Forthcoming in:

F. Battaglia, N. Mukerji and J. Nida-Rmelin (eds), Rethinking Responsi-

bility in Science and Technology. Roo!a" #eries. $isa: $isa %ni&ersit'
$ress.


Towards a philosophical defence of
legal compatibilism
Filippo Santoni de Sio
Recent (rogress in the mind sciences has )uelled radical sce(ticism
to"ards the )oundation o) legal res(onsiilit'. *n order to neutrali+e
radical sce(ticism, the autonom' o) la" as a normati&e enter(rise is
o)ten in&oked. ,o"e&er, this sim(le de)ensi&e strateg' is not su))icient
to o&ercome radical sce(ticism, and a more solid (hiloso(hical de)ence
o) legal com(atiilism is re-uired. *n this cha(ter * o))er a rie) sketch
o) such a (hiloso(hical de)ence.


1. Science and legal responsibility

.he (rogress o) the sciences o) mind in the last decades o) the //
centur' has )uelled radical sce(tical attitudes to"ards the meta(h'sical
)oundation o) legal res(onsiilit'. 0ccording to radical sce(ticism, the
(rogress in the mind sciences is in strong tension "ith our legal s'stem
o) attriution o) res(onsiilit', inso)ar as this (resu((oses the )reedom
o) human action, or 1)ree "ill2 and mind sciences seem to sho" that
this )reedom does not e3ist. Radical sce(ticism on res(onsiilit' has in
turn triggered the reaction o) those that "e du conser&ati&es.
4onser&ati&es think that (ractices o) attriution o) legal res(onsiilit'
F. Santoni de Sio


5
are, taken as a "hole, still justi)ied, no matter "hat mind sciences ha&e
disco&ered so )ar or "ill disco&er in the )uture aout the )unctioning o)
human rain.
6hereas * think that the attitude o) conser&ati&es is asicall'
correct, and that the (rogress o) the science o) mind does not
necessaril' shake the )oundation o) the uilding o) res(onsiilit'
(ractices, * also think that the arguments that are (ut )or"ard '
conser&ati&es are o)ten not )ull' satis)'ing. 0 common strateg' among
conser&ati&es is that "hich a((eals to the autonom' o) la". 0ccording
to this line o) argument, science and la" are se(arate enter(rises "ith
di))erent goals7 "hilst it is u( to the science o) mind to e3(lain ho"
(according to di))erent &ersions o) the argument) the rain or the mind
"ork, it is up to the law to establish how people should behave. %nlike science,
legal attriutions o) res(onsiilit' are asicall' norm-setting (ractices
and it is thus u( to the la" not to the scientists to decide ho"
res(onsiilit' (ractices should "ork
8
.
* )ind this line o) argument dissatis)'ing )or t"o reasons. Firstl', the
conser&ati&es insistence on the autonom' o) the la" tends to (ush to
the ackground the man' "a's in "hich the science o) the mind has
a))ected legal res(onsiilit' (ractices in the (ast, and the "a's in "hich
scienti)ic (rogress ma' legitimatel' a))ect those (ractices in the )uture
5
.
4onser&ati&e are right in insisting that the rules o) res(onsiilit'
essentiall' re)lect moral and social norms o) eha&iour, ut the' are
"rong inso)ar as the' den' or do"n(la' the )act that rules o)
res(onsiilit' also re)lect a certain conce(tion o) human action7 and
that "hilst res(onsiilit' is in itsel) an essentiall' normati&e conce(t,
some conce(ts presupposed ' the s'stem o) attriution o) res(onsiilit'
9 i.e. )reedom, rationalit', ca(acit' 9 re)lect also a certain &ie" o) "hat
human agents and actions are.
#econdl' and relatedl', the conser&ati&e strateg' ased on the
autonom' o) the la" tends to ignore that there are also roader
theoretical 9 non-(urel'-legal 9 reasons to e conser&ati&e aout the

8
4)r. 6. :lannon, ;Neuroiolog', Neuroimaging, and Free 6ill<, (5==>) 5? Midwest
Studies in Philosophy @A9A57 M.#. :a++aniga, ;Neuroscience in the 4ourtroom<, (5=88)
B=C Scientific Aerican >C9?, #.J. Morse, ;.he Non-(rolem o) Free 6ill in Forensic
$s'chiatr' and $s'cholog'<, (5==D) 5> !ehavioral Sciences and the "aw 5=B95=7 and the
discussion o) this literature ' N.0 Eincent, ;!egal Res(onsiilit' 0djudication and the
Normati&e 0uthorit' o) the Mind #ciences<, (5=88) B8@-B58.
5
4)r. N.0 Eincent, n 8 ao&e, B58-B5>.
Towards a philosophical defence of legal copatibilis


