Land Ref orm i n Paki s t an:

A Cri t i cal I s s ue f o r Fut ure De ve l opme nt ?

.
Sal man Azi z and Thomas Gr ay
Thi s paper r evi ews t he l and r ef or ms t hat have been i mpl ement ed i n Paki st an (1959 and
1972) and t he ext ent t o whi ch t hey wer e i nst r ument al i n r esol vi ng pr obl ems of i ncome i n-
equal i t i es, r ur al pover t y and unempl oyment , and agr i cul t ur al pr oduct i on. The aut hor s
ar gue t hat nei t her t he 1959 or 1972 l and r ef or ms have sol ved t hese pr obl ems. I n f act ,
l and owner shi p r emai ns hi ghl y concent r at ed.
i i i stence t enant s as wel l as expl oi t i ng l andl ess l abor er s.
was r edi st r i but ed as a r esul t of t he 1972 r ef or m. Si nce bot h l and r ef or ms wer e i mpl e-
ment ed dur i ng per i ods of "r el at i ve soci al unr est ", i t suggest s t hat "t he pr i mar y obj ect i ve
of t he r ef or ms was not t o achi eve an equi t abl e r edi st r i but i on of l and but r at her t o nol l i f y
t he poor peasant s and gar ner t hei r pol i t i cal support' ' . I n f act , no gr eat agr i cul t ur al
devel opment can be vi sual i zed wi t hi n t he pr esent st r uct ur e of l and owner shi p. Onl y a
r adi cal r ef or m( l and t o t he t i l l er s) cansol ve t he pr obl emof under devel opment . The pos-
si bl e benef i t s of smal l f ar mi ngar espel l ed out i n Sect i on I 11 of t he paper . The aut hor s
admi t t hat t he mat er i al i n t hi s sect i on i s "pr oj ect i ve and hi ghl y t ent at i ve". I t i s,
however , based on st udi es t hat pr edi ct sever eener gy shor t ages and envi r onment al pr obl ems
i n t he near f ut ur e and i s wel l wor t h ser i ous consi der at i on.
Lar ge l andowner s squeeze r ent s out of sub-
Onl y 0. 5 per cent of t he l and
Ther e i s no gener al l y accept ed
def i ni t i on of what const i t ut es "Land Kef om. . "
Some have def i ned i t nar r owl y as a means t o
pr ovi de l and t o t he l andl ess whi l e ot her s
have concei ved i t br oadl y as a compr ehensi ve
pr ogr amf or t he t r ansf or mat i on of t he en-
t i r e agr i cul t ur al economy under t he l abel of
"Agr ar i an Ref or m". ( War r i ner 1969, xi v) For
t hi s st udy t he t er m r ef er s t o "publ i c pr o-
gr ams t hat seek t o r est r uct ur e equi t abl y
and r at i onal l y a def ect i ve l and- t enur e sys-
t emby compul sor y, dr ast i c, and r api d means".
( Tai 1974, 11)
I n t he ent i r e pr ocess of l and r ef or m-
f r omi ni t i at i on t o compl et i on - t he gover n-
ment pl ays a deci si ve r ol e. I n t he wor ds of
Kennet h H. Par sons, ' ' I n a ver y deep sense,
l and t enur e pr obl ems ar e power pr obl ems,
pr obl ems of di spar i t y i n economi c, soci al ,
and pol i t i cal power ". ( Par sons 1956, 9)
Hence, l and r ef or mpr ogr ams ar e di st i nct l y
"publ i c" pr ogr ams. . . under t aken by publ i c or
gover nment agenci es t o modi f y t he economi c
basi s of pol i t i cs. As such, ami cabl e
SOUTH ASIA BULLETIN
VoZ. I. No. 2.
Swnmer 1981.
ar r angement s or vol unt ar y t r ansf er s of
l and ar e doomed t o f ai l ur e as exper i -
enced i n t he Bhoodan movement i n I ndi a.
( J anuzzi 1974, 125-6)
changes. I n an agr i cul t ur al soci et y
wher e l and i s at once t he pr i nci pal
sour ce of weal t h, t he f oundat i on of po-
l i t i cal power , and t he symbol of soci al
pr est i ge, t he syst emof l and- t enur e i s
not hi ng less t han a vi t al i nst i t ut i on
t hat det er mi nes and al l ocat es t he val ues
of soci et y. Gi ven t hat t her e i s ext r eme
concent r at i on i n l and owner shi p pat t er ns,
dr ast i c measur es ar e i nevi t abl e t o accom-
pl i sh t he desi r ed r esul t of l and r ef or m,
i . e. r at i onal and equi t abl e r edi st r i but i on
of l and.
agr ar i an changes be ef f ect ed wi t hi n a
shor t span of t i me. ( Tai 1974, 17)
Wher e l and r ef or mi s necessar y, evol ut i on-
ar y change i s of t en i mpr act i cabl e i f #not
i mpossi bl e. Wi t h cent ur i es- ol d t r adi -
t i ons, t he l and t enur e syst ems of l ess
devel oped count r i es have been const ant l y
r ei nf or ced i n t hei r r i gi di t y. To br eak
such r i gi di t y, speedy and ef f ect i ve
Land r ef or mal so ent ai l s dr ast i c
Fi nal l y, l and r ef or mr equi r es t hat
36
act i on i s t he panacea - not gr adual
adj ust ment s.
OBJ ECTI VES:
of l and r ef or mar e "economi c devel opment and
soci al equi t y". ( Hi rsch 1972, 136) Mor e
speci f i cal l y, t hese obj ect i ves coul d be
st at ed i n t he f ol l owi ng manner.
The r het or i c sur r oundi ng t he obj ect i ves
Soci o- Economi c Obj ect i ves:
A. mor e equi t abl e di st r i but i on of ownep
shi p and/ or r i ght s t o use l and.
B. mor e equi t abl e di st r i but i on of earn-
i ng oppor t uni t y and i ncome.
C. an i ncr ease i n agr i cul t ur al pr oduc-
t i on and t he mar ket abl e sur pl us t o
saf eguar d t he suppl y of domest i c
consumpt i on.
f or th0s. e engaged i n agr i cul t ur al
product i on.
D. i ncr ease of r eal i ncome per capi t a
Al t hough t her e ar e many pi t f al l s t o be
f aced i n at t empt i ng t o i mpl ement l and re-
f or mof a subst ant i ve nat ur e, t hat does not
pr ecl ude t he need and ur gency f or one.
many of t he devel opi ng count r i es wher e a
bi modal di st r i but i on of l and exi st s, t he
pr obl ems of r ur al povert y and st agnant agr i -
cul t ur al pr oduct i on can onl y be ser i ousl y
t ackl ed once t her e i s a more equi t abl e di s-
t r i but i on of l and. ( Asi an Devel opment Bank,
1978, 217) .
I n
ascer t ai ni ng t he opt i mumf armsi ze
( subsi st ence or economi c) i n t he i m-
pl ement at i on of l and r ef or m, many ana-
l yst s have f ound smal l er f ar ms to be
r el at i vel y mor e ef f i ci ent t han l ar ger
f arms. Vdr i ous st udi es on f ar msi ze and
t he l evel of out put have consi st ent l y
i ndi cat ed t hat r el at i vel y smal l er f ar ms
have a great er out put per hect ar e t han
t he l ar ger f ar ms or est at es . 1 However ,
to gener al i ze acr oss t he board woul d be
somewhat mi sl eadi ng, but t he message i s
cl ear. Gi ven good gover nment suppor t i ve
measur es (i . e. Ext ensi on Servi ces) , t he
smal l er f ar ms, a pot ent i al consequenceof
l and r ef or m, can, i n f act , - have a
posi t i ve i mpact on product i on.
f ur t her i ndi cat ed t hat t he mar gi nal pro-
duct i vi t y of l abor i n agr i cul t ur e i n
LDC'S i s very l ow, and as much as t went y-
f i ve per cent of t he r ur al l abor f or ce i s
ei t her under or unempl oyed. ( Schul t z 1964,
54) Ther e i s f ur t her evi dence t hat t he
l ar ger f ar ms t end t o be r el at i vel y capi -
t al - i nt ensi ve whi l e t he smal l er f ar ms
pr act i ce a mor e l abor - i nt ensi ve f or mof
agr i cul t ur e. Gi ven a bi modal f or mof
l and di st r i but i on, t he empl oyment ef f ect s
of a subst ant i ve l and r edi st r i but i on
pr ogr amcan be qui t e appreci abl e.
