The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954 PDF

The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954
Author(s): Bradley Lynn Coleman

Source: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 4 (Oct., 2005), pp. 1137-1177
Published by: Society for Military History
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The Colombian
Army
in
Korea,
1950-1954
Bradley Lynn Coleman:
Abstract
A diverse multinational coalition
fought
to defend South Korea
between 1950 and 1953. The United Nations
(UN) army
featured
combat divisions from industrialized
countries,
but also included
units from small UN member states such as Colombia. This article
examines the multinational
campaign
in Korea
through coverage
of
the Colombian
Army experience.
It finds that the successful inte-
gration
of the Colombia Battalion into the U.S.-led UN Command
grew
from the
republic's larger relationship
with the United States.
APTAIN Luis M. Galindo led a
company
of Colombian
infantrymen
toward the Chinese
position
at 4:30 A.M. on 21 June 1952. From a
forward observation
post,
Colonel
Lloyd
R.
Moses,
commander of the
U.S.
infantry regiment
with which the Colombians
fought,
watched the
South Americans advance undetected into the
enemy
trenches.
Then,
the
predawn
calm
erupted
in violence.
Although
taken
by surprise,
Chi-
nese soldiers
put up
a stubborn
resistance;
a furious
exchange
of small
*
The author
presented
this
paper
at the
August
2002 Conference of Army His-
torians,
U.S.
Army
Center of Military
History, Washington,
D.C. Keri-Lvn
Coleman,
Heather
Harris,
Lester
Langley,
Allan
Millett,
Mark
Russell,
William
Stueck,
Alvaro
Valencia
Tovar,
Erin
Mahan,
and Juana Maria Rubio Fernandez
provided generous
assistance. The views
expressed
in this article are the author's own and do not nec-
essarily represent
those of the
Department
of State.
Bradley Lynn
Coleman is a
graduate
of the
Virginia
Military Institute
(1995)
and
Temple University (1997).
He earned his Ph.D. at the
University
of
Georgia
in
May 2001,
where he studied under the
supervision
of Dr. William Stueck.
Between 2001 and 2003 he served as a U.S.
Army
Central Identification Labora-
tory postdoctoral
research
fellow, investigating
the
history
of
graves
registration
and forensic
anthropology.
Dr. Coleman
currently
works at the Office of the His-
torian,
U.S.
Department
of State.
The Journal of Military
History 69
(January 20)5):
1137-78 Society for Military listory
* 1137
BRADLEY LYNN COLEMAN
arms fire
gave way
to intense hand-to-hand combat. When the Chinese
rushed reinforcements to the
fray,
the Colombians made
expert
use of
artillery
and tank
support
to break the counterattack. On the
verge
of
victory,
the Colombian
infantrymen
tried to take communist
prisoners,
but the
enemy
refused to surrender and the action devolved into a
slaughter.
The
pace
of fire
tapered
off after
sunrise,
and the riflemen
secured the hill. Two Colombian soldiers
lay
dead on the
ground,
and
several others were wounded. To
signal
the
company's success,
Private
Pedro Pira
proudly
unfurled the Colombian
flag
and waved it above his
head. The soldier later boasted that he was a human
flagpole.
That
night,
Colonel Moses recorded in his combat
journal
that "the Colombians
[had] put up
a
splendid fight
to a
man."1
By capturing
Hill 400 the
Colombians had added a new link to the
outpost
line of
resistance,
mak-
ing
more formidable the United Nations
(UN)
front.2
Colombian soldiers attacked the Chinese
position
as
part
of a
larger
UN effort to defend South Korea. Between 1950 and 1953 the U.S.-led
international coalition featured combat divisions from industrialized
countries,
but also included forces from other UN member states.
By
fighting
in
Korea, small-country
units like the Colombia Battalion trans-
formed the UN
campaign
into
something
more than a
simple
test of
American
military prowess.3
The
aggregate strength
of small-nation
forces in Korea,
nearly
fifteen thousand
troops,
bolstered the United
Nations'
political
and
military position
on the
peninsula. Moreover,
as a
UN
operation
that
sought
to enforce UN
resolutions,
the war's multina-
tional character
helped
restrict
fighting
to
Korea, making
less
likely
the
outbreak of a
larger
conflict.
During
the
early
1950s countries like
Colombia invested in the idea of collective
security.
The Korean cam-
paign,
in
turn,
became an
important episode
in the
development
of the
republic's
own
military capabilities.
This article examines small-nation
contributions to the UN Command
through coverage
of the Colombian
1.
Lloyd
R.
Moses,
"Personal
Journal,"
21 June
1952,
Box
"Journal, Correspon-
dence, Memorabilia," Lloyd
R. Moses
Papers,
U.S. Army Military
History Institute,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania. (Hereafter
referred to as USAMHI.)
2. El
Tiempo,
28 June
1952;
Alvaro Valencia
Tovar,
"Colombia en la Guerra
Corea," 197,
in Alvaro Valencia
Tovar, ed.,
Historia de las
fuerzas
militares de
Colombia
(Bogota,
Colombia: Editorial Planeta
Colombiana, 1993),
3:169-235.
"Operational Report,"
Colombia
Battalion,
20-21 June
1952,
Annex
7;
and "Com-
mand
Report,"
June
1952,
31st U.S. Infantrv
Regiment,
7th U.S. Infantry
Division,
Box
3339,
Record
Group (RG) 407,
National Archives and Records
Administration,
College Park, Maryland. (Hereafter
referred to as
NARA.)
3.
Belgium, Colombia, Ethiopia, Luxembourg, Greece,
the
Netherlands,
the
Philippines,
South
Africa, Thailand,
and
Turkey
dispatched
combat forces to
fight
alongside American,
British
Commonwealth, French,
and South Korean units. Den-
mark, India, Italy, Norway,
and Sweden sent medical detachments to the western
Pacific.
THE JOURNAL OF 1138 *
Colombian
Army
in
Korea,
1950-1954
experience.
The
study
considers Colombian President Laureano
G6mez's decision to send
troops
to
Korea,
and shows how the battalion
prepared
for combat. The narrative then follows the Colombian unit
through
the
war,
ending
with the controversial
fight atop
Old
Baldy
in
1953. In
doing
so,
this
survey
finds that the Colombia Battalion's suc-
cessful
integration
into the U.S.-led UN Command
grew
from the
repub-
lic's
larger
affiliation with the United States.
Scholars have
paid
little attention to small-nation contributions to
the UN Command. While
English-language
historians have
produced
intelligent
work on the Korean War's
major participants, they largely
ignore
the contribution of the other UN member states.
Indeed,
the
entire
body
of
English-language
literature on the Colombian
military
in
Korea consists of
only
two
published
articles. Russell
Ramsey
relates
Colombia's wartime
activity
to the
country's larger
commitment to col-
lective
security
in his 1967
article,
but offers students
only
six sentences
on
operational
issues.4 More
recently,
Mark
Danley
has written about the
Colombian
Navy
in the western Pacific.5
Beyond
these
essays,
a handful
of master's theses
explore
other
aspects
of Colombia's involvement in the
Korean War.6 Yet even when combined with other
sources,
the
unpub-
lished
manuscripts present
an
incomplete
account of the Colombia Bat-
talion's service with the United Nations. William Stueck's 1995
description
of the multilateral venture
highlights
the need for additional
work on countries like Colombia in order to understand the conflict's
place
in international
history.7
In Colombia, talented academics have focused on economic and
political questions
to the detriment of
military history.
Historians of
Colombia
during
the 1950s are
scarce, largely
because of the distasteful
nature of domestic affairs
during
that
period,
the intense
political, social,
4. Russell W.
Ramsey,
"The Colombia Battalion in Korea and
Suez,"
Journal
of
Inter-American Studies 9
(October 1967):
541-60.
5. Mark H.
Danley,
"Colombian
Navy
in the Korean
War, 1950-1953,"
American
Neptune:
A
Quarterly
Journal
of
Maritime
History
and Arts 58
(Spring 1998):
243-61.
6. Master's theses of interest are Charles
Steel,
"Colombian
Experiences
in
Korea and Perceived
Impact
on La
Violencia,
1953-1965"
(University
of
Florida,
1978);
Daniel
Davison,
"The Colombian Army
in Korea: A
Study
of the
Integration
of
the Colombia Battalion into the 31st United States
Infantry
Regiment
Based on the
Experiences
of
Major
General
Lloyd R. Moses"
(University
of South
Dakota, 1972);
Christine Sutherland
Galbraith,
"Colombian
Participation
in the Korean War"
(Uni-
versity
of
Florida, 1973);
and
Douglas
Alan
Walthour,
"Laureano G6mez and Colom-
bia in the Korean War: Internal and External Factors in
Foreign Policy
Decision-Making" (University
of
Texas, 1990).
7. William
Stueck,
The Korean War: An International
History (Princeton,
N.J.:
Princeton
University Press, 1995).
MILITARY HISTORY * 1139
and
religious
convulsion known as la Violencia.8 The
relatively
minor
role the Colombian
Army
has
played
in the
republic's political
life con-
tributes to its lack of
appeal
as a
scholarly subject. Military
men there-
fore dominate Colombia's Korean War
historiography.
The collected
works of General Alvaro Valencia Tovar
(an
army captain
in
Korea) pro-
vide the most
comprehensive
and
thoughtful
account of the
campaign.9
In
fact,
any study
of the Colombian
military
begins
with the
general's
six-
volume Historia de las
fuerzas
militares de Colombia
(1993).
Yet the
vast
majority
of the literature consists of nationalistic memoirs that
emerged,
for the most
part, during
the
years immediately
after the war.10
The
monographs provide
readers with
insights
into Colombia's wartime
experience; many
also cover the conflict's
legacy
in the South American
republic. Still,
Colombian
writers,
like their American
counterparts,
have
neglected important aspects
of the Korean
War,
such as how
Colombia came to
fight
with the UN Command.
The Colombian Contribution
Colombia's
military
contribution to the UN effort materialized in the
months after North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. As the
executive
agent
for the UN
operation,
the
Harry
S. Truman administra-
tion
sought
to assemble a multinational coalition to affirm the notion of
collective
security. Washington
also wanted
foreign
troops
to lessen the
8. The lack of available
primary
documentation also frustrates scholars in
Colombia. In
part,
the
scarcity
of written sources stems from a
suspicious
1967 Min-
isterio de Gobierno fire that
destroyed
a vast
quantity
of
government
records from the
Korean War era.
9. Alvaro Valencia
Tovar,
Corea:
Resurgimiento
de las cenizas
(Bogota,
Colom-
bia: Canal
Ramirez-Antares, 1977);
Alvaro Valencia
Tovar,
Testimonio de una
epoca
(Bogota,
Colombiana, 1992);
and Alvaro Valencia Tovar
and Jairo Sandoval
Franky,
Colombia en la Guerra de Corea: La historia secreta
(Bogota,
Colombiana, 2(01).
10. General Alberto Ruiz Novoa's El Batallon Colombia en
Corea,
1951-1954
(Bogota,
Colombia:
Imprenta Nacional,
1956) is the battalion's official
history.
The
book relies on wartime
documents, chronologies, photographs,
and rosters to tell the
Colombia Battalion
story.
Ruiz addresses the
long-term importance
of the war in
Ensefianzas de la
camparia
de Corea:
Aplicables
al
ejercito
de Colombia
(Bogota,
Colombia:
Imprenta Fotograbado, 1956).
Valuable memoirs include Pablo E. Torres
Almeyda,
Colombia en la Guerra de Corea:
Impresiones
de un combatiente
(Bogota,
Colombia:
n.p., 1953);
Ernesto
Hernandez,
Colombia en Corea:
Impresiones
de un
tripulante
de ARC Almirante Padilla en su viaje
a Corea
(Bogota,
Colombia:
Impri-
matur, 1953);
Francisco Caicedo
Montfa,
Banzay: Diario en las trincheras coreanas
(Bogota,
Colombia:
n.p., 1961);
and Gabriel
Puyana Garcia,
Por la libertad . . . en
tierra extrana: Cr6nicas
y
reminiscencias de la Guerra de Corea
(Bogota,
Colom-
bia: Banco de la
Republica, 1993).
Colombian
Arnoy
in
Korea,
1950-1954
burden on the American armed
forces, already
stretched thin with other
global
commitments.
Furthermore,
an international
army guaranteed
that the
"aggressive
effect" of an overt Soviet or Communist Chinese
strike in Korea would be "directed
against
the
greatest possible
number
of UN member
states,"
assuring
that the United States would not stand
alone in a world war
against
the communist
powers.
1
Principles
notwith-
standing,
the U.S.
government
found itself
unprepared
to assemble such
a coalition, a condition that slowed the collection of
foreign
units for the
UN Command. When the war
began,
U.S. commanders in the western
Pacific asked that
ground
forces from UN member states be no smaller
than an
infantry
battalion of
regular troops,
or
approximately
one thou-
sand soldiers.
By meeting
this
standard,
foreign
governments
ensured
that their units would make a real contribution to the UN effort. But the
Truman administration could not
agree
on how
foreign governments
would reimburse the United States for
logistical support
once their units
arrived in the combat zone. Three months of bureaucratic
wrangling
passed
before the administration decided that
contributing governments
could
negotiate
the cost of U.S. assistance.12 The verdict
upheld
the
prin-
ciple
of reimbursement while
allowing
countries like Colombia room to
manipulate
the cost of the war.
Colombia's decision to
fight
in Korea waited for Laureano G6mez's
August
1950
inauguration.