B
)oundation o) res(onsiilit' (ractices. 0nd it is in the interest o) the la"
to s(ell out these reasons as clearl' as (ossile, in order to con&incingl'
address the sce(tical concerns. B' onl' a((ealing to the normati&it' o)
the la", conser&ati&es ma' certainl' sa&e their legal citadel )rom the
sce(tical assaults7 ut unless the' also )ind a "a' to de)end the
conce(tual hill u(on "hich the legal citadel stands, their citadel "ill
sooner or later colla(se. .his cha(ter contains a sketch o) some
theoretical reasons in de)ence o) legal (ractices o) res(onsiilit'. 0)ter
rie)l' e3(laining ho" the la" concei&es o) 1)ree "ill2, * "ill )ocus on
the role (la'ed ' the conce(ts o) ca(acit' and rationalit' in
attriutions o) legal res(onsiilit', and * "ill o))er some theoretical
arguments in de)ence o) this use. * "ill close ' o))ering one
e3em(li)ication o) a correct use o) these conce(ts in legal attriutions
o) res(onsiilit'.
*nso)ar as it aims to de)end the idea that scienti)ic causal
e3(lanations o) the )unctioning o) the human rain are com(atile "ith
morall' justi)iale legal (ractices o) attriution o) res(onsiilit', this
cha(ter aims to o))er a de)ence o) legal copatibilis. ,o"e&er, inso)ar as
it aims to o))er some (hiloso(hical arguments )or this com(atiilit' 9
in addition to the ao&e-mentioned (re&alentl' (ragmatic or legal ones
9 the cha(ter also aims to (a&e the "a' )or a philosophical defence of #legal
copatibilis$.


2. Legal compatibilism

Radical sce(ticism on the )oundation o) legal res(onsiilit' denies the
com(atiilit' et"een causal e3(lanations o) human eha&iour and
(morall' justi)ied) (ractices o) attriution o) legal res(onsiilit'. Radical
sce(ticism is thus one )orm o) incom(atiilism. *ncom(atiilism relies
on t"o ideas aout )ree "ill, namel': a) that )ree "ill is incom(atile
"ith causal e3(lanations o) human eha&iour, and ) that attriutions
o) legal res(onsiilit' are morall' justi)ied onl' i) )ree "ill e3ists
B
. *n the
incom(atilist (ers(ecti&e, the (rogress o) the sciences o) the mind

B
0nother )orm o) incom(atiilism is liertarianism, according to "hich statements
a) and ) are true, and )ree "ill e3ists (so that res(onsiilit' (ractices are sa)e). For a
recent de)ence o) legal liertarianism see F. ,odgson, Rationality % &onsciousness ' Free
(ill (Ne" Gork: H3)ord %ni&ersit' $ress, 5=8B).
F. Santoni de Sio


C
threatens the moral )oundation o) legal (ractices o) res(onsiilit'
ecause the mind sciences o))er more and more rich causal e3(lanation
o) human eha&iour, and the richer the causal e3(lanations the thinner
the ground )or )ree "ill and res(onsiilit'.
0ccording to legal com(atiilism, incom(atiilism ado(ts a too
narro" conce(tion o) 1)ree "ill2. !egal com(atiilists distinguish
et"een a narro" and a road sense o) )ree "ill. 0ccording to the
narro" sense, )ree "ill designates a s(ecial (o"er o) the human mind to
act inde(endentl' or e&en in contrast "ith the causal la"s o) the
uni&erse 9 this is the contra-causal conce(tion o) )ree "ill. 0ccording to
the road sense, 1)ree "ill2 designates the set o) conditions under
"hich it is reasonale to consider a suject as the author o) their
actions (ca(acit', &oluntariness, intentionalit', etc.)7 this set o)
conditions ma' also not include 1)ree "ill2 in the contra-causal sense.
*ndeed 9 com(atiilists admit 9 scienti)ic (rogress and a seculari+ed
&ie" o) man are in tension "ith the contra-causal conce(tion o) )ree
"ill. But scienti)ic (rogress and secularism are not necessaril' in tension
"ith the elie) in the e3istence o) )ree "ill in the road sense. !egal
com(atiilists claim that the la" should not, in (rinci(le, rel' on a contra-
causal &ie" o) )ree "ill7 and that, as a matter o) )act, "estern legal
s'stems do not rel' on it. .he la" should not rel' on a contra-causal
conce(tion o) )ree "ill ecause the la" is a rational enter(rise, and it
should there)ore not ado(t a conce(tion like the contra-causal
conce(tion o) )ree "ill that seems to (resu((ose a dualistic &ie" o)
man (the mind as a meta(h'sicall' inde(endent soul), and a -uasi-
religious &ie" o) human )aults and res(onsiilit' (actions as morall'
attriutale ecause originated in the transcendent dimension o) the
mind)
C
.
,o"e&er, most im(ortantl', no matter "hat incom(atilists think,
as a matter o) )act the la" does not ado(t a contra-causal conce(tion o)
)ree "ill, and thus its )oundation is not shaken ' the (rogress o)
science and a seculari+ed &ie" o) mind and man. *ncom(atilists o)ten
seem to rel' on the idea that e3isting legal e3em(tions and e3cuses
"ork ' identi)'ing a causal mechanism underl'ing the "rong action.
.here)ore, the' think that the more science "ill e ale to sa' aout the

