UNI TED S TATES DI S TRI CT COURT S OUTHERN DI S TRI CT OF NEW Y O R K

_ . . - _ - _ - . . . . X :
MARCUS I SAI AH WASHI NGTON, :
Plaintiff :
-against-
WI L L I AM MORRI S ENDEAVOR
ENTERTAI NMENT, L L C, formerly known as the
WI L L L ^Vl MORRI S AGENCY, I NC.,
JEFF MEADE and SARAH WI NI ARSK I ,
Civil Action No. 10 Civ. 9647 (PKC) (JCF)
Defendants.
-X
P LAI NTI FF' S E ME R G E N C Y FE D . R. CI V. P. 60 "FRAUD UPON T H E COURT' ' MOTI ON. OR
I N T H E A L T E R N A T I V E . P LAI NTI FF' S MOTI ON T O R E S T O R E IN FORMA PAUPERI S
STATUS IN ORDER TO AP P EAL FR A U D U L E N T L Y P ROCURE D ORDERS O F RE P UB L I CAN
APPOI NTED FE D E R A L J UDGE P. K E V I N C A S T E L . DEMAND FOR E X P E D I T E D O R A L
HEARI NG.
Marcus Isaiah Washington
54 Boerum St., Apt. 6M
Brooklyn, NY 11206
(646) 504-6497
humanrights. areamust@gmail. com
Pro 5e Litigant
I . I NTRODUCTI ON
I , pro se Plaintiff, Marcus I saiah Washington, submit this Motion' in responseto theSeptember 5, 2014
Final Order issued by Republican appointed federal judgeP. Kevin Castel and theSeptember 9, 2014
Judgment issued by theClerk of Court, Ruby J. Krajick. See Exhibit A.
After erroneously compelling this landmark employment discrimination and human rights caseinto
arbitration on July 20, 2011, I patiently waited 32 months to receivean Award issued by theAmerican
Arbitration Association so that 1 could personally address thefederal judgewho intentionally "ignored my
argiunents, omitted pertinent facts and misapphed thelaw" in order to prevent an knpartial jury from
determirung themerits of my claims. Despiteseeking Castel's disqualification in my 97 pageMarch 17,
2014 Fraud Upon theCourt Motion dueto what I perceived to bethe"appearance" and/or "actual" racial
bias, prejudice, impropriety and partiality with thetwo federal judges who wereappointed to my case-
Castel and MagistrateJudgeJames C. Francis I V - Castel and Francis both refiised to recusethemselves,
whileCastel continued to render decisions that flouted thelaw, ignored compelling evidencein support of
my arguments and violated my dueprocess. SmceCastel denied"nfy request for an oral hearing as "moof'
beforerendering his deceptively written Final Order, 1 havespent a considerableamount of timeuntangling
diemany factual and legal errors contained tiiroughout his various decisions sincetheinception of my case.
Widi less tiian a week beforethis Motion was due, I decided to scrapthe"voluminous" pleading I was
working on (which totaled 89 pages singled-spaced) becausetheodds of Castel admitting any wrongdomg
at this latestagein thelitigation is slimto none, especially when 1 accused himof abusing his power and
engaging in acts that areworthy of impeachment.
As with all of thepleadings that I havesubmitted throughout this case, my goal is to realign the
record back in thedirection of Onth, so that whether I 'mdead or alive, justicewi l l beserved and oneday,
my namewi l l bevindicated. Should Castel not grant therelief requested, this Motion is basically a
condensed version of the"good faith" argiunents that wi l l bemadeto theSecond Circuit, to demonstrate
' For thelast 28 days, I havespent morethan 360 hours (80 hours a week), working on this Motion and I now realize
that it's futilefor meto meto continue. Thearguments raised in my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon dieCourt Motion
demonstratethat WilliamMorris has engaged in a 116 year pattemand continuing practiceof racial discrimination
against African Americans in employment and discriminated against mebecauseof my race, color and/or national
origin in violation of theCivil RightsAct of 1964, New York City Human Rights Laws, P. Kevin Castel's September
5, 2018 Final Order is erroneous as a matter of law and that WilliamMorris Endeavor Entertainment (formerly the
WilliamMorris Agency), along with their co-conspirators - Loeb & Loeb LLP, P. Kevin Castel, theAmerican
Arbittation Association, Robert P. Patterson. TheSouthern District of New York, theSecond Circuit, Michael P.
Zweig, Christian Carbone, Timothy K. Lewis, theUnited States of America and others - arein engaging in a
conspiracy to interferewith thehuman rightsof African Americans and peopleof African descent. I n order to deprive
meof my constitutional and statutory rights under thecolor of law, P. Kevin Castel violated theConstitution, thelaw,
numerous Canons under theJudicial Codeof Conduct, as well as his Oathof Office. I n short, heshould beimpeached.
I canfill in theblanks in my appeal to theSecond Circuit or "under oath" beforea jury trial in a separateaction when
I sueP. Kevin Castel for intentionally depriving meof my rights under thecolor of law.
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that: (1.) P. Kevin Castel has intentionally conspired to deprive me of my constitutional and statutory rights
undCT the color of law, because of my race, color, national origin and/or pro se status in violation of 18
U.S.C. 242, 18 U.S.C. 241, die Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 as codified as 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) and 42
U.S.C. 1983 and should be disqualified fi-om diis case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2106 and (2.) Loeb& Loeb
LLP and attorney Michael P. Zweig have engaged in an egregious "pattem" of "fi^ud upon the Court" on
WilliamMorris' behalf m two racial discrimination and antitrust cases, ultimately warranting the imposition
of exfreme disciplinary and monetary sanctions, including default judgment on all claims and $250 million
for engaging in "highly unethical and criminal conduct," violating numerous Rules imder the New York
Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as violating New York Judiciary Law 487 and additional laws.
XL PROCEDURAL fflSTORY OF WASmNGTON V. WI L L I AM MORRIS
ENDEAVOR E NT . et a L
I have provided a detailed procediu-al history throughout most of my pleadings, including my March 17,
2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion and April 10,2014 Motion for Reconsideration. I wrote a very detailed
summary of this case's procedural history throughout the Southern District of New York, Second Circuit
and the American'Arbitiation Association for this Motion, but opted to include it instead as an exhibit, in
order to conserve space. See Exhibit B. I t is extremely important that the reader become somewhat familiar
with the procedural history of this case, since I amaccusing WilliamMorris, Loeb& LoebLLP, the
American Arbitiation Association, P. Kevin Castel and others of engaging in "fi-aud upon the Cowt,"
intentionally depriving me of my constitutional and stamtory rights under the color of law, and engaging in
a larger conspiracy to interfere with the hiunan rights of people of Afiican descent.
The original arbitiator in this case - David L. Gregory of the American Arbitration Association -
stated throughout his decisions: "I n my thirty years as an Arbitiator of Labor & En^loyment Disputes, this
case presents the most extensive Motion practice that I have encountered" [Arbitrator Gregory Partial Final
Award, 3.] I n the 9 months that have elapsed since he was fraudulently disqualified by the American
Arbitration Association after finding that I proved by a "preponderance of the evidence" that "William
Morris Endeavor Entertainment LLC discriminated against [me] in violation of pertinent federal, state, local
law prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race" and indicating that I would be awarded
the fiill gamut of monetary damages, including back pay, fi-ont pay, compensatory & punitive damages,
"recompense... for avoidable delays" and "reasonable fees and costs, as a pro se non-attomey prevading
party on statutory claims in a case of considerable procedural and substantive complexity,"^this case has
^Arbitrator Gregory awarded WilhamMorris and Loeb& LoebLLP $1,000.00 for libel. ("I FI ND that Claimant
libeled Respondert and Respondent's attomeys. Claimant states that he raised claims that Messrs. Zweig and Carbone
engaged in 'criminal conduct on WilliamMorris' behalf ...conspiracy, collusion, and fraud" violating, inter alia,
RI CO. I award the $1,000 counterclaimof Respondent. This $1,000 shall be subtracted fromthe money damages
only become even more compUcate4 confusing and wmplex, largely due to the intOTtional
raters of Republican ^pointed federal judge P. Kevin Castel. [Arbitrator Gregory Partial Final Award, 1.]
ra. L E G A L STANDARD FOR RE VI E W: FE D. R. CI V. P. 60.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), oneof the grounds warranting "relief fromafinal judgment, order, or
proceeding" is "fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct
by an opposing party," or pursuant to 60(b)(6), "any other reason that justifies reUef" "The standard for
granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration wil l generally be denied unless the moving part can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - maters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader v. CSX Transp.. Inc.. 70 F.3d
255,257 (2d Cir. 1995). The catchall provision for "any other reason that justifies relief reqmres a showing
of "extraordinary circumstances." Gonzalez v. Crosby. 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2006).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) grants the Court "other powers to grant reUef and states that this "rule does
not limit a court's power to" "set aside a judgment for fraud on the court" Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3)
(emphasis added). Although Castel proooodote deny my Motion for Reconsideration under Fed. R.'Civ>P.
60(b), he makes no mention of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d), although my both of my Motions alleged tflat Michael \o,
P. Zweig, Christian Carbone and Loeb & Loeb LLP were engaging in a "pattem" of "fraud upon the C o ur t , " ^^^
were violating many rules under the New York Rules of Professional Conduct and New York Judiciary | ^a^\rf^
Law 487 - thus warranting the imposition of heavy disciplinary and monetary sanctions, including defauh
judgment on all claims or having the case^^^^f^J^^^^^^P^ District of New York.
According to the New York Rules of Civil Pfooodure, "fraud" "denotes conduct that is fraudulent
under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction or has a purpose to deceive,
provided that it does not include conduct that, although characterized as fi:audulent by statute or
administrative rule, lacks an element of scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or knowing failure to
correct misrepresentations that can be reasonably expected to induce detrimental rehance by another."
Rule l.O(i). Fraud upon die Court. It is well established that "a decision produced by firaud upon flie
court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes finaL" Kennerv. C.I.R.. 387 F.3d 689 (1968);
see also, The People of die State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling. 357 m. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The
maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to
contracts and odier tiansactions."); Allen F. Moorev. Stanley F. Sievers. 336 111. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929)
("The maximthat fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters..."); In re Village of Willowbrook.
awarded to Claimant. Rather than clutter this Partial Final Award with a litany of libel, I direct Respondent's lawyers
to provide alist of case citations corroborating Claimant's unprotected speech as libelous/defamatory to theAAA to
forward to Claimant and copied to me." [Arbitrator Gregory Partial Final Award, 11-12.]
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37I ll.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."), (emphasis added) This caselaw
has been cited sinceI accused Loeb & LoebLLP, Michael P. Zweig and WilliamMorris of engaging in a
"pattem" of "fraud upon theCourt" in my third/fourth appeal to theSecond Circuit.
IV. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THAT P. KEVI N CASTEL HAS
INTENTIONALLY DEPRIVED ME OF MY CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
RIGHTS UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW DUE TO MY RACE, COLOR, AND/OR
NATIONAL ORIGIN AND IS ENGAGING IN A LARGER CONSPIRACY TO
I NTFERE WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PEOPLE OF AFRICAN DESCENT.
IiQQqQIQ^Q] SinceI filed acomplaint with theSouthern District of New York on December 21, 2010,1
havenever had theopportunity to speak under oatii at an oral hearing. I havenever met P. Kevin Castel,
nor have I ever stepped foot in his courtroom. I ammaking somepretty serious allegations against a
supposedly "honorable" federal judge, therefore, oneof theonly ways to demonstrate the "appearance"
and/or "actual" racial bias, prejudice, impropriety and partiality with thejudges assigned to this case, is
through thei^Le, extremely important decisions diat hehas madein this case.
A. Kthical ()bli"ation.s (tf Artick- III I cdtriil .Indies and the I nethical .\ctions olP. Ke\iii ( asU'l|
'TKU i*vf|(cJ-
Vj>.e)-<* Throughout thehistory of theUnited States of America, majority of the federal judges who have been
^l ^' ^^^^^ppoi nted to thebench have been whitemales. On March 5, 2003, Castel was nominated by President
r^or^ \iU GeorgeW. Bush to a seat on dieDistrict Court for theSouthern District of New York vacated by Lawrence
C<,|4M M. McKenna. Castel was confirmed by theUnited States Senateon September 17, 2003, and received his
1>tY*ecA^tMj. commission on September 22, 2003. In his Oath of OfQce, dated September 22, 2003, hestated:
" I wil l support and defend the Constimtion of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic; tiiat 1wil l bear truefaith and allegianceto the same; diat I taketius obligation freely, without
any mental reservation or purposeof evasion; and that I wil l well and faithfidly dischargetheduties of
theoffice on which I amabout to enter. So help meGod."
TheUnited States Constimtion provides 5* and 14* Amendments.
TheJ udicial Code of Conduct "provides guidance forjudges on issuesof judicial integrity and
independence, judicial diligenceand impartiality, permissibleextra-judicial activities, and theavoidanceof
impropriety or even its appearance." I discussed thesethings in moredetail on pages 4 through 8 of my
March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon dieCourt Motion. Sec Exhibit C .
J udicial opinions areintegral to thefunction of theAmerican judicial system, acting as the"vehicles
by which the judiciary elucidates, expounds upon, and creates rights for Americans."^"J udicial
independence [is] theimportant principle that judges befreeto decide cases based on diefacts beforethem
and applicablelaw, without outside pressureand influences. However, judicial independence is predicated
' AlifyaV. Curtin, Gerald Lebovits and Lisa Solomon. Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing. TheGeorgetown Journal of
Legal Ethics. Vol. 21. pg. 244. 2008.
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on 'good faidi' decision-making. It was never intended to include 'bad-faith' decision-making, where a
judge knowingly and deliberately disregards the facts and law of a case. This is properly the subject of
disciplinary review, irrespectiveof whether it is correctable on appeal. And egregious error also constimtes
misconduct, since its nature and/or magnitude presuppose that a judge acted willfidly, or that he is
incompetent.'"*
Over the course of nearly four years, Castel has issued fomdeceptively written and one-sided
Orders i n this case: (1.) July 20, 2011 Order which stayed the case in the federal court and compelled the
case to be arbitrated before the American Arbitration Association ("Stay Order"), (2.) March 7, 2014 Order
modifying his March 3, 2014 Order directing menot to submit my Fraud Upon the Court Motion within
90 days after Arbitrato^regory issued his December 17, 2013 Partial Final Award, (3.) March 27, 2014
der refiising to disqualify himself ("Castel's March 27, 2014 Order") and (4.) die September 5, 2014
der confirming the Final Award issued by AAA board of director and Schnader LLP attomey Timothy
K. Lewis, which "dismissed my casewith prejudice and on the merits," awarded William Morris
$43,707.60 due to my alleged "bad faith" conduct, revoked my in forma pauperis status despite being aware
of my dire economic circumstances and prejudicing my appeal, by falsely stating thati f I decided to appeal,
it would not be made in "good faidi."
"[N]o man in this country is so high diat that he is above the law." United States v. Hastings. 681
F.2d 706,711 (11th Cir. 1982). Despite the power invested in judges, they are not Gods, nor are they "moral
or intellertual giants."^Out of Judicial Codeof Conduct's five Canons, P. Kevin Castel has violated at least
four i n this case.^The ultimate reason why all of Castel's decisions are erroneous as a matter of law in this
* Sassower, pg. 92.
' Richard A. Posner. Haw Judges Think, pg. 7. 2008.
* Canon 1: "An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justicein our society. A judge should maintain
and enforce high standards of conduct and should personally observe those standards, so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved." In the Commentary for this Canon, it states; "Although judges
should be independent, they must comply with the law and should comply with this Code." Canon 2(A): "A judge
should respect and comply with the law and should act at all timesin a manner that promotes public confidencein the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
Canon 2(B): "A judge should not allow family, social, political, financial, or other relationships to
influence iadicial conduct or iudement." (emphasis added). In the Commentary for Canon 2, it states: "An
appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds, with knowledge of ail the relevant circumstances
disclosed bv a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that the Judge's honest, integrity, impartiality, temperament.
or fitness to serve as a judge is impaired. Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and appearance of improDriety. This
prohibition applies to both professional and personal conduct...Actual improprieties under this standard
include violations of law, court rules, or other specific provisions of this Code."
Canon 3(A)(1); "A judge should befaithful to, and maintain professional competencein, the law and should
not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of criticism." Canon 3(A)(4); "A judge should accord to
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employment disorimination and human rights case, is becausehe has intentionally refiised to acknowledge
the now imrefiited pyramid of evidence demonstrating WiUiamMorris' intentional pattemand practjc^of
discriminating against Afiican Americans in employment, he has refiised to ^. I no^^^^j . j ^^^
the things that cannot berefiited, Castel simply ignores it, pretends that the arguments were never raised
and makes no mention of it his Orders - actions that have deprived me of my constitutional and stamtory *t</ied p-^
rights under the color of law. As demonsfrated in titej^roceeding paragraphs, the outcome of this casethus "^ij^ o^
far was largely predetermined and procured through fraud. '^^o^k'v^l?Jm
11?. Detlnin*; Kacisni and V Brief Kxphination of \ h\e ( i\il Rights Act <tf 1964 \ s Passed in the
I nited States of .Vnicrita.l I Since whites and blacks often have different views on race, and the Defendants,
as well as then: counsel and even someof the finder of facts [predominately aU-white/"Jewish" males] have
called me "racist" and "anti-Semitic," it's important for me to define and discuss what racismis early on in
this pleading. Adolph Reed wrote that racism"is not an affliction... Nor is it a thing that can act on its own;
it exists only as it is reproduced in specific social arrangements in specific societies under historically
specific conditions of law, state, and class power."^In her book titiedlhe Isis^ (TSSIS) Pcqjers: The Keys to the
Colors, general and child psychologist Dr. Frances Cress-Welsing provides a "fimctional definition of
racism" and describes "global white supremacy (racism)" as:
"the local and global power system structured and maintained bv persons who classify tfaemselves
as white, whether consciously or subconsciously determined; this system consists of patterns of
perception, logic, symbol formation, thought, speech, action and emotion response, as conducted
simultaneously in all areas of people activity (economics, education, entertainment, labor, law,
politics, religion, sex and war). The ultimate purpose of the system is to prevent white genetic
annihilation on Earth - a planet in which the overwhelming majority of people are classified as
non-white (black, brown, red and yellow) bv white-skinned people. All of the non-white people
are genetically dominant (in terms of skin coloration) compared to the genetically recessive white-
skinned people." (emphasis added).
^>**/e^ 0s/ic> "A key feature of any defimtion of discrimmation is its focus on behavior. Discrimmation is distinct from
*^l*tKacial prejudice (attimdes), racial stereotypes (beliefs), and racism(ideologies) that may also be associated
every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, and that person's lawyer, thefiill right to be heard according to
law."
Paul Frymer. Courts, Labor Law, and theInstitutional Constmction of Racial Animus. The American Poltiical
Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (August 2005). pg. 374
* Dr. Frances Cress-Welsing, The Isis (YSSIS) Papers: The Keys to the Colors, p. vii, ("Isis was the most important
goddess of ancient Africa (specifically, Egypt). She was the sister/wife of the most important Egyptian god, Osiris
("Lord of the perfect Black"), and the mother of Homs. In the astral interpretation of the Egyptian gods, Isis was
equated with the dog star Sirius (Sothis). According to the ancient African story, after the murder and dismemberment
of Osiris by his evil brother Set (Seth), Isis discovered the crime, recovered the pieces of the body of Osiris, and put
themtogether again, restoring his existence and his power. According to legend, Isis admired tmth and justice and
madejustice stronger than gold and silver")
with racial disadvantage. Discrimination may be motivated by prejudice, stereotypes, or racism, but the
; definition of discrimination does not presiune any unique imderlying cause."'
On July 2, 1964 Congress passed theCivil Right Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to
2000e-17. TideV I I was a direct legislative byproduct of theblack-led civil rights movement^" and the
larger struggle of African Americans to live free from both ipvidious and institutional racism in afl
areas of life in America." The Act states that i t is unlawfid for an employer to: (1) "fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individuaL or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions^ or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin" or (2) "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the
objectives of TideV I I are two-fold: (1.) to remedy individual injuries of discrimination and (2.) to end
workplace discrimination. ,,,,
While the main thmst, initially, was to prohibit purposefiil discrimination. I nternational Broth. Of
Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324,335 n. 15 (1977) ("[u]ndoubedly disparate treatment was the most
obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted TideV I I "), "i t was clear to Congress that '[t]he crux of
the problem [was] to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been
traditionally closed to them,'...and it was to this problem that Titie V I I 's prohibition against racial
discrimination i n employment was primarily addressed." United Steelworkers of America. AFL-CI O-CLC
V.Weber. 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979) {quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)). See also,
McDonnell Douglas v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) ("The fanguaee of Titie VQ makes plain the
purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate, those
' Hana Shepherd and Devah Pager, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing,
Credit, and Consumer Markets. 34 Annu. Rev. Sociol 181, 182 (2008).
'"See e.g,. Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years (PBS television broadcast, 1986). Each episode of this
six part series can be viewed on Youtube.; see also, Daniel B. Rodriquez and Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on theCivil Rights Act and I ts Interpretation. 151 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1417, (2002).
" Adjoa Artis Aiyetoro. Can We Talk? How Triggers for Unconscious Racism Strengthen the Importanceof Dialogue.
22 Nat'l Black L. J. 1, 21 (Fall 2009) (""During slavery and Jim Crow it was not unusual for African descendants to
be treated in debasing ways, including being address with demeaning labels such as 'nigger.' Race and racism were
part of the very fabric of the society, and although other racial groups were treated in a discriminatory fashion, the
premier story of racism in the United States has been the treatment of African descendants."); S. Con. Res. 26, 11th
Cong. (2009) (Apologizing for the enslavement and racial segregation of African Americans.) (Whereas the system
of de jure racial segregation known as 'Jim Crow,' which arose in certain parts of the United States after theCivil
War to create separate and unequal societies for Whites and African-Americans, was a direct result of the racism
against people of African descent that was engendered by slavery; Whereas the system of Jim Crow laws officially
existed until the 1960s - a century after theofficial end of slavery in the United States - until Congress took action to
end it, but the vestiges of Jim Crow continue to this day.
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job environments to the
disadvantage of minority citizen."); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody. 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (stating that
"the primary objective[of TitieV I I ] was a prophylactic one.") (emphasis added)
l\}(im\}AcJ ^^^^^^ of New York and New York City additionally have their own set of "human rights" laws.
Human mgflts Law and New York City Human Rights Law. Focusing on the latter statute, I n 2005, the
enactinent of die Local Civil Rights Restoration Act ("Restoration Act"), N.Y.C. LOCAL LAW NO. 85
OF 2005, reflected die New York City Council's concern diat die NY CHRL had been "constiiied too
narrowly." Restoration Act 1. The law explicitiy rejects the "carbon copy" theory: "I n particular, through
passage of this local law, the Council seeks to underscore that the provisions of New York City's Human
Rights Law are to be construed independentiy fromsimilar or identical provisions of New York state or
federal statutes." I d 198.The Restoration Act states that provisions of state and federal civil rights statutes
should be viewed "as a floor below which the City's Human Rights law cannot fall, rather than a ceiling
abovewhich the local law cannot rise." (emphasis added) Restoration Act i rinnriy thig law a<gn
incfFfffftivo i f it'i not onough to invalidatg thf nncnnscinnahlp"disrriminRtinn" prnvisinn in W^'TF'^l hiphly
daocptiy and unc-&ideU dgieemenl tu aiUitidlt. 'The 7 of Restoration Act also amended the Construction
section 8-130. I t states: "The provisions of this [chapter] titie shall be construed liberally for the
accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal or New
York Statecivil and human rights laws, including those laws with provisions comparably-worded to
provisions of this titie, have been so construed." (emphaas in die original). This farther rejects any belief
tiiat die NY CHRL is no broader tiian Section 1981, TitleV I I or the NYSHRL.'2
Despite the fact that theCivil Rights Act of 1964 was passed 50 years ago, the United States of
America has not been able to eradicate racismentirely fromour multi-cultural society.'^"The principle of
See e.g.j Craig Gurian, "A Return To Eyes On The Prize: Litigating Under The Restored New York Chy Human
Rights Law," FordhamUrban Law Journal, 25 5 (2006).