(c) I ncome Redi st r i but i on.
Redi st r i but i on of l and may not onl y
i ncr ease i ncomes of t enant s ( newand ol d)
as a r esul t of t he abol i t i on of shar e-
2
(b) Empl oyment , St udi es have
3
THE CASE FOR LAND REFORM
st r ong case f or l and r ef or mcan be made on t i al f or f ur t her i ncr eases r esul t i ng
soci o- economi c grounds. The economi c ar gu- part i al l y f r omowner shi p i ncent i ves.
ment s deal pri mari l y wi t h product i on, . i ncome Fur t her mor e, evi dence suggest s t hat t he
r edi st r i but i on, and empl oyment . smal l f ar mer s "may" i n t he aggr egat e
cr oppi ng and/ or t enancy r ent s, but t he
I n r evi ewi ng t he l i t er at ur e, an ext r emel y t r ansf er of owner shi p may pr ovi de a pot en-
save mor e t han l ar ger f ar mer s gi ven sui t -
The Economi c Case f or Land Ref orm: Land
r ef or mcan be very i nst r ument al i n r est r uc-
abl e condi t i on^. ^ The ext ent t o whi ch
t hi s i ncr ease i n savi ngs i s channel l ed
t uri ng r ur al soci et y and consequent l y has a
subst ant i al posi t i ve i mpact on pr oduct i on, t i on, however , woul d be dependen
i ncome r edi st r i but i on, empl oyment , and gover nment t ax and pri ce pol i cy.
capi t al f or mat i on.
maker s of t en have mi sgi vi ngs about l and
r ef or mand i t s det r i ment al ef f ect on pro-
duct i on st emmi ng f r omt he i nef f i ci enci es of
smal l f arms. Al t hough f ar msi ze i s a cri t - pl ement at i on of l and r ef or m, i t woul d be
i cal i ssue, and of t en t her e i s di f f i cul t y i n
t owar ds i nvest ment s or on- f armconsump-
I On
(a) Pr oduct i on. Pl anner s and pol i cy
LEGI SLATI ON AND I MPLEMENTATI ON
Al t hough t her e ar e numer ous f act or s
t hat i mpi nge on t he l egi sl at i on and i m-
usef ul t o hi ghl i ght t he mor e cr i t i cal
37
i ssues. ( War r i ner 1969, 15-21) They ar e:
(a) who wi l l be t he benef i ci ar i es; (b) t he
f or mof expr opr i at i on of l and, i . e. wi t h or
wi t hout compensat i on t o t he af f ect ed l and-
l or ds; (c) t he f or mof compensat i on, i . e.
gover nment sponsor ed or a payment by t he
benef i ci ar i es t o t he l andowner s; (d) t he
l egi sl at i on i t sel f t hat mi ght i ncl ude pos-
si bl e l oophol es t hr ough pr ovi si ons f or ex-
empt i on cl auses t hus r ef l ect i ng t he degr ee
of gover nment ' s pol i t i cal commi t ment t o l and
r ef or mmeasur es; (e) t he si ze of t he
r edi st r i but ed par cel s of l and.
I n concl usi on, i t shoul d be emphasi zed
t hat t he cont r i but i on of l and r ef or mi n al -
l evi at i ng t he economi c and soci al di spar i t i es
r esul t i ng f r omt r adi t i onal l and t enur e sys-
t ems i s as l i mi t ed/ ext ensi ve as t he gover n-
ment ' s i nabi l i t y/ abi l i t y ( and commi t ment ) .
I t i s a necessar y, but not a suf f i ci ent con-
di t i on f or f ut ur e devel opment obj ect i ves.
I t i s i nst r ument al i n br eaki ng exi st i ng pat -
t er ns of power and set t i ng a st age wher e
benef i t s of f ut ur e pol i ci es accr ue t o t he
popul ace i n a mor e equi t abl e manner .
11. LAND REFORM I N PAKI STAN
The need f or l and r ef or mi n Paki st an as
a key pr econdi t i on f or r evi t al i zi ng t he ag-
r i cul t ur al sect or was per cei ved by devel op-
ment economi st s mor e t han t wo decades ago.
However , si nce t hen, onl y meager at t empt s
have been made i n t hi s di r ect i on. The r e-
sul t - Paki st an i s st i l l pl agued wi t h a
st agnant agr i cul t ur al sect or , gr eat i ncome
di spar i t i es, and pover t y of t he r ur al
masses.
THE TRADI TI ONAL LAND TENURE SYSTEM
i . t exi st ed pr i or t o t he l and r ef or ms of
1959, had t he f ol l owi ng maj or char act er i s-
t i cs :
A. The "Zami ndar or Sover ment i nt er -
The t r adi t i onal l and t enur e syst emas
6
medi ar i es h' ad f ul l pr opr i et or shi p
over l ar ge est at es and exact ed exor -
bi t ant r ent s f r omt enant s as a -
sour ce of gover nment r evenue and
per sonal income".
B. Uni t s of cul t i vat i on ( sual l
C. A bi modal pat t er n of l and owner -
f ar ms) wer e hi ghl y f r agment ed.
shi p exi st ed wi t h ext r eme con-
cent r at i on of l and owner shi p by
a handf ul of l ar ge f ar mer s ( Tabl e
1). For exampl e, 0.13 per cent of
t he l andowner s owned over f i f t een
per cent of t he cul t i vat ed l and
i n par cel s of over 500 acr es
each.
D. Ext r eme i nsecur i t y of t enant s
and subst ant i al r ack- r ent i ng by
l ar ge owner s ( Zami ndar s) was
pr eval ent .
E. Appr oxi mat el y t en per cent of t he
househol ds wer e cl assi f i ed as
l andl ess l abor , and cl ose t o
t went y- t wo per cent of t he r ur al
popul at i on was ei t her unempl oyed
or under empl oyed.
F. Most of t he benef i t s of devel op-
ment pr ogr ams accr ued t o t he
l ar ge 1andot mer s, a consequence
of t he power exer ci sed by t hem
at al l l evel s of gover nment . 7
nomena and hi ghl y expl oi t at i ve
soci al l y and economi cal l y ( f i f t y
per cent of t he cr op went t o l and-
owners) .
H. Land on t he l ar ger f ar ms was
gr ossl y under ut i l i zed.
Fol l owi ng t he mi l i t ar y coup i n 1959,
a pr ogr amf or l and r ef or mwas i nst i t ut ed
by Ayub Khan. However , f r omt he begi n- -
ni ng, he appar ent l y had no i nt ent i on of
r educi ng t he hol di ngs of any but t he
G. Shar ecr oppi ng was a common phe-
l ar gest Zami ndar s. 8
THE 1959 LAND REFORMS
Al t hough t he of f i ci al l y st at ed
obj ect i ves of t he 1959 l and r ef or mwer e
i ndeed i mpr essi ve i n t hei r scope and po-
t ent i al i mpact on agr i cul t ur al pr oduct i on,
i ncome r edi st r i but i on, and empl oyment ,
t hei r ef f ect i veness or t he l ack of i t i s
cl ear l y r ef l ect ed i n t he f or mof l egi sl a-
t i on passed and t he ul t i mat e r esul t s of
l and r edi st r i but i on t hat f ol l owed.
Legi ~l at i on: ~ The l egi sl at i on
abol i shed t he r ol e of i nt er medi ar i eswi t h t he
gover nment assumi ng t he r ol e of t ax
38
col l - ect or. I n addi t i on, i t cal l ed f or:
A. a l and owner shi p cei l i ng of 500
acr es of i rri gat ed or 1000 acr es of
uni rri gat ed l and, any excess bei ng
resumed by gover nment wi t h compensa-
t i on to t he af f ect ed l andowners.
B. The benef i ci ar i es wer e to be ei t her
exi st i ng t enant s or "ot her deser vi ng
persons". I n addi t i on, t he benef i -
ci ar i es woul d f i nance t he compensa-
t i on of t he af f ect ed l andowner s by
annual payment s.