C
4)r. F. #antoni de #io and N.0 Eincent, ;Rationalit' I 4onsciousness J Free 6ill
' Fa&id ,odgson<, (5=8C) &riinal "aw and Philosophy FH*: 8=.8==DKs88>D5-=8B-
?5A5-8.
Towards a philosophical defence of legal copatibilis


>
causal mechanisms underl'ing human actions, the more "e "ill e ale
to (lea )or e3em(tions and e3cuse7 in the long run "e ma' ha&e no
res(onsile agents at all. But e3cuses do not rel' on causation. *n the
legal deate on the )oundation o) legal e3cuse there is contro&ers'
aout "hether their common rationale is asence o) intention
>
, asence
o) choice
@
, non-con)ormit' o) action to the agent<s character
D
, or a
comination o) these (rinci(les
A
. 6hat is generall' agreed u(on is the
non-rele&ance o) the causal origin o) action )or the e&aluation o) the
agent<s res(onsiilit'
?
.
#till, incom(atilists ma' insist that "hilst the la" ma' ha&e its o"n
(olitical, (ragmatic or conse-uentialistic reasons to endorse certain
(rinci(les and not others, these (rinci(les ma' still e not morall' or
(hiloso(hicall' "ell grounded. *) this "ere the case, "e should seriousl'
consider a radical re)orm o) our legal s'stem.
* think that legal com(atiilists should take this (hiloso(hical challenge
more seriousl' than the' ha&e done so )ar. *n the ne3t sections * "ill
(resent a sketch o) some (hiloso(hical arguments in de)ence o) legal
com(atiilism.


3. Properties and capacities

.he asic incom(atilist insight is that causal e3(lanations are not
com(atile "ith alternate possibilities, so that once it is sho"ed that a
certain eha&iour "as (deterministicall') caused ' certain causal
antecedents, it is not (ossile an' more to descrie that eha&iour as
the outcome o) a choice made ' the agent. 0 standard com(atilist
re(l' to this challenge is to insist that moralit' and the la" are justi)ied
in assuming that )or an indi&idual action 3 that the' (er)orm, there is a
range o) alternati&e actions that the agent has, in general, the capacity to

>
R. J. 6allace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentients (4amridge M0: ,ar&ard
%ni&ersit' $ress, 8??C).
@
M.#. Moore, ;4hoice, 4haracter, and L3cuse<, (8??=) D Social Philosophy and Policy
5?->A.
D
E. .adros, ;.he 4haracter o) L3cuse<, (5==8) 58 )*ford +ournal of "egal Studies C?>-
>8?.
A
J. ,order, ,*cusing &rie (H3)ord: H3)ord %ni&ersit' $ress, 5==C).
?
M.#. Moore, ;4ausation and the L3cuses<, (8?A>) DB &alifornia "aw Review 8=?8-
88C? A>.
F. Santoni de Sio