See e.g;, Jennifer Agiesta and Sonya Ross, " AP Poll: Majority Harbor Prejudice Against Blacks." Associated Press.
October 27, 2012. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-poll-majority-harbor-prejudice-against-blacks. (Prejudice beliefs
amongst Whites extend across the political spectrumas well. I t was also reported that "[a]lthough Republicans were
morelikely than Democrats to express racial prejudice in the questions measuring explicit racism(79 percent among
Republicans compared with 32 percent among Democrats), theimplicit test found little difference between the two
parties. That test showed a majority of both Democrats and Republicans held anti-black feelings (55 percent of
Democrats and 64 percent of Republicans), as did about half of political independents (49 percent),"); Michael I .
Norton and Samuel R. Sommers. Whites See Racismas a Zero-SumGame That They Are Now Losing. 6 Perspectives
on Psychology215, (2011). ("Although legal challenges concerning so-called 'reverse racism' date back as far as the
1970s (Regents of the University of Califomia v. Bakke, 1978), such claims have been at the core of an increasing
number of high-profile Supreme Court cases in recent years, in domains such as equal access to education (Gratz v.
Bollinger. 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger. 2003) and employment discrimination (Ricci v. DeStefano. 2009)two of the
very issues at the heart of the African American Civil Rights Movement a half-century ago. We suggest that these
trends epitomize a more general mindset gaining traction among Whites in contemporary America: the notion that
Whites have replaced Blacks as the primary victims of discrimination. This emerging perspective is particularly
notable because by nearly any metricfromemployment to police treatment, loan rates to educationstatistics
liberal construction of [America's] remedial civil rights statute must be applied to ensure that Titie V I I
continues to be a serious response to a complex social problem.''''* Each racial discrirnination case is unique
and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.Due to the fact thatlhis was an "undesirable case" which
dealt with a complex, yet extremely important social issue and 1, as an African Americanpro se litigant,
was challenging the instimtionally racist and anticompetitive employment & business practices, policies
and procedures of WilliamMorris and Hollywood as a whole, it was even more imperative that the federal
judge assigned to the case was able to remain impartial and independent - even when deciding the threshold
issue of what forumthe case should be litigated. There is generally an automatic prestunption that the judge
is objective and being impartial, but that presumption caimot be given to P. Kevin Castel due to the fact
tiiat he has intentionally violated tiie U.S. Constitutionj -f U i**", ^^rt^^ ^Sj(>it^'^
William Morris' History of liitentioiiallv Kvcludiii" African .Viiiericans Pii'-Datinn
I D
Occurring Durino Mr. \ s Employment .Vnd Policy of.Vrliitratin>\ll (lainis."| I n 1898,
the WiUiamMorris Agency was foimded by a German "Jewish" immigrant named Zeknan Moses, later ^ ^jj^J^
known as WilliamMorris, in New York City. For more than 115 years, this talent and Uterary agency has inin^iand
sat at the epicenter of HoUywood and represented some of the biggest names in entertainment. Pursuant to
the Talent Agencies Act ("TAA"), Cal. Labor Code 1700et seq., one must be "licensed" as an Agent in
order to procure engagements for talent.'^ ^ ^^'^^^f,^^^
I appUed to the company's Agent Trainee programon June 6, 2014 and went through When I began '^^^f"rf'
tip v*U^
employment at the company's New York office on September 2, 2008,1, along with two others who started {sr^A*^,
the Agent Trainee program, signed a number of employment contracts, including a mandatory, pre-dispute -p<fd*.^*^
arbitiation agreement which stated that the parties "agree[d], to arbitrate any and all disputes which may
arise between themregarding any aspect of their employment relationship, including disputes regarding
compensation, benefits, duties or termination, before a single, neutial arbitrator acceptable to botii parties."
continue to indicate drastically poorer outcomes for Black than White Americans. We propose that Whites' belief
about the increasing prevalence of anti-White bias reflects a view of racismas a zero-sumgame...which can be
summed up as 'less against you means more against me.'")
'" Merrick. Employment Discrimination Law and Litigation.
EEOC Compliance Manual Section 15: Race and Color Discrimination. ("Because discrimination is often subtle
and there rarely is a'smoking gun,' determining whether race played arole in the decision making requires
examination of all the surrounding facts and circumstances")
I n theamicus curiae brief filed on December 7, 2007 in support of the Respondent in Arnold M. Preston v. Alex E.
Ferrer, WilliamMorris' attorneys David J. Bederman and Judith B. Prowda stated: "The WilliamMorris Agency
endorsed the enactment of rules for theatrical and motion picture agents (as well as artists' managers) through
California's Employment Agencies Act in 1937, and supported the TAA when it was adopted in its present formby
the California legislature in 1978. WMA continues to support the TAA's operation - as through the licensure,
oversight, and adjudicative decisions of California's Labor Commissioner - to this very day." The New York
equivalent to the TAA is found in Article 11 of the General Business Law and Article 37 of the Arts and Cultural
Affairs Law, in which unlicensed booking is considered a criminal offense. These laws create the illusion to outsiders,
that there are unique skills or knowledge that one must acquire before being hired and/or promoted to Agent.
-9-
[WMA 2008 Arbitration Agreement] Piu-snant to William Morris' contract, "any and all disputes,"
included "disputes involving state and federal discrimination and harassment claims, claims for wrongfid
termination, other statutory claims, and tort and contract claims, including without limitation, claims
brought under TitieV I I of theCivil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act... and any other
analogous state or federal statote or any other employment-related claimof any kind." I d.
At the timeof sigiung the agreement, I had absolutely no reason to object to tius language. Due to
the fact that I knew that the company represented niunerous Afiican American entertauiers over the decades
and my preliminary research on the company yielded nothing about the company's history of racism, I
assumed that Afiican Americans were adequately representis^in meaitingfid positons throughout their
workforce. I had uu iLason to ebjoct thic language, because I I mow die compatiy lepie&euled many Afiicdn
AmcrioQB entortainors'and none uf O i l icscjii^h dial 1 liuMli&led uti Ltltf compiltiy priui lu my empluyment,
indicated that the company had a hiGtor>r of intentionally excluding Afiican Amerioona fi-om hired and/or
promotBd to Agent, Cuuidiualu. u. Afecut TiaiuLL. I ' ^l ^- * ^" ' ' ^l ^^- W t ^t. ' K +V \/v. (c-uW r uf ^^cf H
After meeting all of my co-workers, I realized that I was the only African American employed at <,^o-caH'
any level of the Agent Trainee program. Although there were 50 Agents employed mthe New York ofl&ce,
zero wereAfiican American or Hispanic. See Exhibit D. This was not a problemfor me because I 've spent ^
my entire hfe excelUng in predominantiy all-white environments, however, 1 did have a "gut instinct" diat
something was not right about me being the only Afiican American Agent Trainee. The company was aware
that I had just completed my Masters in Music Business from die University of Miami, a lot of my prior
work experience allowed me to work with many of the artists in "urban contemporary music" that they
represented, and that the artist I spent two years co-managing was si gned^one of the biggest Agents at
the agency - the SVP of Urban Contemporary Mxisic, C. Lewis ("CPL")/CLRis a white/"Jewish" female.
Within the first week of my employment, CPL offered me an opportunity to work as her third
assistant. Prior and during my employment, the company was aware of CPL's reputation of being very
difficidt to work for, that she didn't mentor and that in more than 15 years, she had never promoted any of
her Assistants to Agent. Throughout her career she has represented more than 35 of biggest names in r&b
and hip-hop music, such as Jay-Z, Lauryn Hdl , Eminem, Rihanna, Kanye West, 50 Cent, Jeimifer Hudson,
Pharrell Wilhams, Mary J. Bhge, Ne-Yo, Ludacris and many others. Coincidentally, in or around the time
I submitted my resume, the company ttansferred oneof its Agent Trainees - a white male - to work under
CPL and allowed himto book talent under her, as well as represent his own acts, although he had not yet
been promoted to Agent, and thus, was not "licensed" - a violation of the TAA-For three months, I worked
Prior to applying to the company's Agent Trainee program, I co-managed a recording artist and took theinitial
meeting with the company's SVP of Urban Contemporary Music for representation. That Agent later signed the
recording artist, and during my employment as an Agent Trainee, the recording artist's career blossomed. [PI .
S.D.N.Y. Complaint ffl .]
-10-
in what technically, would be considered a hostde work environment. 1 was never adequately trained and
was blamed for many things that I did not do, I tried my hardest to abide by her rules, but she accused me
of trying to "run my own ship." Although 1 had a good relationship with Lewis, we bomrealized that being
her assistant wasn't going to work. She stated being an "Agent" was boring, and encouraged me instead to
be an artist manager and/or A&R because recognized that 1 had a "good ear" for music. Throughout the rest
of my employment, I maintained a good relationship with CPL and her assistants. 1 gave her feedback on a
lot of new artists, proposed tour ideas, created marketing presentations and attended many shows wi th her
and her assistants.
After leaving CPL's desk, I ttansferred back to the Mai koomand was never able to land an
Assistant position for the remainder of the time that I was employed at the company. [PI. S.D.N.Y. f _ . ]
Over the span of 19 months, 1 reahzed that I was considerably more qualified dian aU of my white/ "Jewish"
counterparts hired into the Agent Trainees program, most who were recent college graduates and had no
, relevant work experience i n the entertainment industry. See Exhi bi t E. I was given a "high frequency of
dead-end assignments and Sisyphean tasks," while being vaguely told by Human Resources that "Agents
didn't want to work wi th me" - although the evaluations that I got a chance to see did not reflect their
; statements.[PI. S.D.N.Y.
No matter how hardI tried to succeed, it was never good enough. Over time, it became clear to me
that I would never have the opportunity to rise above the company's "glass ceiling." I began to develop a
series of gasttointestinal and urinary health issues related to the immense stress that I was under. I knew
that i t would be impossible for me to rise above the company's "glass ceiling" and be promoted to music
Agent. Since I worked throughout the entfre company as a "floater," I experienced a number of incidents
that made me begin to betieve 1 was working in a racially discriminatory work environment. 1 discovered
that one employee blatantiy lied on me i n two e-mails to Human Resources and I received an exttemely
negative review fromtelevision Agent Jason Hodes, although I worked at his desk for less than an hour and
the only diing I had to do was connect his client to a conference call diat she was unaware was taking
place. [PI. S.D.N.Y. % _ _ .] After being unable to advance to Assistant and/or be mentored,^" I held a series
of meetings with upper management about my concems that 1 was being "set up to fai l." [PI. S.D.N.Y. %
K . ] When 1 met with the former COO of the New York office - Cara Stein - and informed her tiiat I
believed that I , as well as other African Americans, were being discriminated against because of our race,
Throughout the litigation, this has essentially been the defenseof the Defendants.
" To my knowledge, Hodes' assistant - M. Mackenzie - who did not informhis client of the conference call, has
since been promoted to Agent.
Before the company merged with Endeavor Talent Agency in April of2009, WMA hired another African American
Agent Trainee after me. Throughout his employment at the company's New York office, he also was unable to land a
desk as an Assistant.
-11-
her response was that the company "would never discriminate" against Afiican Americans. [PI. S.D.N.Y.
"_ _ .] Afler meeting with the head of Human Resources - Carole Katz - I discovered that Human
Resources never informed her that I wanted to discuss this issue with her and after telling her 1 could "make
this a much bigger pfeblem," she offered me five months' salary to "look for another job." [PL S.D.N.Y.
- t-^iS] . ' \
On my last day, April 9, 2010,1 sent a goodbye e-mail to the entire company that went public.^'
This created a lot of debate about the discriminatory employment practicesof the talent agencies and racism
in Hollywood as a whole. On [insert date], I filed a complaint with the EEOC which focused entirely on
my individual experiences, as well as ififormation about the company post-employment. After being
\>J i^kw^/V\*/yJ "
informed of my complaint, New York office hired 5 Afiican Americans in one month.^
On December 21, 2010,^^I filed a detailed and tiiorough, 80 page Complaint with the Southern
District of New York against my former employer and the oldest talent agency in Hollywood: William
Morris Endeavor Entertaiimient (formerly known as the William Morris Agency). T^, coj npl ^t al on^^^^..^
established aprima facie case of pattem and practice ("systemic disparate tieatment"), disparate intact, A v^V^J
pre and post-hiring discrinunation, fadme to promote, retaliation and aiding & abetting in violation of 'y^J ^;^
Section 1981 of die Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981 ("Section 1981"), TitieVI I of tiie Civil e/tflosft^
Rights Act of 1964, as codified, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Titie VI I "), the New York State Human ^ i ^ ^ ^ ^ i
Rights Law, New York Executive Law 290 et. seq. (die "NYSHRL") and die New York City Human
Rights Law, New York Administi-ative Code 8-101 er. (die "NYCHRL"),^'* and sought permanent
injimctive relief, affirmative relief and substantial monetary damages. On [insert date], the Southern District
of New York assigned my case to P. Kevin Castel.
On [insert date], WiUiam Morris and their counsel - Michael P. Zweig and Christian Carbone of
Loeb & Loeb LLP - sought to compel the case into arbitration pursuant to two mandatory, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements I signed as a condition of employment, and denied all of my claims. On [inseit date],
. I submitted my oppositional motion. I stated that on its face, the language appears reasonable. Since whites
*^y/i</^ "f3.CG bigotry and discrimination on the basis of color or a legacy of oppression and unequal
^cKa-I I'j opportuiuty dating back generations"^^in this country, I raised a unique, and extremely narrowed argument
Gt^oj-e.fit, gjj^j^ ^j ^^ is "relentlessly relevant," even when one may think it's not, which applied
antidiscrimination law under the fimnework of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C 1 e/ seq., to
2. fAW<B<H- Vf^^i^ Hoiffwoo^. _
^^(MCiasertdtte],theWdliamMorrisAgsawy n^<^**h^^ekm^\^ "f'^af ' ^ V ' i H^^^^
^P. Kevin Castel states in his Final Order that I submitted my Complaint on Efecertber 22,20 0. ^'at lL^2r^
"Quote the Restoration Act of 2005. ^/ I T T T
Tim Wise. Colorblind. Pg. . +v^^e
-12- ^ Vcm/ i '/ i vz^o^
prove that as a matter of law: Both of the mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements I signed as a
condition of employment, were procedurally and substantively imconscionable.
The compelling evidence demonstrated that WiUiamMorris was highly conscious of race when
making its employment decisions - including the decision to have employees sign arbitration agreements
as a condition of employment. Although 1 was "oblivious" to this reahty while employed at the company,
die same cannot be said for WUliamMorris. As a result, 1 argued that ultimately, WilliamMorris arbitration
agreements were nothing more than a "savvy, legal loophole" that aUowed WilliamMorris the ability to
maintain its racially discriminatory employment practices, policies and procedures without any
accountabUity firom the federal court,based on the company's egregious pattemand continuing^'' practice
of intentionally discriminating gainst African Americans in employment spanning what was then 110
years. The historical and statistical evidence supported that my inabdity to be hired and/or promoted to
Agent was not "accidental" or "due to chance." As an African American, it was unconscionable^'^impany
with such an egregious history of employment discrimination, had the power to supersedeTitleVTI amlJ
have cases decided in a privatized, quasi-judicial forum.
On July 20, 2011, P. Kevin Castel issued his Order, in which he "ignored my arguments, omitted
pertinent facts and mis^pUed the law" in order to derive at a decision which stayed the case in the federal
court and compelled the caseinto arbitration. In his summary of my 80 page Complamt, he made no mention
to the historical and statistical evidence predating my employment, or any mention that my claims included
systemic disparate treatment or disparate impact. Although an unconscionabiUty argument had been raised,
he analyzed the agreements based on the hteral language contained in the agreements and concluded that
pursuant to the "Dele^?|tion Provision" contained in the second arbitration agreement I signed as a condition
01 emplojinapt following the merger between theWilliamMorris Agency and Endeavor Talrait Agency in
April of2009, that die arbitrator had to decide the issueof arbifrability, although tius was an issue typicaUy
decided die court. [PKC Stay Order, _ . ] of IaaA/ -
Since Castel's Order was not "final," the appeUate court claimed they did not have the jurisdiction
to review his erroneous Order and my request for his Castel and Francis' disqualification. On June 15, '
2012,1 filed a Demand for Arbitiation with the American Arbitration Association, where 1 continued to
argue that as matter of law and pubUc pohcy, the mandatory, pre-dispute arbittation agreements I signed
should not be enforced based on the claims that were raised mthis particular case and as a matter of public
When TitieV I I was enacted, it created a right for litigants to adjudicate claims of discrimination in the federal court.
^'^This was supported by the fact that there were zero African American Agents, Coordinators or Agent'Triainees
employed in the New York office when I began ^employment in September of 2008, and that over the course of my
employment, 1 would realize that I was extremely more qualified than majority, if not all, of my similarly situated
white/ "Jewish" counterparts who were also Agent Trainees.
policy, arbitration was an in^propriate forumto achieve the public policy goals of theCivil Rights Act of
1964, as well other antidiscrimination and antitrust laws. See Exhibit F. Without allowing for discovery
C7^M . f ^^ hearing, tiie lawfully appointed arbitrator [Da\id L. Gregory] and tiie fraudulently appointed
So^'o 1>'S*"arbifrator" [Schnader LLP attorney/AAA board of director Timothy K. Lewis] both concluded that the
"J^y c.\f^\, pre-dispute arbitiation agreements I signed as a condition of employment were enforceable
^lr<'f.*+#'_ without any discussion of the parties'arguments and/or any citation of the law.
j^^f tfCtjh^WcjnffBBtffftBWT^^ A montii before die only
ID. ( astefs Refusal to Sta\e Arbitration While Kulh I)eci(lini Ihc Issues Raised In Mr
Washington's March 17. 2014 Fraud r|)on the Court Motion and April 10, 2014 Morion for
TU/^^cti '^b'^^^^j ly appointed arbifrator - David L. Gregory - was scheduled to issue his "omiubus final decision"^'
- 7 0 7
on the merits,^" I began writing a series of letters which informed P. Kevin Castel that 1 would be seeking
his disqualification for intentionally and erroneously compelling my case into arbittation, as well as
addressing the "pattem" of "fraud upon the Court" that Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP were
engaging in on behalf of their ctient WilliamMorris.^' See Exhibit G. On December 17, 2013, Arbittator
Gregory issued his "Partial Final Award" ("Gregory Final Award"), concluding that I proved by a
"preponderanceof the evidence" that "WilliamMorris Endeavor Entertainment, LLC discriminated against
[me] in violation of pertinent federal, state, and local law prohibiting discrimination in employment on the
basis of race" and indicting that I would be awarded the fiill gamut of monetary damages, including back
pay, front pay, compensatory & punitive damages, "recompense...for avoidable delays" and "reasonable
fees and costs, as a pro se non-attomey prevailing party on stamtory claims in a case of considerable
procedural and substantive complexity." 5ee Exiiibit H.
Although Castel does not mention this in his Final Order, he acmally endorsed my letter on March
3, 2014 and set a schedule in which the parties were to submit their motions. See Exhibit L On March 7,
^' Arbittator Gregory stated this in an e-mail on October 16, 2013, after abmptly "suspend[ing]" discovery, cancelling
the oral hearing and instead, asking the parties to submit Final Position Statements before he issued his final decision
on the merits.
' Although I argued the arbitrator does not have the jurisdiction to decide the merits of my case because the
mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreement I signed as a condition of employment was unconscionable and
unenforceable as a matter of law and public policy based on WilliamMorris' intentional violations of theCivil Rights
Act of 1964 and additional laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color and/or national origin, I also
argued that i f the arbitrator
"[OJver the last couple months, I have written letters to Castel indicating that I would be seeking his disqualification,
til the first letter, I sought a notarized copy of Castel's Appointment Affidavit. See Exhibit XX. I never received a
response. I then carbon copied Castel on a letter sent to Robert P. Patterson after we briefly spokefollowing the
January 24, 2014 hearingin Rowe. See Exhibit Y Y . This was not included on the docket. Between Febmary 28, 2014
and March 14, 2014, I [wrote] three letters informing [Castel] that 'when [he] ignored both the Judicial Code of
Conduct and the public policy goals of theCivil Rights Act of 1964 to issue[his] highly erroneous July 20, 2011 Stay
Order compelling this landmark human rights and employment discrimination into arbitration, [he] intentionally
deprived me of my rights under the color of law in violation of 18 U.S.C. 242 and [he] failed to uphold [his] ethical
duties as an impartial, federal judge. See Exhibits C, E and H." [PI. Fraud Upon the Court Motion, 81-82]
-14-
2014, Loeb & Loeb LLP Christian Carijone attomey submitted a letter to Castel. See Exhibit J . On tiiat
same day, Castel issued an Order stating that "[n]o motion to disqualify may befiled until 14 days following
a Final Award in the arbitration proceeding." Exhibit K .
On March 17, 2014,1 submitted the Fraud Upon the Court Motion anyway. The purpose of the
motion, was to address the overall "pattem" of "fi^ud upon the Court" conunitted by the Defendants and
tiieir counsel and because pursuant to 9-12 of the Federal Arbittation, 1 had 90 days to seek to vacate
Arbittator Gregory's Partial Final Award since it was "final, for the sakeof judicial review" and he'd been
fimdulentiy disqualified before he could determine the actual monetary reUefl would receive. On March
25, 2014, Loeb & Loeb LLP attomey submitted a letter to P. Kevin Castel, stating diat my "March 18*
filing constitutes a knowing and intentional violation of this Court's March 7* Order which direcdy
prohibits such filing. Unless this Court directs otherwise, it is our understanding that no response to Mr.
Washington's filing is required or permitted."
I n Castel's March 27, 2014 Order, he refused to disqualify himself and refiised to address the rest
of the arguments contained in my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion. Request for oral hearing
was denied as moot. 1 submitted aMotion for Reconsideration readdressing the issues he did not address
and/or seeking his disqualification. He did not respond tins Motion for Reconsideration untU after my case
was "disnussed with prejudice and on the merits" by theuidawfiilly appointed arbittator Timothy K. Lewis.
Throughout his Final Order, he purports to summarize my arguments [out of context], and argues on behalf
of the Defendants as to why my "arguments" are without merit.
Castel starts planting his seeds of deception in thefirst two sentences of his Final Order. He states:
"Plaintiff Marcus Isaiah Washington, proceeding ^o se, brings this action against defendants... Washington
moves for reconsideration of this Court's Memorandumand Order, filed March 27, 2014, denying his
motion for recusal."^^ [PKC Final Order, 1.] As discussed above, the voluminous Motion that I filed on
March 17, 2014 was much more than a "motion for recusal." One merely has to look at the Cover Page for
this Motion and its Table of Contents to know that Castel is not being honest. See Exhibit L. Although he
never resolved those issues, Castel makes it appear that I submitted this Motion for Reconsideration in or
around the time the Defendants moved to confirmthe arbittation award rendered by Timothy K. Lewis on
June 25, 2014 because nowherein his Final Order does he mention the date that this motion was subnutted
[April 10, 2014].
The reason that Castel is pretending that this Motion only a"motion for recusal," is becauseI abbreviated theMotion
as "Motion to Disqualify" becauseI sought the disqualification of not only the federal judges becauseI believed they
were not impartial enough to be able to decide my claims that Michael P. Zweig and Loeb& Loeb LLP were engaging
in a "pattem" of "fraud upon the Court" on WilliamMorris' behalf but in the alternative, I also sought exfreme
disciplinary and monetary sanctions, including Loeb & Loeb LLP's disqualification and Michael P. Zweig and
Christian Carbone's disbarment, if default judgment was not granted,.
