacts are expected primarily due to competition for vessel berth space and support facilities and the need for additional
docks, berths, and facilities. See Appendix A for definitions of all Impact levels.
Link - Aquaculture
Large scale coastal projects crowd out existing users like trade ships
Jerez 8
Pablo, Department of Marine Sciences and Applied Biology, University of Alicante, Spain, Aquaculture
and Coastal Space Management in Europe: An Ecological Perspective pg online at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/226596819_Aquaculture_and_Coastal_Space_Management_i
n_Europe_An_Ecological_Perspective//sd)
Ecological requirements should dictate first and foremost the position and extent of aquaculture in the coastal zone (Costa Pierce 2002; Guneroglu et al. 2005). Siting criteria should be based
on "ecological carrying capacities" or the ability of the ecosystem to absorb anthropogenic pressures with no major changes to ecosystem functions and processes. A suite of environmental
impacts caused by coastal aquaculture must be incorporated into this process to determine how habitat and biodiversity modification caused by aquaculture can best be managed and
mitigated. A substantial body of knowledge exists on the environmental impacts of aquaculture and this gives excellent insight for allocating aquaculture, while ensuring least adverse impact.
Information on the genetic effects of sea-based aquaculture on wild populations through escapees (Naylor et al. 2005) and cross breeding of wild and cultured organisms (Wier and Grant
2005), nutrient loading (Karakassis et al. 2005), modification of benthic communities (Karakassis et al. 2000), heavy metal and persistent organic pollutant contamination (deBruyn et al. 2006;
Mendiguchia et al. 2006; Sather et al. 2006), spreading of disease and parasites (Bj0rn et al. 2001), impacts on seagrasses (Delgado et al. 1999; Ruiz el al. 2001; Marba et al. 2006), impacts on
farm-associated wild fish (Dempster et al. 2002, 2006) and mcgafauna (Nash et al. 2000) and a range of other environmental impacts must be considered to assess the suitability of new sites.
Capture of millions of tons of small pelagic fishes to make fish meal and fish oil for aquaculture feeds (Tacon and Forster 2003) can be considered an "oceanic" impact which requires fisheries
management measures in addition to coastal zone management. Setting "carrying capacities" to determine the overall extent of
aquaculture in particular coastal regions is a challenging task, as for many of these ecological effects, the level of information currently
available is insufficient to determine the extent of the effect. Once ecological criteria are established, aquaculture can then search
for suitable space that minimizes conflict with the myriad of other users of coastal waters, such as
shipping, fishing, recreational activities and industry (Fig. 3.1). As aquaculture is the "new kid on the block" in terms of its use of
space, in many coastal areas it will struggle to obtain suitable sites that do not conflict with pre-existing
users that may be more important to the economics of the region (Staresinic and Popovic 2004). In such instances, political decisions on the use of
coastal space may be the only way that aquaculture may gain access to coastal waters.
Coastal projects inhibit military and commercial shipping because of mitigated port
access and accident risks
Jerez 8
Pablo, Department of Marine Sciences and Applied Biology, University of Alicante, Spain, Aquaculture
and Coastal Space Management in Europe: An Ecological Perspective pg online at
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/226596819_Aquaculture_and_Coastal_Space_Management_i
n_Europe_An_Ecological_Perspective//sd)
Among the chief users of coastal waters is shipping, whether it is for commercial, recreational or defence related
purposes. While the use of coastal space by ships in any particular area is relatively temporary, it nevertheless places considerable
restrictions on the placement of aquaculture installations. Commercial shipping lanes and their immediate
vicinity, together with military shipping areas, almost completely exclude aquaculture due to the risks posed
by surface-based structures as navigational hazards. Numerous ships transport hazardous products, such as
chemical and petrol-derived products, which affect the coastal environment adversely when accidental spillage occurs
(Davis 1993) and pose environmental and health risks to coastal aquaculture. For example, the break-up of the oil tanker Prestige off the Galician
coast of Spain in 2002 caused 9 million Euros of lost mussel production in the year following the accident (Garza-Gil et al. 2005). Recreational sailing and boating
activities also challenge aquaculture for coastal space, particularly in areas where both operate from local ports. Space in the immediate sea
