Philosophy of Language

Allen Jeffrey Gurfel

What are the two dogmas of empiricism, according to Quine? Why does he allege
that the two are, in fact, at root identical? Explain in your own words. How do Grice
and Strawson suggest the notion of analyticity might be retained in a modified form?
Is this maneuver successful, in your view? Why or why not?

In his paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism W.V.O. Quine argues that empiricists have
taken two beliefs for granted, each of these a mere metaphysical article of faith.

First, Quine calls out the lack of a principled distinction between analytic and
synthetic truths. Such a distinction is not on firm ground and the faith that there is
such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists.

Quine outlines the trouble for several attempts at elaborating analyticity. For
example: if we attempt to ground analyticity in synonymy then we owe an
elaboration of synonymy. There is one case in which this might work: when we
conjure up a synonym with an express definition and agree to use it in the explicitly
specified manner by convention. This is not, however, typical of synonyms and so
doesnt meet the bill in the majority of cases. We cant simply refer to the dictionary
definition since the lexicographer is not inventing synonymous words in the way
stated above but rather recording an empirical observation about words and their
common usage. If we attempt to give an account of synonymy (in the way required
to ground analyticity) in terms of interchangeability salva veritate we still run into
the problem outlined presently. Take the statement Necessarily all and only
bachelors are bachelors. If this statement is true and bachelors is interchangeable
salva veritate with unmarried men, then the following statement is also true:
Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men. It follows that the statement
All and only bachelors are unmarried men is an analytic statement. Here, Quines
gripe is with the word necessarily. If we are considering a purely extensional
language, then synonymy boils down to something weaker than desired. All and
only bachelors are unmarried men may be true but so only accidentally. Its true in
virtue of extensional agreement, but then there is also extensional agreement
between creature with a heart and creature with a kidney. Yes, they pick out an
identical set of creatures, but they mean obviously different things and suggest no
logical necessity. The intentional term necessarily doesnt do the trick for us
because it is intelligible only in the context of a language in which the notion of
analyticity is already understood in advance.

Neither can we appeal to brute postulates in a simplified, artificial language that
eliminates the complexities and convolutions of natural language. The rules of the
language may point out which of its statements are analytic. However, this wont tell
us what analyticity itself consists in. The set of analytic statements in this language
will be a subset of true statements in the language, such that each member is true in
virtue of a semantic rule. But what exactly is this semantic rule? There might be
numerous rules that pick out subsets of true statements in the language in terms of
various arbitrary rules. This brings us no closer to an account specifically of
analyticity.

Second, Quine attacks a darling of empiricism, the verification theory of meaning
and reductionism.

The verification theory is that the meaning of a statement is the method of
empirically confirming or infirming it. It aims to tie statements to particular states
of the world and our sensory-experiential access to those states. Only those
statements which can be confirmed or infirmed empirically by experience, and
thereby judged either true or false, are meaningful. In this context, an analytical
statement is one which logically always confirmed, it is confirmed come what may.

Quine takes it as settled that analyticity is not on firm ground. He further denies that
a statement can be confirmed or disconfirmed in isolation from all other statements.
For Quine, these are all part of a web. Some statements we hold to be true or false
are more recalcitrant than others. We may revise them in light of experience, but
there is an attendant revision of other parts of our web of beliefs. Furthermore, only
a portion of our beliefs, our affirmations of various statements as true or false, are
on the periphery, so to speak, directly in touch with experience. The main point for
Quine is that there are no analytic statements if by that we mean statements that are
confirmed come what may. All statements can, under that definition, be analytic
statements provided were willing to make the necessary revisions elsewhere in our
webnothing is immune to revision, not even our statements of logical rules. This
insistence on considering the whole web of beliefs undermines verificationisms
hope of grounding analyticity in synonymy by defining synonymous statements
considered on their own, in isolation as those with identical methods of empirical
confirmation and information.

H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson argue, in their paper In Defense of a Dogma, that Quine,
for all that he has shown and argued, is not justified in his wholesale dismissal of the
analytic/synthetic distinction as illusory.

First, Grice and Strawson question Quines conditions for an adequate elaboration of
the distinction, suggesting that they may be so strict as to rule out any and all
elaboration.

Second, they offer a possible explanation of the distinction, without using any of the
related terms Quine rules out as equally in need of clarification, such that would
enable a user of the terms analytic and synthetic to use them in the correct way, in
agreement with how they are typically used.