InmyJ iUy 12,2014 letter in response to die Defen<iantsV[iiuiidatel Motion to Con^^ & ^i i r
date] Motion for a Filing Injunction, I argued that the arguments raised in my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon
die Court Motion and April 10, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration were "diamefrically opposed" and Castel
never compelled William Morris or Loeb & Loeb LLP to fde a response, I knew that i f Castel ignored the '
arguments raised in my pleadings, there was no possible way that he was going to rule in my favor. As
predicte4 Castel See Exhibit M. ^ i r .* ^^.4cl ^ ^ . f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * > . aJ^uJ\j
Very few people would admit to the allegations I have made against WiUiam Morris, Loeb & Loeb U| uXit^
LLP, P. Kevin Castel and their predominately all-white/"J ewish" co-conspirators, especially when ^S^^^
' . admitting thetrlith could end one's prestigious legal career. In what was to believe his last and "final" Order Q
in tiiis case, Castel ref i ^eJ my arguments and dien statei o^^i!^fU^ii^ti>l
"I n opposition to the defendants' motion to confirm the award, Washington provides four arguments cUcUi ^
\J(. *J as to why the arbitral award shoidd be set aside. First, Washington argues that Arbitiator Gregory was a>itA -fiAH
Wf <^f*Nt*^''''^improperly remoYed^^uL consequentiy, aU of Arbitrator I ^wi s' orders, including vacating Arbitrator / ^i ^ d^Vi'l^;!
all f ie^i Gregory's partial awarc^-Vevoid. Second, Washington asserts that Arbitrator Gregory and Arbitrator ^C ^ JJO A
oMt^ o-* v!4- Lewis's decisions to enforce the arbitiation agreement were in manifest disregard of the law. Third, /Wfatrf ^f
Washington argues that thefailure to disclose the alleged relationship between opposmg counsel ^^i (0ewt/
and an AAA employee biased the arbitial proceeding in the defendants' favor. FinaUy, he asserts that J^^\^it^
die opposing counsel has been engaging in a pattem of bad faith litigation warranting their removal ^^it^j^^aur
and sanctions."
[PKC Final Order, 14.] (emphasis added) I n typical Castel fashion, he ignores the facts of the case and ""^
^AiAa2e-0^^u5sfantial case law, then proceeds to deny each one of those "arguments" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), , P
L(j*Ll J> lydy^ making absolutely no mention of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d), which specificaUy pertains to "fiaud upon the
^' t l J r i ^' * ' ' ' ' " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ^ ^' ^- ^^^^- > ^^\ ^^
frfjf A ^wt^q p't^l Q^^i states in his Final Order: "Washuigton had explicitiy requested diat these issues be decided f MtJCr jot4*
/5UJ*<1 WAX M>t- .-Wt'iwLl
B*!\y a replacement judge and not tiie undersigned. As the C ourt's O rder denied the portion of .*
Ci) Washington's motion seeking recusal, it was not necessary to reach the remainder of the motion.
tXMA*flrt Because Hie additional issues raised in Washington's motion were contingent on the granting his
^vctftA^ *:|1^^miuest for recusal, the C ourt did not err in not addressmg the issues raised." (emphasis added)
io-cUJ kSj pastel's reasoning is flawed becausei f he refused to disquaUfy himself, than an impartial judge would have
^^^r^^^^'^deci ded the remaining issues that were raised, especially since I presented compeUing evidence
demonstrating that Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP were engaging in a "pattem" of "fraud upon
the Court" on behalf of Wilham Morris. Also, Castel spends his September 5, 2014 Final Order "addressing
S'RW^'IV^ die issues [that were] raised" in both my March 17,2014 Fraud Upon die Court Motion and April 10, 2014
'Srifiy^^^^ih'^ had a feehrfg that Castel was going to do this and I even stated at the end of my March 17, 2(^4 ^^.t)- f i
Fraud Upon die Court Motion; VN>-5^ aijJojVcd'Kai^ IfiOi^ *
( P C 4 K I f?A*^( Pr^ud wfiJ \rt^AjieA U| ccrf-<^^(>p<^*^-^u>cMi2( j o^j K -f -f* v*.Q4e / ^e^^ H^M.
^ - i A m ^ ^ (,Je^4-. 2f ' i ' ^> , Cft 5 K^f Dfi^^cl- Af()-U afp,.,.^^ ^ ^vvf-J
f^y-l * "Since Castel 'ignored my arguments, omitted pertinent facts and misapplied the l aw' in his J uly 20,
2011 Stay Order, there's a strong chancehis decision on this MotionwiU attempt to do the same. For
these reasons, I believe a 'reasonableperson' would agreethat acmal and/or an appearanceof bias,
prejudice, impropriety and partiality in favor of historically all-white/ "J ewish" institutions violating <i 'x
this nation's antidiscrimination and antitmst laws, as weU as engaging in sinister acts that are nothing
less than crimes against humanity: Wi l l i amMorris and Loeb & LoebLLP. At this pivotal juncture in'-^^' T^^^^
U kilwl, ths case, the last thing that should happen is that you be allowed to determine very crucial issues: j ^ i ^ I j ^
^at^j ^'.fojVieJc^fj^oeb & LoebLLP has engaged in fraud on behalf of Wil l iamMorris, whedier dieAAA had jurisdiction
aJ^^ii\irc -fie to remove Arbitrator Gregory after he determined l iabil ity... and whether or not Arbitrator Gregory's
^oJi \naP Partial Final Award should be modified and/or vacated, whether die J uly 20, 2011 Stay Order should
be vacated and default judgment should be granted, or in the alternative, whether an expedited discovery
and j ury trial should take place." ^ . . " ^ ^ ^ j ^ ^(^^^^CSt^'pS^
\i\e,'ZOO\Cliu.,^\d Upon die Court, 96.] The reality is, Castel should have stayed die arbitratiofi, aKwed ft)r an oraT^jl ^
dljjWc+-6o>r^ hearing under oath and resolved aU of the issues that were presentedin my March 17,2014 Fraud Upon the
be vacated and default judgment should be granted, or in the alternative, whether an expedited discovery ,
VA^Aii , .
- - - - - - . ; ; . f ^s ? ^
t>tCAA.TM*rcouTt Motion, insteadof waiting to address theseprocedural issues in his September 5, 2014 Final Order, ^t^P 'U'^
( ^ l i ^ ^ a ^ ^ _ _ aX l i o , ^
\%ckc^j^Ql^fM^ the fraudulentiy appointed "arbitrator" Timothy K . Lewis "dismissed my casewith prejudice and on ^^J ^^^^
NU*^'K oft<9j e mCTits''in violation of 10of FAA. f j ^^ O^] J^U '.A^ocwKa! ,U^/^c^|o( Uwc-oUvi c-hl j : t ' ^ f ^ /
I MwC^i i ^^Wf af I demonstrate throughout the remainder of this Motion, that all of die conclusions reached by ^^^xauf^-
Castel mhis Septernber 5, 2014 Final Order are erroneous as a matter of law and fiirther demonstrate that A*^"**^
rightsof people* of Afiican descent. ' ^2^,Q.1f^.^^\oo^
^rou^e^ty ^WWnfK BI I Tl l i ^J l l fJ I BBl ti gBl ML'l Mi l i ffl ffgffgK l MWtl l i hJ J BI l ^ After filing a Demand for t/^<^^
(I) . Castel's Conclusions that .Vrbitratoi- David L. (iregorv's Partial Final .\\vard Was Not "'I'inal .
U>V "'.u>cmf Arbitration with the American Arbitiation Association on June 15, 2012, the AAA selected David L. q^. |
/>A^ .cnfi ' -yQjggQ^tQ preside over thearbitiation after botii parties could not mumally agreeon the arbitiator. Gregory / ^^/ X ^
ooaeJ .f*W> has more than 30 years' experience as both an arbifrator for the American Arbifration Association and labor f l ' "
& employment law professor at St. J ohn's University, and is stil l employed by both institations. From (j^Qf,^^^j\c^
^ August2012toMarchl 5,2013,thepartiessubmittedtheirrespectiveMotionsforSummaryJ udgmentand (^o^i<o^
^, 1 ^^ "^(.^^^oss-Motions to Dismiss. Between Apri l 15, 2013 and September 25, 2013, Arbifrator Gregory issued ^^^^^^
' ^' ^' f ^*'*5^eehi teri mDecisions. t/^
VA'Ri e>vAOOM. <^J Discuss Arbitrator DavidL. Gregory's Partial Final Award. SeeExhibit H . On the furst pageof the ^'i W^
r^i^o^\c**>' Award, he summarized his fmdings, concluding that "Wdl iam Morris Endeavor Entertainment LLC k? wPo^Ux
^s,Ky. discrimmated against [me] in violationof pertinent federal, state, and local law prohibiting discrimmation . ^^[^^^^
i n employment on the basisof race," that I suffered money damages and tiiat I was "entitied to reasonable 11 Acvi^o
,;., . . fees and costs, as a pro se non-attomey prevailing party on statutory claims in a caseof considerable
' procedural and substantive complexity." [pg. 1.] He acknowledged onceagaioAthat in his "thirty years as
/\tevrg(3J -v^j^ta. ofi ti/[icM0^ . A'-f-M'-H^>*A^'J (l/w?^
'^ an Arbitrator of Labor and Employment Disputes, this casepresentfed] the most extensiveM^^ ^
At*'
4VMV Ihave encoimtered." |>g. 3J In die begiiming of M S Award, henow statedtiiatthe "AAAndes aUow for X>4^^^^
^ss^ j^^j decision of employment disputes without a hearing and based solely on the parties' submission" and
vf-fiift ^ stated that during our July 30, 2013 conferencecall, I "abmptiy changed[my] mind and said[I] wanted^ j ^1 ^e**j
rrto4tou.vWr4a hearing" and "thereafter prompdy demanded to depose[WM E's] Chief ExecutiveOfficer Ari Emanuel P':9c>V>('
J ^ L X : ^ * ' " ^ ' " " ^ ^ ^ " " " ^ ' " " " " ' ^ a ^ -
^-Mtv^ arbitration to be conventional, garden variety, and nonproblematic. There is no credible evidence that they 3U. KW
M . >. , L are unconscionable mwhole or in part" [pg. 3, 11.] Gregory stated that I "situate[ed] [my] individual iy*^jy*
4* '*toe*<^ experience at [WilliamM orris] against the backdrop of Exhibit [31] and the macro backdrop of [my] \ / \
N- A^<>c* interdisciplinary critiqueof deeply embedded racism," which was not entirely trae becauseI learned about
4, /^/^ "Exhibit 31" more than a year after I filed my complaint witir theS.DJ^I. Y . [pg. 5.] He then stated that my ^ ^
^ I*- 'fOj Wf "extensiveM otion p^ers reflect sophisticated jurispmdencegroimd in some of the leading scholarship of a. tJ^pi^^
H^^ C6<iff^ critical race theorists," aldiough most of the jurispmdence that I incorporated into my motions were not 4 f'^^ij
(vt wntten by individuals who woidd be classified by the academic and legal commumty as "critical race ^vUw*i-|ty
j^^'yawcJirft theorists" (e.g. law professor TristinK . Green), [pg. 5] Again, he likened my efforts to "courageous leaders CJ^'oaOcs,*^
^ ^ ^ ^ who ultimately achieved, social change through the legal process" like Rev. Dr. M artin Luther K ing, Jr.,
Thmrgood Marshall and Nelson Mandela, while simultaneously stating that "parts of [my] M otion p^ers ^iJ i^Vwl'l^
' V . . [were] counterproductive anti-Semitic rant" even though WilliamM orris and their coimsel never refiited. ti i vo*^
'the historical and statistical evidence demonstrating the company's centiuy-plus year pattern and continuing
Tvc cArJo practiceof race-based employment discnmmatton. [pg. 5.] ^^xidi^lA\ ,^y^L'f^'^-^'^ ^fi^*^
' ^^' ^f * ^- j ' Regarding "Exhibit 31," he acknowledgetiiat "[Plaintiff], not [Defendant], did most of dus tedious 2^4<,
t
Hi^\<M^ work in a good faith effort to answer my questions" and that "[a]lthough [Defendant] is the presumptive ( ^cj j ^ p'
K 5udi custodianof the email and other communication'archival records. [Defendant's] efforts in that regard were
relatively desultory, compared with the reso^te^ter^i^ of [ ^amti f i p.^( p^^.|^And wtule Gregorynj ^^^l^^
admitted "Exhibit 31" into the evidenceof record on September 25, 2013 and no discovery ever took place**^]J!fiSrc^
. . . mthe casebefore he abmpdy decided to "suspend" discovery without deciding my Em. M otion to Compel, )ri
\C-f>++o*- he now stated that this document was "something less than a smoking gun - but it is not necessarily
nothing." [pg. 6.] He incorrectly stated that Leonard Rowe discovered "Exhibit 31" "two decades" ago, . *'
^CAM>c^(rt although Rowe discovered the document on die desk of Heslin in October 2002. '
of *<cm4 - s>f^i\^ ^ submitted an Appeal to Arbittator Gregory's Partial Final Award, the Defendants
^ cU/A>j O and their counsel filed a second M otion to Disqualify Arbittator Gregory. I immediately objected and
^^^^argued that pursuant to the Review Standardsof theAAA's Administtation Review Councd ("ARC"), tiiis , ' ;
' ^a- ^ l / ^ . c^eJ.* ~ . s i o d ^ . t - f U ^ .
l*j<i^d, f^-i "procedurally improper" because* statetjfliat an objection to an arbitrator may bemade'at any time
1^/3^^ ' ^^arbitration, up to fteissuanceof theAward or other terminating order." (emphasisadded) Thefact
(i ^^^^^^j j ^that theAAA did not immediately striketheDefendants' Motion, signaled to methat despitethelaw and
^ Ji^*^!^ . their own guidelinespertaining to disqualification, they weregoing to get Arbitrator Gregory out of there
TtSX(A* for ruling in my favor. On January 27, 2014, theAAA disquaUfied Arbitiajor Gregory without providing
A^X i f o^j - yreaso ^
4c>(fb|' UIJio* On January 8, 2014, L(^b&LoebLLP attomey MichaelBamett responded to dieAAA viae-mail pe-K"/.!^-^
^Qjy/ Gregory issued a"Partial Final Award," and becausehisAward "contemplate[d] and indeed direct[ed] ^^J^ eit^lajt-
P*1fct^ . further proceedings" to "determinecompensatory and punitivedamages, and 'attorney'sfees,'" hisdecision K J ^ J ^
wasnot a"Final Award," and thus, hecould bedisqualified. Healso stated that Gregory's"Partial Award
pli<.I I UU IJL"^*"'^^* ^^^^ wiM result innof l i cr detennination mthemcriteof the cart widiout any
^.(( lv/i#l<J li^aring being conducted or evidence heard - this violates both AAA Rules and due process, and
leifCA demonsttates further gross misconduct and unfimess warranting the Arbittator's disqualification."^^ : .
, (emphasisadded) In theMarch 7, 2014letter ofChristianCarboneJne stated in afootnote:'"Under section
ifV<> Federal Arbitration Act (9U.S.C. 12), anoticeof motion to vacateafinal award must beserved , *
(e^e.*wlA/^grtvithin 90 daysof issuanceof theAward. Caselaw in tiusCticuit supportstheproposition, that unlessthe *<il^^'*
partieshad agreed to abifimated awd (whidi agreonait doesnot existin thiscase), apartial award asto "^^^^^l^
_ -|u^ hability isnot a'final award' for thepurposesof amotion to confirm, modify or vacate." (emphasisini^/*^ "/I *'*"^
'\o\e^etJii^- VVl< On pages through of my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon theCourt Motion, I discussed the
reasonsin detail why Arbitrator Gregory's"Partial Final Award" was"final, for diesakeof judicial review" */uf-,-f/i
\ >^vc?"^ Award shoidd haveconfirmed in part, aswell asvacated in part, to demonsfratethat P. Kevin ^^^^K****
c Uf K*M Castel' sJuly 20, 2011 Stay Order waserroneousasamatter of law and pubhc policy, and should havebeen w k/ Jn'j
* . . vacated to allow discovery and themeritsof my claimsto bedecided by animpartial jury reflecting the (^^^^^ ^^j
rich diversity of New York City. B-*^ 1.S iCp*, Qet- \^}'2o[3 c. Wf Pfr^CA^^*^"^'^ ^i w /
SinceI requested abififfcated proceeding and Arbittator Gregory deterrnined liability, heof course, i '
fVi^vit f> wasgoing to haveto decidetheissueof damagessinceme'E^:^ndantsr^sed to comply with any of my
discovery requestsand Gregory abmpdy "suspended" discovery beforeissuing hisPartial Final Award. [PI.
2f c- 4^ Fraud UpontiieCourt Motion, 27.] fAvc3 - ^ ^-^f^^ CM^^I ^ ^
C A ^f d i ^. ^ 2ol*j- A ^- ^f x J [ M e^- hK ' W^- t l ^J
(fit(ft(A~ When theDefendantssought Arbittator Gregory'sdisqualification for thesecond time, they also argued that their .
J ^j T. ^i ^due processwasviolated when Arbitrator Gregory "suspended" discovery and cancelled theoral hearing before
^[^^p^^^^ ^ssamg hisAward. Throughout thisentirearbitration, theDefendantsnever wanted to havediscovery or anoral hearing
v\tfWJte>l ^January 2, 2014Appeal, I requested discovery to obtain thenecessary financial documentsso that I fiilly
/*4*^^fiei. ^ computethemonetary damagesowed and an oral hearipg. [ flMJ4|i rvy 1>-*-f4 <ict^tl ) [JAS.^<**>"H ^ity
co^^^& t ^ '""^1"^j-l<i'S -*.l^r^.'l|.'^*4<l^t *V''i(i'*-% iwi-.ici/ce. cwv*
Five months after raising these issues, Castel stateain his September 5, 2014: "According to the
l'r-^>C Ann..
AR C, an objection to an arbitrator may be made 'at any time in the arbitiation, up to the issuance of the ^|/ve/
Award or other terminating order." The inclusion of the clause 'other terminating order' uidicates that theo-Ut"f'+*^
'Award' contemplated by the AR C in this context is a final award conferring jurisdiction to a competent j ^j ov * . \ i ^
tif^'\r\r' fcutfffcourt." [PKC Final Order, 14.] "I n order for an award to be 'final,' an arbitiation award 'must be intended CU- I *^
f*. ^Tr^f I by the arbitrators to be tfaeir complete determination of all claims submitted to fliem.' Arbitiator ^' ^' ' ' { ^' ' ^
Gregory's 'Partial Final Award' was not a complete determination of aU claims. I n the award. Arbitrator fw-<
'^''^^jj^^jrexpMcitlY left open the issues of Washington's reasonable fees and costs." [PKC Final Order, 15] "By g**!^*^
i&Vi^h^vrii leaving open the issues of costs,. Arbittator Gregory's award did not end the arbitration proceedings and
oo-f ^i fw*i vas therefore not a"final" decision. As the award did not terminate the arbifral proceeding, the AR C had
- | > f^AiffT authority to decide on arbittator objections." I d. CYtebesseqtially relies on a casefrom 1980 to support^^^^^,^
his erroneous conclusions. See Michaels v. Mariforum\sii|>ping/S. A. . 624 F.2d411. 414(2d Cfr. 1980B^ Ct6e..
JMwMf'Vj fe>-^j_i "Washington also argues that Arbittator Lewis exceeded his powers when he vacated Arbittator /^/^pvlc.
hCA J ^, . Gregory's award. When Arbittator Gregory was removed, an arbittator vacancy was created. Under R ule
Li|*\</k<i4j'2 18 of the Arbitiation R ules, a vacancy is filled 'in accordancewith appUcable provisions of these R ules. ' ^ ' ^^etjt
o^dzf, Mn'^l j i ttator Lewis was chosen to fill the vacancy by mumal consent of the parties. The appointment of f f j v^^. ^
y > Arbittator Lewis as a neutral arbittator was consistent with R ule 12 of the Arbitration R ules. When an f^a^ C"*
\e.M\/\fAn^^K> d^^^^^ chosen to fill a vacancy as a substimte arbittator, the panel 'shall determine in its sole discretion
^ p' * ! A^l * whether it is necessary to repeat all or part of anv prior hearings.' Arbittation R ides, supra. R ule 18." protxeJU^
^y - ^^^ [PKC Final Order, 15-16.] (emphasis added) H ^ ^ l f / f r / ^ ' ^ L j . L n t" ^^- *
J^vfK^.'^Ki On pages 24 through 34of my March 17,2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion explamin more detail i^^|:j,roif
C*rsV>4-<W'A . why Castel's conclusions are erroneous as a matter of law^ee Exhibit N. "[T]he inclusion of the word f**"
I 'final' in die labelingof the award clearly does provide some guidance to the reviewing court because the HJ^\or\
4<'^'*|v^ word 'final' at least provides a clear indication of the tribunal's intent that the award is, in fact, final and^^g^^J >f*'>
dius tends to satisfy at least one critical element of finahty."^ ^' ^' ' ^ l i l
ai j Kkj &<Viibf i,\e to this is that, the emphasis should not be on "other terminatuig order," instead, it ^' ' ( dt f ^
fs/t^ t/W^t^ should be on "up to the issuanceof the Award" because Arbittator Gregory issued an "Award. " Arbifrator Vfj-A . 2J 2. /
4i*03v6>^G^^g'^'y "ot issue a "terminating order" like TimothyK. Lewisdid, he issued a "Partial Fi nal ^^^^' * ^^^|p[^|j ,
4w ^ 0 *{ A which determined hability and indicated what monetary damages both parties would receive during phas?^^\ <
J i ^ l ^ c ^ \ ^ 1 of this bifurcated proceedmg, thus being "final, for the sakeof judicial review. " This is an employment J i
*^**T*Tf^^^'*^^3%scrimination case and I requested that the proceeding be bifurcatedi f the arbittator decided to uphold the N3<^^
f^ vrSKlo/ff' arbittation agreement. Arbittator Gregory awarded me substantial monetary damages, and awarded William (J^^e- ** \t
I , * Morris and/or Ix)eb & I ^eb LLP $1,000 for dcfimratioBr^lthou^
^A\ \ \ V^' statistical evidence 1 presentedof WiUiam Morris' 116 year pattem and practiceof discriminating against
li|'5(jvaVf^cf<\fiican Americans in employment, my claims of fraud have not been decided since Castel ^
it in his September 5, 2014 Final Order, and nothing that I 've said about the Defendants and thefr coimsel
has been* proven false. Over the courseoffive months, Loeb & LoebLLP never complied with Arbitrator ,
^^*^^'C5 Gregory's Orders pertaining to discovery, and never comphed widi any of my discovery requests. After I
filed an Emergency Motion to Compel, Arbitrator Gregory abmpdy "suspended" discovery and cancelled
, . . die oral hearing. He instmcted us to instead submit Final Position Statements and stated that he would thra >>
OaU !/>vAhcirender his "omnibus final decision."^^^^.^i ^i;^ , ci^+M ^- ^^r " ^^ ^ ' ^tL ^, f... w
K r f l I f the "Award" Arbitrator Gregory was "final, for tiie sakeof judicial review," dien ARC did not O^J^CM>
kf-V^ Kc* tee^liave jmisdiction remove Gregory before he could determine the acmal monetary damages that I would J^AOJ^- ^- ^
cj^c +a receive in this bififfcated proceeding. Ultimately, it doesn't matter because Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & ^' Tt' ! ?^
'CLf^fc. Loeb LLP are engaging in a "pattem^j^crf^'fraud u^on die Court" that Castel refuses to address in ^^s^^^^rj^jl^^
b^S- f September 5, 2014 Final Order. Also, Rule l /^eci fi cal l y deals with filling a vacancy when the arbitration ^i^^lff^f'^
agreement allows for a panel of arbittators. The mandatory, predispute arbittation agreements provided that ef-e^^^Mfi
U'tUili'f^' only a siiigle arbitrator would deterinine the case and that the decision would be "final and binding." Also,
' | I^e 1 IfY^ altiiou^h i t is clear diat pursuant to 10 of dieFAA, only tiie federal court can vacate die f p^K /^ J
'^t^Award" of an arbifrator. . ' . . "ff/ievl tv-H
^^* i s < ^^s i ^^ I td^ sStcm^I citeone*of tke most in-depth and comprehensive law articles written c^^c^o
r(Cot'>*^<i on the top of die finahty of interim decisions and partial final award-rAeFefi?era//lri/rra^/o . 4c/ . - ' ^ / ^ i ^* ^
^ijSit {^^ti^^"^ Incongruities Relating to the Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic and International p, ^ .
y^xA'Ci^^ Arbitrations, vnitteahy JeanesM. Gaitis and published by die American Review of International Arbifration
C M S V I ' ^ in 2005. [ P I. Fraud Upon die Court Motion, 31-32.] As reflected in tittie Gaitis' {numbw of pages] law
*Wf J l ^l dT^l ^article, even Interim Decisions can be"final, for die sakeof judicial review." I t's the "content of a decisicMi
1?/^ffttJi ~ l ot its nomenclature - [that] determines finality." Cases like F>ubhcis Communication v. Tme North ^ -
WfX jyslc*Uk. Communications, hi c. 206 F.3d 725, 728-729 (7tii Cir. 2000) "show that although die[FAA] uses die word ' ,. *
^^^^ ^^ward in conjunction with finality, courts go beyond a document's heading and delve into its substance and '
' impact to determine whether the decision is final." (emphasis in original). See e.g., Andrea Doreen. Ltd. v.