Exempt i on cl auses wer e provi ded f or
l and t r ansf er s t o hei r s and f or
l and used f or or char ds, st ud f ar ms,
and l i vest ock.
D. No f r agment at i on of l and was per mi s-
si bl e whi ch woul d r esul t i n t he f i nal
ar ea of f r agment ed hol di ngs bei ng
bel ow t wel ve acr edo, t he aver age
si ze of r edi st r i but ed par cel s of
l and.
C.
At t he t i me, t hese r ef or ms wer e hai l ed
as r evol ut i onar y. I n r et r ospect , t hey wer e
si mpl y measur es t hat subdued t he pot ent i al f or
soci al unrest and ret ai ned l andl ord l oyal t y.
Consi der i ng t hehei ght of cei l i ngs i mposed, t he
exempt i ons pr ovi ded, and t he pr i or knowl edge
( si nce 1949) of t he possi bi l i t y of l and r ef or ms
by t he l andl or ds, i t was no sur pr i se t hat onl y
910 owner s wer e af f ect ed; onl y f our percent
of t he t ot al cul t i vat ed l and was expr opr i at ed;
and, f i nal l y, onl y 2. 4 percent of t he t ot al
l and under cul t i vat i on was r edi st r i but ed
( Tabl e 2).
1959 l and r ef or m, many shor t comi ngs ar e evi -
dent . Fi r st , cl earl y t he new gover nment
l acked t he pol i t i cal wi l l f or r ef or m. Second,
t he i nor di nat el y hi gh cei l i ng i mposed, cou-
pl ed wi t h t he pr ovi si ons f or exempt i ons,
pr ecl uded t he possi bi l i t y of subst ant i al ex-
pr opr i at i on of l and. Thi r d, t he i mposi t i on
of bur densome payment s on t he benef i ci ar i es
f or t he acqui r ed l and di d not cr eat e pr opi t i ous
ci r cumst ances f or t hem. Four t h, t here wer e no
concr et e pr oposal s i n t he l egi sl at i on t hat
at t acked t he pr obl emof l andl ess l abor. Fi f t h,
al t hough t he Zami ndar s wer e abol i shed, t he
st at e was now t he r ent r ecei ver wi t h t he t en-
ant s r emai ni ng as t enant s. Si xt h, t he r ef or m
was i mpl ement ed t hr ough a hi ghl y cent r al i zed,
pr ovi nci al , bur eaucr at i c admi ni st r at i on t hat
I n r evi ewi ng t he f i nal r esul t s of t he
l acked t he qual i f i cat i ons and i nt egr i t y
f or t he j ob. ( Myrdal 1968, 1330)
Fi nal l y, t here was no peasant par t i ci pa-
t i on i n t he over al l i mpl ement at i on of t he
l and ref orm.
cur bi ng of f r agment at i on of l andhol di ngs
and some i mpr ovement i n secur i t y of t en-
ant s f r omunj ust i f i ed evi ct i ons. ( Tai
1974, 345)
The onl y posi t i ve out come was t he
THE 1972 LAND REFORMS
1959 r ef or ms, can be regarded as a di smal
f ai l ur e i n t er ms of t hei r i mpact on agr i -
cul t ur al out put , empl oyment , and i ncome
di spar i t i es as di scussed l at er i n t hi s
sect i on.
Law Regul at i on 115 (MLR) wer e:
The 1972 l and r ef or ms, l i ke t he
The mai n pr ovi Ei ons of t he "Mart i al
A. A cei l i ng of 150 acr es of i r r i -
gat ed, or 300 acr es of uni r r i gat ed,
l and was i mposed on "i ndi vi dual "
hol di ngs. Any sur pl uswas t obe ex-
pr opr i at edwi t hout compensat i on.
"f ree" t o exi st i ng t enant s and
l andl ess l abor.
C. Pr ovi si ons f or t he r i ght to
t r ansf er l and t o hei r s wer e made.
D. The l andl ord woul d deci de whi ch
of hi s pl ot s he woul d sur r ender .
E. Evi ct i ons of t enant s wer e onl y
j ust i f i ed i f rent was not pai d
by t hem. The l evel of r ent s was
not st i pul at ed. ( Hai der and
Kuhnen 1974, 59)
B. Land was t o be r edi st r i but ed
I n assessi ng t he f i nal i mpact of MLR
115 i n l i ght of t he l egi sl at i on' s mai n
f eat ur es, t her e i s no r eason t o be opt i -
mi st i c. Thi s i s f ur t her suppor t ed by
dat a whi ch i ndi cat e t hat onl y 0. 5 per cent
of t ot al cul t i vat ed l and was r edi st r i but ed
t o onl y 0.1 percent of t he t ot al r ur al
popul at i on wi t h an i ncome r edi st r i but i on
ef f ect of onl y t wo percent . ( Herri ng and
Chaudhry 1974, 245- 279) cabl e 3). Furt hermore,
t he r ef or mmeasur es suf f er ed f r ommany of
t he same weaknesses out l i ned under t he
1959 l and r ef or mf or many of t he same
r easons, i . e. l ack of pol i t i cal commi t ment
r ef l ect ed i n t he i mposi t i on of a f ai rl y
39
hi gh cei l i ng and the provi si ons f or the ri ght
to transf er l and to hei rs.
I n eval uati ng the impact of the two l and
reforms i n terms of redi stri buti on of l and,
the concl usi on i s i ndeed a pessi mi sti c one.
The reforms were not i nstrumental or ef f ecti ve
i n restructuri ng the pattern of l and ownership
which i s sti l l hi ghl y concentrated. The f act
that both l and reforms (1959 and 1972) were
implemented duri ng peri ods of rel ati ve soci al
unrest seems to suggest that the primary ob-
j ecti ve of the reforms was not to achi eve an
equi tabl e redi stri buti on of l and but rather
to mol l i fy the poor peasants and garner thei r
pol i ti cal support.
AGRI CUL TUW PRODUCTI ON, INCOME DI STRI BUTI ON,
AND EMPLOYMENT
Af ter experi enci ng some stagnati on i n
output duri ng the 1950's, Paki stan showed
excepti onal growth duri ng the 1960's wi th
output growing f aster than popul ati on. I 1
reason f or thi s growth i n output can l argel y
be attri buted t o the "Green Revolution".
During the 1950-65 peri od, i rri gati on improve-
ments al one wer e responsi bl e f or nearl y hal f
of the i ncrease i n output. (Stern and Fal l on
1970, 42) I n addi ti on, the i i i troducti on of
hi gh yi el di ng varieties (HYV's) of seeds,
government subsi di es of 50-75 percent on f er-
ti l i zer and pesti ci des, and improved credi t
f aci l i ti es have gi ven f urther impetus to out-
put i ncreases. (El ki ngton 1970, 1) The absence
of an ef f i caci ous l and reform has, i n f act,
precl uded the possi bl e benef i ts that coul d have
been achi eved by i ncreased output, gi ven that
producti vi ty and l and uti l i zati on on the
smaller farms i s substanti al l y hi gher than on
the l arger farms (twenty-fi ve acres and over).
cabl e 5) I n essence, the meager l and reforms
have not had the desi red impact on agri cul tural
producti on. Even af ter the 1972 reforms al l
output i ncreases have resul ted pri mari l y from
i ncreased crop acreage under HYVTs12 and
greater f erti l i zer di stri buti on and use (to
l arge landowners). I t shoul d be emphasized
that most of these output i ncreases are hi ghl y
posi ti vel y correl ated wi th the l arger farms of
above f i f ty acres which use t wi ce as much fer-
ti l i zer as the smaller farmers - pri mari l y
because of thei r soci al presti ge and power that
i s unquesti onabl y usef ul i n condi ti ons of
f erti l i zer scarci ty. l 3
The
Most of the producti on
benef i ts of i ncreased government support
measures gravi tated to the l arge l and-
owners and have resul ted i n greater i n-
come di spari ti es, as popul ati on and rural
unemployment have progressi vel y i ncreased.