@
do (', +, n). #o that "hen an agent (&oluntar') does 3, it is reasonale to
assume (in the asence o) anormal circumstances) that she could have
done ', +, n, and that its doing 3 "as there)ore a choice under her
control
8=
. * think that this line o) argument does not seem to take the
asic incom(atilist insight seriousl' enough. 4a(acit' is a kind o)
(ossiilit'. 0nd the asic incom(atilist insight challenges the idea o)
there eing (ossiilities o(en in )ront o) agents at the time t o) their
action 3, gi&en the sum o) agent<s mental states m and the sum o)
e3ternal circumstances c. *n this (ers(ecti&e, that the agent has a
ca(acit' onl' means that the agent ma' ha&e done ', + or n at the different
ties t= or t5, andKor under the slightly different ental circustances m= or
m5 andKor under the slightly different e*ternal circustances c= or c5. But this
does not matter in the incom(atilist (ers(ecti&e. 6hat matters is that
at tie t- under ental circustances m and e*ternal circustances c- the agent
could not ha&e done other"ise than she did.
*n order to address the incom(atilist challenge, legal com(atiilists
should not sim(l' insists that agents are the authors o) their actions
ecause the' ha&e general ca(acities to (er)orm di))erent actions in
different circustances. 4a(acit' is a kind o) (ossiilit', and gi&en that
incom(atilists seem to ha&e a good argument to den' the e3istence o)
real o(en (ossiilities in )ront o) the agents under s(eci)ic
circumstances, legal com(atiilists should at least tr' to e3(lain what
kind o) (ossiilit' a ca(acit' )or action is, and ho" ma' this (ossiilit'
resist the incom(atilist )ur'.
!egal com(atiilists must and can acce(t this meta(h'sical
challenge. .he conce(ts o) (ossiilit' and ca(acit' are not ethical or
legal in&entions, s(eci)icall' designed to gi&e theoretical su((ort to
s(eci)ic moral or legal (ractices. 0s Faniel Fennett has e))icaciousl'
e3(lained
88
, these categories are indis(ensale to descrie and make
sense o) general )eatures o) ojects in the "orld. 0s :.L. Moore had
(ointed out long e)ore Fennett, a cat "ho is not actuall' climing a
tree in the garden ecause us' chasing a mouse indoors still has the
ca(acit' to clim trees, "hereas a dog lacks this ca(acit'
85
. .on'

8=
4)r. J.M. Fischer and M. Ra&i++a, Responsibility and &ontrol. A Theory of Moral
Responsibility (4amridge: 4amridge %ni&ersit' $ress, 8??A), and the criti-ue ' F.
#antoni de #io and N.0 Eincent, n C ao&e.
88
F.4. Fennett, Freedo ,volves (Ne" Gork: Eiking $ress, 5==B).
85
:.L. Moore, ,thics (H3)ord: H3)ord %ni&ersit' $ress, 8?85).
Towards a philosophical defence of legal copatibilis


D
,onorM e&entuall' concurred, e3(laining that in descriing the "orld
"e can legitimatel' use t"o senses o) 1can2

8B
7 "e ma' sometimes use
the 1can2 particular (the incom(atiilist can), according to "hich at an'
gi&en time an indi&idual suject or oject can onl' do "hat is allo"ed
to do ' the com(lete sum o) the (articular material conditions that
reali+e at that time7 ho"e&er, much more o)ten, in order to gi&e a more
e))icacious descri(tion o) realit' "e need to use the general sense o)
1can2. .he general 1can2 re)ers to "hat sujects or ojects ma' e
e3(ected to do gi&en their general nature, or "hat "e ma' * "ould call
their foral properties. 0dmittedl', i) things are looked at and descried
)rom the (oint o) &ie" o) the aterial conditions reali/ing at a given tie,
such )ormal (ro(erties "ill disa((ear. 0nd i) "e look at things )rom
this (articular (ers(ecti&e, "e can do no other than joining
incom(atilists in sa'ing that "hile us' chasing a mouse indoor a cat
has not the ca(acit' to clim the tree, an' more than a dog has that
ca(acit'7 or, according to an e3am(le ' 0lan 6hite
8C
, that a car "ith a
less-than-)ull' o(en throttle has not the ca(acit' to run at 8== m(h.
* think that legal com(atilist should shi)t the urden o) (roo) u(on
incom(atilists and ask them the )ollo"ing -uestion: 6hat is gained '
rejecting the common &ie" o) the "orld and assuming their
(ers(ecti&eN *ncom(atilists "ould (roal' sa' that ' rel'ing on their
(urel' material descri(tion o) the "orld "e can get closer to a true
descri(tion o) things. ,o"e&er, this seems to eg the -uestion. 6h'
must a descri(tion o) the "orld that does not make an' room )or the
conce(ts o) (ossiilit' and ca(acit', and thus (re&ent the attriution o)
)ormal (ro(erties to di))erent sujects 9 )or instance, in :.L. Moore<s
e3am(le, eing a tree-climer animal 9 should e closer to the truthN
0ren<t )ormal (ro(erties one im(ortant "a' to define, identify and
distinguish di))erent kinds o) ojects 9 )or instance, cats and dogs or cars
"ith di))erent horse (o"ersN *ncom(atilists seem to claim that i) "e
ha&e to take science seriousl' and to e lo'al to the truth, "e ha&e to
gi&e u( the general sense o) 1can2, namel' the conce(t o) ca(acit'. *
think that a good de)ence o) com(atiilism should start )rom the
sim(le consideration that it does not seem to e in the truth<s interest
to eliminate one interesting "a' to distinguish di))erent kinds o) ojects
in the "orld.