Budding Material Local Union 282. 250 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) ("die case law does not
;,:p*'h' 351 am confident that I have sufficient evidence to write the omnibus final decision. Claimant's October 15, 2013 i^i^\'j'^Pi^
[Reply to Em. Motion to Compel and Request for Sanctions] will not be forwarded to me." [Arbitrator Gregory ' r C^.J ve.
Octoberl6,2013 0rde!g. . A-f-tK Wef^^dfty, iu^eoho^m,^
I ^VUl u wt}vG* ^^t c ^i W ^tN'vU l ak^ci i ^af'- f^'^ Aw*^ U fef^TiT t L
. - o ^ ^ ^ . l ^ ^ ^ ^ . cMw u ^ , s ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ p i S ^U ^M ^" " ^ ^ i o ^ < ^
indicate that confirmation can only be done when the 'parties expressly declare an award on habdity in a
bififfcated proceedingwdl be deemed final."') {citing McGregor Van De Moere. Inc. v. Pavchex. Inc.. 927
F. Supp. 616, 618 (W.D.N.Y . 1996)). ; '
pages 34 through 62, I discuss the "Shortcomings of Arbitrator David L. Gregory and The
C ^ U J 4- American Arbitration Association" and explain why "Arbitiation Was Never An Appropriate Fonnn For
t>*i*>' 10* ^^0^ t*^^1 clVy'v^tJ ^<\ ' A j j ^^7 fstSi^ic / O i ^A k J ^*4- 4'
^>iiAi'ualv.<*&<,this Particular Case." See Exhibit O. On page 60,1 stated diat 1 sought for Arbitrator \j regorys "Partial dilf.ffj^
^ ^ ^ I ^^^^F i nal Award" to be "confumed in part and vacated in part to support that Castel's J uly 20, 2011 Stay Order
i^W^f* do [was] erroneous as a matter of law and public policy and therefore shoidd be vacated." On the next page, I ^(^J ie^vvl^
M ^^g'^'y'^Partial Final Award should not be entirely disregarded, especially i f he has still been found c ,
Jo be competent enough to stiU teach employment and labor law this semester at St. J ohn's U niversity,
\^ (^se^yMAt'Z^ well as continue deciding [labor & civil rights] cases for theAAA. Despite all that is wrong with ' v . ',
.iiMf. 4--WI--lfil/J ^egory's Award, it still substantiates and gives credibility to the arguments that were raised in the
JL J^\i*4fPc*iAJo^ federalcomt....Sincelamultimately seeking for Castel's J uly 20, 2011 Stay Order to be vacated, l am
ef-(#** ef^, asking that Gregory's decision be confirmed only to the extent that it demonstrates that (1.) an * ,
iadi\adual of considerable knowledge in antidiscrimination law determined that William Morris - '
(3><yif JlJ"SivLjify discriminated against me because of my race and that I 'mentitied to substantial monetary damages <
c^o^a^\J^ho/'^ "Sr ^^^^^^?> bac^pay; fro^it pay, compensatory & pumtive damages, "recompense for avoidable delays" ''
Ty J and fees and costs as a "pro se non-attomey prevailing party on stamtory claims in a case of
^aAjo\ considerable procedural and substantive complexity" and (2.) arbitiation is not an appropriate forum to
o^-AtrS^ ^'"3''>eflFectuate the pubhc pohcy goals of this nation's human rights and antitmst laws or hold William
Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone and others [accountable] for their " '
GowPf. highly unethical or criminal conduct. ' Tr\f^,A
Castel should have resolved the issue of whether or not Arbitrator Gregory should have been disquahfied, rtv*i* \A/^
^^^l l ^r f l ^l ^^^"^^ decided whether to confirm, modify and/or vacate Arbitiator Gregory's "Partial Final Award." ' ^J ^^^^
touV^^-fvA. Instead, Castel said nothing about theAAA disqualifying Arbitiator Gregory after issuing his Award and c^WifRKa^
^fP^^' ^'^^afl!oweA''the fraudulentiy appointed replacement "arbifrator" - Timothy K. Lewis - to have decision-making <ilHt^^>
V authority over Wilharn Morris and Loeb & LoebLLP' s Motion to Vacate Arbifrator Gregory' s Partial Final l^ee^;^j v|^
; Award - a clear violation of due process. <^6^l f\
Clearly, I disagreewidi the statementsof the American Arbifration Association, Timothy K. Lewis,
Loeb & LoebLLP and P. Kevin Castel regarding the "finality" of Arbifrator Gregory's Partial Final Award.
That is an issue diat wil l have to be resolved by the Second Circuit.
jF.. C astel's September 5, 2014 Final Order Makes .\bsohitelv No Mention of Mr. Washington's
( laiins that Michael P. /.wei". C liristian ( arhone and loeb & Loch I I P llaxe Fngasetl in a
"Pattern" of "Fraud I pon the Court" on William Morris' Behalf or the F.videncc Which Prove
These Claims "Bevond \e Doubt."!
j One of the reasons P. Kevin Castel tries to pretend that ,
J ^"^T!t* *^niy March 27, 2014 Motion only a "motion to disqualify," was so that he would not have to decide my >Ppow/\*-^-^
cAe* /H> cW-v v^*cU .
*f A U i - ^ claims that Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & LoebLLP were engagingin a "pattern" of "fraud upon the Court" \'<\.
e/^(ciHj U-f^*-^dl l i V Ufi M c dU^^/^J -L j ^' /^5 ^- ^d C)(.'afcy|(4j ^Ut<^c^[
on William Morris' behalf in two racial discrimination and antitmst cases involving Wdliam Morris and
Loeb & LoebLLP. Thefirst time I exphcitly raised allegations that Michael Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP
were engaging in a pattem of "fraud upon the Court" was ia my third appeal filed with the Second Circuit
[ ' [0 A M on May 3, 2012, plaintiff Recall Mandate, 3, 7-8, 12-20.] Everything that has occurred and been revealed
, ' , , throughout tteyhistory of this case, proves this fact.
A C/pA-tcf "Doc^t-f- For a fedCTal judge to ignore evidence of fraud and make no mention of it ia his Final Order, is
Castel's September 5, 2014 Final Order makes no mention
10
i ^' ^' ^l ear evidence that fraud is actoally occxirring.
hAeH/l *\ of the terms "fraud on the court" or "fraud upon the Court." This omission is not accidental or due to chanoe-
Ock t / Aof 0 3 On pages 82 through 90, of my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion, I provide the
"The i f CotvA
CA ''w^^f wl "Argiunents Supporting That Wdliam Morris, Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone and Loeb & Loeb LLP
r\o^^plfMrt Have Intentionally Engaged in *Fraud Upon the Court* To Prevent Jury Trial." See Exhibit P. As stated
^^^^ earlier, P. Kevin Castel narrowed my arguments from Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP were
CAiC\aiij> i|A (t^^^^^ ^ intentional "pattem" of "fraud upon the Court" on Wdliam Morris' behalf to stating that I
^ nof argued that "opposing counsel has been engaging in a pattem of bad faith 1iti:iti~n "mrrnntinc litignti-n
vtVie<fc\t'-\Ci*j}'warranting thefr removal and sanctioij" [PKC Final Order, 14.] Theword "fi^ud" appears drree times
4w. |>*^**^*|j-oughout Castel's September 5, 2014 Final Order and "fraud upon the Court" appears zero.
pe-HM ^Ae\A Alieifin pages 12 through 24,1 provided a detaded "Procedural History of Washington Before the
' American Arbittation Association and^Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP's 'Pattern' of Highly V^Mf[ T
o^fKK^\v\>t' Unethical and Criminal Conduct on Behalf of WdUam Morris," which discuses the conspiracy tiiat took '{T '
'fvt.^/U placein Rowe Entertainment Inc. v. William Morris Agency. See Exliibit Q. 1 truly believe that everything a-o^MpncC-
o^d^^^^happens for a reason. I learned about the details of the corrapt conspiracy to conceal "Exhibit 31" and the
underlying e-mads to this document seventeen months after I filed my complaint with the Southern J^J^^^^voJ^
ir<*>6M-.wlA Qistnct of New York. The vahdity of my claims, as well as the clauns raised by the class of blacjf concert o^V AW*
, promoters, has never been dependent on this "smoking gun" evidence, I ^^^juidoubtcdly use it to
my advant^e as a reflection of William Morris aiui its ranployees' discriminatory state of mind. K^"^"* '"^,v
V " During the time that I was appeaJing Castel' s Stay Order in the Second Cu-cuit, I discovered a CNN ^l . * ^: ^ ^
\i^W\f\. article tided "Conuption In Our Federal Courts," which discussed the Rowe Entertainment v. William t-C^f..?r
* &^^^>^3\" Agency. See Exhibit R. In the article, the main plaintiff, Leonard Rowe, discussed how during l ( v
: ' electtonic discovery, his own attomeys from Soimenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP ("SNR LLP") (now
known as Dentons LLP) conspired with attorneys from opposmg counsel for William Morris [Michael P.
Zweig and Helen Gavaris of Loeb & LoebLLP] and Creative Artists Agency [Jeffrey Klein and Jeffrey of
1 - evidence that the class of black concert promoters paid $200,000.00 to acquire. When the
results from Electtonic Evidence Discovery's search came back, theplaintiffs weretold by their attomeys
that "no derogatory terms" were found. Leonard Rowe discovered that tins was a lie after he madvertentiy
sfo^^^eri - ^ j - ^ ^ U\-j>^-^<i^| f
discovered the search results Ust on the desk of Ms attomey Raymond Heslin. He infom i . Wj ' ' ^' ^
based in Smart, Florida - WUUe Gary of the WilUe Gary l ^w Finn - about what he discovered and thi s'fv*^'^,''^
document was faxed to die WilUe Gary Firm. See Exhibit S. Shortly diereafter, SNR L L P withdrew from
die case, but never produced any of the "underlying e-mails" which showed employees from two of J^S\M*.*C>-
. ' HoUywood's biggest talent agencies referring to Afiican Americans in thefr incoming and outgoing e-rnails
as "rugger," "nigga," "coon," "Uncle Tom" and "monkey" to name a few. Leonard Rowe subimtted an delevin*'
. Affidavit in my case, confirming the statements that were made in the article, as well as discussing the " ^' l
. i ^ ^ \oec*uj. -they
overall fraud that had occurred throughout his entfre case. See Exhibit T.
j 2^^( 2p" Around the time of Sonnenschein's withdrawal from the case, the Booking Agency Defendants' .)
'T'H ( S counsel moved for summary judgment. Although this document was included as "Exhibit 31" to the class '^'^^iytj^^
SBCX\^^' of black concert promoters' opposition ^^summary judgment, SNR L L P never produced any of j i ^g^^' ^* ^* ' ^' ^
^rr^^o^ "underlying e-mails" to this document, RepubMcan appointed federal judge Robert P. Pattersori Between .
-f^'^'^-c^'^M ay 14-15, 2012, all four of Rowe's attomeys who conducted electtonic discovery on behalf of the *yj f ^)JtuJ{i(^
I ' ^* * ^' " ' ^* ^ plaintiffs, continued jto commit perjury, by stating that "no derogatory terms" were ever found. One
t^o^iA tK * f I attomey, even went as far as to say, that no e-mails were ever intended to be produced from the searchj^v
iu>U "W/ * "' * * ; Castel stated in die footaote of his Final Order: "Judge Patterson has had no role m Washington's | ' V * ' ^ * ^ ' '
fc^-l^j Washington's inclusion of Judge Patterson appears to stemfrom his role as the presiding judge in 1 " '
separate discrimmation cases against The William Morris Agency, I nc." [PK C Final Order, footoote 2.] ^v^J^v^*''
Once again^Castel is being dishonest and disingenuous because he is exttemely awareof the indfrect role Hf *
-f r j W-H M Patterson has played in this case given that he granted summary judgment in favor of WiUiam Morris in a ^^^^^^j^
prior racial discrimination and antitmst case, and also turned a bhnd eye to the fi^aud that had been Co^ivQ*^^
perpettated upon the Court by the plaintiffs' former attomeys and counsel for the defendants, which "^^J ^
- included Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & LoebL L P. Although die plaintiffs iu Ruwe weie UOl empluyees, {^JA^
Tvsull uf William Morrio' disoritniuatoiy atid 4r.e*vil^
f^tsP^^^- they-TJieg a imsert amount! lawsuit,m 1998 a{>a itsull of Willinm Morrin' diaorimi
i , i aatiuompedUve buijinesspracuctis. C^'rz.oHoJ^'^^\\c^ t/ Wb' f ?| i ^h fv^^-^'jg-of"<?Tf cW -
M A-I 'O. W*" Castel also tries to downplay the "alleged" marriage between Loeb & LoebL L P attorney Christian 0!^^ \s
vjfv *nr^ Carbone and AAA executive, Sasha Angelique Carbone. See Exhibit U. 1 first brought this issue to P. S N P * ^
.5 vUo- A K.evin Castel i a although Castel has never asked-Castel to submit an Affidavit confirmmg or denying this y^^]^^^ .p-
{kPfb^ relationship. When. Castel discusses this issue in his September 5, 2014 Final Order, he only discusses thefr
. ' relatioriship, to the extent that it affected the impartiality of the fraudulentiy appointed .arbitrator, Tunothy
.le** K . Lewis. However, I presented this because it Jikdnn supported that tne American Arbittation Association *
^>t.,ftCi ni d I S and woo not "neutial" as claimed and dittt thiafurther showed die unethical conduct of Loeb & Loeb
0\4Sfyf)f^ L L P, Michael P. Zweig and Christian Carbone due to the fact that this information was never disclosed to
>^' ' * ^' l i J ^ut i i em District of New York or myself at any time tiu-oughout this entire litigation. L*<-^ J * ^ ^
t'^ ^ ^ ^ ^ -24- ^ ^^\^ ^ ^ c ^ ^ ^U/ - ^^' ^,
^ e^^^^W>o^^c^^^ ^^]'- ^^^r^y}^^^ Trfig^-*^;; OW-f.^ v/ ^
\/AJy<"olA*a^- dL>jw./nf/tt4;c/% *^#J rtit vxc Wc{i 6^ -|v*.<|-e-y r f f o ^ f cl<-'*i JK.f ^fx^ ^f - j L u^Oj
j vi / ^ r * ^ ' Oneof themajor limitations of theAinerican Arbitration Association, was that
c)''!^5 0 | did not haveauthority to do anything regarding my claims that opposing counsel wereengaging ina
"pattera"of "highly imetlucal and crirninal conduct" on behalf of WdliamMorris, and violating many Rules
xmder theNew York Professional Conduct, as well as New York J udiciary Law 487. No matter theforum,
" a lawyer must act etiiically. I l i^ed morethan , i><' N )W \ | V )C f^fi/,-f- ^/wWio-wtl CooeUdf "H^"!'
Cft^rtof loepAAl/t<5c ,Whatinakesthissodistinbing, isthatdffOQghoQtP.Ke^ ^i
f^Co<Jti affiliated with many organizations that oeate tlie {^ipearance that he is "honctfable" and ethicaL serves as cM-l-y^^
f '^e Cliainnan Based on thehighly imethical and criminal conduct of Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone, i^jA'
"ZtfO Oio^Loeb & Loeb LLP and WilliamMorris, Canon 3(B)(5) states: "A judgeshould takeappropriateaction upon WfenU
l/^MfBO . learningof reUableevidenceindicating theIdceUhood that a judge's conduct conttavened this Codeor that
a lawyer violated applicable rules of professional conduct." (emphasis added) It is well settledthat a
, \n to disquahiy a law firmand/or an attorney for purported violations of professional rules of ethics, , " '
- can only bedecided by thefederal court, not arbittators.^^Bidermann Industries Licensing. Inc. v. Avmar
>^r, I N.V .. 570 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1st Dep't 1991) ("Issues of attomey disqualification ... involve intapretation and '
application of dieCodeof Professional Responsibility and DiscipUnary Rules, as well as thepotential
jVN^-KM *^deprivation of counsel of thecUent's choosmg," ttaditionally issues for a court); See also Northwestern
^^' ^^^ Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Insco Ltd. 2011 WL 4552997 (S.D. N.Y. 2011); Morgan Stanley DW. hic. v. KeUev & '
^Ul <v4*r Warren. P.A.. 2002 WL 34382748, *2 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 'IWpAlo P ^ C S ^ C<^J / - - K '"'^''^ Cc^C >^
"f^Ao^^a-A * When this casebegan in the SouthemDistrict of New York, diere was oidy one attomey
S -puf- \g William Morris: Michael P. Zweig of Loeb & Loeb LLP. I f my claims were "without merit, '
. legally and fartually," would Zweig need five additional attorneys and 3 paralegals to htigate a case against f
^ OPtt|cls a pro se htigant.wheii hehas been Based on the"highl^unethical and crinunal conduct" of Loeb & Loeb [
^^' ^i . ^j , ^* ^ LLP alone, P. Kevin Castel should haveterminated V itiation and issued extteme disciphnary and
, ^ 5<j \s against Wdham Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP, including default judgment on all clauns ^ ^ ^ o ^ ^
Uafc) Loi? raised in arbitiation, under diecourt's inherent powers. Instea4 Castel told me to contmuearbittating the j ^ . ^ ii n/^
K f ( UAJU W ^<^casein "good faitii" against a law firmdiat had and still is intentionally engaging in a "pattem" of "f i ^ d ^-/W j
<vl'V*vte. upon theCourt" on WUliamMorris' behalf - finther violations of due process and.equal protection under
\J^i^^U^^ ^ ^ ' ' ^ ' TV * ^A^^f '
r<--f \ ^ See i.g., Steven C. Bennett. Who Is Responsible For Ethical Behavior By Counsel In Arbitration? Dispute "tMy-f***
ke>aK+4ed Resolution Journal (May/July 2008). pg. 5-6. "fKKtefi' f
^ ^Uji 0 + https://www.aaau.org/media/17775/where%20do%20we%20drawyo20the%201ine%20-%20materials.pdf ("Certain .
T ^ L ^ sanctions for attomey misbehavior, such as disqualification fromrepresentation for conflicts of interest and disbarmfent a/K(Ev*--7
f"'^^'^*^ belong under thepurview of thecourts.") M*^c-*irf|-1^f^f^wC^H tvei KSlfcO^^t
I Mlllll!(uiUliLlJ I MMfll11WiWI I I !L'llllllllllUI I I HI I j;ilLmilW 1>
I I f the Second Circuit concludes that Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone and Loeb ^
& LoebLLP have engaged in a "pattem" of "fraud upon the Court" on behalf of WiUiam Morris or that P.
Kevin Castel has intentionally deprived meof my constimtional and/stamtory rights under the color of law
kv:|U,*'T*f or that Arbifrator Gregory's Partial Final Award was "final for die sakeof judicial review" and that he was
o.' ( ? OA;4 pi fraudulentiy disqualified before deciding phase 2of the "Final Award" in the proceeding that was meant to
e>tW'^'^>^^^^' ^' ^^' ^^ decisions issued by the fraudulentiy appointed "arbifrator" Timothy K. Lewi s,i ncl udi ng
Confidentiality Order and "Final Award" that P. Ke\'in Castel confirmed m his September 5, 2014 Final
Order which "dismissed my case with prejudice and on the merits" and awarded WiUiam Morris
^ <^<.|) Without saying too much about Lewis, 1 wi l l just include the bullet points that were contained in
^[c o^pkk original draft to the Motion that I am submitting. These things support diat eveni f Arbifrator Gregory
(leve^>^f*-*'*^was lawfiiUy disquaUfied and Lewis had authority to make decisions m this arbifration, theAAA should
(-A'A'A have disqualified him and/or aU of his decisions shoidd have been vitiated^e Southem District of New ^. ,
p^fj cf cc*y Sct^ iflV/*!' - Sow
Lewis adamantiy refiised to read any of the pleadings submitted by the parties prior to Jn^Jjir^
our conference caU and stated that he would be h^py to conduct the call without me.^^Oov>-f"
[PI. Fraud Upon die Court Motion, 26.] d^i^^Xi^
Relying solely on Arbifrator Gregory's Decisions and the dfrectives from the AAA,
Lewis issued a Confidentiality Order^' although I 'd accused Loeb & Loeb LLP of
engaging in fraud. I n paragraph 8, he stated: "Any prior opinion or order issued by the
previous arbifrator, David L. Gregory, is rescinded to the extent inconsistent with this
Confidentiality Order." He aUegedly issued the Order, in order to "restore order,
efficiency, and decorum to a process that had become bogged downin personal attacks
and unwarranted innuendo, and to enable[the] matter to proceedin good faith." Aware
p>c,j^Viool i(>^ftld c<y>dU>'dx6i of my blog which chronicleme fraud and comiption happening throughout my case,
' fhfcl- ( lj*C>\/ '"^Order -"exphcitly prohibited parties from discussing the proceedings through 'any
, . . form of commimication, uicluding but not limited to the internet, blogs, and other
. * ^/ \ f V ' - OT'^y^Z-- online media."' [Castel Final Order, 4; PI. Fraud Upon die Court Motion, 26.] 1^^^ u ^^Ua^
York for violating 10of die Federal Arbittation Act:
"Timotiiy ' K. Lewis' Schnader LLP
Biography:^'"'<>'-W
http://www.schnader.com/professionals/xprProfessionaLDetailsSchnader.aspx?xpST=ProfessionalDetail&profession u*V)>*liA^|-f^
al-142. 'ViOi^ ^c^eJ
In response, I wrote onmy blog: "I f Hon. Lewis is not given and does not begin to read these pleadings before our vl ** M-l^
conference call OR submit a notarized versin of his oath, then there is absolutely no point in me getting on this call. I ' "H* fi^-c
am not going to wastemy time talking with someonewho is going to receive $l,000/hour about my case, who knows kaUi'i A^if-
very little about what has happened and has made a conscious decision to remainin the dark." [insert date]. KAo]f-o^c^^
Oneof the main reasons what was happening in the casecould not be kept "confidential," is because this case began
in the federal court and all of the pleadings that are submitted are public record. I informed P. Kevin Castel of the " '
fraud that was taking place before Lewis entered into this case. /\TVS "ft - |^cf ^) *d <^~ /i i r^
Enlisting a "legal researcher" from his law firm Schnader LLP - Bradley A.
Naidcerville - to be involved m die case prior to receiving consent from both parties. I
objected because Nankerville was not employed by the AAA and per the
unconscionable arbitration agreements 1 signed, the case was to only be decided by a
neufral arbitrator, not a panel or quasi-panel of individuals. ''^[PI. Fraud Upon the
Court, 26-27.] Further proof that theAAA should not have allowed this to happen can
be found in the AAA's "Notice of Compensation Arrangements" signed by Lewis,
which stated that he "sometimes use[d] an associate at [his] firm experienced in J
arbitration matters to perform certain logistical tasks and conduct research where
^propriate in the interests of saving costs to the parties and may elect, conditioned ' *
upon tiie parties' express consent, to do so in tins matter. If the parties agree, the '
associate's billing rate shall not exceed $250 per hour." (emphasis added) 5eeExliibit .