Given the extent of l and actual l y
redi stri buted as a resul t of the l and
reform measures, i t i s suggested that
thei r "employment" impact was al so mini-
mal. The potenti al to do so, however,
exi sts, as the smaller farms not onl y
have a greater croppi ng i ntensi ty but
are al so al most twi ce as l abor-i ntensi ve
as the l arger farms.@able 5) Although
af ter the 1959 reforms a rural works
program was implemented wi th some success
(1961/62), si nce then government i nvest-
ment i n thi s sector has been l acki ng.14
Furthermore, the government subsi di es on
i nputs and credi t, al ong wi th the pol i cy
of mechani zati on and "i ndustri al funda-
mentalism", have tended to be posi ti ve
i ncenti ves towards a l abor-savi ng form
of agri cul tural development on the l arger
farms (Nul ty 1972, 123) thus f urther ag-
gravati ng the si tuati on. The consequence
has been one of pol i ti cal and soci al un-
rest i n the rural areas that i s mani fest
i n the di srupti on i n the country si nce
1968, as the rural -urban mi grati on has
i ncreased markedly. During the peri od
1961-1972, the urban popul ati on i ncreased
by al most si x mi l l i on. However, of thi s
i ncrease, rural -urban mi grati on contri b-
uted 34.7 percent of the total of ap-
proxi matel y two mi l l i on mi grants i n
spi te of the f act that thi s rate slowed
because of the Green Revol uti on.
The questi on of income di stri buti on
and, hence, poverty has al so been subj ect
to some of the same bi ases, resul ti ng i n
greater income di spari ti es and poverty.
Although there i s no data avai l abl e on
the income redi stri buti on impact of the
1959 reforms, there i s reason to bel i eve
that thei r impact was not much greater
than the two percent income redi stri buti on
impact of the 1972 reforms (Tabl e 3).
Although, dats on Paki stan's rural income
di stri buti on i ndi cates that the cumul ati ve
income shares of the l owest ten percentof
househol ds i ncreased over the peri od
1959/61 - 1969/70 (Chaudhry 1973, 250-51),
the income share of thi s group decl i ned
40
from four percent i n 1966-68 to 3.7 percent
i n 1969/70. Over the same peri od, the per-
centage of rural popul ati on under the poverty
l i ne of Rs. 300.00 at constant 1959/60 pri ces
al so decl i ned from 61 percent t o 60 percent.15
On the other hand, the percentage of popula-
ti on earni ng less than the mean income (per
capi ta) has steadi l y i ncreased. (Alauddin
1975, 436)
The major reason f or the decl i ne i n income
di spari ti es duri ng the bri ef peri od of 1963/64
to 1968/69 was pri mari l y a resul t of the ad-
vent of the Green Revol uti on coupled wi th a
massive rural -urban mi grati on pattern. (Burki
1973). By 1969/70, the ri ppl e ef f ect of the
Green Revol uti on began t o subsi de somewhat,
and the popul ati on pressures si nce then have
produced greater i nequal i ty and poverty as
employment opportuni ti es have not kept up wi th
demand. (Popul ati on i s now growing at an annual
rate of 3.2 percent.)
The pauci ty and aggregate nature of data
does not provi de a basi s f or "concl usi ve" evi-
dence that poverty has i ncreased or decl i ned.
However,i f povertyi s def i nedasthestandardof
l i vi ngwi th cal ori e i ntakeas onemeasure of poverty
l evel s, theni ndeed there i s evi dence that suggests
thatpovertylevelsmayhaveincreased . Overthe
peri od1949/50-1971/72,theaveragedai l ycal ori e
i ntakeof the rural popul ati onhas showna steady
decl i ne from2,Ol Ocal ori es i n1949/50to1898
cal ori es i n 1971/72.
I nsummary, the l and reformmeasure s i n
Paki stanhavebeenl argel y i nef f ecti ve i n restruc-
turi ngtheeconomi candsoci al strataof rural soci -
etysoastoprovi deasui tabl ef rameworkf orequi t-
tabl e agri cul tural development.
111
Land reform i n Paki stan has been meagre
at best. L i t t l e l and has been redi stri buted.
We have tri ed to make the case i n thi s paper
that an equi tabl e redi stri buti on of l and
coul d resul t i n greater producti on, greater
total employment, and a more equi tabl e di s-
tri buti on of income and earni ng opportuni ti es.
I ncreased capi tal formati on i s al so a possi -
bi l i ty. (Adams 1973) The foregoi ng di scussi on
has tended to embrace tradi ti onal conceptu-
al i zati ons of l and reform. I n the next secti on,
the authors w i l l attempt to i ntegrate
new obj ecti ves i nto l and reform measures
by i ntroduci ng energy and envi ronmental
i ssues. We i ntroduce these concerns to
suggest the gravi ty of f uture i mperati ves
demanding l and reforms.
ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL SIDE EFFECTS
Development pl anni ng i n Paki stan has
been characteri zed as "growth now/ equal -
i ty l ater".
ti on and di stri buti on i n another.(Hamid
1974) Growth versus di stri buti on has
crystal l i zed i n the agri cul tural sector
as "modernization" of the l argest farms.
The nature of thi s moderni zati on has been
l abor-savi ng, capi tal i ntensi ve, and
energy i ntensi ve, (Nulty 1972) The
authors suggest that a conti nuati on of
thi s "modernization" of the l argest farms
w i l l resul t i n an i ncrease i n income di s-
pari ti es, w i l l contri bute to ri si ng food
pri ces, w i l l worsen unemployment problems,
and coul d resul t i nswere envi ronmental
problems .
Growth l eads i n one di rec-
Energy. To acceptandpromul ga
a system of agri cul tural devel op-
te
ment that is heavi l y dependent upon non-
renewable energy i s to assume that con-
si stent and adequate suppl i es of energy
can be assured. Recent studi es i ndi cate
such assurances cannot be assumed. The
f uture depl eti on of i nani mate energy
suppl i es has been wel l documented by the
Meadows group, Ophuls, and Lovins. I n
uti l i zi ng proj ecti ons by Lovi ns, Butte1
suggests suppl y crises w i l l occur wi thi n
the next two decades. Any agri cul ture
that depends upon these resources does
not stand i n i sol ati on from these trendsJ 6
Only 60 percent of Paki stan's i nani mate
energy needs are produced wi thi n i ts
borders . l 7 The three major components of
i nani mate energy consumption i n a "mod-
erni zed'' agri cul ture are runni ng machines,
manufacturi ng f erti l i zers, and manufac-
turi ng pesti ci des. (Oelhaf 1976) The
conti nued use of these i nputs i n Paki stan
and el sewhere can onl y be i n the f ace of
i ncreasi ngl y hi gher pri ces. A s these
pri ces conti nue to ri se, onl y the l argest
farmers w i l l be abl e to af f ord to purchase
them. The benef i ts of hi gher yi el ds from
these i nputs w i l l l i kewi se be concentrated
41
on the upper end of the si ze scal e. The
l arger farms w i l l be abl e t o gross more whi l e scarcer, export crops i ncrease whi l e
the smaller farms w i l l conti nue to struggl e
to eke out an exi stence. Thi s i s general l y Mechani zati on i nputs themsel ves
the case presentl y i n devel opi ng nati ons. worsen unemployment problems. Mechani-
As non-renewable energy resources become
more and more peopl e may go hungry.
Agri cul tural moderni zati on i s devel opi ng
i n a very unequal manner. I nstead of
pri mari l y benef i tti ng the l arge masses
of poor farmers, i t i s l eadi ng to the
enri chment of the ri ch peasants and the
greater concentrati on of power i n thei r
hands and those of other groups which
now control not onl y the l and but a
great part of the capi tal i nvested i n
the l and as a consequence of modernization.,,
a gap i s steadi l y growing between subsi s-
tence agri cul ture i n the hands of small
farmers and commercial agri cul ture i n the
hands of ri ch l and owners who control
l and, credi t, and technol ogy. (Almeida,
et a1 1974, 25)
I nani mate energy shortages are expected t o .
si mpl y pul l current condi ti ons i nto
cari catures of thei r past selves.
pri ced. Producti on i ncreases from the ap-
pl i cati on of Green Revol uti on technol ogi es
have al ready l evel ed of f . Hi gher pri ced i n-
puts may f orce some producers to revert back
t o tradi ti onal methods thereby reduci ng food
suppl i es. Further, Almeida, et al ., suggest
that i n countri es where there i s a hi gh con-
centrati on of income, food produci ng l and i s
of ten converted to the producti on of export
cash crops. Hungry peopl e cannot af f ord t o
buy the food they need. Thi s i nf l uences the
atti tudes and economic i ncenti ves of
agri cul tural producers.