Third, they focus on the fact that these terms have been applied, consistently and
with great uniformity, by a huge portion of philosophers in the Western tradition.

This all adds up to a very strong prima facie plausibility for the analytic/synthetic
distinction. We can emphasize this initial plausibility by noting that Quine would
have to hold that the phrases means the same as and does not mean the same as
amount to meaninglessness. Further, it would follow that sentences could have no
meaning at all, since the question What does this sentence mean? would become
unanswerable.

In sum, that the distinction is not (yet) perfectly rigorous does not suggest that it
does not exist, especially in the face of such great prima facie plausibility.

Next Grice and Strawson turn to Quines counter-position about webs of belief.
Quines theory does not foreclose on the coherence of the analytic/synthetic
distinction. Rather, it demands an alteration or amendment that takes into
consideration and accounts for the possible revisions in the web. Essentially, they
suggest we can add a ceteris parabus clause: All we have to say now is that two
statements are synonymous if and only if any experiences which, on certain
assumptions about the truth-values of other statements, confirm or disconfirm one of
the pair, also, on the same assumptions, confirm or disconfirm the other to the same
degree. Here we can accept Quines theory and preserve a synonymy account of
analyticity. Similarly, we can accept Quines revisability in principle of everything
we say and maintain our account of analyticity so long as we can make sense of the
idea of conceptual revision. We can admit that there is no necessity to maintain one
conceptual scheme over another conceptual scheme, but still hold that analyticity
makes perfect sense within any given conceptual scheme.

I agree with Grice and Strawsons criticism of Quines attacks on the attempts to
rigorously delineate analytic and synthetic truths. It is an immensely plausible
distinction. Grice and Strawson clearly illustrate the difference between logical and
natural impossibility with their example. Quine has not made any argument to the
effect that it is either a) in principal impossible to clearly draw the distinction or b)
necessary to do so. It seems an empirical fact that countless competent users have
been able to make the distinction with great consistency. I think this suggests that
there is, in fact, a principled distinction there and so the faith in this distinction is
not mere unempirical dogma.

I also agree that analyticity can be preserved in Quines theory in precisely the way
Grice and Strawson broadly outline. That analyticity should apply within a given
conceptual scheme is clear. I dont think its an objection to it that Bob, whos lost his
damn mind, can begin to deny the analyticity of All bachelors are married men
granted that all the beliefs he previously held have been thrown into complete
disarray. We get nowhere fast if we just claim If you go crazy enough, you can
believe anything you want no matter what. Just as Quine accepts certain truths
about logic and reason, certain definitions of terms, when he writes a paper, and
uses these to construct arguments which follow granted certain other beliefs, so too
are some statements analytic granted the avowed truth of certain other statements
and beliefs.

It seems that for Quine to deny this he would have to say that those statements are
precisely not analytic and so because some fact about his web theory makes them
very much not what were looking for in an analytic statement. This would require
him to say what we are looking for in an analytic statement. He is presumably
unable to do so (because then, problem solved) or able to do so only in terms of
verificationism. But weve already seen how that account can be amended to work
with Quines theory. Then any statement might be an analytic given certain other
beliefs. The same statement might be analytic for one person with belief set X and
not analytic for another person with belief set Y. Can we make sense of that? Well,
like with anything, given certain beliefs we can. It seems, then, that we can preserve
the distinction but not without undermining the concept, moving it into a very
subjective realm of private meanings and beliefs. But then, wasnt it that to begin
with, only with the added assumption that we were all, though subjectively, more or
less on the same page, sharing many of the relevant beliefs? I think we often are and
do and so the distinction is useful, fairly clear, principled in some way or other, and
pragmatic. If we see this as a downgrade for analyticity, so be it. We should be
careful about the philosophical work we want analytic statements to doasking if,
on Grice and Strawsons Quinean view of analyticity, they are capable of bearing the
load. (We might also ask what difference the degree of truth and falsity of the
background beliefs might make. For Quine, given his remarks about the
mythological gods and physical objects, this question might be beside the point.) If it
turns out that they cant do the logical work weve had them doing, if unmasked they
were left with no pragmatic purpose, then maybe I would agree with Quine that the
distinction is not only useless but illusory, like a ghost lifting weights.