V. After receiviag Lewis' first invoice from theAAA, I discovered that Nankerville >
had been involvedwith the case before Lewis conducted his first conference call with
the parties. \ -
Duringtiiesame call, he asked the Defendants' counsel to submit a motion of what
they sS^wTshould be paidwith regards to costs and fees although1 afready submitted
this information to the AAA and the Defendants in a detailed, 40 page rough draft
pleaduig. [PI. Fraud Upon die Court Motion, 27.] ^lji> 2wig>'PB:.2ti ^' ' ^
Lewis continued to act as i f he had authority to vacate Arbittator Gregory's Partial
Final Award. Although Heather Santo and Carol Placella were on the call, neither'one ' *
interjected to stated that theAAA had already stated diat the "Association does not ' "
have any authority to change or revoke any prior rulings made by Arbifrator Gregory. .'
Any requests for clarification and/or modification shall be raised to the new arbittator
upon appouittnent." [PI. Fraud Upon die Court Motion, 27.] ^OJ>C ^|. U^wf t t^<^(i *4j*v , ;
On March 10, 2014, 1 learned that Loeb & Loeb LLP attomey Christian Carbone's X (AJ ^^
wife - Sasha Angehque Carbone - worked as the Associate General Counsel for the ^ ^
American Arbittation Association. By letter, I informed theAAA and P. Kevin Castel
that I would not proceed any fiirther under the AAA's fraudulent "jurisdiction and ^
supervision." Widiout addressing the allegations that Carbone's wife was an executive|>.[L^(^c *j
for theAAA, die Defendants submitted thefr Motion to Vacate Arbitt^or Gregory's i
Partial Fuial Award on March 14, 2014. [PI. Fraud Upon die Court, 27.] vi^rt^^At^
In a casetiiat alleged that the main culprits maintainmg discriminatory employrtient ej ^I'rPiHr
practices in Hollywood were "Jewish," Lewis worked for a predominately all- ^6*i'8*>*^
white/"Jewish" law firm that had an active working relationship with Israel^' Based on '^Pu-d'f
the attomey profiles on Schnader LLP's website, there are very few attomeys of ^**^y ^'f
color.''^[PI. Fraud Upon die Court Motion, 55.] "H* p-+5J
^Although Christian Carbone argued that there was nothing wrong with this arrangement, I later found an article
written by arbitrator for theAAA, Paul Bennett Marrow, which stated the opposite.
http .//schnaderpittisrael. com/. Since I brought this issue up, this blog has not been updated. The last post made on
this blog was March 10, 2014.
Castel makes no mention of this fact or Schnader LLP's involvement in the case in his Final Order.
-27-
Entertaining William Morris' Motion to Vacate the Partial Final Award of Arbitrator
Gregory dining first conference call although 10of the FAA states that once an Award
is issued, only the federal court can confirm, modify and/or vacate the Award.
Throughout our conference calls arid in e-mails, the AAA and Loeb & Loeb LLP
constantly referred |Dl^Vvis as "J udge''in his capacity as the "arbitrator''for ti^^ . ...
I made numerous reql^sVo theAAA and Loeb & Loeb LLP iBpealedabjaetiwis that
this was deceptive and unethical due to the fact diat only an active federal judge could
vacate the Award of an arbifrator pursuant to 10 of the FAA.
Lewis never disclosed his working relationship with Sasha Angehque Carboneof the ^ ,
American Arbifratiog Association - wife to Loeb & Loeb LLP attomey Christian j ^^^^L .
Carbone - and statifig that no conflict of uiterest existed although this information was j^^^^^f^T
never disclosed to me. TheAAA was aware of their marriage and should have never ao\A^
offered Lewis as a potential candidate to replace Arbitiator Gregory, fiirther ^
demonsttating that the AAA was never "neuttal" and that arbittation was an
inappropriate forum for tins landmark employment discrimination and human rights
case.
I discussed majority of the bullet points aboveui my March 17,2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion, f* CAi-j^U
Castel concluded that Lewis "did not exhibit evident partiahty in favor of Defendants." Although 10 of ^^^f^^
the FAA enumerates four situations in which a court may enter an order vacating an arbittation award, his C<i ^l
September 5, 2014 Final Order focuses only one "simation"; <\ K>M\ - . . . .
Washington argues that Arbittator Lewis exhibited evident partiahty in favor of defendants due to the
relationship between opposing counsel and the AAA, Under section 10(a)(2) of the FAA, 'evident
partial ity'wil l be found'when a reasonable person, considering all of the circumstances, would have
to conclude that an arbifrator was partial to one-side." AppUed I ndus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine
Ticaret Ve Senayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cti. 2007) (uitemal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (emphasis in original).
Castel quotes Lewis' statements that "he was unaware of the relationship between opposing counsel's law
firm and an AAA employee before Washington brought it to his attention" and that "[o]nce it had been
brought to his attention. Arbitrator Lewis attested that the relationship had no bearing on his unpartiahty."
[PKC Final Order, 18.] He concluded the section by stating: "Because there is no evidence in the record
that Arbitrator Lewis was uifluenced in his decisions, Washington has not met his burden of showing that
a reasonable person would necessarily conclude, and the Court wdl not speculate, that solely on the potential
relationship between opposing counsel and a single AAA employee, that Arbittator Lewis was biased
toward defendants." [PKC Final Order, 18-19]
I f this was not unethical or did not create a conflict of interest and was "no big deal," why would
theAAA ask the arbittators on their "Notice of Appointment": "Have you had any professional or social ;
relationship of which you are awarewith any relativeof any of the parties to this proceeding, or any relative
-28-
of counsel to this proceeding, or any of the witnesses identified to date?" See Exhibit W. Nobody truly
knows what the relationship between SashaA. Carbone and Timothy K . Lewis was like, and any statements
from theA A A could not be tmsted since they repeatedly lied to me and intentionally disregarded thefr rules
throughout the entfre arbitiation. See Exhibit U. , , , , ^ ,, f ^ ^^^r.<L
) r r , oJ ^t j ^c^t ^eA^j rxa^jof 06-*=^^''^*5'^>
Regardless i f Lewis thought he was, mt-WlSi created the appearanceo^^j|jpr given everything that
' tw had tianspfred during the htigation. Although Castel claims that the marriage is "alleged," Christian
pcrJWW A S Carbone has refiised to answer whether or not he is mamed to Sasha Angehque Carbone. And Lewis aside,
this fiirther demonsfrated that Loeb & Loeb LLP and the A A A were Uterally in bed together, fiirther
supporting my arguments that arbifration was an inappropriate forum for this particular caseand that the
A A A was not as "neufral" as it proclaimed to be. I have been made aware that someonefrom the A A A
informed Arbifrator Gregory of thefr marriage, and he sought to confirm this information with the A A A ,
but no response was given. I f the A A A knew of this relationship, they should have disclosed that
information to me. With the hundreds of arbifrators available, theA A A also should have never included
Timothy K . Lewis as a possible replacement arbifrator since the A A A knew that Lewis and Sasha A.
Carbone knewthat 4hey both served as members to theA A A 's Diversity Committee. More importantly,
this fiirther demonsttated that Loeb & Loeb LLP and its attomeys were engaging in a "pattem" of highly
unethical conduct on behalf of WiUiam Morris due to the fact that Christian Carbone never disclosed to the
Southem District of New York when he sought to compel this caseinto arbifration, that his wife was an
executive at the exact sameforum where he sought Castel to have the casecompeUed to.
Castel states: "Defendants subsequentiy submitted a motion to vacateArbifrator Gregory's Partial
Final Award. Washington neither submitted his own motion, nor submitteda response to Arbittator Lewis."
[PKC Final Order, 6.] Since WUUam Morris and Loeb & LoebLLP never responded to my March 17, 2014
Fraud Upon the Court Motion or my Aprd 10, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration, 1 never submitted a formal
opposition to diefr July 3, 2014 Motion to Confirm the Final Award of Timothy K . Lewis and thefr July 10,
2014 Motion to have P. K evin Castel unpose afiling injunction against me. Instead, I submitted a letter to
Castel on July 12, 2014, stating that the Defendants' motions was premature since they were aware that I
was submitting aMotion for Modification to Lewis' Final Award and also stated that the arguments raised
in my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion and A pril [10], 2014 Motion for Reconsideration
. , ,, diametrically oppose[d] and void[ed] any 'legal' argument put forth inWME Entertainment and Loeb &
(AW**]VI>/ Loeb LLP['s]" motions. See Exliibit M. As an exhibit, I included the handwritten notes I made to Lewis'
^i^^^^^^^ Final Award, to demonstrate to Castel that his decision contained many factual errors and inaccuracies. See
V \ JLAM^' Exhibit X. Castel's September 5, 2014 makes no mention of this as weU. Instead, he spends a great portion
cKiO^A y of his Final Order, discussing the one-side decisions of an "arbittator" who shoidd have never been uivolved
^^' ^^i ' . ^' . in the caseand whose decisions should be vitiated.
Cf^*^'" ^4K .C^J ^AAiUc*wfc^-
-29-
Castel makes absolutely no mention of 10(a)(1) ("where the award was procured through
corruption, fraud, or undue means"), 10(a)(3) ("where the arbifrators were gudty of misconduct...in
reftising to hear evidence pertinent and martial to the confroversy; or of any other misbehavior by which
the rights of a party have been prejudiced"), or 10(a)(4) ("where the arbifrators exceeded thefr powers, or
so imperfectiy executed themthat a mutual, final, and defiiute award upon the subject matter was not
made") of the Federal Arbittation Act with respects to Lewis and his Final Award. Since Castelhas ' '
erroneously conchided that theAAA had jurisdiction to disqualify Arbifrator Gregory after he issued his ^ '.
"Award" diat was "final, for the sakel of judicial review" and that theARCJiad jurisdiction to disqualify . , v
Arbifrator Gregory during phase 1 of a bifincated proceeding, that Lewis the authority under Rule 12 to
vacate Arbitrator Gregory's Award, although this rule only apphed to arbifrations involving panels^
knew that i f Castel ignored the arguments and evidence presented in my March 17, 2014 Fraud
Upon the Court Motion and did not requfre WdliamMorris and Loeb & Loeb LLP to respond to my
motions, there was no possible way he was going to rulein my favor. Thus, it was futile for me to spend a
considerable amount of time and energy explaining the other things that occurred while Lewis arbittated
the case. Here are someof the other things that ocgurred after Castel refused to stay the arbifration and fidly
decide my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion:
On Aprd 18, 2014, Lewis unlawfidly vacated Arbittator David L. Gregory's Partial
Final Award in violation of 10 of dieFAA. Heather Santo of theAAA stated shortly (A-JV<
after Gregory was disqualified that dieAAA could not vacate the decisions issued by ^tct^
Gregory, but they allowed Lewis to do so. None of his reasons for vacating Gregory's S\r^-^ f^i
\ ^ , Awardincludedgroundsenumeratedunder lOoftheFAA."*^
ErroneouslydeterniiningtbethresholdissueofarbifrabiUfy without any citation of the
law or discussion of the arguments made by botii parties. Lewis continued to entertain
WdliamMorris' argument that I breached thefr arbittation agreement and dius, all of
my claims should be dismissed. Clearly, thefr argument ignores WilUamMorris' ' ^*''^A''**4
history of intentional racial discrimination, which is the reason why I filed die'^''^'l\*^**^
complaint in the SouthemDistrict of New York. This was problematic for many f^oMT*o^-
reasons, including the fact that WiUiamMorris and its counsel chose not to raise this "^^^-
argxmient in thefr Motions for Sumniary Judgment. Gregory also denied this argument, ^^^f** .
due to die fact diat he refused to grant WME attomeys'fees. Given that my legally .
sufficient arguments were denied without explanation or any citation of the law, this , ,
was a violation of due process and equal protection under the law.
' Lewis stated during our second conference caU on April 29, 2014 that hewould aUow
' discovery, but no oral hearing, before he rendered his Award.
*^I f the grounds to vacate an adjitrator's Award arehard under 10 of theFAA why was it so easy for Lewis to do
the same, especially when hedid not vacate Gregory's Award pursuant to any of the grounds enumerated under 10
of theFAA?
-30-
During thie same conferencecall, Lewis refiised to say the word "conspiracy" when
trying to summarize my claims, although WiUiamMorris is also being sued for
antitmst violations and conspiring to interfere with the human rights of people of
Afiican descent, mviolation of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 18 71.
Refiising to aUow for an oral hearing after my hard drive crashed and 1 was unable to
submit formal reply to the Defendants'Motion to Terminate.*'
BJ )c*|lJ , ^4 , , ^4 ^ submit tom^al reply to tiie L
LUf r et f j t i - j e^ f* * Statmg in his Final Award, which dismissed my casewith prejudice, diat I never
f ^^^j i J +v submitted areply to the Defendants'Motion ^i ^^^j n^^when 1 acmally submitted
. . 1 ^^e^ fv* two responsesviae-maU and included it in i m^^^ti STror Modification, which he
Pn-V\UHcf[ o^r^jf^\^ refiised to address.
Stating in his Final Award that 1 wanted himto dismiss my casewith prejudice,
although I adamantiy and repeatedly asked Lewis to issue his"final" decision since it
was clear to me that he was not impartial.
On May 30, 2014, 1 foimd an article published in May 2013 and written by
[-niai(ec(4<ir attomey/AAA arbifrator Paul Bennett Marrow titied "Can an Arbittator Conduct
Independent Legal Research? I f Not, Why Not?'"*^Marrow explauied tiiat arbifrators
fK. A-/W1"' themselves are not supposed to conduct diefr own legal research outside of die
arguments raised by the parties and that legal researchersare generaUy not aUowed in
arbittation proceedings. This fiirther supports that since both parties did not agree to
Lewis having another person involved in the arbittation [and on die payroU], it should
not have happened. Mv/ i l a^l l c'
What makesLewis' decisions very disturbing, is that Lewis - who proclaims to be Afiican
, ^ American - gave an interview where he talked about instimtionalized racismand diversity.''Inme artich
titied "Stiiving For Diversity In ADR & Why ft Matters: An Interview with die Hon. Tunodiy K. Lewis,"
he made statementslike:
S^(^>*4^ Americaisdiversebyitsverynature.PubUc and private institutions, in my judgment, should reflect
V9e\9iUf . America. After aU, plittaUsmand diversity represent the goodnessand the richness of our country. And as
instimtions and individuals, we are all the better, aU the sttonger, for it. And so I have always been
committed to seeing to it that instimtions that had kept thefr doors closed for so very long to women and to
members of racial and ethiuc minorities open thefr doors so that they and, through them, we aU, can be
improved.'
I did instead submit two e-mails in response to WilliamMorris' Motion to Terminate. In Lewis' "Final Award," he P* '^'^
intentionally lies and statesthat Idid not submit aresponse. G(ft</vJ *f-
http://www.marrowlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/arfaitrator-independent-legal-research.pdf p*4f**
^Me Against Iniquity. "Striving For Diversity In ADR & Why It Matters: An Interview with the Hon. Timothy K. M^CMCJLJ t
Lewis." Febmary 20, 2014. http://meagainstiniquity.wordpress.com/?s=lewis+%2B+interview. \/<fe{\ttj djs^crt
-31- , VvfAOJ -W pc-iH/%>
* It is to me a moral issue, an economic issue, and a broad societal issue. But it really is about our
identity as Americans. You know, welive in a wonderful and diverse country. And the richness of this
country is the result of an amalgamof cultures and classes and influences. There's no doubt in my mind
tiiat we are able to realize the best within the public and private sectors fromthat same experienc^CpJt is
more than an employment issue. In terms of private sector and corporatehiring, it's about understanding
the importanceof inclusiveness in expanding the pool of avaUable talent beyond its tiaditional limitations,
whde at the same time maintaining standards of excellence. **
However, when Lewis becameinvolved in the case, he tried to pretend after allegedly reading all
of the pleadings that were submitted by the parties, tiiat there werestill werestiU issues that needed to be
resolved, thus the need for proposing the parties to conduct discovery before he rendered his "Final Award."
This made absolutely no senseto me and was only going to harmfully delay the casefrombeing resolved.
He claimed that Arbifrator Gregory never fully resolved the claims that were raised in our Motions for
Summary Judgment. With regards to liabUity, this is not tme. Both parties fiiUy submitted briefs arguing
tiiefr case, and WdhamMorris and Loeb & Loeb LLP even submitted a "Fuial Position Statement" on
November 20, 2013 per Arbitiator Gregory's request. For more than three years, WilliamMorris never
6Ke(,|<wt.| refuted the historical, statistical and other forms of evidence I presented which proves that WiUiamMorris
was violating TitleV I I before and during my employment. AdditionaUy, Lewis did not vacate the three
InterimDecisions of Arbifrator Gregory, which admitted "Exhibit 31" into the evidence of the record -
fiuther reason why he should have concluded that the arbifration agreements I signed as a condition of
employment should not hav^^een enforced, and that arbifration^^v^^jna^projpriate^rMn^^ this
particular case. Since Lewis did not want to have an oral hearing, there was essentially no difference
betweenJmu_amC Arbitiator Gregory. Whde Lewis continued to make adverse decisions against me, I
repeatedly asked Lewis to issue his "Final Award." After Lewis decided to enforce the arbifration
agreements without reason or any citation of the law - like Arbifrator Gregory - and I informed himthat I
recorded the conversation, he had the Defendants submit a motion to terminate the arbittation, and granted
it shortly after.
Here are some additional things that I learned about Lewis, that support that an "appearance" and/or
"actual" bias, prejudice, impropriety and/or partiahty existed with him:
Issuing invoices that dfrected WilUamMorris to pay Schnader LLP dfrectiy by
providing the law firm's bank routing number. When I made objections to the AAA
during the case, they refused to anything about it, however, I found out afterwards that
this was done in violation of AAA Employment Rule 44.''^In six months, Lewis and
^"^Throughout Lewis' appointment, I had to repeatedly ask theAAA to forward me copies of Lewis' uivoices. Between
Febmary and July 2014, Lewis and Schnader LLP invoiced WiUiamMorris [more than $115,000.00] for their
"services." This is a violation becauseAAA Employment Rule 44 states: "Any arrangement for the compensation of
a neufral arbitrator shall be made through theAAA and not directly between the parties and the arbitrator Payment of
-32-
Schnader LLP's invoices totaled more dian $115,000.00.** See Exhibit Y. Since
William Morris and Loeb & Loeb LLP were given Schnader LLP's bank routing
number, theA A A is not awareof exactiy how much Lewis and his firm werepaid and
after for the dates WilliamMorris madepayment to Schnader LLP and tho omotmto of
diepaymuin. TheAAA stated they didnoyiroyj^^ information^but that was alie
becausethey provided that informationwhen Cregorywbifceted ttre ease.' See Exhibit
Schnader LLP' s AlternativeDisputeResolution Program, in which Lewis serves as co-
Chair, "serves major domestic and international corporations and smaller, successfiil
businesses throughout theUnited States and abroad." See Exhibit BB.
Lewis is amember of theBoard of Directors for both theIntemational Institutefor
Conflict Prevention and Resolution and theAmericanArbitration Association. Heis
also amember of theCPR Instimtefor DisputeResolution, whereheis on theCPR
Institute's National Panel of Distinguished Neutials."' On August 28, 2014, I
discovered aletter dated November 19, 2009 that was written to four members of
Congress by theIntemational Institotefor Conflict Prevention & Resolution.'" In short,
the members of this "think tank" wrotethis letter to "voice[their] concems over tiie
Arbittation Faimess Act" - aproposed law that would prevent arbittation agreements
from being deemed enforceable in employment and consumer-related disputes.
Throughout my case, I haveadvocated for the passageof this law. At thetimethis
letter was written, Timothy K. Lewis was aboard member of this organization. Lewis
never disclosed his affiliation with this organization to theparties. Lewis was never
going to issue a decision finding a company's arbittation agreements to be
unenforceable.
I must also makenoteof thefact that Lewis serves on theboard of dfrectors for the
A A A and I cannot identify one casein which aparty has sought to confirm, modify
and/or vacateanAward that hehas issued, which leads meto behevethat Lewis has
not arbittated that many cases or any at all.
Prior to woridng for theAmericanArbittation Association, Lewis served as afederal
judgeto theUnited States Distiict Court for theWestemDistrict of Pennsylvania [June
thearbitrator's fees and expenses shall be madeby theAAA fromthe fees and moneys collected by theAAA for this
purpose." On [insert date], I addressed dieseissues with theAAA viae-mail and as of today, therehas been no
response. On September 8, 2014, Carol Placellaforwarded methe Juneinvoice, and stated that theAAA did not
"financial information to opposing party." See Exhibit AA. Onceagain, Placellais lying becausetheAAA provided
that informationwith Arbhrator Gregory. See Exhibit Z. Theonly reasonthey areunableto do so with Lewis, is
becausetheAAA allowed Lewis, Schnader LLP, WME and Loeb& Ix)eb LLP to violateAAA Employment Rule44.
On September 9, 2014, Placella responded to my e-mail, stating: "In responseto Mr. Washington's requests, theAAA
provided information regarding theArbitrators' invoices andwill not beissuing afiirther responseon that issue. The
arbitration has been closed, and accordingly, theAAA administrativerolehas ended."
Between August 2012 and January 2013, Arbitrator Gregory received atotal of [insert amount].5ecExhibit Z.
http://www.schnader.com/contactus/xprGeneralContent2.aspx?xpST=ContactUsGeneral&key=fcealc77-fI65-
4b2d-a4a0-0b55ce998e59&activeEntt-v=aa83bba9-c6db-4aO-9dc9-a8ab671722cf
Intemational InstihJtefor Conflict Prevention & Res. Letter Regarding Arbittation Faimess Act of 2009 (S. 931;
HR. 1020) November 19, 2009. http://www.cpradr.org/Portals/O/Resources/ArbittationFaimessActofZ009Letter.pdf
-33-
18, 1991 - October 9, 1992] arid United States Court of Appeals for theThird Circuit "
[October 9,1992-June 30,1999]. RepubUcan President GeorgeH.W. Bush appomted ;
Lewis to both positions. * .
Arbitrators, like judges, must also abide by a Codeof Ethics. 5eeExhibit C C . Before Lewis issued
his "Final Award," I sought his disqualification on May 30, 2014. See Exhibit DD. Widiout reason, the
AAA refiised to disqualify Lewis. Even "[i ]f the question of whether 455(a) requires disqualification is a . .<
close one, the balance tips in favor of recusal." In re Boston's Chddren First 244 F.3d 164, 167 (1st Cir.
2001). Based on the facts above, Lewis'predisposition - like Castel and Patterson - evinces a "deep-seated
(and unequivocal) favoritismor antagonismthat would makefair judgment impossible." Litekv v. Umted
States. 510 U.S. 540, 555-556, 114 S.Ct 1147, 1157-1158 (1994) (emphasis and parenthesis added).
At the end of the day, the person irst responsible for allowing this to happen is P. Kevin Castel. I
discussed thefirst ten bullet pointsin my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion and April 10,2014
Motion for Reconsideration. After Castel refiised to discuss these issues mhis March 27, 2014 Order, this
' gave theAAA and Lewis the clear signal that they could essentially do whatever they wanted, including
unlawfiilly vacating Arbittator Gregory's Partial Final Award. Before and after filing my March 17, 2014
Fraud Upon the Court Motion, I wrote a few letters to Castel, stating that "[d]ue to the on-going fraud that
has occurred since the inception of tius case, I cannot and will not continue htigating this case anv
ftirtfier under the jurisdiction and supervision of the American Arbitration Association."^'
" ^ ^ ^ I ^ ^ j ^ [Washington Mardi 28 , 2 0 1 4 Lettw] (emphasis ui die original) Had Castel upheld die law and unpartiaUy
decided my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion or the April 10, 2014 Motion for
Reconsideration, therewould not have been another arbittator appointed to the caseand i f so, I would not
have been arbittating this caseagainst Loeb & Loeb LLP. However, Castel waited five mondis to
erroneously decide the issues that were raised and mthat tune, Lewis had afready "dismissed the casewith
prejudice and on the merits" after invoicing WUUamMorris more than $100,000.00, because I continued
; " ' to pubUcly object to the fraud that was occurring throughout the case, something Lewis also pretended did
not exist.