Food w i l l be even dearer and hi gher
Low income of the consumer popul ati on
and unequal di stri buti on of thi s income..
af f ects the development of the market..
(and l eads to an) ... i mbal ance between
real needs and the ways i n which re-
sources are used ... t o the poi nt that
pref erence i s of ten gi ven to produci ng
unessenti al commodities f or export t o
countri es that can af f ord t o pay f or them
rather than to usi ng avai l abl e resources
(both l and and capi tal ) f or produci ng
basi c f oodstuf f s. The great maj ori ty of
the country needs to overcome chroni c
undernourishment.(Almeida, et a1.1974,25)
zati on def i ni ti onal l y di spl aces human
energy, i .e. human l abor, wi th i nani mate
energy. I t al so al l ows the l arger f ar-
mers, the ones who can af f ord i t, to
control and till even l arger acreages.
Energy shortages can onl y emphasize thi s
trend.
A s a caveat t o the foregoi ng, the
authors wi sh to of f er a few comments on
OPEC. Some l eaders of the Thi rd World
have heral ded OPEC as provi di ng a base
f or a ''new i nternati onal order" and a
gl obal redi stri buti on of weal th. (Gi rven
1975, 145-48) Hammarlund and Li ndberg
suggest thi s support has not and w i l l not
be forthcomi ng . "Most OPEC nati ons have.. .
rej ected al l proposal s f or guaranteed oi l
suppl i es t o the most energy-def i ci ent
devel opi ng nati ons, the establ i shment of
a two-ti ered pri ci ng system, and similar
measures that would go beyond the tradi -
ti onal ai d programs." (Hammarlund 1976)
I t i s preci sel y wi th the tradi ti onal ai d
programs, e.g. I nternati onal Monetary
Fund, The World Bank, and a si mi l ar OPEC
l oan agency, where a l arge proporti on of
OPEC assi stance dol l ars have gone.
( Wi l l i ams 1976, 309-23) The amount of
these funds has been ci ted as di sappoi nt-
i ng,(Farnsworth 1976) Hammarlund makes
the case that the maj or i nternati onal out-
l et f or petro- dol l ars i s i n the West.
The West i s the major source of i ndustri -
al , technol ogi cal , and mi l i tary suppl i es.
Furthermore, OPEC i s dependent upon the
conti nued heal th of the West to turn oi l
deposi ts i nto oi l revenues. (Hammarlund
1976, 176) Whether OPEC w i l l be the har-
bi nger of the devel oped worl d's vari ous
eco- pol i ti cal advantages and the savi or of
the Thi rd World i s hi ghl y questi onabl e.
The authors real i ze there are vari ous
f orei gn exchange i ssues i nvol ved wi th i n-
creased pri ces of oi l , food, agri cul tural
i nputs, and other materials. Space does
not permi t us to deal wi th these i ssues
here. However, we do suggest that i t w i l l
be di f f i cul t f or resource poor nati ons
not to conti nue t o move i n a def i ci t
di recti on.
42
Theaut hor shope t o have i ndi cat ed
t hat an agr i cul t ur al syst embased on energy
i nt ensi ve i nput s i s t enuous at best . The
cont i nued avai l abi l i t y of t hese i nput s can-
not be assured. The degree t o whi ch i nput s
ar e or are not avai l abl e wi l l ef f ect di spar -
i t i es bet ween ri ch and poor. These i nput s
al so af f ect t he envi ronment . Pr obl ems f r om
t he appl i cat i on of t hese i nput s i ncl ude:
1. decl i ne of soi l st r uct ur e, or gani c
mat t er cont ent , and mi cr obi ot i c soi l
l i f e,
2. i ncr eased pol l ut i on f r omr un- of f ,
3. poi soni ng of f ood, soi l , and peopl e,
4. i ncr eased ri sk of car ci nogeni cef f ect s,
5 . monocul t ur i ng t hat aggr avat es pest
pr obl ems, soi l er osi on, and soi l
st er i l i t y. ( But t e1 1978)
I n summar y, energy shor t ages suggest t hat
unempl oyment , pover t y, and hunger wi l l al l i n-
crease. Under t hese condi t i ons, i t i s l i kel y
t hat publ i c quest i oni ng of t he l egi t i macy of
t he st at e wi l l occur , as wel l as quest i oni ng
of t he nat ur e of economi c or gani zat i on; or
t o expr ess t hi s t hought mor e emphat i cal l y,
t her e may be consi der abl e soci al unrest . We
suggest t hat OPEC cannot be rel i ed upon as a
saf et y val ve. The OPEC nat i ons have al r eady
r ej ect ed a pr oposal to pr ovi de oi l on l ong
t ermcr edi t i n cr i si s si t uat i ons. ( Hammarl und
1976, 172)
si de ef f ect s of Gr een Revol ut i on t echnol ogi es
cannot be i gnor ed. The l onger t he t i me span
bef or e energy cr i ses occur , t he br oader wi l l
be t he appl i cat i on of such i nput s as ar t i f i -
ci al f er t i l i zer s and pest i ci des, and t he mor e
per vasi ve t he envi r onment al damage. A con-
densat i on of t hese envi r onment al pr obl ems
and t he energy rel at ed pr obl ems seems to sug-
gest a maj or change i n soci al or gani zat i on
i s i n t he of f i ng.
sweepi ng l and r ef or mcoul d i ncr ease pr oduc-
t i on. Dobb echoes t hi s sent i ment i n a di st
cussi on on devel opment and gr owt h/ savi ngs/
di st r i but i on i ssues. He makes t he case t hat
concept ual i zi ng devel opment as l i mi t ed
Whi l e l ess obvi ous, t he envi r onment al
We have previ ousl y suggest ed t hat a br oad
by t he si ze of act ual savi ngs onl y makes
sense on t he assumpt i on t hat t he mar gi n
bet ween pr oduct i on and consumpt i on can
onl y be enl arged by l ower i ng consumpt i on
and cannot be enl arged. . . by
enl ar gi ng t ot al product i on. As soon
as we drop t hi s assumpt i on and al l ow
t he possi bi l i t y of an i ncr ease i n
t ot al pr oduct i on, t he l i mi t upon
devel opment l oses i t s absol ut e char-
act er. ( St i vers 1976)
I ncr eased pr oduct i on can come about wi t h-
out savi ngs f i rst but r at her wi t h t he
f ul l er ut i l i zat i on of exi st i ng resources.
( Dobb 1967, 73) A broad sweepi ng l and
r ef or mwoul d al l owut i l i zat i on of t he
massi ve amount s of under ut i l i zed l abor
and l and i n r ur al Paki st an.
We have pr evi ousl y document ed t he
gr eat er pr oduct i vi t y of smal l er f arms.
A br oad sweepi ng l and r ef or mnri ent ed
t oward a l abor i nt ensi ve agr i cul t ur e
woul d cont r i but e di r ect l y t o meet i ng
human needs.
pl oyed, and mor e f ood pr oduct i on coul d
resul t . The cr i t i cal pr obl ems of peopl e
f eedi ng t hemsel ves do not r evol ve around
t he absol ut e abi l i t i es of i ndi vi dual s i n
t he Thi rd Worl d. Rat her , as Lappe and
Col l i ns st at e, most peopl e i n t he Thi rd
Worl d cannot f eed t hemsel ves adequat el y
because t hey l ack cont r ol over f ood pro-
duci ng resources. ( Hami d 1976, 48)
To addr ess mor e di r ect l y t he ener gy
pr obl em, smal l scal e, l abor i nt ensi ve
agr i cul t ur e does not r equi r e l ar ge, f uel
i nef f i ci ent machi nes. Wher e l ar ge scal e
mechani zat i on has occur r ed, a l and r ef or m
coul d, i n ef f ect , subst i t ut e human ener gy
f or i nani mat e energy. The aut hor s do
not suggest a t ot al demechi ni zat i on but
r at her t he ut i l i zat i on of smal l scal e
machi nes, possi bl y hand- hel d gar den t rac-
t ors. By r educi ng t he scal e of t he ma-
chi ner y, one i ncr eases t he amount of
l abor energy ut i l i zed and r educes i nani -
mat e ener gy demands. Si mul t aneousl y,
smal l - scal e machi nery r et ai ns some of
t he wor k- l i ght eni ng advant ages of
mechani zat i on.