areas surrounding ports is sought after by both aquaculture and recreational boating activities due to ease of access. Most sea-cage fish
farms along the relatively featureless coastline of south-eastern Spain are sited less than 5 km from the coast and operate out of ports that are popular for
recreational boating.
AT: Alt Cause
Shipping is floating over alt causes though 3 distinct methods:
-Mergers
-Slow Streaming
-Pulling out of non-profitable trade routes
Augustine 12 (Jaison Augustine - Augustine 12 Jaison Augustine Senior Vice President & Segment
Head - Shipping & Logistics at WNS Global Services, Vice President - Business Development at WNS
Global Services, Director - Business Process & Business, Development at CP Ships, Cochin University of
Science and Technology, Bluebells International, The Shipping Industry Finds an Unusual Survival Tactic
in Outsourcing (no other info on date) 2012, http://www.wns.com/Resources/Articles/Article-
Details/88/The-Shipping-Industry-Finds-an-Unusual-Survival-Tactic-in-Outsourcing.aspx
Unusual Strategies for Unusual Times Economic uncertainty, over-supply, a slump in demand and drying
up of funding from financial institutions are clearly pushing shipping companies to the corner. To tide
over the existing crisis, shipping majors are looking at ways and means to survive the storm even if it
means adopting strategies, which are unconventional and were unheard of, until recently. As immediate
measures to survive, the industry is forging non-traditional alliances, resorting to 'slow steaming'
strategies, re-aligning services, pulling out from unprofitable routes. Some of these measures may seem
untenable and are bound to send customer sentiments on a downward spiral. Rivals Forging Alliances to
Stay Afloat: In 2011, the world's second- and third-biggest carriers, MSC and CMA CGM, forged a
strategic alliance to overcome the crisis with a joint strategy and plan. A recent Financial Times report
pointed out that CMA CGM exemplified the depth of the shipping industry's crisis by admitting during
the announcement of the alliance, that it had made a $223 Million net loss on $3.86 Billion revenue for
the third quarter of 2011. To tide over the crisis created by a glut of container ship capacity, both the
carriers abandoned traditional rivalries to join hands and formed a partnership spanning several key
markets, including Asia-Europe, Asia-Southern Africa and the South American trades. Some industry
analysts believe the alliance could re-write the liner industry and may work towards deepening the line
between the top three liners and the rest of the competition. The new partnership, with a combined
capacity share of 22 percent, is poised to become the leader in the Asia-North Europe trade. The top
three Japanese shipping lines Mitsui O S K Lines (MOL), Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK Line) and K'' Line
as well as other smaller lines, including Israeli company ZIM, are also considering alliances to consolidate
their position in the market. Slow Steaming' to Cut Costs: Desperate times indeed call for desperate
measures. Driven by losses to the point of near-extinction, global container fleets have started cruising
at record-low speeds. Global liners have resorted to this 'slow steaming' approach to cut down on fuel
consumption. The New York Times recently reported that Maersk cut fuel consumption on major routes
by as much as 30 percent, by halving its top cruising speed over the last two years. Carriers across the
globe - from Germany to Israel to China are beginning to embrace the 'slow steaming' strategy.
According to estimates, today more than 220 vessels are practicing slow steaming cruising at 20
knots on open water instead of the standard 24 or 25 or, like Maersk's vessels, super slow steaming
(12 knots). Pulling Out of Non-profitable Trade Routes: Many established carriers are pulling out of their
non-profitable routes in a bid to prevent losses. According to the second Global Shipping Benchmarking
Survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2010, of around 110 global shipping companies
covered in the study, 23 percent looked at optimization of network and capacity by adopting measures
like re-organizing their fleets and reducing services by pulling out ships. Maersk Shipping Line, the
world's largest container shipping line, has cut its capacity on the Asia-Europe route as a profitability
measure to counter the Euro zone debt crisis. Rival shipping company, Orient Overseas (International)
Ltd., also announced measures to pull down shipping capacity on this route by 20 percent to maintain
profitability amid the market slowdown, as reported in a recent issue of the Wall Street Journal.
AT: Alt Cause - Water Levels
Their card is in the context of the Great Lakes, our impact is based on shipping in the
ocean, they read no ev in the context of ocean water levels.