Bi I <^f{^ j j j j g exactly part of the Defendants and thefr co-conspfrators' plan. The reason why Castel had
OnU^-A;! problemwith theAAA disquahfying Arbittator Gregory after he decided phase1 of his "Final Award"
.'fxi'vg.i or Lewis being appointed although the federal court did not vacateArbittator Gregory's Partial Final Award
1 ^ J ^*>ff^d/or disqualify him, is because it was clear based on the arguments raised in my March 17, 2014 Fraud
^ ^ J Upon the Court Motion, diat my objections to theunlawfid conduct engaged in by Loeb & Loeb LLP, the
fy>6 ^rY ^ i '* American Arbittation Association, Lewis and others, would give himthe necessary pretext to frame his ;
h^T**^ Final Order in a way that would support this false narrative that WiUiamMorris and Loeb & Loeb LLP
" I submitted oneof the letters a day after P. Kevin Castel issued his Order refusing to disqualify himself '
l ^ ' i d *t -{^ftJ ! cooi tf f * Jul y 3o^Zo\S
Afiican Americans andconspiring to exclude themfrommeaningfiil positions of employment, such as
Agent. I've been engaging in extreme "badfaith," that I was "abus[ing] the process of the Cotnts to harass
andannoy other with meridess, fiivolous, vexatious or repetitive pleadings," etc, thus also warranting the
imposition of a filing injtmction against me, aswell as prejudicing my appeal by stating thati f I appealed
i^iu^Je-j' * create since I've exposedthe company's 116 year historyof harboring a racial animus against
As (^^1
^X>{Dflj^o( his decision, it wolddnot be made in "goodfaith." [PK C Final Order, 19-26.]
-^U ( ^^1I J MI |Wj l |UMJ f l J |^
.li .l.f gii ?o<^[TW8!l!!Hroi lffnf{!BW1^^ The issue of
ua/y^- t^U. who has jmisdiction to decide the merits of the claims raisedin this landmark employment discrimination,
cell-
antitmst andhuman rights caseis an extremely important thresholdissue.
Onpages62 through71 of my March 17,2014 FraudUpon the CourtMotion, I explainedto Castel
for thefirst time, why I believedhis July 20, 201 l^tay Order was erroneous as a matter of l^w andpubhc
policy. 5eeExhi bi t EE. In Castel's March 27, 2014 Order, he refiisedto disquaUfy niiiself fromthe casi ot(^^\t)^\
' : U^)> andstoodby his J uly 20, 2011 Stay Order, saying diat it"sp[oke] for itself - altiiough in tiiat Order, he ' ^H^^^
^ , , made absolutely no mention diat my claims involvedsystemic disparate freatment anddisparate impact, \ t(Af ^ Ci'->
O'T \r< U/^c "^nor did he discuss the pyramidof historical andstatistical evidence demonsttatuig that WdhamMorris was wi
^ violating theCivil Rights Act of 1964 before andduring my employment. In responseto my claims that ^. ^^gj i ^
*^rVj*rV<!:^ Castel's July 20, 2011 Stay Order was erroneous as a matter of law andpubUc pohcy, hestated: ^^^-fi^led^c
A R\ - (UO^<K) , On Febmary 25, 2011, the defendants movedto dismiss or stay the action by reason of an arbittation ' ^
^y<?J i .vagreement. As noted, in an ISjiage-Momor^tt^im andOrder filedJuly 20, 2011, theundersigned u'S
grantedthat motion insofar(^^^ying the pendi ng^awardin arbittation. Mr. Washington disagrees
with the content andconclusion5-in the Momorondmn andOrder. While the MemorandumandOrder
^I^A^IJ^ "h^speaks for itself it, among other things, summarizedthecomplaint, analyzedthe2009 Arbittation
^-ttA-M Agreement, examinedtheunconscionabihty argument, consideredit thenature of diearguments
fvvv V|^f J*, L J regarding whether thedispute as to arbittabiUty were for the Court or the arbittator to decide and,
^ applying establishedprecedent, concludedthat they were for dieariiifrator to decide. The court also
^>!^t,tJK *\ examinedwhether there was a congressional intent to foreclose arbittation of claims assertedunder IY^CN^^
l'\ft*f l^K TitieV I I or 42 U.S.C. 1981 andconcludedere was not." t1ic CMA*.
. ,. As hestated, Castel concludedthat theissue of arbifrabiUty was for thearbittator to decide, although I . , r,
JCiOf'^tXc arguedthat the "Delegation Provision" - .which wag only containedin the secona arbifration agreement1 Jd^^^^
\r^^uJ^. signed- fiirther demonsttated that-ti* arbittation agreements were substantively andproceduraUy
(?pf 4^((|ri44a^conscionable. [ tMl ^^p l ^bA-(^U AA& MT ^ W O B ^ h l Tft^cM MA^ g. ,
A-^J ^ A'Wfjol In addition to thefour simations enumeratedunder 10of theFAA to vacate an arbifration award, '^'^'^ "^^t
^fortdjl^ SecondCfrcuit grounds for vacatar also include "manifest disregard" for thelaw. T.Co. Metals. L L C v. <jjoot f\l\
^ ( Dempsev Pipe & Supply. Inc.. 592 F.3d329, 339-40 (2dCfr. 2010). An awardis in manifest disregardof
^^" ^ '"^Z die law i f tiie arbittators are'fidly aware of die existence of a clearly definedgoverning legal principle, but ^^J^^^
^ ((/w'f - ^ refiisedto applyit, in effect, ignoringi t" StoU-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.. 548 F.3d85, 96 (2d
r ^ ^ t i , ^ ' ' ' ^' " i ' - ^- c f ^. ^, . x ^ A I ' x ^
Cir. 20()8)No matter who the arbitrator was, i f they ^ enforced the mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration (o
agreement I signed without issuing a wntten opinion that discussed y arguments and cited^'^y caselaw .
to explain their reasoning, I was goingto<^t to have theAward vacate
y arguments and cited^'^y caselaw . - '
ted because the arbitrator s decision i ti Avt
^ was made in "manifest disregard of the law," and as a result, the arbitrator "exceeded their powers" by C A S ^ \
Aullt>rfVowt-deciding the merits of my claims. ^^(^Pr*
tf^f Vf^A *W>lo|<l^ In arbitration, I raised the same arguments that were made before the SouthemDistrict of New
^^^^^^^^^Y ork and the Second Circuit to show that the mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements that I signed J^^^x"^'
U -Hil J as a condition of employment were unconscionable, tainted with illegality, malum in se and that arbitration hncs.f-l^
^o^l i j '^^f-^ was an inappropriateforumfor this particular case, because theforumitself prevented the pubhc pohcy ^t^J^'
{emMj\fltjC goals of theCivil Rights Act of 1964 frombeing achieved, based on the claims that were raised. See Exhibit
CM}c\<h<l rt*^^WilliamMorris and Loeb & Loeb LLP argued in tiiefr Cross Motion to Dismiss [pg. 35.]:
PPA ( >*^l cy' c^M\ ) *\ ' ( ^' ^^^^^Castel, considering Washington's claims that the Delegation Provision of the Agreement
wks unconscionable, held that 'the 2009 Arbitration Agreement was not signed under procedurally (^jj^j\x^\
, f laicoiiscionable conditions.' Judge Castel fiirther held that Washington faded to 'set forth a sound basis^^^^ cj-^r^
1* ,J" jo fW/Vtipon which this Court could conclude that Delegation Provision is substantively unconscionable such that ^
this alone could be a basis to find the provision unenforceable.' As enforceability of the Delegation y,i^i,^fiic^
Provisionhasafready been decided, it cannot be reUtigated here." r '
Prt>vKiia/> Both Arbitiator David L. Gregory and Tunothy K. Lewis decided to enforce the arbittation *<<^i i ^<
<5c3Af| 1 o|- agreements I signed as a condition of employment without any discussion of my arguments or any citation '^^'Mi
of the law to support thefr conclusions, although this threshold issue was argued i n my Motion for Summary ,
C\i\ca. 1 <^'^^<^Judgment. Given that I have spent nearly four years raising this argument in opposition to the enforceabiUty
"^^^e^TcJo ^arbittation agreements 1 signed and WdliamMorris and Loeb & Loeb LLP raised counterclaims that
pt,vVd^\*ras I breached the arbifration agreement that I argued was "unconscionable," the finder of fact had to explain
reasoning, sinceWilliamMorris took away the court's authority to decide that issue. .
\ro^t p^iU to^ciefg^cHWithout ever discussing the now unrefiited pyramid of evidence I've presented establishing,
u /K6rp violations of the federal, states, local antidiscrimmation pre-dating my employment, Castel concluded that ^tp] ^
"the decisions to enforce the arbifration agreement were not in manifest disregard of the law" and that the 0^{jr
arbifrator was "under no obhgation to provide the reasoning for his award and courtswi ll generally not ..
attempt to analyze the reasoning process of an arbitiator." [PKC Final Order, 16.] Although Castel cited
HaUiganv. Piper Jaf&av. fric. 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cfr. 1998), which states tiiat "where areviewing court
is inclined to find that arbifrators manifestly disregarded the law or the evidence and that an explanation, if
given, would have strained credulitY. the absence of explanation may reinforce the reviewing courfs
confidence that the arbitrators engaged in manifest disregard," he found absolutely nothing wrongwith
the fact that the arbifrators flouted the law and refiised to acknowledgeWilliamMorris'history of racial
discrimination, or apply antidiscrimination law within the framework of the Federal Arbitration Act, to
determine the arguments that were raised by botii parties. / i , , . .
A u ^ irJ HliW hU ni Wl ^cM<tof-
^I ' l ol A0-|- roi<- 1 ^6 fiii^ paragraph of this two-pagesection, Castel's reasoning takes a turn for the-worsTwhen
[PKC
"Thereis a 'barely colorablejustification' for Arbitrator Lewis's determination that the agreement was
not unconscionable. I n its prior opinion, theCourt held that the'Delegation Provision' itself was not
unconscionable and addressed arguments sintilar to thoseWashington raised with Arbitrator Lewis.
Sunilar reasoning coidd conceivably justify a finding that the agreement as a wholewas also not
maiufest
^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Castel has never acknowledged WilhamMorris' history of racial discrimination, tiiereforehis legal
conclusions regarding any a^ect of my case, cannot and should not bethe sameas someonewho does
consider this evidence. I f Castel had no intentions of upholding theCivd Rights Act of 1964 or weighing
thepyramid of evidence estabhshing systemic disparatetreatment and disparateimpact pre-dating and.
occurring during my employment, what was the purposeof staying the case?Theoidy assumption 1 can
make, was to prevent theSecond Circuit fromhaving thejurisdiction to review his legally erroneous
lfiU^^'inJik and prejudice my argimients challenging the enforc^abdity of the mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration
,T"J ^~'n^"^agreements I signed as a condition of employment. Essentially, wejust went in onebig cfrcle, with no
iooifelli/'S^ls der of fact issuing an objective, written decision regardmg the issueof arbitrability,'ami"discus3^""^
ai WiUiamMorris' history of intentional race-based discrimmation in employment which ocourrod beforeand ^
dU.f<yj'>\i/\^*/i fhirinc my fm^\"^'m^* WilliamMnrrin, or at least explain why evidence of WilUamMorris'.history . ,
C,^i+AfoO J excluding qualified Afiican Americans frombeing hfred and/or promoted to Agent is not neeessary when
f\0^]f\Cii{^ determining whether this particular company' s pohcy of having its employees sign arbitiation agreements,
j - f ^i cJ^'^oJ^ nothing morethan a "savvy legal loophole" to givethis jfx)mpany thepower to moveclaims of racial
JiJjis\er\n into a privatized, quasi-judicial forum that-n unable to adequately effecmate the larger .
, 17 Dublic DoUcv eoals of the Ci vi l Riehts Act of 1964. As a result nearly four years have been wasted, while
P"^^''^ pohcy goals of the Ci vi l Rights Act of 1964.
*j/'^^of' Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carboneand Loeb & LoebLLP have been unjustiy enriched fromengaging in
I n WiUiamMorris' Febmary 25, 2011 Motion to Compel Arbitration, Loeb & Loeb LLP attomey
1"^^^ Christian Carbone stated: "Nor is thereany legitunateargument that Mr. Washington can present as to the
ll Si*Jj validity and enforceabUity of theMutual Arbitration Agreemen^Seee.g) J LM Indus. V. Stolt-Nielsen SA.,
Orr{e^' S*?" 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cfr. 2004) (challenges to enforceabUity based on claims of confract of adhesion and
unconscionabiUty to by decided by arbitrator); Wright v. SFX Entm't I nc., No. 00 Civ. 5354, 2001
WL103433 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7,2001) (plaintiff's discrimination claims subject to arbitration including claims
of arbitration agreement's unconscionabiUty)." [pg. 5] I f WilUamMorris was in fact violating tius nation's
antidiscrimination laws beforeand during my employment, then clearly theuiuquefactsof my caseaUowed
meto raisethis uniqueargument in opposition to theenforceabiUty of die arbitration agreements I signed
as acondition of employment. The sameevidence that supported my claims of intentional systemic "^lise^/^M
disparate tieatment, disparate unpact and violationsof federal and state antitmst law, was the sameevidence (^Jl ^cl
used to support my claims that the arbittation agreement I signed were unenforceable as a matter of law
and pubhc pohcy. I f die finder of fact ignored dus evidence when determining the threshold issueof who f^^ /"^
had the proper jurisdiction to decide the merits of this case, they would morelikely than not ignore this g, ; | ^
evidence in their "Final Award." Regardless, I would have clearly argued to the SouthemDistrict of New Wo^t^^o^
York and/or appellatecoiut that the arbittator and/or judge's decision on the issueof arbittabihty was
do SO' I f '7
I M^I '^^^'v ^^^^ ^^ which supported Castel should gg havejurisdiction to weigh this r 9c ft*l>c
^^>K^P<J^ c^^ce of WiUiamMorris' history of racial discrimination, especiaUy since I was "obUvious" * ^' ^* ^! ^^|^^|^
*^f W' 9- information or that there were zero Afiican American Agents, Coordinators or Agent Trainees employed ^^\ci^n
- f- \\ in the New York office when 1 began employment. See e.g., O'Reagan v. Arbifration Forums. Inc.. 246WcK| Aof
^f tl ^"^F.Sd 975 (7th Cfr. 2001). Of course, Castel makes no mention of this case. Castel uitentionally apphed an
O^bi^eJ c-fVc exfremely narrowed mproach to my unconscionabiUty arguments and analyzed the language based on the, * .
\ MM ' ^t'"^language contained in thefour comers of the confracts.ySfow that Castel has issued aFinal Order i*^
*^t^M>aa& again ignoring my arguments, I can seek to have the Second Cfrcuit review the decisions of Castel
^/ *^and the American Arbifration Association. | . :
' Although Castel imposed afiling injunction against me in his September 5, 2014 Final Order and * ?
f I,
( CtMi)ttc|to( stated that my appeal would not be made in good faith, the judge's and arbifrators' erroneous decisions
^A^c*ne 12i<ei^egarding the issueof arbitrabiUty, is procedurally simUar to what hq)pened in theMissouri SupremeCoiut
beW -KU caseof Morrow V. HaUmark Cards, hic.. 273 S. W.3d 15(Mo. Ct App. 2008). After an employee was fired,
iW^V ^ ^ discrimination. Id. at 19. She was ordered to arbitrate her claim, but tried two more times
OJ ^ \ti to have the court hear her lawsuit. Id. at 20-21. Reluctantiy, sheinvoked the mandatory arbifration process
^'^oJ^K^f^i^nA argued to the arbifrator that thearbifration agreement was unenforceable becauseit was iUusory. Id. at
21. She lost the award, but an appeals court vacated it on grounds that thearbifration agreement was one-
sided and therefore unenforceable. Seeid. at 22-27.
, Although I have raised thesearguments ui exfreme "good faith" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, Castel's
vVftiV>-f<. "^"^^ "^^^^ Order and September 5, 2014 Final Order regarding die enforceabUity of WUUam
J <. UOFXX Morris' arbitration agreements demonstrate that his decisions were always predetermined. Castel's actions
Oy, T^^*X^\- demonsfrate that no matter what arguments I raised in opposition to WilUamMorris' arbitration agreements
li^rtediO or how much evidence I presented to buttress those arguments, he was going to compel this caseinto
^^^^J ^* *^arbifration becausehedid not want an impartialjury reflecting therich diversity ofNew York City to decide
e^^#o^I the meritsof my legitimate claims of instimtionaUzed racismand pre-hiring individual disparate freatment.
'^<.^<9^oa^Kir(iaJ^^o.w^.^^oJs^ ^P * ^^ CAaU^9 - t .Kf'-s) U +
-fCiAi^l pcl/cv^f e>*Jo't<kj<
^*''^**^ , Since I was only given one opportunity to oppose enforcing Wi l l i am Morri s' binding arbitration
agreements, I expoimded upon my arguments by showing that i t was strongly i n the pubhc's interests to
I I . Hi e Actions of Wi l l i am Morri s, l.oelt & Loeb LLP, Michael P. /.wci g. (l i ri sti an ( arbonc. P.
ftu^- ip-f^w' have the case remain in the federal court and be decided by an impartialjury. .N\crrt, ^v.*^,'*^^'^
JlrtA^^^ "^f^*^^*''^^*"^" Supreme Court stated i n Alexander v. Gamer-
^ tay^-**^'Denver Co.. 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974), diat "final responsibdity for enforcement of TideV I I is vested wi th
I i. t)'*t^'^"*^^^eral courts." From begmning to end, Castel has adamantly refused to uphold the Ci vd Rights Act of
\n}S -e>ny-A>**^ A section 455(a) motion is "evaluated on an objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality r /
C W ^* * pr ej udi ce but its appearance." Litekv v. Untied States. 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) (emphasis ui the
ct ^' / t i original). The Court also noted that "judicial rulings alone almost never constimte a vahd basis for a-^9e- ' * '
^* p- Qj partiahty moti on...." Id. at 5 5 5. The Second Circuit, applying Litekv, has said diat on a section 45 5(a)
/Wv^ t^^ts^y Amotion "[t]he question... is whether 'an objective, disinterested observer fidly informed of the underlying
p|i'ci| facts, [would] entertain significant doubt tiiat justice would be done absent recusal.'" ISC Holding A G v. ,
^^' pl c j ^^J Nobel Biocare Fuiance AG. 688 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotingUnited States v. Carlton, 534 F.3d
^t c ^ 9 7 , 100 (2d. Cir. 2008). !
P"*^ j j * ! ^ ^ Surprisingly, I lifted die case law abovefrom Castel's March 27, 2014 Order refusing to disqualify.
In his September 5, 2014 Final Order, CasteLtri ^to m^e it,a^l es^^^h^^97 page Fraud Upon the Court
Motion was only a "motion to disqualify" solely due to my imaginary beUef that he issued an erroneous , .
decision compelling my case into arbitration. He stated: "The principal focus of the motion is a July 20, - - '
2011 Memorandum and Order that granted the defendant's motion insofar as i t sought to stay the action ^
penduig an award in arbitration."'^On the thfrd page, Castel concluded that "[vjiewed as a totality, an
objective, disinterested observer fidly informedof the underlying facts wouldnot entertain significant doubt
fliat justice woul d be done i n this action absent recusal of die undersigned." [PKC Recusal Order, 3. ]
In the same way that Castel makes no mentionof the pyramidof unrefiited evidence demonstrating
Wi l l i am Morris'egregious violations of federal, state and local law or that Michael P. Zweig and Loeb &
Loeb LLP have engaged ma''pattern" of''fraud upon the Court," he also refiised to discuss thefi i l l reasons
why I believed there existed an "appearance" and/or "acmal" racial bias, prejudice, unpropriety and
ier. See Exhibit F F . I've been seeking thefr disqualification partiality i n his March 27,^014 Recusal <
smce I filed my first appeal with the Second Cfrcuit and on pages 71 through 82 of my March 17, 2014
I first sought P. Kevin Castel's disqualification when I filed my first appeal with the Second Circuit. I used his July
20,2011 Stay Order asa "lens," as well as his personal and professional background, to show the intersection between
; "racism, politics and the law."
Fraud Upon die Court Motion, I explain in detail why I beUeved the "appearance" and/or actual racial bias, * ' '
prejudice, impropriety and partiality exists with the two federal judges that are currently assigned to my * . i
case and why diey should have disqualified themselves pursuant to . : ..V
Showing the "intersection between racism, pohtics and the law." Genaonifativc judicial agmda.^' \jrf/\Mj
\aBemiQD.ionQS's2QQ2ai\ic\Q Critical Race Theory: New Strategies for Civile
Millenium? pubUshed by the Harvard Blackletter Law Journal, Jones explains the role " pr es i dent i al .
pohtics" had on shaping the ideological make-up of the judiciary less than two decades preceding theciAdl ^j g^l i **, ;
rightsmovementandpassageoftheCivdRights Actof 1964: r-^f^fJefj
As presidential pohtics began more and more to determine the natureof judicial pohcy and pohtics, the p>^Kfj *
Supreme Court reflected this new trend, as Republican presidents nominated like-minded judges to the ^^Lj** ^
bench. The Court becameA^j^neans by which Republican presidents could ensure the end of Uberal
civil rights pohcy becaus^J ptice)iave life tenure. These justices promulgated a formahst position on
civil rights that marked a retmrrto narrow concepts of jurispmdence and a rejection of Uberal judicial t
activism. In the eyes of activists, the Supreme Court was no longer an articidate voice in favor of civil ,
rights and Uberties; instead, it became a threat, for the justices seemed able to limit precedents or do
away with themaltogether. .
TheNew York Times have
Ronald Reagan was elected into oflBce. Quotes to describe those judge
constmctionist-judge[s]" one of the judges who would "constme laws narrowly" "conservative judicial
phUosophy," who were "sympathetic to conservative jurispmdence." "set higher standards to be met by
civil rights plaintiffs and are reluctant to estabUsh new rights for minorities." "identifiable conservative . .
bent" "^^^^(S^^af^itf^ti^ CR\ , C\ti ' ^R^OUMDI^ n,j *f '
Studies have indicated tiiat the poUtical party of die appointing president is afairly good predictor , Vn-
of how an individual judgewUl veto. This raises doubts about the concept of judicial mdependence and a '
judge's alleged unpartiaUty, especiaUy on matters pertaining to civU rights and racial discrimination. The ,., >,
New York Times noted "the tendency of Reagan-Bush appouitees to vote in certain definite patterns "
throughout the court systemhas proved to be rehable6^d the research indicates that there's a relationship
between a judge's poUtical ideology and tiieir judicial opinions (or lack thereof) because judges
overwhelmingly decide cases according to the phdosophical positions of the party that appointed them.'^
[PI. Fraud Upon the Court Motion, 74.] "Empirical scholars have found that many judicial decisions, by no
means limited to the Supreme Court, are sttongly influenced by a judge's political preferences or by other
extralegal factors, such as the judge's personal characteristics and personal and professional experiences,
which may sh^e his poUtical preferences or operate directly on his response to a case.'"* "[S]everal studies
" Lisa Michelle Ellman, David Schkade and Cass R. Sustein. "Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation," University of Chicago. September 2003. (conclusions were based on an examination of
more than 4,480 legal opinions, involving politically diverse issues.)
Hon. Richard A Posner. How Judges Think. Pg. 8. 2008.