Once in
office,
President
G6mez
conferred
with
leading
Colombian
military officials, pledging
to send a
frigate
to
join
the UN armada on 6
September
1950.
Offering
the
warship,
the
president
moved without
involving
the
republic's
full democratic
apparatus.
In 1949
G6mez's
predecessor
Mariano
Ospina
Perez had
imposed
a state of emer-
gency
in Colombia to deal with la Violencia. Still in force
during
the sum-
mer of
1950,
the move
suspended congressional
activities, narrowing
the
country's
normal
decision-making process. Considering
Colombia's
domestic
problems, Washington
did not
expect
a Colombian contribution
beyond
the
frigate,
and U.S. officials
placed
only
indirect
pressure
on
Bogotai
for
troops.
American
diplomats
believed that President Gomez
would not send a battalion of his
twenty-two-thousand-man army
to
Korea,
soldiers he
presumably
needed to maintain internal order. Yet
once
Washington
clarified its reimbursement
policy,
G6mez
pressed
the
subject, resulting
in bilateral talks that culminated in
Bogota's
14 Novem-
ber 1950 announcement that a Colombian infantry battalion would
join
11. "U.S. Course of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter the Korean Hostili-
ties,"
National Security Council
(NSC) Report 76/1,
25
July 1950,
Box
11,
NSC
Reports,
RG
273,
NARA.
12. "Contribution of Ground
Troops by
UN Members for Use in
Korea,"
5
August
1950, 795B.5/8-550,
Box
4305; George
C. Marshall to Dean
Acheson,
26
September
1950, 795B.5/2550;
and Marshall to
Acheson,
30
September 1950, 795B.5/3050,
Box
4306, Department
of
State,
Decimal
Files, 1950-1954,
RG
59,
NARA.
a
C
the UN Command.13
Although military developments
in Korea led
many
observers to conclude that the unit would not see
combat,
the
prospect
of
heavy
action
following
the Communist Chinese intervention in late
November did not
discourage
Colombia. In
fact,
as the Chinese
People's
13. Eduardo Zuleta
Angel
to
Acheson,
14 November
1950, 795B.5/4306,
Box
4306, Department
of
State,
Decimal
Files, 1950-1954,
RG
59,
NARA.
Colomtbian Army in
Korea, 1950-1954
Volunteers
(CPV)
thrashed the UN Command in December
1950,
the
president
considered
increasing
the
country's
military
commitment to
the United
Nations, perhaps
to include an entire
army regiment.
Gomez
eventually jettisoned
that idea as too
large
a sacrifice for
Colombia,
but
remained dedicated to
sending
an
infantry
battalion to Korea.
Colombia's devotion to collective
security predated
the Korean
War,
beginning
with Sim6n Bolivar's drive for a Pan American federation in
1826. At the 1945 San Francisco
Conference,
Colombian
diplomats
played
a
key
role in
drafting
the UN
charter,
and Colombia's
post-1945
military planning
accounted for
possible
action with a UN
security
force.14 For Colombian decision
makers,
United Nations inaction in the
face of North Korean
aggression
would
damage
the
organization's
credi-
bility.
As an active UN
member,
Colombia had a certain
obligation
to
support
UN
security operations. By
1950 Colombia had also
forged
a
close
relationship
with the United
States,
an alliance based on
compati-
ble
values,
shared
opportunities,
and
geographic proximity.
The first U.S.
military
mission arrived in Colombia in
1939,
and bilateral
military
cooperation
continued after World War II.
Dispatching troops
to
Korea,
Colombia
proved
itself a
dependable
American
ally.15
In this
regard,
G6mez
correctly figured
that a
military
contribution to the UN Com-
mand would create conditions favorable for future U.S.-Colombian
coop-
eration,
even
though
U.S. aid for Colombia did not enter into the Korean
War discussions. Internal variables also
shaped Bogota's
decision to
fight
in Korea. In 1950
political
and social
upheaval
in Colombia had
pro-
pelled
G6mez to the Colombian
presidency.
A devout Catholic and
pas-
sionate
anticommunist,
G6mez linked Colombia's domestic affliction to
an international communist
conspiracy;
he also had a keen sense of
Korea's
strategic importance.
The South American
republic
could
actively participate
in the
fight against
the "universal
enemy"
by joining
the UN Command.16
Additionally,
G6mez
might
have calculated that an
overseas
expeditionary
force would serve as a source of national unity
during
la
Violencia,
much as the border
dispute
with Peru had in the
early 1930s,
another
period
of domestic disorder. A host of internal and
14. See "Information
Regarding
Staff Conversations Between
Military
and Naval
Representatives
of the United States and
Colombia," September 1945,
Box
70, Bogota
Embassy,
Classified
Records, Department
of
State, 1944-1945,
RG
84,
NARA.
15. Zuleta
Angel
to
G6mez,
21
August 1950,
Folio
229,
Box
87,
Records of the
Colombian
Embassy
in
Washington,
Archivo General de la
Naci6n, Bogota,
Colombia.
16.
Conferencia
del ministro de relaciones
exteriors,
dictada desde la radiod-
ifursora
nacional el 20 de
augusto
de 1952
(Bogota,
Colombia:
Imprenta Nacional,
1952),
7.
external factors therefore
converged
to bring Colombian soldiers to the
battlefield in Korea.17
Colombia's commitment to the United Nations came
during
an oth-
erwise difficult
period
in U.S.-Latin American relations.
During
World
War II the United States and Latin America had
joined together
to con-
front the Axis
challenge.
Washington's
best Latin American allies
(Brazil
and
Mexico)
even
dispatched
combat units to
fight alongside
U.S. forces.
But
hemispheric solidarity
waned after
1945, principally
as a result of
differing approaches
to
regional development.
In
short, many
Latin
American officials
expected
massive U.S. economic assistance in return
for their wartime
cooperation. Preoccupied
with
rebuilding
Western
Europe
and East
Asia,
the Truman administration failed to meet Latin
American
expectations. Instead, Washington
championed private
invest-
ment and free trade as solutions to Latin American
underdevelopment.
Although
officials formed a
hemispheric
defense
pact
in 1947 and the
Organization
of American States in
1948,
the
dispute
over inter-Ameri-
can economic
development only
became more contentious.
Washington
regretted
the
coming
of the Korean War in June
1950,
but
hoped
that the
new conflict
might
revive
hemispheric solidarity, bringing
the Americas
together
to meet the Soviet threat. Latin American reaction to U.S. over-
tures for
troops ultimately disappointed
the Truman
administration.'8
In 1950 Latin American
delegates
to the United Nations sanctioned
the UN action in Korea
through
a series of
important
votes. Yet when the
Truman administration asked
governments
to send soldiers to
Korea,
Washington
found the
region uncooperative.19 Although
local conditions
patterned
each
country's response
to the
conflict,
the notion that South
Korea's fate
lay
in the hands of the industrialized
powers
dominated
U.S.-Latin American
negotiations. Washington applied significant pres-
sure on some Latin American
governments, particularly Brazil,
to send
troops
to Korea. Those
governments responded
with a
scathing critique
of the administration's
meager foreign
assistance
program.
The Central
American and Caribbean
republics might
have contributed
troops,
but
lacked
military
establishments
necessary
to
support
even the smallest
commitment of
regular
soldiers.
Washington
discovered circumstances
right
for a
military
contribution
only
in Colombia. Because Colombia
had
played
a smaller
part
during
World War II than some other Latin
17. For more on the U.S. effort to field an international
coalition,
and Colombia's
decision to send
troops
to
Korea,
see Bradley Lvnn
Coleman,
"The Colombian-Amer-
ican Alliance: Colombia's Contribution to U.S.-Led Multilateral Military Efforts,
1938-1953"
(Ph.D. diss., University
of
Georgia, 2001),
138-54.
18. Lester
Langley,
America and the Americas: The United States in the West-
ern
Hemisphere (Athens
and London:
University
of
Georgia Press, 1989),
133-88.
19. For records
dealing
with this U.S.
diplomatic
venture in Latin
America,
see
795B.5, Department
of
State,
Decimal
Files, 1950-1954,
RG
59,
NARA.
1144 * THE JOURNAL OF
Colombian Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
American
countries,
Colombian officials held lower
expectations
for
postwar
U.S. aid. The Colombian-American affiliation was therefore less
volatile than U.S. relations with some other Latin American states.
Also,
la Violencia
simultaneously
obscured
post-1945
conflicts in U.S.-Latin
American relations and fueled the
government's
commitment to anti-
communism. In 1951
Bogota dispatched
an
infantry
battalion and
warship
to
fight
with the UN
Command;
the other Latin American
governments
sent
only nonmilitary
assistance to
Korea.2"
Training
the Colombia
Battalion,
1951
The Colombian
Army's preexisting knowledge
of U.S.
military
doc-
trine, organization,
and
equipment
contributed to its success
during
the
Korean War. In
fact,
the
country's decade-long
military
affiliation with
the United States
gave
the Colombia Battalion a
major advantage
over
many
other small-nation units. Colombia benefited from its
partnership
with the United States before its soldiers even left the
country.
In late
1950 President G6mez asked
Washington
for
special
assistance to
pre-
pare
the Colombian
troops.
The Truman administration
agreed,
and U.S.
Army
mission
personnel,
led
by Spanish-speaking
Texan
Major
William
T.
Gordon,
committed themselves to
helping
the battalion. In December
1950
Washington shipped
a small amount of
military equipment
to
Bogota
so the soldiers could train with U.S.
arms,
the
type they
would
use in the western Pacific. While Colombia had
acquired
stocks of U.S.
material
during
the
years
before
Korea,
Colombian officials had dis-
persed
the
weapons
to various domestic
military installations;
consoli-
dating
them now for the sole
purpose
of
training
the battalion
proved
impractical.
In addition to
equipment,
the
Pentagon
sent nine Latino-
American servicemen to South America to coach Colombian
infantry-
men. With the American advisers in
place,
Colombia Battalion officers
gathered
on 31
January
1951. The enlisted
personnel
assembled at a
Colombian
military facility
north of
Bogota
the
following
month. Under
American
guidance,
Colombian officers studied
subjects ranging
from
intelligence gathering
to
leadership.
The riflemen undertook extensive
physical training,
attended
weapons seminars,
and
practiced
small unit
tactics. The Colombian
Army
also
adopted
a North American
organiza-
tional model for the battalion that included a
headquarters company,
20.
Coleman,
"The Colombian-American
Alliance,"
155-66. The total
monetary
value of Latin American material assistance reached nearly $3.5
million,
modest
compared
to the amount sent
by developed
countries like the United States and
Canada,
but more
generous
than other
underdeveloped regions.
United
Nations,
Year-
book
of
the United
Nations,
1951
(Lake Success,
N.Y.: UN
Department
of Public Infor-
mation, 1952),
250-51.
three rifle
companies,
and a
heavy weapons company. Although
a
gen-
eral
success,
the domestic
training program
did encounter some
prob-
lems, such as the size of the
military facility
in
Bogota,
which
prohibited
battalion-level exercises.
Also, despite
the fact that service in the battal-
ion was
voluntary,
some soldiers turned out not to be volunteers: several
local commanders had sent troublemakers to
Bogota
to clean out their
commands. Colombian officials
eventually
returned the unwanted men
to internal
posts,
and the battalion moved to Korea in
May
1951.21
The G6mez
government
orchestrated a
grand
farewell
ceremony
for
the
troops.
Undeterred
by
the
heavy
rain that fell the
night before,
citi-
zens turned out in
large
numbers to see the soldiers off on
Saturday,
12
May
1951. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Jaime Polania
Puyo,
a
widely respected English-speaking infantry officer,
the battalion
marched
through
the
city.
At the end of Calle 26 the unit turned south
toward the Plaza de Bolivar.
Standing
in front of the
capitol building
on
the southern end of the
plaza, government
and church officials reviewed
the
infantrymen.22
In his
public remarks,
President Gomez
praised
the
battalion's heroic mission to defend Christian civilization. The minister
of war then
presented
the soldiers with uniform
insignia (a rampant
lion
on a
red, yellow,
and blue
shield)
for
having
finished their
preparations
for
war;
battalion officers also received a national banner to
carry
with
them to Korea.23 A few
days
after the
review,
the
troops
boarded
railway
coaches for their
trip
to
Buenaventura,
the
country's principal
Pacific
Coast
port. There,
on 22
May,
the men filed onto a U.S. naval
transport,
the USNS Aiken
Victory.24
The Colombian
Army
had
formally
embarked
on its first overseas
military operation.
The battalion continued to train
during
its
voyage
across the Pacific
Ocean.25 Colombian officers examined
military intelligence reports,
reviewed
infantry tactics,
discussed
military ethics,
and
polished
their
English.
Enlisted
personnel improved
their
physical conditioning,
stud-
ied American
weapons
and memorized the Geneva Convention rules for
21. Valencia
Tovar,
"Colombia en la Guerra de
Corea," 171;
Valencia
Tovar,
Tes-
timonio de una
epoca, 150-51; "Trayectoria
del Batall6n
Colombia," 24-25,
in
Viges-
imo aniversario del Batall6n Colombia
(Bogota,
Colombia:
Imprenta y Litografia
de
la Fuerzas
Militares, 1971), 24-30; "Debriefing
of Senior Officers
Returning
from
Field
Assignments: Joy
K.
Vallery," 31, 33, USAMHI; Puyana Garcia,
Por la libertad.
. en tierra
extrana, 58-77;
Valencia Tovar to
author,
12
January
2001.
22. El
Siglo,
13
May
1951.