(all lit on this topic is about Lakes and rivers)
https://www.google.com/#q=water+levels+and+Shipping+industry+-lakes+-river
Impact - Heg
Robust maritime industry key to military readiness
AMP 2012
(American Maritime Partnership, U.S. TRANSCOM General Says Domestic Maritime Industry is "Fourth
Arm of Defense, 5-22,
http://www.americanmaritimepartnership.com/news/2012/052212%20NMD.html, DOA: 7-13-13)

U.S. TRANSCOM Commanding General William Fraser III today said maintaining a strong domestic
maritime industry is critical to the defending the homeland, describing the sector as the "fourth arm of
defense." The Air Force General's remarks came at a National Maritime Day celebration at the
Washington Navy Yard. "Maintaining a national maritime industrial base and strong partnerships with
the commercial maritime industry is critically important to the Department of Defense," Gen. Fraser
said. "A strong commercial American industry is particularly important during times of budget cuts."
General Fraser's remarks came on the 79th anniversary of National Maritime Day, which annually
recognizes the men and women of the U.S. merchant marine for their contributions to American
commerce and the U.S. military. In 1933, Congress designated May 22nd as American Maritime Day to
commemorate the U.S.-flag steamship SAVANNAH embarking on what was the first-ever transoceanic
voyage under steam power in 1819. This historic voyage was the first of many maritime milestones
attributed to the U.S. merchant marine. In the decades that have followed, American companies and
mariners have pioneered innovations such as the containership, self-unloading vessel, articulated tug-
barge units, railroad-on-barge carfloats and many other breakthroughs. The Jones Act, the federal law
that promotes the U.S. merchant marine of skilled seafarers and U.S.-flagged vessels, has made these
innovations possible. By maintaining a viable domestic maritime industry, this law enables the flow of
domestic waterborne commerce and supports a naval and military auxiliary in times of war or national
emergency. Today, the maritime industry is the most economical form of domestic transportation,
moving more than 1 billion tons of cargo annually at a fraction of the cost of other modes. This efficient
transportation mode helps the economy run smoothly and sustains nearly 500,000 jobs. It is also good
for the environment as ships and tug/barge units use less fuel and produce fewer emissions than land-
based modes of transportation. The maritime sector plays an indispensible national defense role,
fulfilling key support functions for the U.S. military. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
Freedom (2002-2010), U.S.-flag commercial vessels, including ships and seafarers drawn from the
domestic trades, transported 90 percent of all military cargoes moved to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Impact - Econ
1NC Link says increased activity makes ports uncompetitive

Reliable ports key to sustainable exports- solves economic recovery
Calhoun 11, Waterways Council Inc. chairman, 2011
(Rick, Dredging for Prosperity, Marine Log, August, proquest)

Just like the nation itself, our maritime industry is facing a multitude of challenges like flooding in the
Midwest, silting of our major shipping arteries, and the need for recapitalization for our lock and dam
infrastructure, to name a few. But these challenges and the solutions to them must be viewed as
investments in the future of our nation itself because without a strong, reliable marine transportation
industry, we simply cannot competitively sell our export products in the world marketplace. Those
countries that buy from America do so because we are a dependable supplier of products at a
competitive price, thanks in no small part to the existence of our enviable transportation system. If that
system becomes compromised, those foreign buyers will simply shop elsewhere and that will further
impact the United States' precarious economic recovery. Witness the dredging situation on the Lower
Mississippi River. This year, we have seen unprecedented levels of high water on the Mississippi River
carrying millions of tons of silt and debris to the mouth of the River. This silting has resulted in
restrictions being imposed for ships and vessels that rely on this passageway to export products to the
world market, as well as import goods competitively, via ports in south Louisiana. In the past the Corps
of Engineers has been able to manage silting issues with funding for dredging that sometimes required
the reprogramming of funds to be sure shortfalls did not occur. This year the Corps has said it can no
longer reprogram funds and that a funding shortfall indeed exists on this vital part of the system.
Throughout this country's great history, the federal government's role is in part to ensure that the inland
navigation system, including the Mississippi River, remains open to transport products such as grain,
coal, steel, petroleum and aggregate materials. The federal government now needs to take necessary
steps to provide funding for our national transportation asset and to allow the Lower Mississippi River to
remain fully open for commerce. We urge the White House to immediately submit an emergency
request for supplemental funds to Congress, and we ask that Congress expeditiously process that
request for Emergency Supplemental Appropriations funding. All of us who are responsible for
managing money have faced times when cutting costs have become necessary, yet those who are
successful rarely focus on reducing costs if it results in an even greater loss in the revenue stream. Again,
dredging this critical artery should be viewed as an investment, not a cost, in the future of our inland
waterways transportation system.

Trade deficit wrecks the economy
Weller et al., Center for American Progress senior fellow, 2011
(Christian, The Case for Strategic Export Promotion, 2-9,
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/high_tech_trade.html/print.html, DOA: 7-13-12)

The United States faces enormous economic obstacles in the immediate future as it recovers from the
worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. The private-sector recovery is under way, with
industrial production growing by 9.2 percent from June 2009 to July 2010, and with business investment
up by an inflation-adjusted 5.2 percent from June 2009 to June 2010. Private-sector employment is also
on the rise with more than 1.1 million jobs created in 2010. This is good news, but large challenges still
loom that could derail the fledgling private-sector momentum contributing to our economic recovery.
An important challenge is the trade deficit. The U.S. trade deficit is widening again, reaching 3.7
percent of gross domestic product (the total amount of goods and services produced in our economy) in
the third quarter of 2010, up from 2.4 percent of GDP in the second quarter of 2009. This widening gap
poses a drag on economic growth since the country has to borrow money overseas to pay for the extra
importsa debt that ultimately will have to be repaid. A country can only import more than it exports if
overseas investors lend it money. For the United States this means a persistent trade deficit requires
taking on ever more foreign debt to pay for the excess of imports over exports. Thats why maintaining
U.S. international economic competitiveness and strengthening our exports must be a key component
of any serious strategy to produce sustained and long-term economic growth.