-40-
^'**.**^"^/ have shown that judges appointed by Repubhcan presidents since Reagan have ruled for conservative
Ofp^^gfT* rjutcomes more often than have their peers. They have been more likely than tfaeir coUeagues to favor
*v ^gct* corporations over regulators and people aUeging discrimination, and to favor government over
'^CCi^>it4' i^eople who claim rights violations. They have also been more likely to throw out cases on technical
t^ffi^MtcHve grounds, like reacting plaintiffs' standing to sue."'' (emphasis added) The decisions of P. Kevin Castel
' in this casereflect that the government's goal of "shift[ing] the courts in a more conservativedirection" has
' i " i s clear diat Castel is hostile to civd rights" or a "stnct constmctionist" because
4< et^u^^ pi\'tei e^^fSiCfJU^
'. - employment discrimination and civil rights easechallenging instimtionally racist practices of WilUam
rp|/ * Morris (and HoUywood), he never discilsses theCivU Rights^Act of 1964, New York City Human Rights
CA. a|r bl/w poU(^^oals of theseantidiscrimination statotes, that my claims include disparate impact cl*-i'AJ
or that in my Complamt, I sought permanent injunctive relief, as well as affirmative relief. He also avoids ^^^/itscs |-
d^iCM mi t*M*y any and aU evidence that I have presented which proves that WiUiamMorris has always been conscious of ^^' ^
^ai i ^c ^race in its employment decisions. '-^ 4 ^ <^ 4* ' ^f ^1 i-f e^r/y* 4 ^ "Hx
*ypi^5^7w/ Although the Defendants argued thatrny claims were"whoUy without merit, legaUy and facmally," ^^"^^-^
^^' ^^^' ^ thehistorical, statistical^^^^ecdotal evidence of racial discrimination predating my employment catmot
( be and has not been disputed. WiUiamMorris' counsel have argued that this historical and statistical
J yv evidence is irrelevant, this it only btcausa tbq' have ignored my claims of systemic disparate treatment,
j rv 'I A ^C T**. disparate unpact and violations of antitmst law and pretended jdiat this is purely an isolated caseof
tfllef Jfff>( individual disparate tieatment. The reason for presenting this information, is becausethis evidence alone
M>/^flPUestabUshed that WiUiamMorris was intentionaUy "violating federal state, and local law prohibiting
ryffutCbce4^ discrimmation in employment on the basis of race" becausethey continued to Urmt and segregateits
workforce when race is not a prerequisite for thejob.
\n *>i4,b/ - Castel's extreme narrow-mindedness is fiirther demonsfrated by the fact that he makes Uttie to no
mt>-t mention about die sttong public interest arguments that I raised, which discussed die role this private ^'^^^'^^
oUcs ^-^ffdi ^^^^'^^ plays in helping maintamracismScTthe mytii of white/ "J ewish" superiority not oidy in
4^ ^ <^fci*^HoUywoo4 but throughout theworld. Although the Defendants claimthat ["Jevnsh
'^'^^*^'*''*'TKbt be disputed that theWUliamMorris Agency was founded by a German "J ewish" immigrant named
Zehnan Moses, later known as WiUiamMorris, in 1898. R-sonnot be dioputod that WilliamN4orrig4ms
tTij^jl^tai^Ypi.vitiy HicrTiminntnrj- ffmpln-j-mnnt prnrtirri l " * ^! i i i "l.T"' '"nr"' iTim-T hn",'-^^
^irtn [IQ^^*o prfiSf"^ ^5 yparcjit cannot be disputed that tho oompany*s de jure poUcy of not hiring
, Afiican Americans as Agents or Agent Trainees [1898-1961 or 63 years] exceeds it^de facto poUcy [1961-
cfjis^*-^ Charlie Savage. "Appeals Court Pushed to Right By Bush Choices." New York Times. October 28, 2009.
-t<A4^t" http://www.nvtimes.com/2008/10/29/us/29iudges.htinl?pagwanted=all& r=0.
2014 or 53 years]. Despite representing many AMcan American entertamers and ma^
off of themover the decades, it cannot be disputed that it took the company 63 years promote its first
African American to music Agent and 101 years to promote its first Afiican American to the position of
film Agent. ( P L S. D. N. Y. Complaint, K.]
Ze^ 'W' cannot be disputed that between 2000 and 2010, zero Afiican American Agent Trainees were
promoted to Agent in the New York office, and oidy oneAfiican American was hired direcdy as an Agent
Ce ^nM* office in first decade of the21** century. It also caimot be disputed that when I began
Kfir<xa*t>Aj employment in the New York office, there were zero Afiican American or Hispanic Agents, Coordinators
iVf /Wv^e4&|t*>etJ
or Agent Trainees employed throughout the Agent Trainee program. See Exhibit D. Since I was not a
lawyer or knowledgeable mantidiscrimination law at any time during my employment, I didn't know that
this alone can create an inference of discrimination. See Bamer v. City of Harvey. No. 95 C 3316, 1998
WL 664951, at *50 (N,D. III. Sept. 18, 1998) ("In cases, such as tius one, tiie 'mexorable zero' speaks
volumes and clearly supports an inference of discrimination."); Ortiz-Del VaUe v. National Basketball
Ass'n. 42 F. Supp. 2d 33 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognized that evidence of an inexorable zero can support a
jury's finding of discrimination against a motion for judgment as a matter of law); Victory v. Hewlett-
Packard Company. 34 F. Supp. 2d 809(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (read Teamsters as holding that an inexorable zero
' standing alone could support a disparate impact claimof sex discrimination in promotions, asserting that
"[t]he Supreme Court has repeated countenanced the useof statistical evidence, and evidenceof the absence
of a singleminority employee being hired, labeled the'inexorable zero,'would in and of itself support an
- inferenceof discrinunation."^: Ewing v. Coca Cola BottUng Co.. No. 00 CFV. 7020(CM), 2001 WL 767070
(S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2001) (die court found aclaimnoting that the inexorable zero was sufficient to defeat
a motion to dismiss becausea near-zero promotion rateof minorities into higher-skilled jobs reflected de
' " facto segregation, and therefore supported an mference of intentional discrimination.); Lovd v. Phillip
. Bros.. 25 F.3d 518, 524 n.4 (7tii Cir. 1994) ("100% sex-segregated workforce is highly suspicious and is
sometimes alone sufficient to supportjudgment for thepl aintiff") I f WdliamMorris weren't racist and/or
race conscious, there's no possible way that the racial make-upof WdUamMorris' New York office would
,^ , have been what it was when I began in September of 2008.'^
See e.g:, Marianne Berttand and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment Ln Labor Market Discrimination." (June 20, 2004). http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873;
Afiican-Americans without criminal records are viewed as less desirable than whites with such records, (finding that
fictitious resumes with Afiican-American sounding names receive markedly fewer callbacks for job interviews than
comparablefictitious resumes with White sounding names and that higher quality resumes for African-American
names also ehcit substantially fewer callbacks than comparable resumes for White names) (finding that fictitious
resumes with African-American soimding names receive markedly fewer callbacks for job interviews than comparable
fictitious resumes with White sounding names and that higher quality resumes for Afiican-American names also elicit
substantially fewer callbacks than comparable resumes for White names).
-42-
Honestly,^b^u^tl^e statis^al^epde^ce^ so egregious, one doesn't need a statistician to
condude that tWs is-aR "acciJent^'or "due to chance.''Thus^'^der of fact caimot pretend to be
blind''or "race-neutral,''even when deciding the threshold issueof wMch forumhad jurisdiction to decide
the merits of this case. Andi f any arbitrator or judge concluded that I had not proven intentional systemic
disparate treatment or that WUUamMorris' employment practices, policies and procedures created a-,
disparate impact against quaUfied Afiican Americans from being hfred and/or promoted to Agent, .
Coordinator or Agent Trainee when the Defendants and thefr counsel have never refiited this evidence, ' .
"^tiuld clearly be making a decision in maiufest disregardof the law - an issue that would also be raised to
^^^+* di e^ndCf r cui t . S^ij-Jiid^'^^'i^h"^-^^'^ ^c ^ H - N J " " ^ * ^o * . * . * f ^| i * r f ^^, . - ^v ;
/vs.},'^Vc*l ^) What's perplexing is diat although Castel has made no mention of Titie V I I or the compelling
/ucV>t^-^j .evidence I've presented demonstrating WilliamMorris' century-plus pattemand continuing practice of
Wc^i^e^Ji racial discrimination against Afiican Americans, he stated in his Jxdy 20, 2011 Stay Order that I "ha[d] not
^^H***^ shown that Congress intended to preclude arbittation for claims asserted under either TitieV I I or 42 U.S.C.
/%oi<i.\\Zcf -' 1981." [PKC Stay Order, 10.] It is ttiie tiiat die United States Supreme Court has held, tiiat statiitory
'^^^^j^^*^mBS are arbitt^le. 14 Penn Plaza v. Pvett. 556 U.S. 247, 267 n.9 (2009) ("Notiung in die text of Titie
*V>*'K'v y n precludes conttactual arbittation."); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.. 500 U.S. 20 ^^j^
Cve<\v4- (1991) (mdividual employees could be compeUed to arbitrate federal age discrimination claims.!: Desiderio ^^SUyyw
S'/i i j J 'i r*' "v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sees. Dealers, fric. 191 F.3d 198, 205-06 (2d Cfr 1999) (Titie V I I claims arbittable), *='^<^"*''
Violfcr) VI |- however, the claims raisedand initial evidence presented in my case, are not the same as the other cases in
^tl l ^^^i ^'rti ^hi di their arbittation agreements were upheld. The arguments raised in opposition to arbitiation by thefr "^J j^r^"^'^
'^'^^"'^^*^*^^f eui ^, were also not the same. ^ . .
P^\ ^J - A\ V' \ Castel could never impartially determme my unconscionabiUty arguments, because he consciously i f tv{-
^^^fsoorci chose to ignore any and all evidence demonstrating that WiUiamMorris was intentionaUy violating the
'^tji CivU Rights Act of 1964 before and during my employment. When he pretoided to summarize the clatais oit(c^
cSp^e^^lj ^ Kdsed in my 80 page Complaint he tried to fiame the case as beii^^iAj n l^voj^ Him i s o^ed^^e^^C/ ^^ ^
4- individuid (ti^jarate treatment, and tiiat I felt I was discriminated ^^ni ^ because... In lOetemiimfig^^ [^o^
jvj^u -KtvlfVi unconscionabUity, a "'flexible' approach, examining 'aU the facts and circumstances of a particular A>irtlt*4lj
iiy|vt>^A-^ case,'" See e.g. Brennan v. BaUv Total Fitiiess. 198 F. Supp.2d 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) {quoting I nre \S'
disu.^^^^-Estate of FriedmanV . Eean. 64 AD.2d 70 (2d Dept. 1978)). (emphasis added) 6^1^^J^t ^ j ^ ' U-of^ 'p
WliAJWrftrift*-se/Jc Even though WiUiam Morris was the party was superior bargaining power, the arbittation \^tn4e^''
eU.UA'>iviijc6A agreement was exttemely one-sided and gave the company the abiUty to supersedere pubUc policy goals ^^'^
- X^^j ^^ conttoUing the forumin which "aU claims" could be raised* Castel saw absolutely nothing j> jc^c^(r><
f'^MLethical or unlawfid with die fact tiiat oneof die attomeys representing William Morris never disclosed to ^'^^J^^g^'*
f i x II ^ttti
the SouthemIDistrict of N ew York that he was mam
American Arbitration Assodation, when he sought to have the case compelled under their jurisdiction.
I n aN ovember 8, 2005 interview w ith The Hollywood Reporter, W M E Agent Charles King -the " ^'
first Afiican American film Agent at W illiam M orris between 1898 and 1999 - stated, "I 've had
conversations where people say, ' I can't find the people [ofcolor quahfied enough to fill executive positions j ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
w ithin Hollyw ood],' and, 'W here are they?...To me, thatis absolutely absurd." He added that: "Onceyou've SccHrt \f^
identified these people (that want to be a part of this industry), the most crucial part is mentorship. I t's ' ' ^ij ^*^*
getting people to mentor those up-and-comers so they can navigate the pohtical waters of our industry Jcc-noA.
because it's so based on relationships and nuances, and it's not necessarily about academic performance
There are very few executives that can make it through this town without some sort of mentorship
or sponsorship, and I tiiink it's even that much harder for people from a diverse background if they
don't have that" (emphasis added)
^^j eJ jrv-'{^ ^ pages 55 through 60of my M arch 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Coxirt M otion, I discuss the larger
rtt<>aclclKfet' See Exhibit GG. Despite our "progress" over the last 50 years, much of die
I '^'*:'*f^eri can middle class has been wiped outi n the courseof afew, short years. Things are oidy getting vvoree
A* . i^e^ and as long as the white majority continues to pretend that racismdoesn't exist, [Pl/Fraud UponShe Coiut
'^Y** W hile Aestvariousforces have been at play, it is completely understandablewhy racismstdl exists
\rrJt^\HS cat
vti\\tt(i { A in 2014. The conclusions contained in the longimdmal smdy Discnmination and Desegregation: E qual
Opportunity Progress in U.S. Private Sector W orkplaces Since theCivd Rights Act mirror the woiiq)lace
trends of W dhamM orris over the past four decades. This stiidy was oneof die "first to produce long-tune
trends on workplace equal employment outcomes" by comparing the fates of black, white, Hispanic and >
Asian men and women over a periodof 36 years (from 1966 through 2002). The researchers concluded:
"...from documenting these basic trends, while almost aU workplaces have incorporated women and
racial/ethnic minorities as employees, status segregation w ithin workplaces remain very high, white
. males continue to have advantaged access to the best quality jobs, most radal progress in E E O stalled
after 1980, and white women seemto have benefited the most from the straggles for E E O."
A* 4'W - (&a.kstf4 ".<oHf ^^'iU-w, A/ w ^ J ; CAA ;rTfl ,lcM ^c+c- v/vf*ti-}U/J cu-T^">o^
"[S]o long as long as the prospective Utigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutoiy cause ^ c-ecj ;
of action in the arbifral forum, the statutevrill continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent fimdion." '^'^^** ^
Gihner v. hiterstate/J ohnson Lane Corn.. 500U.S. 20.28 (19911(auotins M itsubishi M otors Corp. v. Soler .f;|^.
Chrvsler-Plvmouth. Inc.. 473 U.S. 614 (1985)). [Insertnotes firan aibitratiQn.] E ven i f I was accorded a "^^^^^^^
fafr hearing^arbitration was stUl not an effective forumin which to satisfy the pubhc pohcy goals of the p^j e<i4'5 *
employment discrimination statutes. I t is clear that Congress must pass the Arbitration Fafrness Act, i " " ^, ^! ] ^^^^
U tkea\nAJisfut^\ ^Mic>V'xkx c*.ic^ ,Vv^>rijK-t/-*i pf</H. 2) ^^o^+v^J . Hf^J
j v ft-*
order to prevent egregious violators of theCivil Rights Act of 1964 from bemg held Ml y accountable under
the statute. i - - ..
One must also be knowledgeable of the history of arbitration and the decisions of the courts over
f - M p| ^* * ^ ^6 last decades, regarding arbitrating employment disputes involving stamtory claims. On pages 49 through
^i&>('^i** 60 of my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon the Court Motion, 1 discuss the many shortcomings of arbitration
CCCS fij cdi'^ arbitrating this caseunder thejurisdiction of the American Arbitiation Association. See Ejdubit HH.
Ctt>^'^"f**^ Although it is clear that Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 to evince a "strong federal
fif^'M- fr'l'*'''*^5ricy favoring arbitration," Castel makes absolutely no mention of the fact that Congress passed theCivil
^r^*,^^ Rights Act of 1964, to demonstrateC diat there was a sfrong commitment at the federal level, to end all
SM^^rtiit^ foriiisofdiscrimination, particularly discrimination based on race, color and/or national origin.
c*)ivse4-j f^7i*V<kf One of the major shortcomings of antidiscrimination law today is that it is not in ahgnment with
"pkiicASO^^ the extensive sociological literature on the topic of unconscious racism or imphcit racial bias, nor does it
take into account the covert and subtie role a company's "discriminatory organizational stiiicti^e,
J ^'^'^^^l^^^jinstimtiona] practices and work culture defined along racial lines that make it impossible for minorities to
succeed" in the workplace.'^[PI. Em. Appeal, 15.] Since the passageof theCivd Rights Act of 1964, the
u.W4'")VC#'f^^^^^of racism in society has shifted from being blatant and expUcit to being more msidious, subtle,
0kb4i-N**' > ' * ,
vccj ^<\0j\' covert and out-of-the-sight-of-consciousjiess..'* By limiting one' s understanding of unlawfid discrimination
w>^ i * * ^ tiig "old-fashioned" type, ignores how discrimination acmally operates in the 21 ^century, and leaves
much discrimination imtouched.
f^*^***!^^ See e.g., freneV. Blair, Dana R. Camay, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Jack Glaser, Curtis D. Hardin, ,John T. Jost and Laurie
'f^f^ ' A. Rudman. The Existence of Implicit Bias is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: A Refutation of Ideological and
*(-^^ Methodological Objections and Executive Summary of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore. 29 Research in
Ai (o^Organizational Behavior 39 (2009) (discussing "the most important achievements that have emerged from the last 30
<'N4iWl^^Ayears' worth of social psychological research on implicit bias as well as its ramifications for our evolving
understanding of the natureof prejudice."); Pat K. Chew. Seeing Subtle Racism. 6 Stan. J. Civ. Rts. & Civ. Liberties,
183, 186 (October 2010). ("Racism is not always ostentatiously egregious, explicit, or even conscious. Indeed, in
contemporary American society, it is often more subtle and understood only wh^studied within the context in which
_ ' ' ' if occurs. Ongoing empirical research helps to explain inodem racism, including the ways' in w/liich social and
. organizational norms aJffect its occurrence."); Charles R. Lawrence, HI. The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:
' " . ' Reckoning with Unconscious Racism. 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, (1986); Justin D. Levinson. "Forgotten Racial Equality:
, , : Imphcit Bias, Decision-Making and Misremembering. Duke Law Journal 57 (November, 2007); Americans for
American Values, "What is Implicit Bias? Bias by Any Other Name."
^; ^ http://americansforamericanvalues.org/unconsciousbias.: Tim Wise. Colorblind: The Riseof Post-Racial Polrtics and
^ -. ' The Retreat From Racial Equity. 2010. p. 81-84. ("Not all racial bias is blatant however. Indeed, much of the research
- . . ^in recent years indicating the persistenceof white racial biases has been in the area of implicit often subconscious
^J ' ' prejudice, which, however subtle, can still contribute to unequal treatment of people of color in given situations.
: Implicit Association Tests (lATs), which have been administered to hundreds of thousands of people in recent years,
' ' ' * indicate that the vast majority of whites hold implicit biases in favor of whites and against African Americans").
" -i'-'^^KaliHolloway. "Racism Is So Insidious, Even Black People UnderestimateI t." The Guardian. September 29^2014:-
, http://www.theguardian.com/conunentisfree/'2014/sep/29/racism-black-people-experience. ,., , . .,,
AH f Ci w|( i (reflect K^rtj ^^/ Wi /i ^^ncP- l * ^^ .
j ^j ! ^ ^cf) l y^gj j J ^ggan employment at WilliamMoms' New York officeon September 2, 2008, at least five
/ k j . ^ of the50 Agents employed should havebeen Afiican American, oneemployed in eachof theoffices five CY^\<i
tf#A4-'H' key departments: music, theater, Hterary, television and commercials. In I nt'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United \ * * f i * T
{^V*Wi^f<i( States. 431 U.S. 324. 340. n.20 (1977). die SupremeCourt stated: y i . .
' , > ' "Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalanceareprobativein a casesuch as this oneonly becausesuch
T n^***! imbalanceis often atelltalesign of purposefid discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
^c^j Qflpr 1*^8)^ expected tiiat nondiscriminatory hiring practices wi l l i n timeresult in awork force more or less
.uVj cH>i*-|*4*d^^'^^^^^i^ ^racial and ethnic composition of thepopulation in thecommunity fromwhich
employees arehfred."
Instead, WilliamMorris maintained aworkforcethat 9 8 percent of theAgents and morethan8 6 percent of. ^ ^ .
* AtAiCf^ Agent Trainees werewhite/" J ewish." Theimrefiited evidenceI havepresentedin this casedemonstratesv/fiw -t7v*6
^ "i L r^* ^^ I worked in an insidiously discriminatory work envfronment wherethecompany rehed heavdy on /^ ^wt^ullj
^1 subj ectivedecisions, whileimphcit racial biases ran rampant. J ol ^ Cxv^^S^ o-^r>^J^^i
o^^' a^f o^b^ Castel has doneis not "accidental" or "dueto chance." A maj or reason why die substanti v^,^^'^^"
1^ dirf+ic, sfrengdi of theCi vi l Rights Act of 1%4 has been eviscerated, has been dueto thenarrowed i nter^ret^on*f hf ^M^j c
C^wf c^ ' l ' ' ^ f|)redorainately, all-white, ideologically conservativej udges who arepreventing legitimatecases'from fU.
r A f A ^i ' v * iJL 1
^ i^A+U being decided by an unpartial j ury. Thefact that neither Rowenor this casewas ableto havethemerits VT>j **T
C ^^UA C decided bv an impartial iurv demonstrates that "ci vi l rights enforcement fhas returned] to an era when
I ' j ^1 J [Afiican Americans] had hmited access to legal protection fromj ob discrimmation."'^f i t caimot be
U>^^\AAj-'^j disputed that Bush said naarl-j toai ytnro latw to morethan 1.000 peopleat theHyatt Regency Hotel on J^L^^^^' CD
^. ^^P^. - K i ar ch 27, 2002: "We'vegot to get good, conservativej udges appouited to thebench and approved by thevj etj J4e{
v^f ^* f ^^i^Ae,United States Senate."*' 0^.4^1 ; ^ot ef-f*^*,.
N rt P ^Zuo At theend of theday, t^real reason why Castel could not remain unpartial and independent in "i ^j "^oil
-At^^CCAi. particular case, is tkat hrdoesn't respect my rights, or themaUenable and human rights of peopleof '^^'i Oif4w
Afiican descent. I amalso knowledgeableof die history that white-controlled educational mstimtions have ^iddef^
V\^t^ir>lgl4%id I know that "race" is nothing but asocial and legal constmct, aEuropean misinvention for genetic "^^^^^^^
survival ui aworld wherepeopleof color constimtetiie worid's maj ority.*' As aresult of my awareness of Cpc^twloAJ
^cj c^'w^)^^^" Merrick T. Rossein. Employment Discrimination Law andLitigation. WestLaw. 2012.; See also, Igor Volsky, ^- ^^
W<tt^^"CoUn Powell Calls Out die GOP's RacismProblem: There's a"Dark Vein of hitolerance."' ThinkProgress. January fy'^
l^no-^^^' 2013. http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2013/01/13/1440471/colin-powell-condemns-republican-parry-racism-
, 'there-is-a-dark-vein-of-intolerance/?mobile=nc. fMitj^iti-
t^^Ol ^J l i f f to EHsabeth Bumiller. "Bush Vows to Seek Conservative J udges." New York Times. March 29, 2002. ^ 4,,,^^
http-.llvfww. nytimes. com/2002/03/29/us/bush-vows-to-seek-conservative-iudges. html. CM'i4iI*fcLw
*'Seee.g.,CheikhAntaDiop,TheAfricanOriginOfCivilization:MythorRealty(1957); YosefA.A.ben-J ochannan, ^
African Origins oftheMaj or'Western Religions'(1970); TomBurrell, Brainwashed: Challenging theMythsof Black
Inferiority (2010); Jack Gratus, TheGreat WhiteLie: Slavery, Emancipation and Changing Racial Attitudes (1973); ' ' ^^^^^
Michael J . Klarman, Unfinished Business: Racial Equity in American History (2007); IraKatznelson, When (^.orcttt^l
AffirmativeAction Was White(2005); J . A Rogers, NatureKnowsNo Color-Line(1952); Rogers, Sex & RaceVol. \tt:^j^^
^cVoe^, I VA/CMUI Ivuv/t IfrfiAA W'oLAd|(>' p*****!^"^
.t ...
the overall fraud that's befrig perpefrated on the world, including the behef that "Jews" of European descent
are "God's chosen people," Castel has sought to deprive meof my constimtional and stamtory rights even ^ . \
ftnther, by revoking my i n forma pauperis stams and prejudicing my appeal, by stating that it would not be " . '
made in "good faith." [PKC Final Order, 26.] This is a clear abuseof judicial power and fiuther reason why ^ ]
Castel should be impeached for violating the Constimtion and the law, as well as violating numerous' " * -
Canons imder the Judicial Code of Conduct, as well as his Oath of Office. ' '' /'
ITBBWHiniWn "[N]o man i n this country is so high that that he is above the law." United States v. Hastings. ' '.