23. El
Tiempo,
12
May
1951 and 13
May 1951;
Jaime Polania
Puyo,
"La
entrega
de la bandera de
guerra
y
notas de
despedida,"
in
Vigesimo
aniversario del Batall6n
Colombia, 35-38;
and Valencia
Tovar,
Testimonio de una
dpoca,
156.
24. El
Tiempo,
23
May 1951;
and Valencia
Tovar,
Corea,"
174.
25. Valencia
Tovar,
Testimonio de una
epoca,
158.
Coloitmbian Army in Korea, 1950-1954
conducting
war.26 The Colombian servicemen often worked late into the
night
to
complete
their
work,
a
demanding
routine broken
only
by
the
Aiken
Victory's stop
in Hawaii. At Pearl
Harbor,
a four-man team disem-
barked, boarded a U.S.
military aircraft,
and flew to South Korea to
pre-
pare
for the battalion's arrival.
During
their brief visit to
Oahu,
the other
Colombian
troops slipped
off the
transport
to
explore Honolulu; eight
servicemen were so excited to be in Hawaii that they missed the Aiken
Victory's
departure
later that
day, requiring
that a U.S. aircraft
fly
them
to Korea. That miscue
aside,
American sailors on the Aiken
Victory
observed that the Colombians behaved in an
"exemplary"
fashion while
aboard
ship, impressing
U.S. seamen as
hardworking,
"cheerful and
pleasant.
"27
The USNS Aiken
Victory
delivered the Colombian soldiers to
Pusan,
South Korea, on 16 June. South Korean President
Syngman
Rhee
per-
sonally greeted
the
Colombians,
the newest members of a diverse inter-
national
military
coalition.2s With forces like the Colombia Battalion in
Korea,
the UN
campaign
was unlike earlier multilateral
military experi-
ences. While
infantry
divisions were the basic
building
blocks of the
World War II combat
alliance,
new Cold \Var
geopolitical
considerations
produced
a
tapestry
of smaller UN units in Korea. In order to
successfully
integrate
these
ground
forces into a coherent
army,
UN
planners
first had
to make certain that each
contingent
was
properly
trained and
equipped.29
Seasoned
professional soldiers,
such as those from the
British
Commonwealth,
arrived in Korea with considerable
experience
in modern warfare. But
many
small-nation contributions
required
a
period
of
preparation
before
moving
into combat. American
military
leaders
fully
realized this fact after
attempting
to
deploy
the 10th
Philip-
pine Infantry
Battalion Combat Team.
The first
small-country contingent
to arrive in
Korea,
the
Philippine
Battalion took its
place
on the frontline in
September
1950.3(' The Fil-
ipino
soldiers
immediately
joined
the Puerto Rican
regiment
of the 3rd
U.S.
Infantry Division,
an American decision based
upon
the miscalcu-
26. Valencia Tovar to
author,
12
January
2001.
27. Dan Kimball to
Acheson,
16
August 1951, 721.551/8-1651,
Box
3288,
Department
of
State,
Decimal
Files, 1950-1954,
RG
59,
NARA;
and "S-1
Daily
Jour-
nal,"
15 June
1951, UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
June
1951,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
28. El
Tiempo,
14 June
1951;
and Valencia
Tovar,
Corea,"
176.
29.
Guttemberg
A.
Moranda,
"Inter-Allied Military
Co-operations," Military
Review 31
(February 1952):
85-90.
30. For the
diplomatic
dimension of the
Philippine contribution,
and motiva-
tions
surrounding
Manila's UN
contribution,
see
Stueck,
Korean
War,
72-73. The
Infantry
Battalion Combat Team consisted of one
infantry
battalion
augmented
with
one
company
of Sherman tanks and one battery of 105-mm howitzers.
lation that the
Filipino
soldiers
spoke Spanish.31 Attempts
to train and
equip
the
troops during
the fluid
campaign
that followed the Inchon
landing
in
September
1950
proved
unsuccessful.
Personality,
communi-
cation,
and tactical
incompatibility
further
complicated matters,
and
Eighth
U.S.
Army
Commander Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker
eventually
assigned
the battalion to defend communication and trans-
portation
lines. The
problems persisted
after Communist Chinese inter-
vention,
and the
Filipino
commander even
petitioned
Manila to
withdraw the
troops. Although
the unit
stayed
in
Korea,
the "embarrass-
ing
and difficult situation" moved U.S.
planners
to reevaluate the
process
of multinational
integration.32
In
response
to the
problems
associated with
fielding
the
Philippine
Battalion,
General Walker established the United Nations
Reception
Center
(UNRC)
at
Taegu University
in October 1950.33 The UNRC mis-
sion involved
equipping
new
troops,
establishing
uniform
operating
stan-
dards,
and
developing
unit
proficiency. Additionally,
as the first UNRC
Commander,
Colonel John H.
McGee, explained,
the center
sought
"to
gain by
tact and
understanding
the
respect
and confidence" of
incoming
UN units.34 Such
"respect
and confidence" would in turn make the UN
army
more effective. The
center,
with the
capacity
to train
sixty-two
hundred soldiers at
any
given
time,
received the Turkish Armed Forces
Command,
a
brigade
of five thousand
troops
and the first UN unit to train
at the
camp,
on 18 October 1950. Like
any organization,
the UNRC
needed time to
operate
most
efficiently,
but
by
June 1951 it had devel-
oped
into a "smooth
functioning organization."35
31. The
Filipino
soldiers
joined
the 65th U.S.
Infantry Regiment, composed
of
servicemen from the U.S.
territory
of Puerto Rico. Yet rather than
Spanish,
most Fil-
ipino
servicemen
spoke
various native
dialects,
most often
Tagalog.
A few
Filipino
offi-
cers were fluent in
English.
See
Major
William J.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation
During
Combat
Operations" (Military History Section,
Far East
Command, 1952),
52-53,
USAMHI.
Although
the
Philippines
had been a U.S.
colony
until
1946,
and UN
Commander General of the
Army Douglas
MacArthur served in the
archipelago,
American
military planners
seemed to know
very
little about the
Philippine military.
For more on MacArthur and the
Philippines,
see D.
Clayton James,
The Years
of
MacArthur
(Boston,
Mass.:
Houghton
Mifflin
Company, 1970),
1:479-619.
32.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 9,
USAMHI.
33. For documents
relating
to the formation of the
UNRC,
see "Historical
Records,"
8212th
Army Unit, UNRC,
October
1950,
Box
4644,
RG
407,
NARA.
34. Colonel John H.
McGee,
"United Nations
Talk,"
November
1950,
"Activities
of the
UNRC,"
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
4644,
RG
407,
NARA.
By
the time the Colom-
bia Battalion arrived at the UN
training facility,
Lieutenant Colonel
Wesley
C. Wilson
had
replaced
Colonel McGee as the UNRC commander.
35. The UNRC
processed ground
contributions from
Belgium, Colombia,
Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg,
the
Netherlands, Thailand,
and
Turkey.
The
Colombia Battalion was the last UN unit to
pass through
the UNRC. After the Colom-
Colombian Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
The Colombian advance
party (detached
in
Hawaii)
arrived at the
UNRC,
then located in the rural hamlet of
Toko-ri,
on 3 June
1951,
approximately
two weeks before the main
body
of Colombian service-
men.36
By
that
time,
the team
(two
commissioned officers and two non-
commissioned
officers)
had
already
established liaison with the UN
Command in
Japan;
the
Colombians,
like all UN
contingents,
would
maintain a
permanent presence
in
Tokyo,
the seat of the UN Command
headquarters.37
In Toko-ri with UNRC
staff,
the men
planned nearly
every
detail of the unit's
rigorous,
six-week
training
schedule. The
Colombians also translated U.S. Army instructional literature and
post
signs,
often
by tacking Spanish
translations over
English-language
text.38
To facilitate the
training
of the Colombian
soldiers,
3rd U.S.
Infantry
Division Commander
Major
General Robert H. Soule
dispatched
eleven
Puerto Rican soldiers from the 65th U.S.
Infantry Regiment
to the
UNRC.39 Before the battalion
arrived,
some U.S.
planners anticipated
that the South Americans could not be made
ready
for combat in
just
six
weeks. While career soldiers
comprised
over 50
percent
of the
battalion,
some recruits arrived in Korea with
only
basic
training.
Yet once the
South American
troops arrived,
the UNRC staff found the Colombian sol-
diers
motivated, disciplined, cooperative,
and well trained.
Immediately upon entering
the
reception facility,
the Colombian sol-
diers received immunization shots and drew
supplies.
Like most small
UN
units,
the Colombians arrived in Korea without sufficient arms and
depended
on the UN Command for all of their
supplies, including
weapons,
motor
vehicles,
and communication
equipment;
U.S.
military
officials
encouraged
most UN units to use American
equipment
to stan-
dardize and
simplify quartermaster operations.4"
After
attending
to
sup-
bians moved to the
fighting front,
the
training
center
prepared replacement person-
nel for UN forces.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 11,
USAMHI.
36.
Ibid.,
176.
37. Liaison officers from
larger
countries worked out of their
country's
embassy
in
Japan.
Forces from smaller
states,
like
Colombia,
that did not have embassies in
Japan
linked themselves
directly
to the UN
military headquarters.
"Command
Report,"
June
1951, UNRC,
8212th Army
Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
38. "S-1
Daily Journal,"
3 June
1951,
ibid.
39. One U.S.
soldier,
deemed
"unsatisfactory" by
Colombia Battalion
officers,
returned to the 65th U.S. Infantry
Regiment
soon after
reporting
to the UNRC. "S-1
Daily Journal,"
12 June
1951;
and "Command
Report," UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
40. The UNRC
quartermaster provided
the Colombians with M-1
rifles,
Brown-
ing
Automatic
Rifles,
.30 caliber water-cooled machine
guns,
side
arms,
60- and 81-
mm
mortars,
and 57-mm recoilless rifles. The Colombia Battalion also received
nonlethal
supplies, including
thirty
jeeps,
four
three-quarter-ton trucks,
seventeen
two-and-a-half-ton
trucks, trailers, tents, dog tags,
combat
boots, entrenching
Colombian soldiers
defend
a
ridge
in central
Korea,
10 October 1951.
(Source:
U.S.
Army
Signal Corps, NARA.)
Colombian
Army
in
Korea,
1950-1954
Colombian
troops fire
Ca
.50-ciliber imlchince ujin ctt aIon
elnemyI position,
10 October 1951.
(Source:
U.S. Army
Signall Corps, NAA\.)
ply issues,
the South American
infantrymen began
their formal
training
on 18 June. The
opening phase
involved
weapons instruction,
and as the
weeks
passed
Colombian soldiers moved to
squad, platoon, company,
and battalion exercises. Colombians undertook
daylight
and
nighttime
maneuvers, including
live-fire drills to simulate combat. Because of the
lack of
Spanish-speaking instructors,
UNRC
personnel
often
taught
Colombian officers who then tutored individual Colombian
infantrymen.
While the battalion
prepared
for
combat,
Colombian officers rotated to
the front to
acquaint
themselves with the current
military
situation.41 As
the schedule
progressed,
U.S.
military planners reorganized
the South
American
troops along
the lines of an
Infantry
Battalion
Separate
rather
than a traditional
battalion,
as the
group
had been ordered in Colombia.
Most
importantly,
the
change gave
the battalion more motor
vehicles,
making
it less
dependent
on the
Eighth
U.S.
Army transportation
net-
devices,
and communication
equipment.
"S-4
Daily Journal,"
16-18 June
1951,
UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
41. "Command
Report,"
June
1951,
ibid.
work. This last-minute
adjustment,
born from lessons learned in
Korea,
allowed the Colombian unit more
autonomy
in the field.42
During
their time at the
UNRC,
Colombian soldiers
impressed
U.S.
instructors as
"apt
students of warfare," and the battalion received
high
marks for its
performance
at the center.43 In
fact,
the battalion motto was
"mas
sudor,
menos
sangre,"
or "more
sweat,
less blood."44 After the ini-
tial
training phase, Major
Earl W.
Bihlmeyer reported
that the "status of
training [was]
excellent" and that
"prior training
in U.S.
weapons
has
done much to increase the
proficiency
of these
troops."45
Since
many
Colombians had used U.S.
equipment
since the
opening
of World War
II,
the soldiers
adapted quickly
to conditions in Korea. The UNRC staff did
critique
the battalion's
performance,
criticisms
openly
shared with
Colombia Battalion officers. The
principal problem
centered on the lack
of
aggressive leadership. During
one field
exercise,
for
example,
Colom-
bian commanders
deployed
the entire battalion
against
a
single enemy
platoon. Overly
cautious officers also
hampered platoon deployments
at
the UNRC.
Captain
John E.
Byron
observed that Colombian officers were
"reluctant to make decisions" and
appeared
to "lack confidence in their
judgment
and
ability."46
Since
many
of the Colombian leaders had
trained at U.S. service schools
during
the
1940s, they
were well
acquainted
with U.S. tactics.
Still,
because battalion officers saw the
Korean
campaign
as an
exceptional career-building experience,
some
feared
costly
mistakes that
might
tarnish their
professional standing.
Colombians worked to address the U.S.
criticism;
the
problem
nonethe-
less
persisted
throughout
the war.
None of the U.S. instructors at the UN
training camp questioned
Colombia Battalion morale. Colombian soldiers received
high
marks for
their
cooperative
attitude. In
response
to news of the
opening
of
armistice talks in
July,
for
instance, Colombians,
still at the
UNRC,
expressed
concern that the war would end before
they
would have the
opportunity
to
fight.