8B
0.M. ,onorM, ;4an and 4an<t<, (8?@C) DB Mind C@B-CD?.
8C
0. 6hite, Modal Thinking (*thaca, NG: 4ornell %ni&ersit' $ress, 8?D>) C8.
F. Santoni de Sio


A


4. Human capacities and moral statuses

.he distinction et"een material descri(tions o) states o) a))airs and
)ormal (ro(erties o) ojects that "e ha&e just sketched is (articularl'
rele&ant )or the understanding o) the relation et"een science and
attriution o) res(onsiilit'. *n the (ast decades, a leading de)ender o)
legal com(atiilism, #te(hen Morse, has engaged in a (assionate
de)ense o) the general (rinci(les )or the attriution o) res(onsiilit'
emedded in the (0nglo-0merican) criminal la" against the alleged
threats coming )rom the (rogress o) neuroscience. Morse has de)ended
the e3istence o) agenc' and res(onsiilit' against the radical ske(tical
challenge ' stressing the e*planatory force and practical necessity o) "hat he
calls 1)olk-(s'chological e3(lanation2 )or human eha&ior, i.e.
e3(lanation ased on (eo(le<s intentions, (lans, desires, elie)s, choices,
etc. 0s neuroscience 9 Morse rightl' claims - hasn<t (so )ar)
demonstrates that "e are mechanical (u((ets, "e are still legitimated to
see oursel&es and others as 1intentional creatures2 "ho 1can &iolate
e3(ectations o) "hat the' o"e each other2
8>
.
Morse claims that "hat he calls the general ca(acit' )or (ractical
rationalit' is 1the (rimar' res(onsiilit' condition2. *n line "ith the
re-uests o) incom(atilists, he endorses a synchronic &ie" o) ca(acit'
according to "hich in order )or the attriution to e )air the rele&ant
ca(acit' must e (ossessed ' the agent 1at the tie in -uestion2
8@
.
Moreo&er, Morse correctl' assumes that a ca(acit' actuall' (ossessed
ma' sometimes remain not e*ercised, and oser&es that in )act e&en
generall' rational (eo(le o)ten act 1irrationall' and )oolishl'2
8D
.
,o"e&er, Morse<s doesn<t clearl' e3(lain "hat these general ca(acities
are, and ho" the' should e attriuted. Hn "hat asis should "e )or
e3am(le distinguish et"een a suject that at time t
8
possesses but does not
e*ercise the ca(acit' )or rationalit', )rom one that at time t
8
doesn0t possess
that ca(acit', e&en i) she (ossessed it at t
=,
and "ill (ossess it again at t
5
N

8>
#.J. Morse, ;Feterminism and the Feath o) Folk $s'cholog': ."o 4hallenges .o
Res(onsiilit' )rom Neuroscience<, (5==A) ? Minnesota +ournal of "aw- Science 1 Technology
8-B@.
8@
2bide, (. D.
8D
2bide.
Towards a philosophical defence of legal copatibilis