Ar t i f i ci al f er t i l i zer s have i ncr eased
pr oduct i on i n t he Thi rd Worl d.
Ear l i er i n t hi s paper , we advocat ed t hei r
ut i l i zat i on on smal l er f ar ms t o i ncr ease
out put . I n t he cont ext of a sust ai nabl e
soci et y, t hi s woul d be a t emporary meas-
ure. Ar t i f i ci al f er t i l i zer s ar e energy
Mor e peopl e woul d be em-
43
i ntensi ve,and conti nuous use causes severe run-
off and soi l composi ti on problems. There are
vari ous repl acements based on renewable re-
sources. Blobaum has provi ded an excel l ent
summary of the case i n China. I n that coun-
try, a tremendous amount of human, ani mal ,
and pl antwastes are recycl ed. Canal, pond,
and ri ver bottoms are scraped t o col l ect
organi c material to spread on poor soi l .
Si l t eroded from the l and duri ng the monsoon
i s col l ected as wel l . Garbage from ci ti es i s
col l ected, composted, and used as f erti l i zer.
Hogs pl ay an i mportant rol e i n f erti l i zer
producti on. Hog f eedl ots are l ocated conti -
guous to food processi ng pl ants. The wastes
from these pl ants, of ten supplemented wi th
some grai ns, are used as hog feed. The hog
waste is, i n turn, used as f erti l i zer. I n-
dustri al waste water i s used as wel l . Tech-
ni ques have been devel oped and are used to
remove the heavy metals. Blobaum makes the
case that 75 percent of Chi na's f erti l i zer
suppl y comes from organi c, human, ani mal ,
and pl ant wastes. According to USDA estimates,
thi s has been done i n a country that i s pro-
duci ng as much grai n as "modernized" U. S.
farmers. Further, Chinese farmers are rai si ng
three t i mes as many goats and sheep. (Lappe
and Col l i ns 1976) Other l i terature deal i ng
wi th al ternati ves to syntheti c f erti l i zers
i ncl ude Hei chel and Fri nk, Pi methal , and
Al l aby and Al l en. (Blobaum, 1975)
Pesti ci de use may be reduced orel i mi nated
through the uti l i zati on of vari ous less eco-
l ogi cal l y damaging methods. Belden and Forte
suggest crop rotati ons and i ntercroppi ng i m-
prove ecol ogi cal di versi ty and narrow eco-
l ogi cal ni ches f or speci f i c pests and weeds.
Thi s prevents expl osi ve pest problems that
are i ntri nsi c to monocul turi ng. Other
approaches i ncl ude bi ol ogi cal control , micro-
bi al control , steri l e i nsect control , ti l l age
mani pul ati ons, pl anti ng t i me adj ustments, use
of traps to attract i nsects, pruni ng, thi nni ng,
and cutti ng. l8
A l l of the foregoi ng methods can improve
soi l condi ti ons and i ts abi l i ty to produce
and reproduce. The agri cul tural sector i s the
onl y sector that can create energy. I f it i s
goi ng to conti nue to produce energy of vari ous
forms, the del i cate agro-ecosystems must be
protected.
Given proj ected energy rises, the
exacerbati on of unemployment, of income
di stri buti on, and food problems, as wel l
as envi ronmental stresses, we hope to
have provi ded some rudi mentary suggesti ons
to an al ternati ve socio-economic organi -
zati on. Obviously,major soci al - pol i ti cal -
economic f orces, both nati onal l y and i n-
ternati onal l y, w i l l come i nto pl ay bef ore
any major changes i n development ori en-
tati on can occur. The authors are pes-
si mi sti c that any vol untary consensual
movements w i l l bri ng thi s about. Hope-
f ul l y, some posi ti ve changes can be made
before the harsh l ogi c of near total de-
pl eti on of i nani mate energy resources i s
upon us, and class struggl e takes i ts
most vi ol ent form.
FOOTNOTES
1See Hung-Chao T ai , Land Reform and
Pol i ti cs, p. 111, where there i s a com-
pari son of l and producti vi ty i n Brazi l ,
Colombia, Ecuador, I ndi a, and Mexico.
The range of rel ati ve l and producti vi ty
ranged from a minimum of seven percent
for l arge farms i n Colombia to 130 per-
cent f or a fami l y farm, wi th the sub-
fami l y (smal l est) uni t bei ng the bench-
mark of 100 percent. See al so p. 311,
where the ef f ects of l and reform on ag-
ri cul tural producti on are ci ted. For
other studi es, see Peter Dorner, The
Economic Case f or Land Reform: EmDlov-
ment, Income, and Producti on, Fao, Rome,
No. 1, 1971, p. 21. The resul ts were
consi stent wi th the above study. Another
study was conducted by J ohn W. Mel l or
and ci ted i n hi s book, The Economics
of Agri cul tural Development, I thaca,
New York, 1966, p. 136-144. This study,
conducted i n I ndi a (1959), found that
yi el ds were much hi gher on two farms of
si zes 8 and 13 acres as compared t o two
others of camparable soi l condi ti ons and
rangi ng i n si ze from 30-33 acres.
44
2There i s strong evi dence from studi es
that the smaller farms have greater al l o-
cative ef f i ci ency than l arger farms, not onl y
i n farming practi ces but al so i n better uti l -
i zati on of l and. Under and/or unuti l i zed
l and i s a commonphenomenonon l arge farms or
estates. Solon Barraclough, Agrari an Struc-
ture i n L ati n America, Lexington, Lexington
Books, 1973.
3Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (New York:
Pantheon, 1968), p. 1255. I f J apanese methods
of l abor i ntensi ve ri ce cul ti vati on were em-
ployed i n I ndi a, l abor i nputs would i ncrease
by f i f ty percent and output by 100-200 per-
cent. However, the cri ti cal i ssue of mar-
ketabl e surpl us is i mportant. Thi s may or
may not show a percepti bl e i ncrease depending
on vari ous f actors, i .e. l and producti vi ty,
on-farm consumption, si ze of hol di ngs, soi l
condi ti ons, government support servi ces, etc.
4World Bank, Land Reform (Washington,
D.C.: J ul y,1974), p. 6. See al so Dale W.
Adams, The Economics of Land Reform, Food
Research I nsti tute Studi es i n Agri cul ture,
Economics, Trade, and Development, Vol. X I I ,
No. 2, 1973, p. 134.
5The cases of Taiwan, J apan, and Peopl e's
Republic of China provi de good examples.
6For a more detai l ed perspecti ve of tenure
condi ti ons i n I ndi a and Paki stan, ref er
to (a) Dani el Thorner, br ar i an Prospect i n
I ndi a (Del hi : 1956); (b) C.M. El ki ngton,
"Land Reform i n Paki stan", Aid Spri ng Review,
1970, p. 6; (c) Government of Paki stan,
Report of the Land Reforms Commission f or
West Paki stan (Lahore: J anuary, 1959),
pp. 9-19.
7Herbert Feldman, Revol uti on i n Paki stan:
A Study of the Martial Law Admi ni strati on
(London: Oxford Uni versi ty Press, 1967).
Approximately 70 percent of the parl i ament
was control l ed by l anded i nterests and tri bal
chi ef s before and af ter the coup.
8Most of the Mi l i tary Cadre were drawn
from medium-large si ze l andhol di ng fami l i es
(500-1000 acres per hol di ng) which Ayub Khan
could not af f ord to al i enate.
gGovernment of Paki stan, Land Reforms
f or West Paki stan, pp. 24-74.
"Twel ve acres was consi dered a
subsi stence l evel farm pl ot,as defi ned bv
the Land Reforms Commission of West
Paki stan.