Faced with the
prospect
of an armistice before
Colombian
deployment, Corporal Miguel
Contreras told an El
Tiempo
reporter
that he wanted to
fight
communism and
hoped
that the war
might
last
long enough
for him to taste
combat; Corporal
Juvenal Forero
42. An
Infantry
Battalion
Separate
also included more administrative
personnel.
43.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 39,
USAMHI.
44.
Puyana Garcia,
Por la libertad . . . en tierra
extraiia, 131;
and Valencia
Tovar to
author,
16
January
2001.
45. "Command
Report,"
June
1951, UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
46. "Colombia Battalion
Dossier,"
26
July 1951, UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
Captain
Clifford H.
Reynolds
recorded similar
remarks,
con-
cluding
"the
[Colombian]
unit commanders seem
basically
well founded in the
prin-
ciples
of tactics but
lacking
in
troop leadership procedures." Ibid.,
15-27 June 1951.
Colombiani Army
in
Korea,
1950-1954
added that he "believed in the UN and wanted to
fight
for it."47 The
Colombian
Army
was in Korea to learn and
fight,
and
anything
less
would constitute failure. Also, because the Colombia Battalion was a vol-
unteer
force,
individual soldiers were
typically
adventurous and com-
mitted to their
mission,
an
important ingredient
in the unit's
coming
success.48 The concerns of
Corporals
Conteras and Forero
aside,
Colom-
bians would have their chance to
fight,
and as the battalion
prepared
to
move forward to the
front,
UNRC administrators concluded that the unit
was "one of the best to
pass through"
the
facility
and
"comparable"
to
the forces from
Belgium
and the Netherlands.49
Indeed,
Colombians had
comported
themselves well at the
UNRC,
in marked contrast to the
per-
formance of some other small-nation forces.
Among
all the
small-country contingents,
the
Ethiopian
soldiers who
arrived at the UNRC in
May
1951 were the least
prepared
for modern
warfare. Unlike the
Colombians,
the African soldiers had little
experi-
ence with the U.S.
military
before Korea.
Also,
many
Ethiopians
were
mechanically illiterate,
a
major problem
in modern warfare.
Ethiopian
servicemen
struggled
with motorized
vehicles, weapons,
and communi-
cations
gear.
When
they
received M-1
rifles,
for
example,
they
attempted
to burn off the metal
preservatives by placing
the
weapons
in an
open
fire. Three
Ethiopians
were killed and five others wounded as a result of
mishandling
equipment.5" Many
of the
troops
could neither read nor
write,
and fewer
Ethiopian
officers
spoke English
than Addis Ababa
promised.
The men also confronted some racial
problems,
such as when
U.S.
reporters
classified
Ethiopian
servicemen as
"Negroes,"
a label the
Ethiopians vigorously protested. Then,
in contrast to the
disciplined
Colombian
unit,
conflict within the
Ethiopian
ranks caused
problems.
The most serious incident centered on a
plan
hatched
by
several
Ethiopian
riflemen to murder
unpopular
officers. In
spite
of these
prob-
lems,
the
Ethiopians
later earned a
reputation
as brave and resourceful
soldiers,
even if
they
could not read a
map.51
47. El
Tiempo,
5
July
1951.
48.
Galbraith,
"Colombian
Participation
in the Korean
WVar,"
17.
49.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 39,
USAMHI.
50. "S-3
Daily Journal,"
30 June
1951;
and "S-1
Daily Journal,"
2
July 1951,
UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA. In
contrast,
the Colombia Bat-
talion
training
resulted in
only
one minor
injury.
"S-1
Daily Journal,"
18
July 1951,
UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
51.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Co-operations During
Combat
Operations," 31-35,
USAMHI. For
coverage
of
Ethiopian
combat
performance,
see Samuel
Marshall,
Pork
Chop
Hill: The American
Fighting
Man in
Action, Korea, Spring,
1953
(New
York:
William Morrow and
Company, 1956);
and Kimon
Skordiles, Kagnew:
The
Story of
Ethiopian Fighters
in Korea
(Tokyo: Radiopress, 1954).
For
Ethiopian
and Colombian servicemen
alike,
the
completion
of
training
at the
reception
center marked
only
the
beginning
of their war
in Korea. In order to
deploy
small-nation
forces,
U.S.
military planners
decided at the
beginning
of the multinational
campaign
to attach under-
sized UN contributions to
larger
units. As both the executive
agent
for
the
operation
and the
principal military
contributor to the
campaign,
U.S.
military
officials decided to
join
UN detachments with U.S. forces.52
Eighth
U.S.
Army planners,
in
turn,
attached battalion-sized contribu-
tions to U.S.
infantry regiments,
and
larger
forces to U.S. divisions or
corps. Also,
when
possible, foreign
units would remain and
fight
with
their
parent
unit
through the entire conflict. The rationale behind this
move was threefold.
First,
small-nation contributions
simply
lacked the
structure to conduct
operations independent
of a
larger
force. The
Colombian unit needed the infrastructure of a
parent organization
to
sustain itself. American officials also
hoped
to foster
esprit
de
corps
among
diverse forces that would enhance their
fighting spirit. Finally,
operational partnerships
bred
familiarity
between units that eased some
of the natural difficulties
(operational
and
administrative)
of
integrating
multinational
troops.53
In addition to
inserting
UN
ground
contributions into the
Eighth
U.S.
Army,
American officials decided to
spread
UN units across the battle-
front. An even distribution of forces allowed for
greater consistency
in
UN offensive and defensive
capabilities, especially
in cases where small-
nation forces lacked the
proficiency
of their U.S.
counterparts.
American
soldiers would
always
be close at hand to
provide
assistance if
necessary.
In the
field,
U.S.
guidelines encouraged
American commanders to
keep
foreign troops
near the center of the American
line,
sandwiched between
U.S.
infantrymen.
The
Eighth
U.S.
Army
distribution
policy
reduced the
probability
of a communist strike
against
a cluster of non-U.S. units that
might
have diminished the will of a
given country (or
the international
community
as a
whole)
to
prosecute
the war.54
When the Colombia Battalion
completed training
at the
UNRC,
the
24th U.S.
Infantry
Division remained the
only
U.S. division without a for-
eign
unit.
Initially,
the
Pentagon
had
hoped
to
keep
the division exclu-
sively
American in
composition
to
experiment
with tactical innovations.
Yet the
political
value of
spreading
small-nation forces across the front
outweighed
the need for a
homogenous
U.S.
unit,
and the
Eighth
U.S.
Army commander,
Lieutenant General James A. Van
Fleet,
ordered the
52.
By
1953 the
Republic
of Korea fielded
590,000 troops.
That same
year,
the
total number of U.S.
troops
in Korea
topped 300,000.
53.
Benjamin
Franklin
Cooling,
"Allied
Interoperability
in the Korean
War," 12,
USAMHI.
54.
Ibid.,
12-13.
Colombian Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
Colombia Battalion to
join
that division.5" After the transfer to the 24th
U.S.
Infantry Division, Major
General Blackshear M.
Bryan
attached the
Colombian soldiers to the 21st U.S.
Infantry
Regiment,
a decision made
easy by
the fact that Colonel Ginds
Perez,
the
regimental
commander
and an officer with a
reputation
as an
outstanding
combat
leader, spoke
fluent
Spanish.s6
Ready
for action and with a
parent
unit
waiting,
the Colombia Bat-
talion moved to the
fighting
front. With
staggered departures
between 27
and 30
July 1951,
the Colombians traveled north aboard
trucks;
the U.S.
Army
Quartermaster
Corps shipped
most of the unit's
equipment
via the
South Korean
railway.57 Captain
Valencia Tovar rode with one of the
three motorized caravans as it snaked toward the battlefront. Years
later,
he remembered the
sights
and sounds of Korea's wartime
suffering,
mak-
ing special
note of the debris-littered streets of
Seoul,
a
city
then
ravaged
by
war.58 From the South Korean
capital, Captain
Valencia Tovar and the
Colombians
passed through
Chunchon to the northwest and entered the
Hwachon
Valley
near the center of the Korean
peninsula.
The soldiers
moved into the 21st U.S.
Infantry
Regiment
area on 1
August
1951.
Nearly
thirteen months after the
fight began,
the Colombia Battalion
stood on the Cold War's frontline."5
Advancing
the
Line,
1951
The Colombian
troops joined
the 21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment
as the
dramatic ebb and flow of the land war neared its conclusion. In
April
1951 the UN Command halted the Chinese
spring offensive,
a
costly
task
55. The natural location for the Colombia
troops
would have been the Puerto
Rican
regiment
of the 3rd U.S.
Infantry Division,
but
Eighth
U.S. Army
planners
had
already
attached the
Philippine
Battalion to the 65th U.S.
Infantry
Regiment.
Cool-
ing,
"Allied
Interoperability
in the Korean
War," 12-13;
and
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Coop-
eration
During
Combat
Operations," 52, USAMhIII.
56.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 55,
USAMHI.
Eighth
U.S.
Army
officials had taken this decision
prior
to the Colombia Battalion's
arrival. Colombian tactical observation teams traveled to the front while the main
body
of Colombian
troops
trained at the UNRC. The Colombians familiarized them-
selves with the 21st U.S. Infantry
Regiment during
those visits.
Also,
21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment
officers traveled to the UNRC to learn more about the Colombia
Battalion. The 24th U.S. Infantry Division's G-3 had
spent
some time with the U.S.
military
mission in Colombia
during
World War
II; he, too,
visited the Colombian sol-
diers at the UNRC. "S-1
Daily Journal,"
30 June
1951;
and "Command
Report," July
1951, UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
57. "S-1
Daily Journal,"
27-30
July 1951, UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
58. Valencia
Tovar,
Testimonio de una
epoca,
161.
59. Valencia
Tovar,
Corea,"
176-78.
that
brought
the destruction of the 1st Battalion of the British Glouces-
ter
Regiment.
A limited
Eighth
U.S.
Army
counteroffensive
subsequently
cleared most communist units from South
Korea,
and
representatives
from the two sides
began negotiating
an armistice
agreement
on 10
July.
The main UN line of
resistance,
Line
Kansas, began
near the mouth of
the
Imijin
River on the Yellow Sea and ran northeast to the
thirty-eighth
parallel.
The front then turned east toward the Hwachon Reservoir and
the South Taeback Mountains. From
there,
Kansas knifed northeast
through rugged
terrain to the Sea of
Japan, approximately twenty-five
miles north of the
boundary
that
separated
North and South Korea
before the war. Near the center of the
line,
a series of UN
outposts
known
as Line
Wyoming
arched northward to the "Iron
Triangle"
before
loop-
ing
back to Kansas near the Hwachon Reservoir's west bank.60 From
these
positions,
the Korean War
developed
into a
string
of limited
ground
operations designed
to
strengthen
defensive
positions
and inflict casual-
ties on the
enemy
while
negotiators
worked to end the conflict.
Near the center of the UN
line,
immediately
moved into
regimental
reserve near the Hwachon Reservoir.
There,
the
troops
rehearsed for combat and made final
preparations.
From its
par-
ent
unit,
the battalion received
interpreters,
radio
operators, telephone
switchboard
personnel,
and a liaison officer. To coordinate
artillery sup-
port,
Colonel Perez also
dispatched
a forward observation team that
included an
officer,
radio
operator,
and driver. As the Colombia Battalion
incorporated
these new
elements, Captain
Valencia Tovar led soldiers in
the
republic's
first
ground
combat of the Korean
War,
a raid on a com-
munist
outpost.61
At noon on 6
August
1951 one
company
of Colombian riflemen under
the
captain's
command left the battalion
camp,
ordered forward
by
Colonel Perez to test
enemy
defenses in
anticipation
of a
larger
UN offen-
sive. The Colombian
unit, composed
of one
platoon
from each of the bat-
talion's four
companies,
reached the forward U.S.
position
around 12:30
A.M. That
night,
as Valencia Tovar reviewed his
plans
and the soldiers
waited for
daylight,
Chinese forces crashed
against
the UN
line, providing
the men with their first
exposure
to the
"screams, fire, explosions
... and
cornets" of Korean War combat.62 The Colombian
company helped
beat
back the
attack, suffering
its first
casualty
of the war.
Then,
around
day-
break,
three Colombian
platoons
started toward the
opposing
line. Three
60. Walter G.
Hermes,
Truce Tent and
Fighting
Front
(Washington:
Office of the
Chief of
Military History, 1966),
74.
61. El
Tiempo,
12 October
1951;
and
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 75, 104,
USAMHI. The Colombians channeled
requests
for air
support
via radio
directly
to
Eighth
U.S.
Army headquarters.
62. Valencia
Tovar,
Testimonio de una
epoca,
163-64.
Colombican Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
hundred meters
beyond
the UN
trenches,
Lieutenant Rafael Serrano
G6mez's
platoon
encountered
heavy grenade
and small arms fire from
communists
perched atop
an
adjacent hilltop. Captain
Valencia Tovar
quickly
moved forward with the
company's
reserve. Two Colombian sol-
diers hurled
grenades into a bunker that sheltered
enemy spotters.
The
explosion ripped through
the
dugout, killing
the Chinese
soldiers,
effec-
tively blinding
communist mortar fire. The Colombians then
yelled
"Viva
Colombia" and
charged
the CPV trenches. Fire
enveloped
the riflemen as
they pressed up
the
slope,
but
by
8:10 A.M. the soldiers had seized the
communist
position;
eleven Colombians suffered wounds
during
the
charge.63 Shortly
after the
victory,
a Colombian radio
operator
received a
message,
in
English,
from
regimental headquarters.