?
Morse<s onl' ans"er is that e&en "hen the' )ail to eha&e rationall' it is
a 1usual legal presuption that most adults are so ca(ale2
8A
. 0s he
doesn<t clari)' "hat the (hiloso(hical ground )or this legal (resum(tion
is, one might think that the (resum(tion in the end de(ends on the
e(istemic limits o) the la", that is on the actual im(ossiilit' o) a legal
in-uir' into the real mental conditions o) agents at the time o) their
action. But in this "a' radical sce(tics ma' )inall' get "hat Morse
doesn<t "ant to gi&e them 9 the admission that the (resum(tion o)
ca(acit' is in the end onl' a )iction or an illusion.
.o a&oid the risk o) turning general ca(acities into legal )ictions, one
should re(lace the idea o) ca(acit' as a legal presuption "ith a more
solid (hiloso(hical conce(tion o) ca(acit'. * ha&e suggested else"here
the idea o) human ca(acit' as a norative power deriving fro a status
8?
. .his
&ie" strongl' relies on the general meta(h'sics o) ca(acities as
(ro(erties sketched in the (re&ious section. 0ccording to m' &ie", the
(ast (er)ormance o) rational eha&iour, together "ith other )ormal and
material conditions, allo"s the la" to attriute the agent the status o) a
rational agent. #tatuses are )or human agents "hat )ormal (ro(erties are
)or non-human sujects and ojects. 4ats are tree-climers, human are
(ractical reasoners. .he (ossession o) the status gi&es the agent 9
among other things - the capacity to act rationall' in a gi&en set o)
circumstances. .here)ore, i) at time t the agent legitimatel' (ossesses
the status o) a rational agent, and the circumstances are o) a kind that
allo", in general, the e3ercise o) that ca(acit', then ipso facto the agent
(ossesses the ca(acit' to eha&e rationall'. *) she acts irrationall', this
counts as a failed e*ercise o) a general ca(acit' (ossessed ' her. 0 closer
anal'sis o) the material conditions in "hich the )ailure ha((ened 9 e.g.
the oser&ation o) the agent<s neurological states at the time o) action 9
ma' certainl' e3(lain "h' the ca(acit' has not een e3ercised.
,o"e&er, unless the material circumstances are such as to (re&ent the
legitimate attriution o) the status o) a (ractical reasoner to the agent
(e.g. the agent is seriousl' mentall' ill), her eha&iour "ill count as a
)ailed e3ercise o) a ca(acit' at that moment (ossessed ' the agent.
#tatuses, like other )ormal (ro(erties, do not a((ear and disa((ear "ith
any change o) material conditions.

8A
2bide.
8?
F. #antoni de #io and B. Jes(ersen, ;Function, Roles, and ,uman 4a(acit'< 5
Methode. Analytic Perspectives >A-@@.
F. Santoni de Sio


8=
,o"e&er, also material conditions matter in the attriution o)
ca(acities. .he' matter less than incom(atiilists think, ut more than
some legal conser&ati&es think. *n )act, "hich ca(acities a gi&en suject
(ossesses directl' de(end on "hich statuses she (ossesses. ,o"e&er, as
there are also material restrictions to "hat statuses can e attriuted to
di))erent indi&iduals, these material restrictions "ill also indirectl'
in)luence the attriution o) ca(acities in relation to s(eci)ic actions in
s(eci)ic circumstances. .he legislator should not, )or e3am(le, attriute
the status o) a rational agent to a small toddler or to a seriousl'
(s'chotic man. .he general mental conditions o) these sujects are
such that it is not reasonale to im(ose on them an' or &er' lo"
e3(ectations o) rational eha&ior. #till, "hen the material (and )ormal)
conditions )or the attriution o) the status are met ' a gi&en suject 9
)or instance, an adult, neurot'(ical suject ma' legitimatel' e
considered as a rational suject 9 then "hat ca(acities that suject
(ossesses at a gi&en time de(ends on the )eatures o) her status, not on
the material circumstance (including her neurological states) in "hich
she )inds hersel) to acts.


. !esponsibility and practical rationality

Be)ore concluding, it ma' e use)ul to (ro&ide an e3am(le o) ho"
these conce(ts o) ca(acit' and (ractical rationalit' ma' "ork in the
conte3t o) legal attriution o) res(onsiilit'. *ssues o) )ree "ill and
ca(acit' ha&e een recentl' deated in legal and )orensic (s'chiatric
literature, in relation to the -uestion on the criminal res(onsiilit' o)
o))enders a))ected ' addictions and 1(ersonalit' disorders2 in&ol&ing
com(ulsi&e eha&iour such as kle(tomania
5=
. .he legal deate is
centred on the -uestion "hether the traditional insanit' de)ence should

5=
For a (ioneering discussion o) the issue see J. Feinerg, ;6hat is #o #(ecial
0out Mental *llnessN< in J. Feinerg, 3oing and 3eserving. ,ssays in the Theory of
Responsibility ($rinceton: $rinceton %ni&ersit' $ress, 8?D=) 5D59?57 ,. Fingarette,
;0ddiction and 4riminal Res(onsiilit'< (8?D>) AC 4ale "aw +ournal C8B. 0mong more
recent "orks see #.J. Morse, ;4ul(ailit' and 4ontrol< (8??C) 8C5 5niversity of
Pennsylvania "aw Review 8>AD7 ,. Fingarette, ;%ncontrollale %rges and *rrational
$eo(le<, (5==5) AA 6irginia "aw Review 789:. Hn addiction and res(onsiilit' see also RJ
6allace, ;0ddiction as a Fe)ect o) the 6ill: #ome $hiloso(hical Re)lections<, (8???) 8A
"aw and Philosophy @58.
Towards a philosophical defence of legal copatibilis