"During the 1950's the popul ati on
growth rate was 2 . 3 percent wi th output
i ncreasi ng at a 1.8 percent growth rate.
I n the 1960's, however, output expanded
at a rate of 3.91 percent whi l e popul ati on
i ncreased at a rate of three percent.
USAI D Spri ng Review, p. 13.
12Since 1968169 t o 1978, acreage under
wheat HY V's al one has i ncreased from seven
mi l l i on acres to 11.9 mi l l i on acres. The
Paki stan Ti mes, "I mported Wheat Seed Sown
i n Ti me'', December 30, 1978.
l3See al so F.R. Frankel and Karl von
Vorys, The Pol i ti cal Challenge of the
Green Revol uti on: Shi f ti ng Patterns of
Peasant Parti ci pati on i n I ndi a and Paki stan
(Pri nceton Uni versi ty: Center of I nterna-
ti onal Studi es, March, 1972), #38, p . 30
(R2 of 0.77).
14Government of Paki stan, Fourth Five-
Year Pl an, 1970-75, p. 341. The Rural
Works Program reduced rural unemployment
by f i ve percent. On average si nce then,
onl y 1-2 percent of the government budget
has been al l ocated to i t, a f ar cry from
the 1-2 percent of nati onal income that
shoul d be used. "Off -f ar m Employment",
Rural A si a (New York: Praeger, 1978) -
Asian Development Bank.
I5S.M. Naseem, "Mass Poverty i n
Paki stan: Some Prel i mi nary Findings",
The Paki stan Development Review, Vol. 12,
No. 4, Wi nter, 1973, p. 322. No household
had consumption of under Rs. 250.00 as
such Rs. 300.00 has been used as a minimum
subsi stence l evel income.
l6Donella Meadows, et al ., The L i mi ts
to Growth (New York: Uni verse, 1972);
Wi l l i am Ophuls, Ecology and the Pol i ti cs
of Scarci ty (San Franci sco: Freeman, 1977);
45
Amory Lovi ns, "Energy St r at egy: The
Road Not Taken", Fal l , 1976; and Fred But t el ,
"Agr i cul t ur e i n Tr ansi t i on t o a Sust ai nabl e
Soci et y"( Unpub1i shed paper f or Cor nel l
Uni ver si t y, J anuar y, 1978).
I 7Uni t ed Nat i ons : Handbook of I nt er na-
t i onal Tr ade and Devel opment St at i st i cs, 1979.
18G. Hei chel , "Ant i ci pat i ng t he Energy
Needs of Amer i can Agr i cul t ur e", J our nal of
Soi l and Wat er Conser vat i on, 30, J anuar y-
Febr uar y, 1975. See al so Davi d Pi ment el ,
"Food Pr oduct i on and t he Energy Cri si s",
Sci ence, 182, November , 1973; and Mi chael
Al l ahy and Fl oyd Al l en, Robot s Behi nd t he
Pl ow ( Emmaus, Pennsyl vani a: Rodal e Pr ess,
1974).
BI BLI OGRAPHY
Adam, Dal e W.
1973 "The Econqmi , cs of Land Ref orm"
Food Resear ch I nst i t ut e St udi es
I n Agr i cul t ur al Economi cs, Tr ade,
and Devel opment , Vol . XI I , No. 2.
Al l auddi n, Tal at
1975 "Mass Pover t y i n Paki stan' '
The Paki st an DeVehDment Revi ew
~~ ~ ~- ~
Vol. XI V,No. 4 , Wi nt er.
Al mei da, Si l vi o, et al .
1974 Worl d Hunger : Causes and Remedi es
Washi ngt on, D. C. : Tr ansnat i onal
I nst i t ut e/ I nst i t ut e f or Pol i cy
St udi es.
Bar r acl ough, Sol on
1973 Agr ar i an St r uct ur e i n Lat i n
Amer i ca
Lexi ngt on: Lexi ngt on Books.
Bur ki , S.J .
1973 "Rapi d Popul at i on Gr owt h and
Ur bani zat i on: The Case of
Paki st an" -
Paki st an Economi c and Soci al
Revi ew, Vol . XI , "0.3, Aut umn.
But t el , Fred
1978 I' Agr i cul t ur e i n Tr ansi t i on t o
a Sust ai nabl e Soci et y"
I t haca, NewYork: Cor nel l
Uni ver si t y, 1978. Unpubl i shed
paper.
Chaudhr y , M. G o
1973 "Rur al I ncome Di st r i but i on i n
Paki st an i n t he Gr een Revol ut i on
Per spect i ve"
The Paki st an Devel opment Revi ew,
Vol . XI I , No. 3, Aut umn.
Dobb, Maur i ce
1967 Paper s on Capi t al i sm, Devel opment ,
a ; d - Pl anni ng, p. 73.
Lon on Rout l edge and Kegan Paul .
Dor ner , Pet er and Don Kanel
1971 The Economi c Case f or Land Ref orm:
Empl oyment , I ncome, and Pr oduct i on
No. 1.
Rome: FAO.
El ki ngt on, Char l es M.
1970 "Land Ref or mi n Paki st an"
Agency f or I nt er nat i onal
Devel opment . Spr i ng Revi ew.
Far nswor t h, Cl aude
"OPEC Set s up Ai d of $800
Mi l l i on "
NewYor k Ti mes, J anuar y 12.
1976
Fel dman, Her ber t
1967 Revol ut i on i n Paki st an: A Case
St udv of t he Mar t i al Law
Admi ni st r at i on.
London: Oxf ord Uni ver si t y Pr ess.
46
Fr ankel , F. R. and K. V. Vorys
1972 The Pol i t i cal Chal l enge of t he
Gr een Revol ut i on: Shi f t i ng
Myr dal , Gunnar
1968 Asi an Drama: An I nqui r y i nt o
t he Pover t v of Nat i ons
Pat t er ns of Peasant Par t i ci pat i on
i n I ndi a and Paki st an
Pr i ncet on Uni ver si t y: Cent er of
I nt er nat i onal St udi es, March.
Hai der , A. S. and Fr i t hj of Kuhnen
1974 "Land Tenur e and Rural Devel opment
i n Paki st an"
Land Ref orm. Land Set t l ement . and
Cooper at i ves, No. 1/2.
FA0
Hami d, Naved
1974
Her r i ng,
1974
"Al t er nat i ve Devel opment St rat egi es"
Mont hl y Revi ew, Oct ober.
Ronal d and Ghaf f ar M. Chaudhry
"The 1972 Land Ref or ms i n Paki st an
and Thei r Economi c I mpl i cat i ons:
A Pr el i mi nar y Anal ysi s"
The Paki st an Devel opment Revi ew, 13,
No. 3, Aut umn.
Hi r sch, G. P.
1972 "Some Fundament al s of Land Ref orm"
Oxf ord Agr ar i an St udi es, Vol . 1, No. 2.
J annuzzi , F. Tomasson
1974 Agr ar i an Cri si s i n I ndi a: The Case
of Bi har
Aust i n: Uni ver si t y of Texas Pr ess.
Lappe, Fr ances Moor e and J oseph Col l i ns
Washi ngt on, D. C. : I nst i t ut e f or Food
and Devel opment Pol i cy.
1976 Food Fi rst
Li ppi t , Vi ct or D.
1974 Land Ref or mand Economi c
Devel opment i n Chi na
Whi t e Pl ai ns, NewYor k: I nt er nat i onal
Art s and Sci ences Press.
Mel l or , J ohn W.
1966 The Economi cs of Agr i cul t ur al
Deve l oDment
I t haca, New Yor k: Cor nel l Uni ver si t y
Pr ess.
NewYor k: Pant heon.
Naseem, Muhammad
Credi t Avai l abi l i t y and t he
Vi abi l i t y of Smal l Far ms i n
t he Paki st ani Puni ab
~- ~~ ~
Act s Fi l e No. 646.
Nul t y, Lesl i e
1972 The Gr een Revol ut i on i n West
Paki st an. I mDl i cat i ons of
Technol ogi cal Channe
New York: Pr aeger Publ i sher s.
Oel haf , Robert
1976 "The Economi cs of Or gani c
Far mi ng"
Unpubl i shed Ph. D. Di sser t at i on
Depar t ment of Economi cs,
Uni ver si t y of Maryl and.