Valencia Tovar sub-
sequently
ordered the
group
to move back to Line
Wyoming.
Concurrent
with Valencia Tovar's
attack,
the
platoon
under Lieutenant Bernardo
Lema Henao's command
captured
the battalion's first communist
pris-
oner of the war.64
Safely
behind the UN
line, Captain
Valencia Tovar and
Lieutenant Lema Henao correlated information
concerning
the Chinese
forces
they
had encountered and forwarded that
information, along
with
the
prisoner,
to
Colombian war
correspondents
proudly relayed
news of the unit's success to South America.65
Eighth
U.S.
Army planners
used the information
gathered by
the
Colombian
patrol
to
help plan
a
larger
UN offensive. General Van Fleet
sought
to
improve
the overall
disposition
of UN defenses
by capturing
a
series of dominant
geographic
features. American officers also
hoped
that a limited offensive would
provide
more
complete
information on the
preparedness
of communist
forces,
and
help
the UN
army regain
its
fight-
ing
edge
after a
period
of relative
inactivity. Beginning
in the
east,
UN
forces moved forward to seize the Punchbowl's northern
rim,
a
struggle
that involved
engagements
on
Bloody
and Heartbreak
ridges.
In the
west,
Operation
Commando advanced the UN line forward ten
miles, clearing
communist
artillery
from within
striking
distance of the
strategic
Ch'or-
won-Kumhwa railroad. In the
center,
the U.S. IX
Corps,
including
the
24th U.S.
Infantry
Division and the Colombia
Battalion, pressed
north-
ward toward
Kumsong.
Between 30
September
and 2 October Colombian
infantrymen
weeded out
pockets
of Chinese resistance around UN
outposts
on Line
Wyoming.
The chore entailed
significant hazards,
and three Colombian
soldiers died
overrunning
one communist
position.66
Even when not
63.
Ibid.,
178.
64. "Command
Report," August 1951,
21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
24th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3671,
RG
407,
NARA.
65. El
Tiempo,
3
September
1951 and 18
September
1951.
66. Jamin Duran
Pombo, "Sayamg-ni," 20,
in
Vigesimo
Colombia,
19-23.
under direct
enemy fire,
the Colombians faced
danger,
as
graphically
real-
ized when a
booby trap
mutilated one Colombian soldier.67 After
securing
the UN
line,
the battalion moved forward for
Operation Nomadic,
the U.S.
IX
Corps'
drive on
Kumsong.
On 5
October,
as the unit
prepared
for the
offensive,
the
Commanding
General of the Colombian Armed
Forces,
Gustavo
Rojas Pinilla,
visited the
troops. During
his
inspection
of the bat-
talion,
General
Rojas (later president
of
Colombia)
wished the
troops
suc-
cess, inspiring many
on the eve of their
biggest operation
to date.68 In
conjunction
with the 1st and 3rd U.S.
Infantry Battalions,
21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
the Colombians were
ready
to attack the communist
troops
on Hill
561, just
south of the
Kumsong
River.69
The Colombia Battalion
surged
forward at 5:00 A.M. on 13 October.
Colonel Polania
Puyo
committed two
companies
to the attack. At
first,
the men made
good progress,
but around 10:30 A.M. severe
enemy
machine
gun
and mortar fire
stopped
the advance. The Colombian com-
mander
immediately requested artillery fire,
and
shortly
thereafter a
battery
of 105-mm howitzers
pounded
the communist
positions.
Polania
Puyo
then sent one
company
around the communist
flank,
and at 2:15
P.M. the South Americans
lunged
toward the hill from two directions.
After two hours of
tough fighting,
the Colombians
captured
the
objec-
tive.70 That same
day,
the American
infantry
battalions took
adjacent
ground, moving
the UN line to a
point
four miles south of
Kumsong.
Anticipating
a communist
counterattack,
Colombian and U.S. soldiers
immediately
fortified their new
posts.
The Chinese failed to break the
Colombian-American line that
night.71
Pleased with the
disposition
of his force
following
the 13 October
push,
IX
Corps
Commander Lieutenant General William M.
Hoge
decided to
press
the attack. A few
days
after the action on Hill
561,
Colonel Polania
Puyo
received orders for a second advance.
Regimental
planners
asked the battalion to
capture
three
protruding
landmarks on
Hill
552, designated points X, Y,
and Z. American officers
planned
to
incorporate
the
captured positions
into an
outpost
line of resistance that
would reach to within two miles of
Kumsong.
On 20 October the Colom-
bians moved
against
the first
objective, yet
failed to
capture
the
position
by nightfall. Although
a well-entrenched
company
of Chinese soldiers
defended the
hill,
the 21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment
commander con-
cluded that the
"enemy
resistance did not warrant the slow
progress
of
67. "Command
Report," September 1951,
21st U.S. Infantry Regiment,
24th
U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3672,
RG
407,
NARA.
68. Valencia
Tovar,
Corea,"
181-82.
69. "Command
Report,"
October
1951,
21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
24th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3673,
RG
407,
NARA.
70. Ibid.
71. El
Tiempo,
19 October 1951.
Colombian Army
in
Korea,
1950-1954
the
[Colombia]
battalion."72
Fearing
heavy casualties,
cautious Colom-
bian officers failed to
press
the
assault,
a
problem
that had first surfaced
at the UNRC. Unable to move
forward,
Colombian soldiers entrenched
on the hillside and
organized
a defensive
perimeter.
The Colombians
resumed the attack at first
light
on 21 October. Two rifle
companies
moved forward at a modest
pace,
slowed
by
communist mortar and
machine
gun
fire.
Then,
at 1:40 P.M. Colonel Polania
Puyo
radioed Perez
with news that the Colombians had
finally
secured landmark X. Imme-
diately afterward,
UN air forces
pounded
the battalion's second
objective.
On the heels of the air
strike,
one Colombian rifle
company
secured
point
Y
against light enemy resistance;
Colombian
infantrymen captured
their final
objective
on 22 October.73 Concurrent with the South Ameri-
can
advance,
U.S. forces on both flanks moved their sectors of the bat-
tlefront forward.
Colombian
infantrymen
dueled with communist
troops
in the
days
after
capturing
Hill 552.74 The most serious
challenge
to the new Colom-
bian
outpost
unfolded on 8 November when the Communist Chinese
launched a full-scale attack on the Colombia Battalion's forward-most
company.
The communist drive
dislodged
the Colombians from the
trenches,
and at 2:30 A.M. Colonel Polania
Puyo,
concerned that the
troops
would be
isolated,
ordered his men back to the main line of resis-
tance.
Approximately thirty
minutes later Lieutenant Fransisco Caicedo
Montua led the
endangered
men back to the battalion's main
body.
Immediately thereafter,
U.S.
artillery
and air forces attacked the con-
tested
position. Then,
at 6:30
A.M.,
two Colombian
companies, together
with one
platoon
of American
self-propelled quad
.50 caliber machine
guns,
counterattacked. Lieutenants Caicedo Montua and Rauil Martinez
Espinosa provided
outstanding
small unit
leadership
during
the
fight,
and Colombian soldiers soon
reoccupied
the
outpost.75
After the
action,
Colonel Perez moved the Colombia Battalion into
regimental reserve,
where the Colombians remained until December.76
Back on the front line on Christmas
Day,
the South Americans received
72. "Command
Report,"
October
1951,
21st U.S.
Infantry
Regiment,
24th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3673,
RG
407, NARA;
and Valencia
Tovar,
"Colombia en la
Guerra de
Corea,"
86.
73. "Command
Report,"
October
1951,
21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
24th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3673,
RG
407, NARA;
and El
Tiempo,
8 November 1951.
74. An
incoming
round wounded the battalion commander on 23
October;
Colonel Ruiz assumed command until Polania Puyo recovered.
Ruiz,
Ensenianzas de
la
campana
de
Corea,
150.
75. "Command
Report,"
November
1951,
21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
24th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3674,
RG
407, NARA;
and Valencia
Tovar,
"Colombia en la
Guerra de
Corea,"
189.
76. "Command
Report,"
December
1951,
21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
24th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3675,
RG
407,
NARA.
B1RA)I,EY LYNN COIEMAN
Headquarters Company
assembles
for
inspection
behind the
fighting front,
1951.
(Source:
U.S. Information
Service, NARA.)
a
special Spanish-language holiday greeting
from the
opposing
CPV
forces. The
booming
Chinese
loudspeakers
marked the successful com-
pletion
of the Colombia Battalion's 1951
campaign. During
that
year,
Colombia and the United States had transformed a
hemispheric part-
nership
into a combat alliance. In
doing so,
the Colombian soldiers
demonstrated their
aptitude
for
war,
at the UNRC and
during
the Kum-
song
offensive.
Although just
a small unit embedded in a
larger force,
the
Colombian Battalion contributed in
proportion
to its size. The 21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
in
particular,
benefited from Colombia's
involvement,
acquiring
a
capable
fourth
battalion, improving
the
regiment's
overall
effectiveness in combat. Colombian officers
might
have been more
aggressive, especially during
the first
day
on Hill
561,
but the battalion's
overall
performance
had been
very good.
received the Presidential Unit Citation for its
performance
during
Oper-
ation
Nomadic;
U.S. officers also decorated several individual Colombian
1160 *
TIE .lOURNAL OF
Colombian Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
Private Jose Puentes
(center foreground)
distributes letters to
fellow
Colom-
bian
soldiers,
1951.
(Source:
U. S. Information
Agency, NARA.)
soldiers.77 The
impressive beginning gave
the unit confidence as it
moved forward into
1952,
a
year
that would
challenge
the Colombians in
new
ways,
on a different
part
of the UN line.
The
Rhythm
of Life in the
Trenches,
1952
In 1952 the Korean War
slipped
into a
period
of
protracted
stale-
mate. As armistice
negotiations sputtered forward,
both sides
proved
unwilling
to undertake
major
offensive action. At the
beginning
of this
new
phase,
American authorities transferred the 24th U.S.
Infantry
Divi-
sion to
Japan.
With its
parent
unit
leaving Korea,
moved west to
join
the 31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry
77.
By
the end of the
war,
Colombians received
twenty-five
Bronze Stars with
Valor,
nine Bronze
Stars, eighteen
Silver
Stars,
and two Presidential Unit Citations
(one
from the United States and one from South
Korea).
Valencia
Tovar,
"Colombia
en la Guerra de
Corea,"
201.
MILITARY IIISTORY * 1161
Division. The last
group
of South Americans arrived at their
post
on 28
January.
As a
part
of the new
arrangement,
one Colombian officer served
the
regimental
commander as an active staff
member,
a move calculated
to
improve
the
integration
of the two units. On the far
right
of the UN
Command's westernmost
sector,
the Colombian
troops occupied
a line of
interlocking
defenses that demanded of each man faith in
himself,
his
equipment,
fellow
soldiers,
and
adjoining
units.78
spent
1952
rotating
between the front lines
and
regimental
reserve.79 When in the
trenches,
Colombian
infantrymen
occupied
a defensive network reminiscent of the First World War. A
series of fortified
bunkers,
each burrowed
deep
into the
earth,
domi-
nated the line. Soldiers used
heavy logs, sandbags,
and loose earth to
harden the
dugouts
where
they peered
above
ground.
A few bunkers
served
exclusively
as
living quarters,
but most were both
firing position
and residence. An elaborate network of
trenches,
chiseled across the
front,
connected the shelters and allowed soldiers to move between
posts
without
being exposed
to communist
snipers.
In addition to
providing
passage,
the trenches also concealed mortar and machine
gun emplace-
ments,
as well as
firing
stations for individual
riflemen.8"
The men in the trenches held the line
against
communist attacks.
They
also conducted
frequent patrols
into the wasteland between UN
and communist lines to test
enemy defenses,
gather
intelligence,
and
ambush communist sorties.81
Depending
on the
objective,
Colombian
soldiers went forward
during daylight
or after dark. The Colombia Bat-
talion
typically dispatched
one
patrol per day,
and on a
rotating
basis
each individual rifleman
participated
in one mission
per
week.82 On the
line,
Colombian soldiers manned
firing positions,
cleaned
weapons,
and
monitored communist movement from observation
posts.
They
also
hunted rodents and maintained the
physical integrity
of the line.
Daily
author,
14
January 2001;
"Command
Report," January
1952,
31st U.S.
Infantry Division,
7th U.S. Infantry
Division,
Box
3331,
RG
407,
NARA;
and
Torres,
Colombia en la Guerra de Corea,
107-8. The 7th U.S. Infantry
Division had
distinguished
itself
spearheading
the Allied return to Leyte
in October
1944 and
during
the
September
1950 Inchon landing.
Seventh U.S.
Infantry
Division
Historical
Section, Bayonet:
A
History of
the 7th
Infantry
Division
(Tokyo: Toppan
Printing Company, 1952),
8-9.
79. Seventh U.S.
Infantry
Division Historical
Section, Bayonet,
27-28.
80.
Hermes,
Truce Tent and
Fighting Front, 370-71; Sergeant
Pablo
Torres,
who
served in the UN
trenches,
concluded that the entire
network,
etched between
artillery
craters and shattered tree
stumps,
embodied
tragedy
and death.
Torres,
Colombia en la Guerra de
Corea, 107-8,
111.
81. El
Tiempo,
21
January
1952.
82. "Command
Report," May 1952,
31st U.S. Infantry
Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3337,
RG
407, NARA;
and
Hermes,
Truce Tent and
Fighting
Front,
112-14.