88
sometimes e a((lied to cases o) &olitional disorders in&ol&ing 1loss o)
control2, or the a((lication o) the insanit' de)ence should rather e
restricted to o))enders a))ected "ith mental disorders a))ecting their
asic cogniti&e ca(acit', such as schi+o(hrenics. *n m' o(inion, the
interesting -uestion is not whether soe &olitional de)ects should count as
an e3em(ting condition under the insanit' la". * think the' should. .he
interesting -uestion is how to include such elements in the la" "ithout
o(ening the door to the risks o) ause and con)usion. ,ere a correct
use o) "ords and conce(ts ma' e decisi&e. *n (articular, * think that a
good (art o) the (ractical (rolems raised ' the recognition o) a
1&olitional de)ect2 as a ((artial) e3em(tion )rom legal res(onsiilit' lies
in the use o) the misleading language o) 1irresistile im(ulse2, together
"ith a con)using &ie" o) mind and ca(acit' entailed ' that language
58
.
.he 8?>D Lnglish re)orm on diinished responsibility introduced
among other things the (ossiilit' to o))er a mitigation o) (unishment
)or o))enders a))ected ' &olitional disorders, and allo"ed (s'chiatrists
to e called to the stand to testi)' that the accused acted on an
1irresistile im(ulse2. *n&ited to comment on this re)orm, a
6ittgensteinian (hiloso(her e3(ert in 0ristotelian and .homist studies
like 0nthon' Oenn' "rote, -uite (ro&ocati&el':

.he onl' remed' )or this state o) a))airs "ill (resumal' e )or the
(rosecution to call a (hiloso(her to testi)' that there cannot e an'
such thing as an irresistile im(ulse, and there)ore the accused cannot
ha&e acted on one, an' more that he can ha&e murdered a married
achelor or stolen a s-uare circle
55
.

Oenn' "anted to highlight a conce(tual con)usion in&ol&ed in the
idea o) a human action eing the (roduct o) an irresistile im(ulse. Hn
the one hand, a human action is ' de)inition a eha&iour that is
controlled ' the agent<s (s'chological states 9 her desires, moti&es,
intentions. Hn the other hand, the conce(t o) an 1irresistile im(ulse2
e&okes the idea o) a (urel' mechanical event, a eha&iour that cannot e
attriuted to the agent 9 a re)le3, an electricall' induced mo&ement, etc.
.here)ore, the statement that a human action is the (roduct o) an

58
For a orader discussion o) the to(ic o) this section see F. #antoni de #io,
;*rresistile Fesires as an L3cuse<, 99 ;ing0s "aw +ournal, (5=88) 5A?9B=D.
55
0.$.J. Oenn', The 2vory Tower (H3)ord: Black"ell, 8?AA) >@.
F. Santoni de Sio


85
irresistile im(ulse is a logical contradiction, ecause it amounts to the
statement that the same eha&iour is &oluntar' and in&oluntar' at the
same time.
Oenn'<s (oint should not e read as entailing that addicti&e and
com(ulsi&e actions are normal, (aradigmatic, &oluntar' actions.
0dmittedl', there is something s(ecial in the (s'chological conditions
o) (eo(le a))ected ' serious addiction and &olitional disorders
5B
. 0nd
this condition ma' re-uire that "e judge and treat these (eo(le
according to di))erent moral and legal standards. Moreo&er, the
e3(ertise o) a (s'chiatrist ma' sometimes certainl' e hel()ul to ha&e a
etter understanding o) "hat these (s'chological conditions are, and to
decide i) and ho" the (resence o) these conditions should in)luence
our res(onsiilit' judgement on these (eo(le<s "rong actions.
,o"e&er, that o) an addicti&e or com(ulsi&e actions as the (roduct o)
an irresistile im(ulse is a (oor and con)using meta(hor. $oor inso)ar
as it e-uates addicti&e and com(ulsi&e actions and the com(le3
(s'chological structures associated "ith them "ith sim(le in&oluntar'
eha&iour like re)le3 and (h'sicall' induced mo&ements. 4on)using
ecause it suggests the legitimac' o) the reduction o) these com(le3
human actions to (urel' mechanical (henomena.
* think that the reason "h' seriousl' addicti&e and com(ulsi&e
actions ma' e (artiall' e3em(ted )rom res(onsiilit' is that these are
(&oluntar') actions (er)ormed ' agents "ho su))er )rom a ((artial)
inailit' to "ill. .his e3(lanation allo"s, in general, to shi)t the )ocus
)rom "hat Oenn' calls a 1(aramechanical2 &ie" o) action to a &ie" o)
action as the (roduct o) agents e-ui((ed "ith s(ecial linguistic, mental,
and social 9 in one "ord: rational 9 ca(acities. ,o"e&er, in order to
make sense o) this claim, it must e e3(lained "hat an ability to will is,
and this is not a tri&ial task. 6e can easil' decide "hether someone has
a gi&en (h'sical or intellectual ailit', ' "ondering "hether gi&en
certain conditions and gi&en a su))icient moti&ation on her (art, that
agent "ill deli&er a (articular (er)ormance 9 )or instance, a (h'sical
(er)ormance like li)ting a "eight or an intellectual (er)ormance like
doing an arithmetical sum. ,o"e&er, there is no (er)ormance "hich
stands to the ailit' to "ill in the relationshi( "hich the (er)ormance o)