Paki st an, Gover nment of
1959 Report of t he Land Ref or ms
Commi ssi on f or West Paki st an
Lahor e : J anuar y.
Per el man, Mi chael
1977 Far mi ng f or Pr of i t i n a Hungry
Moncl ai r , New J ersey: Al l anhel d
Osmun .
Worl d
St er n, J oseph J . and Wal t er P. Fal con
1970 Growt h and Devel opment i n
Paki st an
Har var d Cent er f or I nt er nat i onal
Af f ai r s, No. 23, Apri l .
St i ver s, Robert L.
1976 The Sust ai nabl e Soci et y: Et hi cs
and Economi c Growt h
Phi l adel phi a: West mi nst er Press.
Tai , Hong- Chao
1974 Land Ref or mand Pol i t i cs: A
Compar at i ve Anal ysi s
Ber kel ey: Uni ver si t y of Cal i f or ni a
Pr ess.
47
Thorner, Dani el (Addend)
1956 Agrari an Prospect i n I ndi a
Del hi : Uni versi ty Press.
Warri ner, Doreen
1969 Land Reform: I n Pri nci pl e and
Practi ce
Oxford: Oxford Uni versi ty Press.
Wi l l i ams , Maurice J .
"The Aid Programs of the OPEC
Countri es I'
Forei gn Af f ai rs, J anuary.
1976
Parsons, Kenneth H. (ed.)
1956 Land Tenure
Madison, Wisconsin.
Schul tz, T.W.
1964 Transformi ng Tradi ti onal
Agri cul ture
New Haven.
AZI Z and GRAY
CONTI NUED
(Tabl es, p . 49-52)
48
AZI Z and GRAY
I
TABLE 1
2,524
LANDOWNERSHI P PATTERN I N
PAKI STAN (1960 CENSUS) (a)
WEST PAKI STAN
/I of Owner s (000)
% of Owner s
Ar ea Owned
(000 Acres)
% of Ar ea Owned
PUN JAB (b)
/I of Owner s (000)
% of Owner s
Ar ea Owned
(000 Acres)
% of Ar ea Owned
NWFP (c)
-
/I of Owner s (000)
% of Owner s
Ar ea Owned
(000 Acres)
% of Ar ea Owned
SI ND( ~)
/I of Owner s (000)
% of Owner s
Ar ea Owned
% of Ar ea Owned
3,266
64
7,427
15
2,312
67
4,332
16
7,700
70
2,506
32
93
30
343
3
1,452
29
15,438
32
968
28
10,285
39
237
22
1,984
25
142
45
1,786
18
25-100
Acres
286
6
10,616
22
131
3.8
5,642
21
76
7
1,546
19
51
17
2,311
23
100-500
Acres
57
1.2
7,671
16
17
0.5
3,493
13
11
1
854
10
23
8
I 25
Over 50(
Acres
6
. 1:
7,490
15.6
1.7
. O!
2,566
10
07
. O[
975
12
3
1
2,963
29
TOTAL
5,067
100
48,642
100
1,433,078
100
26,321
100
. ,096,777
100
I , 868,407
314
100
9,989
(a) Dat a compi l ed by t he Gover nment of Paki st an, pl anni ng commi ssi on, and suppl i ed
(b) Dat a f or 1954/55
(c) Dat a f or 1955
( d) Dat a f or 1946/47
SOURCE: Lesl i e Nul t y, The Gr een Revol ut i on i n West Paki st an, NewYork: . Pr aeger , 1972.
49
TABLE 2
RESULTS OF LAND REDI STRI BUTI ON I N
WEST PAKI STAN (1959-1965)
"THE 1958 LAND REFORM"
Uni t of Land: Acr e
Landowner shi p on t he eve of
Red i s t r i but i on
Tot al # of owner s
Tot al ar ea of owned l and ( acres)
Expect ed Cover age of Redistribution/Expropriation
Number of l andowner s
Ar ea of l and owned ( acres)
Act ual I mpact of Redistribution/Expropriation
Number of owner s act ual l y af f ect ed
Tot al ar ea of l and owned by af f ect ed owner s
Tot al ar ea of l and t r ansf er r ed t o hei r s/ dependent s
**Tot al ar ea of l and acqui r ed by gover nment
Types of Gover nment - Acqui r ed Land
Cul t i vat ed l and
Uncul t i vat ed l anda
Di sposi t i on of Gover nment - Acqui r ed Land
Land l eased ( acr es)
Land sol d t o t enant s ( acres)
Land auct i oned and sol d to ot her s ( acres)
Tot al ar ea of l and r edi st r i but ed
Number of f ar mer s pur chased l and
5, 068, 376
48, 642, 530
6, 061
7, 490, 933
910
6, 106, 631
505, 695
2, 220, 718
823, 062
1, 080, 726
36, 643
662, 199
226, 258
993, 489
56, 906
(a) I ncl udes uncul t i vabl ewast e, f or est , under r i ver .
SOURCE: Hung- Chao Tai , Land Ref or mand Pol i t i cs: A Compar at i ve Anal ysi s, Ber kel ey:
Uni ver si t y of Cal i f or ni a Pr ess, 1974.
50
TABLE 3
RESULTS OF LAND REFORM ( 1972)
I N PAKI STAN, TO 31 MARCH 1974
Expect ed Cover age of Expropriation/Redistribution
Number of Owners
Act ual I mpact of Expropriation/Redistribution
Number of Owner s
Ar ea Owned by Owner s ( acres)
Tot al Ar ea Acqui red by Gover nment ( acres)
Di sposi t i on of Government - Acqui red Land ( acres)
Tot al Ar ea Di sposed of ( acres)
Number of f ar mer s and t enant s
al l ot t ed l and
Tot al Ar ea Tr ansf er r ed as a % of Tot al
Cul t i vat ed Ar ea i n Paki st an
Tot al Ar ea Resumed by Gover nment as a
% of Tot al Cul t i vat ed Ar ea i n Paki st an
I ncome Redi st r i but ed as a % of Nat i onal
Agr i cul t ur al I ncome
11, 990
2, 048
1, 754, 926
850, 150
267, 989
40, 194
0.55%
1. 7%
2. 0%
SOURCE: Uni t ed Nat i ons: "Progress i n Land Ref or m, 6t h Report , " New Yor k,
1976, pp. 70.
51
TABLE 4
OUTPUT AND LABOR I NPUT
PER ACRE BY SI ZE OF HOLDI NGS
I N PAKI STAN
SI ZE OF
HOLDI NG
S mal l H ol di ng
(0 - 12. 5 A cr es)
Medi um H ol di ng
( 12. 6 - 25. 0 A cr es)
Large H ol di ng
( 25. 1 - 50. 0 A cr es)
V er y L ar ge H ol di ng
( A bove 50. 0 A cr es)
VALUE OF OUTPUT LABOR I NPUT (MAN-DAYS)
PER CULTI VATED ACRE PER CULTI VATED ACRE
(RUPEES)
(MAN-DAY S )
467.78 83. 8
391. 51 48. 4
258.99 45.6
134 . 35 --
SOURCE: Chaudhr y and H er r i ng, op. ci t. , pp. 261, 264.
TABLE 5
DAI LY PER CAPI TA CALORI E I NTAKE I N
THE RURAL AREAS I N PAKI STAN
* Data taken f r om Gunnar Myrdal 's A s i an Drama, New Y or k: Pantheon, 1968, p . 544.
YEAR AVERAGE CALORI E
I NTAKE
( T o t al R ur al A r ea)
1949/ 50* 2, 010
CALORI E I NTAKE (AVERAGE)
BY POOR WI TH I NCOME
L ESS THAN Rs. 250 PER
A"UM
--
1957/ 59* 1, 980 --
1963/ 64 1, 988 1,897
1968169 1, 974 1, 857
1969/ 70 1, 983 1,815
1970171 1,950 1, 810
1971/ 72 1, 898 1,736
SOURCE: Talat A l l auddi n, "Mass Poverty i n Paki stan," Paki stan Devel opment
Revi ew, V ol . X I V , No. 4 , p . 444. Winter, 1975.
52