Colombian Army
in
Korea,
1950-1954
communist
artillery
and mortar fire
damaged
the bunkers and
trenches.83
Exploding
shells
ripped gashes
in the barbed wire that
guarded
the
approaches
to the line.
Beyond enemy fire,
the weather cre-
ated some
problems,
as when
heavy
summer rain eroded
parapets
and
triggered
mudslides.84 In
attending
to their
portion
of the UN
line,
Colonel
Moses,
31st U.S.
Infantry
Regiment Commander, observed,
the
Colombians
excelled, wanting
both to master the
techniques
of modern
warfare and to
represent
their
country
with honor.85
The uncomfortable life in the trenches strained the morale of even
the best soldiers.
Night patrols
and a
demanding daytime
work schedule
left little time for
sleep.
When the moment for rest did
arrive,
soldiers
slept
on the
ground
or beds fashioned from
logs,
metal
scraps,
and sur-
plus telephone
wire. Inside the
dugouts, potbellied
stoves
provided
heat
on cold
nights;
there was little relief from summertime heat. As circum-
stances
allowed,
Colombia Battalion vehicles or Korean Service
Corps
porters
delivered a warm breakfast and
supper
to the frontline
troops.
Infantrymen
ate
prepackaged
rations for their noontime meal.86 Like all
wars, the Korean conflict
provided
few
opportunities
for
proper
attention
to
personal hygiene
on the front. Each rifleman came off the line for a
shower
just
once a week. A short time after the
bath,
soldiers were
again
covered in dirt. While the lack of
enemy
air
power
made life in the
trenches less
dangerous
than it
might
have
been,
combat
patrols,
fre-
quent
communist
raids,
and
incoming artillery
fire made life hazardous.
When not on the front
line,
the Colombia Battalion sat in
regimen-
tal
reserve, typically
for a
period
of two weeks. Colombian soldiers
undertook
any
one of a number of diverse tasks while in the rear area.
83.
Hermes,
Truce Tent and
Fighting
Front,
373.
84. Nineteen inches of rain fell in July 1952 alone. "Command
Report,"
July
1952,
31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S. Infantry
Division,
Box
3341,
RG
407,
NARA.
85. Moses noted in a 7
February
1971 interview with Daniel Davison:
"They
[Colombians]
would
always
feel that they were
learning
from
experiences
as well as
from the more senior and
experienced personnel,
whether
they
were Colombians or
Americans,
and
they always
felt that it was a
privilege
to learn how to do
everything
right, preferably
the first time. As a
result,
most of their work was of
good quality.
The
firing positions
of
weapons
were so carefully selected that it would be difficult to find
fault with the fields of final defensive
fire,
defensive
lines, supporting fires, cross-fires,
routes to switch
positions,
routes to first-aid
stations,
routes to water
points,
routes
to the command
posts,
lateral
routes, they
were so
carefully
laid out that
they
served
as a model in the 31st Infantry and we oftentimes would have a
meeting
in one area
to show how
something
should be
done,
and I think the Colombian Battalion was vis-
ited for this
purpose
more than
any
of the U.S. battalions and some
regiments."
Inter-
view in
Davison,
"The Colombian
Army
in
Korea,"
52.
86. Colombian
troops
consumed the same rations as U.S.
Army troops.
The UN
Command
quartermaster occasionally
served ethnic meals to UN combat forces.
First and
foremost,
the Colombian riflemen stood
ready
to
support
front-
line units. The battalion
occasionally
conducted
company-size
raids
against
communist
outposts,
such as the 21 June 1952 action
against
Hill
400.
Weapons
seminars
together
with
squad, platoon, company,
and bat-
talion
training
exercises maintained the unit's combat readiness
during
periods
of
inaction;
Colombian
troops
still found some moments to rest
and relax. The unit also used its time in the rear to absorb
replacement
personnel.
The Colombia Battalion received the first batch of
replace-
ments in
February
1952. The fresh
troops
took the
place
of Colombian
soldiers killed or wounded in
action,
and allowed other servicemen to
return to South America.87
The Colombian
Army personnel policy, nearly
identical to the U.S.
model, provided
for the
periodic replacement
of
infantrymen. Rotating
soldiers
through
the
battalion,
the
procedure
limited the combat service
of
any
individual serviceman while
maintaining
a core of seasoned
troops
in the field. To administer the
process,
the Colombian
Army
established a
training
and
replacement facility
at the Colombian
Infantry
School in
August
1951. American advisers in Colombia worked
closely
with their Colombian
colleagues
to
prepare
and administer the
center,
and much of the
equipment
used for
training replacement troops
came
from the U.S. arsenal in the Canal Zone. Under the command of
Major
Guillermo Pinz6n
Caicedo,
the
faculty
created courses based
upon
wartime
experiences
that both
prepared
soldiers for service in Korea and
improved
the
army's
overall
approach
to
military
instruction.88
Also,
since
by
late 1952 the Colombian
Army
no
longer produced enough
vol-
unteers to fill the
battalion,
the Colombian
Infantry
School
faculty
taught
soldiers about the
importance
of the UN
fight
in
Korea,
critical for
the morale of the
fighting
men. On the
peninsula,
the new
troops
refined
their abilities at the UNRC before
moving
to the
fighting
front.89 The size
of
any given replacement group fluctuated,
but
usually
numbered around
200 officers and
men,
or 20
percent
of the total
strength
of the
infantry
battalion. The
single
exception
to the measured
replacement
of frontline
troops
occurred in
mid-1952,
when three
contingents
arrived
during
a
two-week
period
with the effect of
replacing nearly
50
percent
of the
unit's
personnel. By
the time the battalion left Korea in
1954, 4,314
87.
Ruiz,
El Batall6n Colombia en
Corea, 1951-1954, 9;
and El
Tiempo,
18 Feb-
ruary
1952 and 21
February
1952.
88. Valencia
Tovar,
Corea,"
191-93.
89. For
training
of Colombian
replacements
at
UNRC,
see "Command
Report,"
January 1952;
and
"Training
Schedule Colombia Battalion
Replacements," UNRC,
8212th
Army Unit,
Box
5826,
RG
407,
NARA.
Although
the initial
group
of Colom-
bian
infantrymen
were almost
wholly volunteers,
as the war
progressed conscripts
conprised
an
increasing
number of the enlisted
personnel.
1164 * THE JOTRNAL OF
Colombian Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
Colombian
soldiers,
or
approximately
21
percent
of all Colombian
Army
personnel,
had served on the Korean
peninsula.9"
The Colombian
Army
rotation
procedure
contributed to its consis-
tent readiness in Korea. Since each UN force determined its own
per-
sonnel
policies, replacement programs
varied between
units,
and
partially
accounted for the uneven
performance
of some other small-
nation forces.
Ethiopian
and Thai
officials,
for
example, replaced
their
entire battalions
every
twelve months. This move forced U.S. instructors
to undertake the wholesale
retraining
of these
country
units before rein-
tegrating
them into the
larger
UN Command. The attendant
delays
diminished
Ethiopian
and Thai combat
efficiency
until the new soldiers
acquired
combat skills and
experience.
In the case of the Thailand Bat-
talion,
American officers
complained
that "their
complete unfamiliarity
with U.S.
military organization,
method and
weapons" continuously
taxed American instructors
trying
to
prepare
Thai soldiers for combat.91
Even the five-thousand-man Turkish
Brigade,
which removed
nearly
two
thousand soldiers from the line
every
four
months, struggled
to maintain
its
proficiency
while
incorporating
fresh
troops.92
Small-country
forces
that used
American-style
rotation
programs generally
avoided these dif-
ficulties.93
Although
a
large
number of Colombian Army
personnel passed
through Korea, discipline
within the battalion's ranks did not become a
problem.
The UN Command did not have
legal power
over international
units,
so the
responsibility
for
policing
each UN detachment fell to that
unit's commander.94
Although
the battalion
occasionally
called on the
U.S.
military
to deal with issues
relating
to Korean
citizens,
Colombian
officers
policed
their own men with
good
results. The Colombia Battal-
ion
experienced
the normal
problems
associated with
military organiza-
tions, including
several counts of
theft, fighting,
and insubordination. To
the embarrassment of Colombian
commanders,
one officer even
involved himself in a
Tokyo
bar
fight.
When infractions
occurred, pun-
ishment often
proved
severe. A Colombian
military
court sentenced one
soldier to twenty-four months in a
military
prison
for what
appears
to
have been no more than
petty
theft. After
reaching
the
judgment,
90.
Ruiz,
El Batallon Colombia en Corea,
1951-1954,
67-148.
91.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 66,
USAMHI.
92. For more on the Turkish
Army
in
Korea,
see General Staff History
Division,
The Battles
of
the Turkish Armed Forces in the Korean
War,
1950-1953
(Istanbul:
Turkish General
Staff, 1975).
93.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 63, 128-29,
132-33,
USAMHI.
94. UNRC staff addressed issues
relating
to
disciplinary procedures. See,
for
example,
"S-1
Daily Journal,"
18 June
1951, UNRC,
8212th Army
Unit,
Box
5002,
RG
407,
NARA.
Colombian officers
promptly
returned the
offending
soldier to South
America to serve his time. For smaller infractions,
Colombian officials
made use of U.S.
military
stockades in the western Pacific. These
pre-
dictable
disciplinary problems aside,
Colombians maintained a
superb
overall record of conduct in
Korea,
which
improved
their combat
per-
formance. On this count, some other
small-country
units
struggled;
for
example,
American officials believed that the
Philippine
Battalion's lack
of
discipline
hurt its combat
efficiency, observing
that the unit took
"fewer
precautions"
in combat than
desired, resulting
in heavier than
usual casualties.95 Americans also noted a "siesta
complex" among
Philippine
soldiers that "caused U.S. officers anxious moments
during
battle."96 The Colombia Battalion was not the most
disciplined
UN force
in
Korea;
the Turkish
Brigade
earned that
distinction,
in
part
through
its
use of
corporal punishment. Still,
the 31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment
com-
mander found the Colombian
infantry
unit obedient and
orderly.97
While
discipline
within
small-country
units
varied,
all relied on the
network of U.S. medical
expertise
in the western Pacific.98
Although
the
Colombia Battalion arrived in Korea with its own
medics,
its first aid
spe-
cialists
plugged
into a
larger
UN medical
system.
American doctors and
dentists often examined and treated routine ailments. When a Colom-
bian soldier was
seriously wounded,
medics evacuated the serviceman to
a Mobile
Army Surgical Hospital;
once
stabilized,
Colombian soldiers
then
proceeded
to a
permanent
U.S. medical
facility
before either
rejoin-
ing
the battalion or
returning
to Colombia. The American Graves
Regis-
tration Service
(AGRS),
U.S.
Army Quartermaster Corps,
handled the
remains of deceased Colombians. Each UN force
disposed
of its war dead
through
the U.S.
Army.
The UN Command allowed remains to be either
buried in South Korea or
repatriated
to the native
country.
When choos-
ing
interment in
Korea,
the
contributing government
maintained the
option
of
returning
fallen servicemen to their homeland after the war.
Because the
piecemeal repatriations
of human remains
proved costly,
Colombian officials decided to
place
deceased soldiers in the UN Memo-
rial
Cemetery
at
Tanggok,
near Pusan. Graves
registration
workers cre-
mated dead
Colombians, placed
the ash remains in
urns,
and buried the
cylinders.
The AGRS removed the deceased soldiers from the
cemetery
95.
Fox,
"Inter-Allied
Cooperation During
Combat
Operations," 60,
USAMHI.
96. Ibid.
97.
Ruiz,
Ensefianzas de la
campaina
de
Corea, 152; "Request
for Confine-
ment,"
24
September 1953, Country
File
(Colombia, 1953),
Box
16;
and "Witness
Statement," April 1954, Country
File
(Colombia, 1954-1955),
Box
22,
Liaison Sec-
tion, Headquarters
UN
Command,
RG
333,
NARA.
98. The
system
did include some medical units from UN member states.
Colombian Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
Padre
Rafael
Suso holds
servicesfor
Colombia Battalion
personnel
in
Korea,
16
December 1951.
(Source:
U.S. Army
Signal Corps, NARA.)
after the
war,
and the Colombia Battalion carried the remains back to
Colombia in 1954."9
Confronting
the constant
possibility
of
death,
Colombian soldiers
sought ways
to
escape
the
pressures
of war. For the South
Americans,
most of whom were
devoutly Catholic, religious
services assumed
special
importance.
Before
every
combat
operation, regardless
of
size,
Colom-
bian soldiers attended mass that both catered to a serviceman's
specific
spiritual needs,
and
provided
for
greater
unit cohesion
by joining
men in
communion. When circumstances did not allow for the
proper staging
of
services,
the battalion
chaplain
held mass on an altar made of
empty
ammunition crates or
hastily spread
across the hood of a
jeep.
The 31st
U.S.
Infantry
Regiment
commander
expressed
some concern for the
safety
of the soldiers when the entire
battalion,
over one thousand
99. "Disinterment of Remains of UN
Personnel,"
25
September 1951,
Country
File
(Colombia, 1951),
Box
3,
Liaison
Section, IIeadquarters
UN
Command,
RG
333,
NARA;
and "Colombia
Cemetery
Burial
File,"
Box
1,
Allied Personnel
Files,
AGRS
Korean War
Records,
U.S.
Army
Central Identification
Laboratory,
Hawaii.
MILITARY IIISTORY * 1167
troops,
took mass within
range
of communist
artillery. Fortunately
for
the South
Americans,
Chinese
gunners
never struck the
congrega-
tions.
00
Large
outdoor
religious
ceremonies
posed
a risk to servicemen sim-
ilar to United Service
Organization (USO) performances.