681 F.2d 706, 711 (1 I ti i Cfr. 1982). It is witiiout question that "a well-informed, tiioughtfid and objective
observer" would "question die court's unpartiality" given that Judge P. Kevin Castel has mtentionally
violated the Constimtion, the law, numerous Canons xmder the Judicial Code of Conduct, and his Oath of
Of f i c^in an effort to prevent this landmark human rights, employment discrimination and antitmst case
frombeing decided by an impartial jury. Tmst Co. of Louisiana v. N.N.P., Inc., 92 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cfr. '
1996). Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the ' '
, law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as requfred by law, then that judge is violation ofthe Due Process
Clauise of die U.S. Constimtion. See United States v. Sciuto. 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7di Cu. 1996) ('The rigSt
to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
O t k l Jd^e^M^ W i i e l f ^- t < ^ * cMe^^^ - h* (< U f U W-
. ^ . f . V. PRA YERS FOR REL I EF
i liili'odiu'tionl I Based on the considerable factual and legal errors contained i n aU four of federal judge P.
Kevin Castel's Orders, it is clear that Castel and Francis should have disqualified themselvesfromthe case
when they had the opportunity.
A. I nder the "( (uirt's Inherent Powers." \e .September 5. 2(H4 li nal Order JMH! (tranl Relief
Requested in March 17, 2tll4 I rand I pon dieC oui t Moti on. On pages 90 through 95 of my Fraud
I
Upon the Court Motion, 1 discuss the irreparable harm1 have suffered and my prayers for relief See .
Exhibit I L Under the court's inherent powers, 1 ask that P. KevmCastel vacate his September 5, 2014 and '
grant the rehef requested.*^
'QQQQQQQI^BBEISDEEDSSSESQSES] ^relief graiited above is not granted, I ask that Castel restore
my til forma pauperis status. On January 4, 2011, Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska granted my request to
proceed i n forma pauperis. The American Arbittation Association, also granted me the eqiuvalent of i n
forma pauperis status after filing a Demand for Arbittation on June 15, 2012. _ . _
1 (1952); Carter G. Woodson, The Mis-Education ofthe Negro (1933); MalcolmX, The Autobiography of Malcohn
X (1964).
As of April 1, 2014,1 have spent more than $1,895.00 on costs associated with being able to maintain this litigation.
:' -47-
Due to tiie facttiiat Castel revoked my in fonna pauperis staliis although my fin^
haveonly worsened, #further evidence of Castel's bias, prejudice, impropriety and partiahty i n favor of
WiUiamMorris, Ixieb & Loeb LLP and their co-consptiators. Since the mception of tiiis case, 1 have inade
Castel aware of my dire economic cticumstances. He is aware that 1 have been unemployed for more than
four years and representing myself in this higUy undesirable employment discruiiination and human rights
casehas finther damaged abiUty to gain employment I have made Castel aware that for the last two years,
1 have received $200 every two weeks frommy parents and1 now receive $174.00 in food stamps each
li>.(i*e.fte-fwij mondi, totahng $547.00/a mondi. The cost to file an appeal witii die Second Cfrcuit is $505.00. See Exhibit
J J . I f my financial cfrcumstances haveoidy worsened since filing my Complaint, there is absolutely no
/tvw|<4<< l /o reason that my fri forma pauperis statas should have been revoked, especiaUy sinceit is clear that my appeal
" ^^c S ^' would be made in "goodfaitii." CASE t/| W / ^^^C 1 ^f ^" H / ' WV ^OU J /
pi jeut>i>ta CoO<if t I f Castel does not restore my mforma pauperis statas, I can seek to have the Second Cfrcuit restore
f '^^f f ^1 V^'lftiy statas pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Included with this Motion is an updated and notarized copy
pv^l ^' ' * Af my AppUcation to Appeal In Forma Pauperis. See Exhibit K K .
LAA Ji*i. A T I
...frmnmmm\mmimmmm\u\m\kmMtMi[mmmum^tmmc^d's i ni v20 ^[-^^1^
2011 Stay Order was issued in a way that locked meinto arbitration and prevented mefromappealing his ^^y^^ ^
, . erroneous dedsion. Now, in die last sentenceof Castel's September 5, 2014 Final Order, he has prejudiced CPrl"'
: " ; my appeal, by stating that "any appeal fromthis order would not be taken in good faith." [PKC Fmal Order,
26.] Based on the arguments raised above, and throughout this entire case, it is clear that my appeal to the
g-^^|g^|^|,^|^econd Cfrcuit would be made in "good faith." Castel's reasons for falsely stating this was to only to make
l' i f ^^^ it even harder for my appeal to be taken seriously by the appellate court. ^ -
2o*\e t^*ctff^c*v% I t is for that reason largely, that I wrote this Motion in a way that, even without ade novo review,
^^^^^^^^^ui e Second Cfrcuit*^or any impartial finder of fact, could easdy decide whether or not: (1.) P. Kevin Castel
jlc/rti ^Co^f, has intentionaUy conspfred to deprive me of my constimtional and statatory rights under the color of law,
euj^r^ ^ J^S*"^^^^^ of my race, color, national origin and/or pro se status in violation of 18 U.S.C. 242, 18 U.S.C.
-+Utr)-(U^ ^j 41, die K u K lux Klan Act of 1871 as codified as 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and should
i y^nt ^*t'**t)e disqualified fromtins casepursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2106 and(2.) Loeb & LoebLLP and attomey Michael
f ^. ^j L ^jj^^ Due to the fact that appellate judges GerardE. Lynch, Peter W. Hall and Denny Chin, as well as the court en banc,
', -^^T^. - - ignoredmy arguments and claimed they did not havejurisdiction to decide my appeal to P. Kevin Castel's July 20,
^i jj. f2011 Order erroneously compelling my caseinto arbitration, I have doubts that like P. Kevin Castel, they will have
L.^P'^ theability to remain impartial since I have accused themof wrongdoing and the 5-to-4 Republican majority on the
jp>r^5^^UeV" &preme Court would more than likely defer to decisions made by Castel and the Second Circuit without any
^vtMAOA rwi discussion of theCivil Rights Act of 1964 or explanation on how WilliamMorris' arbitration agreements are
enforceable as both a matter of law and public policy when they have never refuted a' pyramid of evidence
, demonstrating that the company has engaged in an intentional pattemand practice of discriminating against African
Americans frombeing hfred and/or promoted to Agent and has conspired with other businesses throughout Hollywood
* to maintain a race-based inonopoly over decision-making positions throughout the industry.
^ .- ^ "V.-V'^ " -48- ' ^'V ' , ,
^*^p Zweig have engagedin an egregious "pattem" of "fraud upon die Coiut" on WilhamMorris' behalf ui
two racial discrimination and antifrust cases, ultimately warranting the imposition bf extteme disciplinary
and monetary sanctions, including default judgment on all claims and $250 mdlion for engaging in "highly
unethical and criminal conduct," violating numerous Rules under the New York Rules of Professional
Conduct, as well as violating New York Judiciary Law 487 and additional laws.
on Arbifrator Gregory's decision to admit "Exhibit 31" into the evidence of the record, as well as his
conclusion that I proved by a "preponderance of the evidence" that "WdliamMorris Endeavor
Entertainment LLC discriminated against [me] in violation of pertinent federal, state, and local law'
prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basisof race" and awarded me the M l gamut of monetary
damages, including punitive damages and pro se non attomey fees, it is clear that my efforts to appeal P.
Kevin Castel's decisions throughout this casewdl be made in extteme "goodfaith." 1 amincluding the
original draft of my voluminous Motion to Vacate that I was planning on submitting, in order to Ml y :
preserve the record. iSeeExhibit LL.
Also, the Missouri Supreme Court caseof Morrow v. Hallmark Cards. Inc.. 273 S.W.3d 15 (Mo.
' Ct. App. 2008) simports that at the miiumum, the SecondCfrcuit should review the decisions ofthe federal
judge and the arbittators regarding the issue of arbittabihty andenforoig the two mandatory, pre-dispute
- ' arbitration agreements I signed as acondition of employment at WilliamMorris since all of the finder of , ^^^^
fects have tk^idudt b enforce^ilhamMorris' arbifration agreements without addressing WilliamMorris' Orde^'
unreMed pyramid of evidence that has been presentedshowing the company's 116 years pattemand 0^\
continuing practice of discriminating against quahfiedAfiican Americans and people<j ^^mfrom being l * ^' ' ^
hfred and/or promoted to Agent, Coordinator and/or Agent Trainee, f ^"* * k ' ^j \ <' or n\ - ^7^?*'^ UeKjt^
The fact remains that despite thefinal decisions Jiesis^or*
nW^'^'^Vt renderedby Schnader LLP attomey Tunotiiy K. Lewis and P. Kevin Castel, WdUamMorris is stiU '^*ff?l ''h.
bJ l t*<- niaintaining employment practices, poUcies and procedures that are violating ofthe Civil Rights Act of ,f j ^l 5.^ul j
'Cf^Y^o^- 1964, Section 1981, New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law. The ^^u-lr^ie
\/tWV*f gjgQ remains that Arbittator David L. Gregory was fraudulently disquaUfied by die American^H, / A V I }(t
^^. j - i - Arbittation Association and although Timotiay K. Lewis unlawMly vacated Arbittator Gregory's'Co^.ji^'yil/*^
^ ^icry VA/jPecember 17, 2013 Partial Fuial Award, he did not vacate any of Arbittator Gregory's InterimDecisions.
COMi^ ^ Therefore, Arbifrator Gregory's decision to adnrit "Exhibit 31" into the evidence of record and order C O MJ ^ ^ < ^
^ o"5*rf* compeUing WUliamMorris to produce concealed, smokmg-gun evidencefromLeonard Rowe's case, wUl ^^^^
always support our claims that "Exhibit 31" is an authentic document and that aconspfracy took place to aMV*cl
i ol '-'^f ) AAV (jcfiaud die plaintiffs' in that caseand ensure that no smoking gun evidence would be produced and i f '^c*^
L^jf. I j.produced, it would be deemedadimssible in acourt of law. I ^ "* ^h-c*^, ^ ^^^^
&,cvi^i,.^<u^^ ' n, c 4 ; ^, h. . t l - ^ i - f i - (
I haveabsolutely no reason to he on William Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Michael P. Zweig,
Christian Carbone, the American Arbitration Association, Tunothy K. Lewis and others. My pleadings are
too detailed and consistent for me to make false accusations. I 'm not going to havemy casedismissed with
prejudice and on the merits, when no finder of fact has been able to issueawritten opinion explaining how
the mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements 1 signed as acondition of employment are enforceable
asamatterof law and pubhc pohcy based on the arguments raised by both parties. .
Based on the fact that none of P. Kevin Castel's Orders mention the pyramid of evidence
demonsfratmg William Morris's intentional pattem and continuing practice of racial discrimmation or die
evidence supporting that Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP have engaged in a "pattem" of "fi^^ud
upon die Court" on William Morris' behalf, I haveevery right to pursue claims of fi^d, conspuracy to
interferewith human rights of people of Afiican descent, obstioiction of justice, crimes against humaiuty,
etc. against the Defendants and their co-conspirators, including P. Kevin Castel and dieUnited States of
.America. - ^
Arbifrator hmm recognized tiiat my lawsuit was my non-violent form of "creative protest" and
likened my efforts to that of distmguished group of human rights .activists:-Dr. Martui Luther King, Jr.,
Thurgood Marshall and Nelson Mandela. On April 20, 2012, I wrote a letter to Chief JudgeLoretta A.
Preskato "inform [her] about die bias, impropriety and cormption that is happening with the Southem
District of New York and Second Circuit." I received no response, although I asked her to "personally
intervene and etdist a special committee to investigate the facts and allegations in [the] letter to prevent
'manifest injustice.'". Leonard Rowe and 1 filed joint complamts with the Departmental DiscipUnary
Comnuttee against rune of the attomeys involved with concealing evidence in Rowe. and our complaint
was whitewashed, with no investigation taking place." Theseefforts were madeprior to Arbitrator David
L. Gregory admitting "Exhibit 31" into the evidence of record, and three months later, concluding that I
proved by a "preponderance ofthe evidence" that "WUUam Morris discriminated against [me] in violation
of pertinent federal, state, and local law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race." I havealso asked
Castel on more than five seE|g^teoc|^i ^i ^t^^i ^thj ^^^j tter to ^^resi dent of theUnited States of
America, Barack H. Obama, and tne Attomey General, Eric Holder. These requests havealso been denied.
I f the things that I havestated in my pleadings about WilUam Morris, Michael P. Zweig, Christian
Carbone, Loeb & Loeb LLP, the American Arbittation Association and others were and are not tine, why
wasn't I also penahzed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11?
This is exactiy the reason why I stated in my April 10, 2014 Motion for Reconsideration, that I
would file a separateaction* "against aU parties involved" mcluding P. Kevin Castel, Magisfrate Judges
" Oneof the attomeys complained of - Sonnenschein Nath& Rosenthal LLP (now known as Dentons LLP) attomey
MartinR. Gold-is a member of the DDC's board of directors. =
-50-
Francis, JudgePatterson and Timothy K. Lewis, [pg. 30-3L] Based on the arguments raised above, I have
every reason to behevethat all ofthe decisions issued by P. Kevin Castel were "pre-determined," and
ultimately meant to prevent the merits of this landmark employment discrimination, antitrust and human
rights casefrom being decided by an impartial jury. Overall, Castel's erroneous decisions "reflect his
ignorance, lack of empathy and compassion, and complete discoimect for thoseoutside of [his] 'race."' [PI.
Fraud Upon the Court Motion, 92.] Castel has demonsfrated in this employment discrimination and human
rights case, tiiat he "doesn't know what the law is andi f he does, he's intentionaUy trying to deprive me of
my God-given and constimtional rights under the color of law." [Id. at 71.]
Castel has prevented mefrom pursuing clauns of fraud, when he caimot even mention in any of his
Orders that I have accused Michael P. Zweig and Loeb & Loeb LLP of engaging in a "pattem" of "fimid
upon die Court" in two racial discrimination cases, refiised to mention "Exhibit 31" or tiiat Arbitrator
Gregory concluded after months of being appointed to the caseand reading voliuninous motions and
exhibits, that this document was "admitted into the evidenceof record" wbn though RepubUcan appointed
federal judge Robert P. Patterson stated m his January 2005 Order granting summary judgment in favor
of WiUiam Morris and the other Defendants, dismissed its relevance and stated that it was an "unidentified
and uiiaudienticated document." >>^^W>*|tf(?P |><^<,^Uk
No judicial immimity for Castel's actions. As stated on theU.S. Department of Justice's website:
"For the purpose of Section 242, acts under 'color of law' include acts not only done federal, state, or
local officials within thefr lawfid authority, but also acts done beyond the bounds of that official's authority,
i f the acts are donewUe theofficial is purporting to or pretending to act in the performanceof his/her official
duties....It is not necessary that the crime be motivated by aiumus towards the race, color, reUgion, sex,
handicap, famiUal status or national origin of thevictim." Sec Exhibit MM.
"My ancestors' fight for [fidl] human rights wiU not be ui vain and untU thosewho haveviolated
our human rights are held accountable for tiieir actions, I wiU not be sUenced." [PI. Rep. Motion for
Summary Judgment, 95.] "Although Republican appointed federal judges Patterson and Castel have^failed
to nip die bud, the Government may stiU pluck theflower of evdV U.S. v. GrinneU Corp.. 236 F. Supp.
244, 258 (D.R.I. 1964), afiPd m part, rev'd m part, 384 U.S. 563, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 16 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1966).
I wiU not stop fighting untU I receive justice for what I've endured over the last [six] years at the hands of
WiUiam Morris, Loeb & Loeb LLP, Michael P. Zweig, theAmerican Arbittation Association, Timothy K.
if
Lewis and thefr other co-conspfrators. [PI. Rep. Motion for Summary Judgment, 95.]
"TheUnited States has never undergone a reconciUation process. An open and free flowing
dialogue on raceand racism is needed.*^Efibrts to chiU or sUence discussion about racism wdl not work.
In the 21* Century: The President's Initiative On Race. One American Dialogue Guide. March 1999.
http://clinton2.nara. gov/Initiatives/OneAmerica.pirdoc 1.pdf ("We cannot underestimate the power of dialogues.
-51-
especially not in this case. A day after his mauguration, die New York Times reported diat Afiican
Americans expect[ed] President Obama to 'move to the ftirefront of his agenda the issues that Dr. King
championed: civil rights and racial and economic equahty.' Whether White/ "Jews" of European descent
want to address it or not, it will have to occur during President Obama's second term. Afiican Americans
leaders and those sympathetic to our phght weren't bmtally attacked and killed for Afiican Americans to
be unable to secure a jury trial against one ofthe most egregious instimtions in the world that continues to
spread racism, violence and hate throughout the world to fiirther divide the hue-man race." [PI . Rep. Motion
for Summary Judgment, 95.]
Ultunately, this confirms the''pathological natureof white deiual" is ahve and well. And any finder
of fact who ignores antidiscrimination law, compelling evidence of a company's intentional pattern and
continuing practice of racial discrimination in employment spanning ll^years and the findings of the
, lawfiilly appointed arbitrator, is not being impartial or independent man employment discrimination case ]
involving claims of disparate impact and pre-hiring individual disparate tteatment. The reason that 1 know
that 1 have been deprived of my constitutional and statutory rights, is because I know that "race" is nothing
but a social and legal constmct created by those classified as white and that theti alleged superiority is
nothing but a myth. There are a number of events that ttanspired over the last few years that fiirther
demonsti^e that WilUamMorris, Loeb & Loeb LLP and P. Kevin Castel claims that I 'm"racist" and/or
, . "anti-Semitic" or that my claims of instimtionaUzed racismare without merit: ( 1 . ) in 2005 - tiiree years
before my employment at WdUamMorris - the EEOC created the "Systemic Task Force," which has the
''responsibiUty of exaniining the Corni^^i^n^'s^ys^eniic^^
for combating systemic discrimination"^and ^) tde^nited N^ions recent a^omshments of the United
States for maintaining in.*^
The United States of America has had 50 years to get its shit together, yet, our nation continues to
maintain its racial caste systemand engage in crimes against humanity - aU in the nameof "democracy."
When people can explore perspectives and ideas, they discover how much they share in common and leamto
V. AOfigJ' appreciate their differences. Dialogue is an opportunity for growth and change. Dialogue can help open our minds.
,., ' Dialogue can help each of us listen better. And dialogue can bring us closer together.")
" ^^i EEOC. "Systemic Task Force Report." March 2006. http://www 1 .eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/systemic.cfm: see
ff^<ifo<^UL also, William C. Martucci and Kristen A Page. "The EEOC's Systemic Initiative And High-Priority Enforcement
Areas: Compliance Sttategies For Employers." The MettopoUtan Corporate Counsel. August 20, 2012.
'http://wvyw.mettocorpcoim5el.com/articles/20191/eeoc%E2%80%99s-svstemic-initiative-and-high-priority-
. . . enforcement-areas-compliance-sttategies-.
i , . Stephanie Nebehay. "U.N. Urges U.S. To Stop PoliceBmtality After Missouri Shooting." Reuters. August 29,2014.
. . http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/29/us-usa-missouri-shooting-un-idUSKBN0GTlZQ20140829: see also,
"US, Israel Pull Out of Racism Conference." ABC News. September 3, 2014.
http ://abcnews. go. com/Intemational/storv?id=80564. ("The United States and Israel pulled out of a global conference
designed to address prejudice, racismand resentment saying the event has only exacerbated the very things it was
meamto eradicate")
m-i ^o t*^!-^ ' f I " ^' ^^^l ^' : ^ V ^b^ ^ ^^""^ i H^^'^''*' :
This casehas opened^ my eyes and now diat I 'm awareof what's going on, Castel cannot prevent me ^w^r
from pursing l egal cl aims against theUnited States of America, or prevent me from using what has rj^^rwaj
hqjpened to mei n this case, as evidenceto show that aconspfracy to interferewi th thehuman rights of '^^^
peopl eof African descent is taking pl aceby thosewho cl assify themsel ves as whiteand/or "Jewish." The ^ i\)&f4<d
racial demographics of this country arechanging, and whites wdl not bethemajority forever. ^'^ f H cf^'^\j
tjft^ f BecauseAmericacontinues to ignoreor run away from dieissueof raceand dierol ediat
rj g^y'l ^^ti mti onal i zei ^stemi c and other forms of societal racism pl ays i n the
Wwt^ and its burdens, has onl y al l owed bl atant forms of racism to risesinceObamawas el ected mto ofBce. There
^fi^^^fi^cc ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ meaningfid dial ogueabout this issue, and this casepresented that opportunity. Li kePresident
^ ^ ^ ' J ^^e^l dy stated, I 'm argmng about aserious "moral issue." I f al l [ wo j mei l BTC t f ul y Created
Hi\;c)ff6.^hftV equal , ho w co ul d the raci al make- up o f W i l l i am M o r r i s (as wel l as f ^' t ^n,
^pfjy*^'mmy o ther i nsti tuti o ns and busmesses i n A mer i ca) hi st o ri cal l y be al l -
whi t e/ " J ewi sh" and that no t be the resul t o f raci al di scr i mi nat i o n 50^H^fno'>{^
i ^ *^*^f\^^^ ^^^^ passage o f the C i v i l Ri ght s A ct o f 1964, i f o ne' s r a ^ e , ^ ^ J ^ ' ^ j ^
' ^J j ^ a ^ co l o r and/ o r nati o nal o r i gi n i s no t a det er mi ni ng f acto r f o r o ne' s ^ t j ! u ^
abi l i t y to be successf ul at the j o b, especi al l y the j o b o f an A gent ? -f^f^^t^
Depression l evel unempl oyment. I gnoring al l of this evidence, which ul timatel y demonstrates that this is a
much bigger issuethan mysel f and Wi l l i am Morris.
I kycUtA ^ Wdham Morris, Michael P. Zweig, Christian Carbone, Loeb & Loeb LLP, P. Kevi n Castel and
o ^' ^- thefr co-conspfrators owemean apol ogy.
i <4i .' 4i 'o'vA^ VL CONCLUSION
c*^f^s^*^\ishl^4 Dueto thefact that I began wri ti ng this Moti on l ess than aweek ago, I apol ogizefor thenumerous >
pjm4t'<'^ grammatical errors, incompl etesentences and thoughts, etc. There's obviousl y so much morethat can be '
diotP^S^tS^ said. However, I think i t is cl ear that Repubhcan appointed federal judgeP. Kevi n Castel has intentional l y = <
Wi l l >6. M- S viol ated theConstitution, thel aw, his Oath of OfBce, as wel l as many Canon under theJudicial Codeof
^ A, \' Conduct m order to.ensurethat I was" deprivedof my constitutional and statutory rights under thcrcol or o& M ^ C E / 'fc'
pf^dna, fl p l aw, i n viol ation of 18 U.S.C. 242. As aresul t, I ask that P. Kevi n Castel correct this manifest injustice, "^75
, "^."^ A/f by using thecourt's inherent powers to vacatehis September 5, 2014 Fmal Order and grant dierel i ef c^to^t*to
. x> 6ipl original l y requested i n my March 17, 2014 Fraud Upon tiieCourt Moti on. See Exhi bi t n. I f diis Moti on isL^-r
not granted, consider this pleading to be a rough draft of my appeal that will be submitted m extreme "good
faith" to die Second Ckcuit.
Dated: New York, New York By:
October 3,2014 MarcusI . Washington
Pro 5eLitigant
54 Boerum St. Apt. 6M
Brooklyn, NY 11206
(646)504-6497
humanrights.areamust@gmail.com