5B
J. Oennett, N.0 Eincent, and 0. #noek, ;Frug 0ddiction and 4riminal
Res(onsiilit'<, in N. !e&' and J. 4lausen (eds.), <andbook on =euroethics (Fordrecht:
#(ringer, )orthcoming).
Towards a philosophical defence of legal copatibilis


8B
doing sums stands to the corres(ondent intellectual ailit', or the
(er)ormance o) li)ting a certain "eight to the corres(ondent (h'sical
ailit'. .here are certainl' 1acti&ities2 "hich are t'(ical )or agents
e-ui((ed "ith a "ill, ut these are otivational states like deciding,
choosing, and regretting, rather than (er)ormances like li)ting "eights
or making arithmetic calculations. *n )act, that "hich authori+es the
attriution o) a human "ill to a suject is its ailit' to (er)orm actions
in a certain way 9 namel' intentionall', delieratel', rationall' 9 not to
(er)orm (articular kinds of actions
5C
. .here)ore, in order to make sense o)
&olitional disorders as inailities to "ill one cannot rel' either on the
(oor meta(hor o) mechanical )orces )orcing the hand o) the agent or
on the sim(le a((lication o) the logic o) (h'sical or intellectual ailities.
Hne must rel', once again, on the idea o) a de)ect o) that general,
com(le3, (artl' cogniti&e and (artl' &olitional capacity that is human
(ractical rationalit'.
0 legal case "ill ser&e as an illustration o) the role that the conce(t
o) a ca(acit' )or (ractical rationalit' ma' (la' in deciding hard cases o)
res(onsiilit' )or actions committed ' sujects a))ected ' &olitional
com(ulsi&e disorders. *n R v !yrne, the court had to decide a case o)
murder in "hich the de)endant "as a se3ual (s'cho(ath dri&en '
&iolent and (er&erted se3ual desires.
5>
*n his &erdict, the judge !ord
$arker e3(lains that the (oint o) the 1diminished res(onsiilit'2
de)ence in cases o) com(ulsi&e disorders is recognising that some kinds
o) loss o) control ma' lessen the de)endant<s cul(ailit'.
5@
#ure, the
judge admits, in diminished res(onsiilit' (leas some e&idence o) an
;anormalit' o) mind< on the (art o) the suject should also e
(resented. ,o"e&er, according to !ord $arker ;anormalit' o) mind< is
a term ;"ide enough to co&er the mind<s acti&ities in all its as(ects P
the ailit' to )orm a rational judgement as to "hether an act is right or
"rong, ut also the ailit' to e3ercise "ill (o"er to control (h'sical acts
in accordance "ith that rational judgement<
5D
.
B' esche"ing the terminolog' o) 1irresistile im(ulse2 the court in
!yrne has signi)icantl' reduced the risk o) muddling the jurors u(.

5C
4)r. 0.$.J. Oenn', The Metaphysics of Mind (H3)ord: 4larendon, 8?A?) A=-A8 and
the discussion ' F. #antoni de #io, n 58 ao&e.
5>
R & B'rne, (8?@=) 5 QB B?@.
5@
2bide, (. C=5.
5D
2bide, (. C=B.
F. Santoni de Sio


8C
$articularl' )itting is its de)inition o) "ill(o"er as an ailit' to rationally
control one<s (h'sical acts. *ndeed, the (oint is not "hether (h'sical
acts are attriutale to the agent0s ind, or "hether the' are someho"
controlled ' it. H) course the' are, ecause the' are intentional, goal-
directed and desire-ased actions, made in the asence o) e3ternal
coercion and clearl' under the mental guidance o) the agent. .he (oint
is "hether the agent is, in general, rational enough to e attriuted the
status o) a res(onsile agent.