Like their
American
colleagues,
Colombian servicemen
enjoyed
USO
programs,
although
U.S. officers observed Colombians to be much better behaved
than American
soldiers.10l
Many
Colombian infantrymen also traveled to
Japan
for rest and
relaxation; nearly
all discovered it a new and inter-
esting place.102
Yet because the
average
Colombian had little
money,
bat-
talion
personnel generally
found the
trip
less
appealing
than did their
U.S.
counterparts.103 Many
Colombian soldiers volunteered to
help
Korean children
displaced by
the
war,
and the unit created a
scholarship
fund to
support
Korean students
studying
in the United States.104 Per-
sonal
correspondence
also
helped
Colombian servicemen
cope
with
their
separation
from loved
ones, maintaining long-distance
relation-
ships
that relieved some wartime
anxiety.1'0
Beyond family
and
friends,
soldiers often
acquired
new
pen pals
once in
Korea; popular
Colombian
magazines regularly published
letters from
soldiers,
men
usually seeking
eligible
Colombian women with whom to
correspond.
Other forms of recreational activities
helped
Colombians deal with
life in Korea. The
infantry
battalion
supported
several
groups
of musi-
cians,
and band contests often ran
deep
into the
night.
To entertain vis-
iting
U.S.
soldiers,
Colombian musicians
quickly
added several American
swing songs
to their
repertoire,
a musical
display
General Van Fleet
described as
"magnificent.""16
The Colombians also "added some
spice
to
the
dreary operations
in Korea"
through
the introduction of "lurid mam-
buco dances."'17 In the area of athletic
competition,
Colombian service-
men
enjoyed baseball, competing
in the 7th U.S.
Infantry
Division
league.
Much to the
chagrin
of their American
competitors,
the Colom-
bians were
outstanding players
and took second
place
in the division's
100.
Davison,
"The Colombian Army in
Korea,"
82.
101.
Ibid.,
87;
and Valencia Tovar to
author,
14
January
2001.
Betty
Grable and
Marilyn
Monroe were
especially popular among
Colombian servicemen.
author,
14
January
2001;
and Puyana
Garcia,
Por la lib-
ertad ... en tierra
extrania,
264-79.
103. Lack of
spending money
also
kept
Colombians from
taking
full
advantage
of the
post exchange, although
the South Americans did
purchase
their share of
Lucky Strike, Camel,
and Chesterfield
cigarettes. Torres,
Corea,
92.
104. New York
Times,
2
July
1952.
105.
Torres,
Corea,
91.
106. New York
Times,
17 November
1951;
Valencia Tovar to
author,
14
January
2001.
107.
Washington Post,
21 October 1951.
Colombian Army
in
Korea,
1950-1954
1952 tournament.108 In the
end,
Colombians found
many
different
ways
to
escape
the demands of life on the
fighting front,
but the
prospect
of
returning
to
family
and friends in Colombia sustained most.109
Life in the trenches with the UN Command tested men from
many
countries. Yet in the face of wartime
hardships,
Colombian soldiers
demonstrated their
proficiency
at
arms,
and a November 1952 U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff
report
concluded that the Colombian soldiers had accu-
mulated an "excellent record" in Korea.11l Forces from Colombia and the
United States had formed a close
operational partnership.
In
fact,
the
31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment
commander believed the bond between U.S.
and Colombian forces was
stronger
than U.S. ties to
any
other small-
nation unit.
Acknowledging
a sense of inter-American
comradeship,
Colonel Moses observed that the close U.S.-Colombian
partnership
"was
not fictitious" and
grew
from "a
feeling"
that the two countries were
"closely
related."111 Another U.S. officer remembered that the Colom-
bians
"just
fit in
really
well" with American soldiers.112 Colombian ser-
vicemen reinforced that observation.
Captain
Valencia
Tovar,
for
example,
found that the two armies "functioned in a
very
harmonious
way."113
Following
the
fight
for
Kumsong,
Colonel Polanfa
Puyo observed,
"we all became soldiers from the same continent and
fighters
for the
common cause."114
By early
1953 the Colombian and U.S. armed forces
were more
closely
connected than at
any point
since
cooperation began
on the eve of World War II. The
forthcoming
action on Old
Baldy
never-
theless tested the Colombian-American alliance.
The Final
Battle,
1953
In March 1953 the Chinese mounted a
major
effort
against
the 31st
U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
a move
designed
to
give
communist officials
leverage
at the
negotiating
table in
Panmunjom.
The
regiment,
then
commanded
by
Colonel William B.
Kern, occupied
a sector of the UN line
108.
Davison,
"The Colombian
Army
in Korea,"
88.
109. Colombian
participation
in the Korean War also caused
hardships
and anx-
ieties for the families of Colombian servicemen. See "Asi son las madres colom-
bianas,"
in
Vigesimo
Colombia,
77-78.
110. "United States
Policy
Toward Inter-American
Military Cooperation,"
1
November
1952,
President's Secretary's
Files, 1945-1953,
"National
Security
Coun-
cil,"
Box
195, Harry
S. Truman
Papers,
Harry
S. Truman
Library, Independence,
Mis-
souri.
111. Moses
Interview,
3
May 1971,
in
Davison,
"The Colombian
Army
in
Korea,"
107.
112. Author's Interview with T. C.
Mataxis,
8
August
2002.
author,
14
January
2001.
114.
Washington Post,
17
January
1954.
that included coveted
outposts
on Pork
Chop
Hill and Old
Baldy.
Colonel
Kern
deployed
three battalions
along
the front that month: the 2nd Bat-
talion stood on the
left,
the Colombia Battalion in the center
(Old Baldy),
and the 3rd Battalion on the
right (Pork Chop Hill).115
Behind these
units,
rifle
companies
from the 1st Battalion assumed
blocking positions.
In the Colombian
area,
Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Ruiz
Novoa,
battal-
ion commander since
July 1952, posted Company
B on Old
Baldy,
with
Companies
A and C in
supporting
areas.116 The 141st and 67th CPV divi-
sions, facing
the UN
line, began
their attack with a tremendous
artillery
bombardment.117 On 20 March
just
a dozen 122-mm
artillery
rounds fell
on the Colombian
outpost.
Two
days later,
the Chinese fired 331 122-
mm
artillery
shells at Old
Baldy;
the rate of
incoming
mortar and small
115. "Command
Report,"
March
1953,
31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry
Division,
Box
3392,
RG
407,
NARA.
116.
Colombia
Infantry Battalion,
12-13 March
1953,
31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Annex
3,
Box
3392,
RG
407,
NARA.
117.
Hermes,
Truce Tent and
Fighting Front,
395.
Colombian Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
arms fire also increased
dramatically.
Colombian
troops responded by
launching 1,500
81-mm mortar rounds at
opposing
units on 22 March
alone.118 The
deadly barrage
killed or wounded several Colombian sol-
diers,
and
severely damaged
bunkers and trenches. On the afternoon of
23
March,
amid this vicious
exchange,
Colonel Ruiz and Colonel Kern
decided to relieve the battered men
atop
Old
Baldy.
The Colombia Bat-
talion commander ordered
Captain
Gustavo Gonzalez's
Company
C
(and
a 1st Battalion rifle
platoon)
forward. The move
required
several hours
to
execute,
time
during
which the
heavy fight
for the hill unfolded.119
Communist
ground
forces first
engaged
Colombia's
Company A,
southeast of Old
Baldy,
at 8:33 P.M. on 23 March. Colombian
riflemen,
commanded
by Captain Augusto Bahamon,
beat back the
attack, leaving
stacks of dead Chinese soldiers in front of their
position. Then, just
after
9:00
P.M.,
a
regiment
of Chinese
infantrymen
swarmed toward the
Colombian
outpost
on Old
Baldy.
Incoming artillery
rounds shattered
Colombian communications
gear,
and the defenders lost contact with
the
With the relief of
Captain
Hernando
Acevedo's
Company
B still
incomplete,
elements of two Colombian
infantry companies, together
with several U.S.
riflemen,
manned the
trenches. In the action that
ensued,
Colombian and U.S.
gunners
cut
down Chinese soldiers
advancing up
the
slope, inflicting heavy
losses on
the
enemy.
At one
point during
the
assault,
a Colombia Battalion
radioman
intercepted
a Chinese
message reporting
Old
Baldy "impossi-
ble" to
capture.120
Committed to success at
any cost,
CPV commanders
threw more
troops
at the Colombians. The defenders
rapidly depleted
their
stockpile
of
ammunition,
and
deadly
communist
artillery
fire on
the narrow
ridge connecting
the
outpost
to the rear crushed men mov-
ing
forward with
supplies.
After two hours of dreadful
fighting,
Chinese
infantrymen
reached the
trenches,
hand-to-hand combat broke
out,
and
communist
troops pushed
the South Americans back. Bloodied Colom-
bian
infantrymen began trickling
off the hill.121
Colonel
Ruiz,
involved in the frontline
fight,
came down from Old
Baldy
around 10:30 P.M. The colonel met First Lieutenant Jack M. Pat-
teson and some American
infantrymen
at a forward command
post.
An
already
chaotic situation became even more confused as the men talked.
118. "Periodic
Operation Report,"
Colombia
Battalion,
20-26 March
1953,
31st
U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry
Division,
Box
3392,
RG
407,
NARA. Com-
munist
shelling
of the 3rd Battalion
position
on Pork
Chop
Hill increased in
propor-
tion with the
barrage
on Old
Baldy.
119. "Command
Report,"
March
1953,
31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Box
3392,
RG
407,
NARA.
author,
14
January
2001.
121. Valencia
Tovar,
Corea," 205;
and
Ruiz,
El Batal-
16n Colombia en Korea, 52-53.
Ruiz held orders to contain the Chinese advance at the base of Old
Baldy;
1st Battalion officers had instructed Patteson to counterattack. In
an awkward
bilingual conversation,
the two officers needed
nearly
one
hour to
clarify
their orders and
prepare
for a
counterstrike,
a
delay
that
gave
Chinese soldiers time to consolidate their hold on Old
Baldy.
At
11:20 P.M. Colonel Ruiz
gathered surrounding
Colombian
soldiers,
took
command of the U.S. rifle
company,
and moved back toward Old
Baldy.
The
group only
reached the first
outpost
bunkers before the
enemy
halted the advance.122 One U.S. soldier who
fought
under Ruiz that
night
remembered
"nothing
but dead Colombians."123
Meanwhile,
Chinese soldiers overran the U.S. defenders on Pork
Chop
Hill. A
speedy
counterattack there encountered
only light
commu-
nist
opposition,
and U.S. forces soon recovered the
position.
The effi-
cient American
response
on Pork
Chop
Hill
actually placed
the
Colombians on Old
Baldy
at a
disadvantage:
the U.S. move
siphoned
men
from the American rifle
company
behind the Colombian
outpost, leaving
Ruiz with
only
a
platoon
for his attack.124 As the Colombian
fight
con-
tinued,
the new 7th U.S.
Infantry
Division
Commander, Major
General
Arthur G.
Trudeau,
arrived at the 31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment
head-
quarters
to take control of the battle.
Shortly
after dawn on 24 March
1953,
Trudeau ordered the Colombians off Old
Baldy,
back to the reserve
area to
regroup
and attend to their losses.125 The 7th U.S.
Infantry
Divi-
sion commander then told the 1st Battalion and 73rd Tank Battalion to
attack the
outpost
from the southwest. First Lieutenant Willard E.
Smith's
Company
B led the assault that made little
headway
against
the
Chinese. Later that
day,
Colonel Kern committed two more
companies
to the
counterattack,
but those men could
only
establish a
precarious
foothold on Old
Baldy.
At 4:30 A.M. on 25 March
Company
C
swung
around the communist flank and
charged
the mountain from the north-
east.
Again,
the Chinese
pinned
down the Americans. A tank detach-
ment moved forward to
help
isolated U.S.
infantrymen escape.
General Trudeau
pulled
his forces back from Old
Baldy
that
night,
clearing
the
way
for U.S.
fighter-bombers.
The
airplanes pounded
the
outpost, disorienting
the Chinese and
allowing
several Colombian ser-
vicemen, trapped
behind
enemy
lines since the first
night,
to
slip
back
to the UN line. As bombs fell on the
enemy,
General Trudeau
designed
a
122. Torres
Almeyda,
Corea, 134-37;
and
Jorge
Rob-
ledo
Pulido,
"Aniversario del Old
Baldy,"
in
Vigesimo
aniversario del Batallon
Colombia,
56-59.
123. General Roscoe
Robinson, Jr.,
U.S.
Army (retired) Interview, by
Lieutenant
Colonel Duane E.
Hardesty,
U.S.
Army
Oral
History Program (1988), 63-66,
USAMHI.
124. "Command
Report,"
March
1953,
31st Infantry
Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantrv
Division,
Box
3392,
RG
407,
NARA.
125. El
Tiempo,
2
April
1953 and 6
April
1953.
1172 * THE JOIURINAL OF
Colombican Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
plan
to
regain
Old
Baldy.
The 2nd
Battalion,
32nd U.S.
Infantry Regi-
ment, began rehearsing
for the assault behind the main line of resis-
tance. To
support
Trudeau's
operation,
occupied
a
position
behind the battlefront on 27
March, ready
to move when
called
upon by
the
general.
But the Americans never launched the
attack. On 30 March UN Commander Lieutenant General Maxwell D.
