FACTS Respondent was agency administration officer of petitioner John Hancock Life Insurance Corporation. She was placed under preventive suspension by petitioner after being being positively identified thru a security video as the person using the corporate affairs manager after the latters wallet was stolen. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that petitioner terminated her employment without cause, following the dismissal of the complaint for qualified theft filed against her in the city prosecutors office due to insufficiency of evidence.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was valid cause for her dismissal. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. The Court of Appeals found that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC merely adopted the findings of the NBI regarding the respondents culpability and therefore reversed their decisions.
ISSUE Whether or not the respondents dismissal was valid
RULING Yes. Article 282 of the Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate an employment for (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representatives in connection with his work; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In this case, petitioner dismissed respondent based on the NBI's finding that the latter stole and used the managers credit cards. But since the theft was not committed against petitioner itself but against one of its employees, respondent's misconduct was not work-related and therefore, she could not be dismissed for serious misconduct.
Nonetheless, Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another in general or in specific detail.[13] For an employee to be validly dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282, the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the employee.
A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or omission attesting to an employee's moral depravity. Theft committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.
The resolution of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The resolution of the NLRC is reinstated.
464 Yrasuegi v Philippine Air Lines 569 SCRA 467 (2008) Just Causes Analogous Cases
FACTS This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL. In 1984, the petitioners weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to. On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately.
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties. NLRC affirmed. The Court of Appeals ruled that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner was validly dismissed
RULING YES. A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code on analogous cases.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
The Court held that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, voluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
465 Alabang Country Club v NLRC 545 SCRA 351 (2008) Just Causes Analogous Cases
FACTS Petitioner is a domestic non-profit corporation and respondent union is the exclusive bargaining agent of the Clubs rank-and-file employees. Private respondents Pizarro, Barza and Castueras, were elected Union President, Vice-President and Treasurer, respectively. In 1999, the Club and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement which provided for a Union shop and maintenance of membership shop. Section 5 of the CBA provides that Upon written demand of the Union and after observing due process, the Club shall dismiss a regular rank-and-file employee on the ground of failure to join, or resignation from, the Union; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; and malversation of union funds, among others.
After elections for a new set of officers, an audit was conducted on the Union funds. Unrecorded entries, unaccounted expenses and disbursements, and uncollected loans from the Union funds were discovered. The Union notified respondents Pizarro, Barza and Castueras of the audit results and were asked to explained the discrepancies therein. Despite their explanations, they were expelled from the Union.
Subsequently, the Union, invoking the Security Clause of the CBA, demanded that the Club dismiss the respondents in view of their expulsion from the Union. The Club required the respondents to show cause why they should not be dismissed. The Clubs General Manager called them for an informal conference inquiring about the charges against them. Claiming that such are baseless, the general manager announced that he would conduct a formal investigation.
After weighing the verbal and written explanations of the respondents, the Club concluded that said respondents failed to refute the validity of their expulsion from the Union. Thus, it was constrained to terminate the employment of said respondents. Respondents filed a complaint of illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the club. NLRC declared the dismissal illegal. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRC ruling that the respondents were deprived due process.
ISSUE Whether the respondents were illegally dismissed
RULING Under the Labor Code, an employee may be validly terminated on the grounds under Articles 282-285. Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of the union security clause in the CBA. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit or the agreement is terminated. Termination of employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is recognized and accepted in our jurisdiction.
In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the union's decision to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the CBA's union security provision.
In this case, the requisites were satisfied; the three respondents were expelled from and by the Union after due investigation for acts of dishonesty and malversation of Union funds. In accordance with the CBA, the Union properly requested the Club to enforce the Union security provision in their CBA and terminate said respondents. Then, in compliance with the Union's request, the Club reviewed the documents submitted by the Union, requested said respondents to submit written explanations, and thereafter afforded them reasonable opportunity to present their side. After it had determined that there was sufficient evidence that said respondents malversed Union funds, the Club dismissed them from their employment conformably with Sec. 4(f) of the CBA.