Taylor
flew to Trudeau's
headquarters
to discuss the situation. In the
course of their
meeting, Taylor
decided to cancel the counteroffensive
because Old
Baldy
"was not essential to the defense of the sector" and
did not warrant further loss of life.126
Although unhappy
with the UN
commander's
decision,
General Trudeau
scrapped
his
operation.
On
paper,
Old
Baldy
became a
permanent
communist
possession.
In
reality,
near-constant U.S.
artillery
fire made it an uninhabitable addition to the
wasteland that
separated
the UN and communist forces.
For the Colombian
military,
the
engagement
on Old
Baldy
demanded
the
greatest
sacrifice of the Korean War. Communist Chinese forces
killed or wounded 143 Colombian soldiers
during
the
battle; enemy
troops
seized
many
others who remained
prisoners
of war until the end
of the conflict.127 American officers estimated that 600 to 800 Chinese
died
during
the battle. In 1953 Colombian and American
journalists
cov-
ering
the battle focused on these
losses,
obscuring
the fact that the bat-
talion lost Old
Baldy.
Over
time,
Colombian writers have also been
uncritical of the unit's
performance.
The debate
surrounding
the Colom-
bia Battalion's
performance
on Old
Baldy
belonged
to the combatants.
After the
war,
the 7th U.S.
Infantry
Division commander blamed
Colonel Ruiz for the defeat. The Colombian Battalion
commander,
Trudeau
remembered,
"was a fine man" vet had "limited combat
experi-
ence" and "the
pressures [of battle]
were
just
too
great."128
Rufz's
"per-
126.
Hermes,
Truce Tent and
Fighting Front,
395. General
Taylor
replaced
Gen-
eral Van Fleet on 11 February 1953. The new commander saw the CPV offensive as a
"face-saving propaganda
maneuver." Aware of President
Dwight
D. Eisenhower's
desire to
keep
U.S. casualties at the lowest
possible level,
Taylor flatly
rejected
Trudeau's
request
for authorization to retake Old
Baldy.
Clay
Blair,
The
Forgotten
War: America in
Korea,
1950-1953
(New
York: Times
Books, 1987), 972;
and Arthur
G.
Trudeau,
"Memoirs"
(February 1986), 201,
Arthur G. Trudeau
Papers,
USAMHI.
127. These numbers include losses
during
the communist
artillery
barrage
that
preceded
the CPV assault. Casualty
figures
drawn from
Colom-
bia
Battalion,
19-23 March
1953,
31st Infantry
Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry Division,
Annex
3;
"Command
Report,"
March
1953,
31st
Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry
Division,
Box
3392,
RG
407, NARA;
and
Ruiz,
El Batallon Colombia en
Korea,
53.
After 23 March 1953 the Colombia Battalion did not submit another
Operational
Report
until it
regrouped
in the
regimental
reserve area three
days
later. See also
Valencia
Tovar,
Corea,"
207.
128.
Trudeau, "Memoirs,"
200-201. See also
"Debriefing Program,
Arthur G.
Trudeau,"
conducted
by
Colonel Calvin I.
Trudeau,
vol.
III, 3-5,
USAMHI.
formance in that
particular episode
was far from
anything
desired."129
Although
Trudeau
acknowledged
that Old
Baldy
was "the most
exposed
spot"
on the division
front,
he later declared that "there was a
question
in
my
mind then as to their
[the
Colombia
Battalion's] ability, frankly,
to
hold this
position
under
any
severe attack."130 The
general
did not
explain
how he formed such
strong
reservations in the mere three
days
he commanded the division before Old
Baldy.
In
retrospect,
Ruiz
(and
Kern)
should not have
replaced
frontline
troops during daylight
hours on
23 March. The
easily
observable move
encouraged
communist forces at
the moment the battalion was least
prepared
for a
major fight.131
Even
Valencia Tovar admitted that the move was "a bad mistake."132
Also,
the
colonel
might
have been more
aggressive
on the
night
of the
fight.
Rather
than
concerning
himself with orders from
Kern,
he could have returned
to the hill with reinforcements
immediately,
a move that
might
have
given
the unit a chance to retake Old
Baldy
before the Chinese
reorga-
nized.
Nevertheless,
General Trudeau lost both Old
Baldy (March 1953)
and Pork
Chop
Hill
(July 1953).
The 7th U.S.
Infantry
Division com-
mander had found a convenient
scapegoat
in Colonel Ruiz.
Rather than the battalion
commander, Captain
Thomas J.
Ferguson
faulted "low level
leadership"
for the defeat at Old
Baldy.133
The U.S.
infantry captain
who
fought
with the Colombia Battalion on the
night
of
23-24 March
praised
individual Colombian
riflemen,
but
suggested
that
company
and
platoon
officers failed to demonstrate the
type
of leader-
ship necessary
to
prevail
in
heavy
combat. In
fact,
most of the
junior
offi-
cers involved in the action had
just
arrived in Korea.
They
were
inexperienced
in combat and unfamiliar with the Old
Baldy
defenses.
struggled
to overcome cautious
leadership
throughout
its time in
Korea,
a
problem
that
began
at the UNRC in 1951.
Timid
leadership
surfaced
again
in March
1953,
but
proved
less
impor-
tant than the
enemy's
determination.
129.
Trudeau, "Memoirs,"
200-201.
130.
Despite
the
general's apparent misgivings,
on 27 March 1953 he
presented
Colonel Ruiz with a bronze star with valor for "his heroism and
passionate
devotion"
to
duty during
the action.
Trudeau, "Memoirs,"
200-201. Valencia
Tovar,
"Colombia
en la Guerra de
Corea,"
207.
131. A U.S.
Army intelligence report suggested
that the Communist Chinese
might
also have
intercepted
31st U.S. Infantry
Regiment
radio
traffic,
which
helped
them coordinate their attack to coincide with the switching
of Colombia's frontline
companies.
Thomas J.
Ferguson,
Korean War
Questionnaire,
31st U.S.
Infantry
Regi-
ment,
7th U.S.
Infantry Division,
USAMHI.
author,
14
January
2004.
133.
Ferguson,
Korean War
Questionnaire,
31st U.S.
Infantry Regiment,
7th U.S.
Infantry Division,
USAMHI.
Colombian
Army in
Korea,
1950-1954
In 1953 Colonel Kern
posited
that the caliber and
preponderance
of
Communist Chinese
forces,
not Colombian
shortcomings,
decided the
outcome on Old
Baldy.
"The
enemy troops,"
he
observed, "proved
to be
the best trained and
disciplined"
the
regiment
"encountered"
during
Korean War
operations.134 During
the entire
action,
the communists out-
numbered and
outgunned
the Colombia Battalion. The CPV concen-
trated on the Colombian
position,
not the U.S.
outpost
on Pork
Chop
Hill. Yet
by
also
hitting
the Americans on 23
March,
the Chinese
swayed
U.S. officers into
pulling
some soldiers out from behind Old
Baldy,
men
who would otherwise have been available for the counterattack that first
night.
As for the
quality
of the
opposing troops, heavy
U.S. counterat-
tacks from 24 March
onward,
like the Colombian
effort,
failed to
displace
the
Chinese,
and the same soldiers who
prevailed
at Old
Baldy
beat the
Americans on Pork
Chop
Hill in
July
1953.
Crediting
communist
forces,
Colonel Kern revealed the
deciding
factor on Old
Baldy.
In
many ways
the 1953 battle resembled another Colombia Battal-
ion
engagement.
In November 1951 Chinese soldiers
pushed
a Colom-
bian rifle
company
from an
outpost
in the 21st U.S.
Infantry Regiment
sector,
much as the communists did at Old
Baldy.
In 1951 the Colom-
bians counterattacked and
recaptured
the
position,
something
the bat-
talion failed to
accomplish
in 1953. The Colombian officers involved in
the 1951
fight,
veterans of the
Kumsong offensive,
demonstrated out-
standing leadership
at all
levels;
the untested officers on Old
Baldy might
have been more assertive. Yet most
importantly,
the
enemy brought
a
vastly superior
force to the field in March
1953,
making
a successful
Colombian
counterpunch
under even the best
leadership improbable.
Still, nearly fifty years
after the
battle,
Valencia Tovar concluded that the
Old
Baldy "episode
stained with blood the battalion's heroic behavior in
the war."'35
The defeat at Old
Baldy
did not overshadow the battalion's excellent
performance
in
Korea,
nor did it influence the conflict's outcome. On 27
July
1953 UN and communist officials ended the Korean War. Colombia
Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ortiz
Torres,
Rufz's
successor, represented
the
republic
at the historic armistice
signing
cer-
emony
in
Panmunjom.
In
August
communist officials released 28
Colombian
prisoners, part
of the
larger exchange
dubbed
Operation Big
Switch.
Although
the
fighting
had
stopped,
remained in
Korea, part
of the UN
contingency
force
guarding
South
134. "Command
Report,"
March
1953,
31st U.S. Infantry
Regiment,
7th
Infantry
Division,
Box
3392,
RG
407,
NARA.
author,
14 January 2001.
Korea,
ready
for
any
reoccurrence of
hostilities.l36
When the unit
finally
returned to Colombia in November
1954,
the
country
celebrated the
army's accomplishments
in Korea with festivities that
surpassed
the bat-
talion's
departure ceremony
three
years
before. The
republic
honored
the 141 Colombian
troops
killed in
Korea,
and remembered the 556
wounded veterans.137 In a
variety
of
events,
U.S.
representatives
stood
alongside
Colombian officials. American
troops
from the Canal Zone
joined
the battalion
during
a 30 November 1954
parade through Bogota,
and the U.S.
embassy sponsored
a
lengthy
radio tribute to Colombia's
Korean War
participation.138
In December a Colombian
newspaperman
wrote that America's
high profile
involvement was "a
symbol
of fraternal
friendship"
between the two countries that foretold future bilateral col-
laboration.'39
The
journalist
identified
just
one of the
lasting legacies
of
Colombia's involvement in the Korean War.
Conclusion
joined
an international coalition in
Korea,
one that
required
the combination of diverse combat units. In order to
make the UN
army
most
effective, military planners
attached small-
country forces,
some
inexperienced
in modern
war,
to
larger
American
entities.
Overall,
the exercise informed future multilateral
military
efforts, including
the UN
campaign
to liberate Kuwait between 1990 and
1991. In
Korea,
the Colombian-American
operational partnership
tapped
into a
larger relationship.
Colombian soldiers
capitalized
on their
preexisting knowledge
of the U.S.
military system
from
training camp
to
battlefield. With this
advantage
over
many
other small UN
units,
the
Colombia Battalion mounted an
impressive
effort in
Korea,
the
only
136. The
period
after the armistice
brought
some drama. In
May
1954 North
Korean soldiers
apprehended
four Colombian
servicemen, including
Colombia Bat-
talion Commander Ortiz Torres. The UN Command
immediately
arranged
for the
release of the
men, part
of an observation team that
strayed
too close to the commu-
nist line. Colonel Polanfa
Puyo
to Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff,
17
August
1954,
Box
32,
U.S.
Army Operations
Decimal
File, 1954,
RG
391, NARA;
and U.S.
Embassy
Seoul to
Secretary
of
State,
12
May
1954, 721.55/5-1254,
Box
3288, Depart-
ment of
State,
Decimal
Files, 1950-1954,
RG
59,
NARA.
137. One hundred
thirty-one
servicemen died in
combat,
ten in wartime acci-
dents,
and two of natural causes. The whereabouts of two soldiers remains unknown.
For a
complete accounting
of the human cost of the
war,
and the names of
every
Colombian soldier who served in
Korea,
see
Ruiz,
El Batallon Colombia en
Corea,
1951-1954,
149-60.
138.
"Participation
of the United States Embassy
in Celebrations
Honoring
the
Returning
Colombia Battalion from
Korea,"
November
1954,
Box
3, Bogotd Embassy,
General
Records, Department
of
State, 1954-1955,
RG
84,
NARA.
139. El
Tiempo,
2 December 1954.
Colombian
Army
in
Korea,
1950-1954
major
setback
being
the one that occurred on Old
Baldy
in 1953. The
successful U.S.-Colombian
fighting
alliance
subsequently
made future
bilateral
undertakings
more
likely. During
the late
1950s,
for
example,
officials from both countries drew
upon
their wartime
experience
to
form Colombia's modern internal
security program.
Colombian and U.S.
veterans were
key agents
of Colombian-American
cooperation. Beyond
bilateral
ventures,
the Colombian
Army
benefited from its work in
Korea. Wartime lessons in
command, communication, fortification,
intelligence, leadership, logistics, tactics,
and
organization
remade the
Colombian armed forces.140 The Colombian
Army's
success in Korea also
increased its domestic
prestige, contributing
to the rise of the 1953 to
1957
military government
that
displaced
President G6mez. On the world
stage,
Colombia
gained
confidence and
prestige
that allowed it to
become a more
important
international actor. The
republic
used its new
status
during
the 1956 Suez
Crisis, forming
the United Nations Emer-
gency Force;
Colombian soldiers left for
Egypt just
two
years
after
returning
from
Korea, beginning
the
republic's long
involvement in Mid-
dle Eastern
peacekeeping.
In these
ways,
the Colombia Battalion's
fight
for South Korea
produced
more than the
country's
first overseas
military
operation.
Colombia's
participation
in the war
shaped
institutions and
relationships
far
beyond
Korea.
140. General Valencia Tovar observes: "The
contemporary history
of the Colom-
bian
Army
can be divided into two
periods,
before and after Korea." Valencia
Tovar,
Testimonio de una
6poca,
167.

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The Colombian Army in Korea, 1950-1954

Author(s): Bradley Lynn Coleman

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